

CHOOSING SIDES ON THE
FRONTIER IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION

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Walter S. Dunn Jr.

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CONTENTS

Preface	vii
1. Introduction	1
2. Land	9
3. The Fur Traders	29
4. The Settlers	45
5. The Native Americans	61
6. The Loyalists	79
7. The British Army	87
8. The Quebec Act, 1774	105
9. Dunmore's War, 1774	113
10. Neutrality, 1775	129
11. Choosing Sides, 1776	147
12. Conclusion	171
Select Bibliography	175
Index	179

PREFACE

Adversity on the frontier has been a matter of personal interest to me for more than seventy years. My grandmother on my mother's side was an orphan from the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and was raised in Paris. She emigrated to America and married a Dutch farmer in Kentucky. Her husband died young, leaving her with five small children. She opened a general store in Lewisport, Kentucky, on the Ohio River and supported her family in that way.

On my father's side, my grandfather was an officer in the British Merchant Marine and was lost at sea in the Bay of Biscay before World War I, leaving my grandmother with two small children. She remarried and had additional children, but her first two sons were never reconciled. One became a merchant seaman and was seldom in England, and the other, my father, emigrated to America.

The settlers on the frontier in the mid-18th century were probably motivated by similar pressures. Only when faced with adversity does one usually cut ties and embark on a dangerous journey. At the same time, those who do make the journey tend to be survivors expecting to be challenged and accepting the risk as part of a better life than they would have had they remained as before. The primary goal of the settlers was to establish a farm that could support their families.

The Native Americans were also facing rapid changes in their life-style. The availability of guns, tools, clothing, and other trade goods made life more pleasant, but the use of rum by the traders wreaked havoc with the young men. As one chief commented, more men die as a result of alcohol than die in battle. The epidemics brought by the Europeans ravaged the villages and upset the normal social customs. In order to keep the peace, the

Native Americans were forced to permit trading to continue, and in order to maintain life in their villages, it was necessary for them to raid the settlements for horses and women.

Adding to the problem was the fierce competition between various factions for control of the fur trade and land. All of the groups jockeyed for the support of the Native Americans.

Many of the secondary sources have downplayed the economic and social issues. The political differences resulted from economic and social changes. The British Army did not threaten the colonists in 1765, nor was there any serious attempt to limit personal freedom. The colonial protests were concerned with British laws that interfered with the balance of trade between the colonies and Britain, with colonial efforts to obtain a share of the fur trade, and western expansion.

This book is based on primary sources. A major source of data is the financial records from the period. The knowledge that Baynton and Wharton sent 5,000 shirts as part of the cargo destined for Illinois provides us with a rough estimate of the number of adult Native American males in the Ohio Valley. Statistics listing exports of fur compared to the quantities of fur in the financial records indicate the shifting control of the fur trade as the French and British merchants in Canada forced New York and Pennsylvania out of the trade. The insignificant quantities of goods destined for settlers on the frontier tell us that there were far fewer settlers than the secondary sources imply.

The secondary sources tend to minimize the presence of women, children, indentured servants, and slaves. Has anyone commented on the fact that George Washington hired two slave lashers to whip the slaves he sent to improve his land around Fort Pitt. Summarizing thousands of notes provided a basis for much of the life-style described in this book.

As a museum curator and director for more than forty years, I had the opportunity to work with every weapon and implement mentioned in the text. I worked with Native Americans in the preparation of exhibits. I received my undergraduate education in the honours school at Durham University in England. The routine included a weekly essay that was subject to a critique by one's tutor in a one-on-one situation for several hours on Saturday morning. My tutor, Hilary Offler, subsequently became chancellor of Durham University. In England I experienced rigid class distinction. My university friends lived a completely different life-style than my relatives in Sunderland. The aristocratic attitude, difficult to describe, was alive and well in the 1950s and helped me comprehend the positions taken by the British government in the 18th century. All of these life experiences helped me understand everyday life on the 18th-century American frontier.

The book never would have been completed without the assistance of my wife, Jean, who edited draft after draft and made many excellent suggestions.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The overriding issue in the colonies in 1765 was the adverse balance of trade with Britain. The correspondence of the merchants in America at that time is filled with references to finding ways to acquire sterling balances in Britain to pay for the imports to the colonies. During the Seven Years' War, Britain had spent large sums of money supporting its army fighting the French in America. This money was used by the Americans to pay for a long list of luxuries that had previously been available only to the rich planters in Virginia who sold tobacco and the planters in the Carolinas who sold rice in Britain. Upon the end of the war the British sharply reduced military expenditures, and finding sterling in America became exceedingly difficult as the balance of trade shifted heavily against the colonists.

One positive result of the Seven Years' War for the colonists was easier access to the Indians and the fur trade. Prior to the war the French made extraordinary efforts to block the colonists from trading with the Indians. The goal of General Edward Braddock's campaign in 1754, which produced Braddock's Road, the first wagon road to the west, and George Washington's sterling performance in his efforts to assist the British troops, was to remove the French fort on the Ohio River that blocked the path of Pennsylvania traders to the west. Prior to that time, the New York fur traders had to await the tribes' arrival at Oswego on the south shore of Lake Ontario each year rather than go to the Indian villages to trade. With the defeat of the French, the Ohio River and Great Lakes routes were opened to the Pennsylvania and New York merchants and greater trade with the tribes. Furs and deerskin became the third most valuable export to Britain behind tobacco and rice. However, the sterling return after the cost of the trade goods was

deducted was far from enough to compensate for the reduction of military expense.

When the British government took a further step in 1765 to reduce the availability of sterling by imposing a stamp tax on the colonies that had to be paid in sterling, the balance of payment problem became a greater nightmare. Even if the stamp taxes could have been paid in New York, Pennsylvania, and other colonial currency, those payments would have been used to pay for military expenses previously purchased with sterling reducing the British expenditures, but the requirement that they be paid in sterling merely added insult to injury.

The colonists' decision either to oppose Britain, to actively support the British troops, or to remain passive or neutral was related to the reasons some of the colonists declared their intent to break with Great Britain. The Declaration of Independence states the British challenged their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. There had been few threats to the life or liberty of individual colonists when opposition to King George III began in the 1760s, and the pursuit of happiness is very vague. The early drafts of the Declaration used the phrase "pursuit of wealth," and there were many obstacles to that right beginning in 1763. Taxation became an issue because payments had to be made to London in sterling during a period when the colonies had an adverse balance of trade with Britain. Paying the taxes in sterling would force the colonists to reduce their expenditures for British goods, a point well recognized by British manufacturers who sided with the colonists on the issue and succeeded in repealing the taxes. The objection to the Stamp Act of 1765, designed to shift part of the financial burden of military occupation of Canada and the west to the colonists, was the stipulation that the revenue be returned to London in British currency, which would upset the favorable balance of trade between the colonies and Britain. The British repealed the act but imposed the Townsend Duties, which had the same goal, to shift the financial burden to the colonists and again upset the balance of trade. The Boston Tea Party, during which colonists threw British tea into the sea, was caused not by the high import duties but rather by the fact that the duties had been removed, making the tea cheaper than the tea smuggled from Holland, which cut colonial profits.

Before 1763 colonial fur traders were able to offer the Indians more for their furs because of low-cost English goods and therefore were able to compete with the French. When this advantage was removed, the French traders with British partners in Montreal obtained access to cheap English manufactures and were able to dominate the fur trade at the cost of the colonials. Pennsylvania and New York merchants lost large sums of money in attempting to compete with the French. The largest participant, Baynton and Wharton of Philadelphia, went bankrupt.

After contending with the adverse balance of trade, the second major issue that divided the colonists from Britain was land. Britain acquired Canada by the treaty ending the French and Indian War (the Great War as it was called then, and in the 20th century the Seven Years' War when World War I became the Great War). With the fur trade still in the hands of the French for the most part, the colonial merchants and landowners turned to land speculation to restore their fortunes. The Pennsylvania speculators were most interested in the acquisition of vast tracts with the intent to establish a new colony and to sell forty-acre farms to settlers from the east and from abroad. The Pennsylvania speculators were not concerned with the quality of the land and pursued the hilly country that is now West Virginia because this land was suitable for the small farms with horses and cattle. The German farmers in Pennsylvania maintained their land with fertilizer provided by the horse and cow manure. The coastal farmers used fish to fertilize the land used to grow corn, as did the Indians. In contrast, the Virginia plantation owners had no source of fertilizer to maintain their large estates devoted to growing tobacco, so when their soil was depleted, they were forced to move west.

Much of the land in the plantations in Virginia had been under constant cultivation for more than a half century and was exhausted as a result of no fertilizer. As a result, the Virginia speculators were seeking smaller scattered areas of extremely fertile land found along the rivers and streams in what is now Kentucky and Ohio. To maintain their production of tobacco, the plantation owners needed new land and found it in Kentucky. To the present day, Kentucky remains a tobacco-producing state. Centuries of Native American cultivation of corn and other crops had not exhausted the land because the Indians did fertilize their crops by burying a dead fish in the small hillocks where they planted their corn.

Both Pennsylvanians and Virginians wanted land west of the mountains, but the British Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement of land west of the Appalachian Mountains, except under special circumstances, to protect Indian lands and indirectly to support the French fur traders.

A nonissue on the frontier was taxation without representation. The real issue for the land speculators was the need to remove British authority that was blocking the various land schemes in an effort to protect the Native American tribes and the fur trade. A variety of attempts were made to get around the Proclamation of 1763. Baynton and Wharton and a group of speculators from Pennsylvania purchased a large block of land from the Iroquois at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, which would have created a new colony, Vandalia, roughly the size of West Virginia. George Washington and his associates were surveying the bottom land along the Ohio Valley, using the land grants to veterans of the Seven Years' War as their authority. The proclamation issued by King George III in 1763 prohibiting

settlement west of the mountains was intended to protect the Indians and the fur trade as an aftermath of Pontiac's Uprising.

The opposition to British rule increased sharply in 1768 when the British government blocked the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, which would have transferred an enormous block of land to Pennsylvania land speculators. Taxation was not the issue; balance of trade and land speculation were the true issues. Although the Indians sold the land to the speculators led by Baynton and Wharton, the British government delayed action causing further losses to Baynton and Wharton. Virginia land speculators, including George Washington, were also obstructed by the British government leading both groups to take leading roles in the opposition to George III.

The British government was concerned about the welfare of the Native Americans who would be driven off their land by the speculators. The Indian Department led by Sir William Johnson made sincere efforts to protect the tribes, but no amount of supervision saved them from the greed of the white man. The attempt to restrict exchange to the military posts where it could be supervised was unsuccessful, and the Native Americans were left as victims of the rapacious trader. In addition, Johnson should have opposed the land speculators, but instead worked closely with the colonial fur traders who had turned to land speculation. Johnson later had direct ties with the Pennsylvania land speculators. However, in the end the agents of the Indian Department sided with the British and worked to enlist the tribes in fighting the colonists.

The estrangement of wealthy colonial merchants and plantation owners was serious because these men controlled the colonial assemblies that voted to secede from the British Empire. The wealthy colonials were able to provide financial support as well, for example, paying Benjamin Franklin to go to London and Paris to plead the colonial causes. These wealthy colonists were those who realized that separation from Britain was necessary to allow them to pursue happiness or as it appeared in the original draft, the pursuit of wealth.

In addition to land, the issues that divided the Native Americans from the colonists in 1774 were women and horses. The young Indian males needed unrelated women as wives, and the usual source for the Iroquois, Delaware, and Shawnee tribes had been raids on Cherokee villages south of the Ohio River. When Virginia settlements along the south bank of the Ohio River in Kentucky cut off this source, the tribes captured women and children of the settlers. Return of captives was a constant issue in all treaties.

Horses became a prized commodity that would ease the burden of the Iroquois, Delaware, and Shawnee tribes that either had to take circuitous routes by canoe to a limited hunting area or had to carry on their backs all of their belongings to the winter hunting grounds in the fall and back to their villages in the spring. Without horses they were restricted to areas

accessible by the heavy dugout canoes used in the area south of the Great Lakes or the clumsy, heavy elm bark canoes in New York.

Another nonissue was the British Army. The presence of the army was welcomed as long as the cost was paid by the British taxpayers. The army was a very profitable market for rations, rum, and other goods and services. The army became an issue when the regiments were moved to the coast to cut expenses by importing rations from Britain and rum from the West Indies. The lucrative contracts to transport supplies to regiments at Fort Pitt and Illinois were lost. In addition the soldiers were housed and fed in colonists' homes at no expense to the British government under the provisions of the British Quartering Act. The financial loss to the colonists was significant.

Both taxation and the army were used to drum up opposition to British rule, but the most important issue was land. With the removal of British authority the land speculators made fortunes. George Washington, one of the leading speculators, owned 400,000 acres when he died. The land speculators anticipated great profits from selling land to the new settlers. The conflict between Pennsylvania and Virginia over political control of the area around Fort Pitt was directly tied to the competition between rival land speculators.

As in all wars three factors determined the ability to persevere and win. They were motivation, men, and logistical support. In the conflict between the Native Americans and the colonists, the Indians were motivated by the desire to retain control of their homeland. They outnumbered the colonial settlers and soldiers, and they had the support of the British in Detroit and at Fort Niagara. The tribes won most of their battles with the pioneers. Neither Detroit nor Fort Niagara was seriously threatened during the American Revolution. The tribes seldom initiated offensive operations. They had little desire to drive the settlers from their farms, but rather were concerned with preventing the colonists from taking Indian land.

In the past the conflict on the frontier during the Revolution has been described as the heroic settlers defending their farms against attacks by the British Army, the Tories, and the Indians. In truth the situation was far more complex, and the primary motive was not defending farms but acquiring vast tracts of land for later resale at enormous profit.

The fundamental issue creating friction between the Indians and the settlers on the frontier in the 18th century was land. Indian society was midway between the hunting stage where all food came from hunting and the agricultural stage where food came from farming. The Indian obtained food from both sources; hunting provided the protein and farming the carbohydrates. On the other hand, the settlers depended on farming, which provided food for themselves and their livestock. While a farm family could sustain itself with forty acres, the Indian family needed fewer acres to grow corn

but large tracts of woodland to support deer and other wild animals. Therefore the Indians had to defend their hunting grounds in order to survive.

Another factor was the need for women on the frontier. In 1763 the British discharged thousands of Scots and Germans from the Highland regiments and the four battalions of the Royal American Regiment, which consisted of German mercenaries. Virginia awarded these veterans land grants in the west, south of the Ohio River, while other veterans purchased land around Fort Pitt. The net result was 3,000 to 5,000 adult males seeking wives who were essential to survival on the frontier. On the other side, the Indian villages had a constant need for young men and women to add new bloodlines. Hunting and primitive agriculture limited the size of Indian villages to fewer than fifty families separated from other villages far beyond a few days' walking distance. Without new blood, a young man would soon be unable to find an unrelated partner. Given the two factors, land and wives, both settlers and Indians were highly motivated and not willing to compromise.

When the Revolution exploded on the coast, the colonists seized the opportunity to acquire Indian land. The British government retaliated by providing the Indians with logistical support to oppose the settlers, leading to a series of raids on the frontier for the duration of the Revolutionary War. The colonists countered with military campaigns to deprive the Indians of their ability to fight, for example, the Sullivan expedition in New York that burned the Indian villages and crops and drove the Iroquois west to Fort Niagara.

The land speculators from New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia wanted to use the Revolution as an excuse for killing or driving away the Indians from the land adjacent to the frontier. In 1763 the French had ceded all of the land east of the Mississippi River to Britain, and the land barons hoped to grab large parcels based on grants made to those who had fought in the French and Indian War. Britain halted this move with the Proclamation of 1763 prohibiting settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains. The Pennsylvania merchants turned to supplying the French in Canada with a wide range of goods, but were soon displaced by British merchants who could offer the same goods at lower prices. In 1764 the Pennsylvania merchants tried to open a lucrative trade with the Indians in the Ohio Valley and Illinois, but failed again as the French residents interposed themselves and discouraged the Indians from buying from the colonists. Then in 1768 Pennsylvania merchants engineered the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, but the British government refused to validate the sale until 1775, by which time the merchants had joined those rebelling against British rule.

The wealthy landowners in Virginia also had designs on western land. Virginia's royal charter granted the colony all of the land between its north and south boundaries as far as the Pacific Ocean. Virginians who had served in the militia were granted land for their service, and these claims were

purchased by the wealthy members of the Ohio Company for development and resale. Because the boundary between Virginia and Pennsylvania had not been surveyed, conflict arose over the fertile Ohio Valley land around Fort Pitt. The Vandalia proposal claimed land that was clearly part of Virginia, which caused further antagonism between the Virginia Ohio Company and the Vandalia backers.

Given their existing trade with the Indians the Pennsylvania merchants preferred that the Indians remain neutral and continue to sell their fur to the traders. In addition many of the Pennsylvania merchants were Quakers who opposed violence and attempted to prevent attacks on the Indians. The Virginians, in contrast, favored attacks on the Indians as a means of opening their lands for development. George Washington, a member of the Ohio Company, sided with the strategy of attack.

The British were divided on the issue of involving the Indians in the war, but the majority in Parliament favored use of the Indians, and the British Army was instructed to instigate attacks on the frontier as a means of weakening the Continental Army. As a result Washington was not able to recruit regiments on the frontier after widespread fighting broke out in 1776. In view of numerous colonial plans to take Detroit, the British relied on the Indians to protect both Detroit and Fort Niagara from colonial attacks.

The settlers on the frontier were divided. Many of the settlers were former soldiers in the British Army or the colonial militias. A large number supported Britain and were forced to leave their farms and businesses to go to Detroit and Fort Niagara where some joined Butler's Rangers, a regiment made up of loyalists who fought with the Indians. Most of the settlers were neutral or supported the rebels and remained on their farms. They responded to calls to join militia regiments for short periods of time and took part in attacks on Indian villages in return for generous pay and shares in the looting that followed the conquest of a village. Most of the retaliation of the Indians was inflicted on the settlers who became as brutal as their foes.

Coming from diverse cultures, the soldiers, Indians, fur traders, and farmers together created a new society on the frontier between 1760 and 1774. The west provided an opportunity for more than 1,200 traders and their 1,500 employees: canoe men, wagon drivers, horse drivers, carpenters, shipwrights, coopers, blacksmiths, cobblers, and silversmiths. More than 7,000 soldiers were assigned to America, while about 50,000 settlers crossed the mountains to begin new lives. Together, these groups developed a mode of living accommodating to one another and the Indians. With the outbreak of the Revolution, all members of these groups were forced to take sides, which created havoc in the economic, political, and social structures.

At the end of the war the Indians still controlled most of the land west of the mountains supplied by the British in Fort Niagara, Fort Detroit, and Fort Michilimackinac. The British refused to surrender Fort Niagara and Fort

Detroit even though all of the land east of the Mississippi River had been ceded to the Thirteen Colonies by the Treaty of Paris in 1783. The British with Indian assistance remained in control of the posts. Although the Indians did not win the war in the sense of defeating the colonists, the Indians were not defeated and continued the war until the late 19th century.

CHAPTER 2

Land

The two powerful economic groups in England had somewhat different attitudes regarding world affairs. The rise in merchant economic power shocked the landowning aristocracy who paid most of the taxes. The merchants who owned the factories and other businesses paid few taxes. The aristocracy's altruistic concern for the welfare of the Indians was at odds with its ability to meet all the expenses involved. In 1765 the aristocracy began taking measures to equalize the responsibilities of the two groups by imposing new taxes.

In the expansion of England's military power, the merchants had several avenues to make a great deal of money. Supplying the army in America was very costly for the aristocracy but profitable for the merchants. Importing fur from America and selling it to Europe made the fur trade very lucrative, and again the manufacturers profited in exchange for the fur by producing trade goods for the Indians in America. Even more money was also made from importing sugar and selling it to Europe, but this commerce was controlled by a limited number of men who owned the sugar plantations in the Caribbean.

Because the merchants did not pay taxes, the landowners were paying for the cost of expanding these markets for the merchants. The merchants were making money at little cost. To counter this disadvantage to the landowners, in 1765 they cut the taxes on land and passed some of the expense of maintaining the army in America in the form of a stamp tax on all newspapers and legal documents.

In America the land speculators supported British rule until the aristocracy in Britain, to protect the Indians, blocked the attempts of the speculators to seize large tracts of Indian land. Thereafter the speculators

supported the group of colonists who wished to separate from Britain because the British government was blocking westward expansion to protect the Indians and the fur trade. The British also believed that the colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country and saw no benefit of land development in the west. The British government could see that the emergence of a strong agricultural west would lead to economic development in competition with Britain.

The actions of the British government were ineffective in stopping the land speculators and squatters until 1768. The land speculators had little interest in farming or making any other use of the land they acquired. Their sole interest was to obtain large tracts of land at low cost and sell off small parcels at great profit. The speculators were not a united group and were in fierce competition with one another, blocking their opponents' schemes and encouraging the British government to prohibit the settlements of their competitors.

The land conflict began in the area south of Fort Pitt. Before Pontiac's Uprising in 1763, white penetration of the area around Fort Pitt was limited to soldiers garrisoning Fort Pitt with a few hunters, fur traders, and settlers living nearby or on the road connecting Fort Pitt to the east. Even though the Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement west of the Appalachian Mountain watershed, beginning in 1765 a stream of settlers poured into southwest Pennsylvania from both the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys. They were Virginians, some descended from the Scotch-Irish who had originally settled in Pennsylvania, and others were veterans of the French and Indian War. The first settlement was Redstone Creek, south of Fort Pitt. The new settlers had no legal titles to their tracts of land and were called squatters.

The squatters disturbed the Indians, but neither Pennsylvania nor Virginia was able to stop the headlong rush for land. The Indians played a losing game as their land was occupied by the flood of intruders. The British Army failed to remove the squatters whose presence disturbed the Indians. In 1766 George Croghan, Indian agent for the Crown and a fur trader, requested that Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor John Penn take action. He also appealed to Governor Francis Fauquier of Virginia, and both governors took some action by issuing proclamations against the illegal settlers with no effect. A Pennsylvania act of 1768 prohibited settlement of land unless it had been purchased by the Pennsylvania proprietors from the Indians. The claims of George Croghan and settlements permitted by the army were the only legal exceptions. Croghan hoped to have all the frontier squatters removed before the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 that would open the Fort Pitt area to settlement. The treaty would make the claims of any remaining squatters legal.

Virginia also had a system of taking unoccupied Indian land under the provisions of the Virginia law of 1713. A settler obtained a certificate

costing two shillings and six pence (\$30) plus ten shillings (\$125) for each 100 acres. The certificate was given to the county surveyor who had the land surveyed. When the survey was returned, the patent was issued. Then for every fifty acres of arable land the settler was required to clear and work three acres. An acre was the amount of land that a man with an ox could plough in one day. For every fifty acres of barren land, three cattle or six sheep or goats had to be kept. If none of the land was suitable for cultivation until cleared, the pioneer was obligated to build a cabin twenty feet long and sixteen feet wide. After the settlers carried out these provisions and had them proved in county court, ownership was legally established. The provisions of the law encouraged individual settlers because the requirement for clearing only three acres for each fifty acres claimed was a comparatively easy task for a man and his wife plus a hired hand. Another provision was that speculators could hold no more than 400 acres of land.

The law did not please the eastern landowners whose large plantations were being depleted by tobacco and who were looking westward for new land. Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia in 1754 had proclaimed that 200,000 acres would be granted any men who had served in the French and Indian War. Many of these claims were purchased by land speculators for a pittance from veterans who did not have the capital to take advantage of the opportunity. The veterans and speculators who had purchased claims from the former soldiers had legitimate claims to lands around Fort Pitt and on the Ohio River, despite the temporary stall of settlement by the Proclamation of 1763.

Among the speculators who had purchased many military claims were George Washington, Thomas Lee, Colonel Thomas Cresap, Peyton Randolph, Benjamin Walker, Edmund Pendleton, and George Fairfax. The earlier land company claims of the late 1760s and early 1770s had hindered these gentlemen in locating western lands. The thriving business of buying military claims from veterans made many rich men even richer. George Washington was the leading speculator in western lands, ignoring laws to the contrary. Washington's agents moved about freely surveying and claiming the choice bottom land. He employed William Crawford in 1767 to begin surveying parcels that Washington would later claim regardless of the Proclamation of 1763, which prohibited settlements west of the mountains. In September 1767 Washington informed Crawford that he and his friends expected to acquire land near Fort Pitt and farther west on the Ohio River. Washington had no interest in ordinary land and insisted that the lands surveyed be rich and level. Ignoring the Proclamation of 1763 because it was a temporary measure, Washington urged the selection of lands before the restriction was removed. Washington was to pay expenses and Crawford was promised a share of the land. Washington insisted on secrecy for two reasons: because others might compete for the land and he did not want to be accused of violating the Proclamation. In order to conceal the venture,

Crawford was instructed to survey many smaller parcels rather than a few very large ones.

Crawford replied to Washington that he did not know how much could be claimed on the Youghiogheny River near Fort Pitt as there were few settlers because of the fear of Indian attack. However, Crawford had located 3,000 acres in the area on Chartiers Creek, and he offered Washington a share. His plan was to mark his survey with slashes on trees, clear some of the land, and build a cabin.

The lack of a surveyed boundary line between Pennsylvania and Virginia slowed claims around Fort Pitt, the choice area for security and protection for the settlers. The problem with claiming land around Fort Pitt was that apparently the boundary line between Pennsylvania and Virginia would come south of Fort Pitt, although the line had not yet been surveyed because of problems with the Indians. Surveying claims in Pennsylvania was forbidden, so any claims had to be south of the boundary in Virginia.

Washington's tremendous wealth was able to cover all services of his man Crawford at Fort Pitt or any other choice spot. Crawford agreed to work for Washington and set out pretending to be on a hunting trip. Others were already staking claims in the Fort Pitt area. By January 1769 Crawford had four tracts totaling 1,661 acres divided in 300-acre tracts. He paid the surveyors with money from Washington. He chose only the best land and ignored the less fertile acres. The warrants for the land were dated April 3, 1769, made out to Washington, William Athel, John Bishop, John Paty, and Thomas Jones. The other four quickly sold their land to Washington and additional surveys were made in October 1769, all at Washington's expense.

In December 1769 Washington successfully petitioned the Executive Council of Virginia for permission to survey 200,000 acres on the Ohio River on behalf of the veterans of the French and Indian War who had been awarded bounty land for their service, which Crawford began to survey. Washington planned to acquire another 15,000 acres from other veterans after they had received their bounty land. Because Washington was a very wealthy man, he had the money to pay men to go west to clear the minimum amount of land in each claim, which otherwise would have been forfeited.

Washington had made a wise move politically when he married Mary Custis, a very wealthy widow, whose family owned Mount Vernon. After the American Revolution when the federal government planned to move from Philadelphia, Washington, ever growing in influence, urged that the seat be located adjacent to his estate at Mount Vernon for his convenience.

In 1770 when Washington went to the frontier to check Crawford's accomplishments, he met with George Croghan and Alexander McKee at Fort Pitt. He was concerned that settlers would stake out small claims of the richest land located at the mouths of creeks. By December 1770 the enterprising Washington had claims for eighty square miles of land held

in the names of George Muse, Peter Hogg, Andrew Stephens, Andrew Waggener, John Poulson, and John West.

In March 1771 Washington, interested in even more land, met with a group of men interested in obtaining land in western Virginia under the Proclamation of 1754 granting land to veterans. Washington reported on his trip to the west to a group that included George Muse, Dr. James Craik, William Bronaugh, John Savage, Thomas Bullitt, William Wright, Colonel Andrew Lewis, Colonel Adam Stephen, Captain Peter Hogg, Andrew Wagener, and John West. The greedy group resolved to survey land despite an order of the Virginia Executive Council of December 15, 1769, forbidding such surveys. Others were also surveying in the area and if Washington's group waited, the good land would be taken. Washington's final share was 32,373 acres, 9,157 on the Ohio River between the two Kanawha Rivers, 23,216 acres on the Great Kanawha, and 587 acres down river from Wheeling. The 2007 price of good quality farmland is in excess of \$10,000 per acre. Washington's share was worth \$323,373,000 in 2007 dollars, which made him one of the wealthiest landowners in American history.

The first survey in the Ohio Valley by William Crawford was done in June 1771, called "Washington's Bottom," 2,314 acres located three miles down river from the Little Kanawha. Washington claimed the land under the terms of the Virginia Proclamation of 1754 granting land to veterans. The land was patented in Washington's name on November 6, 1772. Also in June 1771 Crawford, assisted by John Custard, George Cox, William Jackson, Marcus Hardin, and Joel Rees, surveyed 10,990 acres on the south shore of the Great Kanawha River two miles from the Ohio River. Washington had another survey made of 7,276 acres on the Great Kanawha. A total of ten tracts of land with a total of 61,796 acres of choice fertile land were made for Washington in 1771. In 2007 this land would be worth \$617,769,000. Even though he would share it with other members of the group, this claim made Washington enormously wealthy.

Washington was also interested in land in Pennsylvania. William Crawford surveyed an extension of the boundary line separating Pennsylvania and Virginia around Fort Pitt to determine if there was any land of sufficient quality to interest Washington. He concluded that the best land had already been claimed by others, including George Croghan. Crawford did find some good land on Charier Creek and Raccoon Creek near Fort Pitt but the plots were in the area claimed by Croghan, and Crawford did not relate his findings to Croghan. Croghan was already selling parcels even though his claim to that land based on a transfer by the Indians was doubtful. In August 1771 Croghan attempted to sell land on Chartiers Creek to Washington but failed. In December 1771 Washington wrote to Croghan that he would not purchase any land from Croghan until the legality of his claim had been established. However, Washington asked Crawford to keep him informed

of any developments on the legality of the claim and how well Croghan was doing in his attempts to sell small parcels to settlers.

Washington's hopes for land were also challenged by the Vandalia project, which granted an enormous tract to a Pennsylvania group headed by John Baynton and Samuel Wharton, Philadelphia merchants. Despite the fact that the British government was delaying approval of this group purchase from the Indians, Washington was eager to learn under what conditions the Baynton and Wharton group would sell land if their claim was approved. Washington was also approached in November 1771 by Thomas Cresap of Maryland to purchase a share in the Walpole Company that was also claiming land in the west.

In early 1772 Lord Dunmore became governor of Virginia. He was interested in acquiring western land and soon became friends with Washington. The two joined forces to oppose the Walpole Company, but Dunmore did not believe he had the authority to make grants west of the mountains because of the Proclamation of 1763 prohibiting settlement. Therefore he refused to approve Washington's surveying. However, under pressure from Washington, Dunmore did allow claims under the earlier Proclamation of 1754. Officers were to receive 15,000 acres and privates 400 acres. Crawford continued to survey land for Washington in Virginia. He hoped to share the Little Kanawha tract with Washington.

Crawford had surveyed the land and Washington then divided it among various persons with claims under the Proclamation of 1754. The claims were patented in 1773, and Washington then purchased the land from the claimants. In the end he owned the entire 28,400 acres around the Great Kanawha River. Washington then offered parcels rent-free for a few years if the settler would clear three out of each fifty-acre plot. The advantage of Washington's offer was that the settler had to pay only two shillings sterling (\$25 in 2006 dollars) quit rent per year. The choice area offered good transportation on the Ohio River, a solid claim under Virginia law, and was of the highest quality, as Crawford had selected the parcels carefully. Washington advertised not only in Virginia but also sent agents to England and Ireland to advertise in local papers just as the developers of the Midwest did in the late 19th century.

In 1773 Lord Dunmore visited Fort Pitt and discussed frontier problems with George Croghan and Colonel William Crawford on the advice of Washington. Dunmore's goals were personal land interest as well as Virginian sovereignty. He enlisted the support of Connolly and Campbell, two of Croghan's agents, with a promise of a large tract near the falls of the Ohio River.

In early 1773 the Pennsylvania merchants were lobbying very hard to convince the British government to approve the purchase of Indian land negotiated at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the Iroquois and other tribes to create a new colony, Vandalia. Lord Dartmouth, the British secretary of

state, was sympathetic to the long-term interests of the tribes and was concerned about removing the Seneca and other Indians from the south side of the Ohio River to make way for Vandalia. The land speculators intended to establish the colony in the area of present West Virginia. Prospects of British approval seemed good in April 1773 when Alexander McKee held a conference with the tribes along the Scioto River informing them of the plan for the new colony. The Delaware Indians supported the project as a means of limiting westward expansion of settlements north of the Ohio River.

Later in the month Sir William Johnson assured Dartmouth that the Iroquois had rights to the land and that they were agreeable to the creation of a new colony because only a few renegade Indians occupied the territory and they had been ordered to return to New York. On the basis of Johnson's information, Dartmouth in England ceased to object. On 6 May 1773, the Privy Council recommended that Vandalia be established in land currently part of Virginia and that a separate colonial government be created.

However, in June 1773 British General Thomas Gage returned to England from America and voiced opposition to the new colony. In response in July the Privy Council requested that approval must include definite boundaries, which delayed the project. In December 1773 the leader of the Vandalia scheme, Thomas Wharton of Philadelphia, informed George Croghan that further delay would result from the Privy Council's action. Apparently the scheme to create Vandalia failed at great cost to the Pennsylvania land speculators.

In the early negotiations Lord Dunmore had allied himself to George Croghan and the Pennsylvania merchants. In April 1773 he halted the granting of land south of the Ohio River in order to reduce Indian resistance until the Vandalia project was approved. In return for this assistance, Dunmore was promised a share of the land in the new colony. In July 1773 Dunmore lost patience with the delays concerning Vandalia and granted more than 13,000 acres of land in present-day Kentucky to veterans of the French and Indian War. This action violated the Proclamation of 1763 that prohibited settlement west of the mountains. Most veterans sold their rights to the Loyal Company that hired surveyors to go to Kentucky and stake out the fifty-acre lots. The surveys overlapped and sometimes included land that had already been settled. On 16 December 1773, Dunmore ordered that new surveys not interfere with existing settlements or previously surveyed claims. He ordered that the current settlers had to purchase their land from veterans or from the Loyal Company that had purchased many of the veterans' claims. The British government ordered him to stop, but on 15 December 1773, Dunmore flaunted the British order and again announced that veterans might claim land west of the Proclamation line.

Croghan, who was part of the Vandalia scheme, was also involved with another group seeking land in the west, The Illinois Land Company formed

on 15 May 1773, by Croghan, John Campbell, David Franks, Bernard Gratz, and Michael Gratz. The latter three were Jewish merchants who had a major share of the Pennsylvania fur trade. William Murray was hired by the Gratz group to purchase land in Illinois from the Indians with goods provided by the Gratz group. The purchases were based on an English legal ruling that a patent issued by the British government was not necessary to buy land in America. In July 1773 Murray purchased large amounts of land from the Indians for the Illinois Company. Hugh Lord, the commander of the British troops in Illinois, ordered Murray to stop and that he would not be permitted to settle the land because of the Proclamation of 1763.

In December 1773 Dartmouth ordered General Frederick Haldimand, the British governor of Quebec, to stop the purchases as the Indians would be provoked. Dartmouth also ordered Sir William Johnson to prevent the purchase of land in Illinois. On 10 March 1774, Haldimand issued a proclamation that no land was to be granted beyond the boundaries of the present colonies or west of the Appalachian Mountains. No grants were to be made on land that had not been purchased from the Indians, and no purchases were to be made without a license from Haldimand. The Virginians ignored his proclamation.

Washington turned to new fields in September 1773 after learning that Governor Dunmore intended to grant land along the Ohio River west of the Scioto River. Washington sent Captain Cuthbert Bullitt down the Ohio River to survey 10,000 acres of which Washington would claim 5,000 acres, and two other veterans who had sold their rights to Washington would claim the remainder. He instructed Bullitt that he wanted bottom land (the most fertile land) that was clear of the Vandalia project, which claimed land south of the Ohio River. In November 1773 Dunmore granted Washington and his friends a large portion of the 200,000 acres that Dunmore had promised to the veterans.

The competition between Croghan and Washington continued in 1773. Both sent surveyors south of the Ohio River. Washington based his claims on the Virginia Proclamation of 1754, while Croghan based his claims on his prior purchase from the Indians in 1749 and the purchase made in 1768 at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix to establish the new colony of Vandalia. Washington was supported by Governor Dunmore, while Croghan and his associates hoped for backing by the government in London. Baynton and Wharton, the leaders of the Vandalia project, were very concerned about Washington's surveys of land along the Great Kanawha that would be part of Vandalia. Thomas Wharton requested that the London government take action. The surveyors were very active along the Ohio River in 1773 and 1774 and alarmed the local tribes. In January 1774 Crawford advised Washington to patent the Chartier Creek land to avoid other claims. In May Crawford sent surveys of additional land, and in July Dunmore issued a military patent for land described as adjoining Miller's Run, a tributary of

Chartier's Creek. In January 1774 the land along the Great Kanawha River was declared open for veterans making claims under the Proclamation of 1754. Claimants were instructed to meet with surveyors at the river on 14 April 1774. Land was surveyed by John Floyd on behalf of Washington, Patrick Henry, Dr. Hugh Mercer, William Christian, William Preston, and Dr. John Connolly. The size of the claims varied from 400 acres for Patrick Henry to 3,000 acres for William Christian and 2,000 acres for Washington. The surveys continued through June with additional claims of a thousand acres for the each and 4,000 for John Connolly. Even though the British government halted land surveys in 1774, the Washington group claims were approved by Virginia after the Revolution in preference to the land company claims.

In January 1775 Washington purchased a number of slaves in Alexandria and sent them to the frontier in March 1775 to clear land under the guidance of William Stevens and several overseers called slave lashers. Cleveland arrived at the Great Kanawha River on 5 April 1775 and set to work. The slaves were not suited for the heavy labor of clearing land and did very poorly. He had trouble with the slaves, who ran away and had to be chased and brought back. Finally Cleveland built a house so that he could lock them in at night. Once the land was cleared, it was leased in small parcels to settlers from Virginia. In August 1775 10,990 acres along the Kanawha River were claimed on the basis of improvements, which included the 28 acres cleared and planted with corn, potatoes, and turnips. Fourteen houses had been built and 2,000 peach trees planted. Washington soon had patents for 30,000 acres of choice land in the west. At his death in 1799 Washington owned 60,200 acres of land. Washington was probably the largest individual landowner in the United States at his death. Because he had no direct heirs, the land was divided among his nephews and nieces, few of whom had sufficient capital to develop the land and therefore sold it at low prices.

Virginia Governor Dunmore was also interested in land claims and used the Proclamation of 1754 granting land to veterans for his own benefit. Dunmore personally was active in land acquisition around Fort Pitt. On 11 October 1773, Dunmore made Fort Pitt the site for Virginia courts under West Augusta County. The new judges were Croghan, John Connolly, Edward Ward, Thomas Smallman, Dorsey Pentecost, and John Gibson, all friends of Croghan. Connolly was the leading figure and met with Dunmore at Fort Pitt. Dunmore bribed him with the promise of 2,000 acres on the Ohio River to support Virginia in the boundary dispute with Pennsylvania. Dunmore also granted 2,000 acres to Charles Wainsdorf who transferred it to Connolly. John Campbell and Edward Ward, Croghan's half brother, also received 2,000 acres. A surveyor was sent to lay out small lots, which were offered for sale in April 1774. All of these grants were made under the provisions of the Proclamation of 1754 awarding land to veterans.

The uncertainty over the location of the boundary between Virginia and Pennsylvania in the Fort Pitt area added to the conflict. The Virginia speculators were concerned that the choice land in question would fall within Pennsylvania once the boundary was established. The conflict between Pennsylvania and Virginia centered around the control of Fort Pitt, which could have been on either side of the boundary between the two colonies. The Mason-Dixon Line later settled the long-standing border dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia when these two surveyors officially established the border. Even so settlers preferred to file their claims under Virginia law, which was cheaper.

Fort Pitt was the center of the fur trade with the Indians in Ohio and the water link with Illinois, as well as the entry point for the rich farmland along the Ohio River. Land acquisition was closely regulated in Pennsylvania by the proprietors who had received the colony from the British king. No land could be purchased from the Indians without an order from the proprietor or his agent. Control was entrusted to the officials of the land office in Philadelphia. The officers included a secretary, a surveyor-general, and three to five commissioners. To obtain land a claim was submitted to the land office and a warrant was issued to authorize a survey. A certificate of the survey was submitted to the secretary of the land office who would then issue a patent, a deed granting rights to the land with a description, and a legal title.

Three land companies became involved in intense competition. Speculators purchased shares in a number of land companies. The funds were used to purchase claims, pay surveyors, pay lobbyists, clear the land, and other expenses. The investors received a share of the profits made from the resale of the land to settlers. Three major companies were the Ohio Company, the Mississippi Company, and the Indiana Company. The Ohio Company was composed of eleven shares held by Virginia investors, six shares by men in London, and three shares by investors in Maryland. The company was active in the Fort Pitt area trying to occupy land along the Monongahela River based on the Virginia Proclamation of 1754 granting land to veterans. Faced with opposition, the Ohio Company sent George Mercer to London in 1763 to convince the British government to support its claims. In 1767 the Virginia House of Burgesses supported the claims of a competing company to land around Fort Pitt. Mercer succeeded in blocking this move by appealing to the British Board of Trade, which refused to permit the Ohio Company to take up land. In 1772 Virginia declared that the 200,000-acre grant to veterans was legal. The matter dragged on until 1773, despite lack of approval from the British government, the Ohio Company hired William Crawford to survey land around Fort Pitt. In 1774 Hancock Lee was hired to assist Crawford, and they were joined by George Rogers Clark in 1775.

The Mississippi Land Company was formed in June 1763 with George Washington as the leading investor. The other shareholders were five

members of the Lee family, three of the Washington family, and members of the Fitzhugh family. Other members were Adam Stephen and Thomas Bullitt, all prominent Virginia families. The company purchased the claims from veterans of the French and Indian War with the goal of acquiring rights to 2,500,000 acres. Having acquired these claims at a fraction of their value, the company in June 1763 petitioned the Virginia government for a grant of land along the Ohio River. In the fall of 1763 Thomas Cumming was sent to London to represent the company and to lobby for British approval. George Grenville opposed the plan in 1764. Arthur Lee became the agent of the company in 1767 and presented another petition, without success, to the British in December 1768 to permit the company to take the land. Washington's Mississippi Company was a complete failure.

The Indiana Company, the third major land company, originated with a group called the "suffering traders," which purchased the claims of fur traders who received grants of land in the west as compensation for their losses from Indian attacks during Pontiac's Uprising in 1763. This group later formed the Vandalia Company and became the Indiana Company in 1776. The company consisted mostly of investors from Pennsylvania, although Sir William Johnson, George Croghan, and other influential politicians also had shares. The leaders were John Baynton and Samuel Wharton, partners who had invested heavily in the fur trade in 1765, hoping to monopolize the trade with the Indians in Illinois and supply the British regiment there. In 1765 the partners invited a wealthy young man from Philadelphia, George Morgan, to invest in the firm, which then became Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan. Morgan was given the task of handling the Illinois venture. However, the Pennsylvania partners failed when the French merchants in Illinois dissuaded the Indians from dealing with Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan and the British government moved the regiment east, ending their lucrative contracts.

As a result the firm went deeply into debt. The men attempted to restore their finances by purchasing 2,862 square miles of land from the Indians at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, basing their right to do so on the land grants made to the suffering traders, but the British government delayed approval. By 1770 the firm had liabilities of £71,485 (nearly \$18,000,000 in 2007 dollars) according to a financial statement in January 1770. Their only assets were land that could not be sold because of the British government's refusal to approve the purchase from the Indians. Cash was so short that John Baynton, a wealthy merchant in Philadelphia, was forced to limit his personal expenses to £700 (\$175,000 in 2007 dollars) per year and had to borrow £500 of that to support his family.

In 1772 the prospects of the land purchase, which was to be a new colony named Vandalia, were widely discussed in the Philadelphia newspapers. In April 1772 General Gage, former commander in America, and Lord Hillsborough, the British secretary of state, objected to the proposal for several

reasons: the land was already part of Virginia, it was west of the Proclamation of 1763 line beyond which no settlements were permitted, and it was contrary to British interests to allow settlement in the west because the lack of good transportation would make it difficult for British merchants to do business on the frontier. Because the British government's policy was that colonies should be governed in a manner advantageous to Britain, the colonies in the west could offer no benefits to the British businessman. There would be no market for any crops grown on the frontier for lack of transportation and, being cut off from the sea, the new colony would foster the growth of industries in competition with Britain. The British government reasoned instead the west should be left to the Indians as a source of fur, a profitable import from America. In June 1772 Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Walpole, Colonel George Mercer, Thomas Wharton, and William Trent appeared before a Privy Council committee, which reversed Hillsborough's opposition. On 1 July 1772 the Privy Council approved the new colony. For a time the Vandalia project appeared promising. Hillsborough was replaced by Dartmouth as secretary of state, and plans were made to create the new colony of Vandalia.

However, opponents of the new colony in London continued their opposition, and the British politicians who wanted to get rid of Hillsborough lost interest in the project once Hillsborough had resigned. In August 1772 the attempts by Thomas Wharton and William Trent in London to secure approval of the land purchase had failed. Although Dartmouth informed Johnson in September 1772 that King George III had approved the purchase made in 1768 at Fort Stanwix and that the new colony could be established, nothing was done. Later in November 1772 the British government officially stated that the new colony was contrary to British policy and disadvantageous to the American colonies, as so much land was still unsettled east of the mountains. Nothing further was done during 1773, and the project was dead. Dissension developed among the members of the group. George Morgan became a bitter foe of Baynton and Wharton because he believed they had cheated him. The many disappointing ventures of Baynton and Wharton, the dissension, and the stonewalling of the British government caused the Baynton and Wharton group to join the colonial cause.

Although the Pennsylvania speculators supported the colonist's cause in 1765 by signing the nonimportation resolutions to protest British taxation, they retained hope that their fur trading venture and land schemes would still be supported by the British government. When the fur trade ventures collapsed in the face of the competition of the alliance of the French fur traders and British merchants in Quebec and Montreal and the land schemes were delayed by the British Parliament, the disappointed Pennsylvania group joined the colonial cause in 1775. During the Revolution George Morgan served as a colonel in the commissary of the Continental Army.

George Croghan retired in poverty to his home in Philadelphia and took no part in the Revolution. Sir William Johnson died before the outbreak of war, but his son was a leader in the loyalist forces that fought for the British, and most of the Indian agents in Johnson's Indian Department remained loyal to Britain. John Baynton died in 1773, but one of his sons, Peter Baynton, sided with the colonists. Another son, John Baynton, served in the Continental Army, while a third son, Benjamin Baynton, joined the Royal Navy in January 1776.

On the frontier overzealous squatters who had little interest in politics threatened the land speculators' claims by settling on land and returning within a short time if they were driven off. The land speculators' claims were endangered by squatters who moved to the Fort Pitt area and simply took parcels of land, began clearing the land, and planting crops. The squatters often joined together to form associations that resisted any attempts to take their land. These settlements were illegal as the Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement west of the mountains except for developments on main roads leading to Fort Pitt that were necessary to support the British troops. These included stations where horses and wagons were housed to transport goods to Fort Pitt. Regardless of the prohibition of other settlements, squatters began to occupy land without any legal title. Even though they were driven off, they returned the next year to the same place. When Washington sought to remove squatters from his land, he was warned that they would retaliate and destroy buildings on his other lands.

In 1768 Washington sent a group of fifty men, women, and slaves to clear land on Muddy Creek in Greene County west of the mountains. Other settlers went to Washington County where they purchased land from the Indians and began clearing land. In reaction to the illegal settlements, Pennsylvania passed a law in February 1768 that imposed the death penalty on anyone who settled on land not purchased by the Pennsylvania proprietor from the Indians and who refused to move on thirty days' notice or returned later.

In 1770 Cumberland County of Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over the Fort Pitt area. In May 1770 Thomas Gist, Dorsey Pentecost, Arthur St. Clair, and William Crawford were appointed as justices of the peace for the area. Crawford was still Washington's surveyor and Pentecost was also a friend of Washington. Arthur St. Clair represented Pennsylvania's interest. The Virginia supporters were less illustrious. Governor Dunmore appointed John Connolly as his agent in 1773. Connolly was born about 1744 in York County, Pennsylvania, of Irish parents. After military service in the French and Indian War, he settled at Pittsburgh, marrying the daughter of Samuel Semple, the local innkeeper. He traded furs in Illinois with Croghan in 1766–1767. William Crawford thought that Connolly was not well acquainted with the nature of the people he dealt with despite spending years on the frontier. William Crawford, born in Westmoreland County,

Virginia, served in the French and Indian War and settled on the Youghiogheny River in 1765. Although Crawford was a Pennsylvanian justice of the peace from 1770 to 1775, he supported Virginia and took part in Dunmore's War in 1774. He was a surveyor by trade and acted as George Washington's agent on the frontier.

Others active at the time were Simon Girty, a member of Connolly's militia. Before the Revolution he was a fur trader and an Indian interpreter for the British government. Alexander McKee was raised on the Pennsylvania frontier and served in the French and Indian War. He was employed in the Indian Department by the British government as Chief Agent at Fort Pitt until 1775. Dorsey Pentecost had been a Pennsylvania justice of the peace, but changed to the Virginia side in 1773. Thomas Smallman, a relative of Croghan, was in the fur trade. Edward Ward was a half brother of Croghan and was employed by him as surveyor.

Almost all of the Virginia leaders had served in the French and Indian War. Some had gone to the frontier before 1760 and most before 1768. Many had become fur traders as a result of Indian contacts made during their military service. By 1770 the Virginians were well established. The only reason they admitted Pennsylvania authority during the period 1769 through 1773 was that this plan was the best defense against the land companies. When their land schemes failed to bear fruit, the companies returned their allegiance to Virginia.

Croghan had multiple roles. He was an Indian agent in Sir William Johnson's Indian Department, a partner of Baynton and Wharton in many of their ventures, a fur trader, and a land speculator in his own right. In 1749 Croghan had obtained a grant of 100,000 acres of Pennsylvania land south of Fort Pitt from the Iroquois and two additional grants totaling another 100,000 acres. In 1768 Croghan purchased from the Indians 127,000 acres in the names of Alexander McKee, John Butler, and Stephen Skinner, his associates in the Indian Department. On 4 November 1768, Pennsylvania confirmed the 1749 grants. In 1769 Croghan parted company with Baynton and Wharton, his previous allies, and joined forces with Bernard and Michael Gratz of Lancaster and Philadelphia, respectively, who were involved in the fur trade competition with Baynton and Wharton who had been ruined in a trading venture to Illinois. The Gratz brothers had the financial resources that Croghan needed to develop his land holdings. Most significant of all the Virginia supporters was George Croghan. He was in the Indian trade in the 1740s and served as an Indian agent during the French and Indian War. After resigning as an Indian agent, he traded with the Indians in partnership with Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan. With them and others he engineered the Treaty of 1768, which gave the Indiana Company its claims. In 1766 he advised Lieutenant Governor Penn that the settlers at Redstone should be driven out before the Treaty of Fort Stanwix made their presence legal. His personal interest was based on his own claim to

these lands. Croghan had acquired through gift or purchase in Pennsylvania alone 100,000 acres in 1749, 100,000 acres in 1768, 1,500,000 acres in 1773, and 6,000,000 acres in 1775. Another major purchase was under way when the Revolution halted such activity. Croghan's support for Virginia was not to further that colony's claim, but rather to prevent the establishment of Pennsylvania's. This thread follows his twisting policy.

In 1770 under pressure of his debts, Croghan went to Pittsburgh. His home, Croghan's Hall, a few miles west of Pittsburgh, was a 1,600-acre farm operated by John Campbell. It served as the headquarters for a fur trade carried on by Thomas Smallman and for Indian relations under the direction of Croghan himself and Alexander McKee. Reversing his policy of 1766, in 1770 Croghan became the friend of the Redstone settlers, using them to contest the Pennsylvania authority in the area. His Indian purchases and grants were valid only if the land were outside Pennsylvania jurisdiction. The confirmation of Vandalia would validate many of his claims but should that fail, Croghan would have a chance under Virginia to make good his claims. Reinforcing his support for Virginia authority was the fear of creditors who were suing him in Pennsylvania courts. Under the assumption that his home was in Virginia territory, he was safe from their grasp. The dispute also served to protect Croghan from payment of taxes, which would have been considerable on his large estate.

In July 1770 Croghan went to Fort Pitt and opened a land office selling tracts of his 200,000 acres acquired in 1749 to settlers under generous terms, £10 sterling for 100 acres plus £6 sterling for surveying. Squatters were moving in and taking land with no legal right, so Croghan was able to offer settlers protection against squatters taking their farms. Otherwise the strongest man would simply take the land. He also sold larger tracts to speculators, 308 acres to Jacob Bousman, 384 acres to Benjamin Tate, and, in 1775, 18,580 acres to Thomas Lawrence. He also tried to sell 15,000 acres to George Washington in 1770 for £550 sterling, but the deal fell through.

In 1771 Croghan sold 100,000 acres around Fort Pitt illegally to settlers based on his share of the Indiana Company claim. He made these sales claiming that Fort Pitt was Virginia territory, ignoring the rights of the Pennsylvania proprietors who legally owned the land. Croghan also took a major role in the fur trade with the Indians at Fort Pitt with Thomas Smallman, Alexander McKee, and Alexander Ross. The ventures were financed by the Gratz brothers who also backed Joseph Simons, John Campbell, and other traders.

Unfortunate turns of events began to erode Croghan's position. In 1773 he was in financial difficulty. He had purchased an additional 1,500,000 acres from the Indians north of the Ohio River, promising them that the land would not be developed for fifteen years or until the Indians left the area. However, trouble was brewing as Governor Dunmore of Virginia

granted patents for surveyed land south of the Ohio River, a great victory for George Washington, because Croghan did not have legal title to the land he was selling. In 1773 Croghan sold 3,234 acres to Edward Ward, 2,817 acres to Alexander Ross, and another 2,170 acres to Ross. Despite these sales, Croghan was forced to borrow money to continue in business.

Croghan switched sides from Virginia to Pennsylvania to take advantage of the changing conditions. In 1774 the boundary controversy was heating up. Arthur St. Clair led the Pennsylvania group in Fort Pitt and John Connolly represented the Virginia group. Croghan had sided with Virginia in the boundary controversy, because there was a possibility that Virginia would give him legal title to the land so that he could sell his land. However, Washington used his influence with Dunmore to block Croghan's plans, so he switched his support to Pennsylvania. Croghan also had objected to the policy of Virginia aimed at driving the Indians off their land as that policy was harmful to the fur trade and would eventually lead to war between the settlers and the Indians.

Neither side trusted Croghan in June 1774 when he went to Williamsburg to discuss Indian policy and further his land claims. However, he never reached Williamsburg. The local people turned him back believing that he was running away because of the threat of war with the Indians.

In February 1775 the ubiquitous Croghan was back on Virginia's side as a judge in the Virginia court in Fort Pitt. This position enabled him to register his claim for 200,000 acres that he had purchased from the Indians in 1768. Later in the year he purchased another 6 million acres from the Iroquois in northwest Pennsylvania and resold portions to Thomas Walker, a Virginia land speculator, and Croghan used some of his profits to pay off his loans. In May 1775 he registered earlier sales to make them legal, including 10,580 acres to Joseph Simons, a Pennsylvania merchant involved in the fur trade, 14,013 acres to Bernard Gratz, a fur merchant who had favored Croghan with financial support for several years, and two sales of 10,229 acres and 31,485 acres to Bernard Gratz. Using the advantage of his Virginia judgeship Croghan was paying off his debtors.

However, Croghan could not cover all of his debts and in 1776 was bankrupt. Most of his friends were loyalists; Alexander McKee and Alexander Ross had been in contact with the British. Croghan himself was accused of being a Tory, although he never openly supported the British. Because the British government opposed the purchase of Indian land, Croghan's only hope for his land claims lay with Virginia although he played no active role to support the colonial cause.

Untrustworthy speculators such as William Trent routinely offered scams to promote themselves. In March 1765 Trent joined with Thomas Ferguson and William George to survey open land, secure warrants, and sell it. Trent carried out the operation while the others provided the funds. Trent was to receive half of the profit. He drew up a plan for a land company to acquire

15,000 acres in Cumberland County between the Allegheny Mountains and Carlisle. Trent planned to sell the land at £22 Pennsylvania for 100 acres in 500-acre lots. The intent was that the buyer would lease the land to a farmer in return for clearing the land. The Pennsylvania proprietors had closed their land office, so Trent offered Edward Shippen, a Pennsylvania official, half of his share if Shippen could arrange for issuing a warrant for the surveyed land. The plan never worked, but it showed how the scheming speculators worked. Trent continued to be involved in a number of similar scams in Cumberland County from 1765 to 1768.

A justice system had to be created to enforce the laws and make legal decisions when the settlers poured into western Pennsylvania. A boom in Pennsylvania land sales flourished in 1769. When the settlers poured in, civil authority was needed. Justices of the peace appointed for the western part of Cumberland County in 1770 were Thomas Gist, Dorsey Pentecost, Arthur St. Clair, and William Crawford, all leaders in the later controversy. In 1771 Bedford County was created from part of Cumberland. Resistance to taxation for a Bedford courthouse was met at Redstone Creek, the center of early settlement. The frontiersmen from Virginia claimed that Pennsylvania jurisdiction ended at the Laurel Hills.

There was more at stake than a few taxes for a courthouse. Arthur St. Clair, an agent of the Penns and leader of Pennsylvania partisans, recognized the land companies' interest in the boundary dispute. He realized that if the land around Pittsburgh were Pennsylvanian, the speculators could not claim it. On the other hand, if Pittsburgh were not part of Pennsylvania, the proposed colony of Vandalia might claim it. A settler wrote to Governor William Franklin, an important figure in the Vandalia scheme, that the people of Redstone refused to pay taxes for a courthouse in Bedford County because they would soon have to pay for courthouses in Vandalia.

Legislation during the Revolution underlines more evidence of the continued power of the colonial large speculators. Colonial legislation during the Revolution supported the land companies and ignored British laws limiting their activity and claims. An act of June 1776 by the Virginia Convention was aimed at destroying the power of the royal supported land companies. The act permitted all persons settled on lands to hold them without any payment until the rightful owners were determined by a legislative commission. People settled on lands without legal owners were to have the right of preemption regardless of Indian deeds and purchases. Land companies were then prevented from selling any of their claimed land to settlers or from driving squatters away.

Despite later laws to protect the speculators in Virginia, the result was favorable to the frontier settler in efforts to obtain a legal title to his land at a low cost. The pioneers were drawn even closer to Virginia in the boundary dispute. Not only was the land considerably cheaper under Virginia

law, but the claims of the Indiana Company and other companies were thrown out.

Despite the failure of Croghan's tremendous schemes, the fact that the claims existed was important in the boundary dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania. Governor Dunmore was seriously interested in land speculation and Indian purchases. He encouraged Croghan to use Virginia courts to reinforce his Indian grants and purchases in 1773–1775. The great Virginia landholders, represented by Washington, had a quite different point of view. If Croghan's and other Indian purchases were valid, Virginia's hopes of western expansion would be severely curtailed. The Virginia landowners with the aid of Dunmore were probably influential in defeating the Baynton and Wharton Vandalia scheme in late 1773.

The following year, when the Virginia landowners were faced with the revitalized Indiana Company, the Croghan claims, and other purchases, the Virginia speculators received help from the British government. Failing to obtain support from Dunmore in blocking the Indian purchases, the Virginians appealed to London. Dartmouth refused to approve the purchases from the Indians and ordered Dunmore to cease granting patents to lands beyond the line of the Proclamation of 1763, which defeated Dunmore's scheme.

A review of Croghan's land speculations makes his political maneuvers more understandable. First, he opposed encroachments of the settlers on lands he claimed to be his own in 1766. He supported Dunmore and Connolly (not George Washington and the Virginia landowners) as a possible means of confirming his titles, especially after the collapse of the Vandalia scheme in late 1773. Croghan opposed Pennsylvania jurisdiction (except during Dunmore's War) as the proprietors' rights would have made his claims invalid. His opposition to Dunmore's War may have resulted from his reluctance to lose the friendship of the Indians by supporting an aggressive war against them. Second, he may have been suspicious of Dunmore's motives in provoking the war. In 1775 Croghan again supported Virginia, but suspicion of his Tory associates resulted in his forced return to Philadelphia soon after war began. There he died in poverty.

In the scramble for western land, in 1768 large blocks of land around Fort Pitt were held by George Croghan, George Washington, William and Valentine Crawford, and others. Croghan was the other major player in the scramble for western land. The controversy was between Virginia and Pennsylvania; Washington led the Virginia faction and Croghan led in Pennsylvania. Because Croghan's allies, Baynton and Wharton plus other traders, had a major stake in the fur trade with the Indians, their policies differed from the Virginians who saw the Indians merely as an obstacle to land development rather than a profitable market. The British government favored the Canadian traders, both French and Scottish, as they represented a very profitable market for British manufactures and a valuable source of furs that

were resold across Europe. To protect this market, the British government generally opposed the land speculators.

Washington's thirst for land was never quenched. By the time of his death in 1799 he was the richest man in America. He purchased not only Indian land but also veterans' claims and even other land companies.

CHAPTER 3

The Fur Traders

Trading with the Indians on the frontier had an unfortunate impact on the deteriorating political situation between Britain and the colonists. Not only was the British Army on the frontier intended to protect commercial activity, but it was also available for repressive action against the colonists; the close relationship between the pro-British fur traders and the Indians led to using the Indians in the struggle against the colonists.

The real economic value of the west developed after the French and Indian War when the west became a lucrative market for consumer goods that were sold not only to the Indians, but also to the white settlers, the Indian Department, and the army. To serve these customers, more than a thousand traders, large and small, moved into Canada and areas west of New York. About 130,000 Indians north of the Ohio River and around the Great Lakes, including Canada, were the largest group of consumers, but not the most profitable. Their demands for merchandise were limited by their ability to provide furs in exchange.

The fur trade was in chaos from 1768 to 1774 as the competition grew among the French and the other traders, the British from Canada, the Dutch from New York, and the Pennsylvanians. The Indians complained of unfair dealings, but the only government had been the British Army and the regiments were transferred to the Atlantic coast beginning in 1768. Another threat to the Indians was the pioneer settlers who were increasing in number rapidly from the time hostilities ended in 1760. On the other hand, the rush of settlers benefited the traders as new customers. Even though most of these families carried on subsistence farming, they needed additional articles, and their increasing numbers made this area of commerce noteworthy.

The province of Quebec had an estimated population of 65,000 in 1762, according to an estimate, and by 1775 had grown to 90,000. Governor James Murray in 1776 estimated that 76,000 lived in the province with 14,700 in Quebec and Montreal. The percentage living in the comparatively undeveloped areas in Canada was much greater than those living on the frontier in New York.

Britain's major interest in gaining control of Canada, Florida, and the west during the French and Indian War was that these areas were militarily strategic. France and Spain could be excluded from the North Atlantic, and their bases would be available for future operations in the Caribbean. For political reasons the economic, rather than military, value of these areas was stressed. However, at that time little attention was directed toward agriculture inasmuch as in the 18th century the only economic worth of Canada and the Old Northwest was the fur trade.

The overall economic value of exported furs to Britain decreased as tobacco from Virginia and rice from the Carolinas grew in importance. Deerskin and fur were of small consequence in view of the fact that peltry made up less than one-half of one percent of all imports into England, even after the acquisition of Canada. Furs amounted to but a small part of the total exports of the Thirteen Colonies. Compared to the £900,000 sterling or more worth of tobacco exported to England, only £100,000 sterling worth of fur and deerskin were exported, ranking peltry third behind rice among the exports of the continental colonies to England. What made the fur trade politically significant was that it was controlled by a relatively small number of merchants and the peltry was exported to continental Europe at a great profit.

The fur trade was the major business enterprise in Canada. The British merchants were the wholesalers, the colonials from New York and Pennsylvania with mostly lesser merchants, and the lower ranks of the trade were French. By 1774 there were more than fifty merchants from New York, Pennsylvania, and other colonies in Quebec and Montreal. The major rivalry from 1763 to 1774 allied the British merchants in Montreal and Quebec with the French Canadians versus the Albany traders who imported goods using the chain of waterways between Albany and Montreal. The Albany traders based at Oswego on Lake Ontario also competed with the French in direct sales to the Indians. Many of the Albany traders were of Dutch descent who were established at Albany, Schenectady, and Oswego. They were in bitter conflict with the more recently arrived British families and the royal officials.

In spite of the larger investment by the newcomers, the French remained numerically superior and completely filled the lower ranks. The French, and to an increasing degree *métis*, the sons of French traders and Indian women, were voyagers who worked the canoes for the merchants, or were lowly vagabonds who lived with the Indians while trading illegally without

licenses, or *hivernants* or winterers who, as agents of a merchant, set up a store in the hunting grounds to supply the Indians during the cold months. Between annual visits to the posts, the tribesmen relied on the *hivernants* and vagabonds as their major source of European merchandise.

Trade with the tribes remained in French hands not only because of their numerical superiority, but also through long experience they handled their dealings with the Indians more skillfully. The French had knowledge of the territory and, as a result, a well-established system of exchange. Nevertheless, the British soon learned to deal with the tribes and began encroaching on the French. The British, with their greater supply of capital, better business organization, better London contacts, and greater government protection, were then able to obtain a larger share of the trade. Although the French traders still outnumbered the British by four to one in the number of canoes sent out from Michilimackinac in 1767, the ten British traders sent more in value—£22,000 sterling worth as compared to only £16,000 by forty French traders.

By 1774 the French merchants in Quebec and Montreal had established contacts with suppliers of trade goods in London and other commercial centers in Britain. Competition between the new British merchants in Canada continued with the French slowly losing ground. The advantage held by the French was their long-standing relationship with farm families whose sons paddled the canoes for a few years to earn cash for their families. These ties went back generations and gave the French merchants a decided advantage in the 1760s, but it began to weaken in the 1770s. The *voyageurs*, the experienced traders who led the canoes, also had strong ties with the French merchants in Montreal and Quebec and also had ties, including country wives, with the tribes they visited every year. A country wife was a Native American woman living with a *voyageur* who came to the village every year or who lived full time with a *hivernant*, a trader who remained with the village year-around sometimes traveling to Montreal to purchase a new stock of trade goods or buying trade goods from a *voyageur*. The country wives gave birth to *métis* who often became assistants to the *hivernants* and replaced them eventually. The *métis* also were employed to paddle canoes and some became *voyageurs*.

General Thomas Gage noted the increase of French intrigue against the British traders in 1772 after two years of comparatively peaceful competition. Then both English and French were trading in the Great Lakes. The prejudice of the Indians against the English had eroded among the Lake Indians, and Gage expected the same to happen in the northwest. In Illinois, the British were beginning to make inroads, but few British traders would venture as far as the Ohio Valley.

There were two routes to the northwest, one north of Montreal over a series of rivers and portages to Lake Huron, and the other up Lake Ontario

to Fort Niagara, a portage around the Falls, and then across Lake Erie to Detroit and by way of Lake Huron and Lake Superior to the northwest.

The French merchants and fur traders were losing their livelihood to the British who were beginning to lead the canoes into the northwest, the territory north of Lake Superior. Because of the distance from Montreal, a greater investment was required. To launch an enterprise in the northwest required enough capital to sustain the trader for three or four years. First the goods had to be purchased in Montreal and transported by canoe to Niagara and carried around the Falls. Then the goods were placed on sloops that moved the packs to Michilimackinac. The engages, the six to eight men who paddled the canoes, arrived from Montreal and together with the voyageurs packed the master canoes for the long trip to Grand Portage at the western end of Lake Superior. The arrival of the canoes in the summer was the occasion for a great gathering of the tribes and the French traders who lived with them during the winter to trade the pelts gathered during the winter for a fresh supply of goods, guns, ammunition, knives, clothing, kettles, axes, and other supplies and rum. The advantage to the traders was that they received more fur for their goods than was possible at Detroit and Michilimackinac. When the negotiations were complete the master canoes returned to Montreal, and the Indians and winterers traveled farther west in smaller three-man canoes.

In 1773 Maurice Blondeau had reached the Saskatchewan River, and in 1774 Samuel Hearne reported that more than sixty canoes had set out from Grand Portage. Twenty or thirty went south of Lake Winnipeg and the others north of the lake to the Saskatchewan River. Franceway, Charles Paterson, James Tute, William Holmes, and Peter Pangman wintered 150 miles from Cumberland up the Saskatchewan. Joseph and Thomas Frobisher pushed north to the Churchill River. In 1775 the number of traders in the northwest increased sharply when they were forced to abandon trade along the colonial frontier because of competition with the Albany traders and the upheaval of the Revolution. The competition among the many traders became brutal and commonplace with theft, hijacking, and murder.

In Detroit and Michilimackinac the trade was divided among the French, the British, and the colonial merchants. In 1767 a petition of Detroit merchants listed one Albany trader, four traders with English names, four French traders, and one Jewish trader. Another petition in Detroit in 1767 listed seven British merchants, four Albany merchants, one trader from Pennsylvania, and three Scots.

The preponderance of Scots in Canada resulted in part from the discharge in America of Highland regiments that had fought in North America in the Seven Years' War. This move by the British government discouraged their return to Great Britain as they were from the same area that had supported the uprising of Bonnie Prince Charles against George II in 1745. The 42nd Black Watch, the 77th, and the 78th Regiments were recruited in Scotland

and sent to America. Simon Fraser, who raised the 78th Regiment, was the son of Simon, Lord Lovat, who was executed in 1745 for his role in the uprising. Between 4,000 and 5,000 Scots were sent to America in 1756 and 1757. The 77th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 42nd Regiment were disbanded in Pennsylvania in 1764, and the 78th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Regiment were disbanded in Canada. The discharged men were given three choices: accept a land grant in America and remain there, reenlist in the 42nd Regiment and return to Britain, or return to Scotland. Most decided to take the land and in later years brought their relatives in Scotland to America. The Scottish veterans also encouraged relatives and friends in Scotland to come to America. In 1765 Hugh Fraser, a former officer in the 78th Regiment, petitioned the governor of New York to grant 100 acres of land to each family that he had brought from Scotland and an additional larger grant for himself for sponsoring the development.

The deep-seated prejudice of the English aristocracy against the Scots, which was reinforced by their support of Bonnie Prince Charlie in 1745, suggests caution in noting negative statements concerning them in the documents. However, they did have faults. Governor James Murray in 1765 described the Scots in Canada as adventurers with little education or either novices in business or older merchants who had failed elsewhere. He thought that they were all out to make their fortunes by any means. Guy Carleton in 1767 described the Scots as discharged officers or men who had remained in Canada because they did not know what else to do or were entrepreneurs who could not remain in England and had come to Canada to make their fortune.

However, others admired the Scots who earned their way with hard work rather than relying on patronage. Life on the frontier was not easy. If they had political supporters, there were easier ways to gain advantages. For the Scots even the support of army friends did little to further business careers. The Scots made their fortunes with hard work.

The competition in Detroit between the French and the newcomers was severe. A major issue was the use of rum by the Dutch traders from New York. Because of the overuse of rum, according to Major Henry Basset, the British commander at Detroit, many of the Indians had not hunted as actively as in the past and very few furs and deerskins were available. In addition, because of the drunken exchanges, the Indians did not have food and came begging to Basset who fed them for fear that they would kill the livestock on the surrounding farms.

Rum and trade goods were also used by the traders to purchase provisions from the French farmers to stock the canoes bound for the northwest. The farmers sold farm products to the traders for goods rather than to the British Army. The British paid with vouchers that took months to transform into cash, and even the cash was less desirable to the traders who needed the provisions to stock their canoes. The army therefore was forced to buy

provisions from the traders at a higher price. The atmosphere was so clouded that Basset expected an attack on Detroit by the Indians as in 1763. Basset prepared to defend with the garrison, the militia, and the British traders, a total of 300 men.

Michilimackinac, a long-time French trading post located on the northern shore of the lower peninsula of Michigan, played two roles in the fur trade in the 1770s. Each year tribes from Lake Michigan and Lake Superior would paddle to Michilimackinac to trade the fur and deerskin gathered during the winter for guns, clothing, tools, and other trade goods. The post also served as a base where canoes were outfitted with provisions and goods to make the long trip to the northwest. Some traders even made the trip from Montreal or New York to sell their loads to the traders bound for the northwest. As one French trader noted in his journal, the Anglais with the load of my liquor arrived.

The quantity of fur passing through Michilimackinac was enormous. In 1773 4,000 packs of fur each weighing ninety pounds were shipped to Montreal from the post. The traders claimed a bad year because more traders were there than ever before.

The competition was severe and bloody at times. The Indians, dissatisfied with the terms, fought among themselves and robbed the traders. In 1772 Philip Boyle was killed, as well as two men who worked for Isaac Todd. The French traders also robbed one another. In 1773 Jean Marie DuCharme was robbed of all his goods by another Frenchman. Later the Spaniards confiscated a hundred packs of fur from DuCharme for trading illegally with the Indians on the Missouri River. In 1765 Daniel Clause seized DuCharme's goods at Detroit in punishment for supplying the Indians attacking Detroit in 1763 with ammunition that DuCharme had stolen from another trader.

The competition between the French and British traders on the frontier at times also turned ugly. Louis Chevalier was the major French trader at St. Joseph on Lake Michigan. The chiefs considered him the worst trader at St. Joseph as he sold large amounts of rum to the Indians rather than trade goods. In 1772 he was accused of conspiring with the local Pottawattomi to murder the employees of Cornelius Van Slyck, a trader from New York. According to the Pottawattomi chiefs, Chevalier instructed some local Indians to murder Van Slyck's men, steal their trade goods, and sell them to Chevalier. The Pottawattomi attempted to murder Van Slyck and his men, killing two of them and the third, a Frenchman, escaped to St. Joseph. Van Slyck was wounded but escaped leaving £1,500 New York in goods behind. The Pottawattomi chiefs took the goods, which included twenty blankets, three small barrels of gunpowder, three bags of lead ball bullets, a barrel of rum, and other items. The chiefs held Van Slyck's goods and returned them to Van Slyck when he came to St. Joseph later in the year. Chevalier and the other French traders could have saved all of the goods, but instead plundered along with the Indians.

Undaunted, Van Slyck took a large cargo of trade goods belonging to Alexander McKee, Jacobus Teller, and Van Slyck to St. Joseph in the fall of 1773. Van Slyck set up shop in a house near St. Joseph and began trading. On 14 December 1773 Van Slyck was attacked by six Indian men and women. When Van Slyck defended himself and killed one of the Indians, he claimed that every British trader who went to St. Joseph was either robbed or murdered by the Pottawattomi while the French were not harmed. Therefore Van Slyck accused the French of instigating the attacks.

In April 1772 General Gage issued an order that all the French vagabond traders must return to the trading posts. Gage believed that the French were stirring up trouble with the Indians in order to maintain control of the trade. In May John Stevenson called a conference with the Huron chiefs, who promised not to listen to the French.

In 1773 the British commander at Detroit, Colonel Henry Basset, retaliated by refusing to grant licenses to trade at St. Joseph from either Detroit or Michilimackinac despite requests from the Indians to deal with legal traders. Without legal traders and access to their trade goods, the Indians were forced to deal with the vagabonds who traded illegally at higher prices for inferior goods. In June 1773 the Pottawattomi brought some furs to Detroit, but Basset refused to permit them to sell the furs. He warned the Indians that unless they behaved better, no traders would be permitted to deal with them. Basset believed that Louis Chevalier and the other French traders at St. Joseph were causing the trouble.

Later Basset expressed his belief that the French were inclined to support the colonists. The French were torn between undesirable alternatives concerning the Revolution. They opposed the colonial traders from New York and Pennsylvania who were taking the fur trade away from them south of Detroit. They were even more antagonistic toward the settlers from Virginia who were taking Indian land and arousing the hatred of the tribes. Native American reaction to the settlers diverted their attention from hunting and trapping. The conflict meant that they had less to trade to the French. The most serious competition to the French was the British merchants in Montreal and Quebec who were making major inroads in the fur trade around the upper Great Lakes. The Native Americans were the allies of the French, with the exception of the Iroquois. However, the Indians had to ally themselves eventually with the British who offered protection from the settlers and the land speculators even though all of the tribes sought to remain neutral in the conflict and continued to trade with both sides.

The fur trade and land speculation dominated the frontier economy, and the rivalries for control of the trade led to the decision regarding the Revolution. French traders and the British traders from Montreal competed not only with each other but also traders for New York. The Scots were well represented on the New York frontier. Daniel Campbell, a Scot, was a prominent Schenectady merchant who established a sizable business in

Niagara and Detroit. John Macomb, who later gained prominence in Detroit, was active in Niagara from 1761 to 1766. Peter Van Brugh Livingston of New York City; Walter Rutherford, a former captain; and John Duncan, a former lieutenant in the 44th Regiment, formed a partnership and established a trading post near Fort Niagara. James Phyn, a Scot, entered the partnership later. John Porteus of Detroit and James Sterling were added to the partnership in 1765 to open business in Michilimackinac. In 1766 Alexander Ellice, a wealthy Scot, joined the combine. In 1770 the partners obtained a license to move £6,000 sterling (\$1,500,000 in 2007 dollars) worth of goods by schooners to Detroit. Phyn and Ellice were middlemen whose customers were the British Army, the Indian Department, and traders who dealt directly with the Indians. Through agents such as James Sterling and John Porteus, Phyn and Ellice extended their trade to Detroit, Michilimackinac, Illinois, and Grand Portage at the western tip of Lake Superior. In April 1772 Phyn sent hundreds of packs of goods, including large quantities of rum, to James Wilson, James Sterling, Charles Morison, John Askin, and others at Fort Niagara and Detroit.

The Scots were in competition with the Albany Dutch traders as well. The Albany Dutch were descendants of the Dutch settlers who came to the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam. In the 17th century the colony was ceded to Britain and became New York. The New York traders obtained goods in Albany that had sailed up the Hudson River in sloops. The goods were sent by wagon to Schenectady and loaded on canoes. The canoes went up the Mohawk River to Schoharie Creek to Oswego on Lake Ontario and then to Fort Niagara where the canoes were hoisted up a 100-foot bank and carried around the Falls. The Dutch traded with the Indians on the shore of Lake Ontario before the Seven Years' War and after 1763 competed with the French and British at Fort Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimackinac.

Rum was used more freely by the Dutch traders than the French. Some canoes reached Detroit loaded completely with rum. In January 1772 an association was being formed in Detroit by Alexander Grant who ordered 100 hogsheads of rum (each 235 gallons for a total of 94,000 quarts). Considering the association would be supplying at most 3,000 Indian adult males in the next six months, the amount was incredible, and the charge that the Albany traders used an excessive amount of rum in their trading was valid.

In January 1772 John Stevenson, the British commander in Detroit, informed Johnson that traders led by William Edgar and Collin Andrews were sending men to the Indian villages contrary to Stevenson's orders. He instructed the Indian chiefs to drive away these men. Stevenson thought the traders were a sad lot who would cut another's throat for a raccoon skin.

There were several Jews among the New York traders. Hayman Levy was a major merchant in New York City who purchased deerskins and fur from

Phyn and Ellice. One shipment alone was valued at more than £500 (\$72,000 in 2007 dollars). However, the business relationship was not happy, and Phyn consigned furs to Levy only as a last resort. In March 1772 Phyn warned his partner Alexander Ellis to beware of Levy as he could either ruin or promote a business venture. On the other hand, Phyn had good relations with the Dutch. In 1772 Phyn hired several boat crews that were employees of Jelles Fonda, the leading Dutch merchant in Albany. Phyn paid for their services with trade goods. Phyn also dealt with the French traders in Detroit. In March 1772 he arranged to sell more than £500 to Daniel Blouin, one of the leading merchants in Detroit who had agents at St. Joseph and Fort de Chartres. Blouin gave a list of the goods needed and promised to pay in deerskins and furs at the end of the summer.

Blouin insisted that the peltry not be sold to Hayman Levy as he did not wish to deal with Jews. This attitude of many of the French traders led the Jews to deal mostly among themselves. There were a few Jewish fur traders scattered about the west. Chapman Abram was in Detroit and Michilimackinac, agents of Gratz and Simon were in Illinois, and Gershon Levy was at Fort Niagara. In 1773 William Murray represented Bernard and Michael Gratz in Illinois. William Murray became a partner in the firm that included David Franks, James Rumsey, and Alexander Ross. Many Jewish merchants were in the fur trade in Pennsylvania and New York, as well as a few in Quebec and Montreal. In December 1773 Richard Winston, who was managing Baynton and Wharton's affairs in Illinois, noted that Jews from Montreal were coming to Illinois. McCarthy, an Irish Jew, and Levy were considered the worst of all devils by Winston.

In 1773 and 1774 the New York traders were challenging the traders from Montreal. In 1773 the value of skins exported from Canada was £32,085 compared to £5,624 from New York. In 1774 £38,228 in skins left Canada compared to £9,970 from New York. In 1773 New York had fifteen percent of the total, in 1774 twenty percent. In 1773 eighty-eight canoes were sent west, some of them elm bark canoes with three men, much smaller than the Canadian birch bark master canoes. In 1774 seventy-six canoes went west, mostly loaded with two-thirds rum.

In March 1773, General Gage was concerned about the likelihood of an Indian uprising. Only a few Seneca had appeared at Fort Niagara in the previous three months, whereas customarily they came in large numbers to trade in January and February. All of the Native American women and children had left the dangerous Fort Niagara area. A French trader was reported to be urging the Seneca to fight the English. At Detroit the Pottawattomi had murdered English traders, but Gage blamed the traders for selling the Indians too much rum. Gage also blamed the French traders at St. Joseph for encouraging the Indians to resist the English. In August 1773 the threat of

war with the Indians had reached Fort Pitt, and Arthur St. Clair requested that the trade goods ordered from Joseph Simons of Lancaster not be delivered. In August in Schenectady, Phyn and Ellice were curtailing their orders for trade goods to accumulate cash to move into the banking business. William Macomb purchased most of the trade goods from Phyn and Ellice in August 1774. The partners were in the money business in 1774 in effect borrowing sterling in London and then selling it in New York for New York currency at a great profit. The New York currency was then sent to Quebec to purchase sterling at a lower rate, and that sterling was used to pay off their loan in London.

Phyn and Ellice opposed the nonimportation agreements planned by the Continental Congress in late 1774 as such action would interfere with the fur trade. In November 1774 Ellice ordered trade goods from a relative in London to be sent to Quebec if delivery could not be made by way of New York.

The New York traders were increasingly active in the Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Lake Superior areas. Even though the exports from Canada were improving, the New York traders were gaining a greater share. The New York traders in Detroit sent agents south, some reaching as far as Carlisle and Lancaster in Pennsylvania. In 1772 Ferrall Wade, a New York trader, had a post at Toronto on the north shore of Lake Ontario and was trading up the Grand River. In 1773 Wade sent agents half way to Hudson Bay to trade with the Indians. He also forced V. Vighy, a Dutch trader, to leave the Toronto area.

When the Revolution began, the New York traders were shut out of the fur trade except for the Iroquois in New York. The British Army blocked their canoes at Fort Niagara, and the merchants were no longer able to obtain goods from Britain. Even in 1773 the Scottish firm of Phyn and Ellice was entering the grain trade and considered dissolving its partnership because of the competition of the Albany Dutch who formed their own ties with suppliers in London. They no longer needed Phyn and Ellice to act as middlemen. The Dutch also exported their furs directly rather than selling them to Phyn and Ellice.

The Dutch traders in New York had no love for the British monarchy, which had taken the Dutch colony in the 17th century and renamed it New York, severing the Albany Dutch ties with their homeland. The Dutch decision to support the colonists was not a difficult one. The Scots as well had no love for the monarchy and generally supported the Revolution. The New Yorkers who supported the British were generally wealthy recent newcomers with close ties to family and businesses in Britain.

In Pennsylvania the fur traders were divided by ethnic background and religion. The colony was ruled by Quakers, including the proprietors, the Penns, and the major mercantile firm of Baynton and Wharton. On the

frontier the fur traders were a mixture of Scots, Germans, and English. The mixed composition of the frontier was indicated by the four men who robbed John Dalton of some pots in Bedford in April 1772: Elias Myers and James Myers were probably Jewish, James McCausland was a Scot, and Thomas Girty was probably Irish. There were more Jews because of the religious toleration in Pennsylvania, and many were involved in frontier trade and land speculation. Bernard and Michael Gratz were major competitors of Baynton and Wharton. Among the Gratz customers were Charles McClure, Aenas Mackay, James Rumsey, William Murray, and two Jews, Isaac Adolphus and Moses Levy. Alexander McKee, the Indian agent at Fort Pitt, was a frequent buyer. The amounts transacted were large, £260, £724, £243, £150, and £360, ranging from \$19,000 to \$64,000 in 2007 dollars. Baynton and Wharton were dealing with a wide range of customers in amounts ranging from £1,100 to £2,000 (\$25,000 to \$50,000 in 2007 dollars). One customer owed Baynton and Wharton £8,000 (\$200,000). The two partnerships, the Gratz brothers and Baynton and Wharton, were major financial powers. Among the lesser traders were William West, James Backhouse, William Backhouse, Edward Morton, and William Lyon. Debts were often paid with deerskin and fur.

Liquor was a significant part of life on the Pennsylvania frontier. Sixteen men were issued licenses to sell liquor on the frontier in 1773. Selling rum to the Indians was very profitable, and many skirted the law. A large shipment of liquor presumably destined for the Indians and owned by Levy was seized at Fort Pitt in 1773. Levy claimed that the shipment was on its way to Detroit, not for local consumption. The quantities were enormous. In January 1772 Bernard and Michael Gratz sold two hogsheads (each 235 gallons) to Aenas Mackay for sale to the Indians along with other goods including Indian shirts, muslin and Irish linen cloth for shirts, and three half coats to be given to Indian chiefs. A total of 3,760 quarts of rum to be sold by a single trader in a few summer months indicates the volume of liquor being used.

The Indian Department also used large quantities of rum at meetings with the tribes. In September 1773 George Croghan bought a large supply of rum from Bernard Gratz to be used at a treaty conference. Liquor also arrived in different circumstances. On 29 September 1772, a Congregational preacher, David McClure, complained that some women brought eighteen gallons of rum from Fort Pitt to Muskingum. They had been hired by traders to sell the rum, and by nightfall the whole town was roaring drunk.

George Croghan, the Indian agent at Fort Pitt, was also involved in land speculation. In 1770 trade on the Pennsylvania frontier was in chaos. The nonimportation agreement had cut off the source of trade goods in Britain, and the Pennsylvania traders substituted large quantities of rum in order to obtain fur and deerskins. The result was violence on the part of drunken

Indians, who murdered some of the settlers in August 1770. Croghan tried to limit the amount of rum with little success.

In March 1770 Baynton and Wharton were closing down their trading store in Fort Pitt. By May George Morgan, a partner of Baynton and Wharton, had sold all of their goods except £1,800 worth left in the hands of Alexander McKee, the Indian agent at Fort Pitt, to give to the Indians at a treaty conference to be held in June. Morgan left for Illinois to manage Baynton and Wharton's affairs there, taking a few of the goods with him. The fur trade continued to decline. In 1772 Alexander McKee and John Ross informed Bernard and Michael Gratz that they were winding up their business in Fort Pitt. They were selling all their goods at a discount to other traders to pay debts and sent their remaining pelts to Bernard and Michael Gratz. McKee bitterly commented that Bernard and Michael Gratz were the only gainers in his enterprise.

In 1773 Joseph Simons and John Campbell were partners trading at Fort Pitt dealing with George Croghan and Bernard and Michael Gratz. In 1774 the remaining fur traders at Fort Pitt supported Arthur St. Clair and the Pennsylvania claim to the area. In the summer the Virginians led by John Connolly, Joseph Simons, and John Campbell planned to take control of the fur trade at Fort Pitt. Croghan and St. Clair planned to move the Pennsylvania fur traders to a new fort at Kittanning. The trade goods and furs would then pass through Kittanning, which was linked to Philadelphia by a road to Frankstown on the Juanita River, and then to the West Branch of the Susquehanna River. In July 1774 the Virginians assembled a group of men to intercept a shipment of trade goods bound for Fort Pitt, but St. Clair was warned and sent men to protect the shipment. In August John Butler was moving a load of trade goods to establish the new trading post at Kittanning when he was arrested by John Campbell on suspicion of illegally planning to trade with the Indians in their villages.

While the Virginians were forcing the Pennsylvania traders out of Fort Pitt, Baynton and Wharton, Bernard and Michael Gratz, and David Franks were moving their fur trade operations to Illinois and began investing in other areas. In March 1770 George Morgan was in Illinois and requested the hardware necessary to build a gristmill and sawmill. Surprisingly, John Baynton engaged Joseph Simons, a Virginia supporter, to provide these supplies. A blacksmith near Lancaster would actually make the parts. Other tools that Morgan had ordered were to be delivered to Joseph Dobson and carried from Fort Pitt down the Ohio River in David Franks's boats, indicating a certain level of cooperation among the competing firms, or at least a willingness to profit from one another. In another surprising turn, John Baynton suggested that John Campbell, an adherent of the Virginia party in Fort Pitt, be hired for nine months to assist Morgan in Illinois. Perhaps experienced men, whatever their allegiance was, were in short supply or Baynton chose to ignore the fact that both Simon and Campbell had

been part of the group that drove Baynton and Wharton from business in Fort Pitt.

By January 1772 Baynton and Wharton's operations in Illinois continued to decline and went bankrupt. George Morgan had returned to Philadelphia and insisted he was not at fault because he had objected to the plan from the beginning. In 1766 Wharton insisted that Morgan go to Illinois in his place because Wharton's wife was six months pregnant. Wharton promised to replace Morgan after six months, but changed his mind and instead in 1768 went to Fort Stanwix to purchase land from the Iroquois. Again Wharton was to replace Morgan after the treaty was signed, but failed to follow through as usual. Morgan blamed Wharton for reckless investments, including the expenses at Fort Stanwix that ran the firm into debt.

In February 1772 John Finley was selling off the assets of Baynton and Wharton in Illinois. John Campbell purchased some of the items. Campbell was associated with John Connally in purchasing the distillery in Illinois. The distillery and other property were placed under the care of Alex Williamson after Finley left Illinois in August. Some of the goods were sold to David Franks, William Murray, and James Rumsey who sued Baynton and Wharton in May 1772 on the grounds that the goods were damaged. Because Finley was needed to help defend Baynton and Wharton in the case, Finley was ordered to bring with him all peltry and any portable items along with all books and papers.

One of the reasons Baynton and Wharton failed in Illinois was the order of the British government in March 1772 that all French residents in the Vincennes area were to leave and return to Quebec. The official who delivered the orders to the French was intercepted by Indians who threatened to kill him. The British orders also required that all vagabond traders were to cease trading with the Wabash tribe.

Another reason for Baynton and Wharton's failure was the loss of the military market. Fort de Chartres was torn down, and the British regiment was returned to the Atlantic coast. General Thomas Gage proposed that a deputy Indian Department agent be placed on the Wabash River and distribute goods to the tribes to compensate for the loss of the French traders. By September 1772 Fort de Chartres was destroyed.

Fifty soldiers were to remain at Kaskaskia where the Indians were rebellious. For example, British soldiers intervened when an argument erupted at a trader's store. When one of the trader's employees was killed, the soldiers fired on the Indians, killing two and wounding three. Because of these conflicts, Sir William Johnson was concerned as to what would happen when the troops were removed. He feared that the French would take advantage of the lack of authority and arouse the Indians against the British traders.

Also in September 1772 Gage ordered the British troops to abandon Fort Pitt and move to the coast. The buildings in the fort were given to George

Croghan. All of these moves were an attempt to save money. The troops could be supplied directly from Britain when they were on the coast rather than being forced to pay high transportation costs for some supplies and pay local farmers inflated prices for rations. The net loss of income to the frontier was substantial. The loss of military purchases when the troops moved to the coast was a major blow to Baynton and Wharton.

In April 1773 Richard Winston was entrusted with Baynton and Wharton's interests in Illinois. He was instructed to end the partnership with Viviat and Elliott and close all of Baynton and Wharton's business in Illinois. He was to sell the property for £1,000 Pennsylvania and the slaves at £120 each. By June 1773 Baynton and Wharton had received a total of £9,106 (\$1,225,000 in 2007 dollars) in returns from Illinois. Many debts were still unpaid; for example, William Connolly owed £1,900 (\$240,000).

The Indian Department and the British Army were major customers of Baynton and Wharton in Illinois. Colonel Andrew Wilkins, the commander, promised Morgan that he would open a post at Vincennes if Morgan gave him five percent of the total sales. Morgan sent a large quantity of goods for the Indians and cattle, pigs, and flour for army rations to Vincennes, but Wilkins refused to certify the purchases to enable Morgan to collect payment from the British government. In October 1773 Wilkins owed Baynton and Wharton £3,580 (\$450,000), but he continued to take goods from Morgan's store at Vincennes. In January 1774 Morgan asked Samuel Wharton whether any payments had been made.

William Rumsey, who managed the Gratz affairs in Illinois, was ineffective and ruining his company. In October 1773 he owed £9,985 Pennsylvania (\$1,250,000) to Baynton and Wharton. Morgan sued him and seized all of his goods. Wharton was accusing Morgan of unfair dealing in Illinois in September 1773. Morgan's affairs had deteriorated since John Finley delegated control to Richard Winston who was drunk every day and buying land and slaves for his private use rather than tending to Baynton and Wharton's affairs. Morgan still trusted the inefficient Winston and believed that he would send payments via New Orleans in October. In December Winston sent only £200 (\$25,000), explaining that the people in Illinois were poor and could repay debts only piecemeal. Also in December 1773 Winston was working with Patrick Kennedy who had returned to Philadelphia and warned Kennedy not to do business with Baynton and Wharton. Obviously Winston was not an honest agent of Baynton and Wharton.

In March 1774 Baynton and Wharton were still selling assets in Illinois. Their still was sold to Daniel Blouin in return for several thousand pounds of flour that Thomas Bentley was to sell on the open market for indigo, Spanish dollars, or bills of exchange. The fortunes of the partnership continued to decline in Illinois with the loss of the army and Indian Department customers. In October 1774 Morgan resigned from Baynton and Wharton.

The enormous losses in Illinois coupled with the refusal of the British government to validate the purchase of land at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix turned the Quakers Baynton and Wharton against Britain. Bernard and Michael Gratz also lost money in Illinois because of British policy, which basically favored the Indians and the French at the expense of the colonists.

The Illinois market was choice and its potential value was the result of the convenience of shipping furs down the Mississippi River to New Orleans in a matter of days to be loaded directly on vessels bound for England rather than rowing upstream on the Ohio River and overland to Philadelphia. The delivery of trade goods to Illinois was also simplified by using the Ohio River, traveling downstream in a matter of days. By 1772 Illinois had become a major source of fur. Twelve hundred packs (each about ninety pounds) were exported from New Orleans. In 1773 the number increased to 2,467 and in 1775, 14,115 packs, 635 tons of deerskin and fur. In October 1773 Morgan instructed his agent in Illinois, John Hanson, to assemble and take his pelts down to New Orleans. There he was to take a ship to Philadelphia or New York. Morgan wanted only beaver, otter, and raccoon as they could be sold at double the value in Illinois. Pelts other than those mentioned would not sell in Philadelphia.

Because the export of fur from a British colony could be made only to Britain under British trade laws, in 1773 the British commander at Fort de Chartres ruled that everyone shipping pelts to New Orleans must report the number to him and post a bond of £200 to guarantee that the furs were shipped to Britain. However, the rule was never put into effect because the commander did not have the authority to impose such rules.

In New York and Pennsylvania the enormous losses by the merchants involved in the fur trade were the result of French opposition and British interference. The government in London was more sympathetic to the welfare of the tribes and of the British merchants in Montreal and Quebec than they were to the colonial merchants and land speculators. Repeatedly the London officials issued orders that sacrificed the interests of the New York and Pennsylvania merchants and favored the Indians and the British merchants. There is little wonder that the colonial merchants would support opposition to British rule.

The French fur traders were losing ground to the British merchants and the New York traders in the Great Lakes area, as well as to the Pennsylvania traders west of Fort Pitt. Given the choice of two evils, the French remained neutral for the most part. The French continued to compete with the British merchants vigorously for the Great Lakes fur trade, but made little if any attempt to support the colonist's military efforts in the St. Lawrence Valley. The French traders north of the Ohio River encouraged the tribes to oppose both the British and colonial traders and especially the Virginian settlers who were taking Indian land in the Ohio Valley.

With an exceedingly complex mixture of economic factors, there was little military action in the early years of the Revolution other than the continuation of the Indian raids on the frontier settlements. Later in the war, the colonists launched attacks against Montreal, western New York, and down the Ohio River, which evoked a backlash by the British and active involvement by the tribes in support of the British. However, for the most part the early years were comparatively peaceful on the frontier.

CHAPTER 4

The Settlers

On the eve of the Revolution the northern frontier was far from a desolate unoccupied wilderness. There was military and commercial activity on the Great Lakes and the Ohio River that had considerable impact on the struggle between the American colonies and the mother country. The influx of white settlers was crowding the tribes on the frontiers. Even though only a small percentage of white men lived on the frontier, their farming drove away the animals and thus deprived the Indians of their livelihood.

The density of white population was low—less than 100,000 people lived on the northern frontier. Western New York was sparsely settled with military garrisons at Niagara, Oswego, and a few other points. The Mohawk Valley had a considerable agricultural settlement, and towns were developing at Schenectady and Albany. The population of the province of New York, according to the Census of 1756, was 96,765, of which only 17,424 lived in Albany County that included the frontier. The remainder lived within eighty miles of New York City. According to the Census of 1771, the population of the province had grown to 182,247, of which 47,375 lived in frontier counties. These numbers indicate a rapid growth in the comparatively undeveloped areas of New York within a period of only fifteen years. Expansion at this rate created a busy market for the merchants of Albany and Schenectady.

In Pennsylvania the frontier population was very sparse. The Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement west of the mountains except for small villages along the road to Fort Pitt for the convenience of the army and fur traders. In June 1777 there were seven posts in western Pennsylvania. Kittanning was fifty miles from Fort Pitt and had a garrison of a company of the Continental Army. Muncie's Bottom was a stockade with only nine

men. Rordon's Bottom forty miles down the Ohio River from Fort Pitt had sixteen men. At the mouth of Yellow Creek, fifteen miles farther down the Ohio River from Rordon's Bottom, was a post with twenty-one men. Mingo Bottom was twenty miles farther down the Ohio River with nineteen men. Wheeling had a garrison of a company of militia. At the mouth of Grave Creek, twelve miles farther down the Ohio River from Wheeling, was a company of militia. Fort Randolph on the Great Kanawha River had two companies of regulars with 100 men. Pioneers settled around these posts for protection. In May 1777 there were three settlements in Kentucky: Harrodsburg had 201 people, Boonesborough had 50, and Logan's Station had 30.

To these people colonial governors and assemblies were far away and the rule of England still farther. Legalities were of little importance. They were involved in a life-and-death struggle with the wilderness and for the most part had to govern themselves. The Virginia settlers had many problems, which overshadowed any concern for politics. Their primary danger was the Indians. The Shawnee raided the Kentucky settlements that stood between them and the Cherokee, the traditional foes of the Shawnee and target of their annual war parties.

Competition with Pennsylvania settlers for the land resulted from the lack of a defined boundary between the two colonies. Poor communications with the east and lack of a market for farm products hampered economic growth. Land was a major concern for the settlers who believed that they had won the land during the French and Indian War that was being awarded to speculators by the British government and by the Virginia governor appointed by the British.

Settlement began around Fort Pitt in 1770. The first settlers came from central counties like York. Only a few hundred people were living in western Pennsylvania in 1766. By 1774 there were 47,000 and in 1790, 65,000. Most of the people lived around Fort Pitt as there were no other significant towns.

There were three types of settlers. Some occupied a few acres and planted Indian corn. They moved farther west when other settlers moved in. The second group built substantial cabins, but did not work the land intensively and often lost their land. The third group worked very hard, building barns and caring for livestock as well as growing a variety of crops.

The settlers in western Pennsylvania resented the power of the more wealthy in the east, the Quakers, the Anglicans, the merchants in Philadelphia, and the pacifist Germans. In the west were the Scotch-Irish and the Lutheran Germans. Many of them were veterans discharged from the Scottish regiments and the Royal American Regiment, which was composed of German mercenaries. Status in the west was based on the ability to farm profitably and shoot well, as opposed to the east dominated by wealth, social standing, and family ties. For the most part, the settlers fought their own battles

against the Indians. In contrast the Quakers sought to protect the Indians. The establishment in the east tended to remain loyal to Britain, which also sought to protect the Indians, while the settlers opposed British rule. A combination of the lower class in Philadelphia and the people in the central and western counties gained control of the government of Pennsylvania and placed it firmly in support of the Revolution. The west felt more antagonism toward the eastern leaders than against Britain.

Many of the settlers in western Pennsylvania were Scotch-Irish, Scots, and Irish. In 1790 these three groups formed more than a third of the population. In general they were not prosperous. Some were discharged British soldiers who received grants of land in reward for their service in the Seven Years' War. Others were indentured servants who had served their time and emigrated to the west, often farming land that was not legally theirs as squatters. Others, including many Scotch-Irish, had been encouraged to emigrate to America by land speculators with the promise of cheap farmland. Another third were English and twelve percent were German. The English settlers came over Braddock's Road from Virginia. The English tended to be better off, either owning their farms or being in business. The Germans were either discharged soldiers from the 60th Royal American Regiment or farmers who came from Germany to purchase cheap farmland.

The lack of a defined border between Virginia and Pennsylvania caused serious problems in the Fort Pitt area in 1773. Squatters, settlers from Virginia and Maryland, were moving into the area and simply taking land. Court records reveal that the squatters quarreled over the farms, and the stronger man would displace the weaker as neither had legal title. Some of the settlers had paid fees to Virginia only to find that the land was already occupied by settlers from Pennsylvania who refused to give up the land.

George Washington owned some land at Chartiers Creek near Fort Pitt that was taken over by squatters in the spring of 1773. They were removed by men sent by William Crawford, but they returned. Crawford asked Washington for men to clear the land and build cabins and more men to protect them. By December 1773 a dozen squatters had occupied Washington's land on Chartiers Creek, encouraged by George Croghan and his half brother Major Edward Ward. The squatters drove away the men sent by Washington and Crawford, and although Crawford sent men to remove them, they returned as soon as Crawford's men left. Crawford thought the only solution was to hire men to clear the land and then rent it to settlers. The squatters held the land during the Revolution, and in 1784, after losing a court case brought by Washington, some of the squatters purchased their land from Washington.

Many Scotch-Irish came to America after the famine of 1740. About 12,000 persons left Ulster for America annually for several years. Another surge came in 1770. Fifty thousand Scotch-Irish came to America from 1770 to 1775, most to Pennsylvania. Many of the squatters in Pennsylvania

were Scotch-Irish or Germans, but the majority were settlers from England and had been in America several generations. The Irish hated the absentee landlord system that prevailed in Ireland into the 19th century. The Scotch-Irish had taken land illegally in Northern Ireland and continued to do so when they came to America. Many settled first in the Cumberland Valley and then moved west to Bedford and Westmoreland. In 1743 the Pennsylvania government, the proprietors, began to eject squatters and survey the land east of the mountains. The squatters had to purchase their land or move west.

The dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania over the boundary was of great concern to the settlers. To gain their support, Arthur St. Clair circulated petitions for the formation of a new Pennsylvania county. On the basis that a new county organization was essential to combat the Virginia claims, he convinced the Pennsylvania council to create Westmoreland County in February 1773. Among those selected for justice of the peace were St. Clair, Robert Hanna, Thomas Gist, and William Crawford. The judicial function was important in county government on the frontier. Cases of minor crime were numerous. The county court also registered land deeds and arbitrated civil differences. It awarded liquor licenses, which were of political importance. John Barr combined his license with the keeping of a disorderly house, a euphemism for a brothel. The tavern keeper was the only dealer in cash purchases; all other activities were on a barter basis. The county seat was the place for the yearly militia parade and other official functions. Its location was a political plum. Robert Hanna, tavern keeper and founder of Hanna's Town, had political control of the new county of Westmoreland and placed the seat at Hanna's Town. The fact that the seat was placed at Hanna's Town rather than Pittsburgh indicated the lack of recognition of Pennsylvania in the Redstone-Pittsburgh area. Because there were more settlers in the western side of the county, had they voted in the Westmoreland elections, they would have far outnumbered the eastern side. Then frontiersmen who wished to support Pennsylvania were forced to make a long journey to plead a case in court. Logically the seat should have been at Pittsburgh, the largest town and the true center of the county.

Among the Pennsylvanians was Thomas Barr, who was born in 1749 and settled west of Laurel Hills in 1770. John Carmichael was born in Cumberland County about 1757, crossed the mountains in 1774, and settled near Redstone Creek. He was a miller and a distiller. Edward Cook, born in the Cumberland Valley of English parents in 1738, went west in 1772 and built a house on the Monongahela River in 1776. He was a storekeeper, a distiller, and a slave owner. Ephriam Douglas, born in the South in 1749, went to Fort Pitt in 1769 to work in the Indian trade. Robert Hanna was an Irish innkeeper at Hanna's Town. Christopher Lobinger, a German, was born in Lancaster County in 1740 and in 1772 was at Mount Pleasant. John McClelland was born in Lancaster County in 1734. Alexander Lowry was

born in Northern Ireland in 1727 and was taken as an infant to Lancaster County in the same year. He entered the Indian trade in 1748 with Joseph Simons. John Moore was born in 1738 in Lancaster County. James O'Hara came to America in 1772 from Ireland and became an Indian trader with Devereaux Smith in 1773. John Ormsby, who had British military experience in Fort Pitt in 1760, was in the Indian trade in 1763 and was one of the traders claiming compensation in land for losses in the French and Indian War. Arthur St. Clair, born in Scotland, had British military experience and settled in Bedford County in 1770. James Smith, born in Cumberland County in 1737, had military experience in the French and Indian War. Van Swearingen came from Berkely County, Virginia, in 1774 to the Monongahela River.

Although many of the fur traders were British born, most of the leaders of the Pennsylvania party were born in the counties just east of the mountains or had lived there for some period. Many of the Pennsylvanians crossed the mountains after 1769 as tavern keepers, distillers, shop keepers, and fur traders. In general, they profited from the maintenance of a peaceful policy with the Indians who allowed them to trade. Those who arrived after 1769 had limited experience with the frontier and did not have the intense hatred of the Native Americans as did the Virginians.

The Germans settled in Bedford, Westmoreland, and Fayette counties. When political power shifted to the new immigrant group, the policy of peaceful relations and trade with the Indians changed to one of aggression to obtain Indian land.

To provide goods for the west, most of the merchants located in Montreal, Albany, Schenectady, Fort Pitt, Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Illinois. After the conquest of Canada, when commercial ties were cut between the French merchants and France, the British and the colonials developed their own wholesale importing business. Agents were sent to Canada by colonial firms that had already gained experience on the frontier in Pennsylvania and New York. A few New York traders moved to Montreal, but most New Yorkers continued to operate from Albany and Schenectady.

The men who paddled the canoes and drove the wagons in the trade from the Hudson River to the Great Lakes were Dutch. Dutch farmers from the Mohawk Valley assumed these roles just as the sons of French farmers along the St. Lawrence River had done for the French fur traders. In 1764 five sleighs of provisions for the Indians were delivered to Sir William Johnson by Mindert Wimple, Cetrean Veddiers, Harramans Vedder, Mindert R. Wimple, and John M. Vader.

In addition to filling the roles of petty merchant and laborer, the Dutch were also represented in the merchant class. Many had connections extending across the Atlantic. Family connections were important. David Van der Heyden of New York dealt with his brother, Dirk, in London. Gerrard G.

Beeckman of New York and William Beeckman of Liverpool supplied Jacob and John Beeckman in Albany.

Sir William Johnson thought the Dutch had become so imperious that one could not bear them. He called them low-lived rascals who refused to serve in the militia because they thought the English discriminated against them. Commissions in the militia were highly sought after, and Johnson was appointed colonel of one of the regiments and awarded many of his friends with commissions.

Unlike the French in Canada, the Albany traders had good connections in England and could bypass the British merchants. By 1767 the Albany traders had established stores in Detroit and their names appear along with the colonial merchants in petitions. The Albany traders also had an extensive trade with the settlers in the Mohawk Valley and the tribes in New York. Johnson complained of these traders who traded cheap rum to the Indians and made enormous profits rather than providing the Indians with needed items. An observer described their business methods. They sell the Indians rum and, after getting them drunk, cheat them when trading their furs for other goods. A disgrace to the colonies, the Albany traders cheated the Indians and provoked them to retaliate. In Detroit, Captain James Stephenson described the Albany traders as a sad set who could cut one another's throats for a raccoon skin.

There was a small number of women in the frontier settlements. In September 1777 the population of Harrodstown included 198 persons. Of these eighty-one were men fit to bear arms, four men unfit for service, twenty-four women, fifty-eight children under ten years of age, twelve children over ten, and nineteen slaves including seven under ten years of age. Nearly a third of the men were married and had more than two children. Most of the children were young. Because there were few men available as hired hands, much of the farm work was done by women and older children.

Not all of the women were married. One diary reported the arrival of Miss Grimes, a fine blooming Irish girl and that "the flesh overcame the spirit." In 1775 Major Crawford, a leading figure on the frontier, shared his mistress with his brother, half brother, and son. Women were at risk from the Indians as well. In September 1777 a woman was killed only 150 yards from a frontier fort.

Women were necessary not only for companionship but to work in the fields and maintain a home. Many of the wives of settlers were formerly indentured servants. In the 18th century an individual in Britain could sign a document that would obligate him or her to serve a person for a stated period of time, usually several years or more. Parents could also indenture one of their children as an apprentice in return for a payment. An adult could receive passage from Britain to America by agreeing to serve a number of years. These contracts, called redemptions, were sold to those who needed workers. Persons who had committed petty crimes were also bound

over as indentured servants. John Baynton and Samuel Wharton, the wealthy Philadelphia merchants, conducted a business finding the people in Britain, paying their passage to America, and then selling them in America for a commission. Baynton and Wharton placed advertisements in Philadelphia announcing the arrival of a group of men and women servants and their availability for purchase. Indentured servants were most common in Pennsylvania. Bernard Gratz, a Philadelphia merchant in the fur trade, sent Patrick Walsh, a blacksmith, to the frontier along with an indentured servant to repair items for the Indians. Almost two-thirds of their immigrants there were indentured white servants, mostly farm laborers and domestic servants. The indentured servants were preferred to slaves, especially German farm workers.

There was also a constant flow of indentured servants to Virginia, and they were advertised in the *Virginia Gazette*. George Washington made use of indentured servants to improve his land near Fort Pitt. In March 1774 more than twenty servants left Mount Vernon for Redstone. George Washington purchased four convicts, four indentured servants with three-year terms, and a man and his wife with a four-year term for £110 (\$27,500 in 2007 dollars). They were country people, rather than city dwellers, and Washington expected them to do well. His servants did not wish to be sold, preferring to remain in Washington's employ. To hinder their sales, they would pretend to be ill or even cut themselves with axes. Washington believed that they were accustomed to hard work and would be loyal employees. They promised that they would not run away and would serve their time faithfully. One Scottish convict working for Washington in the west ran away in July 1774. Although Washington did send a few black slaves to work on his land, most of the people were indentured servants.

The conduct of the indentured servants was enforced by the courts. If they misbehaved, their time of servitude would be extended by the court. There were many servants on the Pennsylvania frontier, and many court cases involved extending the time to serve because of bad behavior, illness, or being imprisoned for crimes. An indentured servant girl in Westmoreland County had her time extended for a year and a half after she gave birth to a child fathered by a slave. The problem of runaway servants was especially difficult on the frontier as the servant could simply move to an undeveloped area and begin farming. The number of indentured servants in Pennsylvania decreased during the war as the stream of new immigrants from Ireland and Germany was blocked by the Royal Navy and the time of service for previous servants ran out.

Slavery was an accepted institution in Pennsylvania and Virginia in the mid-18th century. However, the Quakers opposed the ownership of slaves by its members with the intent to halt the purchase or possession of slaves. In 1712 the Quakers attempted to increase the duty imposed for the import

of each slave from £1 to £20, but the law was disallowed by the British government.

The goal was to exclude any Quaker who had slaves from church meetings. In general slaves were well treated in Pennsylvania, equal to the treatment afforded the indentured servants. On the frontier some of the pioneers held one or two slaves to work their farms. In Fayette County in 1780 forty-one slave owners owned two or more slaves. The owners with the most slaves were Edward Cook with seven, Thomas Brown with six, William McCormick with five, James Finley with eight, Van Swearingen with nine, William Goe with ten, and Robert Beall with eighteen. Obviously slave ownership on the frontier was not like the large plantations in the east, but rather the equivalent of the hired hand on small farms. There were exceptions. In April 1753 Christopher Gist took eleven slave families to a plantation in Fayette County to work the land and work as tradesmen.

The slave owners in Westmoreland County in 1780 were the prominent wealthy people, including two clergymen and all of the Scottish Presbyterian Church officials. There was a total of 342 male and 349 female slaves. The total number of slaves in Pennsylvania in 1775 was only 2,000, while the general population had increased rapidly in the previous decade as a result of the immigration of Germans and Irish and a high birthrate. The slave importers claimed that slaves kept down the cost of labor. Slavery was profitable to fill the need for domestic servants and farmhands, and it was a great sacrifice to free all the slaves in Pennsylvania in 1776. In 1780 there were 10,000 blacks in Pennsylvania, but only 4,000 were slaves.

The Virginians on the frontier were divided on the issue of slavery as well. Most of them favored slavery as contributing to the economy, while others were opposed on the grounds that it resembled the relationship of the British aristocracy and the farmers. Slavery was prevalent on the Pennsylvania-Virginia frontier. More than ninety percent of the 400 settlers in the area came from Virginia, and all of them who could afford it had one or two slaves. In 1763 sixty-three families settled at Gist Point, owning a total of twenty-three slaves. A poll taken by Cat Fish court in August 1773 listed 324 white males, 124 slaves, 24 horses, 326 oxen, and 62 mules.

There were exceptions. In 1766 Joseph Morris settled at Fort Morris with eighteen slaves. Captain MacGruder from Maryland settled at Redstone in 1770, purchasing several parcels of land. He brought twenty to thirty slaves to clear the land and later to work in a powder mill. George Washington was one of the leading slave owners whose agent, Valentine Crawford, employed them to work Washington's extensive land holdings. In 1774 Crawford sold most of the slaves because of the fear that with the outbreak of the war and Indian raids, many would run away. He sold them at the rate of £65 (\$16,500 in 2007 dollars) for a man and wife and two men for £45. He sold all except two men who were injured and could not be sold.

Slave traders were active in Pennsylvania. Bernard and Michael Gratz, merchants active in the fur trade, tried to sell a slave to Aenas Mackay, an Indian trader, in 1772. Baynton and Wharton, the wealthy Philadelphia merchants also active in the fur trade and land speculation, sent a cargo of slaves to Illinois to be sold to the French there. Thomas Hughes was a major slave trader on the Pennsylvania frontier. When a settler was fined by a court, he sold his two slaves to Thomas Hughes in April 1773. Hughes offered slaves at a public sale each month. In order to build a road in the area, a layman was hired to direct three slave lashers, and slaves were rented from local owners. Thomas Hughes provided twenty, Joseph Morris, ten; Richard Hickman, ten; and James Harrod, six slaves.

The relationship between master and slave was not pleasant. George Washington hired two slave lashers, so-called because they carried leather whips not unlike those used to control carriage horses. The threat of punishment was used to obtain the maximum effort from the slaves. Children of slave families were callously sold at auction. If a slave ran off, he was severely punished when he was returned to his master.

Slavery declined during the Revolution. Slavery never took hold in Westmoreland County. In 1780 Pennsylvania began the emancipation of slavery. In response to this threat of loss of property, Virginia slave owners took their slaves out of Westmoreland County in the disputed Fort Pitt area down the Ohio River to Kentucky.

The settlers on the frontier believed that many of their problems were the result of little or no representation in Pennsylvania's government. The assembly in 1771 consisted of twenty-six members from the three eastern counties and ten members from the remaining five counties. Creation of new counties increased the number of members to fifteen, still a minority.

On 9 March 1771 Bedford County was created with Archibald Lochry as treasurer and William Thompson as assembly representative. The three justices of the peace were George Wilson, Dorsey Pentecost, and William Croghan, a nephew of George Croghan. George Wilson wrote to Arthur St. Clair in August 1771 concerning the attempts to undermine Pennsylvania control of the area. As justice of the peace of Bedford County, Wilson had one of the Virginia supporters arrested. In September 1771 St. Clair informed Joseph Shippen, Jr., that Thomas Cresap was spreading the story that the Pennsylvania territory ended at the Laurel Hills and that the land west belonged to George Croghan or was still the property of the British monarch. This activity was making it difficult to enforce Pennsylvania laws. Settlers from Virginia and Maryland refused to pay taxes to Bedford County. In September 1772 the settlers at Redstone near Fort Pitt refused to pay for the construction of a courthouse and other expenses on the grounds that their land was part of the new colony of Vandalia being promoted by Baynton and Wharton and their agent George Croghan. The settlers refused to pay taxes until it was proven that they were in Pennsylvania.

In 1773 Westmoreland County was formed west of the Laurel Hills because the Penn family, the proprietors of the colony, feared the claim by Virginia that the area belonged to that colony as the boundary had never been surveyed. Westmoreland County, which included Fort Pitt and the surrounding villages, was controlled by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania while the economy was in the hands of fur traders headed by George Croghan and the Philadelphia merchants. Arthur St. Clair represented the proprietors. He had managed the petition creating the county and represented the county in dealing with the council and the Penns. In July 1772 Arthur St. Clair wrote to Joseph Shippen, Jr., enclosing documents demonstrating the efforts of Colonel Cresap and George Croghan to resist Pennsylvania authority in the area. St. Clair warned that Philadelphia merchants were behind the effort to establish Virginia control of the Fort Pitt area.

In July 1772 George Croghan was the leader of a movement to prevent the collection of Pennsylvania taxes by the sheriff and tax collectors in the Fort Pitt area. When the collectors tried to collect from Croghan, he threatened to kill them as he claimed that his land was thirty miles from the Pennsylvania boundary.

Claiming land was easy in Virginia, but obtaining legal possession before the Revolution was difficult and had the disadvantage of making the owner liable to quit rents. Quit rents were yearly payments to the Crown used to support the Virginia colonial government. The dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania concerning the Fort Pitt area was a convenient means of avoiding payment to either colony.

Virginia land law included a provision that land held in entail could not be sold by its owner, but must be passed on complete to his heir. An amendment to that law in 1734 permitted the sale of land held in entail not exceeding the value of £200 sterling (\$50,000 in 2007 dollars) and not contiguous to other land owned by the same person. The £200 sterling indicated the market value of the land that was selling on the frontier for as low as £3 (\$750 in 2007 dollars) and up to £15 per hundred acres. The amendment of 1734 seriously weakened the law of entail and made its abolition in 1776 a less important step.

The great landholders of Virginia held the political power in the colony. Their surrender in the matter of entail was only a paper loss. The abolition of primogeniture came only after a hard struggle beginning in 1777 and finally passing in 1785. The abolition of royal quit rents and substitution of taxes was to the eastern landowners' advantage because the frontiersmen were evading the feudal dues and would be caught by the county taxes.

In comparison with the generous provisions of Virginia law for acquiring title to land on the frontier, the proprietors of Pennsylvania held a far tighter grasp on their land. In the early 18th century the Penns sold land in Pennsylvania through a land office located in Philadelphia. Settlers were forbidden to purchase land from the Indians without an order from the proprietor or

his agent. Although the proprietors granted large tracts of land to friends for token payments, they generally sold it in small parcels. In 1765 a limit of 300 acres was placed on tracts unless otherwise ordered by the proprietor. The cost of the land was set at £5 per 100 acres and actual settlement was required.

The price was so high that the law was ignored. The land was taken up by squatting, which became so common that the Penns' land office almost ceased functioning during the early years of the 18th century. The Scotch-Irish immigration brought an ethnic group that hated the absentee landlord and had experience in taking land while in Ireland. In addition, the frontiersmen looked on land as expendable. It would become exhausted before purchase was necessary, and one would move on again.

Landownership on the Pennsylvania frontier was based on improvements made by the squatter rather than on purchase from the Penns. The proprietors objected to squatter appropriation of their land, but could do little to prevent it. The Penns attempted to drive out the squatters but could not. The squatter often simply marked trees with his initials. The practice was called making a tomahawk claim. In 1730 squatting was given legal sanction; those who improved land were allowed to pay two-thirds of the price for a warrant to survey the land. The final patent was granted when the survey was returned. The remaining third of the cost and the unpaid quit rent had to be paid at that time. Few settlers took advantage of this costly device, which offered them so little. The Penns realized that the squatters attracted more settlers and expected that at a later date they would claim the land legally. Of the nearly 670,000 acres settled, nearly 400,000 acres were settled without legal title, and much of the land remained without legal title for as long as ninety years after settlement.

Land possession for the Pennsylvanian was easier than for the Virginian in the matter of feudal dues. It was held in free socage from the Penns; that is, a quit rent was payable to the proprietor, not to the British government. To claim land legally, the settler obtained a grant from the proprietors, the Penns, in return for payment in some form. The usual grant was for 500 acres but larger grants were also made, some as large as 20,000 acres. In 1750 settlement rights were established. If a man cleared a parcel of land, built a cabin, and then lived there, he had preemptive rights to purchase the land at a later date. This law legalized squatting. To prove that he was owner of the land, the squatter obtained a certificate from a justice of the peace describing the improvements that had been made, a description of the cabin, how many acres had been cleared, and any other improvements.

In 1765 the application system was developed. The settler made an application for a warrant that described the land being claimed in an application to a justice of the peace. A warrant was granted usually for 300 acres. The land had to be surveyed within six months after which the settler would pay £5 per 100 acres and would receive a patent for the land.

In contrast in Virginia the settler went to the land office in Fort Pitt and received a certificate in return for a payment of two shillings and six pennies per acre (one-eighth of a pound) plus another ten shillings for each 100 acres. The settler would be challenged to clear more than eight acres, so he could claim eight acres for a total of £1.10 shillings. This was far less than the Penns were charging, a minimum of £5, so settlers preferred to work with the Virginia officials.

As a result, most of the land around Fort Pitt was claimed under Virginia law. When the boundary was finally surveyed, which placed the Fort Pitt area in Pennsylvania, there were more than a thousand Virginia claims that were recognized as Virginia entries. When the same land was claimed under both Virginia and Pennsylvania law, each case had to be decided by compromise or a court case. More than 633,000 acres of the best land around Fort Pitt were recorded as Virginia entries.

Under the Pennsylvania law, the settler had to pay an annual quit rent to the Penns. The proprietors had difficulty collecting quit rent from the beginning, despite energetic collection policies on paper. The Penns were unwilling to pay the cost of efficient collection. Cash was very difficult to obtain on the frontier, and wheat was often used as payment. There was no penalty for late payment. In 1769 Edmund Physick was made collector and visited the small towns collecting quit rents until 1775.

Quit rents varied from a nominal amount to two shillings (one-tenth of a pound, \$25 in 2007 dollars) per hundred acres depending on the quality of the land. In 1776 the proprietors were entitled to quit rents from 4,300,000 acres. Three million acres had rent of one penny or less (one 2007 dollar) per acre and 250,000 acres at less. The remaining acres had rent that varied from one to ten shillings per acre. The total rents were £37,500, of which £19,000 was collected. In 1779 the quit rents were abolished and the Penns were compensated £130,000 (\$12,500,000 2007 dollars). The total amount of unpaid quit rents at the time was £118,500.

The Quaker Party in the Pennsylvania Assembly obstructed attempts to collect. In 1776 with £10,000 Pennsylvania payable, less than a third was collected. In practice, collections were made in the western counties only when a settler desired to transfer his land. Before the transaction could be legally recorded, all of the back quit rent had to be paid. The few collectors sent out were occupied with this transfer activity and had no time to search for delinquents. Thus, if one never had occasion to sell the property, the quit rent would go unpaid forever.

Pennsylvania was not characterized by large estates as was Virginia. The eldest son received only a double share, so there was no contest over primogeniture. The Constitution of 1776 gave the legislature specific power to prevent perpetuities through entails. The Penns had a period of success in selling land between 1769 and 1773 as an indirect result of the contest between the land companies and Virginia. By the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,

the land around Fort Pitt was ceded to the British government and in the fall of 1768 was purchased by the proprietors from the Indians. The act of 18 February 1769 prohibited any survey or claim on land in Pennsylvania not purchased by the proprietors from the Indians. The penalty imposed was one year in prison plus a £500 fine. Any land obtained by the treaty and within the boundary of Pennsylvania could be obtained only by purchase from the proprietors. The land speculators who had engineered the treaty were also deprived. The speculators therefore disputed Pennsylvania's boundaries to validate their claims in that colony.

In this situation, the Penns' offer was the best buy. Whereas a settler could purchase a good title from the Penns, the speculators offered titles on unconfirmed grants. Virginia could not offer good titles as the proposed land companies' charters would probably take precedence over her vague charter of 1609.

The proprietor's land office was opened on 3 April 1769. One hundred acres sold for £5 plus one penny per acre quit rent. A boom began in southwestern Pennsylvania. In 1773 Westmoreland County, the area west of Laurel Hills, had about 50,000 inhabitants, and in 1790, 65,000 were listed in the census. In the first four months of business in 1769, a million acres were sold to 2,790 purchasers, which was the first important move of Pennsylvanians into the frontier as well as the first legal occupation of the area. This boom was halted by the interference of Virginia in 1773. Physical force by Virginia and the collapse of the land company schemes made Virginia titles not only cheaper, but of equal value to the Pennsylvania title in the Ohio Valley. Settlers applied to the Virginians for their land titles and abandoned the Westmoreland office. In 1774 only seven surveys were listed in Westmoreland and in 1775 only two were listed. The Pennsylvanians complained in 1775 of the opening of a Virginia land office by William Crawford and Dorsey Pentecost (both former Pennsylvania adherents who changed sides). The Pennsylvania land office was closed during the Revolution on the recommendation of Congress to encourage enlistment in the army.

The practices of taking land of both Virginia and Pennsylvania must be included in any conclusion regarding the status of landholding in the Pittsburgh area during this period. With the boundary in dispute, a settler entered his land where it was most advantageous. In the period 1765–1769 the settlers came from Virginia and took the land without title. Virginia law extended a method by which they could later confirm their ownership. In 1769–1773 apparently the land companies would take much of the non-Pennsylvania land into their schemes, but could not yet offer for sale confirmed land titles. The settlers turned to the land office at Pittsburgh as the only place to purchase a good title. Late in 1773 the land companies were defeated in London and jurisdiction of the area was returned to Virginia. Dunmore implemented this authority with the efforts of John

Connolly. The Pennsylvania land office was abandoned, and the settlers used the new Virginia county courts to record their lands. In this way most of the area between the Monongahela and Ohio rivers was settled. The settlers supported Virginia before 1775 because of the more forceful backing of its claims to authority and because of the cheaper costs, forty-two shillings and six pennies (slightly more and £2 or \$530) for a 400-acre claim in comparison to £15 for the 300-acre Pennsylvania tracts. Hanna's Town was selected as the county seat owing to the political influence of Robert Hanna, despite the fact that Fort Pitt was the obvious choice.

By the end of the Revolution the economy was dominated by small landowners. Political democracy was partially achieved during the Revolution. Fort Pitt had been abandoned by the British Army before 1774 and Royal appointees lost their positions. Governor Dunmore of Virginia sought refuge on a British warship and his agent Connolly fled. Members of the Indian Department, including George Croghan, Alexander McKee, and Simon Girty, either withdrew from public life or joined the British. Control passed to Arthur St. Clair and others representing the Philadelphia merchants supporting the rebellion.

New counties were created in western Pennsylvania as the population increased in the 1770s. New delegates from these counties were elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly, but exerted little influence. Because of the lack of effective representation in the government there was a movement to establish a new state on the frontier of Pennsylvania in 1776, but it never received strong support.

The number of voters on the frontier increased as the number of landowners grew, although many of the settlers owned 400 acres or less because under Virginia laws a settler had to clear twenty-four acres before he could legally claim his farm. In Pennsylvania a voter was required to own fifty acres of land, of which ten acres had been cleared or have a net worth of £50 (\$12,500 in 2007 dollars). In 1766 this amount was considered a comfortable fortune so the majority of voters were small farmers, while the city dwellers did not have sufficient wealth to qualify. Half of the adult males were qualified to vote as compared to only ten percent in Philadelphia.

Most of the farmers were squatters. The family farms were from 100 to 500 acres. There were more small farmers in Pennsylvania than in any other colony. The average farm was 300 acres, of which 40 acres were cultivated and a smaller area in use as meadows for the livestock. The average farm had two horses, three or four cows, and four or five sheep, although one-third of the farms had no sheep.

The squatters made no attempt to fertilize their land and therefore would exhaust it in a short time. The squatter would then move on to another piece of land. Land was regarded as having little value. The Vandalia scheme leaders sold land purchased from the Indians at Fort Stanwix in 1768 £5 (\$1,250

in 2007 dollars) per 100 acres plus a quit rent on one penny (one 2007 dollar) per year. The price of good farmland in 2007 is \$10,000 per acre.

More than ninety-five percent of the men on the Pennsylvania frontier were farmers although they might also be millers, tavern keepers, ferrymen, boatbuilders, merchants, or other occupations. As farmers struggling to improve their land, they had little time nor inclination to be involved in politics. Their main concern was holding their land and defending themselves against Indian attacks. Given the activities of the Pennsylvania land speculators and fur traders who sought to accommodate the Indians, the settlers tended to side with Washington and the Virginia authorities who offered cheap land and an aggressive policy toward the Indians. However, this tendency was not sufficient to take an active part in the war against Britain other than to defend themselves against British-supported Indians raids.

CHAPTER 5

The Native Americans

The Native American decision which side to be on was often based on the side from which the Native Americans could derive the most benefit. For the most part the tribes wished to remain neutral as long as there was no threat to their land. They attended colonial conferences at Fort Pitt and received gifts, promising neutrality. When the colonists intruded on Indian land and murdered their men, they met with the British in Detroit and promised to fight the colonists in return for trade goods, rum, and guns.

In 1774 the Lenapes (Delaware), the Shawnee, and the Iroquois were most involved with choosing sides. The Lenapes lived on the Delaware River in the early 17th century, leading the colonists to give that name to the tribe. The Lenapes were forced to move west by the European settlers, but they continued to be called the Delaware. In the mid-18th century they were located west of Fort Pitt. The Shawnee were west of the Lenapes. The Iroquois tribes were in the western part of New York.

Originally the Lenape men wore breech clouts and buckskin leggings and carried a deerskin mantle over one shoulder. In the winter they wore robes of beaver, bear, wolf, and other skins sewn together. They shaved their heads, leaving a scalp lock at the rear. They carried deerskin pouches and used implements made of stone.

With the arrival of the fur traders, the Lenapes substituted woolen trousers while the women wore calico dresses. The men wore long shirts that came down to their knees. Woolen blankets replaced the deerskin mantle and winter robes. The stone tools were replaced by metal. The scalping knife was essential to gut a deer after it had been shot with the guns that replaced the bow and arrow. Metal pots replaced the breakable clay pots of the past.

The Shawnee lived north of the Ohio River and west of Fort Pitt in the 18th century. In the 17th century they had lived in western Pennsylvania and what is now West Virginia, but had been forced westward. They lived in small round dwellings called wigwams. A wigwam was constructed by bending small trees together in a circle and tying them to form the structure, which was then covered with bark and dried grass. Each village had a large wooden council house. The frame was constructed using small trees and was covered with pieces of bark sewn together. The long house had a hallway with rooms on each side with platforms for sleeping and compartments for belongings. Living in a heavily wooded area, they used dugout canoes, but most of the time they simply walked before the settlers arrived with horses.

The Shawnee men wore breech clouts and deerskin leggings. In the winter they hunted deer, turkey, and other animals. In the summer the men fished and the women raised corn, beans, and squash. When the families moved to the winter hunting grounds in the fall, they left behind a few older people to guard their village. The families returned in the spring.

The Iroquois Nations included the Seneca, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga nations later joined by the Tuscarora. They lived in the area of present New York State. They lived in long houses, up to 200 feet long and 25 feet wide. Each family had a room in the long house. They obtained food by hunting, fishing, and agriculture, growing corn, beans, and squash. The women tilled the fields under the supervision of the clan mother. They built their canoes using elm bark as there were few birch trees that far south.

Each tribe was divided into clans made up of related persons. Marriage with a member of one's own clan was forbidden as they were aware of the tragic effects of inbreeding. When a man married, he joined his wife's clan and the children belonged to the wife's clan. A clan mother was at the head of each clan. Most of the Iroquois nations had three clans, but the Seneca had eight.

The clan mother had considerable authority. She selected the men who became members of the Council to decide issues. Membership was for life unless the clan mother lost confidence in the individual and he was replaced. The men ruled the clan, but the clan mother had considerable input.

During the 18th century the Native American culture was severely disrupted by a number of changes. Most deadly were the numerous epidemics in the early 18th century resulting from diseases imported by Europeans, especially smallpox, that destroyed entire villages. The diseases moved from tribe to tribe, leaving thousands of dead behind. As the tribes and villages recovered from these devastations, the traditional makeup of the clan, village, and tribe was destroyed. There were far more younger persons in the village than previously and as they grew to maturity in the second half of the 18th century, there were fewer bloodlines and finding a marriage partner in another clan became more difficult.

The rhythm of life was changed by the trade goods provided by the French traders in exchange for deerskin and furs. More time was spent in hunting deer in the fall and trapping beaver and other animals in the winter. The guns and knives provided by the traders made hunting easier, and the steel chisels made the task of breaking into beaver lodges far shorter. Metal pots and horses made travel to hunting grounds much easier. However, the guns also changed the life of young men. Previously strength and skill with a bow were the means to achieve manhood. The raiding parties and skirmishes with other tribes previously had resulted in few fatalities. Using guns, even the weakest young man with a few hours practice could kill not only a deer but also a warrior from another tribe.

With the arrival of new European arms and utensils, intertribal warfare declined because it was too deadly. Combined with the need to repopulate the tribe, the increase in time spent hunting and trapping beaver, and the increased likelihood of death by gunshot if one participated in an attack on another tribe reduced the ceremonious rituals of combat with other Indians. Rather than establishing manhood through participation in a raiding party, the raiding parties then became a means of obtaining a wife or additional children for the village. Although the targeted tribes might remain the same, for example, the Cherokee continued to be raided by the Iroquois, but the objective had changed. When the settlers arrived, their families also became targets for raiding parties seeking women, children, and horses. The raids were no longer pointless devices to prove manhood, but now became essential to the continuity of the tribe for women and children added new bloodlines.

The total number of Indian hunters in the area north of the Ohio River in the mid-18th century was estimated by all of the sources at about 10,000. Thomas Hutchins made a detailed tribe-by-tribe estimate that 4,360 hunters lived in the area north of the Ohio but excluded tribes west of the Mississippi. The Spanish estimated the number at 7,750. In 1774 another estimate including the Sioux and some tribes farther west indicated 25,420 adult males and a total of 130,000 Indians. Other estimates indicated that the Lenapes included 600 adult males for a total of 2,400 persons, the Shawnee at 600 adult males for a total of 2,400 persons, and the Iroquois at 2,000 adult males for a total of 8,000. When the Philadelphia merchants, John Baynton and Samuel Wharton, sent a shipment of goods to be traded to the Indians along the Ohio River, they included 5,000 men's shirts, indicating that the potential market for these goods would include 5,000 adult males. The shipment was bound for Illinois and assumed that the French traders there would purchase some of the shirts and trade them to the Sioux west of the Mississippi and other Woodland tribes in the area around Lake Michigan. The three tribes (Lenapes, Shawnee, and Iroquois) in contact with the American frontier in 1774 probably included 3,500 to 4,500 adult males and a total of about 160,000 persons.

Three factors, maintaining the fur trade, preservation of their land, and the continuation of the raids to obtain captives and horses, influenced the decision the tribes had to make concerning their response to the break between the colonists and the British.

The first was the fur trade. The Iroquois, the Delaware (Lenapes), and the Shawnee were all in close proximity to colonial traders and had become dependent on the guns, knives, axes, blankets, clothing, and other goods provided by the traders in exchange for beaver, deerskin, and other furs. Although French and Scottish traders from Montreal competed with the traders from New York and Pennsylvania, the latter were able to give more goods for the fur because their expenses were less. The colonial traders' transportation cost was lower, they had access to cheap New England and Philadelphia rum, and imports from England came twelve months of the year, while the Canadians were cut off during the winter when the St. Lawrence River froze. Therefore the tribes on the Pennsylvania and New York frontiers were dependent on American traders, while the Canadian traders turned their attention farther west and northwest of the Great Lakes.

When the frontier tribes finally sided openly with the British, they lost their contact with the Americans and were forced to trade with the Canadians. As a result fur exports from Canada to Britain increased sharply during the Revolution when the colonial competition was removed. In addition the tribes received presents of goods from the British Army in return for attacking the colonists. The British had extreme difficulty managing the tribes during the Revolution. Despite giving the Native American warriors presents of trade goods, at times they would not perform the requested attacks on the colonists. The Indians would refuse to fight if the slightest item was denied. The British commanders at Detroit and Fort Niagara continued to provide lavish gifts despite pressure from the British government to be more sparing. However, some attacks were made and the presence of the tribes protected Detroit and Fort Niagara from colonial attacks.

Shipments of trade goods to the Great Lakes increased enormously during the Revolution. Some went to the area northwest of Lake Superior where trade was increasing, as indicated by greater quantities of fur and deerskin being exported from Canada to Britain. Other trade goods included Indian guns (lightweight flintlock fowling pieces), gunpowder, lead, blankets, shirts, trousers, pots, knives, and other items. The most sought after item was rum. The usual peacetime load of a canoe bound for the upper Great Lakes included 200 gallons of rum. In 1774, 122 canoes traded with the Indians north of the Ohio River. Of these 45 went to Michilimackinac and 45 to Lake Superior. Sixteen went to Detroit, 9 to Lake Michigan, and a few each to four other areas. A total of 24,400 gallons of rum were carried on these 122 canoes to serve all of the tribes north of the Ohio River, including about 10,000 warriors each receiving about 2½ gallons. In 1779, 17,502

gallons of rum were given to less than a thousand Delaware and Shawnee warriors, about 17 gallons per warrior. However, this amount pales in comparison to rum imports of the colonists. In 1772 the Thirteen Colonies imported 3,370,000 gallons of rum and distilled more themselves. Pennsylvania imported 900,000 gallons, Virginia, 549,000; and New York, 374,000 gallons. About 180,000 people lived in New York, of which perhaps one-fourth were adult males. Forty-five thousand men consumed about eight gallons a year, half the amount given to the Delaware and Shawnees.

The money was well spent by the British, as there was no real threat to Detroit or Fort Niagara during the Revolution, and at the same time the settlers remained on the frontier to defend their homes rather than serving in Continental Army regiments. After 1777 no troops were organized to serve in the east. A few independent companies were raised to defend the frontier against the Indians.

The Continental Congress was well aware of the problem and discussed its solution with no effect. In December 1777 a commission was appointed to inquire into the situation at Fort Pitt and to explore the means to create a force to oppose the Indians who were being encouraged by the British in Detroit to murder settlers. Nothing came of the matter.

Indian attacks on the frontier occurred long before the Revolution. In 1770 the Virginia settlers believed that the Pennsylvania fur traders were encouraging the Delaware and the Shawnee to attack the Virginians. There were two examples of Virginian trading parties being murdered. In February 1770 Alexander McKee reported to George Croghan that the Shawnee and the Delaware were unhappy because the settlers were stealing horses from the Indians and mistreating the tribes in general. A conference was planned with the Chickasaw, the Wabash, the Cherokee, the Shawnee, and the Delaware to be held at the lower Shawnee towns in June 1770 to discuss the danger of an attack on the frontier in response to a message received from Illinois that the French would support an Indian attack on Fort Pitt.

The British government opposed the settlement of the frontier as early as October 1761 when Colonel Henry Bouquet, commander at Fort Pitt, issued a proclamation against settling west of the Allegheny Mountains. All persons were forbidden to settle or hunt unless they had obtained permission in writing from the British general or a colonial governor and showed the letter to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt. Violators were to be seized with their horses and effects and sent to Fort Pitt to be tried and punished by the sentence of a court martial.

Later King George III signed a proclamation on 7 October 1763 to the same effect. In case the Indians wanted to sell any of their lands, they should be purchased only in the name of the king. However, the proclamation did not keep illegal settlers out.

In 1770 Sir William Johnson and George Croghan discussed the discontent of the Shawnee and the Delaware. Johnson did not believe that the Vandalia proposal to establish a new colony on land south of the Ohio River purchased from the Indians at Fort Stanwix was the real problem. Croghan believed that the British officers at Fort Pitt did not respect the Indians and that the officers could prevent the abuse of the Indians. Croghan promised that he would try to pacify the Shawnee and the Delaware. Alexander McKee, the Indian agent at Fort Pitt, was giving food to the local tribes. In August 1770 McKee presented a request of £61 (\$15,250 in 2007 dollars) for 20,000 wampum beads that he had distributed to the Indians.

During the winter of 1771–1772 the Pottawattomi and other tribes along the Ohio and Wabash rivers were causing trouble. In January General Thomas Gage ordered Johnson to punish them as soon as the traders bound for Illinois and the military convoys with supplies were on their way in March 1772. Johnson reported to Gage that the Kickapoo had taken two British traders prisoner in December and were still holding them. The other tribes were also discontented. John Finley had been taken captive as well, but he was freed after a French merchant in Illinois paid the ransom of £120 (\$30,000) in trade goods.

In 1772 the British were having more problems with the tribes. The Schenectady merchants, James Phyn and Alexander Ellice, warned their agent John Porteus to provide as few goods as possible to traders visiting the tribes in the coming spring. Ten Virginia families had either been killed or taken captive, and the fear was that a full-scale war would break out.

John Porteus was also warned to keep secret that Henry Ellis had gone to London to make better financial arrangements for purchases of goods. Alexander Stedman was also going to England to purchase a large cargo, so the New York merchants expected good business in New York in the summer of 1772 despite the fear of hostilities along the Ohio River.

The Native Americans trading at Detroit were becoming more demanding. They complained of the quality of the blankets offered them, while Lieutenant John Hay at Detroit was bargaining for cheaper blankets from Phyn and Ellice. Suppliers in Britain had raised the price on blankets to 10 shillings and 6 pence New York (\$50 in 2007 dollars) payable in six months after delivery. On the other hand, Hay had earned £259 New York on sales of furs he had sent to Phyn and Ellice and a further £60 sterling for his services to the British government, a total equal to \$52,500 in 2007 dollars. The fur trade was booming at Detroit despite the problems on the Ohio River.

The tribes along the Ohio River and the Iroquois held a conference at Scioto in the spring of 1772 and agreed to remain peaceful despite the false rumors spread by the French. Johnson saw the necessity to remove all the French traders from the Wabash Valley who continually stirred up the Indians against the colonists to maintain the French monopoly on the fur trade

in the region. The tribes continued to complain of being abused by the colonial traders.

The violence escalated in the summer of 1772. To pacify the Chippewa, Johnson gave them a large supply of trade goods, food, and a bateau. Johnson believed that David Ramsay should be executed for the murders as he boasted that he would kill more Indians as soon as he was released from jail. Johnson feared that the tribes would retaliate for the murders by killing innocent traders. Therefore he ordered that all traders were to remain in the forts and wait for the Indians to come to them rather than venturing out to sell their goods in the villages. The traders in western New York all came into Fort Niagara. The report of the Ramsay murders reached Secretary of State Dartmouth in London. He agreed with Johnson that the fault lay with the traders who should be restrained from abusing the tribes. Otherwise Dartmouth feared there would be open warfare.

In July a party of forty Kickapoo met a military convoy on the Ohio River. The Indians did not attack as they considered there were too many soldiers. Instead the Kickapoo begged for rum and ammunition. In November 1772 Alexander McKee, Johnson's agent at Fort Pitt, met with the tribes as far west as the Scioto River. He told them that the British were their friends and that Fort Pitt would be torn down to prove their good intentions. Despite the talks, violence continued. In December Indians near Vincennes killed five Englishmen and one woman escaped.

The winter of 1772–1773 was very mild, and as result the tribes were unable to trap the usual number of animals. Only sixty percent of the normal supply of fur was traded in the summer of 1773, and as a result the Indians were able to purchase far fewer goods. This intensified the competition among the French, the British, and the colonial fur traders. The colonials traded more rum than the others, and Henry Basset, the commander at Detroit, complained to Frederick Haldimand that there would never be a peaceful trade unless the flow of rum from Albany to Detroit was curtailed. The Indian chiefs complained that without the rum, there would be three times as much fur. More young Indians were dying from the effects of the rum than from fighting.

Conflict between the Indians and the settlers was increasing as early as January 1772. William Crawford and the Shawnee chief, Logan, had a disagreement, and Crawford slaughtered Logan's family. In retaliation the Shawnees attacked ten pioneer families, scalping some and taking others prisoner. These attacks provided an excuse for Lord Dunmore to launch his attack on the Shawnees in 1774. Also in January 1772, British General Gage was intent on punishing the Pottawattomi and other tribes on the Wabash River.

The French were taking over the fur trade in Illinois. Both Sir William Johnson and General Gage thought that the British Army should drive them out, but knew that it would be difficult. Gage planned to send a military

force down the Ohio River from Fort Pitt in March 1772 to take control of Illinois.

The Iroquois Indians in New York were generally favorable to Sir William Johnson, but in May 1772 Ramsay murdered eight Indians on Lake Erie. The Indians set out for revenge and the traders at Fort Niagara took precautions by traveling only in ships because the canoes were vulnerable to Indian attacks. However, for the most part, the Indians were aroused against the Virginians, not the Fort Niagara traders. In June 1772 Peter Ryckman, an Albany Dutch trader who had wintered on Lake Erie, returned to Fort Niagara with news that the Senecas had killed five Virginia traders and taken all of their goods. Ryckman was able to save two men and brought them back to Fort Niagara. The colonial fur traders were concerned with their business in the event of open warfare with the Indians. Phyn and Ellis in Schenectady, New York, instructed John Porteus in Detroit to extend as little credit to the Indians as possible, expecting that war with the Indians would break out in the spring of 1773.

The British managed to prevent the war, but the incidents indicated the violence that was seething under the surface. The targets of the Indian attacks were for the most part Virginians.

The violence continued. In the spring of 1773, three Saginaw Indians murdered a trader, Phineas Pond, near Detroit. The British commander, Henry Basset, halted all trade. In May the Saginaw chiefs brought the culprits to Basset, who told the chiefs that the criminals would be held until Sir William Johnson made a decision. In the meantime, Basset wanted the return of all goods stolen by the three, after which Basset would reopen the trade, allow trading in the villages, and permit the gunsmiths to repair Indian guns. Major Basset released the three prisoners in August after receiving their promise that they would behave. Johnson believed that as long as the British did not punish David Ramsay for murdering Indians, he could not punish the three Indians who killed Phineas Pond.

At Fort Niagara the French were lying to the Indians to prevent them from dealing with the British and the colonial traders. The major complaint of the Indians around the Great Lakes was being cheated by the fur traders. Johnson believed that as long as the Iroquois remained friends of the British, they would be able to control the other tribes. The threat of war between the western Indians and the Iroquois was real. The French traders from Illinois were urging the Wabash and the Illinois tribes to attack and the Six Nations, the Shawnee, the Delaware, and the Cherokee were organizing to oppose them. Johnson continued his efforts to maintain peace without success. In November two Indians murdered four French traders on Lake Ontario and another trader, William Lorimier, was robbed. The Iroquois chiefs turned in the two murderers and offered compensation for William Lorimier to Johnson.

However, along the Ohio River the major problem was an influx of many settlers who were uncontrolled. In October a number of Indians arrived at Fort Pitt for a conference with Croghan. When Croghan had fed them and provided goods, they left satisfied.

The second factor concerned horses, which changed previous limits on transportation. The Delaware and the Shawnee used dugout canoes as there were few birch trees in the area south of the Great Lakes. The Iroquois built canoes using elm bark, but they were also heavier than the birch bark canoes. Neither was as easy to portage, that is, carry from one river or lake to another, because of the weight. The birch canoes were generally larger than the dugouts and the elm bark canoes. Limited by their clumsy canoes, the Delaware and the Shawnee had a more limited transport system. They had to carry their belongings on their backs when they went to their winter hunting ground in the fall and returned in the spring.

The horse was a great advantage to these tribes. Lone riders could deliver messages in a few days that formerly took weeks. Horses could carry 200 pounds of cargo directly to Fort Pitt and the trading posts in New York at Oswego and Fort Niagara instead of circuitous and often dangerous trips in dugouts down the streams to the Ohio River or along the shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario. The only source of horses was the British Army, the fur traders, and the settlers, none of whom would part with them willingly. Horse theft became a major issue between the colonists and the tribes. Later in the 1780s some Indian villages began to breed horses, but the primary source remained theft from the colonists.

A third factor was the need for new bloodlines. In every society living in some degree of isolation, finding unrelated brides was difficult. The problem was compounded by the relatively high death rate in childbirth among Indian women. The devastating smallpox epidemics that reduced the population in many tribes in the 18th century further reduced the chances of finding a bride. Often women and children were captured from other tribes to alleviate the problem.

Why the Indians raided white settlements and took women and children captives deserves another look. Current authors picture the Indians as evil people to take captives and possibly hold them for ransom of trade goods. This seldom occurred and then it was usually a man. Women and children were retained and made members of the tribe. In July 1776 George Morgan was in Shawnee town on the Scioto River. He obtained two Virginians taken prisoner by an Iroquois war party and returned with them to Philadelphia. What ransom he paid is not mentioned. In August 1777 Indians captured five men near Hanna's Town and took them to Detroit. Three of the men were exchanged by the British for prisoners of war. The other two died. On the other hand, in July 1777 twenty Indians attacked Fort Strader south of Fort Pitt, killing two men and capturing three children. The Baker family, a German family, had settled on the frontier in 1772. The family was

captured in 1777 during a raid on Beaver Creek twenty miles down river from Fort Pitt. The family members were taken to Detroit where they were well treated and released after the Revolution. The family finally returned to its home.

The white captives were an important part of Indian culture, and often living the Indian life-style was preferable to the hard, rugged life of the colonists. Life as a captive was far better than being a farmer's wife. Some really did not want to go back to the colonists because they were treated so well.

Captives were an extremely valuable asset. They were well cared for because they were needed to reproduce and maintain a strong healthy Indian lifeline. The tribes were well aware that intermarriage among their own small groups could lead to Indian women having deformed children. Intermarriage was so reprehensible that it became a joke. Young Indian men liked sex, but in the absence of contraceptives they knew that sex could be followed by childbirth. There was a conflict, therefore, between the sex drive of the Indian male and the realization that sex may take place only with unrelated females.

In a village of 400 Indians, a comparatively large village, in an average year six boys and six girls would reach marriage age. Of the six females only three would not be related to a male, and he could be related to the other three. An unmarried younger woman often would join the family of her sister. The result was that no females would be available to three males each year.

A letter written from Fort Pitt at that time relates that thirty Iroquois Indians passed through on their way to Kentucky to capture women, kill their husbands, and bring back the children for future mates. When captives were brought back to the village, the clan mother of each clan decided the placement of the women and children. For example, a couple who did not have any offspring would be given children to raise. Even though there was a scarcity of wives for the Indian braves, self-gratification was a very unsatisfactory substitute. The worst part of a brave's social life was the lack of privacy. In a ten foot by ten foot wigwam with an area of 100 square feet lived eight people: two elders, a male father, his wife, the younger brother of the father, a sister of the wife, and two children.

The symbiotic relationship that developed between the tribes' need for new blood to maintain health and strength and the captives' relative ease in their new life met with some approval even though appearing disastrous on the outside. The simpler life of the Indians made living in a wigwam acceptable compared to constructing a log cabin in the colonies. To build a wigwam, suitable small trees, six at least, were bent together to form the frame and covered with bark. Bear skins and beaver robes kept them warm. During the winter there was also a twenty-four-hour fire in the center.

Hunting and fishing were much more enjoyable than clearing land and plowing fields. Both women and children worked hard on the farms. Whereas the Indian women grew only the amount of food needed, the farmer had to grow two or three times as much as he needed in order to buy supplies and clothing. The simple Indian life-style was a primary diet of fish and wildlife, and clothing was made from animal skins. Fur was their export crop, which was used to buy any other needs.

Taking captives was a major objective of the tribes. When a treaty was signed with the colonists, it usually included demands that captives be returned and that horse theft be halted.

Another factor was land. A series of treaties had been made transferring Indian land to land companies. The tribes were forced to move westward encroaching on areas that were home to other tribes, causing friction. The Indians were powerless to halt this steady encroachment on their land.

The British government tried and failed to halt further westward expansion by the Proclamation of 1763. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 included the sale to a Pennsylvania land company of a huge area roughly equal to West Virginia. The British government refused to ratify the treaty despite a vigorous political campaign waged by the Americans, including Benjamin Franklin. At the same time George Washington was a leading figure in a land company surveying Kentucky and north of the Ohio River on the basis of Virginia land grants to veterans of the French and Indian War. The Indians resisted these efforts as a threat to their existence.

Of the four factors, three—horse theft, captives, and land—divided the Indians from the colonists. The fur trade encouraged the Indians to remain friendly to the colonists because they provided cheaper goods. This factor encouraged the Indians to seek neutrality in the war, but the colonist's hunger for land could not be controlled, and the tribes needed the horses and the captives.

The entire fur trade was dependent on the Indians and their ability to trap beaver and kill deer. They were the ultimate source of most of the peltry and provided an important market for merchandise. Contact with the white man completely changed the Indians' way of life by encouraging them to become full-time hunters. The Indians became dependent on the traders for weapons, clothing, tools, and utensils. What had been a luxury then became a necessity. Hunters needed a firearm and a gunsmith to repair it when damaged. As in the past, during the late fall the tribe left its summer camp for the hunting grounds, but in the spring instead of going directly to the summer camp, it stopped at the trading post to exchange pelts for merchandise and liquor.

The westward movement of the settlers in the 18th century forced the tribes to move. The Tuscaroras came up from the South and were adopted by the Six Nations, while some of the Iroquois left New York and moved to present-day Ohio. The Delawares were forced from eastern to western

Pennsylvania and Ohio by the advance of the settlers. The Miami moved from Illinois into what is now Indiana, and the Shawnee moved east on the Ohio River. The concentration of tribes in the Ohio River Valley created a rich new market for the fur traders, but led to the reduction of fur-bearing animals in that area.

The Indian life-style was not seriously disturbed when the French fur traders first contacted them in the 17th century and established a mutually beneficial relationship, trading European merchandise for furs. In 1763 after the French ceded Canada to England, the British and the colonial traders continued to trade with the Indians, but colonial farmers began to cultivate the land, which destroyed the hunting grounds. Encouraged and supplied by the French, the Indians rebelled in 1763 and drove the British Army and the colonists back to their forts. However, the French were unable to sustain the logistical support of the Indians with guns, ammunition, food, and clothing after the British cut off trade to the western posts. The Indians agreed to end hostilities and sullenly tried to work with the British and the colonial newcomers.

In the following decade the Indians were at odds with the colonists. At Fort Stanwix in 1768 a large gathering of Indians was lavished with gifts in exchange for granting land south of the Ohio River in the area that is now part of West Virginia and Kentucky to a group of land speculators led by Samuel Wharton and supported by Sir William Johnson and George Croghan. The British government refused to validate this sale, but negotiations continued until 1774. The refusal of the London government to approve the Fort Stanwix purchase alienated an influential group of Pennsylvania merchants.

Johnson believed the real basis for Indian hostility was mistreatment by the settlers on the frontier. While the fur traders had catered to the Indians, the settlers saw them as obstacles to obtaining more land. During the Revolution settlers continued to move to the frontier, motivated by the low land prices offered by the speculators and in part to escape the war in the east.

Another Indian complaint was the sharp reduction in gifts of rum and other trade goods to the Indians in the decade preceding the Revolution. Once the war began the British attempted to use the Indians to defend Detroit and Fort Niagara and to prevent further westward movement during the war. However, the Indians had little interest in attacking the settlers and were very difficult to manage. If the Indians were denied some item, they would refuse to fight, so the local British officers were forced to provide ever-increasing amounts of goods despite orders from London to economize. During the war the amount of Indian goods sent to Canada increased sharply to bribe the Indians to attack the frontier.

At the same time the fur traders were offering goods in exchange for furs, so the Indians were in an excellent bargaining position. The export of furs to Britain from Canada rose sharply during the war as the Indians acquired an

appetite for the rum, guns, ammunition, clothing, blankets, and all the other items that could be obtained from the traders when the British Army failed to do so.

The French fur traders who worked directly with the Indians discouraged Indian participation in the Revolutionary War. The French had supported the Indians in Pontiac's Uprising in 1763, and both French merchants in Quebec and Montreal and traders in the wilderness continued to compete with the British. But at the same time the French traders opposed the encroachment of the colonial settlers that reduced the supply of fur and the colonial traders who competed with French traders.

The Indians preferred to deal with the French and complained to the British Army officers of the greedy British traders who offered too little for the Indian fur. During the Revolution, both French and British traders in the area south of Detroit suffered from the competition of the British Army, which offered the Indians goods free in exchange for a few weeks' service. Therefore the fur trade shifted to the area northwest of Lake Superior where there was no competition from the British Army and the fur traders could demand more fur for their goods.

Trade in the northwest required greater capital and larger organizations as the goods had to be shipped by sloops to Lake Superior, and the merchant in Montreal had to wait three or four years before he received payment for his merchandise. The cost of sending a canoe with ten men and a load of goods to Grand Portage on the west end of Lake Superior in 1780 was £750 sterling (\$188,000 in 2007 dollars), including the cost of the goods in England and shipment to Montreal (£450 sterling), 200 gallons of rum (£50 sterling), and the cost of sending the canoe up the lakes (£250 sterling). The most profitable item for the traders and the most prized gift by the army was rum. In 1779 Detroit had a stock of 17,502 gallons of rum on hand to supply fewer than a hundred soldiers and less than a thousand Indians. In the long run, the Indians did prevent attacks on Detroit and Fort Niagara, although George Rogers Clark did occupy Illinois.

Gifts from the army and purchases from the traders had become an essential part of Indian life during the Revolution. An Indian village was for the most part self-sufficient; the fur traders brought in luxuries that made life more comfortable, for example, copper kettles, rum, wool trousers, and blankets. The trade goods made life easier substituting guns for the bow and arrow, steel traps for the hand-crafted devices previously used, ice chisels to break into the beaver lodges in the winter, and a host of other goods.

Two factors were essential to the continuation of the Indian village. The first was the preservation of the farmland surrounding the village and the hunting grounds. The British Army ration in the 18th century was a pound of salted beef and a pound of flour for each man. The Indians must have required a similar proportion of protein and carbohydrates in the form of venison and corn meal. There were about 7,500 Indians living in the area

of present-day Ohio. A village of 200 adults and 200 children would require 300 pounds of meat each day. A deer would yield between 40 and 50 pounds of meat, and the village would need six to eight deer each day to provide meat. If the village remained in its permanent summer location, the supply of deer would soon be exhausted. Hunting grounds were an absolute necessity for survival. Game was soon exhausted in the immediate neighborhood of the village and each fall practically all of the tribe packed up and traveled to the winter hunting grounds.

The second need was for additional women to bring new bloodlines to the village. The Indians were aware that related persons would not bear healthy children. Indian villages were widely dispersed, perhaps thirty in the area of present-day Ohio, so finding a wife outside the village was difficult. In the spring members of a tribe would gather from all the villages for a powwow that included feasting and dancing. This was an opportunity to find a wife.

Because of the limited food supply, the Indian population was stable. After an epidemic such as smallpox in the early 18th century, the number of Indians was sharply reduced. However, with fewer hunters the game increased rapidly and with the increased availability of food, the Indian population regained its previous level by the end of the 18th century when the tribes were three generations removed from the devastation of the epidemics earlier in the century.

Life expectancy can be assumed to be about thirty years, longer for the men in most years and shorter for the women who often died in childbirth. In the 18th century life expectancy in England, where records are available, was thirty-five years. To maintain the population level with a life expectancy of thirty years would require a birthrate of thirty-three per thousand. In Russia before World War I when living conditions in the farm villages were primitive, the birthrate was forty-seven per thousand, so one might assume that the Indian birthrate probably exceeded the thirty-three per thousand necessary to maintain the current level.

The Indian village included at most fifty families with 400 persons. Crude farming techniques made it impossible to grow large quantities of food for the people let alone for domesticated animals. Growing corn and other food products for fifty families required at least 500 acres, each of which took an enormous amount of labor to clear and prepare for cultivation.

The 18th-century Indian family unit averaged eight persons, the husband, his wife and often her sister or other related woman, an unmarried adult male, one or two older persons, and two or three children. Infant mortality was high. Because of the limited number of unrelated males, a younger sister would often move to the new household when the elder sister married. If the older married sister died in childbirth, the younger sister could assume her place and raise the children. In a village of 400 persons with a birthrate of thirty-three per thousand, thirteen children would have been born each year.

In the Woodland tribes, marriages were arranged by the family of the young man or, more likely, by the clan mother. Marriage among members of the same clan was forbidden as the Indians were well aware of the increased danger of deformed children resulting from inbreeding. There are frequent references to the danger of having a deformed child. Marriage between cousins did take place, although as the subject of jokes it was not encouraged. As a young man would join the clan of his wife, his offspring would be eligible to marry members of his former clan, which might include some cousins.

At any one time four generations or more would live in the village. At best there would be only four clans who did not share a common grandparent. A young man searching for a wife would have to find her among the unrelated groups. Given the birthrate six men would be searching for wives each year from among a group of six women. To make matters worse some men had several wives, although these were more often sisters. Widowers often married the sister of the deceased wife.

A young woman was considered ready for marriage at sixteen. Young men were initiated as adult members of the tribe at eighteen. When a man found a wife, they would exchange vows to be together until death. Therefore each year even though three young men might find distantly related women, three more would not find wives and remain with their fathers' families.

Finding a wife was even more difficult because of the presence of the French fur traders who often took an Indian country wife even though they had wives in Canada. Their children were called *métis*, and they played an important role in the fur trade. The Indian wife was essential to the trader to grow and prepare his food and to assist him with the chores related to the trade, as well as to provide companionship. The women were willing to enter such marriages because of the obvious economic advantage. Compared to the harsh life of an Indian household, caring for a French fur trader was much easier. Life as the sister of a woman married to an Indian man offered very little other than hard work in the fields, caring for the sister's children, and sexual frustration.

Obviously there were many variations of this pattern and there is little documentation, but the essential element was that a village of 400 persons needed three young women from outside each year to maintain the population. The choices would be limited to those women in a different clan. There are six possible matches if there were four clans in the village, A with B, A with C, A with D, B with C, B with D, and C with D. Over the course of five years, it was mathematically possible for every man to find a wife from another clan, but only after a long wait.

One solution was meeting a young woman from another village at the annual powwow. Another solution was to capture young women from

other tribes or from the settlers. Many references were made to the war parties of forty or so Iroquois men passing through Fort Pitt on their way to attack the Cherokees south of the Ohio River. On their return they had a number of captives. There are many references to young women captured from the Pawnee tribe west of the Mississippi River by the tribes north of the Ohio River. They were so common that they were given the nickname of *Pani* and were exchanged and sold much like slaves. A colonial fur trader would often have a *Pani* to accompany him along with three or more Indian males to manage his string of horses loaded with trade goods.

With the arrival of the white settlers, the frontier settlements offered a closer source of brides. In December 1775 the Kickapoo Indians captured two Englishwomen and took them to the hunting ground in Illinois. During the American Revolution the Indians on the frontier were encouraged by the British to attack the frontier settlements to weaken the colonies. The war parties would often kill the white men and capture the women as potential brides and children who were adopted by the tribe. There are references in contemporary documents to the sale of young women to fur traders as companions and to the maintenance of Indian bordellos by the British Army. However, the usual fate of a captured child was inclusion in the tribe.

Some colonial, British, and French men captives were held for ransom, which was paid in trade goods. However, women and children taken from the Cherokees, the Pawnees, or the settlers were retained by the tribes. In the summer of 1771 Indians took James Finley, a trader, captive in Illinois, and he was redeemed by a Frenchman merchant in Illinois for £120 sterling in trade goods (\$30,000 in 2007 dollars). Some French and British merchants and others in Detroit did purchase adult men and women captives from the Indians and employed them as indentured servants. The Indians were willing to sell the adults, but usually kept the young women and children who either would be adopted into the tribe or sold to another Indian village. Some of the women were sold to the French fur traders as country wives. There are many references to the refusal of young women to return to their families after years of living with the Indians. These young women provided the answer to the continuation of tribe.

When open warfare erupted between the colonists and the British in 1775, the British turned to the Indians for assistance in fighting the frontiersmen. General Thomas Gage, Commander of the British forces in America, claimed correctly that the Americans were the first to use Indians in the siege of Boston and that more were recruited in New England in May 1775. On 2 August 1775, Gage was instructed to employ the western tribes in retaliation against the Americans.

Congress adopted a policy of neutrality with the tribes. In October 1775 a meeting was held with the Delaware, the Shawnee, and others. The Ohio River was made the boundary and the Indians promised neutrality. Morgan,

the Indian agent, in 1776 had a three-point program: (1) to prevent the British from employing the Indians on border raids, (2) to improve the feelings of the warriors toward the settlers, and (3) to prevent Congress from using the land. His insistence that the Indians not be involved in the war and that peace be maintained in the Ohio Valley was thought to further this plan. During 1777 Morgan was purchasing Indian trade goods and outfitting boats for secret expeditions, but these activities had proper authority and a Congressional Commission cleared him of all charges.

Other Americans were not so fortunate. Alexander McKee (the Indian agent at Fort Pitt before the Revolution) and Simon Girty were arrested, but there was insufficient evidence to convict them of treason, and they merely remained on parole. They eventually came to the Amherstburg area near Detroit.

The Indians had two powerful motives for attacking the pioneers, first, to protect their hunting grounds, and second, to secure additions to their tribes. The supplies and military support provided by the British Army facilitated the attacks, but when British support was withdrawn, the attacks continued.

The Indian tribes were divided into small villages of fewer than 500 persons because of the lack of implements for large-scale farming and the inability to preserve large amounts of meat. Without farms to provide fodder, the Indians could not care for herds of cattle and therefore were forced to hunt deer and other animals. An economy based on primitive farming and hunting and with limited transportation could not support large concentrations of people. The Indians in the 18th century had few horses. The use of canoes was limited because the streams froze in the winter and dried up in the summer, limiting the use of canoes. The supply of animals was quickly exhausted around the villages, and the Indians were forced to move to hunting grounds after their crops were harvested in the fall.

Preservation of their land was of major concern to the Indians. Indian ownership of the land was respected when the British merchants formed alliances with the French traders. However, even though the Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains, the colonists resumed their efforts to seize land and convert it to agriculture. When the Revolution broke out on the coast, the colonists seized the opportunity to acquire Indian land. The British government retaliated by providing the Indians with logistical support to oppose the settlers, leading to a series of raids on the frontier for the duration of the Revolutionary War. The colonists countered with military campaigns to deprive the Indians of their ability to fight, for example, the Sullivan expedition in New York that burned the Indian villages and crops and drove the Indians west to Fort Niagara.

Effective resistance to an invader is based on men, material, leadership, and motivation. The Indians outnumbered the colonists and the few militia

and colonial troops on the frontier. The British provided ample supplies of weapons, food, and clothing as well as leadership. The motivation came from two factors: the need to preserve their hunting grounds to sustain a major source of food and the necessity of adding new bloodlines to their villages.

CHAPTER 6

The Loyalists

During the Revolution loyalist fur traders and royal officials on the frontier had no policy of their own despite their presence in large numbers around Fort Pitt compared to eastern Pennsylvania. The loyalists were mostly former British soldiers and members of the Church of England who respected King George III and the British government. They did not believe that the rebels would succeed, and they hoped for a reward if they sided with the British. Some were dissatisfied with their life on the frontier, and a few joined with the Indian raiding parties attacking the settlers.

Lack of confidence in the ability of the rebels to win was the major incentive of the loyalists and led many to desert the colonial regiments either to join the British Army or to escape the war entirely. There were few penalties for being a loyalist. In the eastern counties of Pennsylvania, some loyalist land was confiscated, but not on the frontier.

Outspoken loyalists were denied the right to vote. In Pennsylvania the Test Act of 1776 required all white inhabitants above 18 to take an oath of loyalty to the colony. However, the people in the western counties, Bedford, Northumberland, and Westmoreland, were exempt from this law. Those eligible to vote for the delegates to a convention, which was a precursor of the Continental Congress, were those who had taken the Test Oath, were 21 or more years of age, had lived in Pennsylvania for a year, and had paid either Pennsylvania or county taxes. Obviously the loyalists would not have taken the Test Oath and were ineligible to vote in the eastern counties, but would not have been excluded in the western counties.

The settlers had a number of loyalists in their midst. Some of them deserted during the war to head raiding parties against the frontier. Others remained only to hatch a number of abortive plots that failed to gather

support because even those frontiersmen with loyalist leanings joined the others to defend their very lives when Indian parties swarmed over the border after 1777. What the British lacked in Tory support was more than made up by the help of the Indians.

There were few loyalists among the Virginia landowners who were thwarted by British policies that blocked their schemes to obtain land in the west. Around Fort Pitt some of the new settlers in Kentucky were loyalists who had come to the frontier to avoid the Revolution. Governor Henry Hamilton in Detroit made considerable efforts to encourage the frontier settlers to join the British cause, offering them land and homes at Detroit. When Captain Henry Bird captured 350 settlers in Kentucky in 1780, most of the adult male captives either joined the British Army or worked to improve the British forts at Detroit and Michilimackinac.

The former agents of the Indian Department formed a small but significant group among the loyalists. Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, and Matthew Elliott carried great weight among the Shawnee and the Delaware, the two tribes west of Fort Pitt. These men and others eventually left Fort Pitt and went to Detroit, leaving the local loyalists without leadership. The raids led by these men were counterproductive to some extent because hundreds of loyalist settlers were forced to join with the rebels to defend their homes. Otherwise they would have remained loyal and abstained from the war. The loyalists were divided on the boundary issue between Pennsylvania and Virginia, which was the major concern of the settlers.

Pennsylvania was about equally divided between loyalists and rebels, with most of the rebels in the Philadelphia area. After the British abandoned Philadelphia, the loyalists there were afraid to reveal themselves for fear of reprisal. However, the threat posed by the loyalists kept some of the militia at home rather than joining Washington's army.

The settlers were reluctant to serve in the Continental military units or even in the militia. When settlers were called for Pennsylvania militia service, they claimed to be Virginians and vice versa. Travelers' accounts and court records show the pioneers as uncivilized and scarcely less savage than the red men. Without discipline and without any burning sense of patriotism, self-preservation was the basis of their actions. Joseph Galloway tried to organize loyalist regiments in the counties between Philadelphia and the frontier, but was not successful as most of the loyalists preferred to do nothing. In Congress the Pennsylvanian settlers received little support for their program of passive defense, but as the other groups could not agree on offensive measures, the defensive policy was followed more often than not.

Nicholas Cresswell was one of the more active loyalists in the Fort Pitt area. He was a business associate of Major William Crawford, Valentine Crawford, and John Gibson. In 1774 he was trading with the Delaware and the Shawnee in the Ohio Valley. In 1775 he traveled along the Ohio River trading with the Indians and searching for land. On 14 August 1775

he arrived at Fort Pitt and found lodging at an inn managed by Mrs. Samuel Semple, the sister-in-law of John Connolly. Despite his loyalist sympathy, Cresswell had dinner with Arthur St. Clair, the Pennsylvania justice of the peace, and James Wilson. On 27 September 1775 Mrs. Semple warned Cresswell that he was about to be arrested as a spy by St. Clair. Cresswell left Fort Pitt before he was arrested and returned to England in 1777.

John Connolly, an agent of Governor Dunmore, remained faithful to the British government and offered his services in 1776. The West Augusta County, Virginia, Committee of Safety led by George Croghan had forced Connolly's release after he was arrested by Arthur St. Clair, a Pennsylvania justice of the peace, in June 1775. Because of this favor, Connolly assumed that the committee would support his further royalist actions. Connolly later claimed that he had induced the Indians to support the British during the council in June 1775. He also stated that he had gathered a group of militia officers and magistrates of West Augusta who agreed secretly to assist the British if Connolly received authority from the British to raise men.

In July 1775 Connolly disbanded the Virginia militia at Fort Pitt and went to Norfolk. There he met with Dunmore and prepared the plan for a loyalist uprising in the west. General Thomas Gage approved the plan to send British troops to the western posts. Connolly was to raise a loyalist battalion and enlist the aid of friendly Indians. With these forces, Connolly was to take Fort Pitt and march to join Governor Dunmore in Alexandria.

Connolly's plan never materialized. In August 1775 his letter to the Indians was given to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety by John Gibson. Connolly prepared a list of loyalists in August 1775 and sent it to London. The list was forwarded to Hamilton in Detroit. This list included Alexander McKee, Alexander Ross, and Simon Girty, all of whom subsequently fought for the British. However, it also listed John Campbell, George Aston, William Christy, Jacob Bousman, William Crawford, Valentine Crawford, John Stephenson, William Harrison, Thomas Gist, and his brother, all of whom remained loyal to Virginia. Hamilton accepted the list, however, and believed that there was a strong loyalist party at Fort Pitt. In mid November Connolly was arrested on his way to Fort Pitt. He was imprisoned until July 1780 when he again submitted plans for an uprising against the colonists.

Alexander McKee, British Indian Agent at Fort Pitt, was a thorn in the side of General Edward Hand. Because of his influence with the Indians he had to be handled diplomatically. When Connolly was captured, among his papers was a commission of lieutenant colonel for McKee. With this knowledge, General Hand, the American commander, confined McKee to his house in Pittsburgh.

In February 1776 the British military was actively seeking support among the frontier settlers. Colonel John Butler invited McKee to a conference at Fort Niagara in May to provide information concerning the rebels at Fort Pitt. Coincidentally Colonel Richard Butler, a rebel, learned of the invitation

and warned McKee that his actions would be made public. McKee was forced to reveal details of this invitation to the local Committee of Safety. When McKee revealed the contents of the letter from John Butler, he was placed on parole; that is, his movements were restricted. Richard Butler refused to arrest him on the grounds that McKee would become an outright enemy. McKee signed his parole on 9 April 1776. Hand arrested him in October 1777 presumably for his own safety. McKee was ordered not to leave Fort Pitt or to correspond with the British.

Others were suspected of being loyalists. On 10 April 1776 George Morgan, representing the Pennsylvania speculators led by Samuel Wharton, arrived at Fort Pitt and hired Joseph Nicholson, Simon Girty, and Peter Long as interpreters to negotiate with the Shawnee. The Wharton group ostensibly was trying to defuse the enmity between the Indians and the settlers at Fort Pitt, but the Wharton representatives were also suspected of working on behalf of the British. On 13 June 1776 Captain John Neville reported that Paul Long, an associate of McKee and George Croghan, was detected carrying letters to Fort Niagara. Perhaps Paul Long was the Peter Long that Morgan had hired in April. There was widespread suspicion that McKee was leading an effort to gather support for the British.

British agents were actively engaged on the frontier recruiting supporters against the rebels. They tried to persuade the settlers that the revolt would fail, and if a settler sided with the British he would be rewarded. From London George Germain wrote to Governor Guy Carleton in Quebec that he believed that there were many who were still loyal to Britain. Hamilton at Detroit was ordered to recruit any persons loyal to the crown giving them regular army pay and a promise of 200 acres of land after the war. Another agent promised potential recruits plunder from the rebel settlements and 300 acres of settled land.

During 1777 Henry Hamilton at Detroit had his spies on the frontier circulate his proclamation of 24 June 1777, promising 200 acres of land and pay for military service to any colonial soldiers who would desert. The deserters were to be fed and housed and enlisted in the British Army. The American commanders attempted to hold this order secret for fear of desertions. The proclamation was not too effective, and most of the loyalists preferred to remain neutral. Even the British merchants in Illinois, which was firmly in British hands, refused to take sides, preferring to continue trading with the French and the Indians. Pennsylvania took strong countermeasures against this propaganda. A law was passed on 11 February 1777 that any resident was a traitor if he accepted a commission from the British or enlisted others to join the British. The penalty was death and the loss of all property.

On 20 November 1777 the Continental Congress appointed a commission to investigate any disaffection that might have resulted from Hamilton's offer of pay and land to any who would desert to the British in

Detroit. The commission consisting of George Clymer of Pennsylvania, Sampson Matthews of Virginia, Gabriel Jones, and Colonel Samuel Washington arrived at Fort Pitt in January 1778.

The resulting situation was confused with charges and countercharges. Matthew Elliott traveled from Fort Pitt to Detroit in early 1777 and was arrested by the British as a colonial spy. No proof was available, so he was released and returned to Fort Pitt. By the summer of 1777 confusion reigned. Governor Dunmore of Virginia commissioned Alexander McKee as a lieutenant colonel to raise a loyalist battalion at Fort Pitt. The plan was discovered and McKee was placed in house arrest at Fort Pitt. Later McKee was arrested again. David Shepherd of the Virginia militia found ten copies of Hamilton's proclamation offering pay and land to deserters. McKee was suspected of a plot to murder colonial supporters around Fort Pitt. McKee, Simon Girty, George Morgan, and Colonel John Campbell were arrested as well by General Hand, but released for lack of evidence and put on parole. In March 1778 McKee fled to Detroit.

Even the colonial commander, General Hand, was under suspicion as a traitor to the American cause. Many were arrested including George Morgan, the Wharton agent. Pennsylvania issued a black list of 490 men suspected of being loyalists. Seventy-one turned themselves in and were found innocent of any charge. Thirteen were tried and acquitted. Only a few were found guilty and hanged.

In August 1777 a loyalist uprising was reported afoot at Redstone. In late August Colonel Thomas Gaddis of Westmoreland County learned of a plot and informed Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown at Redstone on the Monongahela River. Brown was ordered to place an extra guard on the powder magazine at Redstone. The loyalists tried to seize the arsenal at Redstone, but Brown was on guard and a force of a hundred colonists under Gaddis and Captain Henry Enoch pursued the loyalists.

Another thirty loyalists led by Henry Maggee fled into the Allegheny Mountains, and some later joined Butler's Rangers, a British regiment made up of loyalists. The British attempts to inflame the frontier failed because of lack of support. The British Army and the Indians sympathetic to the British never appeared to support the loyalists in their efforts at Fort Pitt. In October 1777 George Morgan, the commander of the Monongahela County militia, was arrested under suspicion of drowning a loyalist prisoner. In reaction the militia refused to serve and Morgan was freed.

In Pennsylvania the Test Oath of July 1777 exempted men in Bedford and Westmoreland counties, the frontier counties. A new Test Act of 12 October 1777 reflected the continuing fear of loyalists. The new version of the Test Oath was applied to all men more than 16 years old who had traveled outside of Philadelphia or the county where they lived and generally to all who appeared suspicious. Those who failed to test were sent to jail with

bail. In December a company of forty-five men of the Smithfield, Virginia, militia were disarmed for failing to take an oath to the United States.

Simon Girty continued to be an enigma. In September 1777 he was reportedly involved in a loyalist plot, arrested, escaped, and then gave himself up and was cleared because of lack of evidence. Then later in 1777 Girty volunteered to serve under General Hand in the Squaw Campaign against the local tribes. Girty's relatives served the colonial cause. George Girty served with the Willing expedition to New Orleans, and James Girty acted as a messenger for the Congressional Commission investigating loyalist activity in Fort Pitt. On 28 March 1778, McKee, Girty, and five others escaped from Fort Pitt and joined the British.

George Morgan was warned by General Hand not to send messages to the Indians, who were upset as a result of the murder of one of the chiefs, Cornstalk. Morgan was arrested, but Hand was unable to find sufficient evidence that Morgan had betrayed the colonists. The only evidence was that Morgan, while away from Fort Pitt in the summer of 1777, had discussions with the Shawnee using McKee as his interpreter. Morgan left again in October 1777 and returned in late December. In December 1777 the Congressional Commission continued to believe that a conspiracy existed involving George Morgan, Alexander McKee, and Simon Girty and that General Hand may have played a part. Colonel Campbell was also under suspicion. Morgan and McKee were placed in house arrest, and Girty was put in the military guard house. The only evidence Hand had was a report in November from a woman that McKee had written letters to Detroit, but the woman had a personal feud with McKee and her information was untrustworthy. Morgan was cleared by the Congressional Commission because of insufficient evidence.

General Hand firmly believed in their innocence, but Hand himself was under suspicion by Congress. Morgan and Hand were cleared of any charges, but McKee and Girty remained on parole. Hand suspected that McKee was preparing to escape to British territory. To prevent this possibility, McKee was ordered to York. He ignored the order pleading illness. Morgan believed that Matthew Elliott, recently returned from Detroit, had convinced McKee that he would be murdered on his way east. On 28 March 1778 McKee, Elliott, Simon Girty, and four others escaped from Fort Pitt.

Shortly after McKee escaped, disaffected soldiers in the 13th Virginia Regiment plotted to blow up Fort Pitt to coincide with an Indian attack led by the British and escape by boat down the Ohio. The plot was uncovered and prevented by Colonel Zackwell Morgan who assembled 500 militia to fight the loyalists. Twenty-one of the loyalists tried to escape but were pursued by Colonel Morgan, and all but eight were captured. The other loyalists returned to Fort Pitt. Two leaders were shot and a third was hanged. Two others were whipped. In the first four months of 1778, a total of forty soldiers had deserted from Fort Pitt, taking prisoners and settlers

with them. Considering the small size of Hand's garrison, this loss was considerable. General Hand was so pestered with charges of disloyalty that he requested relief from his command. He believed that a new commander would be able to gather more support.

In February 1778 a band of Tories met under John Weston in Sinking Valley to raid the frontier. They encountered a band of Indians whom they greeted as allies, but the Indians killed and scalped Weston. The loyalist party dissolved and most of them were later captured and jailed.

To maintain the situation at Fort Pitt, troops had to be taken from Washington's army. After the disastrous series of desertions, Hand wrote that if additional men were not sent to Fort Pitt to encourage the colonists and threaten the loyalists, the area would be overrun by British and loyalists within a short time.

Relief from these demoralizing desertions from Fort Pitt came from an unexpected source. On 5 January 1778 Hamilton, the commanding officer at Detroit, sent another message encouraging the loyalists to join the British cause, this time with an affidavit signed by six men reporting the good treatment they had received in Detroit. General Frederick Haldimand, the new British commander in Canada, disliked the procedure. Haldimand, who had replaced Guy Carleton as British commander in Canada in July 1778, ended the encouragement of loyalist support. Keeping American deserters at Detroit was too expensive unless they were soldiers. Haldimand disapproved of granting land to the deserters because he feared some might be spies, and if they were given land near the fort at Detroit they could obtain information. He ended attempts to bribe the Americans.

The loyalists continued to be active in 1779 and 1780. Colonel William Preston of the Virginia militia suppressed uprisings in the Virginia counties aimed at taking the lead mines. The court records of those counties contain numerous indictments for treason throughout 1779, 1780, and in January 1781. Disloyalty to the United States became more rampant on the frontier during the war as immigrants from the east went west to escape military service. Charles Brodhead complained of the loyalist leanings of many of the inhabitants west of the mountains. They wanted the colonial troops removed and have the area submitted to the British Army. Though the loyalists never succeeded in winning the frontier, in combination with the British forces and the Indians, they prevented Congress from drawing recruits from the west after 1777 and forced Washington to return two regiments merely to maintain American control at Fort Pitt.

Fear of raids, poor leadership of the loyalists, and prompt action of the faithful militia prevented the loyalist plots from gaining wide support or from seriously affecting the war. The most damaging effect of the loyalists on the conduct of the war resulted from their leadership of Indian raiding parties.

CHAPTER 7

The British Army

By far the greatest portion of the money appropriated to the British Army in America before 1768 was spent on the frontier and Canada, and comparatively little of the cost of the army in America was spent in England. In 1754 during the struggle with France, England had placed a large army in America that had occupied Canada by 1760. England's military purpose had been not only the defense of the Thirteen Colonies, but also the acquisition of French territory in Canada and the west. After the Seven Years' War (the French and Indian War), a major factor was provisioning the many troops that remained to control the frontier and to protect the colonists, especially the fur traders in their dealings with the Indians. Even though a much smaller force could have regulated Indian affairs and because there was no real threat to the colonists from the French living in Canada and Louisiana, it was only coincidental, not deliberately planned, that this large army was available for police action on the seaboard after 1765.

Although few in number, the soldiers played an important part in the commercial activity on the frontier. There was little objection to the army on the frontier as long as its cost was paid by London. Money spent for supplies and payroll made the army one of the major industries in the colonies. The primary resentment on the part of the colonials was aimed at the British government's insistence that the colonists pay for this large army. Many elements of the colonial society were pressing to maintain military spending near the level of wartime spending to boost the American economy. About a tenth of total British imperial military expenses and about a fifth of the money spent on the army went to America. In 1756 the British spent £81,178 (\$20,294,500 in 2007 dollars) on the 60th Royal American Regiment consisting of four battalions of Germans recruited in Germany and

from among German settlers in America in 1755. Recruiting in America was not successful, so about 2,000 rejects from British regiments in Ireland were used to fill the battalions along with the German mercenaries. Henri Bouquet and Frederick Haldimand commanded two of the battalions.

In 1757 Britain spent £46,022 (\$11,505,500 in 2007 dollars) on the 77th and 78th Scottish regiments each of only one battalion. Most of this money was spent in America for pay, rations, and transportation. From 1759 to 1761, more than a million pounds sterling (\$250,000,000 in 2007 dollars) of English money was spent annually, which tremendously stimulated the colonial economy. In 1762 when the army was sent to the West Indies, British expenditures in the colonies dropped sharply to little more than a half million pounds, but jumped to £750,000 in 1763 as a result of Pontiac's Uprising and the return of the troops. From 1764 on, when the troop strength was reduced to a peacetime level, the figures dropped to between £300,000 and £400,000 except for one year. When comparing these figures to the export and import figures, obviously military expenditures, in the form of purchases of American goods and services, were a deciding advantage in balancing the payments between America and the mother country. In 1760 the combined total of exports and military expenditures had been £1,943,000 compared to imports of £2,612,000, a deficit of £669,000, whereas by 1764 exports and military expenditures dropped to £1,487,000 and imports increased to £2,249,000, an even greater dent in the balance of trade. In 1760 military expenditures were sixty percent of the total of exports and military spending. In 1764 military expense dropped to only twenty-five percent of the combined total of military expense and exports. Americans replaced some of the military spending with exports, but the total deficit continued to increase to £762,000. By 1772 military expenditures dropped even further to only twenty percent of the combined export-military expenditures figure, and the deficit expanded to more than £1,400,000 (\$350,000,000 in 2007 dollars), which clearly indicates the effect of military spending on the balance of trade.

Life in the frontier posts was far from desirable despite the high cost. The soldiers were healthy and constantly at work. They could easily eat up the standard army allowance of four pounds of pork and seven pounds of flour per week. Either the company cook or one of the women who accompanied the regiment would use the flour to bake bread and prepared stew with the salted beef and any vegetables that were available. Much of the correspondence from and to the British posts refers to food. At Fort Niagara the provisions sometimes were not fit to eat, and there was a lack of vegetables. In some cases the packed beef was spoiled and had to be replaced by venison bought from the Indians. In one case there was a shortage of flour, and the baker was found stealing and selling it to men who were deserting. Colonel Henry Bouquet in one report requested some beans to make the pork go down. In 1760 General Thomas Gage ordered garden seeds to be sent to

Niagara and Oswego with orders to cultivate large gardens to grow vegetables for the use of the troops. He also sent vinegar and lime juice to the posts to check the scurvy, which had caused a number of deaths.

General Jeffrey Amherst, the British commander in America in 1763, had little knowledge of conditions at the posts. He ordered the commander at Fort Niagara to treat the Indians as enemies and put them to death if they came near the post. Amherst was also ignorant of exposure to the severe Great Lakes climate in winter. He disapproved of sending the sick away from Niagara because he mistakenly believed it was one of the healthiest places in America. Cold weather brought an increase of sickness to the garrison. In November 1763 the commander at Fort Niagara sent more soldiers of the 80th Regiment away as there was no hospital. He also sent the sick men from the 55th and 17th Regiments back to Montreal because they were naked and without rations lying in the utmost misery. There was no possibility of their being of the least service and their enlistments were nearly expired. They contributed nothing and merely bred sickness in Fort Niagara and ate the scarce provisions.

In 1764 Major Henry Gladwin at Detroit was in dire straits. He had 670 men with provisions and stores for the time being, but the sloop on Lake Erie that brought supplies was a complete loss and could not be repaired. In January 1764 he reported that the arms of the garrison were almost unserviceable and had to be replaced with new ones. In April 1764 it was reported that the troops at Detroit had been very sickly the previous winter owing to the lack of vegetables.

Transport was not always sufficient. Official reports from Niagara record movements of troops, transport and problems regarding spoilage of provisions, and the construction and repair of vessels on Lake Erie and Lake Ontario as well as losses by storms. Bouquet ordered pitch and oakum for use in building and repairing boats. There were shortages of pack horses, storage places, and boats. The roads were next to impassable during the rainy season and during the winter until they were frozen. The service was very hard on horses, and many gave out struggling on bad roads. Transport was indeed unmanageable.

The cost-cutting measures ordered by London became evident in the maintenance of the forts. Fort Niagara was in constant need of repair. On 28 November 1771 Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith of the 10th Regiment of Foot took over. General Gage wrote him on 16 June 1772, enclosing a contract of 15 May of that year with engineer Lieutenant Francis Pfister to repair the fort. Most of the time some part of the fort needed repairing. Wood was the most used material, and since wood preservation did not come in until about 1830 in Germany, it was not surprising that it decayed quickly.

To escape the rigors of military life, many British officers accepted half pay and returned to Britain. Others applied for extended leaves of absence

or tried to sell their commissions. A few officers applied for land grants presumably for farming. Excessive drinking was a constant problem even among the officers. Ensign William Hay came into the commandant's room one evening drunk. He was arrested and ordered to appear before a court of inquiry.

There were a few cases of disputes among officers or misdemeanors that called for a court-martial. Generally the commandants preferred having the courts-martial sit at Montreal or Quebec where more officers would be available for court-martial duty. Another cause of friction was dealings with firms supplying material for the garrison or for Indian presents. The accounting procedures by the army were insufficient. Litigation with the firm of Taylor & Forsyth resulted. The Indian Department brought suit against it and the decision was against Taylor & Forsyth. There were also sutlers at Niagara who were ordered to leave.

Retaining skilled enlisted personnel was also a problem. A sergeant applied for leave to join his company and settle his accounts, but Colonel Bouquet wanted him back as he had no interpreter who understood the language of the Five Nations settled near Detroit. Transporting the supplies to the forts was extremely difficult. Colonel Bouquet sent Major Walters in September 1760 a long list of articles needed for building sailing vessels on Lake Erie, none of which were in store in the Niagara garrison. Walters did not think a sloop would meet Bouquet's expectation as she would draw too much water, nor were there harbors along the lake for such a vessel. Walters did not believe that a sloop could come near Little Niagara at the Lake Erie end of the portage around Niagara Falls. There were several shoals to pass around Presque Isle, the only harbor between the Niagara River and Detroit.

The British regiments were scattered among numerous small posts before 1763, including Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, Green Bay, and Venango as well as the larger posts at Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Fort Niagara. Three outposts, Presque Isle, LeBoeuf, and Venango, had a share in the French-British conflict, and all three were casualties of the Indian attacks during Pontiac's War. In April 1753 a French expedition built the fort at Presque Isle (site of future Erie, Pennsylvania). The attraction was the harbor. The fort was 120 feet square with a log bastion at each corner and a blockhouse in the center. The fort was constructed of fifteen-foot-long chestnut logs squared and overlapping. A gate was on the south side and another on the north. A road was built to connect the fort to a branch of French Creek, which led about fifteen miles to a branch of the Ohio River system.

Venango was built at the junction of French Creek with the Allegheny River. An English trader, John Fraser, had built a trading post there. He was ordered by the French to leave and went to Turtle Creek on the Monongahela. All of the forts were abandoned by the French after the fall of

Niagara. The British repaired them and put in small garrisons. All three were captured by the Indians in Pontiac's Uprising.

On 15 June 1763 the Indians attacked the blockhouse at Presque Isle commanded by Ensign John Christie with twenty-seven men. After a siege of two days Christie capitulated and surrendered to the Indians on the promise that they should go unmolested to the nearest post. They were kept prisoners for some time and then carried to Detroit. Christie either escaped or was brought to the fort by six Huron chiefs in July. Both Le Boeuf and Venango were captured and burned. The entire garrison at Venango was killed.

Obviously it was extremely dangerous to place small garrisons in outposts. This scattering of the troops also weakened their military potential because it weakened discipline. The formal relationship between officers and men and the rigid patterns of barracks life necessary to sustain order in the army were almost impossible to maintain in the one- or two-company garrisons.

Supplying the army was of widespread interest. Augustine Prevost wrote to Sir William Johnson from Jamaica in April 1773 concerning rum. Most of the planters were Scots and formed ties with the Scots in the 60th Regiment then in Jamaica. Prevost presented Johnson with a plan to sell rum to Johnson. He had purchased old rum and allowed it to age another year making it better than any rum available in New York. The general practice in the West Indies was to "baptize," add color, and otherwise adulterate rum to make it appear better. The term baptize probably referred to the addition of water.

To support a military operation of this size was a considerable drain on English resources. The money used to pay and supply the British troops in America made the army one of the major sources of sterling. By far, most of the money appropriated to support the army in America was spent in America. Why then could not the colonists share in the expense of providing an army to protect them? The British felt the answer was that the regiments on the American frontier were unnecessary. There were no British regiments permanently stationed on the frontier when the French controlled Canada and stirred up the Indians to resist the colonists. Why then were the regiments required when the French were no longer in power.

The frontiersmen stood to gain the most from the presence of a protective army had it been necessary, but they realized that it was unnecessary. The true reason for the army's presence was to conceal from Parliament an addition to the standing army. To support a military of the size desired by George III was a considerable drain on British resources and, combined with the need to pay interest on the huge debt already accumulated during the Seven Years' War, meant heavy taxation of the landowning aristocracy in Britain.

George III wanted to change England's foreign policy from one of imperialistic expansion worldwide, which required a powerful navy, to one of

confrontation with France on land in Europe, which required a large standing army. Parliament resisted support for a large standing army, so George III sought a way around. Had Parliament been willing to pay the cost of the army, there would have been no need to hide regiments in America and no need to tax the colonists to pay for the army. Sterling payments for the expense of the regiments would have continued to flow to America and return in the form of payments for British goods.

An additional unfortunate result for the colonists was that the regiments were readily available to enforce British laws when the colonists rebelled. Had not these regiments been ready for repressive action in the 1760s, England's decision to employ force rather than reason might have tempered the misunderstanding with the colonists.

The origins of the policy that created an imperial force in America began in 1754 when in April the Board of Trade presented a plan to increase the size of the army in America. In 1754 the British Army in America consisted of 3,149 officers and men. Two companies were in Bermuda and the Bahamas. The remainder, two regiments and nine companies plus the 47th Regiment coming from Ireland, were on the mainland. The British Board of Trade on 5 August 1754, faced with aggressive moves on the part of France, advocated vigorous defense of the colonies. The plan provided funds not only for the building and garrisoning of frontier forts, but also for the management of Indian affairs by arranging salaries for members of the Indian Department and presents for the Indians.

The military aspect of the Board's recommendation began with the appointment in 1755 of General Edward Braddock as commander in chief and his dispatch to America with the first of many regiments. To implement the Indian policy, Sir William Johnson was appointed superintendent of the Iroquois, and money was made available for presents.

The influx began in 1754, and by October 1761 more than twenty percent of the entire British Army was in America—23,000 men of a total of 108,000. In 1762 there were thirty-eight regiments in North America, the largest number of troops in any theater of war. In December 1762 the army in America consisted of 8,000 men distributed as follows:

Canada	3,650
Nova Scotia, Cape Bretons Island, Newfoundland	1,700
Upper New York posts	1,250
Western Pennsylvania	400
Michigan area	350
South Carolina and Georgia	450
New York City area	200

As soon as the Seven Years' War ended, political pressure was exerted in London to reduce the high cost of the army. In 1760 the British Army had a total of ninety-six regiments. The peace was signed in Paris on 10 February 1763, but even before, on 1 February, King George III and Lord Ligonier, the British commander in chief, had agreed to ask for an overall peacetime army of eighty-five regiments. However, because of Parliamentary objections, this number was reduced to seventy-five. On 24 February 1763 the king's ministers called for an army in Britain of about the same size as before the war. In 1763 the North American army of only 3,100 men before the war was increased to twenty regiments with 7,500 men. This plan was approved by Parliament the following day with the provision that the army in America would be supported by England the first year and thereafter the cost would be borne by the colonists. In March 1763 the House of Commons approved the twenty regiments with the understanding that American taxation would supply £50,000 sterling of the estimated cost of £250,000.

On 8 June 1763 the Board of Trade reported that part of the overall plan for North America should be a sizable military force to defend against possible French or Indian uprisings and to provide security to settlers on the frontier. The army was also to provide military government for the Indian territory and to protect the Indians from abuse by the traders. No civil government was provided and settlement was prohibited west of the mountains, the origin of the Proclamation of 1763 limitation of settlement west of the mountains. On 14 July 1763 the king approved of this plan. On 15 September 1763, Lord Halifax, the secretary of state (south), directed the Board of Trade to prepare a proclamation not only limiting settlement, but also providing for an award of land to officers who served in America and to enlisted men who were discharged there rather than returning to Britain with their regiments.

The departing regiments left a significant number of men behind. Many British soldiers chose to remain in America and obtain land from the British government. The British regiments in America had recruited some colonists to fill vacancies despite rules to the contrary, and these men chose to remain along with those who wanted to start a new life in America. Of the five regiments sent back to Britain in 1767, 450 men elected to remain in America, about one-third of the men. In 1769, 266 men from the 9th and 34th Regiments preferred to remain in America, about half of the men, to acquire land under the Proclamation of 1763.

A significant factor was the large number of Highlander Scots who elected to remain in America and Canada when their regiments were disbanded. In 1757 two regiments were recruited, each with 1,100 men, from Scotland. In addition each existing Scottish regiment was to receive eighty additional men. The intent was to reduce the number of Jacobites, supporters of Bonnie Prince Charles, the Stuart pretender to the throne, who had led an

insurgency against George II, which was defeated at the Battle of Culloden in 1745.

A Highlander was one born north of the River Tay in Scotland. Highlanders belonged to clans composed of related persons having the same surname and sworn to allegiance to the chief of the clan. The chief was primarily a military leader and had absolute authority. The women did the farming and the men were trained as soldiers. The father of Simon Fraser, one of the colonels of the two new regiments, was Lord Lovat, who had been hanged for his part in the rebellion led by Prince Charles. There is little question that the Highlanders were not favorable to the German-born George II. Lord Cumberland worried that the new regiments might present problems. On the other hand, the leading Jacobite, the Duke of Argyle, feared that there would be difficulty in finding recruits. In the spring of 1756 recruiting began and by January 1757 two regiments were ready. The 77th Regiment led by Colonel Archibald Montgomery, son of the Earl of Eglinton, included 1,460 men from the Fraser, MacDonald, Cameron, Maclean, and other clans. The 78th Regiment led by Colonel Simon Fraser included men from the Lovat area. The 42nd Regiment, an existing Highland regiment, also received new recruits. Each regiment had 1,100 men. By July 1757 the two regiments were in America along with the 42nd Regiment that had preceded them in the spring of 1756. The 42nd Regiment (the Black Watch) began as militia companies in 1725 to maintain order in Scotland and became a regiment later in the year.

In July 1757 George II approved the dispatch of an additional 3,000 men to America. Two thousand were obtained by taking forty men in from each regiment in Britain and an additional thousand newly recruited Highlanders to be divided among the 42nd, 77th, and 78th Regiments. The Scots were recruited in the area north of Glasgow in August 1757. The Scots were assembled in Glasgow in November and then sent to Cork in Ireland in December. On 20 December 1757 they left Cork and arrived at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, on 11 March 1758 after a rough crossing. One company was blown off course toward Portugal and Antigua, finally arriving in New York City on 24 June 1758. The Scots were all billeted in towns around New York City to recuperate after their voyage. Under the English Quartering Act, householders were legally obligated to take in soldiers and feed them for as long as the army wished, leading to the prohibition of quartering in the American Constitution.

In August 1763 the reduction of the Scottish regiments began. General Jeffery Amherst informed Colonel Henry Bouquet, commander at Fort Pitt, that officers and men of the 42nd and 77th Regiments at Fort Pitt who wished to remain in America and take up land were permitted to do so under the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763. Three companies of men who chose to return to Britain left on 12 December 1763. Five hundred or more men must have chosen to remain in America. Later Bouquet was

offered a large grant of land if he would convince fifty or more former soldiers to settle in the Fort Pitt area under his leadership. Many of the Scots from the 78th Regiment disbanded in Canada and entered the fur trade in the area northwest of the Lake Superior.

After the size of the army had been decided, a plan for its use was developed. On 12 February 1763 the secretary at war had ordered General Amherst to submit a plan for the distribution of the troops that would be economical and at the same time accomplish their mission. Not until April did Amherst reply that the Mississippi River and Canada would require the majority of the troops to guard against a Spanish invasion and to control the Indians. Other soldiers would be required in Florida, but none were to be assigned to the seaboard communities.

The major interest in gaining control of Canada, Florida, and the west during the French and Indian War was that these areas were militarily strategic. France and Spain could be excluded from the North Atlantic and their bases would be available for future operations in the Caribbean. In 1764 the 22nd Regiment with 300 men was sent up the Mississippi River to replace the French at Fort de Chartres in Illinois. For political reasons the economic, rather than military, value of these areas was stressed. However, at that time little attention was directed toward agriculture inasmuch as in the 18th century the only economic worth of Canada and the Old Northwest was the fur trade.

Britain's official reason for the large peacetime army in America was the management of the Indians and the French traders. If furs were to be obtained, the colonial traders had to be protected from robbery and murder by the Indians, a task that could be performed best by troops in strategically located posts. The Pennsylvania and New York merchants repeatedly demanded that the fur trade be tightly regulated with the aid of the army. The only serious threat was the disaffection of the Indians, which culminated in Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763. French encouragement and supplies were factors in the early success of the Indians, which resulted in the deaths of many soldiers and fur traders.

While control of the wilderness was necessary, there was little need for troops to control the French in Canada. Even though there were some 70,000 French people in Canada, most of them were farmers who had little concern for life outside their village. Furthermore, their leadership was weak inasmuch as the so-called seigneurs were, in effect, only landowners with titles dating back no more than one or two generations. The civil servants ruling Canada before 1760 had returned to France under the provisions of the Capitulation of Montreal. The remaining French habitants were accustomed to European rule and therefore adjusted quite well to the British.

To accomplish all of these objectives of the army, a minimum force would have been two battalions in Florida; four in Canada, Newfoundland, and

Nova Scotia; four in the wilderness; at least two in reserve; and two in transit. This general pattern was followed in later years. Some Britons, as well as the colonists, did not agree on the necessity of the garrisons in Canada and Florida and the posts in the wilderness. They believed that the army was there to surreptitiously suppress the colonists. William Shelburne's secretary, Maurice Morgan, believed that the forts in the interior were not for the purpose of controlling the French and Indians but to restrain the colonists. He believed that the regulation of the Indians and road building were mere pretenses.

The intent of Parliament was that the colonies should assist in financing the army in America there for their protection, and Parliament proceeded with its plan. In September 1763 the Treasury Board in London ordered the draft of a bill for colonial stamp duties to provide revenue to be used to defray military expenses. In March 1764 Lord Grenville presented a resolution to the House of Commons for duties on colonial imports and exports, which was subsequently enacted as the Sugar Act of 1764. This act specifically stated that the revenue was to be used to defray the expense of defending the colonies. Further strengthening the English position in March 1764, a resolution was adopted in Parliament to the effect that the expense of defending the British colonies in America should be met by stamp duties.

Taxes imposed by requiring that documents have revenue stamps attached was a traditional means of raising revenue in Britain and is still in use in the United States in 2007. For many years cigarettes were taxed in this manner. Stamps are required in most states on many legal documents.

The Stamp Act of 1765 specifically referred to the use of receipts for defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the colonies, which meant that the great political dispute between the colonies and the mother country was directly related to the army. Had the army not been present, there would have been no drain of £300,000 sterling on the British treasury, nor a need to require the colonies to pay taxes for their defense.

Faced with strong colonial reaction, England repealed the Stamp Act, and an attempt was made to reduce expenditures. To cut costs Secretary at War Lord William Barrington proposed to withdraw the soldiers from the western posts because supplying them in the west at the end of long trade routes was more expensive. Furthermore, when the regiments were split into small detachments problems emerged, discipline deteriorated, and they could not be assembled quickly when needed for police duty, as was discovered during the Stamp Act riots. Barrington was not convinced that troops could even control the Indians at the small posts. Also, experience had shown that the Indians were willing to trade at the larger posts. Therefore the reason for maintaining the army dispersed throughout the west was no longer valid. He recommended that the troops be concentrated in East Florida, Canada, and Nova Scotia where they would be cheaper to maintain

and more readily available for riot duty. Sir William Johnson objected to the plan because he believed that if the small posts were abandoned, the French would be free to hatch plots with the Indians against the British. In addition to supplying the troops, another growing market was the Indian Department which, during the French and Indian War, made sizable purchases of gifts for the Indians to maintain their loyalty to the British. Attempts were made to reduce the number of presents after the fighting ended in 1760, but by that time the practice had become deeply rooted. Furthermore, the sharp curtailment was seen by the tribes as evidence of ill will, for under French control, the French government had accepted this expense as part of the cost of obtaining fur, which went to a government monopoly. Under British rule even though the furs went into private hands, the government was expected to provide the gifts and pay the agents, hence the official reluctance to continue spending substantial amounts for gifts. Had the Indian Superintendent been supplied with funds directly appropriated for this purpose, for example, from the Stamp Act tax, the British attitude toward gift giving, which profited the manufacturers and merchants, might have been more generous and, as a result, the Indians might have been pacified.

After Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763 when the Indians slaughtered the British traders and soldiers, the average amount spent annually by the Indian Department was increased to £10,000 sterling. During later years when the amount of presents was gradually reduced once again, there was no exceptional reaction from the Indians.

Despite Johnson's disapproval, on 11 December 1766 instructions were sent to General Thomas Gage to cut military spending, and though all efforts were made to do so, political pressure continued from London. One of the objections to the budget presented to the House of Commons in January 1767 was the £400,000 sterling for the army in America. In view of growing American defiance of British sovereignty, which made the army all the more essential, many members of Parliament believed that the colonists should pay a share of the cost. Ironically, the Americans were being asked to support an army that later would be used to force them to pay more taxes.

On 5 October 1767 Lord Shelburne forwarded to the Board of Trade a plan for the future of the west, which had great bearing on the role of the army. The plan included the previous Barrington proposal to decrease military expenditures by withdrawing the garrisons from the west and replacing them with new settlements to supposedly create a barrier against the Spaniards and control the Indians. The presentation of the Board of Trade to the king on 7 March 1768 included only moderate features of the Shelburne plan, reducing the number of forts in the interior but recommending additional colonies. This proposal became the blueprint for withdrawal and subsequent reduction in costs. The troops in the Indian country, not directly involved in the protection of the trade, were to be brought east as well as

those blocking possible French and Spanish interference with the tribes. Because of the reduction in the Indian Department, the proposal was that Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Niagara would be sufficient for trading purposes.

In general, the proposals of the Board of Trade found favor with Lord Hillsborough, Shelburne's successor, who believed most of the troops should be in Canada and Florida with three battalions in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, a plan that would reduce the number of smaller western posts. Gage also agreed to abandon most of the western posts, but that some should remain to protect the frontier and the fur trade. Other than the three main posts, Gage recommended that a few men remain at Crown Point, Ticonderoga, Oswegatchie, and Fort Erie to hold open supply lines.

In 1767 regiments were scattered in the west. Those in Canada were located in the populated areas to show evidence of English occupation. About two regiments were usually divided among the posts in upper New York and the Great Lakes. The line of communication from Philadelphia and Fort Pitt usually took a regiment. Several companies were used in the frontier posts in Georgia. A regiment was posted in Illinois after 1765, and two or more were assigned in Florida after 1763. Other than troops awaiting transportation or traveling to new locations, those stationed in the urban centers were limited to a few companies in New York and Philadelphia. New York was the headquarters of the commander in chief, which required a few troops for ceremonial purposes, general housekeeping duties, and maintenance of the supply service for garrisons upstate. Philadelphia was also the supply depot for the troops in Fort Pitt and Illinois. The primary reason for maintaining the large army in America apparently was to control the new acquisitions, the fur trade, and the Indians, rather than to repress the colonists.

After lengthy debates, in June 1768 Gage was ordered to withdraw from all minor posts in the interior. The order was carried out, and the troops were sent to the major cities on the seacoast to quell further difficulties. From 1769 to 1773, an average of four regiments were in Boston and three each in Pennsylvania and New York. The Montreal and Quebec garrisons were reduced from four or more to two regiments.

Even though the order succeeded in reducing the troops in the west, after 1768 London demanded that the cost of the army be further reduced. Gage made strenuous efforts to do so by restricting expenditures for extraordinaries, which were expenses in excess of the usual appropriation for food, clothing, and pay. The extraordinaries included Indian Department expenditures, transportation charges, and other variable charges. Gage also made a major saving by refusing to authorize repairs on the various posts, particularly on the frontier. Gage shaved extras and repairs, but even these savings on minor expenses had little impact on the overall cost of the army.

The availability of this powerful military force was to produce unfortunate political decisions in England, but does not necessarily prove that the army was designed from the beginning as a repressive force because it had little opposition before 1768. Before the Stamp Act crisis, the colonists considered the army a profitable market, as well as a shield against the Indians and a controlling factor in the west. Parliament had been convinced originally that control of the wilderness by the regular army was essential for the security of the colonies and for the preservation of the fur trade, for without access to the European traders the tribes were likely to revolt. However, British budgetary problems led to an attempt to obtain from the colonies that were supposedly benefiting from the added security and commerce some of the funds needed to support this army and the Indian agents.

In 1765 the Stamp Act to tax the colonists was written specifically for the support of the regular army and British-paid officials in America. The colonies in turn refused to accept financial responsibility for the west and argued that the Indian trade was a matter of imperial responsibility. This division of attitude created serious political difficulties between the colonists and the mother country. To counteract opposition and to reduce costs, the British removed the army from the Indian territory, ending its usefulness to the Americans and creating further difficulties on the coast.

The colonists were on the horns of a dilemma. The army was closely related to overall colonial prosperity. Though they did not want to support it financially, the British Army was a tremendous economic asset to the colonists, and they did not object to its presence until the army was brought to the coast to quell riotous behavior. After withdrawal in 1768 the army was not missed on the frontier except as a customer, which raises the question of its need before inasmuch as the furs continued to come in at the same rate.

There was a fundamental change in the British Army in America as reflected in the accounts of General Gage. In 1768 the firm Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan was paid £126 (\$31,500 in 2007 dollars) for military expenses in Illinois. In 1769 the same firm received £2,461 (\$615,250) for Illinois expenses, and Thomas Hutchins received £1,203 (\$300,750). The regiment there was probably reduced to less than 500 men, so the cost in addition to pay was nearly \$2,000 per man. In 1770 neither of these suppliers received any funds, but £439 (\$109,750) went to George Ludlow & Son and £829 (\$207,250) went to the Pennsylvania Jewish rival of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, David Franks & Company. In 1772 the two firms received £2,014 (\$503,500). Others received smaller sums in this period, but Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan was definitely shut out of the army market in Illinois in 1770.

The military market at Fort Pitt was divided up among the merchants there who dealt with the Indians directly as well as General Gage, the commander in chief in America. Most of the expense was probably for presents

to be given to the Indians by the agents of Sir William Johnson's Indian Department. Many of those involved later sided with Britain during the Revolution. Among those recorded as receiving payment two or more times in the period 1770 to 1773 were Aenas Mackay, Thomas Smallman, Alexander Ross, Milligan & McClure, Joseph Spear, Milligan & Campbell, William Owen, Devereaux Smith, Joseph Simon, Simon Girty, and George Croghan. Most of these men were well-known fur traders. In December 1772 Alexander Ross offered to provide more than a half ton of flour and a similar amount of beef to Alexander McKee, an Indian Department agent at Fort Pitt, to feed a large group of Indians who were to attend a conference there. The usual ration for troops was a pound of flour and a pound of beef daily to each soldier. The Indians were usually given more, and the cost of feeding hundreds of Indians was considerable. The food was at Fort Pitt as a reserve for the regiment, but was no longer needed as the regiment had been withdrawn to the East Coast, so Ross was left with the unneeded rations.

In 1771 and 1772 James Phyn and Alexander Ellice were working with William Duer to obtain the contract for supplying provisions to the British Army at Fort Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimackinac. On 13 January 1772 Phyn and Ellice wrote to Duer outlining the proposal. The British maintained a fleet of boats at Montreal to supply the posts, and these would be available to the contractor supplying the rations. A valuable perquisite was that the contractor was given priority for transporting goods around Niagara Falls and this would be a great advantage to Phyn and Ellice in their fur-trading business. The flour and peas could be purchased in Detroit, which would save on transportation costs. Only the beef would have to come from the Mohawk Valley in New York. In March 1772 Alexander Ellice and William Duer went to London to lobby for the contract but failed. Commercial setbacks like this served to alienate the merchants in the colonies.

Although Lord Hillsborough wanted to remove the regiment from Illinois to save money, the threat of war with Spain upset his plan. In June 1770 Gage informed Hillsborough of the threat to Illinois posed by the Spanish troops in New Orleans. The 16th Regiment was sent to Pensacola on 3 May 1770. In March a company of the 18th Regiment was sent down the Ohio River to reinforce the Illinois garrison. The 26th Regiment in New Jersey replaced the 16th Regiment in New York, and the 29th Regiment was brought down to New Jersey from Boston. Seventy recruits passed through Schenectady in June 1770 on their way west to reinforce the Second Battalion of the 60th Royal American Regiment. In December Parliament voted the funds to add an additional company to every battalion and twenty men to each company. Hillsborough urged Gage to recruit Americans to fill these new posts as soon as possible. The recruiting went well for the 18th, 26th, 31st, and 29th Regiments and the first and second battalions of the

60th Regiment. This recruiting in response to the Spanish threat was a break in previous practice that discouraged the recruitment of Americans into British regiments.

The strength of the British Army in 1770 in America had been reduced greatly along with the general reduction of the army. Most of the regiments in America were in the West Indies.

England	25,708
Africa	214
Gibraltar	3,103
West Indies	3,103
Total	33,050

The figures add to 31,525. No figures are given for Ireland or for America, which may account for some of the difference.

By spring 1771 the threat of war in Europe was over. French Minister Étienne-François de Choiseul was removed, and the antagonism between France and Britain lessened. In April 1771 the plan to increase the British Army was reversed. In 1772 Hillsborough planned to eliminate all of the western posts except Fort Niagara, Detroit, and Michilimackinac. The 60th Regiment was withdrawn from the Great Lakes and replaced by the 10th Regiment. Three regiments were sent to Canada in 1772, the 8th, the 7th, and the 26th, but the regiments had been reduced to only 340 men compared to the war strength of 1,000 and the normal peace strength of 500. The 7th Regiment relieved the battalion of the 60th Regiment in the Great Lakes area, and the 23rd Regiment replaced the other 60th battalion in New York. The men of the 60th Regiment in New York were divided between the Europeans, mostly German mercenaries, and Americans. More than half the men, most of the Americans, deserted in the summer of 1772. They deserted in groups every night.

The movement of the troops from Illinois and Fort Pitt was delayed for fear of an Indian uprising reported by General Gage. In protest against the schemes of the land speculators, Hillsborough resigned on 15 August 1772 and in March 1773 his replacement, Lord Dartmouth, halted the evacuation of Illinois and Fort Pitt. In June 1773 General Gage had reduced the army in America to 6,000 men and was determined to reduce expenses even though it resulted in the forts crumbling for lack of repairs.

All of this changed in 1774 as colonial opposition increased. In April 1774 the 64th Regiment was the only regiment in Boston. By November 1774 there were ten regiments and elements of two others in Boston, a total of more than 3,000 men. Two of the regiments, the 4th and the 43rd, had come from Britain. Two came from Ireland, the 5th and the 38th. Four came from Canada, the 10th, the 52nd, the 59th, and two companies of the 65th.

The 23rd came from New Jersey and the 47th came from New York. Part of the 18th came from Philadelphia.

In 1775 a significant portion of the British Army was in the American colonies. The majority of the regiments were scattered among various outposts.

Great Britain	2,493
Jersey	208
Guernsey	208
Africa	214
Gibraltar	3,339
Minorca	2,335
West Indies	2,306
North America	3,109
Total	31,958
Troops voted by Parliament	100,000+
Militia	20,000
Germans in British Pay	55,000
Irish Establishment	12,000
Total	190,000 men

Requiring the payment of the Stamp Tax in sterling had increased the overall deficit, and even after its repeal additional duties reduced the amount of sterling spent in America for the army. When the British regiments were removed from the frontier and billeted in coastal cities, military expenses were further reduced. The army no longer had to pay the high cost of transported supplies to the frontier. Rather than paying premium prices for flour and beef to farmers on the frontier, the British were able to pay the lower prices in the cities or import the rations from Britain. The huge deficit resulted in higher prices for British manufactured items including clothing, shoes, and hardware of all kinds. In addition imports of sugar and tea became more expensive. Colonial merchants struggled continually in the 1770s to find sterling to pay for their imports.

The colonial economy was stunted when Parliament would no longer make large expenditures in America after 1763 because of the huge debt incurred during the Seven Years' War. Attempts were made to raise taxes in the colonies. The colonists quite naturally objected. The merchants, in particular, were aware that if the source of army funds was changed to the Stamp Tax, less money would come from England, resulting in a loss to the colonial economy and a more adverse balance of trade. What made matters worse was that the Stamp Tax had to be paid in sterling to London whereas army expenses had been paid with sterling in America, so the

merchants not only had to send more sterling back to England but also lost a large source of sterling in army purchases.

Even though American merchants could build favorable cash balances in England by trade with the West Indies, Southern Europe, and Africa, the essential fact remains that the Americans were aware of the direct impact of military spending. As the amount of military spending was reduced, the American merchants had to find new markets and sources of sterling in other parts of the world or face an unfavorable balance of trade.

CHAPTER 8

The Quebec Act, 1774

In June 1774 the Quebec Act became law. In general the act provided that the Roman Catholic religion would be the state church of Canada, and the legal system would be a compromise between French and British law. Canada would be governed by an Executive Council, and the land between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi would be annexed to Quebec. These provisions were intended to strengthen the allegiance of the French to Britain and, at the same time, provide civil government for the Indian land and close it to unrestricted settlement by the colonists.

The negative reaction of the Quebec Act was caused by a misunderstanding by several of the groups involved. Basically the act on paper was to appease the French and to preserve the fur trade in Canada and the area between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi River. Always in the back of the mind of the British Parliament was that the true value of Canada was money that Britain made by the resale of fur for beaver hats to the wealthy aristocrats of France, Germany, and Russia. In order to maintain control of this valuable commodity, a government had to be established in the vast area, and the simplest solution appeared to be to extend the boundaries of Quebec to include the entire area and to create four subordinate districts.

By appeasing the French traders to make them more compliant to British rule and halting the westward movement of the colonial settlers, the hope was that the Quebec area would remain neutral in any conflict between the colonists and Britain and at the same time preserve the fur trade.

The act was not well received and the lieutenant governors never established control of their districts. Although the new governments were established, actually the British military remained in control much to the

disappointment of the colonial fur traders. They feared being forced out of the rich fur trade that had opened up to them after the defeat of France in the Seven Years' War.

The colonists saw the act as a penalty imposed on them for their resistance to British taxes. The act also overruled claims to western lands contained in the original charters of Pennsylvania and Virginia. Another concern was the military threat of British troops based at the rear of the Thirteen Colonies. The Quebec Act was passed to tie French allegiance to Britain, but failed in its mission.

In 1766 the government in London was concerned that Canada could not be transformed into a predominantly British colony. Sir Guy Carleton, the second governor of Canada, suggested that a French government be established in Quebec. In the following year, the troubles in the coastal colonies led Carleton to examine his situation closely. Obviously Canada must be securely tied to England. The most important issues in Canada were legal institutions and religion. By reaching some satisfactory solution to those issues, Carleton hoped to hold the clergy and the nobility and expected that they in turn would ensure the loyalty of the others. Carleton was fearful that in the event of a war with France, there were few British in Canada to defend it from attack. He requested extensive fortification of Quebec to defend against a French attack. These fortifications could also serve as a threat to the American colonists.

In May 1767 William Shelburne learned that the Duke of Richmond in Parliament was preparing an attack on the prime minister concerning his weak Canadian policy. In response Shelburne wrote to the Board of Trade for immediate action. In the same year, he wrote Carleton requesting information, specifically improvement of the civil constitution and the blending of French and British law that would be acceptable to both. The Board of Trade studied the matter for the next four years.

Shelburne was certain that his proposed colonies west of the mountains would help alleviate the danger from the predominance of the French in the west. At the same time the new colonies would act as a threat to the thirteen seaboard colonies. The Board of Trade disagreed on the grounds that the west was safe as it was and there was no need to create new colonies. Instead, the Board recommended a reduction in the number of troops in the western posts.

There have been many justifications of the annexation of the western territory to Quebec based on grounds that it was natural in view of economy, religion, social customs, geography, and history. One of the most reasonable arguments for the necessity of extending the boundary of Quebec was that an established government was necessary to prevent French influence from spreading up the Mississippi and taking advantage of the vacuum. General Thomas Gage thought the French farmers and fur traders in the west were a liability and proposed that they be deported elsewhere,

especially those in Vincennes and Michilimackinac. Lord Hillsborough agreed with Gage in this, expressing worry about the continued connection between the French habitants in Canada and in France as late as 1772.

One of the objectives of the Quebec Act was to provide for government of the west. On 3 January 1775 instructions, including a plan for the government of the west, were issued to Governor Carleton. The territory was to be divided into four districts, Michilimackinac, Detroit, Kaskaskia, and Vincennes, each under a lieutenant governor. The duties of the lieutenant governor would be civil administrator, Indian agent, judge, and military commander. In each district, courts were to be set up and post boundaries established. However, because of the lack of financial support for the system, as well the interruption of the Revolution, most of the plan never came into effect. The army continued to rule as before. In effect the rule of the lieutenant governors was but an extension of the army rule of the west, as all of those appointed were military officers. This type of government was especially applicable for the time, as the posts were under pressure from the threat of American invasion. However, after the end of the war the influx of loyalists from the colonies made this system no longer satisfactory and the pressure for change increased.

The appointment of the governors coincided with the American attack on Quebec. Captain Henry Hamilton of the 15th Infantry was appointed lieutenant governor of Detroit on 1 May 1775, and he also held the post of military commander. He was still in Montreal when the American forces attacked the city, but managed to escape and reached Detroit later in the year. In 1775 Detroit was protected by a wooden stockade, nine to fifteen feet high. The garrison numbered 120 British troops supported by 350 men in the French militia.

Captain Patrick Sinclair was chosen as the lieutenant governor of Michilimackinac on 7 April 1775. However, while attempting to reach his post by way of New York, he was arrested there and deported. He did not reach Michilimackinac until 4 October 1779.

A complete change of policy came in mid 1772. Lord Dartmouth replaced Hillsborough as colonial secretary of state in August 1772. The policy of driving out the French was reversed, and a serious attempt was made to provide a satisfactory government for both French and British Canadians. Gage was ordered back to England in 1773 to provide information for writing the Quebec Act. He was replaced by Frederick Haldimand. In London Gage gathered suggestions from Carleton and the members of the cabinet.

Dartmouth was under pressure from the events taking place in the west. In July 1773 William Murray purchased large amounts of Indian land in the west basing his right on a British legal decision that a patent was not necessary for the purchase of Indian land. The governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, was also preparing to establish a colony beyond the line established by the Proclamation of 1763. Dartmouth hoped that annexing the Indian

lands to Quebec would keep out the colonists and at the same time give the French habitants at Detroit and elsewhere the special rights enjoyed by the residents of Quebec. Previously Hillsborough had objected to expanding French rights fearing that joining the west to Quebec would lead to the expansion of French settlements. Dartmouth thought there was little to fear. He felt it was of utmost importance to prevent the colonists from interfering with the fur trade and the Indians. The annexation would accomplish this end.

One factor was certain in 1774: a change was needed. Even the traders were protesting the lack of civil government in the west. Civil government was necessary to remove the military from both law enforcement and control of the fur trade for which they were not qualified.

Many colonists believed that the Quebec Act was a penalty meted out to the colonists for their resistance to the taxes imposed by London. In fact, the main provisions of the Quebec Act had been worked out before the Boston Tea Party even took place. Only minor alterations were made regarding the church, the compromise with French law, and the exact details of the boundary. However, the Quebec Act was passed at the same time as the penalty laws, and it appeared they were related. The colonists believed that a Catholic stronghold with autocratic rule had been created to threaten the colonists.

Regardless of appearances, an examination of the act forces the conclusion that the true purpose was to satisfy the demands of the French habitants, rather than to act as an additional punitive act against the colonists. The passage of the act was made easier by the feelings of the members of Parliament who liked the provisions that were detrimental to the colonists. The major opponents of the Quebec Act, Edmund Burke, Colonel Barre, and Charles J. Fox, and those reflecting the views of the City of London, were the same persons who objected to coercing the colonists. However, even they did not see the Quebec Act as a means of denying the colonists their western claims contained in their respective charters, some of which stipulated that their colony would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific between designated latitudes. For the most part, the Parliamentary opposition was not given much knowledge of the details of the act, and it was forced through by the government majority with few amendments. In the House of Lords, Lord Camden and Lord Chatham opposed the act bitterly, but with no success.

In order that the Catholic religion be made an established church, a provision was inserted that the tithe was to be collected from the Catholics only for the support of the Catholic Church. In order to ease the position of Catholics in government, the British Exclusion Laws, which prohibited Catholics from holding office in England, were not to be applied to Canada. The oaths to be given to the Catholics were changed to make their acceptance of office possible. These church and office holding provisions were especially

designed to cater to the demands of the nobility and the clergy. The hope was that these groups would influence the other French to remain loyal to Britain. However, when France entered the Revolutionary War in support of the colonists, the nobility and clergy became less trustworthy than the merchants, the traders, and the farmers.

Although the legislative provisions of the Quebec Act were intended as a compromise, their application made them much less so. The legislature was never summoned, and all legislative power was placed in the hands of the governor assisted by his council. The council members appointed by the governor were strongly pro-French. As a result, the British merchants had very little voice in legislative matters. The legislative acts of this council were, however, subject to review by the cabinet in London.

The denial of a legislature was especially objectionable to the fur traders. When a legislature was not called, difficulties in finance resulted. Taxes could not be levied. Therefore, revenue came only from acts such as the Quebec Revenue Act passed by the British Parliament. This act attempted to pay for part of the administrative costs by duties on imports and a licensing fee for taverns. Drafted with little knowledge of local conditions, the act was not enforceable. In the application of British law, the opponents had even more to complain about than the controversy in passing the law. Habeas corpus and trial by jury in civil cases were denied to residents of Quebec as of 1 May 1775. Those who drafted the Quebec Act intended that this outright denial be softened by the governor, but Carleton withheld this information, fearful of the French attitude toward the British Empire. In effect, the provision appeared to be designed to discourage further British immigration into the colony.

The Quebec Act was, therefore, not well received, even by the French whom it was meant to please. The act's reception by those whose interests it overrode was even more unfavorable. The colonists considered the Quebec Act as one of the causes of the Revolution. The unsuccessful attempt to deal with imperial government in Quebec and the west became one of the principal causes of the break that resulted in the loss of the Thirteen Colonies even though the act was passed without serious intent to harm the Americans. Although passage of the act coincided with the dispute with the colonies, the reason was to prevent similar misunderstandings with the Canadians leading to revolution there as well.

The provisions regarding the west were incidental in the Quebec Act. The main intent was the pacification of the French, but the act failed. Carleton returned from England on 18 September 1774 certain of the success of the act in winning over the French. His certainty was expressed by sending half of the garrison of Quebec to General Gage in Boston in the fall of 1774 to assist in the control of the Americans. By thinning the ranks, only 800 troops remained in all of Quebec in 1775. The French and the British traders in Montreal and Quebec were of doubtful loyalty. Their sympathy for the

colonists' cause was expressed by the shipment of money and wheat to Boston to relieve suffering caused by the laws passed by Parliament to punish the colonists.

Governor Carleton did nothing to soften the rigor of the provisions of the Quebec Act as it applied to the British merchants. The resulting government was military rule with only a few quasi-legal forms of government in Quebec. The petitions sent by the British fur traders to London protesting this treatment were ignored. The French who dominated the governor's council represented the nobility and the clergy and had authoritarian ideas of government. As a result no one was pleased by the act. Ironically those whose interest was best served were the first to turn against the government.

The colonists saw the Quebec Act as a punitive measure. First of all, it created an alien colony on their western border with an arbitrary government similar to the type that King George III apparently wished to establish in the Thirteen Colonies. The appearance was that Quebec would serve as a base for troops applying a direct military threat to the colonial rear. Agreeing with these colonial fears of direct threat is questionable when one considers that Carleton returned to Canada in 1774 without the requested permission to raise Canadian regiments. London evidently had no intention of pouring foreign troops from the north into the colonies. However, the presence of the example of arbitrary rule in a colony cannot be overlooked as an indirect threat to the existence of the thirteen seaboard colonies.

The provisions most damaging to the desires of the colonists were the boundary provisions. Most of the Thirteen Colonies had some claim to western lands in their original charters. First, these claims had received a blow with the establishment of the Indian Reserve Line in 1763, but this arrangement had been accepted as temporary, which did not specifically deny them claim to the land. The attachment of this land to another colony, Quebec, however, did deny their claims by giving silent acceptance to the French claims that this territory had always belonged to Quebec as a result of French exploration before 1754. Second, the west was then for the first time placed in a regularly governed territory. Claim to the land by Quebec could then be based on its actual government. The strategic importance of Detroit and other forts in the west caused alarm in the event of hostilities.

In fact, the Quebec Act did annex the west to the old province of Quebec. It actually increased the boundaries of Quebec, for the boundaries of Quebec under French rule had never extended to include the Illinois territory and Vincennes. The purpose of the British annexation, however, was an attempt to preserve the Indian Reserve rather than to threaten the colonists. Experience had shown that an imperial domain without local government was unsuccessful because of the lack of imperial funds to cover the administrative expenses. The London government had not been able to administer the area satisfactorily. It was assumed, and properly so, that the governor of Quebec and his council would prevent any large migration by the French

or British settlers. The hope also was that the governor would be able to halt more effectively the settling taking place on the Ohio River in the area that would later become Kentucky. At least the transfer of the land to Quebec would deny any validity whatsoever to the claims of these settlers to the land that were based on colonial grants from Virginia and Pennsylvania.

The transfer ended the many plans of the seaboard colonies to develop the area and naturally raised the ire of individuals such as Benjamin Franklin, who was heavily involved in land schemes. Not only the land speculators, but also the fur traders from New York objected. They feared being forced out of the rich trade about Detroit and Fort Niagara. However, the outcry that the boundary provisions aroused resulted not from a change of policy but from an attempt to clarify and make feasible the intents of the draftees of the Proclamation of 1763. After a failed attempt to create an imperial domain, the government tried to retrace its steps. However, the Proclamation had established that the colonies had some legitimate claim to this area, or at least, there was no denial of their legitimate claims in the Proclamation of 1763. The colonists, therefore, had a precedent on which to base their claims. The Quebec Act itself attempted to dodge its own shadow with the inclusion of the provision that the boundaries were not to infringe on any other colonial claim. Nothing in the act concerning Quebec was to affect the boundaries of any other colony. Obviously, regardless of this provision, the actual existence of the new Quebec boundaries was bound to seriously weaken any future colonial claim to the area. The timing of the reversal, during the unrest in the Thirteen Colonies, could not have been worse if seriously intended, as it no doubt was, to be an acceptable solution to the problem of the western boundaries.

CHAPTER 9

Dunmore's War, 1774

Open warfare between the Virginians and the Shawnee began in 1774 when Lord Dunmore decided to take matters into his own hands. In January 1774 the conflict between the Pennsylvania merchants backing the Vandalia Colony and the Virginia speculators centered on whether Fort Pitt was part of Pennsylvania or Virginia as the boundary line between the two colonies had not been established. At stake were the quit rents that the settlers would pay to the colonial governments. Families from Virginia were settling the area south of Fort Pitt and Maryland, and they paid their fees to Virginia. If this land was judged to be in Pennsylvania, Virginia would lose the quit rents.

George Croghan was a prime mover in the Virginia party and supported John Connolly when he became Dunmore's agent in 1773. In June 1774 Connolly's Indian war policy drove Croghan to the peaceful Pennsylvanians, a change that confused everyone. Croghan was unsuccessful and the war did break out. After Dunmore's War, Croghan returned to the Virginia side, using the new courts to enter his land claims and to record the sales. His major concern throughout the period was to turn the potential wealth in his land claims into ready cash to meet his obligations. In 1770 he began selling his claims even though they had not yet been confirmed. In that year William Crawford, an agent for George Washington, dealt at length with Croghan on the purchase of a large tract on Chartier's Creek for Washington. By the end of 1775 Croghan had sold about 90,000 acres of his Indiana Company land at about £15 Pennsylvania per hundred acres. More than 55,000 acres went to the Gratz brothers presumably to cover his debts; more than 10,000 to Joseph Simons, a fur trader; 18,000 to Thomas Lawrence; and nearly 4,000 to Edward Ward, one of his supporters. Only two sales

of less than 400 acres at £10 Pennsylvania per hundred acres actually went to settlers. Croghan's land office was a failure. The big sales were really to settle debts, and the buyers probably accepted the land because no other means of repayment seemed possible.

Discussion gave way to direct action. In April 1773 the West Augusta court set fines for all Pennsylvanians who attempted to settle on Virginia soil. Virginians who befriended the intruders were also fined. The West Augusta court records were filled with cases of forcible entry, a term used to indicate physical conflict over landownership. In October 1773 Dunmore established an additional court for West Augusta at Pittsburgh. Appointed justices were Croghan, Connolly, Ward, Thomas Smallman, Dorsey Pentecost, and John Gibson. Dunmore employed the Croghan faction of former imperial Indian agents, soldiers, and fur traders, rather than representatives of the settlers, which reveals the true nature of Dunmore's program. Rather than defending the persecuted frontiersman from the Westmoreland tax collector and the murderous Shawnee, Dunmore was seeking territorial expansion for Virginia and land for himself at the expense of both Pennsylvania and the Indians.

On 1 January 1774 the issue was clearly drawn. Dunmore proposed that a new Virginia county, West Augusta, be formed including Fort Pitt that would provide legal control for the area. Dunmore's proclamation stated his intent to establish a new Virginia county that would include Pittsburgh.

Arthur St. Clair, justice of the peace at Fort Pitt, responded to the proclamation by arresting Connolly in mid January, beginning the series of arrests and counterarrests throughout 1774 and 1775. On 20 January 1774 Governor Penn of Pennsylvania wrote to Arthur St. Clair, the justice appointed by Pennsylvania, that Connolly's actions were illegal and ordered St. Clair to arrest him along with his associates and charge them with illegal assembly under the riot act.

The timing of Dunmore's proclamation was probably the result of information that the Vandalia scheme had fallen through. In January 1774 Crawford, Washington's agent, informed him that the Vandalia project had fallen through, and Dunmore was ready to claim Fort Pitt for Virginia. On 11 January 1774 Aeneas Mackay informed St. Clair that Connolly was coming and had appointed Thomas Smallman, John Campbell, and John Gibson as justices of the peace.

St. Clair arrested Connolly but was forced to release him. After his release Connolly organized a body of eighty men and seized Fort Pitt, renamed it Fort Dunmore, and assumed control of the new county of West Augusta. The Pennsylvania sheriff, William Proctor, and justices Deveraux Smith, Andrew McFarland, and Aenas Mackay went to Fort Pitt to protest without success. Connolly arrested Proctor.

John Connolly was appointed captain of the Virginia militia and assembled them on 25 January 1774. The new Virginia militia was

commanded by Connolly, Captain George Aston, lieutenants William Christy and Simon Girty, and Ensign Jacob Bousman. St. Clair and Mackay believed that Croghan, whose personal motives were suspect, was involved in the move. Connolly's supporters were George Croghan, Edward Ward, John Stephenson (the brother of William Crawford), William Harrison (Crawford's son-in-law), Isaac Cox, George McCormick, Joseph Beckett, John Campbell (a fur trader), Dorsey Pentecost (a former Pennsylvania justice of the peace), John Gibson (a fur trader), George Vollandigham, Thomas Smallman, William Crawford, William Goe, Alex McKee (an Indian Department agent), and Simon Girty (an Indian Department agent).

Opponents of Connolly were led by Arthur St. Clair and included Devereaux Smith, Alexander Mackay, Aenas Mackay, Andrew McFarland, William Lockey, James Pollock, James Cavet, Van Sweringen, and William Brocken. On 25 January St. Clair and the Pennsylvania party in Fort Pitt protested the seizure at the militia assembly. In response to St. Clair's appeal, Pennsylvania Lieutenant Governor John Penn wrote to Dunmore on 31 January 1774 protesting the seizure. Dunmore refused to accept Penn's claim to the Fort Pitt area and received support for his expansionist activities from the Virginia landowners.

The matter created a stir in London. Thomas Wharton, agent for the Pennsylvania merchants and the Vandalia project, informed British Minister Walpole that he believed Dunmore had acted on instructions from England, presumably Lord Hillsborough, to prevent the Pennsylvania merchants from establishing Vandalia. An angry reprimand was sent to Dunmore by Lord Dartmouth, who had replaced Hillsborough in the British cabinet. Dartmouth accused Dunmore of pretending not to know of the Vandalia claim to the area and of Hillsborough's order that no settlements were to be made west of the 1763 Proclamation line.

On 3 March 1774 Dunmore responded to Governor Penn in support of Virginia's claim to the Fort Pitt area. Dunmore charged that the only reason that the British government had recognized Fort Pitt as Pennsylvania territory was to escape the cost of maintaining it. Dunmore also claimed that the boundary line between the two colonies drawn by Pennsylvania had not been approved by the British government and was therefore not conclusive. Dunmore demanded that Connolly be released and that St. Clair be dismissed for arresting him.

The Virginia position was summarized in an article on 3 March 1774. Governor Dunmore had taken his action because Pennsylvania and Maryland had exploited the fur trade while Virginia had previously done little. While Pennsylvania had encouraged settlements all along its frontier in violation of the Proclamation of 1763, Virginia had settlements only around Fort Pitt. To resolve the matter and to give Virginia a fair share were the reasons Dunmore had granted land to veterans of the French and Indian War as well as appointing judges and Connolly to organize the militia. Penn

responded to Dunmore requesting that he reverse his actions in the Fort Pitt area and stop granting land. Penn argued that the boundary had been surveyed in 1769 placing Fort Pitt in Pennsylvania and that Pennsylvania judges had been appointed in 1771. Croghan sided with Dunmore stating he had denied that Fort Pitt was Pennsylvania territory, but had worked with Pennsylvania judges as it was a matter of convenience and there were no Virginia judges. Croghan pointed out that he had never paid Pennsylvania taxes in the area, and now that Virginia had established courts, he would recognize only the Virginians.

The Virginia faction gained support in early April by offering positions in the militia as well as in the county government and promising grants of land on easy terms. The tax collectors reported that the people refused to pay Pennsylvania taxes. Even some of the Pennsylvania officials were changing sides.

Governor Dunmore's aggressive policy met with success in April 1774. Connolly had won the favor of the pioneers who refused to pay the Pennsylvania taxes. Connolly appeared at his trial on 9 April in Hanna's Town, Pennsylvania, with 180 militiamen and threatened the court. This trial was the aftermath of his arrest by St. Clair earlier in January. The following day Connolly arrested the Westmoreland judges, Mackay, Smith, and McFarlane, and sent them off to Staunton, Virginia. Dunmore later released the judges, but the matter was not settled.

In the spring of 1774 Colonel William Preston, the surveyor of West Augusta County in Virginia, was ordered by George Washington on behalf of the Loyal Company to lay out grants for officers who had served in the French and Indian War. In April 1774 John Floyd, a Virginia militia officer, reported to Preston that the Shawnee Indians were preventing his men from surveying on orders from George Croghan who still had contacts with the Pennsylvania merchants.

When Governor Penn received these reports, he sent a commission to Dunmore seeking to settle the disputed boundary. Governor Penn sent James Tilghman and Andrew Allen, members of the Pennsylvania Council, to Virginia to protest. They arrived on 9 May 1774 and met with Dunmore. All agreed that they should apply to the British government to set the boundary, but neither would agree to a temporary line. The discussions ended on 27 May 1774. Dunmore refused to accept the Pennsylvania terms, claiming Pittsburgh as Virginia territory. By the end of April Penn gave up. He wrote to William Crawford (still titular head of the county of Westmoreland though an open Virginia adherent) to abandon the struggle. Penn cautioned against actions that would cause further harm.

Having established Virginia's authority in Westmoreland, Dunmore turned to the next step in his plan: further expansion at the expense of the Indians. Dunmore and Connolly were the aggressors in Dunmore's War, the border skirmish that began in April 1774. Dunmore had sent John

Connolly to Fort Pitt in January 1774 to repair the fort and rename it Fort Dunmore. With the breakdown of British control on the coast, the purpose presumably was to establish Virginia authority in the area and prevent Pennsylvania troops from marching west and occupying not only Fort Pitt, but also Kaskaskia in Illinois also claimed by Virginia.

In April 1774 Connolly held Fort Pitt, preventing Pennsylvania from sending troops to Kaskaskia in Illinois. Governor Penn advised William Crawford and the local judges on 22 April 1774 to wait for the British government to act, as nothing could be done as long as Connolly controlled Fort Pitt. Penn had no desire to resort to force to settle the matter. On 7 May 1774 Penn instructed the Pennsylvania commissioners appointed to deal with Dunmore to have him agree to a temporary boundary line with a clause that would safeguard Virginia rights when the final line was drawn. However, Penn insisted that Fort Pitt be located north of the temporary line and that Virginia had no rights east of the Monongahela, the river that ran south from Fort Pitt. The goal was to end the controversy and quiet down the situation at Fort Pitt.

Governor Penn ordered St. Clair to keep his supporters away from the conflict. However, in May 1774 St. Clair formed a company of 100 rangers to protect the frontier from the Indians and at the same time to counter Connolly's Virginia militia. George Croghan had then switched sides and supported St. Clair because he opposed Connolly's Virginia policy of antagonizing the Indians. Aware that the Virginians were their enemies, the Indians did not threaten the less antagonistic Croghan, who was suspected of being a loyalist, but his group joined the patriotic movement of Virginia.

However, Virginia surveyors along the Ohio River stirred up the Shawnee Indians and Shawnee raids began on 21 April 1774. The more peaceful Pennsylvania merchants also continued to survey land in the west and continued to trade with the Indians. On 28 May 1774 Andrew Levy wrote to Michael Gratz concerning the sale of furs and his need for additional rum to trade to the Indians.

In May 1774 Michael Cresap was surveying land for Virginians along the Ohio River where he had a dispute with the Indians. He killed some of the Indians, which Thomas Wharton, the Pennsylvania merchant's representative in London, reported to Walpole to turn the British government against the Virginia claims. In July 1774 Samuel Wharton asked Dartmouth in England to instruct Governor Dunmore to forbid the sale of land on the Ohio River. Dunmore ignored the order. The Virginia legislature recommended that Dunmore take a more conciliatory line toward Pennsylvania rather than arresting its judges, which Dunmore ignored as well.

On 5 May 1774 Governor Dunmore ordered the Virginia militia at Fort Pitt to active duty to protect the area from the Indian attacks. At the same

time Dunmore ordered all the settlers in the area to pay their taxes to Virginia because Pennsylvania was obstructing the Virginians. Most of the settlers sided with Virginia because its laws concerning land were more friendly. The Pennsylvania laws included high taxes, legal fees, and discrimination in favor of the Pennsylvania government in settling land.

In June 1774 George Washington, the leading Virginia land speculator, was informed by Connolly that he planned to build a fort on the Kanawha River near land owned by Washington. Connolly wrote to St. Clair that the settlers on the frontier were waiting for approval from the Virginia government to drive the Indians out of the Ohio River valley.

St. Clair favored a peaceful approach, offering reparations to the Indians for the murder committed by Michael Cresap and an honest, open fur trade. St. Clair believed that this policy would be cheaper than a war. If the Shawnee were attacked by the Virginians, other tribes would join the Shawnee and open a major conflict on the frontier.

In June Connolly tried to undermine the Pennsylvania fur traders by imposing a tax on their furs. Connolly, John Campbell, and Joseph Simon had control of the fur trade at Fort Pitt and imposed a tax of four pennies (\$4 in 2007 dollars) per skin on all furs brought in by Pennsylvania traders. A single ninety-pound pack of fur would be charged about \$400 in 2007 dollars and each trader brought in scores of packs. A single wagonload would be at least a hundred packs and taxed \$40,000. This was a prohibitive tax. When the traders did not pay, Connolly seized the furs. He had the power because his Virginia militia controlled Fort Pitt and the wagon road leading east to Carlisle.

Dunmore's War began in February 1774 when Connolly's militia fired on Indians near Fort Pitt. The Williamsburg papers were calling for war by March. However, Colonel William Preston sent out a survey party under Washington's instructions, expecting little trouble from the Indians. The party was intercepted by a group of Indians who told Floyd that Croghan had instructed them to kill all the Virginians on the river and to rob the Pennsylvanians. Disregarding the warning, the party continued.

Connolly sent a circular letter in Virginia on 21 April, declaring war on the Indians. When Captain Michael Cresap with another surveying party on the Ohio River received this letter, they immediately attacked a group of unsuspecting Indians. Throughout May and June the Indians retaliated for the murders. However, through the efforts of Croghan, no general war broke out. On 10 June Dunmore ordered the militia out after receiving a report from Pittsburgh that the Shawnee had declared war on the settlers.

Later in the month Dunmore sent out writs for a new assembly to deal with the crisis. Richard Henry Lee happily reported Dunmore's action to Samuel Adams, leader of the Patriots in Boston. With the House of Burgesses in session, Virginia would be able to join in the protest against England.

On 20 June 1774 Dunmore ordered Connolly to attack the Shawnee rather than await their raids. Before Connolly could attack, the Indians raided near Fort Pitt, forcing Connolly to defend. In July 1774 Lord Dunmore began collecting an army of 1,200 Virginia militiamen and marched up to Fort Dunmore reaching there on 30 September 1774. The army of 1,200 men commanded by Colonel Andrew Lewis marched to Point Pleasant at the mouth of the Great Kanawha. There, with heavy loss, Lewis defeated the Indians on 10 October. The Indians retreated and agreed to negotiate. As a result an agreement was reached with the Shawnee in which they agreed not to hunt south of the Ohio River and the war was ended.

This action was but a flexing of the military strength of Virginia. St. Clair wrote to Governor Penn that an Indian war was part of Dunmore's plan being carried out by Connolly. The plan included repairing Fort Pitt and forming a local militia. Thomas Wharton in London wrote Samuel Wharton in Philadelphia on 5 July 1774 that the British government was well aware that Dunmore was responsible for the crisis at Fort Pitt with the intent to prevent British approval of the new colony of Vandalia. If the Vandalia project were rejected, then Dunmore and his land speculator friends would step in and claim the land south and west of Fort Pitt. On 2 August 1774 Thomas Wharton informed Prime Minister Walpole in London that Dunmore was behind the war to obtain land north of the Ohio for himself and a few others.

Dunmore planned to purchase land north of the Ohio from the Indians after defeating them. Patrick Henry lied to Thomas Wharton in September 1774 when he told him that Dunmore's War would favor the Vandalia scheme. Later Patrick Henry asked Baynton and Wharton for a source of Indian goods to be used in purchasing Shawnee land, so he was definitely involved in Dunmore's plans.

While the Virginians fought the Indians, Pennsylvania remained neutral. In May 1774 St. Clair, Croghan, and others privately organized a ranger company to protect the Pennsylvania frontier. The Indians repeatedly claimed that they would not attack Pennsylvanians whom they defined as those settlers east of the Monongahela River. Although rumors of raids frightened the settlers, no attacks were made on the Pennsylvanians. The Shawnee escorted some of the Pennsylvanian fur traders into Fort Pitt to protect them from other Indians. Throughout the war St. Clair maintained his peaceful policy in Pennsylvania. He refused to allow the ranging company to accompany Dunmore's army and advised Connolly that the Indians were ready for peace if offered protection and trade.

In late June 1774 Dunmore reprimanded Connolly for his aggressive tactics and ordered him not to oppose the Pennsylvania judges. He was ordered to run a temporary line ten miles east of Fort Pitt to mark the boundary between Pennsylvania Westmoreland County and Virginia West Augusta County. In late June the tide was turning against Connolly. Many of the

fur traders signed a petition protesting his actions, including Aenas Mackay, Devereaux Smith, Joseph Spear, and Richard Butler. However Dunmore still refused to accept the Monongahela River as the border. On 14 June 1774 a rally of merchants in Fort Pitt called for the governor to help in opposing Connolly.

The Pennsylvania merchants appealed to the British government for assistance. In July 1774 Thomas Wharton, the agent of the Pennsylvania merchants in London, asked Dartmouth to forbid Dunmore from selling Ohio land, which he did. On 27 June 1774 the Pennsylvania Council took action and sent ammunition to the Fort Pitt area. The Council also called the Pennsylvania Assembly to meet on 18 July 1774 to take further measures against Dunmore. St. Clair feared that the Assembly, being pacifist in nature, would try to avoid the issue and blame the settlers and the ranger company for the conflict.

Penn had approved the ranger company on 7 June 1774 for the purpose of defending the settlers and had reassured them in order to prevent them from fleeing from the border settlements. Because of the threat of Indian attacks around Fort Pitt, 200 families had already returned to the east. St. Clair was promised that he would be reimbursed for his expenses in raising the company. St. Clair repeated that the ranger company was to protect the frontier, not to fight with the Virginians.

Dunmore and the Virginians believed in June 1774 that the Vandalia project would be approved in London and would claim the land south of the Ohio River, presently the state of West Virginia. For that reason Dunmore turned his attention to land north of the Ohio River. Dunmore may have encouraged attacks on the Shawnee to make their land north of the Ohio River available for settlement.

To further complicate matters, on 27 June 1774 the Committee of Correspondence in Philadelphia representing those who opposed British rule sent a circular to every county in Pennsylvania asking citizens to sign a petition demanding a meeting by the Pennsylvania Assembly. The petition recommended that local committees of correspondence, the term used for the groups opposing British rule, be appointed and send delegates to a meeting of the Pennsylvania Committee of Correspondence in Philadelphia.

This action required individuals to take a stand regarding the dispute with England. Patriotic activity began in eastern Westmoreland in 1774. On 11 July a committee met in Hanna's Town in response to a letter from the Philadelphia Committee of Correspondence. Robert Hanna and James Cavet were selected as delegates to the Philadelphia meeting during a large meeting in Hanna's Town on 11 July 1774. Hanna and Cavet were both justices of the peace, and Hanna was also a tavern keeper. The two men were to attend the meeting in Philadelphia on 15 July to protest the British Coercive Acts of 1774. Robert Hanna and James Cavet arrived late at the meeting, but signed the petition on 21 July 1774.

In the Hanna's Town meeting St. Clair read Governor Penn's letter that promised assistance to the Westmoreland people in defending themselves against the Indians, a pledge that pleased the group. However, the Hanna's Town meeting also passed resolutions objecting to both the British government and the Pennsylvania government. The settlers did not favor Penn's policy of dealing peacefully with the Indians.

The issue that divided Pennsylvania and Virginia was land. The *Pennsylvania Gazette* on 13 July 1774 published a letter accusing the Virginia land speculators of using Governor Dunmore to further their plans to acquire the land that was originally intended to go to the men who had served in the French and Indian War. Thomas Wharton in London wrote to Samuel Wharton that he believed the Virginia group members were using Dunmore to influence the British government to reject the Vandalia project and obtain the land for themselves.

Connolly was actively pursuing recognition of the Virginia claim to the Fort Pitt area. In July 1774 he was planning to send a Delaware chief, White Eyes, and some Delaware Indians to England to support the Virginia claim to the land. At the same time Connolly was pushing for an attack on the Shawnees. He claimed that the settlers needed only official approval to launch the attack, and Connolly was tired of waiting for the pacifist-minded Quaker Pennsylvania government to act. Instead Connolly was to prepare to attack regardless of the lack of action by Pennsylvania or the Westmoreland County officials.

St. Clair, the leader of the Pennsylvania faction in Westmoreland County, opposed any attack on the tribes. The settlers expected to be protected from the Indian attacks, but the promised troops from Pennsylvania had not come. Instead St. Clair believed that the Shawnee should be given reparations for the murders committed by the Virginians and that trade with the tribes should be continued in an honest way. He felt that these actions would be far cheaper than any war because if the Shawnee were attacked, the other tribes would come to their aid and wide-scale war would result from sending a Virginia army down the Ohio River. Connolly offered any settler who joined him the promise of confirmation of their titles to land and an additional 300 acres when the dispute with Pennsylvania was resolved.

On 20 July 1774 Colonel William Preston advertised for volunteers to attack the Indians. The objective was to drive the Delaware and Shawnee from their land. He offered good pay from the Virginia Assembly and plunder from the Indian villages, especially Shawnee horses. This opportunity would allow the settlers to force the Shawnee, whom Preston referred to as useless people, to abandon their land.

In September 1774 General Gage was working with others to block the Vandalia project. General Gage, formerly the British commander in America, had returned to London and was actively campaigning against

the Vandalia project, causing a delay. Thomas Wharton was convinced that the delay was caused by influential persons, specifically General Gage. Wharton informed Prime Minister Walpole that Gage opposed Wharton's plan for Vandalia, but he believed that Gage did not have sufficient influence to prevent Walpole from gaining approval of the Vandalia project.

Patrick Henry, representing the Virginia speculators, discussed the problem with Thomas Wharton, the representative of the Pennsylvania speculators. Henry claimed that Dunmore's attack on the Shawnee would favor the Vandalia project as it would drive the Shawnee farther west. Dunmore had resigned himself to the loss of the land south of the Ohio River to the Vandalia project and decided instead to acquire land on the north side of the Ohio River. Dunmore intended to purchase the land from the Shawnee after the war.

The Camden-Yorke legal decision in Britain had ruled that government permission was not required to purchase land from the Indians. Dunmore intended to do so and had surveyed land along the Scioto River, which flowed into the Ohio River from the north. Patrick Henry also asked Thomas Wharton to help him purchase a large quantity of Indian goods presumably to purchase the land north of the Ohio River in conjunction with Dunmore.

The issue between Pennsylvania and Virginia was land. The Pennsylvania group of speculators led by Samuel Wharton hoped to obtain approval of the Vandalia project, which would have given them thousands of acres of land south of the Ohio River to sell to settlers. Their attitude was to keep the peace and trade with the Shawnee north of the Ohio River. The Virginians feared that the Pennsylvania merchants would get the land south of the Ohio River, so the Virginians hoped to drive the Shawnee out of the territory north of the Ohio River and claim that land under the Virginia law that awarded land to veterans of the French and Indian War. The Virginia speculators led by George Washington had purchased many of the claims from the former soldiers and were expected to use these to acquire thousands of acres. In anticipation of their success, the Virginians had already begun surveying the area and had fought with the Shawnee. Neither of these groups was particularly interested in conflict with Britain. The Pennsylvania merchants expected to find support for the Vandalia project from Dartmouth who was chastising Dunmore for his illegal claims in the Fort Pitt area. Although Dunmore was the royal governor of Virginia, he sided with George Washington's group and actively encouraged an attack on the Shawnee.

By November 1774 Dunmore's War had ended, and attention turned once again to the boundary dispute. On 17 September 1774 Dunmore had proclaimed that all land west of the Laurel Hills belonged to Virginia under the charter of 1609, which extended eastward Virginia's previous claim to the southwestern corner of Pennsylvania. Penn replied with a proclamation

on 12 October 1774 denying Virginia's pretension, but advising that inhabitants keep the peace until the British government should decide. Penn maintained his right to Fort Pitt and demanded that everyone in the area obey Pennsylvania laws. St. Clair reported on 2 November that the proclamation had done some good.

Although Dunmore was ordered by Dartmouth in September 1774 to award no bounty land (land awarded to veterans of the French and Indian War) west of the mountains (Laurel Hills), Dunmore on 17 September 1774 proclaimed that all of the land west of the Laurel Hill was Virginian and that he intended to assume control by confirming all existing land claims and assist additional settlements. Governor Penn objected on 12 October, denying Dunmore's claim and ordering the Westmoreland officials to continue to govern the area. However, as a pacifist, he ordered the settlers to keep the peace until the British government made a final decision. In December 1774 Dunmore expressed surprise to Dartmouth's rejection of Dunmore's grants west of the Proclamation line.

Thomas Wharton believed that Dunmore's attack on the Indians was initiated to create fear among the settlers and that 200 families had abandoned their farms. Wharton believed that the war with the Indians would result in rejection of the Vandalia project and that afterward the Virginians would move in to claim the land.

Direct results of the war were insignificant. Dunmore imposed a humiliating treaty on the Shawnee, demanding hostages and limiting them north of the Ohio. Another treaty was to be made in Fort Pitt during the summer of 1775. When this time arrived, involvement in the political affairs of the revolution in Williamsburg prevented Dunmore from returning to Fort Pitt for this treaty and obtaining land from the Indians.

After a treaty was signed by the Indians, Connolly returned to Fort Pitt on 5 November 1774 with his army and enforced Virginia rule. At the same time Connolly made an ambiguous statement concerning the dispute with England. Although he supported American liberty and stated that his army would fight for it, he did not believe that riots were the answer. He also affirmed his loyalty to King George III and praised the leadership of Dunmore whose only motive was the welfare of the country.

Meanwhile Dartmouth, the British secretary of state, had heard of Dunmore's actions in a very unfavorable light from Lieutenant Governor Penn. Dartmouth asked Dunmore if these accusations were true. In his reply to Dartmouth on 24 December 1774, Dunmore claimed that his land grants had been made only in the face of pressures of the westward-moving settlers. Dunmore felt the war resulted from Indian attacks. Dunmore denied that he sought land for himself. He stated that he was not acting as an agent for the Virginia land speculators, nor was he seeking to obtain a large parcel of land for himself. Instead Dunmore claimed he was following the wishes of the British government and was merely trying to resolve the boundary dispute.

Dunmore claimed that the accusations were made by Pennsylvania because Dunmore was interfering in its plans to acquire land. Dunmore expressed surprise that Dartmouth should object to the granting of land west of the Proclamation of 1763 line, which was merely a matter of interpretation of the law. His letter apparently satisfied the secretary of state, for no further action was taken. Dartmouth merely forwarded Dunmore's letter to Penn.

Arrests and counterarrests, personal attacks, breaking and entering, and other examples of civil discord continued through the winter of 1774–1775. Connolly prevented the Pennsylvania officials from collecting taxes. On 12 November 1774 Connolly sent a warrant to Joseph Scott to explain his actions as a Pennsylvania official. When Scott refused, he was arrested. Dunmore claimed that Scott had no authority as Fort Pitt was part of Virginia. In December a group led by William Christy and Simon Girty broke open the Westmoreland jail at Hanna's Town and freed William Thomas. The Virginians gained political power by force and violence.

Despite this success, discord was growing within the Virginia party. Dunmore attempted to combine the cost of Connolly's activities at Fort Pitt with the pay of the militia that defeated the Indians at Mount Pleasant. Dunmore's opponents hoped to expose his western policy in the coming assembly. On 1 February 1775 Colonel Adam Stephen warned Richard Henry Lee that care be taken to separate the money due the volunteers in the Kanawha campaign from the money spent at Fort Pitt because extravagant amounts were spent to repair the fort, which had no relationship to the Indian attack. Because of mounting patriotic resistance, Dunmore prorogued the assembly without obtaining the money for the militia. Stephen believed that the result would be that the militia would no longer obey his orders. Dunmore had lost his popularity on the frontier.

The Virginia speculators were also displeased with Dunmore. They did not approve of his method of handling Richard Henderson's land purchase on behalf of the Transylvania Land Company from the Cherokee south of the Ohio River. Dunmore ordered Henderson to leave the Indian territory in a proclamation of 21 March 1775. The proclamation also permitted further surveying of lots from 100 to 1,000 acres east of the line previously surveyed. The pioneers who had purchased land from Henderson ignored the proclamation. Those interested in western lands did not look on Dunmore and his policies as adequate protection for their interests.

By the spring of 1775 Dunmore had alienated all of his western allies. When the struggle against the British came to a head, only Connolly openly supported Dunmore. Many held personal views favorable to the British government, but Dunmore's policy alienated everyone. He had failed to obtain pay for the frontier volunteers, his ambitions for lands had alienated Croghan and the land companies, his attacks on Pennsylvania authority and on the fur trade left him no friends in that quarter, and the Indians had suffered humiliating defeat at his hands.

Dunmore had not failed completely, however. Although he was able to obtain land for himself, the fight for supremacy at Fort Pitt had been won and Virginia controlled the region from 1774 to about 1778. Pennsylvania's western border was placed at Hanna's Town. This lull in the conflict made possible the truce in 1775 at the crucial moment for American independence. The basic feelings of the frontiersmen were expressed in the resolution passed by Dunmore's troops on 5 November 1774. They pledged allegiance to George III only as long as he desired to rule a brave and free people. They resolved unanimously to fight for American liberty when called.

The news of Lexington and Concord first reached the frontier on 5 May 1775. On 16 May popular meetings were held in both Hanna's Town and Fort Pitt. Resolutions were passed at these meetings in support of American liberty, and Committees of Safety were appointed.

The Pittsburgh resolutions under Virginia leadership contained a careful statement of grievances of the frontier against England and against the eastern-dominated colonial government. The resolutions demanded repayment for money spent in Dunmore's War, a garrison for Fort Pitt (Dunmore had dissolved the Fort Pitt militia), and support against possible attacks from the Indians and Quebec. Complaints were made regarding the unsettled boundary, the lack of freeholders, which prevented assembling a grand jury, and the collection of Virginia taxes on the fur trade, which would end the fur at Fort Pitt. These resolutions in opposition to George III and to the royal government of Virginia reflect a loss of political control by the Dunmore-Connolly group.

Leadership at Fort Pitt was assumed by Croghan's relatives and agents who dominated the Fort Pitt Committee of Safety. A Committee of Correspondence was formed for Westmoreland County in 1775. St. Clair attended the revolutionary meetings and took a leading though reluctant part. He wrote on 18 May 1775 that he was almost as afraid of success in the conflict with Britain as losing. The resolutions of the meeting of 16 May 1775 were patterned after the eastern resolutions and contained little sectional antagonism against the proprietor and his government. The Hanna's Town group went further than Pittsburgh in immediately organizing a regiment.

St. Clair was not an enthusiastic observer. He believed the committees were being formed all over, but everything was confused. Unless Congress would offer a conciliating plan, the golden days of America would end. In July an English visitor to western Pennsylvania commented that the people are liberty mad and think of nothing but war. On 14 July 1775 Captain Cresap found no difficulty recruiting a rifle company, which was to be the first western detachment to reach Boston to support Washington.

Other than supplying troops, the pioneers played little part in the Revolution. The Westmoreland delegates elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly were not outstanding, even when they did attend the distant meetings. The

actions of the assembly had little effect on Westmoreland. Local government went on under the same leaders as before 1775.

The Revolution in the east did not interrupt the boundary dispute. The truce at the time of the passing of the patriotic resolutions in Fort Pitt and Hanna's Town was short-lived. Pennsylvania returned to the offensive in June 1775. St. Clair arrested Connolly on 7 June. The Virginia settlers obtained the release of Connolly by counterarrest. On 25 July Congress formed a committee that requested that both parties abstain temporarily from conflict and disband all armed forces. This committee included Patrick Henry, Benjamin Harrison, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Jefferson, John Dickerson, Benjamin Franklin, Charles Humphreys, George Ross, and James Wilson.

Virginia countered on 7 August by sending a company of men under Captain John Neville to occupy Fort Pitt. Neville's occupation was authorized on 25 July, the same day that the Congressional committee met. The avowed purpose was to protect the frontier from Indians and the British as requested in the Fort Pitt resolves of 16 May.

St. Clair was surprised when Neville marched in on September 1775. St. Clair reported that the Congressional Indian commissioners then at Fort Pitt were also disturbed. The arrival of the troops ended hope of conciliation through Congress. In September quarreling and fighting continued at Fort Pitt on the boundary issue. The controversy raged on during 1776. Richard Butler reported that the dispute was as serious as ever.

Croghan's group, led by Neville, formed the Virginia party. Virginia asserted the claim that she had inherited England's sovereign rights to the west after the Declaration of Independence. To settle the controversy, the Indian commission appointed by Congress on 4 July 1776 suggested that the county courts divide jurisdiction along the Youghiogheny River. Neither state would agree to this suggestion. After making two offers for conciliation, on 16 November 1776 Virginia created three counties from West Augusta: Ohio, Yohogania, and Monongalia. In December 1776 the boundary committee of the Virginia Assembly was willing to give up territory to end the dispute, but Pennsylvania refused to relinquish any part of its claim. For two years nothing was accomplished. In May 1779 commissioners were appointed by both Pennsylvania and Virginia. They met in Baltimore, Maryland, in August and in four days agreed to extend the Mason-Dixon Line 5 degrees of longitude for the southern border and to draw a meridian at that point north to determine the western border. Pennsylvania accepted this plan in November, but Virginia refused.

In December 1779 Congress requested that neither state grant land in the disputed area nor disturb those in possession. Virginia had passed the land acts of 1779, and commissioners were settling titles and selling land. Further work on their part would make compromise impossible as all of the land would be in Virginian hands. In 1780 William Crawford surveyed more

than forty tracts of 100 to 900 acres each. This survey aroused a storm of protest from Pennsylvania, which complained to Congress that its settlers were being ejected by the Virginian commissioners. Pennsylvania was ready to send troops. In May the Virginia Assembly prohibited action of its commissioners north of the Mason-Dixon Line. By 1 June Joseph Reed was informed that all was quiet again.

In the same month of June the Virginia Assembly agreed to the compromise advocated at Baltimore providing that the Virginia land certificates would be held valid by Pennsylvania. Land was to go to the prior claim regardless of whether it was under Virginia or Pennsylvania law. Although an injustice to many settlers, Pennsylvania agreed in September.

Actual running of the boundary line was delayed for several reasons. In May 1781 the Virginia coast was invaded by the British, and the state government had no time to appoint boundary commissioners. Many pioneers had no interest in having the line defined. The necessity of running the line was indicated by Colonel Charles Brodhead when he pleaded that he could not call out the militia in case of invasion. Lack of a boundary prevented George Rogers Clark from effectually drafting militia for his western expedition in 1781. He refused the help of the Pennsylvania authorities, relying instead on the Virginia county authorities. Settlers were eager to escape militia duty and used the lack of definite boundary as a means of avoiding service under either. Losing patience, Pennsylvania in March of 1782 appointed a commissioner, Laughlin MacClean, to run the line regardless of whether his Virginian counterpart showed up.

The militia was raised to protect the surveyors, and in June the survey was to begin. A group of armed Virginians threatened the party. Short of a war between the Virginians and the Westmoreland County militia, the line could not be run without both Pennsylvania and Virginia commissioners. Finally on 4 November the line was begun under the protection of 100 militia from Hampshire County, Virginia, and 100 from Pennsylvania. The line was completed on 19 November. In slightly more than two weeks the surveyors ran the line that had disturbed the lives of 50,000 people for twelve years. Numerous civil cases followed concerning land title and drafting of men for the campaign of 1781, but the boundary controversy had ended.

Indian fear of the pioneer settlements in the Ohio Valley made Governor Dunmore's task easier, but the Shawnee stressed that they fought only the Virginians who had attacked them and not the Pennsylvanians. The settlers' fear of the Indians was not a primary cause of Dunmore's War, as the settlers from Pennsylvania were coming in faster than Virginians after 1769.

Another supposed reason for the war was that the fur traders had urged it on. A letter to Richard Henry Lee stated that the Indians would behave well if they were not poisoned by the dishonest traders allowed to trade with them. The traders did share with the Indians an interest in limiting settlement for the preservation of the fur trade. They also continued to trade

during the war. Because of this common economic interest, the Croghan group joined with the Pennsylvania traders in trying to keep peace. This policy for peace aroused resentment on the part of the Virginians causing the war. The settlers, seeing the traders continuing to deal with the Indians during the war, became convinced that the war was in part the fault of the traders.

The primary cause for the war was Dunmore's aggressive policies. Antagonism between the pioneers and the Shawnee created an explosive situation, but was a secondary cause. The Pennsylvanians and the fur traders did their utmost to preserve peace and cannot be blamed.

The issue between Pennsylvania and Virginia was land. The Pennsylvania group of speculators led by Samuel Wharton hoped to obtain approval of the Vandalia project, which would have given them thousands of acres of land south of the Ohio River to sell to settlers. Their attitude was to keep the peace and trade with the Shawnee north of the Ohio River. The Virginians feared that the Pennsylvania merchants would get the land south of the Ohio River, so the Virginians hoped to drive the Shawnee out of the territory north of the Ohio River and claim that land under the Virginia law that awarded land to veterans of the French and Indian War. The Virginia speculators led by George Washington had purchased many of the claims from the former soldiers and were expected to use these to acquire thousands of acres. In anticipation of their success, the Virginians had already begun surveying the area and had fought with the Shawnee. Neither of these groups was particularly interested in conflict with Britain. The Pennsylvania merchants expected to find support for the Vandalia project from Dartmouth who was chastising Dunmore for his illegal claims in the Fort Pitt area. Although Dunmore was the royal governor of Virginia, he sided with George Washington's group and actively encouraged an attack on the Shawnee.

CHAPTER 10

Neutrality, 1775

In considering western policy Congress resolved on 12 July 1775 that obtaining Indian help in the war effort would be expedient. This statement was the first by Congress on the complex Indian argument that was to plague the western frontier throughout the war. There were three possible courses to follow in regard to the Indians: Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the settlers wanted to attack them; Congress and Washington sought to win them over as allies against Britain; George Morgan hoped to achieve a policy of neutrality. Policy changed from month to month, and even day to day, as factions varied in power within Congress. For the most part Congress, on the advice of George Washington, was in favor of the conquest of the British post at Detroit, preferably with Indian support but without if necessary.

The colonial policy of neutrality on the frontier began with the establishment by Congress of the commission for the supervision of Indian affairs on 12 July 1775. George Croghan was the obvious choice for colonial Indian agent at Fort Pitt, but because he was under suspicion of being a loyalist, another trader from Fort Pitt, Richard Butler, was appointed Indian agent. The commissioners and the agent were to preserve peace and friendship, a policy of neutrality, with the Indians to prevent their taking any part in the war against Britain. Contrary to this policy, on the same day, Congress recommended the capture of Detroit with the provision that friendly tribes be employed in the expedition. In September 1775 the Indian commissioners for the Middle Department met at Fort Pitt, and in October a meeting was held with the Delaware, the Shawnee, and other tribes. The Ohio River was authorized as the border between the tribes and the colonists, and the

Indians north of the Ohio River promised neutrality. This agreement recognized the Virginia settlements south of the Ohio River.

The British wanted no part of Indian neutrality as they intended to use them to fight the war in the west. When this treaty was reported to Captain Henry Hamilton, the British commander at Detroit, he commented that the hatred of the settlers for the Indians was so great that the treaty would mean nothing. On 2 August 1775 British Secretary of State Dartmouth wrote to General Thomas Gage instructing him to employ the Indians in retaliation for American efforts to use the Indians after they had agreed not to use them. Hamilton requested permission to use the tribes and was confident that in the spring of 1776 he would successfully attack the Virginia settlements with the aid of the Indians, and the settlers would suffer heavy losses.

As troubles in America grew more serious in 1775, opposition to Prime Minister Lord North's government in England increased. In Parliament, Charles Fox took an increasing part in opposing North in 1774 and 1775. The Rockingham Whigs and the Chathamites, supporters of the former prime minister, William Pitt (the Elder), now Lord Chatham in the House of Lords, led by William Shelburne made up most of the opposition votes. North, in an awkward position, favored a moderate policy toward America, but the Royalist friends of the king in the cabinet along with George III himself insisted on a harsh policy. North in his frustration planned to resign in 1775, but George asked him to continue, and North's sense of duty persevered.

The rumblings in the colonies finally turned to open warfare. In America the king's appointees were on the horns of a dilemma. The beginning of the Revolution created havoc in the fur trade. One of the major reasons for the Quebec Act in 1774 had been to protect the fur trade by preventing the colonists from driving the Indians from their land west of the frontier. The Revolution also reduced the quantity of British merchandise being sold to the Pennsylvania and New York traders who were practically cut off from the trade and were forced to trade rum instead of other goods to the tribes for fur.

The settlers also objected strenuously to the traders providing the Indians with guns and ammunition. During the void, the French traders in the Wabash Valley took over the trade north of the Ohio River, sending the furs down the Mississippi River to New Orleans. The French fur traders around the Great Lakes and the British merchants in Montreal drove out the New York traders. Associations, which later became the Northwest Company, were formed to exploit the area west of Lake Superior.

On the Ohio River frontier, Governor Dunmore and John Connolly of Virginia, appointees of the king, attempted to raise a regiment of loyalists, but this activity was halted by the arrest of Connolly at Pittsburgh in 1775. In general, the colonists' policy toward the Indians was a desperate attempt to keep them neutral. Neutrality would protect the exposed

American flank in the west. In 1775 the Indians were invited to Fort Pitt to make a treaty of neutrality for the duration of the war. This treaty was upheld by some of the eastern tribes for as long as two years. The colonists, always in fear of the Indians, urged the British to take similar action on the basis that neutrality would be advantageous to the British trade.

After the battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775 in Massachusetts, open war broke out in the east. Under severe pressure near Boston, General Gage requested and received two of Governor Guy Carleton's four regiments from Canada, leaving only 800 men to defend the entire province of Quebec. However, Carleton, even though short on protection, was confident of the loyalty of the Canadians and the Indians. In May 1775 Carleton fortified the tip of Fort Champlain, building the fort of St. John's. He found little support for this project from either the Canadians or the British fur traders, who proved doubtfully loyal. Perhaps the heavy representation of Scots among the British traders was an element in their lack of enthusiasm for the British cause. In the winter of 1775–1776, the American army swept up into Quebec, taking Montreal and besieging Quebec. Though the American Army was only a hasty collection of militia, the attack served to strengthen Carleton's request for reinforcements.

The two essential posts in the War of Independence in the west were Fort Pitt, the keystone of colonial defense, and Detroit, the nerve center of the Indian campaign. Detroit was near the end of a lengthy line of communication and supply. During the summer letters were carried from Detroit to Quebec by light three-man canoes taking from eleven to fourteen days. During the winter the only communication with Quebec was by runner. The surrender of General Charles Cornwallis on 19 October 1781 was learned from an American prisoner five months later in Detroit on 22 March 1782.

Supplying the forces at Detroit was extremely difficult for Britain. Even in 1788 after war ceased to interfere with supplies, a day's ration for a soldier in Quebec cost 6d (six denari or six pennies) sterling (\$1 in 2007 dollars) while the same ration in Detroit cost 10-1/2d (\$10.50). In the face of these physical difficulties, only a few soldiers could be maintained at Detroit. In 1776 the garrison consisted of 120 men of the 8th Regiment under Captain Richard Lernoult. By 1777 the strength had been built to 300 to 500 men by the addition of two companies of Butler's Rangers recruited from American loyalists and reinforcements to the 8th Regiment. Feeding this number and providing the goods needed for the Indians strained the supply line. The total number of Indians in the Old Northwest area was estimated between 7,000 and 9,000 warriors of which 5,000 were Chippewa.

Even with these minute forces, the cost of the war in the west was tremendous for Britain. During the Revolution more than £1,100,000 (\$275 million in 2007 dollars) in money drafts was sent to Detroit and Michilimackinac for the purchase of supplies from traders. A single meeting with the Indians in December 1777 cost £24,000 (\$6,000,000 in 2007

dollars) in trade goods in addition to rum and rations given to the Indians. That Britain continued to support this expensive toehold in the west revealed her estimate of its importance.

On the colonists' side, Fort Pitt was the center point, but the conflict continued between Virginia and Pennsylvania for its control. Surveying a boundary between Virginia and Pennsylvania was extremely difficult in the west because the line crossed the mountains. Most boundaries were easily determined by rivers or by surveys across favorable terrain.

In 1775 Fort Pitt had no military garrison as the British troops had been transferred to the East Coast. Only a hundred persons lived in the fort, which relied on local militia for defense. To make matters worse the Pennsylvania Militia Law of 1757 expired in June 1775, and the officers were hard-pressed to keep their companies organized under an older law of 1738. Ranger companies paid by local authorities were formed under a law of 1724 to create units to collect stray horses. To all intents, Pennsylvania surrendered its authority in Fort Pitt to Virginia, but maintained its legal claim.

In February 1775 there were duplicate county governments at Fort Pitt-Monongahela for Pennsylvania and West Augusta for Virginia. The justices for Augusta County were George Croghan, John Connolly, Thomas Smallman, John Campbell, Dorsey Pentecost, William Goe, John Gibson, and George Vallandigham. The two rival governments continued the competition of previous years, arresting one another. A group of armed men commanded by Benjamin Harrison, a son-in-law of William Crawford who ordered the attack, went to Hanna's Town and released three prisoners on 7 February 1775. In April the Virginia justices arrested Robert Hanna and James Cavet, who were Pennsylvania justices and held them behind bars for three months until they were freed by a Pennsylvania sheriff. The Virginians were in firm control and threatened imprisonment to anyone who supported Pennsylvania. William Crawford and Dorsey Pentecost were appointed deputy surveyors and began registering land titles for sales to Virginians. Faced with this opposition, many of the Pennsylvania settlers gave up and returned to the east.

To further complicate matters, a strong loyalist element also remained at Fort Pitt, which included many of the fur traders and the supporters of the Vandalia project, the new colony for Virginia. The leader of the Vandalia group was Samuel Wharton, the wealthy Pennsylvania merchant who had invested heavily in the fur trade and was seeking British approval of his purchase of Indian land at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. His representative on the frontier was George Croghan, the former Indian agent under Sir William Johnson. The Quebec Act had cast doubt on the Vandalia project and in March 1775 William Trent, Wharton's lobbyist in London, was preparing to return to America. Trent gave up hope that Parliament would approve of the Fort Stanwix purchase, but still hoped that the

purchase would be legal under the Camden-Yorke legal decision. That decision declared that a royal writ was not necessary to purchase Indian land. Many in Fort Pitt suspected rightly that the supporters of the Wharton group were loyalists with close ties to the Indians. Ironically on 1 May 1775 the draft of a royal grant creating a new colony of Vandalia was completed in England, but was postponed pending the outcome of the uprising in America. The Wharton group lost about £20,000 pounds sterling ((\$5,000,000 in 2007 dollars). The costs in London for Trent's lobbying were £10,000 alone. The Wharton group had paid the Indians for the land, but could not resell it because of British restrictions.

In October Trent was accused of stirring up the Indians against the colonists. Supposedly Trent had arrived in Baltimore with £40,000 sterling (\$10,000,000) from the British government to bribe the Indians against the Americans in cooperation with Lewis Morris, James Wilson, and Thomas Walker. Trent denied the charge and claimed that he had urged the Indians to remain neutral at Fort Pitt in September. He was cleared by a committee chaired by his friend George Croghan, a member of the Vandalia group, who also was suspected of disloyalty.

Virginia was having difficulty governing West Augusta County, the designation it gave the Fort Pitt area. Governor Dunmore of Virginia had provoked a war with the Shawnee in 1774 and drove them from the area north of the Ohio River with an army of militia under Colonel Andrew Lewis. Later Dunmore was accused of encouraging the Indians to attack the force commanded by Colonel Lewis on the basis of information provided by the Shawnee. Dunmore seemed to want to continue the going at all costs. Dunmore was also accused of creating civil war at Fort Pitt in 1774 and of releasing Indian hostages. However, Dunmore had no money to pay the militia, and in February 1775 the troops made clear that they would not serve again unless they were paid for past service.

In Virginia, peace was made with the Shawnee and the Cherokee when Dunmore issued an order that no one was to trespass on Indian land or attack them. He ordered the local Virginia officials to enforce this rule, protecting the Indians and arresting anyone who violated the law.

Regardless of these rules, a colonial land speculator, Richard Henderson, met with the Cherokee at Watauga on 17 March 1774 and purchased a large block of land in Kentucky between the Great Kanawha River and the Tennessee River for £10,000 sterling (\$2,500,000) in trade goods. Henderson based his right to purchase the land on the legal decision that the British government had no claim to land west of the Allegheny Mountains.

Colonel William Preston reported to Dunmore that the sale would have been stopped had Virginia officials been informed and that the Virginia government should act immediately or Virginia would lose the land. Henderson was offering the land for sale directly to settlers in competition with Dunmore's plan to have the land surveyed and then sold to the British

government, which in turn would offer the land for sale. The settlers preferred the latter as Henderson could guarantee that his sales were legal. However, because Henderson said that he would prevent Dunmore from surveying the land, Dunmore would have to use force. Preston said that he was ready to begin the official surveys for grants to veterans of the French and Indian War. Because of Henderson's threat, Preston informed Dunmore that the people therefore would settle in Kentucky and that it was up to Dunmore to see that they purchased the land from Virginia rather than the company led by Henderson. Many of the veteran claims had been purchased by the speculators led by George Washington of Virginia.

George Washington and his associate George Mason were alarmed by the situation on 9 March 1775 and the lack of action by the Virginia government to stop Henderson. However, on 21 March 1775 Dunmore ordered surveying of lots varying from 100 to 1,000 acres and sale to the highest bidder. Dunmore specifically prohibited Henderson's purchase as being illegal and threatened him with a fine and jail if he did not leave. Disregarding the proclamation, settlers began purchasing land from Henderson in Transylvania, which was named by Henderson. In April 1775 Henderson was in Fort Boone, and on May 8, 1775 he established the colony of Transylvania with a constitution and an elected assembly.

To counter Henderson's activity, Dunmore and William Murray formed the Wabash Company to speculate on land in Illinois and the Wabash Valley. The company included Dunmore and merchants from Maryland, Philadelphia, and London. In October 1775 the company purchased two tracts of land on the Wabash River from the Indians based on the Camden-Yorke legal decision that no British government approval was necessary.

The rival county governments at Fort Pitt between Pennsylvania and Virginia met with mixed results. Whereas John Newell and John Harvie represented West Augusta in the Virginia Convention in March 1775, Westmoreland County was not represented by the Pennsylvania Provincial Convention in Philadelphia in January 1775.

Regardless of lack of support from the Philadelphia patriots, Arthur St. Clair, the justice in Westmoreland, continued to resist the Virginia authorities who were trying to collect a duty on furs passing through Fort Pitt. St. Clair also resisted suggestions that he free prisoners jailed by the Virginia group because even more problems could be created. Prisoners Robert Hanna and James Cavet had been held in the guard room at Fort Pitt. An appeal was sent to Governor William Penn asking whether they should give bail or release the prisoners by force. St. Clair remained opposed to force.

Land was the issue. Using a jury of twelve men, the Virginians were granting land to their supporters that was previously claimed by Pennsylvania adherents due to the continuing boundary dispute between the two colonies. The specific case was that of Devereaux Smith, whose land was given to

George Sly. Connolly sent his men and forced Smith to leave his home on 9 May 1775. Hanna, Cavet, Smith, Aenas Mackay, and T. Scott hired John Harvie to represent them in the court case.

Dunmore, as royal governor, withdrew his support for the Virginia group in Fort Pitt in late May 1775 because the colonies revolted against England and the royal governors. Under suspicion was the belief that the rebel Virginians who hated Dunmore were profiting at Fort Pitt by selling land. Dunmore declared sales illegal in a vengeful move; he reversed all of the Virginia land transfers and ordered that any money be returned to the purchasers. The governor also ordered Connolly to dissolve his militia and try to pacify the Pennsylvania group. He also ordered Connolly to begin a campaign to convince the Indians to support the British government against the patriots. Connolly accordingly invited the local tribes to meet with him on 19 June 1775.

Richard Henry Lee, one of the Virginia patriots, sought to distance them from Dunmore's War against the Indians because the war was viewed in the northern colonies as a maneuver by land speculators. Lee believed that a few Indians would always cause trouble, but that was no reason to launch an expensive campaign. The British government was planning to use the Canadians and the Indians to attack the colonies and Dunmore's War in 1774 had played into the hands of the British. Ethan Allen and Guy Johnson were asking the New England Indians to assist the patriots against the British.

When news of the battles of Lexington and Concord reached Fort Pitt, both the Virginians and the Pennsylvania supporters joined in support of the Revolution and abandoned their struggle on land claims. Placing the future of the American colonies above personal gain, both groups called meetings to express support for the patriot causes. Almost all of the colonists chose the new direction of independence compared to the rule of the British king.

On 16 May 1775 a committee of thirty fur traders and Pennsylvanian advocates gathered at Fort Pitt and abandoned their struggle to express support for the patriot causes, including money and service. Each family was asked to donate a half pound of powder, a pound of lead, flints, and cartridge papers. Included in the committee were George Croghan, John Campbell, Thomas Smallman, George Vanandigham, Dorsey Pentecost, William Crawford, and John Neville. The group praised the effort of John Neville and John Harvie who had attended a Virginia patriot convention reflecting their support for the patriots.

Another angered committee met at Hanna's Town on 16 May 1775, also in Westmoreland County, and promoted an even stronger stand against Parliament as wicked and corrupt. The committee called for the formation of regiments to resist the British Army. A regiment was formed immediately under the command of John Proctor, and regiments were formed in other

counties. In May 1775 the Continental Congress requested 4,300 men from Pennsylvania.

Also on 16 May 1775 Augusta County, Virginia passed resolves that were basically against Dunmore's policies. They demanded payment of the expense of Dunmore's War, as well as a military garrison for Fort Pitt, support to defend the settlers against the Indians and the Canadians, settlement of the boundary dispute with Pennsylvania, and opposition to the duties on the fur trade. Friendship with the Indians was to be encouraged, and anyone killing an Indian would be punished.

The settlers in the Fort Pitt area were more concerned with clearing land for their farms and defending themselves from Indian attacks than opposition to the British government. However, there were leaders in the area west of the Allegheny Mountains who were vitally concerned with British rule. In Westmoreland County St. Clair remained the leader transferring his allegiance from the royal governor to the patriot leaders in Philadelphia. The committee representing the Virginia settlers in Augusta County was most concerned about relations with the Indians. The people of Augusta County believed that Dunmore's activity had aroused the hatred of the Indians and were suspicious of the motives of John Connolly, Dunmore's agent, who had called a meeting with the tribes west of Fort Pitt to take place in June.

The Virginia Assembly referred the matter to a committee composed of George Washington, Thomas Walker, Colonel Adam Stephen, James Wood, Colonel Andrew Lewis, and John Walker. The committee was instructed to meet with the Indians at Fort Pitt. The Continental Congress instructed both Virginia and Pennsylvania to send representatives to the Connolly meeting.

Connolly's meeting took place on 22 June 1775 despite his arrest on 21 June 1775 by St. Clair, the Westmoreland justice. Another meeting took place on 29 June 1775 after Connolly was freed by Augusta County officials. At the same time the Virginians, in turn, arrested St. Clair's supporters, George Wilson, Joseph Spear, and Devereaux Smith. The apparent outcome of the meeting was a treaty echoing the terms of the treaty ending Dunmore's War, which the Virginia Assembly approved on 25 July 1775. However, during the meeting vengeful Connolly met secretly with the Indians to encourage them to support the British government and attack the Pennsylvania settlers. Connolly believed that the Augusta County officials would also support the British government because they had freed him earlier in the month, but the West Augusta, Virginia, officials remained divided on the issue. A small group including officers in the Virginia militia and Augusta County officials did meet with Connolly and agreed to help him restore British rule to the area whenever Connolly received authority from the British to raise troops. Connolly's untoward activities convinced the

Pennsylvania settlers that they must support the patriots against the British. St. Clair noted that the settlers were angry and feared what might occur.

The Continental Congress in June 1775 ordered Pennsylvania to raise eight companies of expert riflemen each with eighty-one men to be formed into the 1st Westmoreland Battalion. The new battalion and the existing Associators in Westmoreland were incorporated into the Pennsylvania militia. The battalion was ordered to join the patriot forces surrounding Boston.

The Virginia militia, loyal to Dunmore, was holding Fort Blair at Point Pleasant commanded by Captain William Russell. In June Russell was ordered to take his provisions and cattle back to Fort Pitt. Russell refused to obey on the grounds that his troops were necessary to defend the area, as he had heard rumors that the Shawnee and the Mingo tribes would attack the settlers.

There was ample evidence that the British intended to use the Indians against the patriots. Carleton, the governor of Quebec, was offering presents to the northern Indians to attack New York. British General Gage thought using the Indians was proper as the patriots had begun the practice at Boston. Gage urged Carleton to use Indians in the planned attack on Ticonderoga and Crown Point in New York. Carleton sent messages in June 1775 to many tribes to attend a conference at Detroit in the spring of 1776 to enlist the support of the Indians. Carleton found little support for the war among the British merchants and the French population in Quebec. George Washington was suspicious of the Indian agent, Guy Johnson, who he believed was trying to organize Indian opposition to the patriots.

The Continental Congress on 1 June 1775 advocated neutrality toward the Indians and Canada. No one was to attack Canada. However, on 27 June 1775 the policy was changed to encourage taking Montreal with local French support. General Philip Schuyler was ordered to investigate the feelings of the French and the Indians and also to learn more of the plans of Carleton to attack Ticonderoga with the help of the Indians. George Washington, Richard Henry Lee, and John Adams were convinced that the Iroquois and other Canadian tribes were determined to stay out of the fight and therefore Canada could be taken. Should Montreal be taken, the Indians and the western Indians would also remain neutral.

Congress also acted to keep the peace with the Indians in June. A committee composed of Philip Schuyler, Patrick Henry, James Duane, James Wilson, and Philip Livingston was appointed to meet with the Indian tribes in New York and west of the Allegheny Mountains. Also in June, Virginia on 14 June 1775 appointed a committee composed of Thomas Walker, James Wood, Andrew Lewis, John Walker, and Adam Stephens to meet with the Indians west of Fort Pitt. James Wood was selected to go to Fort Pitt where he hired Simon Girty, later a loyalist leader of Indian raiding parties, as his interpreter. On 24 June 1775 the Virginia Assembly agreed to ratify the

peace treaty drafted by John Connolly with the Indians and added George Washington to the committee.

The royalists' first plot in the Fort Pitt area was launched in June 1775 by Connolly. He was arrested by Arthur St. Clair, proprietary agent in Westmoreland County (Pennsylvania) and one of the leading justices of the peace. St. Clair was forced to release Connolly by the West Augusta County (Virginia) Committee of Safety led by George Croghan, former British Indian agent, fur trader, and speculator in western lands. His support by the Virginia faction led Connolly to believe that the committee would support further royalist actions. However, this assumption was false as shown by the failure of his plan.

Connolly called another peace conference with the Indians in July 1775 because he feared that should the Indians attack the settlers, all the loyalists and the undecided individuals would be driven into the patriot camp to save their lives. The treaty established the Ohio River as the boundary between the settlers and the Shawnees, removing them from Kentucky. The Shawnee agreed because the treaty offered some hope of future protection. Connolly's objective was to keep the peace between the Shawnee and the settlers in Kentucky.

Because of the strength of the patriots in Fort Pitt, Connolly disbanded his Virginia militia that was holding Fort Pitt in early July. He abandoned his office as justice of the peace, the *de facto* leader of the Virginia adherents at Fort Pitt, and went to Norfolk, Virginia, to meet with Dunmore who was living on a British warship in the harbor. Virginia, on 12 August 1775, revoked all of the land grants made by former Governor Dunmore and prohibited any surveys of these grants.

In July 1775 Connolly met with Dunmore in Norfolk and prepared the plan for an uprising on the frontier. General Gage, commander of British forces in America, approved the plan to gather the royal troops at the western posts, as well as raise a loyalist battalion and enlist the aid of friendly Indians. With these forces, Connolly was to take Fort Pitt and then march to join Dunmore in Alexandria. However, Connolly's plan never materialized. In August his letter to the Indians was passed on to the West Augusta Committee of Safety by John Gibson, one of Croghan's party. In November Connolly again was arrested on his way to Fort Pitt and imprisoned.

A list of loyalists prepared by Connolly in August 1775 was submitted to London and then forwarded to Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton at Detroit. The list included the names of Alexander McKee, his brother, Alexander Ross, John Campbell, George Aston, John Cannon, John Connolly, Edward Ward, George Gibson, Benjamin Harrison, William Christy, and Simon Girty, all of whom subsequently fought for the British, along with ten others including Jacob Bousman, William Crawford, Valentine Crawford, John Stephenson, William Harrison, Thomas Gist, and his

brother who remained loyal to Virginia. Hamilton, however, believed a strong royalist party at Fort Pitt existed and used this list in planning his efforts to encourage defection.

Connolly also considered John Gibson a loyalist and in correspondence with him mentioned George Croghan. Connolly wrote to Gibson on 9 August 1775 informing him of a letter to White Eyes asking him to ignore the rebels but wait until Connolly had a chance to present his case. Gibson turned the letter over to the Committee of Safety of Virginia.

With the approval of General Gage, Dunmore and Connolly developed a British plan for the frontier. Connolly was to go to Detroit and there take command of the troops currently led by Captain Hugh Lord. Connolly would recruit the French at Detroit, loyalists, and Indians to join the British forces and take Fort Pitt and Fort Cumberland. He would then take his force east to join with troops led by Dunmore to take Alexandria. Connolly spent two weeks in Norfolk and then went to Boston to discuss the plan with General Gage.

Britain hoped to carry on a war in the west with the help of the Indians. The British wars in America against France had always involved tribes allied with both sides. Indians were soon called to help the British cause. General Gage claimed correctly that the Americans used them first in the colonists' siege of Boston in 1775 and that more were recruited in New England in May 1775. On 2 August 1775, Dartmouth wrote to Gage instructing him to employ the western tribes in retaliation for the American use of Indians. Britain was definitely committed to using the tribes by mid 1775. Congress had some suspicion of the British plans. On 1 July 1775 Congress resolved that if the British attempted to incite the tribes, the colonists should form Indian alliances to oppose the British. The Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, passed by the Second Continental Congress on 6 July 1775, included the complaint that Guy Carleton, the British commander in Canada, was raising war parties against the colonists.

However, Congress in fact disregarded the British action and adopted a policy of neutrality. The Commission for Indian Affairs was established on 12 July 1775 to preserve peace and friendship with the Indians and to prevent their taking part in the war. In September 1775 the commissioners for the Middle Department met at Fort Pitt, and in October a meeting was held with the Delaware, the Shawnee, and others. The Ohio River was the boundary and the Indians promised neutrality. When this treaty was reported to Hamilton at Detroit, he commented that the settlers' hatred of the Indians was so great that the treaty would mean nothing.

After the battles of Concord and Lexington on 19 April 1775 Dartmouth in London authorized Carleton to raise 3,000 French Canadian troops. Even though Dartmouth increased the number to 6,000 on 22 July 1775, Carleton needed military support immediately and turned to the Indians. In July 1775 Guy Johnson, an Indian agent, was trying to obtain Indian support

for Carleton. The objective was to defend Canada and to divert American military resources from the east.

In August General Gage urged Dartmouth in London to order the use of Indians against the Americans. Dartmouth finally formally ordered Gage to use Indians in the war against the Americans and enclosed a statement in a letter placing Colonel Guy Johnson as the colonel in charge of the operation. A large quantity of goods would be sent to Johnson as gifts to the Indians to encourage them to support the British. Johnson was extremely busy during the summer of 1775. On 24 September 1775 he submitted a bill for £17,081 New York (\$2,125,000 in 2007 dollars) for expenses for officers, rangers, boatmen, transporting goods, fortifying his house, and food and presents for the Indians. In addition the bill included £2,988 New York for salaries for Indian Department agents, a total of more than £20,000 New York (\$2,500,000). In early September Guy Johnson assembled representatives of the Iroquois at Oswego. The Iroquois wanted to remain neutral in the conflict.

Some of the Iroquois Indians previously had attended a meeting with the colonists at Albany who advocated neutrality, but larger numbers of various tribes gathered in Montreal to hear the offers of Carleton and Johnson. The Indians were told that they should attack from the west while the British attacked the colonists by sea. With the colonial supply of gunpowder cut off by the British Navy, they would soon lose. The Indians remained undecided, but Adam Stephen in a letter to Richard Henry Lee stressed that if the colonial campaign failed to take Quebec from the English, the exposed American weakness would encourage the Indians to turn against the colonists. In that case Stephen thought it would be necessary for the Americans to take Detroit and Fort Niagara.

In July the Continental Congress concluded that it must deal with the Indians because they were dependent on trade goods. If Congress did not act, the British would gain Indian allegiance by default, as they would be the only source of guns, ammunition, clothing, kettles, and other trade items. The goods were available to Congress. On 10 July 1775 John Alsop informed the Congress that a merchant in Philadelphia had a large supply and was willing to sell the goods to the Congress. Philip Livingston of New York, Patrick Henry of Virginia, and John Alsop of Pennsylvania were appointed members of a committee to investigate the matter. Congress created an Indian Department on 12 July 1775 to supply friendly tribes with trade goods, including guns and ammunition.

The policy of the commission was to promote neutrality with the Indians and to prevent them from taking part in the war. Three departments were created, one to deal with the Iroquois in New York, one to deal with the Cherokee and other tribes in the south, and a third to deal with the Middle Department, the Shawnee, the Delaware, and other tribes west of Fort Pitt. Three commissioners were appointed for the Middle Department, Benjamin

Franklin, a lobbyist for Baynton and Wharton, merchants who dealt in Indian trade goods; Patrick Henry, and James Wilson. Richard Butler was selected as the Indian agent for the Middle Department at Fort Pitt. George Croghan, former agent of the British Indian Department, was excluded from any role. Congress could not agree on commissioners for the southern department, but selected General Philip Schuyler, Major Joseph Hawly, Turbutt Francis, and Oliver Wolcott as commissioners for the northern department.

The commissioners were instructed to arrest any British agents who were found to be encouraging the Indians to fight the colonists. Earlier on 1 July 1775 Congress had resolved to seek Indian assistance if the British did so. Captain James Wood at Fort Pitt reported to the Virginia Convention that the British were trying to stir up the Indians but that the tribes were still unwilling to enter the war. On 1 August 1775 Richard Henry Lee informed Washington that effective measures had been taken to secure peace with the Indians all along the frontier.

Congress was concerned with obtaining the neutrality of the Iroquois in New York. The St. Francis Indians offered to assist the Americans, but Washington refused the offer maintaining the policy that the Indians remain neutral unless the British succeeded in bringing their friendly tribes into the war. In that case Washington advocated ending the neutrality policy.

In August 1775 a commission composed of Volkert P. Douw, Oliver Wolcott, Tench Tilghman, and Turbutt Francis called a meeting with the Iroquois in Albany. They were reluctant to attend but were promised escorts for protection on the way to the meeting, which took place from 23 August 1775 to 1 September 1775 at Saratoga, New York. The commissioners stated that they wanted to maintain the neutrality policy but wanted to know what Guy Johnson had said to them. The Iroquois responded that they wished to remain neutral and so informed Guy Johnson.

Although the Iroquois remained neutral, Carleton had some success with the tribes farther west who had promised to assist the British. General Schuyler, who commanded American troops in New York, wrote Washington that given this situation, the colonists should employ any willing Indians.

Fighting broke out in August 1775 in New England between the Green Mountain Boys and the Caughnawaga tribe. Two Indians were murdered and in the skirmish that followed, a colonist was killed. As a result, General Philip Schuyler assumed that the Caughnawaga tribe would support the British. Schuyler hoped that the Iroquois would intercede. The Iroquois sent four warriors to Schuyler and then took an apology from Schuyler to the Caughnawaga. Schuyler hoped that this message would settle the matter.

In September the Congressional Indian commissioners for the Middle Department called a meeting to be held on 20 September 1775 with the Indians at Fort Pitt. Benjamin Franklin could not attend and was replaced by

Colonel Lewis Morris of New York. Dr. Thomas Walker replaced Patrick Henry who refused to attend as well. Resignations of such prominent members as Franklin and Patrick Henry indicated that Indian affairs were not considered of great importance.

The Indians began arriving at Fort Pitt on 10 September 1775. Representatives of the Ottawa, Wyandot, Mingo, Shawnee, Delaware, and Seneca tribes were present. The Wyandots were attached to the British at Detroit but came to listen. A short time before, the Wyandots had robbed a colonial trader and killed one of his men. Later the Indians apologized and returned the goods to the trader.

The tribes were slow to appear at Fort Pitt, evidently waiting to see how things went in Canada and then join the strongest side. In October a treaty was signed by the colonists and the Indians agreeing to maintain their neutrality. The treaty lasted two years during which Kentucky was opened for settlement and a few men from Pennsylvania and Virginia were able to leave the frontier to fight with Washington's army. However, the frontier could not be left unprotected and a flow of militia began from the east.

In view of the danger to the frontier, after the departure of loyalist militia and Dunmore's allies, on 25 July 1775 the colonial Virginia Convention then in power in Virginia resolved to send two companies each of 100 troops to hold Fort Pitt, a company of 100 men to Point Pleasant, and 125 men to the Wheeling area. On 7 August 1775 Virginia ordered Captain John Neville to take control of Fort Pitt with a company of 100 men to be paid by Virginia. In August he set out from Winchester and arrived at Fort Pitt on 11 September 1775. Neville remained at Fort Pitt until 1777, first as a Virginia officer and then as an officer of the Continental Army.

At the end of August the Indians were preparing to attack the settlers. They were cutting their corn early in preparation for leaving their villages. The settlers were alarmed, and Samuel Moorhead was sent east to purchase gunpowder and lead. In September the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety authorized Colonel George Slaughter to purchase 100 pounds of gunpowder in York, Pennsylvania, for use in the defense of the new settlements in Kentucky. On the other hand, many of the settlers around Fort Pitt were enthusiastic in their support for the patriot cause. Captain Michael Cresap at Redstone was enlisting a company of marksman who planned to go to Boston to pick off British officers.

Fort Pitt was in a state of turmoil as the local people quarreled and fought over the boundary issue. The Indian commissioners objected to Virginia again taking over Fort Pitt and tried but failed to prevent the company under Captain John Neville from coming to Fort Pitt. This action destroyed the prospect of the settlers agreeing to postpone the boundary matter until after the war as ordered by Congress. The commissioners recommended that Congress intervene and establish a temporary boundary to end the dispute among the settlers.

To bring the factions together, Congress on 15 July 1775 formed a committee to attempt to disband both the feuding Virginia and Pennsylvania forces at Fort Pitt and postpone the settlement of the boundary disputes until after the war. All land titles were to remain valid regardless of which colony had granted them. The supporters were from both Virginia and Pennsylvania including Patrick Henry, Benjamin Harrison, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Jefferson, John Dickerson, Benjamin Franklin, Charles Humphreys, George Ross, and James Wilson. To end the controversy regarding the civil government of Fort Pitt, Virginia, on August 22, 1775, ordered that both Pennsylvania and Virginia courts were to continue as if separate counties and not challenge one another.

Arthur St. Clair, a Pennsylvania justice of the peace, acted as secretary for the commission at Fort Pitt in September 1775. He urged that Congress launch an attack on Detroit under his command. He was supported by George Rogers Clark, David Rogers, William Harrod, Hancock Lee, Colonel Lewis Morris (one the commissioners), James Wilson (another commissioner), and others. The third commissioner, Dr. Thomas Walker from Virginia, did not support the plan.

The colonists recognized the importance of Detroit, realizing that its conquest was the primary goal of western strategy. Detroit was a key to the fur trade and furs from Detroit moved through Fort Pitt to Philadelphia. Holding Detroit would give the Americans a major base for dealing with the Indian tribes around the upper Great Lakes.

St. Clair proposed to gather 500 volunteers to be equipped and paid by Congress. If the Indians did not oppose the attack, with his force, St. Clair thought he could surprise and take Detroit. The plan was submitted to Congress on 6 September 1775. A number of objections were raised because that late in the year the expedition could not be organized before winter set in and brought transportation to a halt. Congress was not satisfied with the quality of the intelligence concerning Detroit and its garrison. Some thought that cannons would be needed to break into the fort, and these were not available. The Indians might resist the attack and could stop it effectively.

The major objection was that an attack on Quebec led by General Schuyler was planned, and if that succeeded, Detroit would be forced to surrender without a struggle because communication with Britain would be cut off. Perhaps the real reason the plan was rejected was that even though Washington favored the attack on Detroit, Virginia opposed the plan. Virginia favored an attack on Detroit, but only if it was done by Virginia troops, which would give that colony some claim to the area. George Morgan favored the attack on Detroit, but only if it could be accomplished without disturbing the Indians. Pennsylvania and the settlers attached the condition that the frontier must not be left unprotected against Indian attacks.

In November Washington changed his mind and opposed the attack on Detroit in 1775 as unnecessary because the occupation of Quebec would

result in the capitulation of the other parts of Canada, including Detroit. Washington believed the British garrisons in the upper lakes would have the choice of surrendering or fleeing to Fort de Chartres in Illinois, but the latter was not probable. Although Congress and Washington were confident that General Benedict Arnold would take Quebec and that all of Canada would surrender when the supply line was cut, the Quebec campaign failed in the winter of 1775–1776. The Americans failed to hold their gains in Canada in the face of British reinforcements, and Detroit remained a hub for raiding parties on the frontier for the remainder of the war.

On 13 November 1775 Richard Henry Lee reported to General Washington that the treaty with the Ohio Indians and some of the Six Nations tribes in the area had been concluded. The treaty was completed despite the efforts of the British in Detroit to encourage the Indians to attack Virginians. Congress was not favorable toward neutrality and took a more aggressive attitude toward the Indians. However, following the treaty with the Iroquois at Albany, Congress approved efforts to open trade with the peaceful Indians and to provide them with gunpowder. Congress also funded an American Indian Department to provide two blacksmiths and an interpreter. Blacksmiths were crucial to the Indians to repair their guns and other metal implements. A week later on 30 November 1775 Congress approved gifts to the St. Francis, Penobscot, Stockbridge, St. John's, and other tribes and ordered that in an emergency those tribes might be called on to assist the colonists. The limited nature of the program was indicated when Congress allocated £60 sterling for gifts made to the Indians at the Albany meeting while the British were providing tens of thousands of pounds worth of goods.

Lord North was not quite honest when he informed Parliament on 20 November 1775 that the British would not employ Indians or blacks against the Americans unless they did so first. Lord North claimed that the Americans had done so, and therefore Carleton had asked the Indians to assist him in defending Canada against the colonists. The inclusion of blacks in the statement indicated that the Americans must have employed black soldiers at Boston.

Lord Shelburne opposed the British government by objecting to the employment of Indians and welcomed the fact that to date their employment had not succeeded. Shelburne expressed his feelings that the Indians were not as barbarous and inhumane as shown by their refusal to attack as the British government had asked them at Carleton's request.

The British reaction in Canada to the neutrality treaty at Fort Pitt was quite different. Captain Henry Hamilton arrived at Detroit on 9 November 1775 to take command of the post. He was a genial and kind-hearted man who tried to contain the brutality of the war. The Indians requested his assistance in attacking the frontier, but he refused without orders to do so. Because Montreal was occupied by the Americans, Hamilton could not

communicate with Carleton at Quebec. Hamilton therefore concentrated his efforts on repairing the fort and the four schooners and four sloops on the Detroit River. Work proceeded slowly as Hamilton had no supplies to pay the French to work on the fort.

The Detroit garrison of 500 men under the command of Captain Richard Lernoult included two companies of the 8th Regiment, two companies of Rangers, and Indians led by officers of the Indian Department. The Rangers were loyalists who had enlisted in the British Army. This force would have been formidable to counter St. Clair's plan to attack Detroit with 500 volunteers.

Hamilton did not fear for the security of Detroit because of the Indian support. He reported to Carleton that the treaty at Fort Pitt meant nothing because the hatred between the settlers and the Indians was so strong. Hamilton expected that attacks on the frontier would begin in the spring of 1776 and that Virginia would be subjected to most of the attacks. Large quantities of goods intended for the Indians were to be sent to Canada to encourage them to make a major campaign against the frontier.

Additional support for Hamilton was to come from the loyalists around Fort Pitt. John Connolly had been commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the British Army and set out for Detroit on 13 November 1775 along with Alan Cameron and Doctor F.D. Smyth, who were to become officers in the Loyal Foresters Battalion under Connolly's command. However, the colonists learned of the plan, and he was arrested at Hagerstown on his way to Fort Pitt. He and his companions were taken to Philadelphia and jailed. Dr. Smyth escaped on 28 December 1775 and went to Fort Pitt with a letter for Alexander McKee noting a plan for the Detroit troops to join Dunmore's forces.

Alan Cameron provides us with an example of the loyalists on the frontier. Cameron was born in Scotland in 1753. He came to America around 1772 intending to buy land in the west. Serving as an agent of the Indian Department in North Carolina, he refused a commission in the North Carolina militia and instead went to Virginia in 1775. He accepted a commission from Dunmore to serve in Connolly's regiment in 1775. After the Revolution Cameron continued his service in the British Army and in 1794 raised the Cameron Highlanders, which later became the 79th Regiment of Cameron Highlanders.

The best hope for the Americans was that the army under General Arnold would succeed in holding Quebec and prevent the delivery of goods. Deane, sent by Congress to confer with the Iroquois, returned with bad news. The Cayuga, the Mohawks, and the Senecas had met with Guy Johnson and were intending to attack the colonists. The remaining tribes of the Six Nations were still undecided, but the majority favored neutrality. Volkert Douw, the Indian agent for Congress, requested funds to pay for presents and gunpowder at a council to be held with the neutral tribes.

Undoubtedly, the major problem on the frontier was the Indian threat. The conflict with the Indians had begun with the landing of the first explorers and continued until the mid-19th century. As the Indians were gradually pressed westward, they retaliated with surprise attacks on isolated settlements. In 1770 the most important tribes on the upper Ohio border were the southern bands of the Six Nations on the Allegheny River: the Mingoes (a tribe of the Six Nations), the peaceful Delawares, and the belligerent Shawnee. Farther west, centering around Detroit, were the Chippewa, the Wabash, the Pottawattomi, and other tribes. During the period 1775–1780 the Delaware were friendly to the Americans while the Shawnee and the Mingo, aided by the British, soon turned hostile. All of the other tribes eventually acted under British direction against the colonies.

CHAPTER 11

Choosing Sides, 1776

As a direct result of the colonists' policy of Indian neutrality, the fur trade was not disrupted in the early years of the Revolution. In Illinois in 1776 George Morgan, a partner of the firm of Baynton and Wharton of Philadelphia, Richard Winston, and Daniel Kennedy continued to trade goods to the Indians for fur and to the French farmers for flour, which was shipped to Philadelphia via the Mississippi River and New Orleans. Oliver Pollock at New Orleans and Robert Morris in Philadelphia were also involved in the Illinois trade. Morgan had associates, Matthew Elliott and David Duncan, at Fort Pitt to ship goods down the Ohio River to Illinois.

The French traders were still active around the upper Great Lakes, while north and west of Lake Superior British merchants formed a pool to share the risk of voyages in the new trading areas. In 1776 the pool became known as the Northwest Company. The returns were tremendous, £200,000 pounds sterling (\$50,000,000 in 2007 dollars) from the northwest area alone in 1776.

The British Army in the west had been reduced by transfers of the Fort Pitt garrison to the East Coast. General Frederick Haldimand, the commander of the British forces, therefore had a major task in defending Canada with fewer troops. The British troops at Kaskaskia in Illinois were withdrawn also, leaving Philippe-François de Rastel de Rocheblave in charge with no money or means to defend Fort de Chartres. There was unrest at Michilimackinac where Lieutenant Governor Patrick Sinclair and the military commander Arent Schuyler DePeyster quarreled. At Detroit the military commander, Captain Richard Lernoult, worked well under Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton. Under Lernoult's command in April 1776, the

garrison of Detroit consisted of 120 British soldiers and 350 French, British, and American militia.

The colonial fur traders were divided on which side to support. Matthew Elliot at Piqua on the Pennsylvania frontier was expected to side with the colonists and provide them with horses if an attack was launched against Detroit. On the other hand, Alexander McKee, on a more friendly note, was asked to come to Fort Niagara by Colonel John Butler who had replaced Guy Johnson in the Indian Department. The meeting with the Indians was to take place in May, and McKee was needed because of his knowledge of Indian affairs and also to provide intelligence concerning the colonists' plans.

Land, the second treasure after fur, was still a major source of conflict in 1776. There was a great demand for land in the Fort Pitt area and along the Ohio River. Several land companies were selling parcels on the flimsy hope that in the future an arrangement would give legal possession to those in possession, in other words, after-the-fact recognition of titles that were not valid at the time of purchase. The older land companies continued to actively seek legal standing for their claims. The Ohio Company had been joined by the suffering traders group, merchants who had purchased the claims for land from traders who had lost property during Pontiac's Uprising in 1763 and had been offered compensation in the form of land on the frontier. The Ohio Company of Virginia, including George Washington and his friends, had purchased rights to western land given to veterans of the French and Indian War. The group had already surveyed land along the Ohio River, which was claimed on the basis of the trader compensation.

The new project leaders met at Fort Pitt on 21 September 1775. They included Robert Callender, William Trent, John Gibson, Joseph Spear, Joseph Simon, George Croghan, John Ormsby, Thomas Smallman, and George Morgan, all with long experience in the fur trade, the Indian Department, and land speculation. Daniel Boone was one of its agents. Members of the group who did not attend were William Franklin, Samuel and Thomas Wharton, Joseph Galloway, and David Franks, all with connections to the fur trade and land speculation.

The group planned to determine the boundaries of the proposed development, have it surveyed, and open a land office. Morgan was appointed as the land officer. Any settler who arrived before 1 June 1776 would receive 500 acres and an additional 250 acres for each person in his family. They were lured to move to the area on the promise of cheap land and low taxes—paying £1 (\$250 in 2007 dollars) for each 100 acres. The quit rent or tax was only two shillings (\$25) for each 100 acres and would not be collected until 1780. However, when they arrived the price per acre was increased to £2.10 (\$625).

There was a split in the Transylvania Company regarding in which colony the titles should be registered. Croghan and his supporters in the company

avored registering the titles with Virginia, whereas Samuel Wharton, the Philadelphia merchant; Benjamin Franklin, who had lobbied for the company in London; and Morgan, a business partner of Wharton, favored Pennsylvania titles. Neither Samuel Wharton nor his brother Thomas attended the meeting; temporarily the deeds were to be registered in Williamsburg, but there was no assurance that the titles to the land were valid. The settlers appealed to Virginia to assume control and register their titles. The conflict within the company continued until 20 March 1776 when Franklin resolved the difficulty, but in the meanwhile the company was divided.

In December 1775 Morgan expressed interest in reconciling with Pennsylvania's Samuel Wharton. James Hogg was elected as the delegate from the new colony of Transylvania to attend the Continental Congress. He arrived in Philadelphia on 22 October 1775, but was not officially recognized because forming a new colony would only antagonize the British government further. However, Hogg was unofficially recognized as a representative.

The efforts of the Indiana Land Company to obtain a large parcel of land continued regardless of the war. Some of the adherents of Croghan had joined the Virginia faction, including Thomas Smallman, Edward Ward, John Campbell, and John Gibson. On 19 January 1776 the Pennsylvania faction reorganized the Indiana Company and placed it in the hands of Richard Bache (Benjamin Franklin's son-in-law), Isaac Wharton (the brother of Samuel and Thomas Wharton), and Owen Jones, Jr. The new managers met with Morgan on 20 January 1776 and came to an agreement about future policy. On 20 March 1776 Joseph Galloway was made president of the company, Thomas Wharton, the vice president, George Morgan, the land agent, and Robert Hooper, the surveyor. The company opened a land office at Fort Pitt. Settlers already present on the land would be offered titles to 400 acres at a low price, but they had to confirm their titles with the Indiana Land Company before 1 January 1777. On 15 April 1776 Morgan advertised Indiana Company land for sale.

Virginia protested the actions of the Indiana Land Company and appealed to Congress. Virginia asserted that it owned all western land and no other colony had any claim to the land. The Virginia claim was based on the Treaty of Lancaster of 1744 and the Virginia Law of 1754 that prohibited the purchase of Indian land by anyone other than the British government. Virginia claimed that it had replaced the British government. If the Indiana Land Company accepted the Virginia jurisdiction, the land sale under the Treaty of Fort Stanwix was illegal and void.

Virginia was willing to support the actions of the Indiana Land Company if the company would recognize Virginia jurisdiction. Morgan was willing to accept Virginia jurisdiction, but Samuel and Thomas Wharton and Joseph Galloway feared that accepting the Virginia law of 1754 would result in the loss of land by the Indiana Company. Because the company

refused to accept Virginia, the Virginia delegates in Congress blocked the company and ordered them to cease selling land. Without the support of Virginia, the settlers would not pay the Indiana Land Company.

The Virginia land speculators led by George Rogers Clark attempted to use the Transylvania project to pressure the Virginia authorities to cooperate when the settlers in Kentucky appealed for aid against the Indians. Clark threatened to secede Transylvania if aid were not provided. Clark was given the task of delivering the arms and other necessary supplies. Clark was appointed the major of the Kentucky militia with Daniel Boone, James Harrod, John Todd, and Benjamin Logan as captains. Every settler was required to join a militia company.

Washington's agent in land dealing, William Crawford, reported to him that others were selling his land even though Crawford had posted warnings that these sales were illegal. The Ohio Company continued its efforts to acquire these claims to land, but the Virginia Convention questioned the validity of the claims in June 1776 and again in October 1776. Finally in June 1779 the trader claims were ruled invalid by the Virginia Convention, a tremendous loss to the merchants.

The Pennsylvania land speculators also suffered losses. The Indiana Company, which had purchased a large tract from the Indians at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, had among its supporters Samuel Wharton, John Baynton, and Benjamin Franklin. Other members of the company included Thomas Wharton, William Franklin (the royal governor of New Jersey), and Joseph Galloway. William Franklin was arrested as a loyalist in 1776, and in December 1776 Joseph Galloway fled to take refuge with the British. In the summer of 1777 Thomas Wharton was banished, and his property was confiscated in 1778. William Trent returned from England in July 1775 where he had been lobbying for the Indiana Company and the Vandalia project. Trent and Morgan, the speculator/Indian agent, resolved their differences, and both worked together on behalf of the company. The company gave up on the tactic of obtaining Parliamentary approval of its land purchase and shifted to reliance on the Camden-Yorke legal decision, which made British government approval of land purchases from the Indians unnecessary. The new plan was to ignore British opposition and establish a new colony of Transylvania, west of the Vandalia project in what is now Kentucky. The land was to be purchased from the Cherokees and part of the land would be designated Louisa County as part of North Carolina. The land in the area of the Ohio River, the Cumberland River, and the Louisa River would be named Transylvania.

Meanwhile settlers were pouring westward, more than at any previous time. Virginia established Fort Henry at what is now Wheeling, West Virginia, and Fort Randolph at the mouth of the Great Kanawha River.

The boundary controversy still raged at Fort Pitt. Both Virginia and Pennsylvania members of Congress tried to ease the tension but made no

progress. The Pennsylvania party in Fort Pitt became the aggressor, arresting Dorsey Pentecost, the official in charge of West Augusta County. The Pennsylvania group selected eight men to supervise the election of delegates to the constitutional convention. Two were later elected as delegates, James Barr and John Moore. The others selected as supervisors were Clement McGeary, George Wilson, John Kile, and Robert McConnell. The others elected were John Carmichael, Edward Cook, James Smith, John McClelland, Christopher Lobenger, and James Perry.

The province of Pennsylvania created the office of county lieutenant. The duties were chief military and civil officer who armed and clothed the militia, had the power to call it out, and held courts-martial. The counties were divided into districts, each of which would raise eight companies of militia, a total of about 680 men. The officers were elected by the men. On 31 January 1776 Captain John Nelson had formed a company of riflemen from Westmoreland County and sent them east to join General Benedict Arnold's expedition to take Quebec.

The Virginia party at Fort Pitt was led by Captain John Neville, the commander of the Virginia troops at Fort Pitt. His primary subordinates were William Crawford and Dorsey Pentecost. In 1776 Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia established three counties, dividing up West Augusta. The new counties were Ohio, Yohogania, and Monongalia.

The winter of 1775–1776 saw a temporary change in the Continental Congress policy. On 30 November 1775, on a request from Washington, Congress approved the recruitment of New England Indians for service, but only in case of real necessity. Later on 8 March 1776 Congress emphasized that it opposed the use of Indians to fight the British unless a council of the tribes all approved and not even then unless Congress specifically approved the action. The neutrality policy was reaffirmed when on 10 April 1776 George Morgan, active in the Indiana Land Company, was selected to replace Richard Butler as Indian agent for the Middle Department. Morgan's social and political position, plus his experience as an Indian trader, qualified him for the post, but he did not abandon his personal interests. He retained his private position as representative for the Indiana Land Company and continued to work for its advancement while representing the interests of the United States as an Indian agent.

The British government on the other hand was actively working to inflame the frontier. On 12 January 1776 Dr. Smyth was captured at Fort Pitt with letters connecting him to the British plans. In March Lord Germaine in London wrote to General George Howe that the war on the frontier would depend on the success of Guy Johnson in recruiting the tribes of the Six Nations to fight on the British side. Sir John Johnson in March revealed his plan to have the Indians attack the settlers in April 1776. From Montreal David Wooster wrote American General Philip Schuyler that

attacks on the frontier would be launched from Detroit with British troops, French and British militia, and Indians.

Richard Butler informed Colonel James Wilson on 8 April 1776 that conflict between the Virginians and the Pennsylvania groups was as strong as ever. Each group claimed to have legal control of Fort Pitt. A change did take place in April. The Westmoreland County Court met for the last time under the authority of the king of England. The court did not meet again until 6 January 1778 under the authority of the Continental Congress. The rejection of King George III by the Pennsylvania group was final. There was no turning back or opportunity to straddle the fence.

The British at Detroit held a meeting with Indian leaders in late April 1776 and called another meeting to take place at Fort Niagara on 1 May 1776. The objective was to convince the Indians to attack the frontier settlers. Alexander McKee was actively involved in the British program to recruit the Indians. Colonel John Butler, the British commander of Fort Niagara, had asked McKee to attend the conference there in May along with representatives of tribes in Ohio. One of the Indians, Kisola, asked Richard Butler, the new Indian agent who replaced John Gibson, and Captain John Neville, the commander of the Virginia company at Fort Pitt, whether he, Kisola, should attend the meeting. The Americans told Kisola that they could not prevent him from attending and gave him a speech to deliver at the conference. Kisola said that he would attend, but would abide by the treaty made at Fort Pitt in the fall of 1775 not to enter the war. His main reason for going was to get the presents that would be distributed because the colonial traders were demanding high prices and had few goods to sell. Richard Butler explained the shortage of goods on the fact that supplies could no longer be imported from England. On 8 April 1776 Butler spoke to the Delawares, urging them to remain neutral and not listen to the British. He promised that guns, ammunition, and other goods would soon arrive and be sold to the Indians.

Butler then went to McKee to ask about the letter from Fort Niagara. When the letter arrived, McKee obtained it from George Croghan and then met with Thomas Smallman, John Campbell, John Gibson, and Joshua Wright to discuss the letter. The committee placed McKee on parole with instructions not to leave Fort Pitt or correspond with the British. Butler did not believe that McKee was guilty of disloyalty. Croghan made a strong bid to replace Butler as Indian agent, but instead Congress, suspicious of Croghan, appointed George Morgan.

In early April Morgan had acted as a guide to White Eyes, a Delaware chief, who appeared before Congress concerning a dispute between the Delawares and Bernard and Michael Gratz, one of the major firms involved in the fur trade at Fort Pitt. White Eyes declared that the Delaware were determined to remain neutral, that they would not attack the settlers, and their goal was an honest trade with the merchants. White Eye's complaint was

referred to an arbitration committee to resolve the differences with Morgan as the umpire.

On 10 April 1776 Congress appointed Morgan as the Indian agent for the Middle Department with instructions to pursue a policy of neutrality. Morgan was the captain of the Silk Stocking Company of the 3rd Battalion of Philadelphia militia, a cavalry unit whose members were from the elite society in Philadelphia. He was an active partner of Baynton and Wharton and had managed their affairs in Illinois. Although he promised to have no further private interests, he continued his connection with the Indiana Company and Baynton and Wharton. He continued to further the interests of the Pennsylvania land speculators and oppose the Virginia group led by George Washington. Morgan left Philadelphia on 17 April 1776 and arrived at Fort Pitt on 29 April 1776. He found the Indians restless and sensed the danger of attacks on the frontier. With instructions to maintain Indian neutrality, Morgan appointed William Wilson, Peter Long, Simon Girty, and Joseph Nicholson as his assistants.

The colonists turned their attention farther west. Richard Henry Lee hoped that an expedition to take Detroit would solve the Indian problem by removing the source of guns, powder, and other supplies needed by the Indians to carry out the attacks. In New York, the Six Nations were openly hostile to the colonists, and Colonel Moses Hagen expected that they would attack the settlers in the spring of 1777.

Washington finally abandoned his hope to keep the Indians neutral in a letter to Congress on 19 April 1776, citing Colonel Hagen's opinion that the Six Nations would attack. To Washington there was then no doubt that the Indians would be involved on one side or the other, or perhaps both. He advised Congress to take immediate steps to recruit the Indians for the American cause. He saw no solution to the problem until the British garrisons were removed from the west, as the posts were the source of continual effort to encourage the Indians to attack the settlers. Washington also wrote General Philip Schuyler in New York of the need to enlist the Indians on the colonial side; otherwise, they would accept the British bribes and fight against the colonists.

John Adams was still reluctant to seek Indian assistance in his letter to General Horatio Gates on 27 April 1776. Adams believed that the Indians were expensive to maintain and difficult to control. He believed that using them against any opponent was inhumane, but because the British were intent on using them, the colonists would have to do so as well because the Indians could not be kept neutral.

Congress reconsidered an attack on Detroit. In May a Congressional committee was appointed to confer with Washington. The committee was still discussing the matter at the end of the month. Other committees of Congress disagreed on the wisdom of taking Detroit. One committee simply postponed any decision. Another committee recommended that the

expedition to Detroit begin immediately, but postponed any attack on Fort Niagara. General Charles Lee, on the other hand, urged immediate action, if not the taking of Detroit, at least Fort Niagara.

The Shawnee was the tribe most threatening to Fort Pitt. Representatives of the tribe reminded Congress on 24 April 1776 that Congress in the fall of 1775 had urged the Shawnee to remain peaceful and to return captives, which the Shawnee did. Now the Shawnee wanted the colonists to refrain from any attack on Detroit because the British commander there had told the Shawnee to remain neutral. Therefore the Shawnee did not wish to see any American expedition cross the Ohio River.

The Virginia party further upset the Indians by surveying an island in the Ohio River four miles south of Fort Pitt. William Crawford made the survey for John Marcie, Charles Sims, and Captain John Neville, the commander of the Virginia company holding Fort Pitt. This survey was in violation of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, as well as the treaty made with the Indians at Fort Pitt in the autumn of 1775. The survey not only served as a precedent for more, but also gave the British an argument to enlist the Indians in the war against the colonists. Virginia also sent a company of troops on 15 May 1776 to the mouth of the Great Kanawha River where it flowed into the Ohio River. The troops were to rebuild the fort there and to provide the garrison. Morgan sent an Indian with the troops with messages for the Delaware and the Shawnee to allay any possible fears.

Washington's recommendation that an approach be made to the Indians was referred to a special committee of Congress on 22 April 1776. The committee, including Richard Henry Lee and John Adams, was instructed to determine the cost of an expedition to take Detroit. On 23 April 1776 the committee presented its suggestions, which began with a recommendation that an expedition be launched against Detroit. Other recommendations were that the Delaware be provided with a missionary, a schoolmaster, a farmer, and a blacksmith; that no traders enter Indian territory without a license from the American Indian agent; that Morgan give the friendly Indians a ton of gunpowder and obtain other goods for them; and that no settlements be permitted in Indian territory. Congress approved the recommendations except those regarding the missionary and others for the Delaware and, of much more importance, the recommendation that no settlement be permitted on Indian land. The land speculators blocked this position. On 6 May 1776 Congress appropriated \$10,000 to buy gifts for the Indians at Fort Pitt and Montreal. Trying to maintain the peace, Morgan wrote to Governor Hamilton at Detroit assuring him that there would be no attack on Detroit unless the British encouraged the Indians to attack the frontier settlements.

The Pennsylvania group at Fort Pitt strongly favored the attack on Detroit and offered to provide assistance on 26 March 1776. Congress ordered the preparation of a plan to take Detroit. Washington, with the support of

General Charles Lee, on 19 April 1776 had strongly urged an expedition be launched from Fort Pitt to take both Detroit and Fort Niagara. He thought the attack could be done easily and would solve many problems. The garrison of Detroit in April 1776 was only 120 men of the 8th Regiment and 350 militia. The English merchants there were favorable to the British government, but the French were neutral and they made up the bulk of the militia. The British considered Indian support doubtful as they were divided on the issue of attacking the Americans. Washington believed that the Seneca Indians, who were friendly to the colonists, could be used to help the expedition against Detroit. The proposal was dropped because of the lack of troops and funds. In addition the Iroquois refused to grant permission for the colonial expedition to cross their lands and formally opposed the expedition at a meeting at Fort Pitt on 6 July 1776. One of the reasons the Americans were not eager to use the Indians was that they were of use only in attacking, for example, Detroit and Fort Niagara, and they were of no use in defending the frontier.

Arriving at Fort Pitt in April 1776, Morgan found the border restless but not aflame. Although the Wyandots were on the warpath, the Delaware and the Shawnee, the two nearest tribes, were docile. Morgan had a three-point program: (1) to prevent the British from employing the Indians on border raids, (2) to improve the feelings of the warriors toward the settlers after the crushing defeat of Dunmore's War, and (3) to prevent Congress from using the tribes against the British. In May Morgan sent invitations to all of the tribes, including those around Detroit and Fort Niagara, to come to Fort Pitt on 10 September 1776 to make a treaty. Richard Butler continued to work with the Indians as well, telling them that he was still the Indian agent. Morgan received positive responses from the Shawnee, the Delaware, the Senecas, and the Wabash tribes.

Congress also made moves to pacify the Indians. On 11 May 1776 the committee for Indian affairs requested that a treaty be made with the Indians at Fort Pitt on 20 July 1776, and Morgan was ordered to inform the Indians. The Virginia Convention also made an effort, and on 21 May 1776 resolved that the Indians be informed that any encroachment on their land beyond the boundaries set by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix would be removed.

In April 1776 Congress appointed George Morgan to restore Fort Pitt and to act as Indian agent to keep them neutral. Despite his efforts to maintain peace, Morgan was aware that trouble was brewing. The Senecas were expected to attack the Fort Pitt area, and Captain Neville, the Virginia commander at Fort Pitt was warned. Morgan believed that the British had the resources to take Fort Pitt. Captain John Gibson also had learned that the Wyandot Indians from the Detroit area had received presents from Hamilton and intended to attack the frontier settlements. However, the Shawnee and the Delaware were not expected to take part in the raids. The Virginia

Convention warned the western counties to prepare for attacks. On 21 May 1776 militia companies were formed and supplies were sent to Fort Pitt. In Fincastle County 100 militiamen were raised. Another 100 were organized at the mouth of the Great Kanawha River and 50 at Wheeling. Pennsylvania reacted to the threat of Indian attacks as well. On 5 June 1776 Westmoreland County authorized a company of 100 militiamen to be stationed at Kittanning and paid by Pennsylvania.

In view of the threat, Virginia abandoned the neutrality policy and ordered the recruitment of 200 Indians. On 21 May 1776 John Gibson was ordered to negotiate with the Ohio and other western tribes to enlist 200 warriors to serve in the Continental Army and fight against the British Army on the coast. However, the action was later postponed until 20 July 1776 and then only if Thomas Walker and John Harvie thought it advisable.

Washington had a better appreciation than Morgan of the Indian danger. Nine days after Morgan's appointment, on 19 April 1776, Washington recommended to Congress that Indians be employed by the Americans just as the British were doing. The Indians would be useful in taking the western posts and ending the war on the frontier. This letter was referred to a committee headed by Richard Henry Lee and John Adams. In April 1776 Congress approved an expedition against Detroit as Washington suggested. The Indians were to be used in attacks on Fort Niagara and Detroit. They were offered a bounty of £50 sterling (\$12,500) for each British soldier that they captured and the right to plunder both Fort Niagara and Detroit. The Indian agents were to organize the Indians. Some Indians were also to be enlisted in the Continental Army. Congress, however, refused to carry out these measures and deferred action until further consideration. Although the committee made a report in favor of an expedition against Detroit, Congress repeatedly delayed action. For example, on 25 May 1776, Congress postponed action on the proposed attack on Detroit and advised the use of Indians as allies, but on 25 June the use of Indians was restricted to the Canadian theater, and throughout May and June plans were made for this venture.

Hope that the Indians would remain neutral evaporated in early June. Colonel John Butler at Fort Niagara was recruiting Six Nations Indians, and the Chippewa and the Ottawa were ready to fight for the British. Attacks were expected on the frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia if the British were able to supply the Indians.

On 9 June 1776 Washington asked Congress to approve the use of Indians in attacking Detroit and Fort Niagara while the British were busy driving the Americans out of Montreal. He suggested that the Indians be offered £5 (\$1,250) for each British prisoner to reduce the chances that the Indians would slaughter them. Congress approved the employment of Indians on 17 June 1776 anywhere that he saw fit. The Indians were to be offered \$100 Continental for each officer they captured and \$30 Continental for

each private. General Schuyler already had permission to use Indians in New York, which Washington approved but recommended that no more than 2,000 be employed, a far greater number than could reasonably be expected.

Congress backed off on the use of Indians on 25 June 1776 when it ordered Washington to stop using the Mohican and the Stockbridge Indians who had been authorized to fight in Canada because that campaign had ended and the American forces were no longer in Canada. Congress was unable to find sufficient money or troops to carry out the proposed attacks on Detroit and Fort Niagara, and the plan was abandoned when the Iroquois objected to the Americans crossing their land on 6 July 1776.

The American invasion of Canada brought the French Canadians back into the British fold as a result of the undiplomatic behavior of the Americans in their attempts to requisition supplies for their forces. Guy Carleton had requested help from the Indians, but none arrived until July 1776. In May 1776 with the opening of the St. Lawrence River to British shipping, a large force arrived, including 10,000 British regular troops. The outnumbered American Army in Canada retreated south by way of Lake Champlain and was able to escape because Carleton did not pursue the Americans effectively. Carleton thought a greater achievement would be simply driving them out and scattering them rather than capturing the force. If the Americans were captured, Carleton would be faced with the disposition of large numbers of captives who were technically traitors and subject to rigorous penalties. As a result of Carleton's failure to pursue the Americans, he missed the chance to capture their boats on Lake Champlain. Carleton was forced to spend the next year building boats.

Once the Americans had left Quebec, Carleton began planning attacks on the colonists. He wrote to Captain Arent DePeyster, the commander at Michilimackinac, to stop the Lake Superior and Lake Michigan Indians from coming to Montreal as they were no longer needed. Carleton planned to strike at Fort Pitt with attacks launched from Detroit. Hamilton gathered the tribes and urged them to begin raiding settlements around Fort Pitt and in Kentucky, but he was hampered because of lack of supplies as Detroit had been cut off by the American invasion of Canada. On the other hand, the Indians were fearful of an American expedition through their lands. The Wyandots from the Detroit area did attack several settlements in mid 1776.

Morgan wrote to Hamilton on 31 May 1776, promising that the colonists would not attack Detroit nor even cross the Ohio River unless Hamilton first started a war along the frontier. Morgan asked Hamilton to cooperate in keeping all the Indians neutral. Even though Hamilton reported this letter to his superiors, he had no intention of cooperating with Morgan. Morgan objected to the use of Indians by the colonists as the frontier would be

exposed to retaliation. The British had no such fear as their troops were in forts.

Hamilton was unable to muster many Indian allies. The border remained quiet in the spring of 1776, and Congress, while planning an attack on Detroit, encouraged an Indian neutrality policy with the appointment of George Morgan as agent at Fort Pitt. Croghan again made a bid for the position, but it was given to Morgan. His personal interests clouded his judgment.

Despite the opposition of both the Pennsylvania and Virginia groups at Fort Pitt who saw the Indians as a threat, George Morgan set out on a tour of the Indian villages in the Ohio Valley on 3 June 1776. Morgan had several objectives: to prevent the British from gaining the support of the Indians and employing them on border raids, to pacify the Indians who were still angry about Dunmore's attack in 1774, to improve the feelings of the Indians toward the settlers after the crushing defeat of Dunmore's War, as well as to prevent Congress and the Virginians from recruiting Indians to fight the British. Morgan also had an ulterior motive in struggling to maintain Indian neutrality. Because he was connected with the land companies that were selling land to the settlers, Indian attacks would prevent the settlement of Kentucky.

Morgan invited the Shawnee and the Delaware tribes on the Muskingum and Scioto rivers, urging them to attend a conference at Fort Pitt on 6 July 1776. The Shawnee and the Delaware suggested to Morgan that he talk with the Wyandots who were the most aggressive tribe. The tribes came to the council and convinced Morgan that they would remain neutral. The council sent a message to all Indians that the Shawnee, the Delaware, and the Mingo would remain neutral and urged the others to do likewise. Morgan told the Indians that he wanted their friendship and hoped to supply them with sufficient goods.

The tribes came in to Fort Pitt during the summer and fall, and Morgan became convinced that there was nothing to fear from the Indians. These meetings may have had much to do with the abandonment of the plan to attack Detroit in July 1776. Morgan held another conference with the Indians at Pittsburgh in September 1776, but he lacked the financial support to compete with the British for Indian favor. British Governor Henry Hamilton at Detroit destroyed Morgan's peace belts, promising that the British would protect the tribes against the Americans. Morgan's report of his treaty making at Fort Pitt reached Congress in September, and no further action was taken on the subject of a western expedition.

Expecting Indian attacks at any moment, on 20 June 1776 Congress appointed Richard Butler a major. He was a former Indian agent at Fort Pitt. Butler was ordered to raise a battalion of troops to defend the frontier. Earlier on 8 June 1776 the Virginia Convention ordered additional troops for the 9th Virginia Regiment, three companies of 68 men each. The forces

defending the frontier included 200 men at Point Pleasant, 50 at the mouth of the Little Kanawha River, 50 at Wheeling, and 100 at Fort Pitt. The soldiers at Fort Pitt and Mount Pleasant were offered bounties to reenlist. These troops were for the protection of the frontier and not to be ordered out of Virginia without the permission of the Virginia Convention.

The boundary issue at Fort Pitt continued to flare up as the Pennsylvania group believed that the troops sent to defend the frontier against the Indians were really there to substantiate Virginia's claim to the area. Virginia appealed to Congress to establish a temporary line; otherwise civil war might erupt. The Virginia Convention also approached the Pennsylvania Assembly on the boundary matter. Virginia suggested using Braddock's Road as the boundary, a plan that would place most settlers in the state from which they had come. Any questions of title to land were to be deferred until the permanent boundary was established. Until then all titles would be recognized. Existing settlers would not be forced to pay any fees to land companies claiming ownership under the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. This clause was specifically aimed at the Indiana Company, which was trying to extort fees from Virginia settlers on land claimed by the company. This action repudiated the claims of the Indiana Company, Vandalia, Croghan's purchases, the Transylvania purchase in Kentucky, the Virginia Ohio Company, the Illinois Company, the Wabash Company, and others. No future purchases were to be made without the approval of the Virginia Convention. On 4 July 1776 the Virginia Convention appointed a committee to oppose the claims of the Indiana Company and others that had purchased land from the Indians. On 20 July 1776 Pennsylvania appointed David Rittenhouse, Thomas Smith, and Lourey Biddle to confer with Virginia concerning the boundary.

The land issue was becoming more complex as a result of the removal of British authority. In New York the issue was the Susquehanna Valley, which the Six Nations sold to the land barons at the Treaty of Stanwix, a sale not recognized by the British government until 1776 when its authority was no longer significant. As a result of that sale, the Six Nations stated that the valley belonged to Pennsylvania.

The land issue and the boundary dispute with Pennsylvania caused a deep rift in the Virginia Convention. Opposed to the landowners, including George Washington, was a radical group headed by Patrick Henry, including the representatives from the western counties. In October a Congressional commission proposed a compromise that neither colony would accept.

On 18 December 1776 the Virginia Convention offered Pennsylvania a line that would give Fayette, Greene, and part of Washington County to Virginia, but the offer was refused. The Convention resolved to surrender the area claimed by Pennsylvania to end the dispute, which angered the people on the frontier.

In June George Rogers Clark and J. G. Jones had been elected by the people in West Augusta County to represent them in the Convention and oppose the land claims in Kentucky of the Henderson Company. In the fall of 1776 the Convention refused to admit Clark and Jones as the majority of the Convention favored the Henderson Company. In December 1776 Kentucky, which included the land claimed by the Indiana Company as Transylvania, was made a Virginia county, a victory of the Virginia land speculators who then would be able to sell land at great profit to the settlers.

In the south the governor of West Florida in August 1776 offered any settler who came to Florida seeking refuge from the rebels 100 acres plus 50 acres for each child, slave, or indentured servant who came with him. The land would be free of quit rent payable to the colony for some years, and the settlers would have the right to cut any trees for lumber, which could be readily sold to the West Indies. These were powerful incentives for the many settlers who wished to avoid involvement in the war.

Land in Illinois was also at stake. In May 1776 Colonel George Gibson was in Williamsburg promoting an expedition to take Kaskaskia, which would open Illinois for potential land purchasers. Other entrepreneurs were urging Congress to get into the land business, which Thomas Jefferson steadfastly resisted. The idea that Congress should assume the rights of the British government to all the western land and sell parts was opposed by many in Congress, and Jefferson mistakenly predicted that it would never happen. Also at issue was whether Congress should have the power to limit the claims of the individual colonies to western land. The royal charters did not always include the western boundary of colonies; for example, Virginia's charter inferred that the western boundary would be the Pacific Ocean. John Adams was concerned that if some colonies, including Virginia, maintained this right, they would become large enough to dominate the other colonies in any federation that might be formed in the future.

Morgan worked diligently to win Indian favor. He took the unusual step of purchasing \$5,000 Continental worth of clothing, blankets, gunpowder, lead, and other Indian goods at Cuyahoga from two traders from Detroit in the winter of 1776–1777. His greatest concern was to prevent settlers around Fort Pitt from attacking the Indians as a pretext for seizing Indian land. Morgan, representing the Indiana Company, was suspected to be planning to seize Illinois during the winter while the Indians were still neutral. Once Illinois was occupied, Morgan would have the option of seeking recognition for ownership from either Congress or the British.

The Virginia land speculators were also busy along the Ohio River. In December George Rogers Clark went down the Ohio River with a supply of gunpowder for the Kentucky settlers from the Virginia Convention. However, finding less than a dozen men at McClelland's Station, he hid the powder near the river and went on to Harrodsburg. A few settlers trying to deliver the gunpowder were attacked by Indians. Later Clark, Daniel

Boone, and others returned to retrieve the powder and deliver it to Harrodsburg and Boonesborough in January 1777.

The major issue in September 1776 was the boundary between Virginia and Pennsylvania at Fort Pitt. Congress had urged that both colonies accept a temporary line because the fight over the issue was playing into the hands of the British. However, the Virginia proposal of 15 June 1776 was unacceptable to Pennsylvania because it gave far more land to Virginia. The Pennsylvania negotiators, David Rittenhouse, Thomas Smith, Alexander Lowrey, Owen Biddle, James Potter, and Edward Cook, suggested that a temporary boundary line be established jointly with Virginia. The Virginia negotiators were Thomas Nelson, Richard Henry Lee, and Francis Lightfoot Lee.

The Americans continued to express interest in recruiting Indians to serve their cause. On 8 July 1776 Congress authorized Washington to enlist warriors from the northern tribes, the St. John's, the Nova Scotia, and the Penobscot, in cooperation with Massachusetts. Congress would reimburse Massachusetts for any expense. Washington requested that 500 to 600 Indians from those tribes be enlisted for a term of two to three years. On 10 July 1776 a council attended by the St. John's, the Micmac, and the Nova Scotia agreed to furnish 600 men and send them to New York. Washington's tit for tat desire for Indian support was influenced by the fact that the British had brought in German mercenaries to fight the colonists and attempted to get slaves and Indians to rise up against the colonists. Colonial soldiers captured in Canada during the retreat were turned over to the Indians by a British officer, tortured, and murdered. John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress, informed Washington that such cruelty, if continued, reinforced his right to retaliate. Given this statement, Hancock hoped that the British officers would prevent future murders of prisoners. The Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776 referred to the encouragement by the British of Indian attacks on the frontier and the cruelty of the Indians.

Carleton continued to press for Indian involvement in July 1776. Carleton informed Hamilton at Detroit that money would be available but only to support the Indian attacks. Captain DePeyster at Michilimackinac was ordered to gather Indians and French volunteers to harass the colonists, but he was to conduct the attacks with humanity, in other words, prevent the Indians from torturing and murdering prisoners. DePeyster in turn instructed Captain Charles de Langlade, a former French officer, to carry out this order. Langlade left Michilimackinac on 4 July 1776 for Montreal. Because the group of 140 Ottawas arrived at Montreal too late to fight the Americans, Carleton told them to go home and be ready to act in the spring of 1777.

There were some Indian attacks in the summer of 1776. Isolated bands of Shawnee attacked the settlers along the Ohio River, forcing them to seek refuge in the few forts. Some settlers gave up and returned to Virginia. General

Lee advocated that Virginia and North Carolina should attack the British and thereby intimidate the Indians. Virginia ordered Colonel William Crawford to form two regiments, the 7th and the 13th Virginia in the Fort Pitt area for the defense of the frontier. Congress assumed control of the forts at Wheeling, the Great Kanawha, and Fort Pitt and would pay the Virginia troops stationed there. By the end of July, the 7th Regiment was still not ready to fight because of organizational problems.

Congress also responded to the threat to Pennsylvania. On 11 July 1776 Congress recommended that the forts be built at Presque Isle on Lake Erie, Le Boeuf, and Kittanning. They were to be garrisoned by the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment consisting of eight companies to be raised in Westmoreland and Bedford Counties. Aenas McCoy was named colonel; George Wilson, lieutenant colonel; Richard Butler, major; and John Boyd, paymaster. McCoy was given \$12,500 for expenses. Another two companies of militia each of fifty men were formed by Pennsylvania. The companies were to be paid until 15 September 1776, and a request was made to Congress to reimburse Pennsylvania for the expense.

The Continental Army was faced with a serious dilemma, a shortage of gunpowder. Before the war the major source of gunpowder was Britain, but this supply was cut off with the beginning of hostilities. Therefore many decisions were based on the available supply of gunpowder. In June 1776 Spain gave the Continental Congress 1,000,000 livres and in July deposited 2,000 barrels of gunpowder in New Orleans. George Gibson and Oliver Pollock purchased five tons of this gunpowder from the Spaniards in New Orleans and sent it up the Mississippi River in August under the care of Lieutenant William Linn. The gunpowder arrived in Fort Pitt on 2 May 1777 as the heavily laden flatboats had to be rowed upstream against the current the entire distance. Carleton was aware of the Spanish assistance to the colonists and instructed Hamilton at Detroit to do everything he could to intercept any supplies coming up the Mississippi River, while being careful not to transgress the Spanish side of the river or create an incident that would cause a problem between Spain and Britain. In October 1776 Hamilton ordered Rocheblave to block traffic between the Spaniards and the colonists on the Mississippi River. Hamilton was not to allow any boats, other than Indian canoes, without a passport from a proper authority. No ships other than common flat boats were to be built on the Mississippi except for British government purposes. These measures were designed to prevent the colonists on the frontier from receiving supplies from New Orleans.

Congress was also concerned with moving military supplies to Fort Pitt in September 1776. Congress sent two tons of gunpowder and four tons of lead to Fort Pitt along with 10,000 flints (for use on the flintlock muskets and rifles) to George Morgan. Colonel McCoy, commander of a battalion at Fort Pitt, was sent \$7,000 to pay his expenses. Pennsylvania was also

concerned with the defense of the frontier in September and formed a committee to work with Congress on possible measures.

The expedition to Canada ended badly. At the end of July the shattered remnant of the American forces were at Ticonderoga. General Horatio Gates was named the new commander. The defeat influenced the Six Nations to side with the British, although there was still hope that they would remain neutral. Given the shortage of powder and the defeat in Canada, Washington was concerned about diversions away from the main effort. In July 1776 he expressed little interest in the defensive measures being taken against Indian attacks on the frontier and was most concerned about the cost of the goods needed to win the support of the Indians. Washington requested that all available troops be sent to either New York or Canada. Pennsylvania ordered all available militia to move to Trenton to support Washington, but the order exempted the militia from Westmoreland, Bedford, and Northampton Counties, the frontier.

Congress still had hopes of keeping the Indians neutral. In July 1776 Peter Livingston and Samuel Huntingdon were selected as members of the Committee on Indian Affairs and Jasper Yeates and John Montgomery were made commissioners for the Middle Department. Congress sent \$3,000 to James Wilson at Fort Pitt to buy presents for the Indians at the meeting scheduled for 6 July 1776. Morgan was also purchasing large amounts of goods for the Indians. In June he purchased goods worth \$296 from Simon and Campbell and \$653 from Michael Gratz, both firms long established in the fur trade.

Although Morgan had called for the meeting on 6 July, some of the Indians did not arrive until the end of October. However, the Shawnee, the Delaware, and the Mingo representatives were at Fort Pitt meeting on 6 July to meet with Major Trent, Ward, and Captain Neville, the commander of the Virginia troops at Fort Pitt. The Mingo said they desired peace and had told the British commander at Fort Niagara and all the other tribes not to be part of the war between the Americans and the British. However, the Mingo wanted neither the British nor the Americans to send armies through Indian land and the Americans should not attack Detroit. Captain Neville assured the Indians that would not happen unless the British attacked the frontier.

Congress also favored neutrality and encouraged the commissioners of the Middle Department to extend the meeting at Fort Pitt and keep the Indians there in August, including the Six Nations from New York. The Six Nations had met at Onondaga on 18 June 1776 and called on the tribes in Canada to remain neutral. They asked British Colonel John Butler to send back any warriors with him. In July the Six Nations, the Shawnee, and the Delaware all told Morgan that they would remain neutral. These words eased the fears of the settlers on the frontier. While Morgan was at an Indian village on the Scioto River, he learned that a Six Nations war party had returned from Virginia with two prisoners. Morgan demanded their release,

and they were returned to Fort Pitt. However, all was not well in Virginia. The Cherokee were defeated at Watauga in August. The Shawnee killed two settlers at Big Bone Lick in Kentucky in July. Traders, perhaps from Detroit, discouraged the Indians by telling them that if they went to Fort Pitt seeking free goods, they would be hanged. The motives of the traders were obvious: if the Indians could obtain free goods at Fort Pitt, they would not give fur to the traders in exchange for goods.

Morgan still favored neutrality and finally convinced representatives of the Six Nations, the Delaware, the Mainstays, the Mohican, and the Shawnee to come to Fort Pitt. Morgan made a special effort to bring in the Wyandotte from the Sandusky area. The Delaware were the most favorable to Morgan. In September Morgan continued to work at Fort Pitt with the Indians and had their promise of neutrality as long as neither side sent an army through their land.

The British motivation was the continuation of the fur trade, which remained lucrative despite the war. The Americans wanted to keep peace on the frontier to avoid the diversion of troops from the battles on the coast. The American plan to take Detroit was dropped, and some of the militia on the frontier were disbanded on the basis of Shawnee friendship.

Others were not convinced that the Indians would remain peaceful. Colonel William Crawford, commander of the 7th Virginia Regiment on the frontier, informed Washington that the Shawnee and the Delaware had not met with Walker and his commission at Fort Pitt. The 7th Virginia Regiment, which had been paid by Congress since 17 June 1776, was held in readiness to defend the frontier in the event of Indian attacks.

In August a group of officers, including Thomas Walker, John Montgomery, John Harvie, and J. Yeates, warned of pending Shawnee and Delaware attacks, which were expected as soon as the Indians harvested their corn and formed their war parties. The warning forced the settlers to withdraw into their small local forts. The militia opposed this approach. Captain John Stuart saw hiding in small forts that could be taken by small bands of Indians as self-defeating. Stuart instead recommended that larger forts be built and ranging companies formed to attack the Indians.

There were 100 troops at Fort Pitt, 100 at the Big Kanawha, and 25 at Wheeling. Attempts were made to strengthen the defenders. Colonel William Preston assured Congress that the militia would turn out in force if the Indians attacked. The Pennsylvania Convention appointed a committee with power to call out the militia in the event of an attack, and militia captains were given authority to call up their men if needed. Captain John Nelson, with his company from Westmoreland County at Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain defending the northern approach to New York City, requested that his company be transferred to the Fort Pitt area to join the Pennsylvania troops.

Congress was also suspicious. In August arrangements were made to supply the troops at Fort Pitt. In September Congress ordered the settlers and soldiers at Fort Pitt to treat the Indians well, but asked the Ohio Indians to convince the Canadian tribes not to side with the British. On the same day that Shawnee representatives addressed Congress promising neutrality, Congress ordered guns for the frontier.

Congress was correct in expecting trouble from the Indians. Jefferson wrote to John Page on 5 August 1776 that the Six Nations were intending to attack the colonists. Jefferson instructed the commissioners for the Northern Department of Indian Affairs to inform the Six Nations that if they entered the war, the colonists would punish them severely. Even though they fled from the villages with their families, the colonists would pursue them until not one Indian remained alive. The Six Nations were told that if they did not recall the braves from Canada, the colonists would consider them at war and retribution would follow. The Six Nations did recall their men, and Jefferson believed in early August that the situation was under control.

However, in late August General Thomas Gage was informed that Carleton was urging the Indians to attack the colonists. Because of the cruelty of the Indians, Elbridge Gerry recommended to Gage that he employ riflemen to pick off British officers, including Carleton, whenever the opportunity arose, a practice that European armies deplored.

In August 1776 Germaine ordered Carleton to return to Quebec and hand over command of the British Army in New York to John Bourgoigne who would be under General George Howe's command in future operations to restore British rule in New York. Germaine encouraged Carleton to enlist the support of the Indians and informed him that a large supply of presents for the Indians had been sent to Quebec.

According to Washington, Carleton refused to exchange prisoners in August and closed any communication with the colonists. Morgan was trying to keep the Indians neutral and sent Indian messengers, a colonist, the Delaware chief, Captain White Eyes, and a Frenchman, Joseph Mouton, to Detroit with a letter and a wampum belt appealing for Hamilton to keep the Indians neutral. The letter urged the Indians to meet at Fort Pitt to declare themselves neutral. Hamilton would have no part of neutrality and destroyed the letter and the wampum belt. Sending the messengers back to Fort Pitt, Hamilton distributed a liberal amount of presents to the Indians and believed that he had countered Morgan's efforts.

Earlier in the year the American invasion of Canada had cut off communications between Detroit and Quebec, which led to a severe shortage of supplies for the troops and the Indians at Detroit. However, once the Americans had been driven from Canada in July, supplies of goods and provisions arrived in Detroit. Guy Carleton ordered Hamilton to encourage the Indians to attack the frontier settlement in the fall of 1776. In early September

Hamilton sent some Ottawas, Chippewa, Wyandots, and Pottawattomi on the schooner *Gage* to Fort Niagara to join with the Six Nations in attacking the colonists. Hamilton met with representatives of the Ottawa, Chippewa, Wyandot, Shawnee, Seneca, Delaware, Cherokee, and Pottawattomi tribes on 1 September 1776 and asked them to hold off attacks until he gave the order. However, he expected the Indians to begin raiding the Virginia settlements in September in small parties even though he had asked them to wait. Hamilton's message to the Indians included an offer of £20 sterling (\$5,000) for each scalp they brought to him.

The British continued to prepare for war on the frontier. In September a survey was made of military assets, the forts, and the ships on the Great Lakes. Detroit was in a satisfactory state to defend itself. There were 1,500 settlers, mostly French, whose farms lined the Detroit River thirteen miles north of the town and eight miles downriver. The houses were either log cabins or frame buildings with shingled roofs. Hamilton thought little of the illiterate French whose life-style was too easy. Fertile land enabled them to supply rations to the British Army with little effort; a river full of fish, ample game, and birds provided additional meat, and friendly Indians were in the area. Hamilton thought that the British merchants would soon take over trade with the Indians and that the new British settlers were much better farmers.

The fort, currently named Fort Detroit, consisted of a square stockade 300 yards on each side with eleven blockhouses that were continually being improved. The minimum garrison was two companies. Carleton in October 1776 told Hamilton that there would be sufficient funds to maintain the fort and provide presents for the Indians to maintain their friendship. However, Hamilton was asked to be frugal.

The main purpose of Detroit was to enlist Indian support for attacks on the colonial frontier. Carleton wanted the tribes ready for a series of attacks in the spring of 1777 either in the Fort Pitt area or elsewhere. There was some question in London concerning Carleton's dedication to the use of the Indians. In London it was said that Carleton was averse to their use, but others thought that from 1,500 to 2,000 Indians should be employed as scouts and to terrorize the frontier. The Indians should not be given a free hand for humanitarian concerns, but they should be used to irritate the colonists if Carleton had the ability to control them. Even in London there was concern about the cruel manner in which the Indians conducted their raids. Guy Johnson reported on 15 November 1776 directly to Lord Germaine in London that he was ready to rejoin the Indians and bring them large quantities of goods. Johnson was certain that he had the support of the Six Nations and the tribes around Detroit despite the efforts of the colonists to convince the tribes to remain neutral. In the Green Bay area, Langlade was ordered to bring together a party of 200 Indians in the spring of 1777

to join in the attacks on the frontier along with British soldiers from the 8th Regiment.

The Americans continued to work for neutrality. At the end of September 1776 the Congressional Indian commission at Fort Pitt met with Indians at Fort Pitt. The Indians leaders insisted they were still neutral, but that the British at Detroit and Fort Niagara were working on the young men. The Indian chiefs were divided on the issue of neutrality. To show good faith and to ease the supply situation, some of the militia at Fort Pitt had been disbanded, but 340 defenders remained at Fort Pitt.

At the same time in September the commission reported Indian activity. A total of 1,500 Chippewa and Ottawa were to meet at Tuscarawa. A smaller number of Pottawattomi were already on their way to attack the frontier. The Mingo, the Wyandot, and the Canawaga had assembled at the Kickapoo town and a band from Pluggy's Town was raiding settlements in Kentucky. In view of these pending attacks, the commission ordered Colonel Carnahan to call up 100 riflemen from each militia battalion in Westmoreland County and Dorsey Pentecost to provide 300 men from West Augusta County; in other words, both Pennsylvania and Virginia were called on to send more troops to Fort Pitt.

There was a mixed reaction to the events on the frontier. Elbridge Gerry wrote to Samuel Adams on 4 October 1776 that the American Indian Department and the Indians were firmly in favor of neutrality. At the conference at Fort Pitt in October and November, 644 Indians representing the Six Nations, the Delaware, the Shawnee, the Munsee, and the Mohican attended and offered to remain neutral. The Indians complained of continued efforts of the land companies to survey their land north of the Ohio River. Morgan promised them that the surveying would cease. A few of the Indians went to Philadelphia after the council in November and spoke to the Continental Congress, promising neutrality.

The Virginia group at Fort Pitt believed that the war with the Indians was in full heat in October. The only solid evidence was a report that eleven settlers were killed on 9 October 1776 at Wheeling by a party of Indians including Tawas, Wyandots, Mingoes, and other tribes. Morgan believed that the only attacks on Pennsylvania in late 1776 were by a small band at Pluggy's Town.

Dorsey Pentecost, the county lieutenant of West Augusta and commander of the Virginia militia, passed on reports that the British had reinforced Detroit and Fort Niagara and attacks by the Wyandot, the Mingo, and other tribes were to be launched in the spring of 1777 on Fort Pitt and other locations. One raiding party was already active. Morgan rebuked Pentecost for spreading the rumors in August and September that many Indians were going to attack. Pentecost had mobilized the Virginia militia to protect Fort Pitt and had warned Captain William Harrod that some settlers would cross the Ohio River to attack the Indians leaving the conference at Fort Pitt. This

ambush would destroy the Indians' faith in neutrality and result in attacks by the Six Nations.

Because of the alarm, the settlers abandoned their farms along a 200-mile stretch of the frontier and withdrew to forts built where they expected to defend themselves against the Indians. Morgan believed that the Six Nations were still neutral and were working to stop the Indians at Pluggy's Town from launching their minor raids. However, Morgan still pleaded for a ton of gunpowder for the militia in November.

The apparent success of Morgan's peacemaking had a tragic result for the frontier. Washington requested that his army be increased from 94 to 110 regiments, and some of the reinforcements came from the frontier. Congress had ordered regiments raised in western Pennsylvania and western Virginia to defend the frontier against the Indians and possible British attack from the British forts. The 1st Westmoreland Battalion, 2nd Pennsylvania Battalion, and parts of the 3rd Pennsylvania, the 8th Pennsylvania, and the 6th, 13th, and 7th Virginia Regiments had been raised in the Ohio Valley. The Virginia regiments were raised in November in the three frontier counties including West Augusta. William Crawford was appointed colonel of the 13th Virginia and Captain William McKee was recruiting men in West Augusta County. The Virginia delegates to Congress requested that two of the regiments being recruited from the settlers stay on the frontier to defend against the Indians. The 9th Virginia was ordered to join Washington's army in December 1776.

The 8th Pennsylvania was authorized on 15 July 1776 for the purpose of defending the Pennsylvania frontier along with some rifle companies raised by Morgan. In October the 8th Pennsylvania under Colonel Aenas McKay and supplied by Ephriam Blaine was given \$5,000 by Congress for supplies. On 23 November 1776 the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment was ordered to leave the west and join Washington's army at Brunswick, New Jersey, reducing the defensive forces along the frontier. On 5 December Colonel McKay issued the order to assemble on 15 December and march to New Jersey by way of Philadelphia. The regiment was not completely equipped and expected to pick up camp kettles, muskets, and other supplies in Philadelphia. Many of the troops protested, claiming that this order left their homes unguarded from Indian attacks and that the settlers would abandon their farms. Two officers offered to resign, and McKay expected more losses before the regiment began its move. However, the regiment left Kittanning in January 1777 and arrived in New Jersey in February 1777.

Morgan's treaty misled Congress into a sense of security and discouraged the Virginia militia because the Indians could not be attacked. Many of the companies simply disbanded. No additional regiments were formed on the frontier after 1776. Instead the men remained on the frontier and joined in volunteer militia detachments to defend their homes.

At the end of 1776 the frontier was open to attack from parties of Indians led by British soldiers or loyalists. Troops could not be spared from Washington's army, so the settlers had to defend themselves as best they could. In the ensuing years the settlers sustained many casualties, and the few colonial counterstrokes produced only retaliation. The war on the frontier, if not lost, ended with the frontier settlers at a decided disadvantage and the British remained in control of Detroit and Fort Niagara despite the Treaty of Paris, which had surrendered them to the new nation.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

By the time of the Revolutionary War in 1775 the goals of most of the groups in America had been set. The Indian life-style had been improved with the guns, clothing, kettles, and other goods provided by the French, the British, and the colonial traders in exchange for fur and deerskins. The tasks of trapping the beaver and killing the deer were made far simpler with metal traps and guns.

Beaver fur was highly desirable in Europe mainly for the fine beaver hats for the wealthy class. France benefited most in the fur trade until it lost the Seven Years' War to England and was forced to sacrifice Canada and the lucrative fur trade to England in exchange for the return of Guadeloupe and Martinique, French islands in the Caribbean, that had been captured during the war. Britain assumed control of the fur trade and reaped great benefit reselling the furs on the European continent. Colonial fur traders also expanded their market into territory formerly closed to them by the French.

However, with the French threat removed, the colonists began to take up land west of the mountains, driving the tribes farther west. To protect Indian land and the fur trade, the British government issued the Proclamation of 1763 prohibiting settlement west of the mountains. Indians were not to be disturbed by settlers looking for farmland.

During the Seven Years' War a few regiments of British troops had tried once unsuccessfully to capture Fort Duquesne, later renamed Fort Pitt, but a second effort succeeded. Rather than returning the regiments to Britain, they were held in America, based on a false premise that troops would be needed to maintain order in the west. King George III ordered that British regiments be maintained in America in order to keep a large standing army

available for action in Europe. There had been no need for an army when the French held the west.

The army could have been used to control the settlers and to protect the Indians from the land speculators, but these were civil matters that were addressed unsuccessfully by the Quebec Act in 1774, which extended Quebec far enough south to block colonial expansion. The British government maintained the army in America supposedly to protect the Indians, but the real purpose was to conceal from Parliament a large standing army partially at the expense of the American colonists. Parliament had rejected George III's proposal to maintain a large standing army at home in Britain both from the point of view of cost and of the potential danger to civil liberties of British citizens. Within five years the British regiments were withdrawn from the frontier posts and stationed in coastal cities, an economics move to satisfy objections in Parliament.

A turnaround in economic conditions in the American colonies caused some unexpected conversions among the various groups active in 1776. In order for Parliament to achieve its goal of protecting the Indians and not disrupting the lucrative fur trade, Parliament took some measures that offended most of the significant role players in America. Some members of Parliament were even quite willing to employ the tribes to punish the Americans for their resistance to British rule.

The middlemen in the fur trade were the established merchants in New York City, Albany, and Philadelphia. The traders dealt directly with the Indians. The main thorn in the side of the merchants was the leftover French traders who still had a foothold in the fur trade because of their long-standing relationships with the Indians. Many of the French traders had Indian wives and *méti* children.

Even the wealthy merchants and traders who could be expected to support the laws of the mother country were caught up in the conflict and were extremely disturbed by the actions taken against them. The Pennsylvania merchants and traders, such as the giant Baynton and Wharton, were blocked in their land deals. After spending a great deal of money buying the land from the Indians, the British government finally ruled illegal the purchase at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. This ruling, combined with the losses in the Illinois fur trade as a result of the loss of sales to British troops when they were transferred to the coast, eventually led to the bankruptcy of John Baynton and Samuel Wharton and changed their attitudes to support for the rebel cause.

Even George Washington and the Virginia plantation owners, competitors with Baynton and Wharton for western land, were blocked by the British government. All of the land claims west of the mountains were declared illegal under the Proclamation of 1763 that prohibited settlement in the west. In addition the Quebec Act annexed the western land to Canada, blocking the colonists. Washington and his associates had spent

considerable sums of money purchasing the claims for land granted to veterans of the Seven Years' War. Each veteran was entitled to forty acres of land in the west, but as most lacked sufficient funds to clear the land and begin cultivation, the veterans were willing to sell their claims for minimum amounts. Washington and his associates then spent large sums having select parcels of good rich bottom land essential for tobacco crops surveyed and patented in Virginia courts. Britain declared all of this activity illegal, and the land became part of Canada under the Quebec Act of 1774.

A third group of merchants, the British fur traders who had immigrated to Montreal and Quebec, opposed the colonial fur traders who were competing with them. The British merchants also supported efforts to protect Indian land from colonial settlers as that would infringe on the fur trade as well. The French fur traders also opposed any attempt by the colonists to take Indian land as it would harm the fur trade.

The Iroquois attempted to remain neutral, but were forced to join with the British after Sullivan's campaign destroyed their villages and crops and drove them to seek protection at Fort Niagara. The Delaware favored neutrality, but continued to steal horses and capture women and children, which resulted in colonial counterattacks. The Shawnee were the most threatened by the Virginia settlers in Kentucky and supported attacks on the settlements along the Ohio River Valley. The other tribes were bribed by the British Army to support raids on the frontier, but took no initiative on their own.

The focal point of the Revolution in the west was the southwest corner of Pennsylvania surrounding Fort Pitt, where the largest concentration of settlers west of the mountains arrived between 1765 and 1776. The first open conflict with the Indians after Pontiac's Uprising in 1763 was Dunmore's War launched from Fort Pitt in 1774. Fort Pitt was a center of trade and communication with routes leading down the Ohio to Illinois and up various streams to the Great Lakes. This area was a center of political and economic upheaval from 1765 until 1800. The issues were land speculation, political control, the fur trade, and the Indian threat.

The contesting parties included Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, the Virginia and Pennsylvania land speculators, the proprietors of Pennsylvania, the settlers, and the Indians. The immediate conflicts regarding land and political control between Pennsylvania and Virginia were resolved by the overriding threat of war with Britain, but the Indian threat continued until the last decade of the century.

During the Revolution the frontiersmen conveniently supported either colony, whichever was more favorable to them at the time. Even though the more peaceful Pennsylvania Indian policy was more attuned to their interests, the settlers continued to give some support to Virginia because claims to their land were from Virginia. The military commanders at Fort Pitt could not obtain supplies through the Pennsylvania Westmoreland

County officials because the farmers claimed Virginia jurisdiction. On the other hand, Virginia county officials were unable to raise militia because the frontiersmen claimed their homes were in Westmoreland. The farmers refused to acknowledge Pennsylvania authority to impress grain, yet were willing to serve in brief raids for the purpose of killing Indians.

The major issues dividing the people on the frontier in 1775 were land and trade with the Indians. The land speculators had not openly opposed British rule until it seemed that all hope for the land deal with the Indians made at Fort Stanwix was blocked by the British government. Baynton and Wharton were the major players in the proposal to create the new colony of Vandalia and hired Benjamin Franklin to represent their interests in London in the 1760s. Baynton and Wharton also lost a fortune in an attempt to monopolize trade with the Indians in Illinois. They were blocked by French merchants in Illinois who were supplied by British merchants who had migrated to Canada after 1763. Franklin became a leader of the opposition to Britain and represented the views of his employers and other wealthy merchants in Philadelphia.

George Washington was one of if not the leading landowner in the colonies. His claims to land along the Ohio River were worth untold wealth, but full exploitation of this land was blocked by the British government, which sought to protect the Indian land and the fur trade from the colonists. George Washington became a leader in the opposition to Britain.

The fur traders in New York, including the Scottish firm of Phyn and Ellice in Schenectady, had close ties in Britain and were profiting from trade with the Indians. James Phyn and Alexander Ellice took an ambivalent view and were not outspoken opponents of Britain.

The fur traders in Pennsylvania, for example, Michael and Bernard Gratz, were losing their market with the tribes in Ohio to competition from French traders who then had access to the same inexpensive quality goods from Britain through the British merchants in Montreal and Quebec. The traders from Pennsylvania could not compete with the close ties with the Indians that the French had developed over a century. Many of the French traders were *métis*, the children of Indian wives of French traders. Before the Seven Years' War the Pennsylvania traders had sole access to British goods while the French had to purchase inferior goods at higher prices in France. As a result the Pennsylvania traders had been able to offer better value to the Indians, not only in price, but also in quality. British-made Indian guns were of far better quality than the guns manufactured in Belgium for the French. When this advantage was removed, the Pennsylvania traders lost their market and they became adversaries against British rule.

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INDEX

- Abram, Chapman, 37
Adams, John, 137, 153–54, 156, 160
Adams, Samuel, 118, 167
Adolphus, Isaac, 39
Albany traders, 36, 38
Allen, Andrew, 116
Allen, Ethan, 135
Alsop, John, 140
Amherst, Jeffrey, 89, 94–95
Andrews, Collin, 36
Arnold, Benedict, 144–45, 151
Askin, John, 36
Aston, George, 81, 115, 138
Athel, William, 12
- Bache, Richard, 149
Backhouse, James, 39
Backhouse, William, 39
balance of trade, 1–3, 9, 88, 102
Barr, James, 151
Barr, John, 48
Barr, Thomas, 48
Barrington, Lord, 96
Basset, Henry, 33–35, 67–68
Baynton & Wharton: fur trade, 2–3, 22, 38–41, 63, 141, 147, 172; Indiana Company, 19, 150, 153; land deals, 119; sales to British Army, 42, 99; seeking settlers, 51; slavery, 53; Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 4, 20, 43, Vandalia, 14, 16, 19–20, 26, 132
Beall, Robert, 52
Beckett, Joseph, 115
Beeckman, Gerrard G., 50
Beeckman, Jacob, 50
Beeckman, John, 50
Beeckman, William, 50
Bentley, Thomas, 42
Biddle, Lourey, 159
Biddle, Owen, 161
Bird, Henry, 80
Bishop, John, 12
Blaine, Ephriam, 168
Blondeau, Maurice, 32
Blouin, Daniel, 37, 42
Boone, Daniel, 148, 150
Boston Tea Party, 2, 108
Bouquet, Henry, 65, 88–90, 94
Bousman, Jacob, 81, 115, 138
Boyd, John, 162
Boyle, Philip, 34
Braddock, General Edward, 1, 92
British Army, 6, 29, 32–33, 42, 87–103, 157

- Brocken, William, 115
 Brodhead, Charles, 85, 127
 Bronaugh, William, 13
 Brown, Thomas, 52, 83
 Bullitt, Cuthbert, 16
 Bullitt, Thomas, 13, 19
 Butler, John, 22, 40, 81–82, 148, 152, 156, 163
 Butler, Richard, 81–82, 120, 126, 129, 141, 152–53, 155, 158, 162

 Callender, Robert, 148
 Camden-Yorke legal decision, 122, 133–34, 150
 Cameron, Alan, 145
 Campbell, Daniel, 35
 Campbell, John: arrested, 83; fur trade, 40–41, 118, 135; justice of the peace, 114, 132; land deals, 14, 16; link to Connolly, 115; McKee committee, 152; suspected loyalist, 81, 84, 138; Virginia faction, 149;
 Cannon, John, captives, 69–71, 75–76
 Carleton, Guy: British Army, 131; employing Indians, 137, 139–41, 144–45, 157, 161, 165–66; loyalists, 82, 85; opinion of Scots, 33; Quebec Act, 106–10; relations with Spanish, 162
 Carmichael, John, 48, 151
 Cavet, James, 115, 120, 132, 134–35
 Chevalier, Louis, 34–35
 Christian, William, 17
 Christie, John, 91
 Christy, William, 81, 115, 124, 138
 Church of England, 79
 clans, 62–63, 70, 75
 Clark, George Rogers, 18, 127, 143, 150, 160
 Clause, Daniel, 34
 Clymer, George, 83
 Connolly, John: arrested, 126; forced settler to leave, 135; forming loyalist battalion, 130; fur trade, 40; Illinois distillery, 41; justice of the peace, 132; link with Dunmore, 14, 21, 24, 26, 58, 113–19, 124; link with Washington, 17; loyalist, 81, 136, 138–39; military service, 21
 Connolly, William, 42
 Cook, Edward, 48, 52, 151, 161
 Cox, George, 13
 Cox, Isaac, 115
 Craik, James, 13
 Crawford, Valentine, 26, 52, 80–81, 138
 Crawford, William: agent for Washington, 47; committee to defend Fort Pitt, 135; justice of the peace, 25, 48, 132; land holdings, 26; link with Dunmore, 21–22, 57; links with Washington, 11–13, 113–17; mistress, 50; murdered Indians, 67; surveys, 11–13, 16–18, 126; suspected loyalist, 80–81
 Cresap, Michael, 117–18, 125, 142
 Cresap, Thomas, 11, 14, 53–54
 Cresswell, Nicholas, 80–81
 Croghan, George: British Army, 41–42; defended settlers, 1774, 119; excluded from Indian Department, 141; favored Indian neutrality, 128, 133; fur trade, 54, 135; horse theft, 65; Illinois Land Company, 16; Indian agent, 22, 39, 58, 66, 69, 100, 129; land purchases, 19, 23, 26, 47, 114, 159; link with Connolly, 81, 113–15; link with Dunmore, 26, 116, 124; link with Washington, 12–16, 21–24; Ohio Company, 148; opposed Virginia claims, 10, 24, 53, 117–18; retired, 21; supported Virginia, 126, 132, 135, 138, 149; suspected loyalist, 82, 133, 139, 152; Vandalia, 72, 133
 Croghan, William, 53
 Cumming, Thomas, 19
 Custard, John, 13
 Custis, Mary, 12

 Dartmouth, Lord: blamed violence on fur traders, 67; halted evacuation of

- Illinois, 101; halted purchase of Indian land, 16, 26, 120, 123–24; ordered use of Indians, 139–40; Quebec Act, 107–8; reprimanded Dunmore, 115, 122; Vandalia, 20
- David Franks & Company, 99
- DePeyster, Arent Schuyler, 147, 157, 161
- Detroit, 143–45, 154–57, 161–62, 165–66, 169
- Dickerson, John, 126, 143
- Dinwiddie, Robert, 11
- Dobson, Joseph, 40
- Douglas, Ephriam, 48
- Douw, Volkert P., 141, 145
- Duane, James, 137
- DuCharme, Jean Marie, 34
- Duncan, David, 147
- Duncan, John, 36
- Dunmore, Lord: campaign against the Shawnee, 67, 113–28, 133; encourages Indians to resist, 135–36, 139; land acquisition, 14–17, 107, 124, 134–35; link with Connolly, 21, 81; link with Croghan, 26; raising a loyalist battalion, 83, 130, 137–38; refuge on warship, 58, 138; veteran's grants, 17, 23
- Dutch traders and farmers, 36, 38, 49–50
- Edgar, William, 36
- Ellice, Alexander, 36–37, 100
- Elliott, Matthew, 80, 83–84, 147–48
- Ellis, Henry, 66
- Enoch, Henry, 83
- Fairfax, George, 11
- farming, 3, 10, 58, 73–74, 166
- Fauquier, Francis, 10
- Ferguson, Thomas, 24
- Finley, James, 52, 76
- Finley, John, 41–42, 66
- Floyd, John, 17, 116, 118
- Fonda, Jelles, 37
- Fort Stanwix, Treaty of: British objections, 6, 43, 56–57, 132, 149, 172; Croghan's support, 10; land companies, 3, 154, 159; negotiations, 1768, 71–72; negotiations, 1772, 19–20; negotiations, 1773, 14, 16
- Franceway, 32
- Francis, Turbutt, 141
- Franklin, Benjamin, 4, 20, 71, 126, 141–43, 149–50, 174
- Franklin, William, 25, 148, 150
- Franks, David, 16, 37, 40–41, 148
- Fraser, Hugh, 33
- Fraser, John, 90
- Fraser, Simon, 33, 94
- French fur traders, 30–31, 35, 43, 72–73, 75, 105
- Frobisher, Joseph, 32
- Frobisher, Thomas, 32
- fur trade, 1–3, 6, 9, 26, 29–44, 64, 68, 71–73, 90, 95, 105, 147–48, 164
- Gaddis, Thomas, 83
- Gage, Thomas: approved army plan for west, 81, 109; cut army spending, 97–99; employment of Indians, 76; fear of Native American uprising, 37, 100–101; French conflict with British traders, 31, 35; fur trade, 41; garden seeds to forts, 88–89; opinion of French, 106; opposed Vandalia, 121–22; ordered punishment of Indians, 66–67; requested regiments from Canada, 131; return to England, 15, 121; use of Indians, 130
- Galloway, Joseph, 80, 148–50
- Gates, Horatio, 153, 163
- George Ludlow & Son, 99
- George, William, 24
- Germain, George, 82
- Gerry, Elbridge, 165, 167
- Gibson, George, 138, 162
- Gibson, John, 17, 80–81, 114–15, 132, 138–39, 148–49, 152, 155–56, 160
- Girty, James, 84

- Girty, Simon, 2, 58, 77, 80–84, 100, 115, 124, 137–38, 153
 Gist, Christopher, 52
 Gist, Thomas, 22, 25, 48, 81, 138
 Gladwin, Henry, 89
 Goe, William, 52, 115, 132
 Grant, Alexander, 36
 Gratz, Bernard and Michael: dispute with Delawares, 152; fur trade, 37, 39–40, 42–43, 117, 163, 174; indentured servants, 51; land purchases, 24, 113; link with Croghan, 22; slavery, 53
 Hagen, Moses, 153
 Haldimand, Frederick, 16, 67, 85, 88, 107, 147
 Hamilton, Henry, 80–82, 85, 107, 130, 138–39, 144–45, 147, 154–55, 157–58, 161–62, 165–66
 Hancock, John, 161
 Hand, Edward, 81, 83–85
 Hanna, Robert, 48, 58, 120, 132, 134–35
 Hanson, John, 43
 Hardin, Marcus, 13
 Harrison, Benjamin, 126, 132, 138, 143
 Harrison, William, 81, 115, 138
 Harrod, James, 53, 150
 Harrod, William, 143, 167
 Harvie, John, 134–35, 156, 164
 Hawley, Joseph, 141
 Hay, John, 66
 Hay, William, 90
 Hearne, Samuel, 32
 Henderson, Richard, 124, 133–34
 Henry, Patrick, 17, 119, 122, 126, 137, 140–43, 151, 159
 Hickman, Richard, 53
 Highlander Scots, 93, 94
 Hillsborough, Lord, 19, 98, 100–101, 107–8, 115
 Hogg, James, 149
 Hogg, Peter, 13
 Hooper, Robert, 149
 horses, 4, 69
 Hughes, Thomas, 53
 Humphreys, Charles, 126, 143
 hunting, 74
 Huntington, Samuel, 163
 Hutchins, Thomas, 99
 Illinois Land Company, 15–16
 indentured servants, 47, 50–52, 76
 Indian Department, 4, 22, 41, 58, 80, 90, 92, 97, 100
 Indiana Company, 18–19, 22–23, 26, 149–50, 151, 153, 159–60
 Iroquois, 62
 Jackson, William, 13
 Jefferson, Thomas, 126, 143, 160, 165
 Jewish traders, 36–37, 39
 Johnson, Guy, 135, 137, 139–41, 145, 148, 151, 166
 Johnson, Sir William: British Army, 41, 91–92, 97; favored Indians, 68; fur trade, 49; Indiana Company, 19, Indian Department, 22; Indian discontent, 66–67; land and speculators, 4, 16, 19, 72; new colony, 15; opinion of Dutch, 50
 Jones, Gabriel, 83
 Jones, Isaac, Jr., 149
 Jones, Thomas, 12
 Kennedy, Daniel, 147
 Kennedy, Patrick, 42
 Kile, John, 151
 land and speculators, 3, 5–7, 9–27, 53–57, 77, 93–95, 107, 110, 113–14, 123–24, 127, 133–35, 148–50, 154, 159, 160–61
 Langlade, Charles, 161, 166
 Lawrence, Thomas, 23, 113
 Lee, Arthur, 19
 Lee, Charles, 154–55
 Lee, Francis Lightfoot, 161
 Lee, Hancock, 18, 143
 Lee, Richard Henry, 118, 124, 126–27, 135, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 153–54, 156, 161

- Lee, Thomas, 11
 Lenapes (Delaware), 61–62
 Lernoult, Richard, 131, 145, 147
 Levy, Andrew, 117
 Levy, Gershon, 37
 Levy, Hayman, 36–37
 Levy, Moses, 39
 Lewis, Andrew, 13, 119, 133, 136–37
 Linn, William, 162
 Livingston, Peter Van Brugh, 36, 163
 Livingston, Philip, 137, 140
 Lobinger, Christopher, 48, 151
 Lochry, Archibald, 53
 Lockey, William, 115
 Logan, Benjamin, 150
 Long, Paul, 82
 Long, Peter, 82, 153
 Lord, Hugh, 139
 Lorimier, William, 68
 Lowry, Alexander, 48, 161
 Loyal Company, 15
 loyalists, 79–85
 Lyon, William, 39

 MacClean, Laughlin, 127
 MacGruder, Captain, 52
 Mackay, Aenas, 39, 100, 114–16, 120, 135
 Macomb, John, 36
 Macomb, William, 38
 Maggee, Henry, 83
 Marcie, John, 154
 Mason, George, 134
 Matthews, Sampson, 83
 McClelland, John, 48, 151
 McClure, Charles, 39
 McClure, David, 39
 McConnell, Robert, 151
 McCormick, George, 115
 McCormick, William, 52
 McCoy, Aenas, 162
 McFarland, Andrew, 114–16
 McGreary, Clement, 151
 McKee, Alexander: arrested, 77; fur trade, 35, 39–40; Indian agent, 22, 58, 65–66, 100, 148; Indiana Company, 1773, 15; land purchases, 22–24; link with Washington, 12; loyalist, 80–84, 138, 145, 152; opposed Connolly, 115
 McKee, William, 168
 Mercer, George, 18, 20
 Mercer, Hugh, 17
 Michilimackinac, 34
 military expenditures, 1–2, 5, 9, 64, 72–73, 88, 91–93, 96–99, 131, 140
 Milligan & McClure, 100
 Mississippi Company, 18–19
 Montgomery, Archibald, 94
 Montgomery, John, 163–64
 Moore, John, 49, 151
 Moorhead, Samuel, 142
 Morgan, George: arrested, 83; favored Indian neutrality, 157–58, 164–65; fur trade, 40–43, 147; Indian agent, 152–54, 160, 162; Indiana Land Company, 151; link with Baynton and Wharton, 19–20, 82, 149; negotiations with Indians, 69, 76–77, 84, 129, 143, 155, 167; Ohio Company, 148; purchase of Indian goods, 162–63; Vandalia, 150
 Morgan, Zackwell, 84
 Morison, Charles, 36
 Morris, Joseph, 52–53
 Morris, Lewis, 133, 142–43
 Morris, Robert, 147
 Morton, Edward, 39
 Mouton, Joseph, 165
 Murray, James, 30, 33
 Murray, William, 16, 37, 39, 41, 107, 134
 Muse, George, 13

 Native Americans, 4–6, 29–44, 61–78, 121–24, 133, 137–44, 148–74
 Nelson, John, 151, 164
 Nelson, Thomas, 161
 Neville, John, 82, 126, 135, 142, 151–52, 154–55, 163–64
 Newell, John, 134
 Nicholson, Joseph, 82, 153

 O'Hara, James, 49

- Ohio Company, 18, 148, 150, 159
Ormsby, John, 49, 148
- Page, John, 165
Pangman, Peter, 32
Paterson, Charles, 32
Paty, John, 12
Pendleton, Edmund, 11
Penn, John, 10, 115
Pentecost, Dorsey, 17, 21–22, 25, 53, 57, 114–15, 132, 135, 151, 167
Perry, James, 151
Pfister, Francis, 89
Phyn and Ellice, 36–38, 66, 68, 100, 174
Phyn, James, 36
Physick, Edmund, 56
Pollock, James, 115
Pollock, Oliver, 147, 162
Pond, Phineas, 68
population, 45–46, 73–75
Porteus, John, 36, 66, 68
Potter, James, 161
Poulson, John, 13
Presque Isle, 90, 91, 162
Preston, William, 17, 85, 116, 118, 121, 133–34, 164
Prevost, Augustine, 91
Proclamation of 1763, 3, 6, 10–11, 21, 65
Proctor, John, 135
Proctor, William, 114
- Quebec, 30
Quebec Act, 105–11, 130, 172–73
- Ramsay, David, 67–68
Randolph, Peyton, 11
Reed, Joseph, 127
Rees, Joel, 13
Rittenhouse, David, 159, 161
Rogers, David, 143
Ross, Alexander, 23–24, 37, 81, 100, 138
Ross, George, 126, 143
Ross, John, 40
- rum and liquor, 39, 50, 64–65, 73, 90–91, 132
Rumsey, James, 37, 39, 41
Rumsey, William, 42
Russell, William, 137
Rutherford, Walter, 36
Ryckman, Peter, 68
- Savage, John, 13
Schuyler, Philip, 137, 141, 143, 151, 153, 157
Scotch-Irish, 47–48
Scots, 93–94
Scott, Joseph, 124
Scott, T., 135
Scottish traders, 35–36
Semple, Mrs. Samuel, 81
settlers, 5, 7, 10–27, 47–59, 93, 111, 124, 173
Seven Years' War, 1
Shawnee, 62
Shelburne, Lord, 97, 106, 130, 144
Shepherd, David, 83
Shippen, Edward, 25
Shippen, Joseph, Jr., 53–54
Simon & Campbell, 163
Simons, Joseph, 23–24, 37–38, 40, 49, 100, 113, 118, 148
Sims, Charles, 154
Sinclair, Patrick, 107, 147
Skinner, Stephen, 22
Slaughter, George, 142
slaves, 17, 42, 48, 50–53, 144
Sly, George, 135
Smallman, Thomas, 17, 22–23, 100, 114–15, 132, 135, 148–49, 152
Smith, Devereaux, 49, 100, 114–16, 120, 134–36
Smith, Francis, 89
Smith, James, 49, 151
Smith, Thomas, 159, 161
Smyth, F.D., 145, 151
Spear, Joseph, 100, 120, 136, 148
St. Clair, Arthur, 21, 24–25, 38, 40, 48–49, 53–54, 58, 114–21, 123–26, 134, 136, 138, 143, 145
stamp tax, 96–99, 102

- Stedman, Alexander, 66
 Stephen, Adam, 13, 19, 124, 136–37, 140
 Stephens, Andrew, 13
 Stephenson, James, 50
 Stephenson, John, 81, 115, 138
 Sterling, James, 36
 Stevens, William, 17
 Stevenson, John, 35–36
 Stuart, John, 164
 taxation, 2–3, 9
 Teller, Jacobus, 35
 Thomas, William, 124
 Thompson, William, 116
 Tilghman, James, 116
 Tilghman, Tench, 141
 Todd, Isaac, 34
 Todd, John, 150
 Townsend duties, 2
 Trent, William, 20, 24–25, 132–33, 148, 150, 163
 Tute, James, 32

 Vader, John M., 49
 Vallandigham, George, 115, 132, 135
 Vandalia Land Company: boundary, 25; conflict with Virginia, 7, 53, 113–15; favored by Johnson, 66; Indiana Company, 1776, 19–20; negotiations, 1773, 14–16, 114–15; negotiations, 1774, 114–15, 119, 121–23, 128, 133, 150, 159; sales to settlers, 58
 Van der Heyden, David, 49
 Van der Heyden, Dirk, 49
 Van Slyck, Cornelius, 34–35
 Van Swearingen, 49, 52, 115
 Vighy, V., 38
Virginia Gazette, 51
 Viviat and Elliott, 42

 Wade, Ferrall, 38
 Waggener, Andrew, 13
 Wainsdorf, Charles, 17
 Walker, Benjamin, 11
 Walker, John, 136–37
 Walker, Thomas, 24, 133, 136–37, 142–43, 156, 164
 Walpole, Thomas, 20
 Walsh, Patrick, 51
 Ward, Edward, 17, 22, 24, 47, 113–15, 138, 149, 163
 Washington, George: conflict with Vandalia Company, 14, 114; Detroit attack, 143–44, 163; frontier troops sent to East, 168–69; indentured servants, 51; land companies, 3–5, 22–27, 71, 113, 116, 134; link with Croghan, 23–24; Mississippi Land Company, 18–19; Ohio Company, 7, 148, 150; Seven Years' War, 1–2; 22–27, 71, 113–16, 116, 134, slavery, 53; squatters, 21, 47; Virginia associates, 17, 59, 153, 159; Virginia claims, 11, 128; wanted Indian support, 129, 136–38, 141, 151, 154–57, 161, 164
 Washington, Samuel, 83
 West, John, 13
 West, William, 39
 Weston, John, 85
 Wharton, Isaac, 149
 Wharton, Samuel, 42, 72, 82, 117, 119, 121–22, 128, 132, 148–50
 Wharton, Thomas, 15, 20, 115, 117, 119–23, 148–50
 Wilkins, Andrew, 42
 Williamson, Alex, 41
 Wilson, George, 53, 136, 151, 162
 Wilson, James, 36, 81, 126, 133, 137, 141, 143, 152, 163
 Wilson, William, 153
 Wimple, Mindert R., 49
 Winston, Richard, 37, 42, 147
 Wolcott, Oliver, 141
 women, 4, 6, 39, 48, 50–51, 61–63, 69–71, 74–76, 81, 88
 Wood, James, 136–37, 141
 Wooster, David, 151
 Wright, Joshua, 152
 Wright, William, 13

 Yeates, Jasper, 163–64

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

WALTER S. DUNN JR. is an independent researcher and a retired museum curator. He has published a dozen books on World War II and on colonial and local history.