JAMES R. ARNOLD AND ROBERTA WIENER, EDITORS

COLD WAR

THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE GUIDE

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Cold War

THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE GUIDE

James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, Editors

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Overview of the Cold War

The Cold War was as much an ideological battle as it was a military struggle. Although the origins of the conflict can be traced as far back as the November 1917 Russian Revolu- tion, the Cold War began to take form in late 1945. It did not formally end until December 1991. Simply put, the Cold War can de de- fined as a state of mutual hostility, distrust, and rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. This contest soon pitted the capitalist West—and its allies around the world—against the communist-controlled East and its allies throughout the world. A large part of the Cold War “battle” involved competing political and economic ideologies. The capitalist West generally represented popularly elected, multiparty governments that supported individual rights and a free- market economy in which government control was limited. The emphasis was on individual initiative, personal and collective rights, and private property. Though some pro-Western governments were in reality not very demo- cratic, they usually subscribed to some form of capitalism. The communist East advocated vastly different governmental and economic systems. Nearly all communist regimes were controlled by a single political party, which exercised strict control over individual rights and political participation. Communist econ- omies were tightly regulated by the central government, and most private property was

forbidden. The idea of individual initiative was alien. Instead, the emphasis was on col- lective collaboration among the population. Thus, the Cold War symbolized two com- pletely different ways of life.

Hot Wars within the Cold War

Although the Soviet Union and United States never engaged in direct military ac- tion against one another, the Cold War was marked by a series of both small and large wars. These conflicts were fought in almost every corner of the world. In most cases, the West backed one side while the East sup- ported the other. In addition to the many small wars, the Cold War featured three major and prolonged conflicts: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1946– 1975), and the war in Afghanistan (1979– 1989). The Cold War was also a period that witnessed a massive arms race and the rise of permanent and powerful defense industries. Many historians have pointed out that the Cold War "militarized" everyday life in both the East and the West. The world's major powers spent trillions of dollars on large standing armies and advanced weaponry. And unlike more conventional conflicts, which have fairly distinct beginning and end points, the Cold War endured for more than four decades. Each side was therefore obliged to arm itself to fight a large-scale,

worldwide war for a seemingly indefinite pe- riod of time. Perpetual military readiness be- came a Cold War watchword.

Both national and international politics were affected by the Cold War. In many in- dustrialized Western nations, the politics of anticommunism resulted in periodic civil liberty violations and overzealous attempts to suppress or outlaw communist or leftist organizations. As such, political freedom was sometimes diminished. Oftentimes, Western nations—particularly the United States—supported repressive and undemo- cratic governments abroad so long as they were anticommunist. This was especially

the case in the developing world (particu- larly Latin America, Africa, and Asia). In the communist nations, the insistence on

a singular political-economic philosophy brought with it periodic crackdowns against those who dared to think or act differently. Sometimes this manifested itself as internal repression, as was the case during the Cul- tural Revolution in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the late 1960s. At other times it brought external repression, as was the case when the Soviet Union crushed the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring of 1968. Finally, the process of de- colonization was profoundly influenced by Cold War politics. Conflicting ideologies forced many newly independent countries to choose one system or the other—capitalism or communism. Doing so could cause po- litical instability, economic crisis, and even civil war in these fledgling nations.

Hungarians gather around the fallen statue of communist leader Josef Stalin in front of the Na- tional Theater in Budapest on October 24, 1956. The statue, pulled down the

previous day by anticommunist demonstrators, was later smashed to pieces. The short-lived revolt against Soviet rule ended by November 4, 1956. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Economics

In economic terms, the cost and conse- quences of the Cold War are almost impos- sible to calculate. The arms race and the need to maintain large, permanent military estab- lishments cost trillions of dollars. Money spent on defense and weaponry was money taken away from social welfare programs, education, health care, and housing. As the arms race accelerated and defense budgets ballooned, inflation and economic stagna- tion became problematic in the West. In the East, periodic consumer goods and food shortages plagued many communist coun- tries. The Vietnam War seriously harmed the American economy. And the Soviet war in Afghanistan contributed to an economic crisis and, ultimately, to the fall of the So- viet Union.

The Cold War was also witness to a world in which dozens of relatively small "proxy wars" were fought by surrogates of the United States and the Soviet Union. These conflicts resulted in constantly shifting na- tional borders and changes in global and re- gional balances of power. They also resulted in millions of deaths and injuries. In spite of international bodies such as the United Na- tions (UN), the constant push-pull of Cold War geopolitics often impeded international cooperation. This meant that economic de- velopment efforts, disease eradication pro- grams, antidrug campaigns, and even nuclear nonproliferation initiatives were weakened, stalled, or halted completely.

Society and Culture

Cultural and social trends were far from immune to Cold W ar influences. Cold W ar themes were not just the subjects of mov- ies, plays, novels, and television shows; they also gave birth to new genres of cul- tural expression. Spy thrillers, for example, were born of the Cold War. Science fiction

moved into entirely new areas as it dealt with the political and technological con- sequences of the period. Even music and art reflected Cold War values. Music es- pecially became linked with various Cold War peace movements, as demonstrated during the Vietnam War. At the same time, both sides in the Cold War engaged in propaganda through cultural expres- sion. And

censorship of “nonconforming” art forms was routinely practiced in both the East and the West, although it was far more prevalent in the East. The Cold War touched religion as well. Most communist regimes tried to stamp out organized reli- gion by banning it or persecuting its fol- lowers. However, conservatives in both the Christian and Muslim faiths sought to fight atheistic communism by becoming more politically active. Some even became militant, sparking internal and external armed conflicts. In some Muslim nations, the ad- vent of theocracy—or religiously imposed government—began during the last quarter of the Cold War.

Ethnic lines tended to blur as a result of the Cold War, especially in the communist bloc. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in particular insisted on artificially incorpo- rating many different and diverse ethnic groups. Some groups were therefore forced to deemphasize or even abandon their languages, customs, and centuries-old tradi- tions. Not even gender escaped the impact of the Cold War. In the United States dur- ing the 1950s, for example, women and men were encouraged and even expected to ful- fill very specific social roles in the belief that this would “immunize” the nation from communist influences. W omen were ex- pected to become ideal mothers and house- wives and to forgo careers outside the home. Men were required to develop a career be- yond the domestic sphere as the solitary breadwinner.

Military and Technology

Nuclear power, a byproduct of World War II, came into its own during the Cold War. On the positive side, nuclear technology revolution- ized health care, electrical power generation, and many of the sciences. On the downside, nuclear weapons, numbering in the tens of thousands by the end of the period, threat- ened the world with complete destruction. Nuclear power made all-out war among the major world powers suicidal. In that sense, some historians have argued, these weapons may have prevented World War III. By

the late 1950s, nuclear-powered submarines had revolutionized naval warfare and fundamen- tally altered defense strategies.

Rocket, satellite, and guided-missile tech- nologies were also Cold War inventions. But they were also a mixed blessing. They pro- vided for space exploration and gave rise to the so-called space race but also made a nu- clear war possible with the push of a button. This greatly increased the odds of an acci- dental nuclear exchange. As such, modern warfare became entirely impersonal and had the potential for unleashing a global holo- caust in a matter of hours.

Computers, another Cold War technol- ogy, were used almost exclusively in mili- tary and medical applications. By the end of the conflict, however, they had become com- mon household appliances. In that sense, a

technology originally designed for govern- mental and military purposes revolutionized human existence in less than one generation. Related to this, computerization and other electronic advances emerging from Cold War applications ushered in the era of in- stant communication. This development em- powered the media (television in particular) to reach every corner of the globe in just a few seconds.

The Cold War waxed and waned over its 46-year history. From 1945 to the early 1970s, the Cold War world was said to be bipolar. That is, the global balance of power was split rather evenly between the Western bloc, dominated by the Americans, and the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviets. As more nations decided to forge their own geopo- litical strategies, however, the Cold War world became multipolar by the mid-1970s. American and Soviet predominance weak- ened and global power became more dif- fuse. Moreover, East–West relations were marked by periods of relaxed tensions in the late 1950s, the 1970s, and again in the mid- to-late 1980s. Although a major world war was averted, nothing better exemplifies the danger that was always part of the Cold War than the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the two superpowers came as close as they ever did to a full-blown nuclear war.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

Causes of the Cold War

Immediate Causes

Because ideology was part of an all-encom- passing zero-sum game, conflict and com- petition touched virtually every issue in the immediate post–World War II period. The Cold War was as much a fight over ideas and principles as it was a military confron- tation. Long-standing mutual suspicions be- tween East and West were made worse by the advent of the nuclear age in 1945, which greatly complicated superpower relations. Both the Americans and the Soviets sought to exploit the power vacuums that resulted from World War II. This occurred not only in Europe, but in Asia, Africa, and the Mid- dle East as well. They also took advantage of severe economic dislocations to convince various populations to embrace their par- ticular politico-economic systems. Finally, individual personalities and differing lead- ership styles must be factored into any study of Cold War developments. The "human fac- tor" cannot be ignored in historical analysis.

Opposing Ideologies

During World War II, the United States, So- viet Union, Great Britain, and the other Allied nations put aside their considerable ideologi- cal differences and temporarily united to de- feat the Axis nations. When the war ended in 1945, however, conflict among the Allies

flared because the common enemy had been defeated. The Soviets sought to introduce their brand of communism to nations and ter- ritories that they occupied as a result of the war. They also hoped to strengthen commu- nist parties in various Western nations—in Italy, Greece, and France for example —and perhaps even "convert" populations there to communist political and economic ideology. In short, the Soviet Union envisioned spread- ing its system of authoritarian, one-party rule and government-controlled economy to any nation in which it had influence. Further- more, communist ideology regarded capital- ism as the enemy, a grave peril that was to be countered

vigorously. Believing that capital- ism's primary goal was to expand, the Sovi- ets saw in their opponents both ideological and physical threats.

The United States and the other Western European nations viewed communism and one-party rule in a very negative light. They were turned off by its undemocratic political system and its emphasis on a government- run economy in which personal initiative and property were forbidden. In addition, they perceived communist ideology that called for a worldwide revolution against capital- ism as a direct threat to individual freedom and democracy. Instead, the West believed the future belonged to multiparty, demo- cratic capitalism and, like the Soviets, tried

to export that ideology wherever it could. This struggle between two opposing ways of life contributed significantly to the devel- opment of the Cold War. As long as East and West conceived of their rivalry in such stark and ideological ways, conflict was virtually guaranteed.

East–West ideological differences soon manifested themselves in Germany, which was split into western and eastern occupa- tion zones in 1945. Soviet leader Josef Stalin hoped to unite Germany under a pro-Soviet government that would be loyal to commu- nist ideals and serve as a buffer zone be- tween East and West. He also demanded a harsh and punitive peace with the Germans. Among other things, Stalin sought huge war reparation payments and the dismantlement of German industry, which would be reas- sembled in the Soviet Union. The Ameri- cans, British, and French wanted a free and democratic Germany that would be reinte- grated into the capitalist West. They opposed large reparations and Germany's deindus- trialization, fearing that this would perma- nently cripple Germany and even reignite militarism there. The clash over Germany became irreconcilable, and the country was soon divided between East and West, a divi- sion that lasted until 1990.

The Atomic Bomb

In 1945, the United States was the only na- tion in the world to possess atomic bombs. Efforts by the British and Americans to develop such weapons had specifically excluded the Soviet Union. The Soviets cer- tainly knew about the atomic bomb program (known as the Manhattan Project) through espionage activities and were upset that their allies had tried to keep the technology a secret. Beginning in 1944, the British and American governments cracked the Soviets' encrypted top-secret messages in Project

VENONA. Soon thereafter, the West be- came aware of an extensive Soviet spy ring. Clearly, the Soviets had channeled their es- pionage activities toward gathering infor- mation on the atomic bomb. By 1950, the arrests of Klaus Fuchs, Alger Hiss, and Ju- lius and Ethel Rosenberg in both Britain and the United States offered clear evidence of Soviet infiltration of the Manhattan Project and subsequent nuclear weapons programs.

Soviet leaders were understandably suspi- cious of Western motives. They concluded that the American atomic monopoly might be used to force them to make concessions against their will or even compel them to cede control in areas over which they already had charge. They were especially worried that the United States might use its atomic might to push them out of Eastern Europe, creating a serious security problem along their west- ern border. Furthermore, periodic right-wing political rhetoric in the United States gave the Soviets a reason to fear the atomic mo- nopoly on a personal security level. A few hawkish lawmakers in Congress publicly ad- vocated using atomic bombs against the So- viet Union in a preemptive war that would, they argued, get rid of the communist men- ace for good.

Strategic Imperatives and Power Vacuums

The power vacuums that resulted from World War II ensured that both East and West would rush in to fill the void. As a result of Allied war strategy during World War II, So- viet troops occupied all of Eastern Europe by 1945. Almost immediately, the Americans and Soviets were sharply divided over what type of governments would rule in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and Germany. The Soviets established pro-Soviet commu- nist regimes in much of the region, to the dismay of American leaders. In the February

1945 Allied Declaration on Liberated Eu- rope, the Americans, British, and Soviets had pledged to support free elections and self-rule throughout Eastern Europe. When the war ended, however, American policy- makers quickly asserted that the Soviets had broken this agreement. But there was little they could do to change the situation because a huge contingent of Soviet troops had al- ready secured much of the region. Indeed, they occupied all of Poland and Czechoslo- vakia and much of Austria, Hungary, Roma- nia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

In Germany itself, East and West differed dramatically over how to treat the defeated enemy. The Soviets controlled eastern Ger- many and were already in a strategic position to dictate its future. The Soviets fortified the Communist Party in eastern Germany with the help of German communists trained in the So- viet Union under Moscow's careful guidance. In the end, Germany would be permanently divided during the Cold War, as West Ger- many was integrated into the Western orbit and East Germany fell into the Soviet orbit.

Power vacuums in other areas of the world meant that the Soviets and Americans would also try to impose their influence in van- quished territories. In Asia, for example, the United States insisted on complete control over Japan. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wielded influence in nearby northern Korea and supported communist forces in China. World War II loosened French, Brit- ish, and other colonial powers' ties to their overseas possessions. Thus, large swaths of Africa and Southeast Asia became Cold War battlegrounds. And as decolonization progressed throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, both sides sought to achieve a strategic edge by gaining a foothold in newly independent countries. They even supported anticolonial movements in regions where they sought strategic dominance.

Economics

World War II wrought widespread devas- tation throughout Europe. This war —more than any other in history—visited unprece- dented hardship on civilians and their prop- erty. Millions of Europeans were susceptible to indoctrination by both the Soviets and Americans, who offered very different pre- scriptions for postwar reconstruction. By 1945, many economies had

been destroyed or badly crippled, and food, clothing, hous- ing, and medical care shortages were ram- pant. The Soviets held out the promise that communism would bring an end to economic deprivation and inequality. The United States had emerged virtually undamaged from the war, so it used its immense economic power and wealth—not to mention promises of for- eign aid—to convince war-weary Europeans that democratic capitalism offered the only acceptable way of achieving economic suc- cess and freedom. This tug-of-war further entrenched the U.S.–Soviet rivalry.

Leadership and Personalities

In April 1945, just a month before the defeat of Germany, President Franklin D. Roos- evelt died, and Vice President Harry S. Tru- man became the new leader of the United States. Truman, who had been vice president for just three months, had little foreign pol- icy experience and was largely ignorant of the content of Roosevelt's discussions with Stalin. Roosevelt's style of wartime diplo- macy with Stalin had been very personal and informal. Being well-seasoned in foreign af- fairs, he did all he could to keep the Sovi- ets in the war to stop them from seeking a separate peace with Germany, as they had done during World War I. Roosevelt sought compromise and therefore postponed mak- ing difficult postwar decisions. And the de- cisions he did reach with Stalin tended to be vague.

Truman's leadership style was far more forceful and direct than was Roosevelt's. This difference, combined with Truman's and Stalin's mutual unwillingness to com- promise, especially after Germany's May 1945 defeat, led to significant U.S.–Soviet tensions in the immediate postwar period. These tensions were most pronounced when it came to the postwar order in Eastern Eu- rope. Roosevelt had committed to impre- cise and unenforceable agreements with the Soviets regarding the postwar settlement, especially at the February 1945 Yalta Con- ference. When Truman took over, he lacked both the experience and charm of his prede- cessor. Armed only with the knowledge of the immediate situation and not knowing ex- actly what Roosevelt had agreed to, Truman decided to take a hard line toward the So-

viets. For his part, Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill tended to share Truman's distrust and suspicion of Soviet motives. The change in U.S. leadership played a central role in how the Cold War unfolded after April 1945.

Intermediate Causes

Friction between East and West certainly predates World War II and the ensuing Cold War. In fact, if one is to comprehend the Cold War's origins, it is crucial to under- stand how 1930s foreign policy contributed to both World War II and the distrust among the Allies during and after the conflict. The way in which World War II was fought—the strategies involved—can help explain why so much disharmony existed once the war was over. The Soviets believed that they had been forced to endure too much of the bur- den in the war against Germany. Their losses were horrific and far worse than those suf- fered by the British and Americans, and they believed that their sacrifice empowered them to exercise influence over the areas that they

U.S. president Harry Truman (center) shakes the hands of British prime minister Winston Churchill (left) and Soviet premier Josef Stalin (right) on the opening day of the Potsdam Con- ference in Berlin, Germany, July 17–August 2, 1945. (Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)

had liberated. Here we see repeated exam- ples of how shortsighted policies designed to meet immediate needs can cause unfore- seen and unwanted consequences in the lon- ger term.

Foreign Policies of the 1930s

Two significant prewar foreign policy devel- opments shaped the uneasy alliance formed among the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States to defeat the Axis nations. They also contributed to mutual suspicions that turned into open hostility once World War II ended in 1945.

During the mid-to-late 1930s, Nazi Ger- many's Adolf Hitler made clear his inten- tion to dominate all of Central and Eastern Europe. His Anschluss Osterreichs policy,



which brought about the forceful annexation of Austria in March 1938, began a worri- some trend. Fearing more Nazi annexations, the French, British, and Soviets entered into negotiations to form an alliance or mutual defense pact. In doing so, they hoped to prevent a German offensive against West- ern Europe or the Soviet Union. However, these negotiations broke down by mid-1939 because of mutual suspicions and misunder- standings. The French and British feared that the Soviets would use any such agreement as a pretext to control Eastern Europe. The Soviets, in turn, were fearful of the West's

continuing appeasement of Hitler. They also believed that the West was leaving them alone to face German aggression. This was especially so after the infamous September 1938 Munich Agreement, in which France and Britain ceded German-speaking portions of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. Josef Stalin was incensed by the Munich Agreement and was insulted that he had not been consulted, much less included, in the deliberations. Ul- timately, these mutual fears and suspicions led the Soviets and West Europeans to pur- sue policies that proved quite damaging to each other. To make matters worse, the Americans displayed a "hands-off" policy toward the gathering storm in Europe. Isola- tionism and the continuing economic depres- sion at home prevented President Franklin D. Roosevelt from playing a meaningful role in European affairs. In general, however, Roos- evelt tacitly supported appeasement.

Just as the Munich Agreement angered the Soviets, the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact outraged the West. The pact was signed on August 23, 1939, just one week before Germany invaded Po- land, marking the beginning of World War II. Thus, the Soviets stayed out of the war until they were attacked by Germany in June 1941. In a significant way, Western

appeasement policies and unwillingness to fully engage the Soviets prior to 1939 left Stalin with little choice but to enter into the pact with Hitler. The Soviets viewed the pact as necessary for their survival. The Western powers, however, saw it as a great betrayal. Obviously, then, the World War II alliance cobbled together after June 1941 was based not on long-term trust or even long-term mu- tual interests. It was based only on the will to defeat a common enemy. Once the war was over, each side—East and West—recalled these prewar policies, and mutual suspicion replaced mutual cooperation.

Allied Conduct of World War II

The way in which the Allies conducted World War II also contributed to Cold War antagonism. Because the United States was tied down in the Pacific against Japan, it was unable to devote its full military resources to the war in Europe. As an example, in De- cember 1943 U.S. troop deployments were evenly divided between the European and Pacific theaters. Each had received 1.8 mil- lion personnel. The fact that American troop strength in Europe

represented just 50 per- cent of its total strength meant that the Brit- ish and Soviets bore the brunt of the Nazi war machine in Europe. But the Soviet Union paid a much higher price than Britain be- cause Hitler's ground forces had launched a massive invasion of Soviet territory. Much of the war in Europe, in fact, was fought on Soviet soil.

To make matters worse, British prime minister Winston Churchill continued to postpone the opening of the second front in Western Europe. Creating a second front would have necessarily relieved the Sovi- ets. Roosevelt was initially anxious to open a second front to divert the Germans and ac- commodate the Soviets. As early as 1942, he had promised Stalin that the front would be

opened before the end of the year. Churchill, however, argued that Britain was not ready for such a large undertaking. His nation would be used as the main staging area for an attack across the English Channel against German forces in northern France. Roos- evelt reluctantly went along with Churchill. In July 1942 Roosevelt agreed to dispatch American troops to North Africa to fight along with the British against Nazi forces.

In 1943 the Americans and British fur- ther forestalled a cross-channel invasion of France. In spring 1943, with the North African campaign against the Nazis virtu- ally won, Churchill convinced Roosevelt to launch an invasion of Italy, beginning in Sicily and moving north. Though this of- fensive forced the Germans to divert forces to Italy, it also meant that a full- scale inva- sion of France would not be possible before 1944, and the Italian offensive alone was not enough to bring the Soviets any significant relief. Instead, the Soviets fought fiercely against the Germans, who had laid siege to Stalingrad beginning in August 1942. By February 1943, the Soviets had turned the tide of the war and had the Germans retreat- ing westward. But the failure to open the sec- ond front until June 1944 contributed to the wholesale devastation of the Soviet Union. It also greatly agitated the Soviets and com- pelled them to conclude that their British and American allies were not to be entirely trusted. They also believed that American and British decisions to

postpone the sec- ond front contributed to their astronomically high World War II casualties.

War Damage and the Soviet Union

Among all of the World War II combatants, the Soviets suffered—by far—more damage than any other nation. Estimates now put So- viet war deaths at 27–28 million, including 7–8 million military dead and 19–20 million

civilian dead. The Soviets claimed that 1,700 towns and some 70,000 villages were de- stroyed, while major cities such as Stalin- grad, Odessa, Kiev, and Leningrad suffered catastrophic damage. An estimated 25 mil- lion Soviets were homeless at war's end, and estimates hold that at least 25 percent of the total national wealth of the country had been wiped out. Stalin and his successors believed that their country would have suffered much less damage and far fewer deaths had its al- lies dedicated more resources to the World War II effort in Europe. They were similarly convinced that the postponement of the sec- ond front prolonged their struggle against the German Army. The Soviets' shocking war- damage figures go a long way in explaining why the Soviets felt so put upon at the end of the war. And they certainly explain why mutual distrust soon replaced mutual coop- eration after the Axis nations were defeated.

Another by-product of Soviet war damage was that Stalin felt entitled to control East- ern Europe at war's end. He believed that the great suffering and sacrifices made by his citizenry had earned him the right to es- tablish pro-Soviet regimes from Yugoslavia all the way to the Polish-Soviet border. He sought dominance there for ideological as well as security reasons.

Long-term Causes

An understanding of long-term historical trends is necessary to comprehend how and why the Cold War developed as it did. By examining the full sweep of history, we can see that individual events, decisions, poli- cies, and consequences build on one another to shape the future in a particular way. His- tory is not just an endless list of unconnected events. Rather, it is a dynamic, always-evolv- ing process that fits together like the pieces of a

puzzle. In this case, how the Soviets were perceived and treated when they first came

to power in 1917 greatly affected how they reacted to events both internally and exter- nally. These early experiences with the West "conditioned" the Soviets to act and react in a certain manner. Russian history—going back hundreds of years—also shaped Soviet Cold War policies. The West was similarly conditioned to view the Soviets in a specific way. Josef Stalin's internal policies of the 1920s and 1930s directly influenced W estern views of the Soviet Union after 1945.

Soviet Security Concerns

Russian history is punctuated by invasions from outside forces. Its long experience of repeated invasions dates at least to the 13th century, when the Mongols (also referred to as Tatars) invaded much of Russia and brutally ruled there for almost 250 years. In the 14th century, Belarus and Ukraine, once controlled by the Russians, were annexed by Lithuania. In more modern times, Russia was subjected to three attacks from the West in less than 130 years. Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Russia in 1812. His armies caused considerable damage, and before his cam- paign bogged down in winter weather, he had managed to capture Moscow. Much of the city was burned during the siege. In Au- gust 1914, as World War I broke out, Ger- many declared war on Russia and swept into Russian territories shortly thereafter. Ger- many broke its 1939 nonaggression pact with the Soviets and again attacked Russia in June 1941. Given this history, Stalin was most concerned about securing his nation against attack once World War II ended. Es- pecially worried about a resurgent Germany and a possible fourth invasion, he sought to establish a "security zone" along the Soviet Union's western border. This meant control- ling much of Eastern Europe.

Also influencing Soviet actions in the region was the desire to "isolate" Soviet

citizens from Western cultural and eco- nomic influences. Soviet leaders feared that such influences would undermine the Com- munist Party's uncontested grip on power. Thus, they viewed the construction of a "de-

fensive" perimeter in the west as the best way to keep capitalist pressures at bay. Sta- lin's desire to establish a defensive perimeter in Eastern Europe contributed to the eventual clash with the West, which believed Eastern Europe should control its own destiny.

Western Interference in the Russian/ Bolshevik Revolution (1918–1921)

In January–February 1918, Great Britain, the United States, and France decided to inter- vene in the Russian Revolution of November 1917. The revolution led ultimately to a civil war. This struggle pitted the Bolsheviks (the "Reds"), who wished to bring communism to Russia, against anticommunist forces, some- times referred to as the "White Russians." Bolshevik leaders Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky alarmed the West by trying to export the revolution to neighboring countries. In fact, civil war was narrowly averted in Ger- many during 1918–1919, when leftist work- ers' councils tried to impose a communist system there. In nearby Hungary, the Hun- garian Soviet Republic established itself for a brief time under the leadership of Béla Kun during March–August 1919. Kun's govern- ment was easily overthrown by the Romanian Army. Nevertheless, these developments led Western nations to conclude that unchecked Bolshevik communism would be perma- nently imposed in Russia and might well spread farther westward.

Britain, America, France, Japan, and several other Western nations sent troops to Russia to stop the Bolsheviks. The first troop deployments landed in Russia in the spring of 1918; by the end of the year, there were 180,000 foreign troops on Russian soil.

Among them were 10,000 U.S. troops. The European Allies had also imposed a naval blockade on Russia in an attempt to "starve" the Bolsheviks into submission. Neither the ground intervention nor the blockade worked as

planned. By 1921, the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power and the West ended its intervention and blockade.

The Soviets (as they now called them- selves) deeply resented the West's interven- tion in what was clearly an internal affair. Not only would they never forget that Brit- ish and American troops were on their soil, they also realized that the West was to be their principle ideological and military ad- versary. This history weighed heavily on East–West relations. Thus, it is little wonder that the Cold War developed so quickly after the World War II alliance against the Axis had dissolved. Indeed, during one of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's famous public tirades against the West in the early 1960s, he made reference to the fact that American and Western troops had "violated" Russian sovereignty in the past. This was a clear ref- erence to the 1918–1921 intervention in the Russian Civil War. It also demonstrated just how deep Soviet indignation ran concern- ing Western hostility toward the November 1917 Russian Revolution.

Interwar Politics

After the West's failed attempt to reverse the communist revolution in Russia, relations between the Soviets and the major Western powers were practically nonexistent until the late 1930s. The West attempted to isolate the Soviet Union diplomatically and economi- cally, to seal it off from the rest of Europe to prevent the spread of communism. The British did not recognize the Soviet govern- ment until 1924. The United States did not do so until 1933. Without the benefit of regu- lar and formal diplomatic relations, each side

was compelled to guess the other's motives, which only increased mutual misapprehen- sions. This lack of understanding became far more problematic when the United States and Soviet Union became the world's two leading powers after World War II.

Stalin's dictatorial rule and ruthless poli- tics during the 1920s and 1930s also played a part in the East–West conflict. Stalin's forced collectivization of agriculture in the 1920s and early 1930s is estimated to have caused nearly 5 million Soviet deaths. Many died because they opposed Stalin's policies and

were eliminated by the state. Many more died as a result of a severe famine during 1932–1933. Stalin also suppressed his po- litical opponents and "enemies of the state" by ordering their imprisonment or murder. Between 1935 and 1938, Stalin's purges may have resulted in as many as one mil- lion deaths. These horrendous human rights abuses did not go unnoticed by the West. Fur- thermore, they convinced Western leaders that Soviet communism posed both ideologi- cal and physical dangers and was antithetical to democracy. The West later turned a blind eye to Stalin's abuses during World War II for the sake of the alliance. However, they again became a major issue of contention as soon as the conflict had ended.

The Soviets were more than just shunned by the West after World War I. They were purposefully excluded from international politics. Failing to include the Russians in the 1919 Paris Peace negotiations after World War I, or the League of Nations, was a major miscalculation on the part of the West. By excluding the Soviets from such international venues, the W est added an- other dimension of paranoia to Soviet rule. It also ensured that Soviet leaders would pursue internationalist policies only when absolutely necessary (as in W orld W ar II). They had little experience or incentive to

do otherwise. Their national self-interest often trumped international cooperation, a situation that ensured conflict with the West after 1945.

Propaganda and the Red Scare

Soviet government propaganda during the 1920s and 1930s added yet another element of conflict between East and West. The So- viets portrayed Western democracies as de- praved, greed-driven societies bent on world domination. This line of thinking helped so- lidify the Communist Party's power. But it also meant that the Soviet leadership would be dominated by doctrinaire ideologues who were sometimes unwilling or unable to seek and sustain compromise with the West. In the West, preconceived notions of com- munism were equally damaging. Seeking

accommodation with the Soviets was fu- tile, it was believed, because they were ir- rational and cared only about converting the world to communism. In the United States, the first anticommunist "Red Scare" during 1918–1921

resulted in serious civil liberty violations. U.S. attorney general A. Mitchell Palmer embarked on a zealous anticommu- nist crusade that employed crude propaganda and communist caricatures to stamp out the "red menace" in the United States. Although the Red Scare died out after Palmer left of- fice in 1921, its lingering effects included irrational fears of communism and a funda- mental misunderstanding of Soviet motiva- tions. Thus, propaganda and the politics of anticommunism also informed the eventual East–West conflict.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

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Consequences of the Cold War

Immediate Consequences

The long-standing mutual distrust and mis- understanding between East and West only intensified after World War II. In the first five years of the Cold War (roughly 1945– 1950), much of the foundation of the Cold War was laid. Disputes over the future of Eastern Europe and Germany added immea- surably to Cold War tensions. Thus, each side was compelled to pursue policies that would solidify their power within their spheres of influence. The Americans began construct- ing an expansive foreign policy and military apparatus designed to contain the Soviets and the spread of communism. The Soviets likewise walled off Eastern Europe to pro- tect it from Western influences. They also resorted to brutal and repressive measures to stamp out political opposition. The year 1949 was a critical one in the development of the Cold War. That year saw the end of the Berlin Blockade, the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the end of the American atomic monopoly. It also witnessed the "loss" of China to the communists, and the permanent division of Germany.

Communist Containment, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan

In February 1946, U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan sent an 8,000-word telegram (the

"Long Telegram") from the U.S. embassy in Moscow to the State Department in Wash- ington, D.C. In it he warned policymakers of the Soviets' tendency toward secretiveness, paranoia, and insecurity. He also cautioned that the Soviets were driven by commu- nist ideology that viewed capitalism as an enemy and that called for world domination. He concluded that the current Soviet lead- ership could neither be trusted nor reasoned with. He urged a hard-line foreign policy toward the Soviet Union to counter Soviet aggression. Kennan's telegram had an im- mediate and substantial impact on U.S. policymakers. They began to talk about a containment policy that would resist Soviet military advances and prevent the spread of communism.

In response to communist pressures in Turkey and a civil war in Greece, where communists threatened to take control, Pres- ident Harry S. Truman announced the Tru- man Doctrine on March 12, 1947. With Kennan's top-secret Long Telegram in mind, Truman proclaimed that the United States would commit itself to support any nation struggling against "armed minorities or out- side pressures." U.S. foreign policy thereby formally adopted Kennan's containment pol- icy. In the same speech, Truman asked Con- gress for $400 million to stop communist movements in Greece and Turkey. Congress

readily agreed. In July 1947, Kennan anony- mously published an article in *Foreign Af- fairs* in which he restated his Long Telegram positions. By publicly and explicitly stating the principles of containment, the United States put the Soviets on notice and rein- forced the Truman Doctrine. The contain- ment policy became a key component of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

In June 1947, U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall announced a U.S.-spon- sored economic aid program (the Marshall Plan) to help European nations recover from World War II. Although the United States did not

specifically exclude aid to them, the Soviets nonetheless refused to accept Mar- shall Plan aid. Josef Stalin viewed the pro- gram as a threat, a way for the Americans to control Soviet internal affairs and dic- tate policies in Eastern Europe. The Amer- icans saw the plan as a potent weapon for their containment policy. By strengthen- ing W est European economies, the threat of communism taking hold in the region was diminished. The Marshall Plan was an overwhelming success. During 1947–1952, $13.5 billion went to Western Europe. Eco- nomic catastrophe was averted, containment efforts were bolstered, and the Soviets were put on the defensive.

The Soviets Consolidate Power: Internal Repression, Eastern Europe, the Cominform, and Comecon

By the beginning of 1948, the Soviets were reeling from the quick succession of U.S. foreign policy initiatives the previous year. Stalin was compelled to react, and in so doing essentially completed the partitioning of Europe into two rival camps. At home, Stalin tried to restore the Communist Party's supremacy by cracking down on dissidents, real and imagined. Thousands of World War II prisoners of war (POWs) returned home

to the Soviet Union only to be imprisoned in bleak labor camps (known as gulags) out of fear that they had been poisoned by cap- italist ideology. Soviet officials launched a nationwide campaign in 1946 to force writ- ers, artists, intellectuals, and even musicians to strictly adhere to Stalinist ideals. And in 1949, Stalin initiated a major purge of Com- munist Party officials in Leningrad because of their alleged betrayal of Stalinist poli- cies. Many of those involved were either ex- ecuted or imprisoned. By 1949, Stalin had consolidated his power and that of the party he controlled, creating a terribly repressive environment.

In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union moved to strengthen its control, in a way mimicking the U.S. containment policy by walling off Eastern Europe from Western in- fluence. During 1945–1949 it systematically imposed its political, economic, and cultural values throughout the region. Local commu- nist parties, often with the backing of Mos- cow, began establishing socialist economic policies in East European nations as soon as World War II ended. Albania and Yugosla- via set up communist governments on their own by

1946. In Poland, the Soviets forced several million Poles, Germans, and Ukrai- nians to relocate as they redrew the nation's borders and established a pro-Soviet regime there. Bulgaria declared itself a communist republic in September 1946. By 1948 Roma- nia had a communist government in place. During 1947–1948, Soviet-sponsored coups ensured that both Hungary and Czechoslo- vakia had installed communist regimes. In Soviet-controlled eastern Germany, Stalin was creating a puppet regime. After the 1948 Soviet–Y ugoslav split, Stalin embarked on a merciless campaign to purge "revision- ist elements" from communist governments throughout Eastern Europe. By doing so, he further tightened his grip over the area.

In response to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which the Soviets saw as a concerted effort to encircle them, Stalin or- ganized the Informational Bureau of Com- munist Parties (Cominform) in September 1947. This was an effort to unify commu- nist parties around the world and to put up a united front against capitalist aggression. In January 1949, the Soviets organized the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), a Russian version of the Mar- shall Plan designed to aid Eastern Europe in postwar reconstruction. It was also used to bind together the economies of the Soviet bloc, all under Moscow's strict supervision. By 1949, Europe was sharply divided into two rival political and economic systems.

Cold War Turning Points: The Berlin Blockade and NATO

In June 1948 the Soviets blockaded Ber- lin, located in the Soviets' eastern occupa- tion zone. By doing so, they hoped to force the Western Allies to abandon the western half of the city. They also sought to stop the creation of an independent West Germany. Many historians view the Berlin Blockade as the first serious confrontation of the Cold War. From June 1948 to May 1949, when Stalin called off the blockade, the Allies sup- plied West Berliners with 500,000 tons of food and 1.5 million tons of coal via a huge airlift operation that at its peak employed 400 planes flying 24 hours a day. The So- viets' Berlin Blockade backfired, and they were forced to admit defeat. The blockade antagonized the West and increased the like- lihood of a major war. It also accelerated the division of Germany. On May 3, 1949, The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) was founded as an independent

state. In eastern Germany, the communist- led German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) became a sovereign nation

on October 7, 1949. Germany was now for- mally divided.

The Western Allies had feared that the Berlin Blockade was a precursor to a So- viet invasion of Western Europe. Their re- sponse was the formation of NATO on April 4, 1949. This bound the United States, Can- ada, and West European nations together in a defensive military pact aimed at containing the Soviet Union. For the first time since the American Revolution, the United States en- tered into a permanent politico-military alli- ance. NATO forced the Soviets to respond in kind. In 1955 they founded the Warsaw Pact, a military and mutual defense pact between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Atomic Bomb

The Western Allies' successes of early 1949 were short-lived. On August 29, 1949, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, ending the American monopoly. This caused near-panic in the United States and danger- ously increased the stakes in the growing Cold War. Many Americans now feared a Soviet nuclear attack. Many more concluded that the Soviets had suddenly changed the global balance of power. The Soviet atomic bomb also marked the beginning of a huge and costly nuclear arms race. The United States tested its first hydrogen (or thermo- nuclear) bomb in October 1952; the Soviet Union followed suit in November 1955.

The "Loss" of China

In October 1949, communist forces en- gaged in the long-running Chinese Civil War triumphed and proclaimed the cre- ation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chinese Nationalist (anticommu- nist) forces were forced to seek refuge on Taiwan, off the southern coast of China. The Chinese communists, led by Mao Zedong, had been helped by the Soviets. And their

1949 victory precipitated great dismay in the West. The world's most populous nation had now been "lost" to the communists, and in Western eyes it seemed as if the communists had gained the upper hand in the Cold War. The Soviets immediately recognized the new PRC and began supplying it with economic and military aid. Just as the Soviets believed they had been "encircled" by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the West be- lieved the loss of China was part of a larger conspiracy to encircle capitalism. This de- velopment further polarized East–West rela- tions and would lead to a serious escalation of Cold War tensions in the coming years. Indeed, the communist victory in China in- troduced the Cold War to Asia.

Intermediate Consequences

The evolving Cold War in Asia precipitated the Korean War (1950–1953). This conflict carried with it grave consequences. As the first "shooting war" of the Cold War, it not only escalated tensions between the super- powers, but as many historians argue, it came close to igniting World War III. The war also introduced unprecedented war strategies and made use of new technologies. During the 1950s and 1960s, Cold War pressures changed the political landscape in individual nations as well as at the regional and inter- national levels. This period also witnessed a series of Cold War crises, the worst of which was arguably the 1962 Cuban Missile Cri- sis, which threatened to engulf the world in a nuclear war.

The Korean War

As a result of the Cold War, the Korean Pen- insula was permanently divided by 1948. North of the 38th Parallel, Kim Il Sung pre- sided over the communist, pro-Soviet Dem- ocratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). In the south, Syngman Rhee

led the anticommunist, pro-Western Re- public of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Both leaders wished to unite Korea under their re- spective regimes. During 1948–1949, North and South Korea began engaging in a series of border clashes along the 38th Parallel. By then, the DPRK had built a formidable army using Soviet arms left over from World War II. The Soviets had also begun to train North Korean troops and were providing signifi- cant

armaments to North Korea in the spring of 1950. Kim, after receiving promises of support from both Josef Stalin and Mao Ze- dong, prepared to invade the south, crush South Korean forces, and reunite Korea under his leadership.

On June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. South Korean forces, badly outnumbered and outgunned, were caught off guard and began retreating southward. Seoul, the South Korean capital, fell in a matter of days. The war also took the United States by surprise. However, President Harry S. Truman acted quickly, taking the issue to the United Nations (UN) and send- ing U.S. troops to help South Korean forces. By mid-July, a 17-nation military coalition fighting under a U.S.-led UN Command was engaged in fierce fighting against ad- vancing North Korean troops. And so began a bloody and costly three-year war. In late December 1950, China intervened in the war when UN forces were about to defeat North Korean forces. This move prolonged the war and made a wider war a distinct possibility. It also marked the only time that Western forces directly battled against a major com- munist power. The war ended in July 1953 in an armistice. No peace treaty was signed, and North and South Korea remain techni- cally at war to this very day. The war re- sulted in several million casualties among the Chinese and North and South Koreans. The United States lost 33,686 soldiers, a rate

that was significantly higher than that of the Vietnam War, in relative terms.

The Korean War was a great Cold War turning point. It introduced the concept of limited war as a way to prevent an escalation to a nuclear war. It forced both the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in a massive military buildup. It put U.S.–Chi- nese relations on ice for more than 20 years, and convinced the Americans to become in- volved in the Indochina War being fought between French and Vietnamese national- ist forces. The Korean War was also famous for witnessing the first jet fighter battle in history, using helicopters in combat, and employing Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units to reduce war casualties. Ad- ditionally, it was the first major “test” of the UN and the first military operation under- taken by that body.

Political Realignments

In the United States, the Korean War and evolving Cold War had far-reaching effects. Among the most noteworthy was the change in U.S. politics. Korea fueled the politics of anticommunism and sustained McCarthy- ism. In February 1950, Sen. Joseph R. Mc- Carthy (R-Wis.) charged that the U.S. State Department was riddled with communists. Although unproven and untrue, the allega- tion struck a chord among many Americans who feared communist subversion as the Cold War deepened. But it was the Korean War that made McCarthy—and McCarthy- ism—household words. McCarthy used the Korean conflict for personal political gain and to "prove" to the public that the Sovi- ets and Chinese were bent on conquering the world. McCarthyism, an anticommunist witch hunt that lasted until 1954, resulted in serious civil liberty violations and a divisive political atmosphere. It ruined the careers of hundreds of writers, actors, and teachers who

were accused of being communists during McCarthy's many public hearings. By 1952, when McCarthyism was at its height, a siz- able number of Americans believed that the nation was threatened by internal commu- nist subversion and further believed that the Democratic Party was largely to blame.

Republicans, even those who disavowed McCarthy's baseless accusations, capital- ized on McCarthyism. During the 1952 pres- idential elections, they used anticommunism and public disaffection with the Korean War as potent political weapons. The end result was quite dramatic. In November 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidency, the first Republican to do so since 1928. Re- publicans also won control of both houses of Congress, a feat not seen since 1930. For the first time since the U.S. Civil War, the Republican Party "cracked" the so-called Solid South. Until then, the South had voted as a bloc, invariably for Democratic candi- dates. In the years to come, the primacy of the Democratic Party gradually diminished, politics took a turn toward the Right, and the Republicans steadily gained ground in the South. By the 1980s, in fact, the Republi- cans had become more powerful in the South than in any other region. These develop- ments caused a fundamental realignment of political power in the United States. Except for

a brief time in the mid-1960s, politics in the nation drifted to the Right, and Southern states increased their political clout.

In Western Europe, Cold War consider- ations prompted a movement toward eco- nomic and political integration in the 1950s and 1960s. The European Integration Move- ment was initially designed as a tool to coun- ter Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and to equitably distribute defense burdens among many nations. As a result, Western Europe came together to control atomic en- ergy, foster increased intra-European trade,

encourage multinational industrial collabo- ration, and even to rearm West Germany. By the mid-1960s, increased political integration in Western Europe was also used as a device to counter the United States' economic and military dominance. It also allowed Western Europe greater freedom of action in foreign policy. Perhaps the most important benefit of European integration was that it ensured the full reintegration of West Germany into the Western alliance. This prevented a resur- gence of German militarism and made war on the European continent far less likely by binding Western Europe together. When na- tions share common goals and economic interests, the likelihood of a war erupting among them is diminished significantly.

The Cold War also brought political turmoil to the communist bloc. In Febru- ary 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev stunned his communist colleagues at the So- viet Twentieth Party Congress by denounc- ing Josef Stalin and making public the true cruelty of his rule. Seeking to ease Cold War tensions and appear more accommodat- ing to the West, Khrushchev embarked on a de-Stalinization campaign to rid his coun- try and Eastern Europe of Stalinist political and economic influences. He also advocated peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West and admitted that communism need not be imposed forcefully. Furthermore, he prom- ised that the Soviet Union would not attempt to incite revolution abroad. Khrushchev's radical pronouncements had dazzling con- sequences. Nations such as Poland and Hun- gary especially welcomed de-Stalinization. In Hungary, a significant democratization movement blossomed. But it soon became apparent that

Khrushchev's new policies had a limit. When Hungary attempted to back away from the communist bloc and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, Soviet forces invaded the country and crushed the revolution in

November 1956. There were obviously lim- its to de-Stalinization efforts, but in general they did bring about a bit more autonomy in Eastern Europe and made international com- munism a less monolithic movement.

In China, Khrushchev's new policies did not go over well. Mao Zedong disagreed with de-Stalinization and peaceful co-exis- tence with the West. He viewed these efforts as a sell-out and argued that the Soviet Union had abdicated its right to lead the worldwide communist movement. In 1960, the Soviets and Chinese, once allies, broke off relations. The resulting Sino-Soviet split led to several border clashes between the two nations and forced the Chinese to pursue their own for- eign policy objectives. They now directly competed with the Soviets, especially in the developing world. The Chinese thus broke the solidarity of communism and embarked on a concerted effort to become a predom- inant regional and international player. In 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb, which further destabilized the communist bloc. Ironically, perhaps, the Sino-Soviet Split would lead to vastly improved Sino- American relations by the 1970s.

Cuba and the 1962 Missile Crisis

Despite Khrushchev' s desire for peaceful coexistence, Cold War tensions flared dan- gerously in the late 1950s and early 1960s. First came the Soviets' 1958 ultimatum that the Western Allies vacate West Berlin. The West refused, and during 1958–1961 the fate of Berlin threatened to ignite a war between the superpowers. Only the Soviets' 1961 con- struction of the Berlin Wall put an end to the crisis. The 1959 Cuban Revolution, however, sparked the most dangerous confrontation of the entire Cold War. Fidel Castro, who seized control of Cuba in 1959, soon made it known that he had communist inclinations and would ally himself with the Soviet Union. The

Americans did all they could to destabilize and topple the Castro regime. In April 1961, the United States even sponsored a failed in- vasion of Cuba designed to oust Castro from power (the Bay of Pigs Invasion).

After that, the Soviets vowed to protect Cuba from U.S. intervention. Beginning in late summer 1962, the Soviets began secretly installing nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba. The John F. Kennedy administration, made aware of the situation through aerial recon- naissance, publicly confronted the Soviets and demanded that the missiles be removed. The Americans argued that the missiles posed a serious threat to their national se- curity and destabilized the world balance of

power. Kennedy forced a showdown with the Soviet Union by ordering a naval block- ade of Cuba while insisting that the missiles be withdrawn. During October 21–28, 1962, the United States and Soviet Union stood at the brink of nuclear annihilation, the closest they would ever come to a full-fledged war. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed will- ingness to compromise, but it was ultimately Khrushchev' s decision to remove the missiles that ended the crisis and averted nuclear war.

Long-term Consequences

The Cold War was perhaps unlike any other conflict in history. It touched the lives of people around the world in unprecedented



The SSBN *George Washington*, the first nuclear-powered submarine designed to launch Polaris ballistic missiles while submerged, on its launching at Groton, Connecticut, on June 9, 1959. The *George Washington* was built quickly by cutting an attack submarine in half and adding a missile compartment. (United States Naval Institute)

ways. And its reach went far beyond that of a traditional war or military conflict. The idea of national defense was transformed into national security, which meant that entire societies were kept perpetually mobilized. Because a full-blown war between East and West would have resulted in a global holocaust, the Cold War saw a series of proxy wars fought mainly in the developing world. The Vietnam War engulfed the United States in a "crusade" that brought with it great up- heaval at home and embarrassment abroad. The Soviets experienced their own version of Vietnam in Afghanistan during 1979–1989. Finally, the Cold War resulted in a super- power arms race, space race, and technology race. On one hand this revolutionized mod-

ern life; on the other hand it brought with it the constant threat of instantaneous annihila- tion and environmental degradation.

The National Security State and Perpetual Mobilization

The Cold War necessitated both perpetual military mobilization and ideological mo- tivation. Even in the democratic West, na- tional security became a far-ranging effort that greatly increased the power of the cen- tral government. In 1947, the U.S. Congress passed the National Security Act (NSA). Among other things, the NSA created the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC). The CIA was a powerful, centralized intelligence operation designed to oversee all aspects of espionage and coun- terespionage. The NSC worked directly with the president—often in secret—to assess for- eign military threats and formulate national security strategies. The NSC and CIA, es- pecially, marked a distinct departure in U.S. government operations. Policymaking be- came more secretive, more centralized, and more inaccessible to the average citizen. The government began spending hundreds

of millions of dollars a year on long-term spy operations, something quite unthinkable prior to the Cold War. Over the course of the Cold War, the CIA engaged in activities that sometimes undermined the United States' democratic ideals. CIA operations in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973) ousted popularly elected governments thought to be communistic in nature. During 1984–1986, the CIA's illegal involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair tarnished the Ronald Reagan administration.

The Soviet bloc engaged in its own subver- sive activities. The Soviet Union's powerful KGB not only conducted espionage against the West, but was involved in inspiring revo- lutions in Asia and Africa and supporting na- tional liberation movements, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. During the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB was also involved in activities at home, clamping down on dissi- dents who criticized the Soviet system. The same pattern emerged in Eastern Europe. In the late 1940s, for example, communist of- ficials in East Germany set up the Ministry for State Security ("Stasi"). It became infa- mous for its repression and involvement in both internal and external covert activities.

In September 1950, the West was con- vinced that the Korean War was the be- ginning of the communist bloc's plan to systematically attack democratic capitalism. As a response, President Harry S. Truman approved the recommendations of a top-se- cret NSC memorandum known as NSC-68. The NSC recommended a massive rearma- ment program that would keep the United States partially—and permanently—mobi- lized. Between 1950 and 1953, the U.S. de- fense budget quadrupled from $13.5 billion to $52 billion. From that point on, defense budgets remained at levels inconceivable prior to the Cold War. Several million Amer- icans worked in defense industries begin- ning in the 1950s. The aerospace industry,

which exploded during the Cold War, turned Southern California into a major industrial defense region. By the late 1950s, a new de- fense economy, sometimes called the mil- itary-industrial complex, was transforming the country. Americans began leaving the older industrial areas of the Midwest and Northeast to seek employment in defense and hi-tech industries located in the South and Southwest. This demographic realign- ment shifted political and economic power to these regions. Cities in the North ex- perienced population and tax losses that plunged them into a long and steep economic recession.

In the East, the Soviets embarked on a major military expansion of their own, spend- ing billions on developing more powerful nu- clear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to carry them. Briefly, be- ginning in 1959, Khrushchev de-emphasized heavy industrial and defense-related produc- tion through his Seven Year Plan. His goal was to increase agricultural and consumer goods production. However, after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the plan was aban- doned and much emphasis was again placed on defense output. Doing so created periodic food and basic consumer goods shortages throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, dissatisfaction with the Soviet system grew, which in turn weakened the power and pres- tige of the Communist Party. In China, Mao Zedong implemented the 1958 Great Leap Forward campaign to increase iron and steel output and promote heavy industry. This was to serve as a counterbalance to Soviet power and increase self-sufficiency. Mao's campaign increased Chinese output but also permitted much waste and increased bureau- cratization and corruption to

take place. In 1978 China launched another initiative to modernize its industries, to include defense. These periodic programs contributed to China's economic growth but, as in the United

States, also carried with them demographic and political dislocations.

Proxy Wars

Proxy wars were fought throughout the de- veloping world as a way for the superpowers to retain—or expand—their control in a given region. During 1961–1973, the United States gradually escalated its involvement in the Vietnam War. During 1961–1963, the num- ber of U.S. military personnel in South Viet- nam increased from roughly 1,200 to 16,000. President Lyndon B. Johnson engaged in a steady escalation of the conflict there so that by 1968 550,000 U.S. troops were fighting the Vietnam War. The war had stunning ef- fects on the United States. It demoralized and discredited the U.S. armed forces, especially the army, derailed social welfare programs, brought about inflation and economic stag- nation, ended Johnson' s political career, and helped the Republican Party's ascendancy. It also deeply polarized the American home front, which became home to sometimes violent confrontations between antiwar protest- ers and the government. Worse still, millions of Vietnamese were killed, Vietnam suf- fered severe environmental damage, and the United States lost 58,220 soldiers before the U.S. withdrawal in 1973.

In other parts of the world, but most notably in Africa, post–World War II decolonization movements witnessed both the Americans and Soviets competing for influence. This superpower rivalry either precipitated regional or civil wars or greatly prolonged con- flicts already in progress. Such was the case in Congo (Zaire), Nigeria, Angola, Mozam- bique, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, among other African states. Untold millions died in these wars through government-sponsored genocide, forced relocations, and starvation, not to mention armed conflict itself.

During 1979–1989, the Soviet Union en- gaged in a war in Afghanistan not unlike the

U.S. war in Vietnam. For 10 years the Sovi- ets fought to maintain control of the unstable nation, intervening in what began as a civil war in the fall of 1979. By 1980, 50,000 So- viet troops were engaged in guerrilla-style warfare against a determined enemy. Oppos- ing the Soviets were the mujahideen, aided indirectly by the United States and other Western nations. By 1988, when the Soviets were forced to admit defeat, 115,000 Rus- sian troops were stationed in Afghanistan. The war was a disaster for the Soviet Union. It ended détente and led to a reinvigorated Cold War with the United States. The war tarnished the reputation of the Red Army, badly weakened the Soviet system, and practically bankrupted the Kremlin. Russian casualties reached 50,000. Afghanistan suf- fered greatly, too. The nation's infrastructure was ruined, five million Afghanis became refugees, and perhaps one million civilians were killed. This conflict had a direct impact on the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991.

The Space and Technology Race

The nuclear arms race that began in earnest immediately after W orld W ar II spawned a concurrent space and technology race be- tween East and West. The nuclear arms competition soon included Britain, France, and China; between 1953 and 1964 all three became nuclear powers. By the late 1970s, India, Pakistan, and Israel had also joined the nuclear club. In November 1957, the So- viet Union surprised the world and shocked many Americans when it launched *Sput- nik 1*, the first manmade orbiting satellite. *Sputnik 2* was launched shortly after. The *Sputnik* launches not only set off the space race but also demonstrated Soviet rocket technology, which was adapted to ICBMs. ICBMs quickened the pace of the nuclear

arms race and drastically altered nuclear strategy. Not to be outdone, in 1958 the U.S. Congress created the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (NASA). The United States launched its first rocket-propelled satellite in January 1958. In the coming years, the superpowers competed to achieve superiority in space. The Sovi- ets claimed the first manned space flight in April 1961. The United States sent its first man into space via NASA ' s Mercury Pro- gram in May 1961. Mercury was followed

by the Gemini Program and, finally, the Apollo Program that put the first man on the moon on July 20, 1969.

The space race bred the technology race between East and West that produced ev- erything from computers to microcircuitry to global positioning satellites (GPS). Space technology was applied to advanced weap- ons systems that produced breakthroughs such as the cruise missile and smart bombs, first used in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It is not possible to list even a fraction of the ad- vances made during the space and technol- ogy races that began during the Cold War. This competition revolutionized human ex- istence in the span of less than 25 years. Com- munications, transportation, health care, and education all were radically transformed by the technologies first used in military and space applications. And as technologies progressed —particularly in the computer field—the rate of change picked up even greater speed beginning in the mid-1980s. Indeed, the lifestyle you lead today and the technologies you use day-in and day-out would have seemed like science fiction when your parents were your age just a few de- cades ago. Never in human history has tech- nology so rapidly changed and transformed everyday life in so short a span of time.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

A

Acheson, Dean Gooderham (1893–1971)

Dean Acheson was the chief architect of U.S. foreign policy in the formative years of the Cold War. Born on April 11, 1893, in Middletown, Connecticut, to British parents, Acheson attended the prestigious Groton School and graduated from Yale University in 1915. He earned a degree from Harvard Law School in 1918 and went on to serve as private secretary to Supreme Court Jus- tice Louis Brandeis from 1919 to 1921. After his Supreme Court stint, Acheson joined a Washington, D.C., law firm. He entered pub- lic life in

1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt named him undersecretary of the treasury. Acheson resigned soon thereaf- ter, however, over a disagreement concern- ing gold and currency policies. In 1940 he authored a key legal opinion that led to the Lend-Lease program. He became assistant secretary of state in 1941 and then undersec- retary of state in 1945.

The possessor of a brilliant legal mind, a regal bearing, and a biting wit, Acheson ini- tially favored a policy of postwar coopera- tion with the Soviet Union. But he quickly reversed his view and, along with George F. Kennan, became one of the chief propo- nents of the Cold War containment policy. Though Kennan believed that the contest with the Soviet Union was primarily po- litical in nature, Acheson stressed the mil- itary dimension. Sobered by the failure of democratic nations to halt the Axis pow- ers in the 1930s, Acheson advocated a pol- icy of developing military strength before

negotiating with the Soviet Union. After the USSR detonated its first atomic bomb in September 1949, Acheson played a leading role in persuading President Harry S. Tru- man to move ahead with the development of the hydrogen bomb.

Acheson also played a critical role in implementing major Cold W ar initiatives in Europe. When the British informed the United States in early 1947 that they no lon- ger possessed the financial means to sup- port Greece and Turkey, Acheson pushed the Truman administration to take quick ac- tion, warning that if the United States did not supplant British power in the eastern Medi- terranean, the result would likely be Soviet control of the region. Truman subsequently announced his Greco-Turkish aid package and enunciated the Truman Doctrine to aug- ment the containment policy. Acheson ag- gressively promoted the 1947 Marshall Plan to aid West European recovery efforts and to resist pressures that might lead to com- munist regimes there. Despite his role in creating the United Nations (UN), Acheson did not believe that it could prevent Soviet aggression or the spread of militant com- munism. Instead, he trusted military power and saw the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation (NATO) as the best means of defend- ing the West from the Soviets. NATO had the added benefits of strengthening U.S. ties with Europe, quelling internal unrest, and binding W est Germany to the alliance.

When Acheson was sworn in as secre- tary of state on January 21, 1949, he was already recognized as the key architect of postwar foreign policy. Truman, a great

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admirer of Acheson, gave him wide lati- tude in foreign policy matters. During his tenure in office, Acheson pushed through the implementation of NSC-68 and won Senate approval for continued stationing of American troops in Europe and for ex- tensive military aid to the NATO allies. He failed, however, to secure European ap- proval for German rearmament, stymied by French opposition.

Acheson's tendency to view international affairs largely from a European perspec- tive hampered his efforts to deal with ris- ing nationalism in the developing world. His attachment to a world united by impe- rial prosperity and order created unnecessary problems for the Western Allies as well as for emerging nations. Asia, possessing no significant industrial base outside of Japan, ranked low among Acheson's priorities. He based American policy on the tenuous—and as it turned out faulty—premise that com- munist China was the puppet of the Soviet Union. He sided with the French regarding Indochina, advising Truman to make what proved to be a fateful commitment of Amer- ican assistance to anti–Viet Minh forces in 1950. Acheson all but ignored Africa and Latin America, mainly because neither re- gion was as yet on the front lines of the Cold War. Like those who preceded him, Acheson viewed Britain as an indispensable Ameri- can ally and partner.

A primary target of Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist witch hunt, Acheson was lambasted for being friendly with alleged spy Alger Hiss, "los- ing" China to communism, and being unable to end the Korean War, which Acheson's en- emies wrongly believed he provoked by pub- licly excluding it from America's "defense perimeter" in a January 1950 speech.

Ache- son also provided fodder for other Repub- licans, namely Richard M. Nixon, who in

1952 derided Democratic presidential nom- inee Adlai Stevenson for having graduated from "Dean Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment."

Acheson retired from public life in 1953 but was not disengaged from public pol- icy. He soon became the main Democratic critic of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's foreign policy. Acheson regarded NSC-68, which advocated the strengthening of con- ventional military forces to provide options other than nuclear war, as the foreign policy bible for the Cold War era. When the Eisen- hower administration committed itself to a policy of massive retaliation that empha- sized nuclear responses over conventional responses to crises, the former secretary of state reacted with utter disbelief to what he termed "defense on the cheap."

In the 1960s, Acheson returned to pub- lic life as the head of NATO task forces, special envoy, diplomatic trouble-shooter, and foreign policy advisor for Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Acheson was noted for his hawkish advice to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Cri- sis of 1962. Acheson died of a heart at- tack on October 12, 1971, in Sandy Spring, Maryland.

Caryn E. Neumann

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Afghanistan War (1979–1989)

The Soviet–Afghan War represented the culmination of events dating to April 1978, when Afghan communists, supported by left- wing army leaders, overthrew the unpopular, authoritarian government of Mohammad Daoud and proclaimed the People's Dem- ocratic Republic of Afghanistan. Although the extent of Soviet involvement in the coup remains unclear, Moscow certainly wel- comed it and quickly established close re- lations with the new regime headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was committed to bringing socialism to Afghanistan.

With the ambitious, extremely militant foreign minister Hafizullah Amin as its driv- ing force, the Taraki regime quickly alien- ated much of Afghanistan's population by conducting a terror campaign against its op- ponents and introducing a series of social and economic reforms at odds with the re- ligious and cultural norms of the country's highly conservative, Muslim, tribal society. Afghanistan's Muslim leaders soon declared a jihad against "godless communism," and by August 1978 the Taraki regime faced an open revolt, a situation made especially dan- gerous by the defection of a portion of the army to the rebel cause.

As Afghanistan descended into civil war, Moscow grew increasingly concerned. Committed to preventing the overthrow of a friendly, neighboring communist gov- ernment and fearful of the effects that a potential Islamic fundamentalist regime might have on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, specifically those in the republics bordering Afghanistan, the Soviets moved toward military interven- tion. During the last months of 1979, the Leonid Brezhnev government dispatched approximately 4,500 combat advisors to assist the Afghan communist regime while

simultaneously allowing Soviet aircraft to conduct bombing raids against rebel po- sitions. Although Soviet Deputy Defense Minster Ivan G. Pavlovskii, who had played an important role in the 1968 Soviet inva- sion of Czechoslovakia, counseled against full-scale intervention in Afghanistan, his superior, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, convinced Brezhnev to undertake an inva- sion, arguing that only such action could preserve the Afghan

communist regime. He also promised that the Soviet presence there would be short.

Brezhnev ultimately decided in favor of war, the pivotal factor arguably being the September 1979 seizure of power by Hafi- zullah Amin, who had ordered Taraki ar- rested and murdered. Apparently shocked by Amin's act of supreme betrayal and inclined to believe that only a massive intervention could save the situation, Brezhnev gave ap- proval for the invasion. Beginning in late November 1979 and continuing during the first weeks of December, the Soviet military concentrated the Fortieth Army, composed primarily of Central Asian troops, along the Afghan border. On December 24, Soviet forces crossed the frontier, while Moscow claimed that the Afghan government had requested help against an unnamed outside threat.

Relying on mechanized tactics and close air support, Soviet units quickly seized the Afghan capital of Kabul. In the process, a special assault force stormed the presiden- tial palace and killed Amin, replacing him with the more moderate Barak Kemal, who attempted, unsuccessfully, to win popular support by portraying himself as a devoted Muslim and Afghan nationalist. Soviet forces, numbering at least 50,000 men by the end of January 1980, went on to occupy the other major Afghan cities and secured major highways. In response, rebel mujahideen

Soviet soldiers and a BMD-1 airborne combat vehicle in Kabul, Afghanistan, in March 1986. (De- partment of Defense)

forces resorted to guerrilla warfare, their pri- mary goal being to avoid defeat in the hopes of outlasting Soviet intervention.

Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan had immediate and adverse international con- sequences, effectively wrecking détente, already in dire straits by December 1979 thanks to recent increases in missile deploy- ments in Europe. Having devoted much ef- fort to improving relations with Moscow, U.S. president Jimmy Carter believed that he had been betrayed. He reacted swiftly and strongly to the Afghan invasion.

On December 28, 1979, Carter publicly denounced the Soviet action as a "blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior." Three days later, he accused Moscow of lying about its motives for inter- vening, and declared that the invasion had dramatically altered his view of the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals. On January 3, 1980, the president asked the U.S. Senate to

delay consideration of SALT II. Finally, on January 23, in his State of the Union Ad- dress, Carter warned that the Soviet action in Afghanistan posed a

potentially serious threat to world peace because control of Afghanistan would put Moscow in a posi- tion to dominate the strategic Persian Gulf and thus interdict at will the flow of Middle East oil.

The president followed these pronounce- ments by enunciating what soon became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any effort to dominate the Persian Gulf would be interpreted as an attack on Amer- ican interests that would be rebuffed by force if necessary. Carter also announced his intention to limit the sale of technol- ogy and agricultural products to the USSR, and imposed restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. In addition, he notified the International Olympic Com- mittee that in light of the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, neither he nor the American public would support sending a U.S. team to the 1980 Moscow Summer Games. The president called upon America' s allies to follow suit.

Carter also asked Congress to support in- creased defense spending and registration for the draft, pushed for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that could intervene in the Persian Gulf or other areas threatened by Soviet expansionism, offered increased mili- tary aid to Pakistan, moved to enhance ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), approved covert CIA assistance to the muja- hideen, and signed a presidential directive on July 25, 1980, providing for increased target- ing of Soviet nuclear forces.

Carter' s sharp response was undercut to a certain extent by several developments. First, key U.S. allies rejected both economic sanctions and an Olympic boycott. Second, Argentina and several other states actually in- creased their grain sales to Moscow. Third, a somewhat jaded American public tended to doubt the president' s assertions about Soviet motives and believed that he had needlessly reenergized the Cold War.

Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the November 1980 presidential election, took an even harder stand against the Sovi- ets. Describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" that had used détente for its own nefarious purposes, the Reagan adminis- tration poured vast sums of money into a massive military buildup that even saw the president push the development of

the Stra- tegic Defense Initiative (SDI) (labeled "Star Wars" by its critics, this was a missile de- fense system dependent on satellites to de- stroy enemy missiles with lasers or particle beams before armed warheads separated and headed for their targets). The Soviet re- sponse was to build additional missiles and warheads.

Meanwhile, confronted with guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, the USSR remained committed to waging a limited war and found itself drawn, inexorably, into an ever-deeper bloody quagmire against a determined op- ponent whose confidence and morale grew with each passing month. To make mat- ters worse for Moscow, domestic criticism of the war by prominent dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov appeared early on, while foreign assistance in the form of food, trans- port vehicles, and weaponry (especially the Stinger antiaircraft missile launchers) from the United States began reaching the muja- hideen as the fighting dragged on.

Neither the commitment of more troops, nor the use of chemical weapons, nor the replacement of the unpopular Kemal could bring Moscow any closer to victory. Ac- cordingly, by 1986 the Soviet leadership, now headed by the reformist General Sec- retary Mikhail Gorbachev, began contem- plating ways of extricating itself from what many observers characterized as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam."

In April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a United Nations mediation proposal providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops over a 10- month period. One month later the departure of Soviet military forces, which had grown to an estimated 115,000 troops, commenced—a process that was finally completed in Febru- ary 1989.

Although the Soviets left Afghanistan with a procommunist regime, a team of mil- itary advisors, and substantial quantities of equipment, the nine years' war had exacted a high toll, costing the Soviets an estimated 50,000 casualties. It seriously damaged the Red Army's military reputation, further un- dermining the legitimacy of the Soviet sys- tem, and nearly bankrupted the Kremlin. For the Afghans, the war proved equally costly. An estimated one million civilians were

dead, and another five million were refugees. Much of the country was devastated.

Bruce J. DeHart

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Africa

The Cold War in Africa commenced with the end of the colonial era, continued through Africa's independence movements, and fi- nally ended in the postcolonial period. The Soviet Union linked African national libera- tion movements to its own Marxist-Leninist ideology in order to gain a foothold in the continent. The United States, on the other hand, responded fitfully and belatedly to Af- rican decolonization.

Individual African states—and regions— were an important component in the geopo- litical chess match between the United States and the USSR, but not until later in the Cold War. From the late 1950s to the late 1970s, the United States purposely played a second- ary role to that of the Europeans in Africa. During President Dwight D. Eisenhower's second term (1957–1961), the U.S. National Security Council proposed a "division of labor" for the developing world: the Euro- peans would be responsible for Africa, while

the United States would play the dominant role in Latin America. The White House, in particular, expected France to police fran- cophone Africa, and Great Britain to take the lead in southern Africa. Nonetheless, the Eisenhower administration created the Bureau of African Affairs within the U.S. Department of State. In 1957, Senator John F. Kennedy presciently warned of growing communist influence in Africa. As the Cold War advanced, African countries became la- beled as either pro-Soviet or pro-American. A shorthand for this dichotomy was mem- bership in either the relatively radical Casablanca Group, led by Ghana's president Kwame Nkrumah, or membership in the more pro-West Monrovia Group.

From 1981 to 1988, U.S. military aid to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to about $1 bil- lion. During the latter days of the Cold War, American aid became indistinguishable from U.S. geopolitical aims. Pro-Western governments such as the one in Senegal under President Abdou Diouf received aid, for in- stance, while Marxist governments such as President Didier Ratsiraka's of Madagascar did not. The United States routinely tied its aid to African nations to their geopolitical importance.

Generally speaking, America's Cold War geopolitical interests in sub-Saharan Africa were narrow in scope, but where the com- mitment existed it ran deep and often mani- fested itself in covert activity. Three regions deserve special mention: the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia), where an intense superpower rivalry played out; Zaire (Dem- ocratic Republic of the Congo), one of the earliest battlegrounds of Cold War rivalry; and southern Africa, where the superpowers fought a proxy war in Angola and where they were directly or indirectly involved in an in- tricately latticed struggle for independence


AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1951 – 1968
ATLANTIC OCEAN
SPANISH MOROCCO 1956
Algiers
Tunis
Rabat
TUNISIA 1956
Mediterranean Sea
MOROCCO 1956
Tripoli
Benghazi
Cairo
ALGERIA 1962
SPANISH SAHARA
LIBYA 1951
EGYPT U.A.R.
Red Sea
MAURITANIA 1960
Nouakchott
MALI 1960
NIGER 1960
CHAD 1960
Khartoum
ERITREA 1962
Dakar
SENEGAL 1960
GAMBIA 1965
Niamey
Banjul
Bamako
DAHOMEY 1960
SUDAN 1956
DJIBOUTI
GUINEA-BISSAU
GUINEA 1958
Ouagadougou
Fort Lamy
VOLTA 1960
Addis Ababa
Conakry
IVORY COAST 1960
GHANA 1957
Porto-Novo
NIGERIA 1960
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 1960
Freetown
Monrovia
Lomé
ETHIOPIA
SIERRA LEONE 1961
Abidjan
Accra
Logos
CAMEROON 1960
TOGO 1960
SOMALIA 1960
LIBERIA
Bangui
UGANDA 1962
KENYA 1963
Yaoundé
Mogadishu
SPANISH GUINEA 1968
CONGO REPUBLIC 1960
Kampala
Libreville
RWANDA 1962
Kigali
Nairobi
GABON 1960
CONGO 1960
Bujumbura
TANGANKA 1961
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
BURUNDI 1962
Dar es Salaam
Luanda
TANZANIA 1964
MALAWI 1964
Comoros
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA 1964
Lilongwe
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Lusaka
Harare
MOZAMBIQUE 1975
Mozambique Channel
Tananarive
RHODESIA 1965
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
BOTSWANA 1966
MADAGASCAR 1960
Gaborone
Pretoria
Mbabane
Maseru
SWAZILAND 1968
SOUTH AFRICA
LESOTHO 1966
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French
Italian
Portuguese
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and freedom in Mozambique, Namibia, Rho- desia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa.

The Horn of Africa is composed of Ethi- opia, Somalia, and Djibouti. Because it ad- joins the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, flanks the oil-rich states of Arabia, controls the Bab el Mandeb Straits (an important choke point for oil), and overlooks the pas- sages where the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean converge, it was a very important piece in the Cold War geopoliti- cal chess game. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Horn was intense, and their policies were analogous, if obviously in direct competi- tion. American policy there was grounded on four principles: the economic security of the West (i.e., oil), stability and security in the Middle East and in the Horn, the ability

to block Soviet attempts to choke Western oil lanes, and keeping the Red Sea and the In- dian Ocean open for Israeli and Israel-bound shipping. The Soviet strategy in the Horn was predicated upon strategic deterrence, naval presence, sea denial or sea control, and projection of power. The geopolitical competition between the United States and the USSR revolved around the Ethiopian– Somalian conflict.

America's foothold in the Horn was Ethiopia, where it had maintained a pres- ence since 1953. The Soviet Union initially had a strong presence in Somalia. Between 1953 and 1974, when Ethiopian ruler Haile Selassie was overthrown, the United States supplied more than $200 million in military aid to Ethiopia, which in 1970 comprised al- most half of all aid to sub-Saharan Africa.

African heads of state attend a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), November 9, 1966, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. OAU was created in May 1963 and is based in Addis Ababa. (AFP/ Getty Images)

In 1953, an American military base opened at Kagnew Station in Asmara, Ethiopia, for, among other purposes, tracking space satel- lites and relaying military communications. More than 3,200 U.S. military personnel were stationed there. The United States also supported counter-insurgency teams fight- ing the Eritrean Liberation Movement. American support of Ethiopia was largely a response to the regional machinations of the Soviet Union. General Barre, the head of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of So- malia (an overtly socialist organization), had by 1977 received more than $250 million in military aid from the Soviets. The Soviet Union also helped construct port facilities at Berbera, overlooking the Red Sea, as well as communication facilities. This base was strategically situated almost directly oppo- site the Soviet naval facilities in South Ye- men's port of Aden.

The strategic equation in the Horn took a strange twist beginning in the mid-1970s. With the weakening and then the collapse of Selassie's regime in Ethiopia, the United States was forced to abandon its base in As- mara and

move its base of operations to the island of Diego Garcia (1,500 miles off the African coast in the Indian Ocean). Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the Derg military junta, ruled Ethiopia under a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship from 1974 until 1991. This provided a window of op- portunity that the Soviets could not resist, but they had to be careful not to alienate their Somali allies.

The Soviets responded to the new Ethi- opian government's request for assistance (which the United States was no longer willing to provide) just as the Eritreans and Somalis were enjoying more success in Ethiopia. In September 1977, the Soviet Union began the delivery of approximately $385 million in arms, including 48 MiG

jet fighters, 200 T-54 and T-55 tanks, and SAM-3 and SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles. The Soviet Union had gambled that its new relationship with Ethiopia would not affect its relationship with Somalia, a bet that it lost. The Soviet Union was expelled from Somalia in 1977. It also failed to achieve its aims in Ethiopia, for after seven years of civil war the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) from far southern Ethiopia entered Addis Ababa in May 1991, over- throwing the Marxist regime. Meanwhile, the United States had become the major pa- tron of Somalia, supported Barre throughout the 1980s, and inherited the strategic base in Berbera once held by the Soviets.

During the 1960s, Washington ordered a series of covert actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, Zaire). The DRC was a flashpoint in the Cold War al- most from its inception. Three central events in its history punctuate the role it played in the U.S.–USSR geopolitical competition in sub-Saharan Africa: the defeat of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the rise of Mobutu Sese Seko, the first secessionist cri- sis in Katanga (renamed Shaba in 1971) in 1960, and the second secessionist crisis in Shaba in 1978.

The first and most significant result of such actions was the assassination of Lu- mumba and the subsequent rise of the pro- Western Mobutu. Mobutu, who ran what became commonly known as a kleptocracy, received approximately $1.5 billion in eco- nomic and military aid over the course of nearly 25 years. The United States consid- ered Mobutu a vital cog in its

global anti- communist network, as well as a supplier of important strategic minerals (cobalt, copper, diamonds, gold, cadmium, and uranium).

In June 1960, the Belgian Congo gained independence and was renamed the Republic of Congo, with Joseph Kasavubu as its first

president and Lumumba as its first prime minister. Lumumba, a leftist, almost im- mediately faced a secessionist crisis in the mineral-rich Katanga province. At the re- quest of the Congolese government, United Nations (UN) troops were sent in to restore order. The United States opposed Lumum- ba's nationalist and nonaligned policies and his implicit support of the Soviet Union. In September 1960 President Kasavubu, along with the army, dismissed Lumumba and in January 1961 delivered him to the secession- ists in Katanga province, who executed him.

From 1961 until 1964 (when Belgian para- troopers finally restored order), there was fighting between rival secessionist groups. A merican-educated Moise T shombe then emerged as the leader of the Katanga se- cessionists. After a short period of exile, Tshombe was named the premier of the Government of Reconciliation by Kasavubu in 1964. Two years later Tshombe was dis- missed and accused of treason and again went into exile. He was kidnapped and im- prisoned in Algeria, where he died in prison in 1969. President Kasavubu was ousted in a second Mobutu-led coup in November 1965. By 1967, the pro-Lumumbist elements had been effectively defeated. Zaire then became a staging area for neighboring Cold War struggles.

Mobutu's involvement in neighboring Angola's civil war resulted in the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) invasion of Zaire's Shaba region in March 1977, known as the Shaba I Crisis. Included in the invading force was a small remnant of the Katangan rebels. The FLNC quickly captured several towns and gained control of the railroad to about 19 miles (30 km) from the copper mining town of Kolwezi. The dis- sidents aimed to

take over the entire country and depose Mobutu. Their advance and the threat to Kolwezi forced Mobutu to appeal

for international assistance. Thus, Belgium, France, and the United States responded to Mobutu's request by immediately airlifting military supplies to Zaire. Other African states, namely Egypt and Morocco, also sup- ported Zaire during the crisis. By the end of May, the joint force had regained control of Shaba. The FLNC then withdrew to Angola and Zambia.

Government reprisals after Shaba I drove 50,000–70,000 refugees into Angola. Also, Zaire's continued support for Angolan dissi- dent groups ensured continued Angolan gov- ernment support for the FLNC. The Shaba II Crisis was triggered in May 1978 when the FLNC launched its second invasion of Zaire in a little over a year. During early May 1978, 10 FLNC battalions entered Shaba through northern Zambia, a sparsely populated area inhabited by the same ethnic groups (Lunda and Ndembu) that made up the FLNC. A small group went toward Mutshatsha, about 60 miles west of Kolwezi, to block the path of Zairian reinforcements that threatened to move into the area. During the night of May 11–12, 1978, the remainder of the force moved to Kolwezi, where it joined with the rebels who had earlier infiltrated the town. The town of Kolwezi was lightly defended, and the rebels quickly gained a foothold in the mineral-rich Shaba (formerly Katanga) province, thereby controlling about 75 per- cent of the country's export earnings. The French and Belgian governments requested U.S. help in putting down the rebellion.

The administration of President Jimmy Carter viewed Shaba II as an instance of So- viet expansionism. Subsequently, U.S. planes transported roughly 2,500 French and Belgian troops and supporting equipment to the region. The American commitment to Mobutu and Zaire was consistent with its long- standing support of Mobutu and with the U.S. concern over Soviet/Cuban influence in neighboring

Angola. President Carter, in fact, rebuked Cuban leader Fidel Castro for supporting the FLNC attack launched from Angolan terri- tory. Carter's national security advisor, Zbig- niew Brzezinski, claimed that the invasion was launched with Moscow' s blessing. The Carter administration believed

that it had to respond to aggressive Soviet/Cuban penetra- tion of Africa (15,000 Cuban troops and So- viet advisors were already in Ethiopia). By the end of May 1978, the second Shaba invasion was all but over. Belgian forces began to with- draw, leaving a battalion in Kamina, and the French Foreign Legion departed.

Southern Africa was the third African hot spot during the Cold War. The epicen- ter of American–Soviet conflict was Angola, but Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa also featured prominently in the latter years of the Cold War. Each of these countries, with the notable exception of South Africa, was seen as aligned with the Soviet Union. Namibia, under tight South African control, was linked to the Angolan civil war. Mozambique, which gained independence on June 25, 1974, was a self-designated Marxist-Leninist regime led by Samora Ma- chel, chairman of the Frente Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) and president of the People' s Republic of Mozambique, and joined the Soviet-led Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. In turn, Frelimo, with the backing of the Soviet Union and other com- munist states, supported Robert Mugabe' s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe Afri- can National Liberation Army (ZANLA), in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe national libera- tion struggle against the settler regime of Ian Smith, leader of the Rhodesian Front (RF).

The RF had declared Rhodesia's inde- pendence from Great Britain in 1965, trig- gering a 15-year-long civil war. A second insurgency group in Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe,

led by Joshua Nkoma's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) along with its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolution- ary Army (ZIPRA), was supported by the Soviet-aligned Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In an impor- tant subplot during the era, the United States was almost completely dependent on south- ern Africa for its uranium supply and was willing to go to great lengths to secure the critical fuel for its nuclear arsenal.

In March 1975, a civil war broke out in Angola. The United States initially sup- ported the National Front for the Libera- tion of Angola (FNLA) as a

counter to the Marxist MPLA. After the FNLA fell apart, America switched its support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The United States refused to sup- port the de jure MPLA government, and what followed was a quarter century of civil war. The Soviets and Cubans intervened in Angola in support of the Marxist MPLA re- gime, which subsequently developed close military ties with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO, Namibia) and the socialist regime in Mozambique as well as with Zambia and the African Na- tional Congress in South Africa. American involvement in Angola was seriously inhib- ited by the U.S. Congress's Clark Amend- ment of 1975, which banned military aid to any Angolan party. For a decade, direct U.S. involvement in southern Africa was mini- mal. The election of President Ronald Rea- gan, however, changed that.

In July 1985, Congress repealed the Clark Amendment. Thus, the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, became a primary recipi- ent of U.S. paramilitary aid under the Rea- gan Doctrine, which argued that the USSR should not only be contained but that its in- fluence and gains abroad (such as in Angola) should be rolled back. Zaire was a major

conduit (along with South Africa) for U.S. covert assistance. At the peak of America's clandestine operations, Reagan labeled Sav- imbi a "combatant for liberty."

In 1981, under the stewardship of Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for Af- rican affairs, the United States announced a policy of constructive engagement for south- ern Africa. This was the endgame for U.S.– Soviet competition in the region. Crocker linked the independence of Namibia (from South Africa) to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This entailed a quasi- alliance with South Africa's apartheid gov- ernment but not support for the regime in Pretoria per se. To some, this disinterred what was called the Tar Baby Option, Presi- dent Richard Nixon's secret policy of rap- prochement with Smith's white minority regime in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe embodied in Option Two of the National Security Study Memorandum 39, a

review of U.S. African policy ordered by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The United States became one of three UN members (along with Portu- gal and South Africa) that allowed trade with Rhodesia from 1971 to 1977 under the Byrd Amendment, which circumvented UN sanc- tions against Rhodesia by permitting impor- tation of Rhodesian chrome.

Nevertheless, following eight long years of negotiations, constructive engagement led to the 1998 New York Accords and the sub- sequent exit from Angola of Cuban and South African forces aligned, respectively, with the MPLA and UNITA. The Cold War in south- ern Africa was over.

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Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism rose as a response to Eu- ropean imperialism after W orld W ar II and stressed unity of purpose among the Arab countries of the Middle East. Though re- spectful of Islam, Arab nationalist move- ments were mainly secular in tone and drew heavily on socialist economic principles and anti-imperialist rhetoric. While the socialist, anti-Western character of Arab nationalism attracted Soviet political and military sup- port and increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, Arab leaders avoided domina- tion by the Soviet Union and found common cause with the nonaligned nations of the

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third world. Political and military opposition to the State of Israel served as a focal point of Arab nationalist movements, although re- peated Arab military defeats contributed to the decline of such movements.

Arab nationalism has its roots in the late 19th century, when European ideas of nation- alism affected the Ottoman Empire. After World War I, as the British and French ac- quired mandate authority over various Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalist sentiment was divided be- tween unifying notions of Pan-Arabism and individual independence movements. Such thinking contributed to the formation of the Arab League on the one hand and the growth of numerous regional nationalist groups such as the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Étoile Nord-Africaine in Al- geria on the other. These and similar groups combined nationalism with strong Islamic identity in their drive for independence from Britain and France.

In the years following World War II, most Arab states gained their independence, yet were ruled by governments sympathetic to the interests of the European powers. Politi- cal crises in the late 1940s and 1950s, includ- ing the Arab defeat in the first war with Israel (1948), resulted in the overthrow of many of these governments and the establishment of new regimes willing to challenge the West, particularly in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. These nations lay at the heart of the Arab national- ist movement during the Cold War. Ongoing conflict with Israel would play a major role in the growth of Arab unity. The common Israeli enemy provided the Arab states with a greater cause that overshadowed their in- dividual differences.

Opposition to Israel and support for Pal- estinian refugees also served to link the re- sources of the newly wealthy oil states of the Persian Gulf to the larger Arab cause.

Finally, the conflict with Israel, combined with the importance of petroleum resources, made the Middle East a region of great stra- tegic interest to the United States and the So- viet Union, and the two superpowers would have a substantial effect on the development and destiny of Arab nationalism.

Arab nationalism during the period of the Cold War stressed Arab unity, but not neces- sarily in the form of a single Arab state; dif- ferent states could act in concert to achieve goals that would benefit the entire Arab world. In addition, Arab nationalist move- ments fit into a broader picture of postco- lonial political ideologies popular in the developing world. Such ideologies stressed national or cultural identity, along with Marx- ist or socialist ideas, as a counter to Western influence. Promoted by the Soviets, social- ism served as a reaction among develop- ing nations to their former experiences with European imperialism.

The two most important Arab national- ist movements that took root were Baathism and Nasserism. The Baath (or Resurrec- tion) Party became prominent in Syria after World War II. One of its founders, Michel 'Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, conceived of a single Arab nation embracing all the Arab states and recapturing the glory of the Ara- bian past. Though the movement was re- spectful of Islamic tenets, its rhetoric and agenda were largely secular and socialist. This socialism grew partly as a response to Western imperialism and partly as a result of increasing Soviet political and military support of Baathist Arab states. The Baath Party increased in influence in Syria and Iraq throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Syria, it came to dominate the country's turbulent politics by the early 1960s and continued to do so throughout the regime of Hafez al-Assad (1971–2001). In Iraq, the party rose to power in 1963 and remained the

predominant political force until the over- throw of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Nasserism reflected the agenda and the political prowess of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt' s leader during 1952–1970. Raised amid British domination in Egypt, Nasser combined his rejection of imperialist influ- ence with socialist principles and progressive Islam. Although he used religious rhetoric to appeal to the Egyptian people, his out- look, like that of the Baathists, was primarily secular. Nasser stressed modernization, state ownership of industry, and Egypt's role as the "natural" leader of the Arab world. His suspi- cion of the West, socialist economic prescrip- tions, and acceptance of Soviet military aid after 1955 drew him toward the Soviet sphere, but he avoided subservience to Moscow and supported the Non-Aligned Movement among developing nations. Nasser actively sought the leadership of a unified Arab world. The temporary union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic (1958–1961) illus- trated his nationalist vision and the overlap of Nasserist and Baathist ideologies.

Israel served as a focal point for Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism; he viewed the defeat of Israel (never achieved) as an ex- pression of Arab unity and a rejection of im- perialist interference in the Middle East. In addition, Egyptian leadership in the struggle

with Israel contributed to his stature in the Arab world as a whole. Nasser's position in Egypt and among Arab nations was further enhanced by the 1956 Suez Crisis. However, Egypt's attempted military intervention in Yemen (1962–1967) brought Nasser's vi- sion of Arab nationalism into conflict with the royalist, Islamic views of Saudi Arabia and demonstrated the limits of his influ- ence. Further, Egypt's disastrous defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel in June 1967 dealt a crippling blow to his power and pres- tige. Nasser's authority survived the 1967 War, and the overwhelming popular rejec- tion of his resignation testified to the scope of his popular appeal, but the 1967 defeat ul- timately signaled the end of the Nasserist vi- sion of Arab unity. From that point onward, Baathism remained as the strongest single force of Arab nationalism.

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B

Bay of Pigs (April 17, 1961)

In the spring of 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower approved a covert operation to send small groups of American-trained Cuban exiles to work in the Cuban under- ground as insurgents to overthrow Castro. President Eisenhower had soured on Cas- tro after the latter nationalized a number of Cuban companies and began leaning toward the Soviet orbit of influence. There were also rumors of Cuban involvement in attempts to invade Panama, Guatemala, and the Domin- ican Republic. In 1960, the United States turned down Castro's request for economic aid and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. After the American rejection, Castro met with Soviet foreign minister Anastas Mikoyan to secure a $100 million loan from the Soviet Union. U.S. policymakers thus decided that Castro was becoming too close to the Soviets and should be overthrown.

By the fall, the plan, called Operation Pluto, had evolved into a full-fledged inva- sion by exiled Cubans, and included U.S. air support. The rebels of Brigade 2506, as they were called, deployed to Guatemala to train for the operation, under the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with arms supplied by the U.S. government.

When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he could have called off the invasion but chose not to do so. Dur- ing the 1960 presidential campaign, Ken- nedy had criticized Eisenhower's handling of the

Cuban situation and so did not find it politically expedient to back down from the invasion. Kennedy was also anxious to prove

his hawkish stance toward the Soviets during a period of heightened Cold War tensions. But the new president was not well served by the CIA or its director, Allen W. Dulles, whom he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. The agency grossly underesti- mated the effectiveness of Castro's forces and overplayed the extent to which Cubans would rally behind the invasion force.

On April 17, 1961, an armed force of ap- proximately 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba, although the inva- sion had technically commenced two days earlier when American B-26 medium bomb- ers with Cuban markings bombed four Cuban airfields. The invasion began at 2:00 a.m. when a team of frogmen went ashore with orders to set up landing lights to guide the main landing force. Between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m., two battalions of exiles armed with American weapons came ashore at Playa Giron, while another battalion landed at Playa Largas. They hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to attack Havana. Cuban forces reacted quickly, and Castro ordered his air force to halt the invaders. Cuban aircraft promptly sank the invading force command- and-control ship and another supply vessel carrying an additional battalion. Two other ships loaded with supplies, weapons, and heavy equipment foundered just offshore. In the air, Cuban T-33 jets shot down 10 of the 12 slow-moving B-26 bombers that were supporting the invaders. President Kennedy, on the recommendation of Secre- tary of State Dean Rusk and other advisors,

decided against providing the faltering inva- sion with official U.S. air support.

Lacking supplies or effective air cover, the invaders were hammered by Cuban ar- tillery and tank fire. Within 72 hours, the invading force had been

pushed back to its landing area at Playa Giron, where the troops were soon surrounded by Castro's forces. A total of 114 exiles were killed, and the remainder of the invasion force either escaped into the countryside or was taken captive. In all, 1,189 captured exiles were tried in tele- vised trials and sentenced to prison.

Cuban exile leader José Miro Cardona, president of the U.S.-backed National Revo- lutionary Council, blamed the failure on the CIA and Kennedy's refusal to authorize air support for the invasion. In December 1962, Castro released 1,113 captured rebels in ex- change for $53 million in food and medicine raised by private donations in the United States.

The Bay of Pigs invasion provoked anti- American demonstrations throughout Latin America and Europe and further embit- tered U.S.–Cuban relations. The poorly planned and executed invasion greatly em- barrassed President Kennedy and subjected him to heavy criticism at home. More important, it led directly to increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the invasion, Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ex- changed messages regarding the events in Cuba. Khrushchev accused America of being complicit in the invasion and warned Kennedy that the Soviets would help de- fend Cuba if necessary. Kennedy replied with an equally strong warning against any Soviet involvement in Cuba. Although the crisis quickly passed, it set the stage for in- creased Soviet military aid to Cuba, which led ultimately to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

The failure of the invasion led to the res- ignation of Dulles and opened the way for closer scrutiny of U.S. intelligence gathering.

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Berlin Blockade and Airlift (1948–1949)

As part of the Potsdam Agreements, Ger- many and Berlin were divided into occupa- tion zones by the victorious World War II Allies (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain), reaffirming prin- ciples laid out earlier at the Yalta Conference. Although the provisions of the agreement al- located occupation sectors of Berlin to the other three Allies, no formal arrangements had been made for access to Berlin via the Soviet zone.

After the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West deteriorated steadily, as demonstrated by disputes in the United Nations, Winston Churchill's March 1946 "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech), U.S. empha- sis on Soviet containment, Soviet hostility toward the Marshall Plan, and a growing Western commitment to consolidating oc- cupation zones in western Germany to form

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a single, independent state. The Soviets, who had been invaded by Germany twice in the first half of the 20th century, were alarmed at the prospect of a reunited, independent Germany.

In late 1947, discussions on the fate of Germany broke down over Soviet charges that its former Allies were violating the Potsdam Agreements. After the decision of the Western powers to introduce a new cur- rency in their zones, on March 20, 1948, the Soviets withdrew from the Four-Power Allied Control Council, which controlled Berlin. Ten days later, guards on the east- ern German border began slowing the entry of Western troop trains bound for Berlin. On June 7, the Western powers announced

their intention to proceed with the creation of a West German state. On June 15, the So- viets declared the Autobahn entering Ber- lin from West Germany closed for repairs. Three days later all road traffic from the west was halted,

and on June 21 barge traf- fic was prohibited from entering the city. On June 24, the Soviets stopped all surface traffic between West Germany and Berlin, arguing that if Germany were to be parti- tioned, Berlin could no longer be the Ger- man capital.

From the start of the Cold War, West Ber- lin had been a Western outpost deep (110 miles) within the Soviet occupation zone, a hotbed of intelligence operations by both sides, and the best available escape route

Berliners watch a U.S. Douglas C-54 transport land at Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift, a massive transfer of essential supplies into Berlin by the Western Allies during the Soviet-imposed Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949. (Library of Congress)

for East Germans fleeing communism and Soviet control. U.S. president Harry Tru- man was convinced that abandoning Berlin would jeopardize

control of all of Germany. He further believed that the Soviets were determined to push the W estern powers out of Berlin, thereby discrediting repeated American assurances to its allies and the rest of Europe that it would not allow Ber- lin to fall.

A military response to the blockade was initially considered, but rejected, as the Western powers lacked the manpower to counter the massive Red Army's numerical advantage. Thus the United States, working with its European allies, undertook to sup- ply West Berlin via air corridors left open to them in a postwar agreement. The Ber- lin Airlift began on June 24, 1948, and con- tinued uninterrupted for the next 324 days. Western fliers, under the leadership of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, made a total of 272,000 flights into West Berlin, delivering thousands of tons of sup- plies every day.

The airlift was at first meant to be a short- term measure, as Allied officials did not be- lieve that the airlift could support the whole of Berlin for any length of time. The situa- tion in the summer and fall of 1948 became very tense as Soviet planes buzzed U.S. transport planes in the air corridors over East Germany, but the Allies only increased their efforts to resupply the German city once it became apparent that no resolution was in sight. The Soviets never attempted to shoot down any of the Western aircraft involved in the airlift, no doubt because such a provoca- tion might well have resulted in war.

Hundreds of aircraft were used to fly in a wide variety of cargo items, including more than 1.5 million tons of coal. By the fall, the airlift, called by the Americans "Opera- tion Vittles," was transporting an average of

5,000 tons of supplies a day. At the height of the operation on April 16, 1949, an air- craft landed in Berlin every minute around the clock.

The airlift was an international effort; air- planes were supplied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but there were also flight crews from Australia, Can- ada, South Africa, and New Zealand. The three main Berlin airfields involved in the effort were Tempelhof in the American sec-

tor, Gatow in the British zone, and Tegel in the French sector. The British even landed seaplanes on the Havel River.

The airlift gained widespread public and international admiration, and on May 12, 1949, the Soviets, concluding that the block- ade had failed, reopened the borders in return for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, perhaps believing that they could have some influence on the Western Allies' pro- posed plans for the future of Germany. Even though the Soviets lifted the blockade in May, the airlift did not end until September 30 because the allies sought to build up suf- ficient amounts of reserve supplies in West Berlin in case the Soviets blockaded it again. In all, the United States, Britain, and France flew 278,118 flights transporting more than 2.3 million short tons of cargo. Thirty-one Americans and 39 British citizens, most of them military personnel, died in the airlift.

In the end, the blockade not only was completely ineffective but also backfired. The blockade provoked genuine fears of the Soviets in the West and introduced even greater tension into the Cold War. Instead of preventing an independent West Ger- many, it actually accelerated Allied plans to set up the state. It also hastened the cre- ation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an American–West European military alliance.

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Berlin Crises (1958–1961)

Continual disagreement between the Soviet bloc and the Western Allies over the con- trol of Berlin had begun in earnest in the late 1940s, culminating in the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949). Renewed Cold War tensions transformed the city into one of the world's potential flash points during 1958–1961.

With Soviet prestige dramatically boosted by the launch of *Sputnik 1* in 1957, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to re- vive the issue of Berlin. On November 10, 1958, he sought to end the joint-occupation agreement in the city by demanding that Great Britain, France, and the United States withdraw their 10,000 troops from West Ber- lin. He also declared that the Soviet Union would unilaterally transfer its occupation authority in Berlin to the German Demo- cratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) if a peace treaty were not signed with both East and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, W est Germany) within six months. West Berlin would then become a free city. Khrushchev couched his demands by por- traying W est Berlin' s proposed free-city

status as a concession because it lay in East German territory and therefore properly be- longed to the GDR. None of the Western powers, however, formally recognized East Germany, viewing it as a mere subsidiary of the Soviet Union.

The United States flatly rejected Khrush- chev's demands, although other Western powers initially tried to placate the Soviet leaders by proposing an interim Berlin agree- ment that placed a limit on Western forces and curtailed some propagandistic West Ber- lin activities, such as radio broadcasts that targeted East German audiences. These Al- lied proposals would have given the Soviets and East Germans some measure of power in West Berlin, a concession that many West Berliners viewed as a highly dangerous step toward neutralization and, ultimately, aban- donment. In December 1958, the Allies is- sued a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declaration rejecting Soviet de- mands and insisting that no state had the right to withdraw unilaterally from an inter- national agreement.

Khrushchev gradually retreated from his hard-line stance on Berlin. American U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union indicated that the West had an accurate count of the comparatively small number of Soviet nu- clear missiles, and the Soviet leader obvi- ously feared starting a war that he could not win. The Soviets now envisioned a gradual crowding out of the Western powers without bloodshed. In the meantime, the economic situation in East Germany continued to de- teriorate, with vast numbers of refugees flee- ing to the West.

In 1961 the newly elected U.S. president John F. Kennedy abandoned the demand for German unification that had been part of U.S. policy since the 1940s. His foreign pol- icy team had drawn the conclusion that such a policy was not only impractical but might



Russian and American tanks face off at the tense Friedrichstrasse checkpoint on the East–West Berlin border October 28, 1961. Sev- enteen hours after the confrontation

began, Russian tanks pulled away from the border and moved up a side street in East Berlin, ending the crisis. (AP/Wide World Photos)

actually provoke a U.S.–Soviet war. Ken- nedy and his advisors decided that only three interests were worth the risk of nuclear war: the continued Allied presence in West Ber- lin, Allied access to West Berlin by land and by air, and the continued autonomous free- dom of West Berlin. Realizing that a rather inconsequential event and a sequence of mutually threatening and unnecessary mo- bilizations had led to World War I in 1914, Kennedy worried constantly that a relatively minor incident in Germany could escalate into World War III.

Meanwhile, GDR leader Walter Ulbricht decided to close the East Berlin borders in an attempt to exercise control over all traffic to

and from Berlin, including Allied military as well as German civilian travelers. On August 13, 1961, East German authorities began the construction of the Berlin Wall, essentially sealing off East Berlin from West Berlin. Ul- bricht sought to control not only what went into East Berlin but also what came out, in- cluding thousands of East Germans who sought refuge in West Berlin. The Soviets and the East Germans had wagered that the West would not react to the construction of the Wall. Kennedy, in accordance with his policy, offered little resistance. Embold- ened, Ulbricht began to take further mea- sures to assert control over Berlin.

Ten days after closing the border, the GDR allowed tourists, diplomats, and West- ern military personnel to enter East Berlin only via the crossing point at Berlin Fried- richstrasse. The only other two checkpoints into East Germany were Helmstedt at the West German–East German border and Dreilinden at the West Berlin–East Germany border. According to the military's phonetic alphabet, the Helmstedt checkpoint became Alpha, Dreilinden was nicknamed Check- point Bravo, and the checkpoint at Fried- richstrasse was famously dubbed Charlie. Checkpoint Charlie would soon become one of the best-known symbols of the Cold War.

At all of the East German checkpoints tourists were fully screened, but the post- war occupation agreement prevented East German authorities from checking any members of the Allied military forces. On October 22, 1961,

Allan Lightner, chief of the U.S. Mission in Berlin, attempted to pass through Checkpoint Charlie to attend the opera in East Berlin. East German police stopped Lightner and asked him for identi- fication. Lightner, following long-standing instructions, stated that he was a member of the U.S. occupation authority as shown by

his U.S. Mission license plate and that he therefore did not have to provide identifi- cation. The East German police refused to let Lightner pass. General Lucius D. Clay, the hero of the Berlin Airlift and now Pres- ident Kennedy' s personal representative in West Berlin, immediately dispatched a squad of U.S. soldiers to the site. With that, Lightner' s car went through the checkpoint, backed up, and went through it again and again to make the point that U.S. officials were going to move freely. Although Ken- nedy was reluctant to precipitate a crisis over a somewhat trivial affair, Clay none-theless ordered tanks to the checkpoint, while the Soviet military brought in its own tanks to oppose them.

The 1961 Checkpoint Charlie incident thus proved that the Soviets, not the East Germans, were actually in charge of East Germany. The photos of American and So- viet tanks facing each other at the check- point on October 25 became one of the most memorable images of the Cold War. The confrontation boosted the morale of W est Berliners because it clearly showed that the Allies, particularly the United States, would not yield to East German or Soviet pres- sure tactics. It also unmasked the charade of an independent and autonomous GDR that could deal on an equal basis with the West- ern powers.

Caryn E. Neumann

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Berlin Wall (August 13, 1961– November 9, 1989)

Officially known in East Germany as the "Antifascist Bulwark," the Berlin Wall was constructed in August 1961 to stop the flood of East German citizens seeking asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). *Republikflucht* (flight from the Republic) created tremendous economic strains.

Most of the people fleeing the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) were young skilled workers. Between 1949, when the GDR was created, and 1952, when the border was sealed off everywhere but in Berlin, almost 200,000 people left for West Germany each year. After the East Berlin Uprising in 1953, the number of refugees doubled, with more than 400,000 people leaving the GDR that year. Although flight from the GDR dropped to normal levels again for 1954, a mild economic crisis in 1956 led to another exodus.

Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) that controlled the GDR, proposed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev that the border in Berlin be sealed in early 1961. This was a risky move, as Ber- lin was still theoretically an open city under the control of all four Allied powers. De- spite Soviet misgivings, GDR army, police, and volunteer (*Kampfgruppen*) units began the construction of the barrier on the night of August 12–13, 1961. The Brandenburg Gate was closed to traffic the following day, and by August 26 all crossing points into West Berlin had been sealed off. Eventually,

Global Divisions at the Height of the Cold War, 1962

12 checkpoints were established to regulate traffic between the GDR and West Berlin. The most famous, in the center of Berlin, was called Checkpoint Charlie.

The Berlin Wall went through four gen- erations of architecture. Far more than the symbolic barricade that cut through the cen- ter of Berlin and was so often photographed by tourists, the wall encircled the western half of the city. Until 1971, when a con- necting road was constructed, two western exclaves existed behind the wall and were supplied solely by the American and Brit- ish military. There were obstacles in canals, sewer lines, and communications and trans- portation tunnels that formed part of the Ber- lin Wall system. It stretched for 106 miles (155 km) and by 1989 contained 92 watch- towers, 20 bunkers, anti-vehicle trenches, and other advanced defensive systems.

The first two versions of the Berlin Wall consisted of concrete blocks and barbed wire. These were replaced in 1965 with a system of concrete slabs and steel girders topped by a sewage pipe to make scaling the wall more difficult. In 1975, this structure gave way to one made entirely of reinforced concrete some 12 feet high, not including the tube el- ement on top. Behind this was the so-called death strip secured by dogs, tanks, trip-wire machine guns, and guards.

Though these measures prevented the flood of refugees in numbers like the late 1950s, they did not stop people from trying to escape from the GDR to the West. In the early days of the Berlin Wall, people jumped from buildings, used ladders to climb over the wall, or dug tunnels under it. As the sys- tem evolved, attempts became more danger- ous and more complex. At least 171 people

An unidentified West Berliner swings a sledgehammer, trying to destroy the Berlin Wall near Potsdamer Platz, on November 12, 1989, where a new passage was opened nearby. (AP/Wide World Photos)

were killed trying to leave the GDR between August 13, 1961, and November 9, 1989, when the wall came down. More than 5,000 East Germans, including 574 GDR border guards, successfully crossed the wall.

East Germans were not the only victims of the Berlin Wall, however. Because the wall was actually built a few yards back from the border, in the early years of the wall West German citizens who strayed too close could be and were sometimes arrested by GDR border patrols. The restricted supplies and claustrophobic atmosphere of West Berlin caused a drop in population of some 340,000 people between 1963 and 1983. To keep the city alive, the FRG encouraged foreign im- migration and granted special privileges to West Berliners.

The western half of the city became a sym- bol of freedom, recognized most famously in the phrase "*Ich bin ein Berliner*" (I am a resi- dent of Berlin) in John F. Kennedy's 1963 speech. A later American president, Ronald Reagan, also recognized the symbolism of the Berlin Wall when he challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this Wall" to prove his sincerity about reform. Soviet pressure for reform in fact did play a part in the fall of the Berlin Wall.

During the transitional crisis of late 1989, the new East Berlin regime lifted travel re- strictions to West Berlin. Günter Schabowski, head of the SED's Berlin organization, an- nounced on television on November 9, 1989, that the lifting of restrictions would be effec- tive immediately. East Germans went, cau- tiously, to test this at the Berlin Wall; lacking specific instructions, border guards let them through. Within hours, Germans from both sides of the wall were sitting atop it, drink- ing champagne and celebrating the end of the divided city.

Today, the only reminder of the Ber- lin Wall is a strip of bricks that follows its

former path. Most sections of concrete are in museums, many in foreign countries. While it existed, however, the Berlin Wall was one of the most infamous and powerful symbols of the Cold War.

Timothy C. Dowling

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Brandt,Willy (1913–1992)

Born Hubert Ernst Karl Frahm in the town of Lübeck on December 16, 1913, Willy Brandt became the most charismatic German politician of the Cold War era. He joined the youth section of the German Social- ist Workers' Party (SAP) in 1929 and then briefly became a member of the German So- cial Democratic Party (SPD) in 1930 before returning to the more radical SAP in 1931. He adopted the name Willy Brandt in 1933, when the rise of the National Socialists in Germany forced him to flee to Norway.

Brandt spent the war years as a journalist and organizer. He returned surreptitiously to

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President John F. Kennedy and Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin at the White House, March 13, 1961. (Library of Congress)

Berlin in 1936 to reorganize the SAP resis- tance, then went to Spain as an observer re- porting from the republican side of the civil war there. The Nazi government stripped him of German citizenship in 1938. When World War II ended, Brandt returned to Ger- many; among his first jobs was covering the Nuremberg trials for the Scandinavian press.

Brandt became involved in politics again once his citizenship was restored in 1948. As a pragmatic socialist who was also an anticommunist, he was elected to the Ger- man parliament in 1949 as a member of the SPD. He served as president of the senate for the City of Berlin during 1955–1957 and, in 1957, won election as mayor of Berlin. Brandt proved his mettle during the crises

of 1958–1962 and especially during the con- struction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The SPD subsequently put Brandt for- ward as its candidate for chancellor in 1961 and again in 1965. Although both campaigns were unsuccessful, Brandt became foreign minister and vice chancellor in the

SPD- Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Grand Coalition government that emerged in 1966. In 1969, when the SPD led a coalition with the Free Democratic Party, Brandt became

chancellor.
He quickly set about implementing the

policy that would become his legacy: *Ost- politik*, or eastern politics. Brandt believed that the path to German success and unity lay in reconciliation with the Soviets and

Brandt,Willy | 25



26 | Brandt,Willy

with Eastern Europe. He was particularly concerned with establishing normal rela- tions with the German Democratic Re- public (GDR, East Germany), a direct contravention of the previous regime' s Hallstein Doctrine. Whereas

Konrad Ade- nauer and the CDU had claimed to be the sole legitimate representatives of the Ger- man nation, Brandt was willing to accom- modate "two states in one nation." In the wake of the Prague Spring of 1968, more- over, he had openly renounced violence in favor of mediation. To that end, he became the first chancellor of the FRG to visit the GDR when he went to Erfurt in March 1970 as part of an exchange of visits with Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers for the GDR.

By all accounts, Brandt was received "like a rock star" in East Germany, and he moved quickly to consolidate his posi- tion. In August 1970, the FRG concluded a treaty of nonaggression with the Soviet Union, the so-called Moscow Treaty. The FRG recognized the borders of Poland and of the GDR and agreed to make no terri- torial claims. The Soviets, for their part, recognized that the FRG's position on uni- fication remained unchanged but agreed to work for the normalization of the situation in Berlin. The Four-Power Agreement that realized that goal was signed in Septem- ber 1971.

With the groundwork for normal relations with East Germany in place, Brandt signed a similar agreement with the Poles. In the Warsaw Treaty of December 1970, the FRG gave assurances that West Germany would accept the borders established in 1945, but Brandt's performance during the concluding visit was even more spectacular. At a cer- emony commemorating the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Brandt dropped to

his knees before a memorial to Jews victim- ized by the SS in 1943 and bowed his head in a gesture that demonstrated to many people that Germany had turned over a new leaf. In addition to being named *Time* magazine's Man of the Year for 1970, Brandt won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.

Brandt's achievements were not always readily accepted in the FRG. However, a con- structive no-confidence vote forced the issue in April 1972. Brandt and the SPD were re- turned the following November with 45 per- cent of the vote, and they forged ahead. In June 1973, Brandt became the first German chancellor to visit Israel, where he offered words of consolation and apology for Ger- many's actions during World War II. Three months later, he became the first German chancellor to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Brandt's term as chancellor came to an end in 1974, when his loyalty to Gunter Guillaume, an aide who was revealed to be an East German spy, caused a scandal that brought down the government. Brandt con- tinued in politics outside of Germany fol- lowing his resignation. He was involved in negotiations for peace in the Middle East at several points and worked on nonprolifera- tion issues in a number of capacities. Brandt died in Unkel am Rhein, near Bonn, on Oc- tober 8, 1992.

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Brezhnev, Leonid (1906–1982)

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was born in the Ukrainian town of Dneprodzerzhinsk, then called Kamenskoye, on December 19, 1906. The son of a steelworker, he graduated as an engineer in 1935 from the Kamenskoye Met- allurgical Institute and worked in the iron and steel industries of the eastern Ukraine. In 1939 he became CPSU secretary in Dnepro- petrovsk in charge of the city's important de- fense industries.

Brezhnev matured as an unquestioning follower of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and gained rapid promotion within the Commu- nist Party hierarchy, especially after the po- litical purges of the late 1930s opened up many positions. Following the German inva- sion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Bre- zhnev was soon drafted into the Red Army as a political commissar. By the end of the war he was in charge of the Political Administra- tion of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

After the war, Brezhnev's party career gained momentum. During 1946–1955 he served as party first secretary in Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, and then in the republics of Moldavia and Kazakhstan. In 1952 he was also appointed a member of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1957 he joined the Politburo.

Brezhnev's meteoric rise was due in large measure to the power of his new patron, Nikita Khrushchev. Nevertheless, Brezhnev, together with Alexei Kosygin, unseated Khrushchev during a 1964 CPSU power struggle. In the di- vision of power that followed, on October 15, 1964, Brezhnev became first secretary of the

CPSU, while Kosygin became prime minis- ter. In 1966 Brezhnev named himself general secretary of the CPSU and began to dominate the collective leadership. In 1975 he was ap- pointed an army general; in 1976 he became marshal of the Soviet Union (the highest mili- tary rank); and in 1977 he replaced Nikolai Podgorny as head of state.

During the Khrushchev years, Brezhnev had supported the leader' s denunciations of Stalin's arbitrary rule and the liberalization of Soviet intellectual policies. But as soon as he had ousted Khrushchev, Brezhnev began to reverse this process. The 1966 trials of Soviet writers Y uri Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky marked the reversion to a more repressive pol- icy. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopas- nosti (KGB, Committee for State Security) regained much of the power it had enjoyed under Stalin, although there was no recur- rence of the political purges of the 1930s and 1940s.

In August 1968 Brezhnev brought com- munist reforms in Eastern Europe to a halt by ordering the invasion of Czechoslovakia, where the Prague Spring had threatened to dissolve that country's political and mili- tary solidarity with Moscow and the War- saw Pact. This military intervention was afterward justified by the Brezhnev Doc- trine, which claimed for the Soviet Union the right to interfere in its client states' affairs in order to safeguard socialism and maintain the unity of the Warsaw Pact.

During Brezhnev's tenure, a nonaggres- sion pact with the Federal Republic of Ger- many (FRG, West Germany) was concluded in 1970, marking the beginning of détente with the West. On a global level, Brezhnev carried out

negotiations on arms control with the United States and signed the 1968 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1972 Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty. On the

whole, during the 1970s Brezhnev advocated a relaxation of Cold War tensions, which he also demonstrated by signing the 1975 Hel- sinki Final Act. This recognized the postwar frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe and in effect legitimized Soviet hegemony over the region. In exchange, the Soviet Union agreed to respect human rights and funda- mental freedoms.

Relaxation abroad was not matched by lib- eralization at home. On the contrary, Brezh- nev tried to neutralize the effects of détente by expanding the Soviet security apparatus and government control over society. His re- gime also became synonymous with corrup- tion and the severe repression of dissidents. Urbanization had given rise to an ever-larger number of Soviet citizens, especially from the young and educated groups, hoping to live a Western lifestyle with access to West- ern culture and a Western middle-class stan- dard of living.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 signaled an end to détente. The Af- ghanistan War soon deteriorated into a deba- cle and contributed to the steady decline of the communist regime. Although the Soviet Union was awash in oil dollars, this money

was of little help to the civilian economy because the regime frittered its wealth away on construction projects, corruption, and handouts to brother regimes and pumped it into military industries and the Afghan quagmire.

Parallel to the deterioration of the eco- nomic and political system, Brezhnev's physical health and mental awareness steadily declined in the late 1970s. The ge- riatric Politburo, however, with an average age of 70, feared change and thus kept him in power well beyond his time. Brezhnev died in

Moscow on November 10, 1982, after several years of failing health, and was suc- ceeded by KGB head Yuri Andropov.

Beatrice de Graaf

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C

Central Intelligence Agency

Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in July 1947 to centralize and coordinate intelligence and espionage activities in reaction to the deepening Cold War. The CIA was to focus on the Soviet Union and its satellites. The CIA ' s primary function was to advise the National Security Council (NSC) on intelligence matters and make recommendations for coordination of intelligence activities. To accomplish these goals, the CIA was to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence and perform other services in accordance with NSC directives. President Harry S. Truman appointed leg- endary spymaster William "Wild Bill" Don- ovan to serve as the first CIA director.

The CIA assumed primary responsibil- ity not only for intelligence collection and analysis but also for covert actions. Because Congress was vague in defining the CIA ' s mission, broad interpretation of the act pro- vided justification for subsequent covert op- erations, although the original intent was only to authorize espionage. The CIA director was responsible for

reporting on intelligence ac- tivities to Congress and the president. No CIA director ever exerted central control over the other 12 government entities in the U.S. intelligence community.

Known to insiders as “The Agency” or “The Company,” the CIA consisted of four directorates. The Directorate of Operations (DO) supervised official and nonofficial agents in conducting human intelligence col- lection, covert operations, and counterintelli- gence. The DO was divided into geographic

units and also contained the Center for Counterterrorism. The Directorate of Ad- ministration managed the CIA ’ s daily ad- ministrative affairs and housed the Office of Security (OS). Created in 1952, the Director- ate of Intelligence conducted research in in- telligence sources and analysis of the results.

It produced the “President’s Daily Brief” and worked with the National Intelligence Council in preparing estimates and studies. The Directorate of Science and Technology, created in 1963, was responsible for devel- opment and operation of reconnaissance air- craft and satellites, operation and funding of ground stations to intercept Soviet missile te- lemetry, and analysis of foreign nuclear and space programs. It also operated the For- eign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which monitored and analyzed all foreign media outlets.

During its first years, the CIA had diffi- culty prevailing in bureaucratic battles over authority and funding. For example, the State Department required CIA personnel abroad to operate under a U.S. ambassador. Wal- ter Bedell Smith, who replaced Donovan in 1950, was an effective director, but the CIA ’ s power increased greatly after Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, became director in 1953. An 80 percent increase in the agency’s budget led to the hiring of 50 percent more agents and a major expansion of covert operations.

The CIA played a key role in the overthrow of allegedly radical governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. With the advice of CIA operative Edward G. Lansdale, Phil- ippine Secretary of National Defense Ramon

Magsaysay crushed the Hukbalahap uprising in his country during 1950–1954. CIA agents in South Vietnam infiltrated the Michigan State University Advisory Group that trained police and administrators during 1955–1962 as a basis for nation building. In Laos, the CIA operated Air America and supported right- ist politicians, while Donovan, who became U.S. ambassador to Thailand, organized Thai paramilitary units to fight communist forces in neighboring countries.

President John F. Kennedy lost confi- dence in the CIA after the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion, which failed to oust Cuba's Fidel Castro in 1961. The CIA nonetheless continued to devise imaginative but some- what improbable schemes to assassinate or discredit Castro, efforts suspended during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1961, however, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer began providing the CIA with information on Soviet strategic capabilities, nuclear tar- geting policies, and medium-range ballistic missiles that would prove critical in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The CIA also pene- trated the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the De- fense Ministry and General Staff, the GRU, and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezo- pasnosti (KGB). But its covert activities— especially its operations to kill Castro and its involvement in the murders of South Viet- nam's Ngo Dinh Diem and later the Congo's Patrice Lumumba—soon caused much of the world community to view the agency as a sinister force.

As direct American military action in Indochina grew, covert operations became less important, but by 1968 they witnessed a resurgence in the Phoenix Program that called for assassination of communist oper- atives. Debate continues over CIA involve- ment in the 1970 coup in Cambodia but not on its role in ousting Chile's Salvador Al- lendein1973.

In 1975 public revelations of CIA assas- sination plots and an illegal operation to spy on American citizens protesting the Viet- nam War led to the creation of the Presi- dent's Intelligence Oversight Board as well as an Intelligence Committee in each house of Congress. In 1977 President Jimmy

Carter increased oversight of the CIA and reduced its budget, but he reversed course after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the CIA used its renewed power and clout to undermine communist regimes worldwide, providing support for Afghan rebel forces that included Osama bin Laden. Ignoring statutory limits, the CIA also participated in the secret sale of arms to Iran and used the proceeds to fund covert actions against Ni- caragua's leftist government. In 1991 Con- gress passed a new oversight law to prevent another Iran-Contra Affair.

In 1991 the CIA correctly forecast a coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. But the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union beginning in August 1991 came as a com- plete surprise. Two-and-a-half years later, in February 1994, the arrest of agent Aldrich H. Ames for selling secrets for many years to the Soviets and compromising operatives provided critics with more evidence to back their controversial charges that the CIA had prolonged rather than helped to win the Cold War.

James I. Matray

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Churchill,Winston (1874–1965)

Winston Churchill was born at Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, on November 30, 1874, the eldest son of Lord Randolph Churchill. His father was a rising Conservative politi- cian, his mother, Jennie Jerome, an Ameri- can heiress. From 1895 to 1899 he held a commission in the British Army, seeing ac- tive service in India, on the Afghan frontier, and in the Sudan, where he took part in the Battle of Omdurman. Captured by South Af- rican forces in 1899 while reporting on the Boer War as a journalist, he won popular fame after escaping.

Churchill entered politics in 1900 as a Unionist member of Parliament. In 1904 his party' s partial conversion to protectionism caused him to join the Liberals, who made him president of the Board of Trade (1908– 1910) and home secretary (1910–1911) after they returned to power. As first lord of the Admiralty (1911–1915), Churchill sought to modernize the Royal Navy, con- vert it to oil, and improve its administration. He championed the 1915 Dardanelles expe- dition against Turkey, the failure of which prompted his resignation. He spent the next six months to May 1916 on active service on the Western Front but regained high office in July 1917, when Prime Minister David Lloyd George made him minister of muni- tions. In December 1918 Churchill moved to the War Office, where he unsuccessfully

advocated forceful Allied action against Russia to eliminate that country's new com- munist government. In late 1920 he became colonial secretary. In 1924 he returned to the Conservatives, who in November 1924 made him chancellor of the exchequer, a post he held for five years.

By 1928 Churchill believed that the post- war peace settlement represented only a truce between wars, a view set forth in his book *The Aftermath* (1928). When Labour won the 1929 election Churchill lost office but soon began campaigning vigorously for major British rearmament, especially of the Royal Air Force (RAF). From 1932 onward he sounded this theme eloquently in Parlia- ment, but Conservative leaders remained unsympathetic, and throughout the 1930s Churchill held no cabinet position. Churchill also became the most visible and vocal critic of the appeasement policies of the succes- sive governments of Prime Ministers Stan- ley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, who effectively acquiesced in German rearma- ment and

Chancellor Adolf Hitler's delib- erate contravention of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, Churchill resumed his old position as first lord of the Admiralty. On May 10, 1940, the day Germany launched an invasion of France and the Low Countries, Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as prime minister. After the fall of France, and with Britain remaining as Germany' s sole major military opponent, Churchill responded vig- orously. An outstanding war leader, he deliv- ered a series of rousing and eloquent speeches, affirming Britain' s determination to continue the fight and his conviction of ultimate tri- umph. He also established a close relationship with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and persuaded U.S. policymakers to furnish substantial assistance. Churchill welcomed

British prime minister Winston Churchill (left), U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (center), and Soviet leader Josef Stalin (right) at the Yalta Conference. The "Big Three" met in Yalta, Crimea (in what is now the Ukraine) on February 4–11, 1945, to discuss military and political strategy for ending the Second World War. (Library of Congress)

Japan's December 1941 attack on Pearl Har- bor and the subsequent German declaration of war on the United States, believing that U.S. participation in the war guaranteed an Allied victory. Britain and the United States now worked closely together, establishing a Joint Chiefs of Staff and agreeing to pool technology.

After Germany invaded Soviet Russia in June 1941, Churchill also welcomed the Soviet Union as an ally, although his rela- tions with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin were never as close as with Roosevelt. Churchill made repeated visits to the United States and met Roosevelt at other venues; all three leaders met at major international summit

conferences in 1943 and 1945, and Churchill also met Stalin separately on several occa- sions. Stalin resented the Anglo-American failure to open a second front in Europe until June 1944, a decision due in consider- able part to Churchill's fear that if Britain and the United States launched an invasion of Western Europe too soon, the campaign would degenerate into bloody trench warfare resembling that of World War I.

As the war proceeded and Soviet forces began to push back German troops in the east- ern region, Churchill feared that the Soviet Union would dominate postwar Eastern Eu- rope. Soviet support for communist guerrillas in occupied countries and for Soviet-backed

governments-in-exile, as well as Moscow' s failure to aid the uprising of Polish forces in Warsaw in August 1944, reinforced his apprehensions.

In October 1944 Churchill and Stalin ne- gotiated the informal Percentages Agree- ment, whereby the two leaders delineated their countries' respective spheres of influ- ence. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt both acquiesced in Soviet domination of most of Eastern Eu- rope, Churchill most reluctantly. In April 1945 Churchill unavailingly urged Ameri- can military commanders to disregard their existing understandings with Soviet forces and take Berlin.

From early in the war the Allies had com- mitted themselves to the creation of a post- war international organization to maintain peace, which led to the United Nations (UN) in May 1945. Churchill, however, hoped that close Anglo-American understanding would be the bedrock of the international world order, a perspective intensified by his con- tinuing fears of Germany.

In August 1945 the British electorate voted Churchill out of office, replacing his administration with a reformist Labour gov- ernment. He was still, however, honored as "the greatest living Englishman" and the war's most towering figure. Churchill's six best-selling volumes of *The Second World War* depicted a rosy view of unclouded and harmonious Anglo-American wartime co- operation, carefully designed to promote the continuing alliance between the two coun- tries, which had become his most cherished objective.

Churchill deliberately used his prestige to rally American elite and public opinion in favor of taking a stronger line against So- viet expansionism in Europe and elsewhere, a position he advanced to enormous public- ity in his famous March 1946 “Sinews of

Peace” speech (also known as the “Iron Cur- tain” speech) at Fulton, Missouri. Although the speech was cleared in advance with both British prime minister Clement Attlee and U.S. president Harry S. Truman, at the time many Americans criticized the address as unduly bellicose. One year later, however, the president’s Truman Doctrine endorsed this position, and by the end of the 1940s the United States had launched the Marshall Plan to facilitate West European recovery and had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NATO).

From 1951 to 1955 Churchill served again as Conservative prime minister. Growing Soviet–American tensions and the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons led him to urge U.S. president Dwight D. Eisen- hower to negotiate an understanding with the Soviet Union to limit and perhaps re- duce stocks of such bombs. Churchill also gave early support and encouragement to the movement for European integration, regard- ing this as the only means whereby the con- tinent would be able to defend itself against the Soviet Union, become a credible interna- tional military and economic force, and avoid future destructive internecine conflicts.

Declining health eventually forced Churchill to resign from office. In retirement, he urged Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to repair Anglo-American relations after the damaging 1956 Suez Crisis, on the grounds that Britain could not afford lasting estrange- ment from its most vital ally, and offered his assistance in this endeavor. A House of Commons man to the core, Churchill con- sistently refused the peerage to which his services entitled him. He died at his London home on January 24, 1965, an occasion that for many marked the symbolic final passing of Great Britain’s imperial age. An idiosyn- cratic political maverick whose pre-1939 re- cord was at best mixed, Churchill rose to the

occasion to become the greatest British war leader since the 18th-century Earl of Cha- tham. The prestige that Churchill won in this capacity enabled him to have a major impact on the development of the Cold War.

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Civil Defense

Civil defense refers to programs and preven- tive measures to help defend civilian popula- tions from military attack. During the Cold War, such efforts were directed mainly at protecting civilians during a nuclear attack. The civil defense programs of the Soviet Union and the United States can be regarded as standardized systems. These nations ex- ported their civil defense organizations to their allies.

Soviet civil defense consisted of a system of state-sponsored measures designed to se- cure the population and national economy in time of war and

to manage rescue and recovery efforts with the purpose of mini- mizing casualties. The Soviet civil defense apparatus was well organized, thought to be reliable, and based on two primary prin- ciples. First, civil defense was organized on a territorial-industrial basis to protect the entire nation. Citizens underwent continu- ous training in civil defense measures, and high emphasis was placed on fallout shelters, which were designed to safeguard the popu- lation from the effects of nuclear detonations. Second, civil defense called on the mobiliza- tion of material and human resources of the nation as a whole.

The Soviet government approached civil defense with four major premises. The first was that a well-trained populace would be less prone to injury or death and less suscep- tible to panic in the event of a war. Second, adequate training would help the population to deal with dangers contingent on an enemy attack. Third, people trained in civil defense would be capable of providing aid to the in- jured and could be mobilized to begin recov- ery efforts as soon as possible. Fourth, civil defense training would reinforce the defen- sive capabilities of the country. During the Cold War, some 30 million Soviet citizens and 70 percent of the industrial workforce were directly involved in civil defense pro- grams. It is estimated that the Soviet Union spent $1 billion per year on civil defense measures.

Two organizations oversaw the Soviets' civil defense program. The Local Civil De- fense (MPVO) system was organized in in- dividual municipalities. The objective of the MPVO was to protect local citizens against enemy attacks of various kinds. In charge of the Municipal Executive Committee of the

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Council of Workers' Deputies (ECCWD) was the municipal chief. The committee chief exercised the exclusive right to issue direct orders and make decisions in the best interest of the locality. Such committees were responsible for providing a diverse range of services by order of the Soviet gov- ernment in order to maximize civil defense measures during an attack.

The second civil defense organization was the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF). The objective of DOSAAF was to train people in the basics of military warfare. DOSAAF

provided training to the civilian population, especially youth, to develop basic skills in firing weapons, skiing, driving, parachuting, piloting aircraft, and radio communications. In the process, DOSAAF also promoted var- ious sports. DOSAAF fell under the aegis of the National Defense Ministry and worked closely with MPVO units.

In the event of enemy attack, one of nine warning signals would be transmitted to cities and towns by means of siren alarms, loudspeakers, whistles, and radio. The ma- jority of fallout shelters were public; in fact, the construction of family or indi- vidual shelters was not encouraged, as the common perception was that an enemy at- tack would focus on public places such as industrial centers, factories, and motor- ways. Soviet shelters were classified in part by their sophistication, including blast shel- ters with high-level, industrially manufac- tured air filtering equipment; blast shelters with simplified filtering equipment; nuclear shelters equipped to handle peacetime ac- cidents (such as nuclear reactor accidents); and simple nuclear shelters fabricated from readily available materials to offer refuge from nuclear attack. Fallout shelters were also classified according to capacity: small- scale (accommodating up to 150 persons),

medium (150–450 persons), and large-scale (450 or more persons).

In the event that people could not reach fallout shelters in time, Soviet citizens were trained to wear protective clothing. Usually, they wore suits of rubber or plastic equipped with a breathing apparatus and gas mask, protective gloves, and footwear. Respirators were issued to high-ranking officials and civil defense chiefs. Families and individu- als had to obtain protective gear at their own expense.

In the United States, civil defense was not nearly as well organized. Civil defense mea- sures were left primarily to local and state au- thorities, with the federal government playing a relatively minor role, mainly coordinating and disseminating information. American civil defense emphasized individual self- help, privatization, voluntarism, and decen- tralization. Unlike Soviet citizens, Americans were routinely prompted to construct their own individual fallout shelters, and many did, particularly in the 1950s.

The first national Cold War civil defense agency was created in January 1951 as a response to the Soviets' first atom bomb detonation in 1949 and to the Korean War (1950–1953). This agency, the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), had a nar- row mission, which was chiefly geared to educating the populace on appropriate civil defense measures to take in the event of a nuclear attack. Although the FCDA recom- mended the construction of fallout shelters as part of a comprehensive civil defense apparatus, the federal government never al- lowed for the construction of adequate public shelter protection, and no cohesive national civil defense policies were ever imple- mented. The emphasis remained on regional and local programs.

The U.S. government did, however, de- velop a civil defense plan aimed at protecting

A volunteer in Battle Creek, Michigan, stands beside the 14-day emergency food supply for two persons that she purchased in a 1961 test of how much the food would cost, how much it would weigh, and how much space it would take to store it. Her particular supply consisted of 113 articles of 67 foods, cost just under $28 to buy, and weighed 118 pounds. Such a food supply was recom- mended by the Office of Civil Defense of the Defense Department. (National Archives)

America' s industrial base. In August 1951 President Harry S. Truman announced the National Industrial Dispersion Policy, a pro- gram designed to decentralize American manufacturing, thereby making it less vul- nerable to a concentrated Soviet air attack. The dispersion program itself, however, was highly decentralized, and the onus of im- plementation was placed on individual lo- calities. Thus, almost no federal funds were allotted to the endeavor, and the policy had little impact on the protection of America's industrial sector. By the late 1950s, with the proliferation of highly destructive hydrogen bombs and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBMs), the National Industrial Dispersion Policy was rendered largely moot and faded into obscurity.

The closest the United States ever came to duplicating the more ambitious Soviet civil defense efforts was the National Security Re- sources Board (NSRB), created in 1947 to mobilize national resources and industrial production in time of war. It did not play a large role in more traditional civil defense preparations. In December 1950, in response to the reversal of fortunes in the Korean War, the Truman administration established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), whose task was to coordinate all military and

defense production—much like the War Pro- duction Board of World War II. But again, the ODM played almost no role in civil de- fense procedures. In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower combined the NSRB and the ODM into one agency, although its mission did not change. In 1958, U.S. officials de- cided to merge mobilization and civil defense readiness into one agency when they consoli- dated the FCDA and the ODM into one unit: the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). The OCDM went through several permutations over the years and became more of a disaster relief agency than a civil defense apparatus, especially after nearly all military and civilian defense operations were consoli- dated into the Federal Emergency Manage- ment Agency (FEMA) in 1978.

Most U.S. communities developed their own emergency plans and tasked local civil

defense officers with specific functions. Ad- ditionally, civil defense volunteers under- went training to complement regular officers. The responsibility of alerting the public of an impending nuclear attack rested with the na- tional, state, and local civil defense offices. These agencies arranged training courses for volunteers who had to be ready to assist au- thorities in managing existing shelters, de- contamination procedures, fire fighting, first aid administration, and recovery efforts.

Adequate advance warning depends on the detection of approaching aircraft or missiles as far from the nation's borders as possible. To this end, the

National Warn- ing System (NA W AS) was established in 1957. It worked with local warning systems to form the Civil Defense Warning System. Telephones, radios, teletype, and other com- munication systems were used to transmit



Ground Zero Cincinnati. (AP/Wide World Photos)

urgent civil defense information. Public si- rens were also used for early warning. To provide early warning, the North Ameri- can Air Defense Command (NORAD) still maintains a sophisticated surveillance net- work including ground radar and radar- equipped aircraft deployed across the entire North American continent. Detection first begins at the Distant Early Warning Line, a radar wall extending some 4,000 miles across the Arctic through the Bering Sea and into the North Pacific.

The United States possessed two civil de- fense alert warning signals. The first was a steady, three- to five-minute siren that indi- cated an advanced-warning alert signal. This was used if enough time remained for people to seek protection in public or family fallout shelters. The second, a series of short siren blasts for five minutes, meant that immedi- ate cover should be taken, indicating an im- minent attack within minutes.

Local alert transmission systems differed from locale to locale. Two main alarm trans- mission systems were in place: a National Emergency Alarm Repeater (NEAR) system and a Control of Electromagnetic Radiations (CONELRAD) system. NEAR was designed to provide for almost instantaneous warning of an impending attack for the indoor pub- lic. NEAR had the capability of reaching 96 percent of the population in homes, of- fices, factories, schools, and other indoor public places. This system was especially valuable in that it was capable of transmit- ting alarm signals to rural areas, where in- stallation of outdoor alarm systems would be costly. Meanwhile, CONELRAD was invented to assure radio communications in a national emergency and to prevent enemy aircraft from using radio signals in search of targets. CONELRAD's importance de- creased as the potential of attack via ballis- tic missiles increased, but it is still used to

ensure more efficient communications be- tween public officials and civilians.

Cold War fallout shelters in the United States were classified on the basis of their protection factor (100 meant the radiation level outside a shelter could be 100 times as high as that inside a shelter). During and after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, re- laxed civil defense qualifications yielded 110 million shelter spaces, of which more than 70 million had a protection factor

of 100 or greater, and an additional 35 million shel- ters with a protection factor between 49 and 99. The shelters with a protection factor of 100-plus were concentrated in the larger cit- ies of the United States. Only shelters with protection factors of 100 or greater were stocked with food and survival supplies.

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Committee on the Present Danger

Committee on the Present Danger was a bi- partisan group of senior U.S. government

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officials, academics, and opinion leaders first organized in 1950, subsequently re- vived in 1976, to convince the U.S. public and policymakers of the dangers posed by the Soviet Union's military and foreign poli- cies. The success of this organization in the 1950s spurred the creation of a similar body that bore the same name and had similar goals 25 years later.

The first Committee on the Present Dan- ger was founded shortly after the Korean War began, to campaign for the permanent expansion of U.S. military forces, capabili- ties, and commitments, especially the de- ployment of far

more substantial U.S. troop contingents in Western Europe to strengthen the infant North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO). Similar prescriptions had been made earlier that year in the National Secu- rity Council Report 68 (NSC-68), a paper prepared by the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and largely authored by the second PPS di- rector, Paul H. Nitze. President Harry S. Tru- man initially rejected its recommendations, which effectively called for a major militari- zation of the existing policies of containment of the Soviet Union, but accepted most of them once the Korean War erupted in June 1950. Even before the war began, several State and Defense Department officials and consultants who supported NSC-68 hoped to establish a citizens committee to press for major increases in American defense bud- gets and commitments.

Headed by James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, and largely run by for- mer army undersecretary Tracy S. Voorhees, the committee, although formally a private organization, received strong backing and assistance from leading Truman administra- tion officials, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Undersecretary of De- fense Robert A. Lovett as well as Nitze. Es- tablished in December 1950 after extensive

preliminary discussions with administration officials, the committee compared the Soviet menace to the Nazi threat a decade earlier and pressed for the restoration of the mili- tary draft, doubling the size of the existing U.S. military, and the deployment of sev- eral additional divisions to Western Europe. The committee quickly attracted an array of prominent members, including several col- lege presidents, lawyers, media figures— among them Edward R. Murrow of CBS, Julius Ochs Adler of the *New York Times*, and Screen Actors Guild president Ronald Reagan—and William J. Donovan, former director of the Office of Strategic Services.

The committee worked closely with Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials and with the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) established by Truman in the spring of 1951 to coordinate efforts to win the loyalties of peoples in Soviet-controlled states, especially in Eastern Europe. Committee members cam- paigned energetically for the policies they favored, speaking and writing extensively, sponsoring films, disseminating cartoons and other publicity, briefing journalists, lobbying congressmen, and writing detailed

policy rec- ommendations and briefs for sympathetic ad- ministration officials.

The committee's efforts contributed sig- nificantly to the Great Debate of 1951 on U.S. foreign policy, the outcome of which decisively oriented the country away from isolationism and toward a militarily assertive position of high defense expenditures, large armed forces, and major overseas alliance commitments. Leading committee officials, including Voorhees, successfully urged the sympathetic General Dwight D. Eisenhower to seek the Republican Party nomination for president in 1952, in the hope that this would check the influence of Republican isolation- ists and wed that party, like the Democrats, to the militarized internationalism that the

committee favored. After Eisenhower's elec- tion victory in November 1952 and the Ko- rean War armistice the following summer, the committee members felt that the commit- tee's mission had been accomplished, and by late 1953 it had effectively faded away.

The first committee subsequently served as a model for the second Committee on the Present Danger, founded in the mid-1970s by foreign policy experts—including academics, former officials, and opinion makers—who argued that an expansionist Soviet Union was increasing the size, composition, and capa- bilities of its military arsenal in spite of arms control agreements and a general warming of superpower relations, known as détente. Com- mittee members feared that the Soviets were preparing to wage —and prevail in—a nuclear exchange with the United States, thus giving the Soviet Union enormous leverage in any future confrontation with America or its al- lies. The committee favored the development of new American weapons and opposed arms control agreements, which it believed bol- stered Soviet military dominance. In 1981, when Reagan (an early member of the com- mittee) became president, many of the com- mittee' s positions became official government policy.

V eteran U.S. foreign policy advisor and NSC-68 drafter Nitze and Yale Law School Dean Eugene V. Rostow, formerly an un- dersecretary of state for President Lyndon B. Johnson, conceptualized the organiza- tion in late 1975. While they were finalizing plans the following year, Nitze and several other like-minded foreign policy experts were asked to scrutinize the government' s recent assessment of the Soviet Union. They ultimately concluded that the United States was systematically underestimating Soviet military capabilities. These findings further spurred the committee' s organiza- tional efforts. Eventually, political scientist

and future United Nations (UN) ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, congressional aide Max Kampelman, labor leader Lane Kirkland, and novelist Saul Bellow joined Rostow, Nitze, and 142 others as founding mem- bers of the second Committee on the Pres- ent Danger.

Although the foreign and defense policies of Republican president Gerald R. Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were the committee's main focus during its for- mative stages, organizers believed that their efforts were necessary regardless of who won the 1976 national election. Thus, two days after Ford was defeated by Democrat Jimmy Carter, the committee formally an- nounced its establishment. Over the next sev- eral years, the group undertook a high-profile campaign, including disseminating analyti- cal studies, conducting public opinion poll- ing, and offering congressional testimony in support of new nuclear weapons and greater skepticism of détente. The committee vigor- ously opposed Carter's effort to conclude a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union.

Critics of the committee believed that it was misreading Soviet military develop- ments and foreign policy goals. To these observers, changes in the Soviets' arsenal could be explained benignly as defensive in nature or dismissed as a logical reaction to American actions. They believed that the committee's antagonism toward the Soviet Union and advocacy of new weapons re- flected discredited past approaches and only increased the likelihood of a dangerous su- perpower confrontation. The committee's critique of American policy did not waver, however, and many of its suggestions were implemented by the Reagan administration, particularly during 1981–1985.

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Communist Revolutionary Warfare

Communist revolutionary warfare in the Cold War context is usually associated with the Chinese communist theoretician Mao Zedong and Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap. Based on his experiences in the Chinese Civil War and against the Japanese in World War II, Mao argued that in predom- inantly rural countries such as China, the revolution of the masses did not have to be led by the proletariat, as Vladimir Lenin had taught. Rather, the peasantry would be in the vanguard. Giap subsequently showed during the Indochina War against the French that Mao's approach could be adapted to more densely populated regions and that it applied as well when the principal enemy was a co- lonial power. But Giap's chief contribution to revolutionary warfare came in his assess- ment of the political and psychological diffi- culties that confront a democracy in waging a protracted war. Giap believed that public opinion would at some point demand an end to the bloodshed and that political leaders would find themselves forced to promise an early end to the fighting.

Communist revolutionary warfare re- quired that certain conditions develop, which were clearly evident in the wake of World War II. These included a peasantry dissatis- fied with the status quo, the discrediting of colonial regimes, and the rise of national- ism. Mao's views received a further boost following the final Chinese Communist vic- tory over the Nationalists in

October 1949. Communist revolutionary warfare was also an appealing strategy during the Cold War because it provided a means by which the major communist powers—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC)— could support surrogate movements around the world while minimizing the potential for nuclear confrontation with the United States and its allies. Finally, the strategy relied on guerrilla warfare, so it reduced the advan- tages that a government and its support- ing states might have in terms of firepower and technology and placed the conflict in a venue in which that government was less comfortable.

In its orthodox form, Mao's approach set forth a three-stage progressive process by which the Communist Party would ulti- mately achieve victory. The transition to a higher stage required that certain conditions be met, but reversion to a lower stage could also occur if a change in the situation so war- ranted. In the first stage, subversion, the party established and publicized a basic cause for the insurgency and highlighted the govern- ment' s contradictions—that is, its weaknesses and inability to meet the needs of the people. It built cells and arms stores, organized and trained guerrilla units, carried out acts of sab- otage and terrorism, and generally attempted to reduce public confidence in the regime's ability to both handle the situation and gov- ern the country.

Once insurgency leaders believed that the party had become strong enough to confront

the government directly, the second, or guer- rilla, stage began. Starting in remote areas where government control was weakest, the party focused on building up its base areas—a communistundergroundinthevillages—while guerrillas conducted operations, designed to prevent government interference with this process, in the surrounding areas. As success was achieved, the areas under insurgent con- trol expanded, and the costs to the govern- ment increased. When these costs began to be unacceptable to the existing

government, the insurgents seized the initiative and gained momentum. If the government was unable to reverse the situation, its defeat became inevitable.

Concurrently during the second stage, the insurgents built and trained main force units for commitment during the third stage, the war of movement. When the party leader- ship believed that the government was on the verge of collapse, the transition to the final stage occurred. Fresh main force units were committed in a general offensive in the ex- pectation that a mass uprising would occur and the government would be overthrown. In sum, communist revolutionary warfare employed the elements of time, space, and cost in protracted warfare to destroy the will and ability of the government to resist. Ev- erything, including military operations, was subordinate to political considerations.

The methodical, elastic, and relatively low-cost nature of communist revolutionary warfare provided the insurgents with advan- tages in dealing with a weak government, particularly if that government was unable to develop the proper counterstrategy. The insurgents were not without challenges of their own, however, and a failure to address these satisfactorily could have fatal conse- quences. Gaining popular support early on was critical. This required identifying a basic cause that generated widespread appeal and

exploiting inequities in the country that could be blamed on the government, even if they were not the government's fault. Selecting the right cause was important because it had to promote national unity, even among those who might not be receptive to the commu- nist message. Successful communist insur- gent movements, such as those in Vietnam, solved this potential problem by creating fronts such as the Viet Minh, composed of all political groups, and then controlling the fronts from behind the scenes.

The Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) during the latter half of the 1950s provides a classic situation in which this re- lationship was ripe for exploitation. President Ngo Dinh Diem's rejection of the elections scheduled under provisions of the 1954 Ge- neva Conference that ended the Indochina War—a course that had the full support of Washington—led to a resumption of fighting. Diem' s actions reinforced the impression that his government

could not win the election because it was corrupt and oppressive, was uninterested in correcting long-standing in- equities such as land ownership, and was un- able to address the growing insurgent threat.

Conversely, the effect of a weak-cause contradictions message can be seen in the Malayan insurgency. There, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) attempted to unite the Malayan people behind an anticolonial- ist/nationalist banner as well. However, this failed to resonate because the MCP was 93 percent Chinese in an ethnically diverse so- ciety. In addition, the contradictions of the colonial government were offset by the sus- tained British effort to prepare Malaya for independence and by an effective British counterinsurgency campaign.

Guerrilla success required strong lead- ership and organization. The presence of a charismatic leader such as Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam was highly beneficial. In addition,

the movement had to be well organized and well disciplined, not only to show that it could support a national effort but also to be able to administer territory that came under its control and to demonstrate that it provided a credible alternative to the government. Again, the Malayan communists suffered in this regard because the government' s decla- ration of a state of emergency in the summer of 1948 forced the party to enter the guerrilla stage before it was fully prepared to do so.

The strength of an insurgent movement could be further bolstered if it received out- side support. Generally this took the form of political or moral support, infiltration of ma- terial and personnel assistance, or access to cross-border sanctuaries. The value of such support depended on the insurgents' ability to use it to exploit government weaknesses. Geography could also have a bearing on the potential success of an insurgency. The pres- ence of difficult terrain such as mountains and jungles, for instance, was beneficial be- cause it provided the insurgents with space in which to work and was more difficult for the government to access, especially if its ad- ministrative infrastructure and communica- tions systems were deficient.

Unless a government took immediate ac- tion to develop and implement the correct counterstrategy, the situation would pro- gressively deteriorate and inevitably lead to an insurgent victory. The most comprehen- sive counterstrategy to deal with communist revolutionary warfare was the so-called oil spot theory. This theory, promoted by Brit- ish strategists in Malaya, maintained that an effective counterstrategy had to have a clear aim and had to be comprehensive and based on the rule of law in order to reinforce the government's legitimacy. This legitimacy differentiated it from the insurgents, who em- ployed terror and other extralegal means. As a first step, the government had to secure its

own base areas, particularly population, eco- nomic, and communications centers. Once this had been accomplished, the government could expand its control progressively, first to the immediate outlying areas that were less infiltrated by the insurgents and then into the more heavily infiltrated regions that lay beyond. In doing so it had to place prior- ity on destroying the subversion, the commu- nist underground, and not on the guerrillas, whose purpose was to protect the under- ground and to disrupt pacification—the gov- ernment's effort to establish its control over the area. In this view, it was essential that the government counterstrategy be closely coor- dinated as a single effort: its primary aim was both offensive and constructive, that of na-tion building; its secondary, defensive aim was destruction of the guerrillas; and the two were joined by pacification.

The high point of communist revolution- ary warfare coincided with the era of post– World War II decolonization and nation building. However, it was neither the only form of protracted war pursued by insur- gents during the Cold War, as illustrated by revolutionary movements such as those in Algeria and Mozambique, nor the only one employed by communists, as demonstrated in Greece and Cuba. Although its propo- nents frequently tried to surround it with an aura of invincibility, the record shows that communist revolutionary warfare enjoyed only mixed success. Its most notable victo-ries occurred in the Chinese Civil War and in Indochina, but it was defeated in Malaya, the Philippines (Hukbalahap), Thailand, and Peru (Shining Path).

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Congo Civil War (1960–1965)

The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union with opposing factions in the Congo Civil War transformed a nationalist struggle for control in the newly indepen- dent country into a Cold War battleground. The conflict began in July 1960 and com- prised three main phases. The first was the secession of the Katanga and South Kasai provinces and the ensuing struggle to re- store them to the nation. The second phase was the battle for control between the op- position governments of Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lamumba, and the third was the fight for power between Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe. Throughout the five-year conflict, the United States supported Kasa- vubu, while the communist bloc provided assistance to his main opponents. The inter- locking conflicts were finally resolved when army

chief of staff General Joseph Désiré Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko) seized power, with American support, on November 24,

1965, presenting the Americans with a per- ceived victory.

Hopes of an orderly transfer of power from Belgian colonial rule ended when dis- satisfaction throughout the Congo turned vi- olent. An army mutiny on July 5, 1960, was followed by the secession of two provinces: Katanga (Shaba) on July 11 and South Kasai on August 8. As rioting spread, Belgium sent in troops to protect the lives and property of its citizens. Faced with the disintegration of their country and an unauthorized for- eign intervention, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the United Nations (UN). On July 14, 1960, a UN resolution called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and organized a UN military force to restore order. Although the United States supported the UN action, there was increasing concern that Lumumba's leftist political orientation might provide an op- portunity for communist infiltration. Thus, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized covert action to oust Lumumba and cultivate pro-Western leaders, such as Kasavubu and Mobutu.

On September 5, 1960, Kasavubu dis- missed Lumumba as prime minister, initiat- ing the next phase of the war. Asserting that this action exceeded Kasavubu' s constitu- tional authority, Lumumba, in return, dis- missed the president. As conflict loomed, Mobutu took control and ordered Lumum- ba' s arrest. In response, Antoine Gizenga, as leader of the Lumumbists, established an alternative government at Stanleyville (Ki- sangani) in November. By the end of 1960, the Congo was divided into four warring re- gions: Katanga under T shombe' s leadership, South Kasai led by Albert Kalonji, the west- ern Congo under Mobutu's control, and the eastern regions under Gizenga.

When the world learned in February 1961 of Lumumba's death while in government

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custody, protests erupted against Mobutu's regime. The USSR formally recognized Gi- zenga's government, while the United States declared its

support for Mobutu's govern- ment in Leopoldville (Kinshasa). By the summer of 1961, with direct UN action and indirect U.S. action, Mobutu defeated Gi- zenga's rebel regime and ended the Kasai secession. Civilian control returned in July when an agreement was reached for the for- mation of a coalition government containing representatives from all three factions. Kasa- vubu resumed the presidency, with Cyrille Adoula as prime minister.

Tshombe, however, refused to join the coalition government, continuing to assert Katanga's independence. His recalcitrance encouraged the Lamumbists, and the co- alition began to collapse. Gizenga left the government, joined forces with Tshombe, and by November 1962 directly threatened Adoula's rule. When the Soviets offered Adoula military aid, the United States urged the UN to act. On December 28, 1962, Bel- gian troops supplied and financed by the Americans led the UN operation to restore Katanga to the Congo. On January 21, 1963, Tshombe, realizing defeat was inevitable, surrendered, ending the Katanga secession.

Gizenga, however, continued to oppose the Kasavubu-Adoula regime with support from the communist bloc and by the summer of 1964 controlled more than half of the Con- go's territory. Fearing that Kasavubu was not strong enough to withstand the Lamumbist advance, the United States stabilized the government by pressuring Kasavubu to ac- cept Tshombe, a staunch anticommunist, as prime minister while persuading Belgium to provide military support for the Congolese Army, enabling it to defeat the Lumumbist insurgency.

Although 1965 began with a seemingly unified Congo, a power struggle developed

between Kasavubu and Tshombe, both of whom wanted executive control. When they attempted to oust each other, civil war again threatened. But on November 24, 1965, Mobutu, allegedly with U.S. support, dis- missed all the politicians and assumed power, thereby ending the Congo Civil War.

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Cuba

The largest and westernmost island of the West Indies chain, Cuba is in the Caribbean Sea, west of Hispaniola and 90 miles south of Key West, Florida. Cuba became a politi- cally independent state on May 20, 1902. For the first half of the 20th century, the United States set the standards to which the Cuban population aspired.

General Fulgencio Batista's military coup on March 10, 1952, occurred only two months before an election in which nationalist forces were within reach of the presidency. The de- struction of the Cuban democracy by Batis- ta's rightist junta did not generate significant opposition in Washington. Indeed, the United States backed Batista as an ally in the Cold War. For its part, the Cuban authoritarian right manipulated the West by presenting itself as a bulwark against communism. In

practice, the Batista government was actu- ally undermining democracy with its repres- sive policies. And Batista's regime did little to improve living standards for poor Cubans, while the middle class and elites enjoyed a close and lucrative relationship with Ameri- can businesses.

A potent popular insurrection against Ba- tista's regime had grown in the eastern and central parts of Cuba by 1958. The leaders of the revolution, Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, questioned Cuban depen- dence on the United States as well as market economy principles. They perceived their

movement as part of a developing-world re- bellion against the West and as a natural ally of the communist bloc.

The United States was not prepared to deal with the charismatic and doctrinaire Castro. After his takeover, the United States under- estimated the profound grievances provoked by American support for the Batista regime. Some of Castro's early measures, such as land reform, the prosecution of Batista's cro- nies (with no guarantee of due process), and the nationalization of industries, were over- whelmingly popular, but at the same time they met stiff U.S. resistance.

Against this backdrop, Castro approached the Soviet Union for support, and in Febru- ary 1960 a Soviet delegation led by Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba and signed a trade agreement with Castro's gov- ernment. The Soviets then began to replace the United States as Cuba's main trade and political partner. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev soon promised Cuba new ma- chinery, oil, consumer goods, and a market for Cuban products now subject to Ameri- can sanctions.

In April 1961, U.S.–Cuban relations col- lapsed completely, thanks to the abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The assault was

condemned to failure, given Castro's pop- ularity and the lack of U.S. air support for the rebel force. The botched attack only en- couraged closer relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Khrushchev subsequently proposed installing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba to ensure a better bargaining posi- tion with the United States and as a means of offering protection to Cuba. Castro was elated. Khrushchev naively assumed that the missiles could be installed without U.S. de- tection. U.S. intelligence quickly discovered the activity, however, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous confron- tation between the two superpowers of the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy de- clared a naval quarantine against the island in October 1962. For nearly two weeks the world stood at the edge of a nuclear abyss. In the end, Kennedy and Khrushchev worked out an agreement in which the Soviets with- drew the missiles in return for U.S. promises not to invade Cuba and to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

The end of Kennedy's quarantine did not conclude the strife between Cuba and the United States, however. In addition to an embargo that continues to this day, the United States launched additional covert op- erations against Castro's government. The most important one, Operation Mongoose, included 14 CIA attempts to assassinate Castro. American hostility was reinforced by the Cuban revolution's transformation from a nationalist rebellion against authori- tarianism to a totalitarian state aligned with the Soviet Union, with serious shortcomings in civil and political liberties.

The solution to the Cuban Missile Cri- sis also created serious strains between Ha- vana and Moscow. Cuba's foreign policy was made in Havana, and therefore Castro refused to accept Moscow' s or Beijing' s directives. In 1968 he cracked down on a group of Cuban

communists, accusing them of working with Soviet agents in Havana. In the end, he used the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslo- vakia against the Prague Spring to broker a compromise by which Cuba preserved its autonomy but promised not to criticize the USSR publicly. Cuba thus became a Com- econ member and received significant addi- tional economic aid from the communist bloc.

In Latin America, the Cuban government actively supported revolutionary movements with leftist or nationalist agendas, especially those that challenged American hegemony in the region. But the 1960s witnessed suc- cessive failed Cuban attempts to export rev- olution to other countries. Guevara's 1967 murder in Bolivia concluded a series of sub- versive projects encouraged by Havana. Cuban revolutionary attempts were part of Cubans' core revolutionary beliefs and also a response to the rupture of diplomatic rela- tions with Havana by all the Latin American countries except Mexico.

From the 1970s to 1990, as part of the Cold War conflict, Cuba played a major role in the international context. A high point of Cas- tro's foreign policy came at the 1979 Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana. Cuba became a major conduit of al- liance between the developing world and the communist bloc. Havana's diplomatic suc- cess and military involvement were accom- panied by a massive civilian involvement in aid

programs to African, Latin American, and Asian countries in the areas of health and education.

Cuba adopted a foreign policy suited to a medium-sized power. Castro sent 40,000 troops to Angola to support the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in its struggle against the National Union for the Total Inde- pendence of Angola (UNIT A) forces backed by South Africa and the United States. Cuba

also dispatched troops to aid the pro-Soviet government of Ethiopia. In all, Cuba de- ployed more than 300,000 troops or military advisors to Angola, Ethiopia, the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, Syria, and South Yemen. The fight in southern Af- rica was ended through a skillfully designed tripartite agreement signed by Cuba, Angola, and South Africa and mediated by President Ronald Reagan' s administration. This agree- ment led to the independence of Namibia.

Paradoxically, due in part to these Cold War commitments, Cuba missed its best chance to solve its conflict with the United States. During 1970–1980 the Americans sought serious negotiations with Cuba. This began under Richard Nixon's presidency and saw the most promise during Jimmy Cart- er's presidency (1977–1981). Carter dem- onstrated that he was serious in his desire to improve relations among the nations of the hemisphere and promote human rights. In 1977 Carter went so far as so say that the United States did not consider a Cuban retreat from Angola a precondition for be- ginning negotiations. Castro, however, in- sisted on continuing what he defined as "revolutionary solidarity" and "proletarian internationalism."

The Cuban government was interested in negotiations with the Americans but insisted on a radical leftist solution to problems. Cas- tro took significant steps in releasing politi- cal prisoners and allowing visits to the island by Cuban exiles as goodwill gestures to the United States. In the international arena, Cuba informed the Americans about the Ka- tanga rebellion in Zaire. Nevertheless, Cuba gave priority to its relations with other revo- lutionary movements, especially in Africa. In 1977 Castro sent 17,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia to support dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in his territorial conflict with Soma- lia. This development, despite the progress

in several bilateral issues, represented a major blow to the prospect of improved Cuban–U.S. relations, as did Castro' s support for the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s.

A new development came in 1976 when Ricardo Boffill, Elizardo Sanchez, and Gus- tavo Arcos founded the first human rights group in Cuba since 1959. A new genera- tion of opposition groups based on strategies of civil disobedience slowly emerged, gain- ing strength in the 1990s. During the 1970s Cuban civil society also began to emerge from totalitarian ostracism that had reduced its religious communities to a minimum. This evolution continued, and at the end of the 1980s the religious groups were growing at a fast pace.

The collapse of the communist bloc be- ginning in 1989 was a major catastrophe for Castro's government, as Cuba lost its major benefactors. At the same time, the interna- tional community, particularly Latin Amer- ica and the former communist countries, adopted general norms of democratic gover- nance opposed to the goals and behavior of the Cuban leadership. Without Soviet back- ing, Cuba adjusted its economy and foreign policy to survive in a world that was no lon- ger safe for revolution. In 1988 Castro with- drew Cuban troops from Angola and reduced the Cuban military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Cuba's gross domestic product fell by al- most one-third between 1989 and 1993. The collapse of the Cuban economy was particu- larly hard on imports, which fell from 8.6 bil- lion pesos in 1989 to about 2 billion pesos in 1993. In response to the economic collapse, Castro permitted limited private enterprise, allowed Cubans to have foreign currencies, and pushed for foreign investment, particu- larly in tourism. His reforms, however, did little to stop the economic hemorrhaging.

In addition, Cuban troops were withdrawn from wherever they were posted. More than 15 years after the Cold War wound down, Castro remains one of the last leaders of the old-style communist order.

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Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, came to full- scale nuclear war. In 1958 an indigenous revolutionary movement led by Fidel Cas- tro seized power from Fulgencio Batista, a U.S. client who since 1933 had been dictator of the Caribbean island of Cuba, less than a hundred miles from the American coast. Al- though Castro initially declared that he was not a communist, in the spring of 1959 he covertly sought Soviet aid and military pro- tection. American economic pressure and boycotts quickly gave him an excuse to move openly into the Soviet camp. In response, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planned to assist Cuban exiles to attack the island and

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overthrow Castro. Initiated under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and inherited by his successor John F. Kennedy, the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion attempt proved a humil- iating fiasco for the United States. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa- mara continued to develop plans for a second invasion, and their advisors also devised var- ious ingenious and often far-fetched schemes to overthrow or assassinate Castro. Castro, in turn, sought further Soviet aid.

In mid-1961, as the concurrent Berlin Cri- sis intensified and culminated in the build- ing of the Berlin Wall, military hard-liners in the Kremlin,

frustrated for several years, succeeded in implementing a 34 percent increase in spending on conventional forces. Both the Bay of Pigs and Kennedy's bel- licose inauguration rhetoric that his coun- try would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, op- pose any foe, in order to assure the survival

and the success of liberty," may have ener- gized them. Despite claims of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, in practice the strategic missile im- balance greatly favored the United States, which had at least eight times as many nu- clear warheads as its rival. Even American leaders were unaware of just how lopsid- edly the nuclear situation favored them, be- lieving the ratio to be only about three to one. The then recent U.S. deployment of 15 intermediate-range missiles in Turkey, directly threatening Soviet territory, fur- ther angered Nikita Khrushchev, the So- viet Communist Party's general secretary, making him eager to redress the balance. It seems that he also hoped to pressure the United States into making concessions on Berlin while he rebutted communist Chinese charges that the Soviets were only paper ti- gers who were unwilling to take concrete action to advance the cause of international



revolution. In addition, Khrushchev appar- ently felt a romantic sense of solidarity with the new Cuban state, which reassured him and other old communists that their cause still possessed international vitality.

Early in 1962, Khrushchev offered Soviet nuclear missiles, under the control of So- viet technicians and troops, to Castro, who accepted and oversaw their secret installa- tion. Khrushchev apparently believed that these would deter American plans to invade Cuba. Rather optimistically, he calculated that Kennedy and his advisors would find the prospect of nuclear war over the Cuban mis- siles so horrifying that, despite their chagrin, once the missiles were in place they would accept their presence in Cuba.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco followed by Khrush- chev's June 1961 summit meeting with Ken- nedy at Vienna apparently convinced the Soviet leader that Kennedy was weak and would be easily intimidated. So confident was Khrushchev that when Kennedy admin- istration officials warned in July and August 1962 that the United States would respond strongly should the Soviets deploy nuclear or other significant weaponry in Cuba, he implicitly

denied any intention of doing so. Admittedly, by this time the missiles had already been secretly dispatched, and their in- stallation was at least a partial fait accompli. At this stage of his career, moreover, Khrush- chev's behavior tended to be erratic. In any case, he miscalculated. Instead of treating

Aerial view of the San Cristobal medium range ballistic missile launch site number two, Cuba, November 1, 1962. (U.S. Air Force)

the Cuban missiles as deterrent weapons, the Kennedy administration regarded them as evidence of Soviet aggressiveness and re- fused to accept their presence.

In October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance planes provided Kennedy with photographic evidence that Soviet officials had installed intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. When the president learned on October 16, 1962, of the presence of the missiles, he summoned a secret Executive Committee of 18 top ad- visors, among them chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D.

Taylor, CIA di- rector John McCone, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa- mara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, and the president's brother and closest ad- visor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, to decide on the American response. Presi- dent Kennedy also included senior members of the broader foreign policy establishment, including former secretary of defense Robert A. Lovett and former secretary of state Dean Acheson.

Whatever the logical justification for Khrushchev's behavior, politically it would have been almost impossible for any Amer- ican president to accept the situation. The American military calculated that the mis- siles would increase Soviet nuclear striking force against the continental United States by 50 percent. In reality, U.S. officials under- estimated missile numbers, and they actually would have doubled or even tripled Soviet striking capabilities, reducing the existing American numerical advantage to a ratio of merely two or three to one. Kennedy, how- ever, viewed the missiles less as a genuine military threat than as a test of his credibil- ity and leadership. Taylor, speaking for the U.S. military, initially favored launching air strikes to destroy the missile installations, a course of action that would almost certainly

have killed substantial numbers of Soviet troops, was unlikely to eliminate all the mis- siles, and might well have provoked full- scale nuclear war. Another option, invasion by U.S. ground forces, also risked nuclear war. Discussions continued for several days. Eventually, on October 22, Kennedy pub- licly announced the presence of the missiles in Cuba, demanded that the Soviet Union re- move them, and announced the imposition of a naval blockade around the island.

Several tense days ensued, in the course of which, on October 27, Soviet antiaircraft batteries on Cuba shot down—apparently without specific authorization from Krem- lin leaders, whom this episode greatly alarmed—a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance air- craft. Seeking to avoid further escalation of the crisis, Kennedy refused to follow Tay- lor's advice to retaliate militarily and delib- erately refrained from action. After some hesitation, Khrushchev acquiesced in the re- moval of the missiles, once his ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, secretly obtained an unpublicized pledge

from Rob- ert Kennedy that his brother would shortly remove the missiles in Turkey. Provided that the Soviet missiles were removed and not re- placed, the United States also promised not to mount another invasion of Cuba.

Recently released tapes of conversations among President Kennedy and his advisors reveal that to avoid nuclear war, he was pre- pared to make even greater concessions to the Soviets, including taking the issue to the United Nations and openly trading Turkish missiles for those in Cuba. In so doing, he parted company with some of his more hard- line advisors. Showing considerable states- manship, Kennedy deliberately refrained from emphasizing Khrushchev's humilia- tion, although other administration officials were less diplomatic and celebrated their victory to the press.

Newly opened Soviet documentary evi- dence has demonstrated that the Cuban situ- ation was even more dire than most involved then realized. Forty-two thousand well- equipped Soviet troops were already on the island, far more than the 10,000 troops that American officials had estimated. Moreover, although Kennedy's advisors believed that some of the missiles might already be armed, they failed to realize that no less than 158 short- and intermediate-range warheads on the island, whose use Castro urged should the United States invade, were already op- erational and that 42 of these could have reached American territory. A bellicose Cas- tro was also hoping to shoot down additional U-2 planes and provoke a major confronta- tion. The potential for a trigger-happy mili- tary officer to set off a full-scale nuclear war certainly existed.

The Cuban Missile Crisis had a sobering impact on its protagonists. Humiliation at American hands was among the factors that compelled Soviet leaders to undertake an expensive major nuclear buildup to achieve parity with the United States, reaching this in 1970. Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964 was probably at least partly due to the missile crisis. Soviet officials also felt that they had come dangerously close to losing control of the actual employment of nuclear weapons in Cuba, either to their own mili- tary commanders on the ground or even po- tentially to Castro's forces. Even

though the settlement effectively ensured his regime's survival, Castro felt humiliated that the So- viets and Americans had settled matters be- tween them without regard for him. Before Khrushchev's fall from power, the two men were reconciled, and Soviet–Cuban relations remained close until the end of the Cold War. To the chagrin of successive U.S. presidents, however, Castro remained in power into the

21st century, eventually becoming the doyen among world political leaders.

The Cuban Missile Crisis tested and per- haps weakened the W estern alliance. W est European political leaders, including Har- old Macmillan of Britain, Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, W est Germany), and most notably Charles de Gaulle of France, felt some discomfort that although Kennedy dispatched Acheson to brief them on the crisis, American offi- cials had not consulted them on decisions of great importance to their own countries' survival. This may have been one factor im- pelling de Gaulle to follow a highly inde- pendent foreign policy line in subsequent years.

The crisis exerted a certain salutary, ma- turing effect on Kennedy, making the once- brash young president a strong advocate of disarmament in the final months before his untimely death in November 1963. His stance compelled the Soviet leadership to es- tablish a hotline between Moscow and Wash- ington to facilitate communications and ease tensions during international crises. The two powers also finally reached agreement in 1963 on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which halted nuclear testing in the atmo- sphere, under water, and in space. From then on both superpowers exercised great caution in dealing with each other, and on no sub- sequent occasion did they come so close to outright nuclear war.

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Dominican Republic, U.S. Interventions in

Occupying the eastern two-thirds of the is- land of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic has witnessed two large-scale U.S. mili- tary interventions. The first occurred during 1916–1924 and the second in 1965. The first American intervention, when U.S. president Woodrow Wilson sent U.S. Marines to the island nation in 1916, was justified as being necessary to terminate lawlessness and Do- minicans' failure to meet their financial ob- ligations to the United States. As early as 1905, the Americans had taken over the re- ceivership of the Dominican Republic's cus- toms, which lasted until 1940.

Though the military occupation im- proved the island republic's infrastructure to some degree, nationalist opposition to U.S. rule was especially focused on the U.S.- established National Guard, which often- times acted with considerable brutality. When the United States withdrew its forces from the country, it left power in the hands of the National Guard, led by Rafael Tru- jillo. Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic for more than three decades, from 1930 until his assassination in May 1961.

Trujillo ruled with considerable savagery, using the National Guard and his feared se- cret police force to suppress and eliminate any political dissent. Meanwhile, he treated the Dominican Republic as his personal fief- dom. Until the late 1950s, Trujillo enjoyed the uncritical support of the United States. He also quickly learned how to exploit Cold

War fears of communism in the Caribbean to secure favors from Washington.

The removal of Trujillo in May 1961 was partly assisted by the growth of inter- American and U.S. opposition to his brutal rule and a decision by the John F. Kennedy administration to reduce American support and impose economic sanctions. The period between Trujillo's assassination and the 1965 U.S. military intervention was marked by a complicated history of attempts to create a stable political climate in which Trujillo's cronies and relatives tried, unsuccessfully, to continue the dictator's rule.

In national elections in 1962, the first democratic elections in nearly four decades, a nationalist-reformist coalition, the Do- minican Revolutionary Party (PRD), came to power with the support of middle-class sectors and some populist movements. The new government was headed by the Domin- ican novelist Juan Bosch. After an initial honeymoon period in which the Kennedy administration responded warmly to the new government, relations with Washing- ton began to deteriorate, especially when Bosch made clear his intentions to recog- nize the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. Bosch's economic reforms, which included modest land reform and the nationalization of several major enterprises, further aroused anti-communist fear within the Dominican Republic and in the United States.

With signs of U.S. approval, in September 1963 elements of the nation's armed forces led by archconservative General Elias Wes- sin y Wessin overthrew Bosch, who went

into exile in Puerto Rico. The coup installed a military triumvirate headed by business- man Donald Reid Cabral.

The leaders of the new regime abolished the constitution, but nearly two years of cor- ruption and brutal internal repression pro- duced a popular uprising on April 24, 1965, which restored Bosch and his Constitution- alist movement to power. For four days the Constitutionalists and their military and ci- vilian supporters, led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, fought to prevent a counterattack led by Wessin y Wessin.

The fighting in Santo Domingo soon took on the characteristics of a popular insurrec- tion and began to spread to other regions of the country. Despite their use of tank as- saults and aerial bombing, the Wessin-led forces were on the verge of defeat. The im- pending collapse of the Wessin forces and faulty intelligence supplied by U.S. ambas- sador William Tapley, who reported to the U.S. State Department that the lives of Amer- ican citizens were imperiled by communist- led hordes, set the scene for a full-scale U.S. intervention.

On April 28, 1965, a clearly panicked President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered 20,000 U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic. The Americans' official rationale was that the action was needed to prevent a communist takeover of the country and the emergence of a "second Cuba." Evidence of communist influence within the insurrection was, how- ever, very thin. The Communist Party's small number of militants and the members of the Castroite June 14 Movement certainly played a role in the Constitutionalist resistance, but the popular insurrection was overwhelm- ingly made up of the urban poor of Santo Domingo. The American intervention in practice seemed designed to prevent a return to Constitutional government by Bosch and to block radical social and economic change in the island republic.

U.S. intervention forces were soon aided by an Organization of American States (OAS) intervention peace force. The OAS force was the result of vigorous U.S. lobbying and was in violation of inter-American prohibitions on foreign military intervention in the affairs of the region. American and OAS forces took a month to defeat the Constitutionalist insur- rection and impose an interim administration before new elections were convened. In the elections of June 1966, a large majority of voters elected Joaquín Balaguer, a

former Trujillo loyalist, and his Reformist Party. Balaguer remained in power for most of the next 28 years. Systematic police terror, an astronomical increase in political corruption, and the transformation of the Dominican Republic into a secure location for foreign in- vestors were the main legacies of the U.S. intervention.

Barry Carr

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Dulles, John Foster (1888–1959)

Born in Washington, D.C., on February 25, 1888, John Foster Dulles studied under Woodrow Wilson at Princeton University and at the Sorbonne, earned a law degree from George Washington University, and in 1911 joined the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Appointed to the U.S. delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace

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Conference, Dulles unsuccessfully sought to restrain Allied reparations demands on Germany.

Active between the wars in internation- alist organizations, Dulles initially opposed American intervention in World War II. Once American belligerency seemed prob- able, however, he focused intensely on post- war planning. A prominent Presbyterian, in 1941 he became chairman of the Commis- sion to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, established by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing 25 million American Protestants. Its blue- print for international reform, finished in 1943, urged the creation of international or- ganizations to facilitate peaceful resolution of

disputes among states, economic integra- tion, arms control, and religious, intellectual, and political freedom, objectives all conso- nant with the 1941 Atlantic Charter.

Dulles also became prominent in Republi- can politics, advising presidential candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey on international affairs. Seeking to secure bipartisan politi- cal support for his foreign policy, President Harry S. Truman included Dulles in virtually all major international meetings, beginning with the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drafted the final United Nations Char- ter. Briefly appointed Republican senator for New York in 1948–1949, Dulles strongly supported creation of the North Atlantic Se- curity Organization (NATO). He also sup- ported European integration as a means of strengthening the continent's economies and militaries.

By the late 1940s Dulles had become a ded- icated anticommunist. When Chinese com- munists won control of the mainland in 1949, he advocated American backing for Jiang Jieshi' s Guomindang (Nationalist) regime on Taiwan. In June 1950, when the Demo- cratic People' s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea

(ROK, South Korea), Dulles urged U.S. in- tervention and the extension of protection to Taiwan. As a foreign affairs advisor to the Republican presidential campaign in 1952, Dulles argued that the Truman administra- tion had been timorous in merely contain- ing Soviet communism when it should have moved to roll back Soviet influence in East- ern Europe.

Named secretary of state by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, Dulles de- ferred to the president's leadership, although the two men were very different in style. A supporter of Eisenhower's New Look de- fense policy of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, Dulles rhetorically threatened to wreak "massive retaliation" against Ameri- can enemies, a tactic nicknamed "brinkman- ship." In practice, however, he was often more cautious. Although Dulles's belli- cose anticommunist rhetoric alarmed many European leaders, his policies proved prag- matic, effectively respecting established So- viet interests in Europe. When discontented East Berlin workers triggered an uprising in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in 1953 and again when Hun- garians rebelled against Soviet

rule in 1956, Dulles and Eisenhower welcomed refugees but offered no other support.

Dulles and Eisenhower ended the Korean War in 1953, pressuring both sides to accept an armistice, and established a series of alli- ances around Asia, supplementing the 1951 United States–Japan Security Treaty and Australia, New Zealand, United States Secu- rity Treaty (ANZUS) Pact with bilateral se- curity treaties with South Korea and Taiwan and with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- tion (SEA TO). When possible, Eisenhower avoided direct major military interventions, preferring to rely on covert operations or- chestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headed by Dulles' s younger brother Allen. The CIA played key roles in coups that

overthrew Left-leaning governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954.

In Indochina in 1954, Dulles and Eisen- hower withstood pressure from U.S. military leaders and, after Britain had declined to as- sist, refused to authorize air strikes to res- cue French troops surrounded by insurgent Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles attended the 1954 Geneva Conference but would not sign the resulting accords that par- titioned Vietnam, instead calling for coun- trywide elections within two years, a contest that Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh was widely expected to win. Instead, Dulles and Eisenhower broke the accords and provided economic aid to the noncommunist Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), seeking to build it up to ensure its independence.

Dulles and Eisenhower considered strength- ening America's West European allies as their first priority. In March 1953, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin died, and new Soviet leaders ad- vanced suggestions for German reunification and neutralization. Distrust on both sides made such proposals ultimately fruitless, although the former World War II allies agreed on a peace treaty with Austria that left that state neutral throughout the Cold War. Seeking to reinforce NA TO, Eisenhower and Dulles backed proposals for a

multinational Euro- pean Defense Community (EDC), a plan that France vetoed in 1954.

Dulles's relations with Britain and France, whose imperialism he deplored, reached their nadir in 1956. In 1953 Egyp- tian nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power. Initially, he sought military and eco- nomic aid from the United States, but the Israeli lobby prevented such aid. He then obtained arms from the Soviet bloc. This, in turn, led Dulles in 1956 to rescind an ear- lier American pledge to provide Nasser with funding for his Aswan Dam project, where- upon Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal,

co-owned by the British and French govern- ments. While openly joining Dulles in ne- gotiations with Egypt, Britain and France covertly agreed with Israel on war against Egypt to regain the canal, mounting an inva- sion in early November 1956 just before the U.S. presidential election. Dulles and Eisen- hower strenuously pressured all three pow- ers to withdraw, which they eventually did, but the episode soured Anglo-American re- lations. Although Dulles hoped to align the United States with nationalist forces around the world, the open growth of Soviet inter- est in the Middle East brought the announce- ment the following spring of the Eisenhower Doctrine, whereby the United States claimed the right to intervene militarily against in- digenous or external communist threats in the region. This provoked significant anti- Americanism throughout the world.

The emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as top Soviet leader in the mid-1950s seemed to promise a relaxation of Soviet–American tensions, as Khrushchev openly repudiated Stalinist tactics and called for peaceful coex- istence between communist and noncommu- nist nations. Eisenhower hoped to conclude substantive disarmament agreements with Khrushchev. In practice, however, Khrush- chev was often far from accommodating. The USSR's success in launching the first space satellite (*Sputnik*) in 1957, Soviet possession of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and Khrushchev's seeming readiness from late 1958 onward to provoke an international cri- sis over Berlin all alarmed American lead- ers, including the ailing Dulles (diagnosed in 1957 with cancer).

Although American nation-building efforts in both Taiwan and South Vietnam enjoyed apparent success, during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958) Dulles was notably more cautious about gratuitously challenging either communist China or possibly, by extension,

the Soviets. When his cancer worsened, he re- signed as secretary on April 15, 1959. Dulles died in Washington, D.C., on May 24, 1959.

Priscilla Roberts

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E

Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890 –1969)

Born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890, Dwight Eisenhower grew up in Abilene, Kansas, and graduated from the U.S. Mili- tary Academy, West Point, in 1915. Posted to France during W orld W ar I, he arrived only after

the end of combat operations. In 1939 Eisenhower became chief of staff to the new Third Army. Transferred to the War Depart- ment in W ashington following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he held increasingly responsible staff jobs, working in the War Plans Division, where he helped to plan the Europe First strategy before his summer 1942 transfer to London as commander of American and Allied forces in Britain. In No- vember 1942 he organized the North Afri- can campaign and in late 1943 launched the invasion of Italy. In December 1943 he was named to command the Allied forces sched- uled to invade Western Europe in 1944, and in spring 1945 he was promoted to general of the army.

From 1945 to 1948 Eisenhower served as chief of staff of the army. He was president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1952. During this time he was actively involved with the Council on Foreign Relations and spent time in Washington, informally chair- ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Admi- ral of the Fleet William D. Leahy's illness. Eisenhower strongly endorsed President Harry S. Truman's developing Cold War policies, including intervention in Korea. Eisenhower's focus, however, remained the European situation and Soviet–American

rivalry. In January 1951 he took leave from Columbia to serve as supreme commander of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In 1952 the Republican Party, desper- ate to choose a candidate who would be as- sured of victory, turned to Eisenhower. As a candidate, he promised to end the Korean War but otherwise continued Truman's Cold War policies. Eisenhower won the Novem- ber elections, defeating Democrat Adlai Stevenson.

Under Eisenhower, U.S. defense commit- ments around the world solidified into a net- work of bilateral and multilateral alliances. While maintaining its existing commit- ments to NATO, the Rio Pact, Japan, and the ANZUS South Pacific alliance, the United States established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, associated itself with the Middle Eastern Baghdad Pact in 1959, and signed bilateral security treaties with South Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

A fiscal conservative uncomfortable with high defense budgets, Eisenhower in- troduced the New Look strategy of relying heavily on nuclear weapons rather than on conventional forces. Critics of the New Look defense strategy complained that it left the United States unprepared to fight limited wars.

In March 1953 Soviet dictator Josef Sta- lin died, to be replaced first by a triumvirate of Soviet officials headed by Georgy Malen- kov and then in 1955 by Nikita Khrushchev. Stalin's death may well have facilitated ef- forts to end the Korean War, although Soviet

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

General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded the Western Allied forces in the invasion of Europe and the defeat of Germany in World War II and was the first supreme commander of North Atlantic Treaty Orga- nization (NATO) forces (1950–1952). Eisenhower served two terms as president of the United States during 1953–1961. (Library of Congress)

proposals in 1953 to neutralize and reunite all Germany proved fruitless. As president, Eisenhower fulfilled his campaign pledge to end the Korean War, seemingly threatening to employ nuclear weapons unless an armi- stice agreement was concluded.

Alarmed by the increasing destructiveness of nuclear armaments, Eisenhower was the first president to attempt, albeit rather unsuc- cessfully, to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. British prime minis- ter Winston Churchill, in office when Eisen- hower first became president, strongly urged him to reach such understandings. Eisen- hower's efforts began with his "Atoms for Peace" speech of December 1953, developed

into his Open Skies Proposal at the 1955 Ge- neva Conference, and evolved into lengthy negotiations for a treaty to restrict atmo- spheric nuclear testing, which by the time the Geneva Conference was held in 1959 seemed likely to be successful.

In February 1956 Khrushchev repudi- ated much of Stalin's legacy, including his personality cult and his use of terror against political opponents, a move suggesting that the potential existed for a Soviet–American rapprochement. Soon afterward, Khrush- chev expressed his faith that it might be pos- sible for the East and West to attain a state of peaceful coexistence with each other. Prog- ress toward this end was patchy, however. From 1958 until 1961, Khrushchev made re- peated attempts to coerce and intimidate the Western powers into abandoning control of West Berlin.

In September 1959, after a protracted Ge- neva conference on disarmament, Khrush- chev visited the United States, a trip that included an address to the United Nations, an apparently fruitful meeting at Camp David, a stay on Eisenhower's Maryland farm, and a presidential tour of the nearby Gettys- burg battlefield. The much-vaunted Spirit of Camp David, however, soon evaporated. In May 1960, a long-planned summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev ended in fiasco after Russian artillery shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory on May 5, shortly before the meeting began. Eisenhower took full responsibility for this event but refused to yield to Khrushchev's demands that the United States apologize and cease all such overflights. In response, Khrushchev angrily canceled the summit.

As the Bandung Non-Aligned Move- ment gained strength around the developing world, especially in decolonizing Asia, Af- rica, and the Middle East, where nationalist sentiments frequently ran high, Eisenhower

sought to entice Third World nations into the U.S. camp. In July 1956 the United States re- scinded an earlier offer to grant Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's new and fiercely nationalist president, a loan for the Aswan Dam proj- ect, leading Nasser to seize the Suez Canal from France and Great Britain. Eisenhower refused to endorse the subsequent invasion of Egypt by those two nations, in conjunc- tion with Israel, in late October 1956, and instead put heavy, and effective, pressure on them to pull their forces back.

Shortly afterward, the Soviet Union issued a statement threatening to intervene should there be any further Western threats to Mid- dle Eastern countries. The United States, suspicious of any Soviet initiative that might jeopardize Western control of Middle East- ern oil, responded promptly in January 1957 with the Eisenhower Doctrine, pledging American military and economic assistance to any Middle Eastern country that sought to resist communism. Except for Lebanon and Iraq, few nations welcomed this doctrine, be- cause most countries in the region believed that they had more to fear from Western im- perialism than from Soviet expansionism. In 1958 Egypt and Syria encouraged Pan-Arab sentiment by their brief union in the United Arab Republic. Civil war broke out in Leba- non as Muslims sought to replace the pre- dominantly Christian government with an Arab state. Eisenhower responded by land- ing U.S. Marines on Beirut's beaches to re- store order.

As president, Eisenhower was generally cautious in risking American troops in over- seas interventions. He boasted proudly that during his presidency no American soldier lost his life in combat duty. Despite Republi- can claims during the 1952 presidential cam- paign that they would roll back communism across Eastern Europe, when workers rose against Soviet rule in East Berlin in June

1953 and again when Hungarians attempted to expel Soviet troops in the autumn of 1956, Eisenhower refused to intervene. Although he would not recognize the People's Repub- lic of China (PRC), he reacted cautiously in the successive Taiwan Straits crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, leaving ambiguous the likely U.S. reaction to a Chinese attack on the Guomindang-held offshore Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu islands.

In 1954 Eisenhower declined to commit American forces in Indochina after French troops were defeated at Dien Bien Phu. When the 1954 Geneva Accords were an- nounced ending the First Indochinese War and temporarily partitioning Vietnam until countrywide elections could be held, Eisen- hower refused to recognize them. His admin- istration encouraged the government of the southern Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) in its refusal to hold the elections mandated for 1956, and provided military and economic assistance to bolster its in- dependence. Eisenhower justified these ac- tions by citing the domino theory—that if the United States permitted one noncommu- nist area to become communist, the infection would inevitably spread to its neighbors.

Eisenhower also relied heavily on covert activities, authorizing the Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA) to back coups in both Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954 and encouraging it to undertake numerous other secret operations. These included plans for an ill-fated coup attempt against Cuba's communist leader, Fidel Castro.

Rather ironically, in his Farewell Address of January 1961 Eisenhower warned that Cold War policies tended to undercut the demo- cratic values that the United States claimed to defend. He also expressed his concern that high levels of defense spending had created a military-industrial complex with a vested interest in the continuation of international

tensions. Nevertheless, Eisenhower himself contributed to its development by engag- ing the United States in the Space Race and mounting a major educational and industrial drive to enable the United States to surpass Soviet scientific achievements.

After leaving office in 1961, Eisenhower backed American intervention in Vietnam, an area that he specifically warned his suc- cessor John F. Kennedy not to abandon. In retirement Eisenhower wrote two volumes of presidential memoirs. He died in Wash- ington, D.C., on March 28, 1969.

Priscilla Roberts

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G

Geneva Conference (1954)

The Geneva Conference on the Far East opened in that Swiss city on April 26, 1954, with negotiations concentrating on trans- forming the previous

year's armistice in Korea into a permanent peace. Negotiations on that issue produced no results. Separate negotiations over the ongoing war in Indochina began on May 8, one day after the fall of the French bastion of Dien Bien Phu in northwest Vietnam to the Viet Minh. The Indochina talks involved representatives of France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Britain, Laos, Cambodia, and the State of Vietnam (later the Republic of Vietnam).

The Viet Minh capture of Dien Bien Phu seemed to offer a perfect opportunity to re- solve the long Indochina War. The West- ern powers were able to resist a demand by the communist powers that the "resistance governments" of Laos and Cambodia (the Pathet Lao and the Free Khmer, respec- tively) be represented at the talks. On June 17 longtime critic of the Indochina War Pierre Mendès-France became French pre- mier and foreign minister. On June 20 he im- posed a 30-day timetable for an agreement, promising to resign if one was not reached. The Geneva Accords were signed on the last day of the deadline, July 20, but only be- cause the clocks were stopped; it was actu- ally early on July 21.

The leading personalities at Geneva were Mendès-France, PRC foreign minister Zhou

Enlai (Chou Enlai), Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, British foreign min- ister Anthony Eden, U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, DRV premier Pham Van Dong, and State of Vietnam foreign minister Nguyen Quoc Dinh. Dulles left the confer- ence after only a few days. He saw no like- lihood of an agreement on Indochina that Washington could approve, and he disliked the idea of negotiating with Zhou (the United States had yet to recognize the PRC), whom he deliberately snubbed. Dulles ordered the U.S. delegation not to participate in the dis- cussions and to act only as observers.

The Geneva Conference produced sep- arate armistice agreements for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. But Pham Van Dong found himself pressured by Zhou and Mo- lotov into an agreement that gave the Viet Minh far less than it had won on the battle- field. Pending unification of Vietnam, there was

to be a temporary dividing line ("provi- sional demarcation line") at the 17th Parallel. A demilitarized zone would extend 3 miles (5 km) on either side of the line in order to prevent incidents that might lead to a breach of the armistice. The final text provided that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial bound- ary." Vietnam's future was to be determined "on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integ- rity" with "national and general elections" to be held in July 1956. Troops on both sides would have up to 300 days to be regrouped north or south; civilians could also move in either direction if they so desired. An

international supervisory and control com- mission (ISCC) composed of representatives from Canada, Poland, and India (a Western state, a communist state, and a nonaligned state) would oversee implementation of the agreements.

Pham was bitterly disappointed that na- tionwide elections were put off for two years. Eager to take advantage of the Viet Minh' s military successes, he had initially sought a delay of only six months after con- clusion of a cease-fire. The DRV accepted the arrangements only under heavy pressure from the PRC and USSR and because it was confident that it could control southern Viet- nam. There is every reason to believe that the Chinese leadership was willing to sabotage their ally in order to prevent the formation of a strong regional power on their southern border.

As it worked out, in 1956 the new gov- ernment of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) headed by Ngo Dinh Diem claimed that it was not a party to the Ge- neva Agreements and was thus not bound by them. Supported by the Eisenhower admin- istration in this stand, Ngo refused to autho- rize the previously agreed-upon elections to reunify Vietnam. This decision led to a re- sumption of the war, with the Americans tak- ing the place of the French.

Spencer C. Tucker

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Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–)

Born on March 2, 1931, in Privolnoye, Stav- ropol Province, Russia, to a peasant fam- ily, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev joined the Komsomol (Communist Union of the Young) in 1946 and in the same year began driving a harvester for an agricultural co- operative. In 1951 he entered the Law Faculty of Moscow State University, where he earned a law degree in 1955.

Returning to Stavropol following his studies in Moscow, Gorbachev enjoyed a remarkably rapid rise within the ranks of the CPSU, first through various posts in the Komsomol and then in the party apparatus in Stavropol in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Gorbachev be- came a member of the CPSU Central Com- mittee in 1971, a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979, a full member in 1980, and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in March 1985. A keen politi- cian, Gorbachev's political ascendancy was further promoted by Mikhail Suslov and particularly by Yuri Andropov.

Once in power, Gorbachev consolidated his position within the party and proceeded to move forward with internal reforms. He termed his reform agenda *perestroika* (re- structuring) and *glasnost* (openness). What soon became called the "politics of per- estroika" was a process of cumulative reforms, ultimately leading to results that were neither intended nor necessarily desired.

Perestroika had three distinctive phases. The first phase was aimed mainly at the ac- celeration of economic development and the revitalization of socialism. The second phase was marked by the notion of glasnost. Dur- ing this period, Gorbachev emphasized the need for political and social restructuring as well as the necessity of dealing openly with the past. Media freedoms were enhanced

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considerably as part of this process. In the economic arena, limited market-orientated elements were introduced, and greater lati- tude was given to state-owned enterprises. The third and final phase of perestroika was aimed at democratizing the Soviet political process. Reformers created a new bicameral parliament, and new procedures allowed for the direct election of two-thirds of the mem- bers of the Congress of People's Deputies. In March 1990, the Congress abolished the CPSU's political monopoly, paving the way for the legalization of other political parties.

Perestroika's third phase was also marked by some incongruous paradoxes. While the power of the CPSU was waning, Gorbach- ev's power was on the increase. In Octo- ber 1988, he replaced Andrey Gromyko as head of the Presidium of the Supreme So- viet. Seven months later, Gorbachev be- came chairman of the new Supreme Soviet. Finally, in March 1990, the Congress elected him president of the USSR, a newly estab- lished post with potent executive powers. At the same time, Gorbachev's economic re- forms were yielding little fruit. Perestroika was already being overshadowed by civil unrest, interethnic strife, and national and regional independence movements, particu- larly in the Baltic and Caucasus regions.

Gorbachev enjoyed his most remarkable successes in foreign policy. He quickly eased tensions with the West. Two sum- mits with U.S. president Ronald Reagan (Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavík in 1986) paved the way for historic breakthroughs in Soviet–U.S. relations and nuclear arms reductions. On December 8, 1987, the In- termediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by both nations, the first agreement in history that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. In the succeeding years, Gorbachev' s interna- tional stature continued to grow. In 1988,

he ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, ending his nation' s di- sastrous decade-long struggle there. He also promised publicly to refrain from mili- tary intervention in Eastern Europe. In fact, Gorbachev embraced the new democrati- cally elected leadership in the region. Espe- cially significant was his agreement to the reunification of Germany and the inclusion of the new united Federal Republic of Ger- many (FRG, West Germany) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA TO). Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, Gorbachev is generally considered a driv- ing force behind the end of the Cold War.

While Gorbachev's foreign policy was being hailed abroad, problems within the Soviet Union continued unabated. Old-line communists considered Gorbachev's poli- cies as heresy, and economic dislocations multiplied. In 1990, several Soviet-controlled republics, including Russia, declared their independence. Gorbachev tried to stem this tide but was unsuccessful. Talks between Soviet authorities and the breakaway repub- lics resulted in the creation of a new Russian federation (or confederation), slated to be- come law in August 1991.

Many of Gorbachev's reforms were tainted by an attempted coup of reactionary opponents of perestroika in August 1991. Led by high-ranking officials, among them the chief of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), the defense minister, the prime minister, and the vice president, Gorbachev was put under house arrest in his home in Foros after rejecting any negotia- tions with the putsch leaders. With the cou- rageous intervention of the Russian Republic leader Boris Yeltsin, the coup collapsed after two days. Gorbachev returned to Moscow but was now dependent on Yeltsin, who banned the CPSU from the Russian Repub- lic. On August 24, 1991, Gorbachev resigned

as CPSU general secretary. On December 7, 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created a loose confederation called the Community of Independent States (CIS). Soon afterward, eight other republics joined, and the CIS treaty was concluded on Decem- ber 21. Gorbachev resigned as

Soviet presi- dent on December 25, and the Soviet Union became extinct on December 31, 1991.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

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Greek Civil War (1946–1949)

Greece's civil war was rooted in age-old di- visions within Greek society and was com- plicated by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. The nationalists were strongly supported by Britain and the United States. The war was one of the earli- est Cold War tests of will between East and West and claimed the lives of an estimated 80,000 Greeks, a fatality rate that surpassed the suffering of that nation in World War II. Both sides committed atrocities and tried to settle old scores under the guise of conflict- ing ideologies. The conflict's greatest legacy was the Truman Doctrine, which committed the United States and its allies to come to the aid of any nation threatened by commu- nist takeover. This set the stage for President Harry S. Truman's containment policy.

In the early years of the 20th century, conservative and liberal parties in Greece struggled for power, engaging in a series



of bloodless purges that heightened politi- cal instability and created great anger and bitterness. This atmosphere provided fer- tile ground for authoritarianism, and in 1936 General Ioannis Metaxas established a fascist-style dictatorship, further polarizing the country.

Metaxas's death in 1941 and the flight of the Greek government to Egypt after the German invasion left Greece in virtual chaos. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) persecuted under Metaxas, stepped into the power vacuum by creating the National Lib- eration Front (EAM), dedicated to the libera- tion of Greece. By 1944 the EAM boasted nearly two million members, and its military arm, the National Liberation Army (ELAS), had enlisted 50,000 fighters.

In October 1944, British prime minister Winston Churchill, fearful of a communist takeover in Greece and the loss of control over the eastern Mediterranean, met with Soviet Premier Josef Stalin in Moscow and struck a deal over control of the Balkans. In return for Soviet dominance in Bulgaria,

Ro- mania, and Poland, Stalin ceded Greece to Great Britain and vowed not to directly sup- port the KKE after the war.

Relations between the British-backed Greek monarchy and the EAM quickly soured as the communists suppressed dissent and tried to assert control over the country. In retaliation, the British rehabilitated the collaborationist police, returned monarchist military units to the nation, and demanded that the ELAS disarm. On December 2, 1944, collaborationist police fired on antigovern- ment demonstrators, triggering the Battle for Athens. It resulted in a victory for the nation- alists and the disarming of the ELAS. The EAM splintered as moderates and socialists abandoned it, while KKE membership plum- meted from its peak of more than 400,000 to only 50,000. KKE leader Nikos Zachariades

attempted to impose tighter party discipline but was stymied by the strength of the na- tionalist forces.

In an attempt to maintain order, the Brit- ish strengthened the Greek National Guard and turned a blind eye as security forces conducted a campaign of repression against the communists. In the Greek parliamentary elections of March 1946, the rightist can- didates won a landslide victory. The alleg- edly rigged elections prompted the KKE to declare a state of civil war and reorganize ELAS units as the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). The DSE won notable gains in the first year of fighting due in part to sup- port from the communist governments of Yugoslavia and Albania.

Fearing that the nationalists might indeed lose the war against the DSE, the British appealed for help from the United States. Previous British requests for American as- sistance in Greece had been rebuffed, but by 1947 American attitudes had begun to change. President Truman's growing an- tipathy toward the Soviets and their tighten- ing of control in Eastern Europe hardened his stance. On March 12, 1947, he addressed a joint session of Congress, enunciating the Truman Doctrine and requesting a $300 mil- lion aid package to support the Greek nation- alists and anticommunists in nearby Turkey.

The KKE did not take the Truman Doc- trine seriously, believing that the nationalists would capitulate even with U.S. support. By 1948, however, it was becoming clear that the DSE was in dire straits as the American- backed nationalist army grew exponentially. In January 1949, KKE leaders foolishly de- clared that the goal of the civil war was no longer the restoration of parliamentary de- mocracy, as they had previously stated, but rather the establishment of a proletar- ian dictatorship. The DSE then shifted from a mobile war of attrition to a campaign to

defend territory, a tactical miscalculation that played into the hands of the revitalized nationalist army.

In the spring of 1949, the nationalist army cleared the communist rebels out of southern Greece and launched a two-pronged offen- sive designed to drive them completely out of the country. As the fighting reached its cli- max, Yugoslavia closed its border and ended arms shipments that had kept the DSE in- surgency viable. After sustaining more than 2,000 casualties in the summer of 1949, DSE fighters withdrew into Albania during the night of August 29, 1949, effectively ending the civil war. Although sporadic DSE raids continued into 1950, the victory of the na- tionalist forces was by then complete.

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Gromyko, Andrey (1909–1989)

Born on July 18, 1909, to a peasant fam- ily in Starye Gromyki, Belorussia, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko studied agricul- tural economics at the Minsk School of Agricultural Technology, earning a de- gree in 1936. He also became active as a

Komsomol (Communist Y outh) official. After working as a research associate and economist at the Soviet Academy of Sci- ences in Moscow, he entered the Foreign Affairs Ministry, where he was named chief of the U.S. division of the People's Com- missariat of Foreign Affairs in 1939. That same year he began working at the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. In 1943 So- viet leader Josef Stalin appointed Gromyko as Moscow' s youngest-ever ambassador to the United States.

Gromyko played an important role in co- ordinating the wartime alliance between the Americans and Soviets and played a fairly prominent role at diplomatic events such as the February 1945 Yalta Conference and the July–August 1945 Potsdam Conference. He also attended the conference establishing the United Nations (UN) in October 1945 and became Moscow's UN representative in 1946. He served briefly as the ambassador to the United Kingdom during 1952–1953 and then returned to the Soviet Union.

In 1956 Gromyko attained full member- ship on the Central Committee of the Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In 1957 he began his 28-year tenure as for- eign minister. In 1973 he ascended to the Politburo.

During his long career, Gromyko be- came known as an expert and cunning ne- gotiator. In the West he was dubbed "Mr. Nyet" (Mr. No) because of his hard bargain- ing and staunch communist views. At home, he exhibited a great talent for adjusting to the ruling leaders. Thus, he did not develop a characteristic line of politics of his own. Under Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Gromyko readily adapted to the leader's er- ratic whims and played a key role in the Ber- lin and Cuban Missile crises. Under Soviet

leader Leonid Brezhnev, Gromyko reached the apogee of his powers. Brezhnev believed

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in a system of loyalty combined with free- dom to rule one's own destiny. Therefore, he gave Gromyko virtual free rein in setting Soviet foreign policy.

During 1973–1975 Gromyko negotiated on behalf of the Soviet Union during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which led to the landmark 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This act recognized Eu- rope's postwar borders and set a political template for further negotiations concern- ing human rights, science, economics, and cultural exchanges. The Helsinki Final Act marked the full flowering of East–West dé- tente, but because it did not match expecta- tions about liberalization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it precipitated mounting dissent at home and protest abroad.

In 1985 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appointed his own protégé, Eduard She- vardnadze, as foreign minister and named Gromyko president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by then a purely symbolic position. He remained in this post until 1988. Gromyko died on July 2, 1989, in Moscow.

The first gulags were established in tsarist Russia and in the early Soviet era under Vlad- imir Lenin. The gulags reached their zenith in the period of Josef Stalin's rule. Unlike other labor camps before and after, people were imprisoned not just for what they had done but also for who they were in terms of class, religion, nationality, and race. The gulag was one of the means of implementing Stalin' s political purges, which cleansed the Soviet Union of real and imagined enemies.

The first gulag victims were hundreds of thousands of people caught in the collectiv- ization campaigns in the early 1930s. After the Red Army's invasion of the Baltic states and Poland in June 1941, the secret police incarcerated potential resistors. When Adolf Hitler sent German armies into the Soviet Union in June 1941, people of German an- cestry in Eastern Europe were incarcerated as well. Following the German defeat at Stalingrad,

the Red Army advanced west, capturing and imprisoning enemy soldiers. Stalin also incarcerated partisan groups from all over Eastern Europe.

Following World War II, the Allies agreed that all Russian citizens should be returned to the Soviet Union. This naturally included Soviet prisoners of war held by the Germans. The Western Allies also forced anti-Soviet émigrés, many of whom had fought with Hit- ler, to return to the Soviet Union. The vast majority of these were either shot or simply disappeared into a gulag. In March 1946, the Soviet secret police began incarcerating ethnic minorities, Soviet Jews, and youth groups, as well as people who were viewed as a hindrance to Sovietization campaigns in Eastern Europe, for allegedly anti-Stalinist conspiracies.

The juridical process for sentencing peo- ple to a gulag comprised a three-person panel, which could both try and sentence the ac- cused or simply rely on Article 58 of the

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Gulags

The term *gulag* arose from the Russian ac- ronym for Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagerey (State Director of Camps), an agency of the Soviet secret police that administered the Soviet system of forced labor camps where political dissenters, dissidents, and other al- leged enemies of the state were sent.

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Barbed wire surrounds the Soviet penal colony at Minsk in the USSR, February 16, 1958. (Bettmann/ Corbis)

Soviet Criminal Code. Article 58 deprived Soviet citizens suspected of illegal activity of any rights and permitted the authorities to send anyone to the camps for any reason, jus- tified or not. The gulag served as an institu- tion to punish people but also was meant to fulfill an economic function, for Stalin sought to deploy workers in remote parts of Russia that had brutal climates but were rich with natural resources.

In the early 1950s, gulag authorities is- sued reports revealing that the camp system was unprofitable. Stalin, however, com- manded further construction projects such as railways, canals, power stations, and tun- nels. Thus, thousands of prisoners died, and maintenance costs skyrocketed. To an ex- tent, the situation changed in the gulags after the war because the inmates had changed. These new politicals were well-organized

and experienced fighters who often banded together and dominated the camps. Slowly, authorities lost control.

Immediately following Stalin's death in March 1953, Lavrenty Beria briefly took charge, reorganized the gulags, and aban- doned most of Stalin's construction projects. Beria granted amnesty to all prisoners sen- tenced to five years or less, pregnant women, and women with children under age 18. He also secretly abolished the use of physical force against detainees. In June 1953, he an- nounced his decision to liquidate the gulags altogether. However, he was subsequently arrested and executed. The new Soviet lead- ership under Nikita Khrushchev reversed most of Beria's reforms, although it did not revoke the amnesties.

Because neither Beria nor Khrushchev rehabilitated the political prisoners, they

began to fight back with their new and well- organized groups. They killed informers, staged strikes, and fomented rebellions. The biggest of these occurred in Steplag, Kazakh- stan, and lasted from spring until late sum- mer 1954. Inmates seized control, but Soviet authorities brutally quashed the revolt.

In the aftermath of the Steplag rebel- lion, the secret police relaxed gulag regula- tions, implemented an eight-hour workday, and gradually began to reexamine individ- ual cases. This process was accelerated by Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's rule in February 1956. In the so-called Thaw Era, the gulags were officially dissolved, and the two biggest camp complexes in Norilsk and Dalstroi were dismantled. Despite the Thaw, certain politicals were still incarcerated.

Under Leonid Brezhnev, politicals were renamed "dissidents." In the wake of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) used two camps in Moldovia and Perm to incarcerate dissidents. In contrast to former prisoners, these detainees consciously criticized the government and purposely in- vited incarceration to gain the attention of Western media. By 1966 Brezhnev, and later Yuri Andropov, then chairman of the KGB, declared these dissidents "insane" and im- prisoned them in psychiatric hospitals. When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985 and

embarked on reform, perestroika brought a final end to the gulags in 1987, and glasnost allowed limited access to information about their history.

It is impossible to determine just how many people were imprisoned and how many died in the gulags. Conservative esti- mates hold that 28.7 million forced laborers passed through the gulag system. There were never more than two million people at a time in the system, although perhaps as many as three million people died in the camps dur- ing the Stalin era.

Frank Beyersdorf

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Helsinki Final Act (1975)

The Helsinki Final Act was signed by repre- sentatives of35 European and North Ameri- can states on August 1, 1975, in Helsinki, Finland, and was the summation agreement of the Security and Cooperation in Europe Conference (CSCE). The act bridged sig- nificant differences between Western and Eastern Europe through far-reaching con- currences on political borders, trade and, most notably, human rights. The accord is often described as the high point of détente and was a key diplomatic turning point in the Cold War.

The Helsinki Final Act was not a formal treaty. It was an international agreement to which countries were bound politically but not legally. The act was the result of years of negotiations, first proposed by the Soviets in Geneva in 1954. Discussions commenced in earnest with the Helsinki Consultations of November 22, 1972, and the formal opening of the CSCE on July 3, 1973. The Consulta- tions and talks that followed focused on four baskets of issues. The first dealt with 10 prin- ciples guiding relations in Europe, including the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, and the peaceful settle- ment of disputes. The first basket also incor- porated confidence-building measures such as advanced notification of military troop maneuvers. The second basket addressed economic, scientific, and technological co- operation among CSCE states, and the third basket concentrated on such humanitarian issues as the reunification of families, im- proved working conditions for journalists,

and increased cultural exchanges. The fourth basket focused on follow-up procedures.

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act was initially unpopular in many Western coun- tries because it conceded Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and formally recognized the Soviet Union's annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Yet the publication of the Helsinki Final Act in Eastern Europe spurred the formation of Helsinki Monitor- ing Groups, the most prominent of which was founded in Moscow by Yuri Orlov, Yelena Bonner, and nine other Soviet human rights activists. These monitoring groups called upon Eastern bloc nations to uphold their Helsinki commitments and drew inter- national attention to their reports of human rights abuses. These groups became part of a larger political and social movement that ul- timately prefigured the end of the Cold War.

The Helsinki Final Act marked the begin- ning of an ongoing process, known as the Helsinki Process, in which CSCE states con- vened periodically to review the implemen- tation of the act and initiate further efforts to decrease East–-West tensions. In 1989, as the Berlin Wall came down and the Czecho- slovakian Velvet Revolution moved into high gear, many East European reformers, including Czechoslovakia's Václav Havel, cited the Helsinki Process as a key part of their success in throwing off the yoke of communist totalitarianism.

Sarah B. Snyder

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Hiss, Alger (1904–1996)

Born on November 11, 1904, in Baltimore, Maryland, Alger Hiss was educated at Johns Hopkins and Harvard universities. He joined the U.S. State Department in 1936. Among several important assignments, he was pri- vate secretary to U.S. Supreme Court Jus- tice Oliver Wendell Holmes, secretary to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), and among the U.S. delegation to the 1945 Yalta Conference. Hiss also served as sec- retary-general of the United Nations' (UN) organizing conference in San Francisco (1945–1946). In February 1947, with sup- port from John Foster Dulles, Hiss became head of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- national Peace.

In August 1948 Whittaker Chambers, a self-confessed ex-communist, accused Hiss of having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s and of having betrayed State Department secrets to the Soviets. Hiss

strenuously denied the charges under oath. He was subsequently indicted by a grand jury for perjury, as the statute of limitations for treason had expired, and was bound over for trial, which resulted in a hung jury in July 1949. Then, in a highly publicized retrial in January 1950, Hiss was found guilty and served 44 months in the Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary. He continued to assert his inno- cence and so too did a large and influential body of supporters, which precipitated one of the most intense and enigmatic debates of the entire Cold War.

Archival revelations in the 1990s, includ- ing those from Russian sources, vindicated neither Hiss nor his defenders. Historical ev- idence now seems to suggest that Hiss was indeed guilty of treason. The strange case of Alger Hiss was a defining episode not only in the Cold War but also in modern American politics. It rallied conservatives, gave birth to the excesses of McCarthyism, and spot- lighted Hiss's nemesis, the little-known Cal- ifornia congressman Richard M. Nixon, who would later go on to become a U.S. senator, vice president, and president. Hiss died on November 15, 1996, in New York City.

Phillip Deery

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Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)

Born Nguyen Sinh Cung on May 19, 1890, in Kimlien, Annam, Vietnam, his father was a Confucian scholar who had served in the Vietnamese imperial bureaucracy but re- signed to protest the French occupation of his country. Nguyen received his secondary education at the prestigious National Acad- emy, a French-style lycée in Hue. In 1911 he hired on as a merchant ship cook, travel- ing to the United States, Africa, and Europe. He then became first a photography assistant and then an assistant pastry chef in London. With

the beginning of World War I, Nguyen moved to Paris, where he became active in the French Socialist Party. Changing his

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name to Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Pa- triot), he became a leader in the large Indo- Chinese community in France. After the war, he helped draft a petition to the Allied lead- ers at the Paris Peace Conference demanding self-determination for colonial peoples; the petition was ignored.

When the Socialist Party split in 1920, Nguyen became one of the founders of the new French Communist Party. He spent the early 1920s in Moscow at the headquarters of the Communist International (Comin- tern). In 1924 he went to Guangzhou (Can- ton), China, and during the next two years worked to form a Marxist-Leninist revolu- tionary organization in French Indochina. In 1925 he organized the Vietnamese Revolu- tionary Youth League as a training ground for the future Vietnamese Communist Party. In 1929 he presided over a meeting in Hong Kong that brought several communist fac-tions together, forming a single Vietnamese Communist Party, later renamed the Indo- chinese Communist Party (ICP).

By the early 1940s Nguyen had taken the name Ho Chi Minh (Bearer of Light). He left Hong Kong and returned to Vietnam in early 1941, where he formed a broad nationalist alliance, the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh), to combat both the French and Japanese occupations. The Viet Minh generally downplayed orthodox communist ideology and emphasized anti- imperialism and land reform, although it was dominated by the ICP.

During World War II Ho shuttled between Vietnam and China to build support for his movement. He was held in detention for a year in China by the anticommunist Chinese Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists), who re-leased him in 1944. He had also worked with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Viet Minh occupied Hanoi, and

Ho established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). He became president of the newly formed nation on March 2, 1946. Ho

sought to avoid hostili- ties with France, but differences between the Viet Minh nationalists and the French, who steadfastly refused to give up their hold on Vietnam, led to fighting and the beginning of the Indochina War in December 1946.

During the eight-year conflict against the French, Ho played an active part in policy formulation, while Viet Minh General Vo Nguyen Giap was chief military strategist. Following the defeat of the French at the Bat- tle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Vietnam was

Pictured here in 1954,Vietnamese communist and nationalist Ho Chi Minh founded the Indo- china Communist Party in 1930 and was presi- dent of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 1945 to 1969. (Library of Congress)



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divided along the 17th Parallel, with elections in North Vietnam and the Republic of Viet- nam (RVN, South Vietnam) scheduled for 1956. When South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem refused to accede to the elections, with the blessing of U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower' s administration, fighting re- sumed in the south and in 1960 Ho and the North Vietnamese leadership decided to sup- port it. Although Ho was certainly a staunch communist, he was first and foremost a Viet- namese nationalist, determined to see his na- tion unified no matter the cost.

During the subsequent long war with the United States, Ho remained an important symbol of nationalist resistance and played an active part in formulating North Viet- namese policy. He was primarily responsi- ble for North Vietnamese dealings with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ho did not live to see his dream of a united Vietnam realized. He died in Hanoi on September 3, 1969. In 1975, when North Vietnamese troops were victo- rious, the South Vietnamese capital of Sai- gon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City in his honor. Today, Ho's body is on public display in a mausoleum in Hanoi.

James H. Willbanks

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Hoover, John Edgar (1895–1972)

Born on January 1, 1895, in Washington, D.C., J. Edgar Hoover studied law at George Washington University and earned an LLB in 1916 and a master of

law degree the next year. He went to work for the Department of Justice in 1917.

Beginning in 1919, Hoover spent two years as a special assistant to Attorney Gen- eral A. Mitchell Palmer. Hoover's anticom- munist crusade began under Palmer when he assisted in the arrests of more than 4,000 sus- pected radicals and resident aliens, a number of whom were deported. Following this First Red Scare, the Palmer Raids, and the finan- cial scandals of President Warren Harding's administration, on May 10, 1924, Hoover was appointed director of the Bureau of In- vestigation (soon to become known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation). He turned his attention to reforming the agency, in- creasing its professionalism, and, above all, crafting an image of himself as a tough, pro- gressive, and scientific crime fighter.

By the late 1930s Hoover was convinced that communism threatened social values and posed a significant threat to the United States. This attitude hardened in the postwar period when the FBI liaison to the highly secret Venona project, an army intelligence effort to decode thousands of Soviet diplo- matic cables, reported the discovery of a So- viet spy ring within the U.S. government.

Hoover's fear that the hidden apparatus of the Communist Party had permeated Amer- ican liberal organizations set much of the domestic tone of the early Cold War in the United States. His belief that President Harry S. Truman's loyalty program had not gone far enough to stanch the communist threat prompted his testimony in 1947 before the House Un-American Activities Committee

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(HUAC). Hoover also elaborated on the dangers posed by communism in such books as *Masters of Deceit* (1958) and *A Study of Communism* (1962). Under his direction, the FBI arrested the leaders of the Commu- nist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), utilizing provisions of the anti-communist Smith Act; tracked down secret communists in government, such as Alger Hiss, a former State Department official ac- cused of espionage; and arrested and interro- gated Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were accused of betraying the secret of the atom bomb to the Soviet Union.

The 1950s perhaps marked the height of Hoover's influence, as he enjoyed the trust of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and lived a privileged life that included the company of millionaires and Hollywood ce- lebrities. By the end of the decade the FBI had broken the back of the CPUSA, which forced the Soviet Union to replace its net- work of ideologically motivated spies with professionals and paid informants. Hoover nonetheless refused to acknowledge his an- ticommunist successes and continued to de- vote FBI resources to fighting the CPUSA and other radical groups, often at the expense of emerging hot-button issues such as grow- ing violence against civil rights workers in the South and the continued rise of organized crime.

Hoover had a strained relationship with President John F. Kennedy, but President Lyndon B. Johnson understood Hoover's clout and used the FBI much as President Franklin Roosevelt had, as a tool to advance his political agenda. Johnson pushed Hoover to destroy the network of violent Ku Klux Klan organizations in the South through use of the FBI's counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO). It combined wiretapping with the use of informants and disinforma- tion campaigns designed to disrupt target

groups. However, the presence of former and current Communist Party members in civil rights and antiwar groups inspired Hoover to direct COINTELPRO operations against civil rights leader Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Panthers, the tiny Social- ist Workers' Party, and many others groups and individuals who attracted the FBI's attention.

Hoover, the longest-serving FBI director in history, died of a heart attack on May 2, 1972, in Washington, D.C. Although still re- spected at the time of his death, revelations about the extent of his domestic spying and the FBI's illegal activities as well as about the details of his personal life greatly tar- nished his reputation.

Vernon L. Pedersen

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Human Rights

Rights are rule-governed powers of some people to activate duties that others owe them but cannot extinguish unilaterally. Du- ties may be to act or refrain from acting. For example, the right to free speech confers the duty on people to refrain from interfering with each other's expression of opinion ac- cording to rules that exclude, say, speech that constitutes a clear and present danger.

Some philosophers posit that rights must protect legitimate interests and create an in- violable, morally justified cordon around a person. For example, each person has a le- gitimate interest in receiving due process; it is morally justified. The right to due process creates a protective cordon around each one of us. By contrast, an effort to silence all peo- ple who happen to disagree with a particular person is illegitimate. It is not morally jus- tified, and so there is no protective cordon around that person.

Human rights are those rights that each person possesses by virtue of his or her hu- manity; for example, the right to life or free expression. By contrast, civil rights are those that some people retain by virtue of being citizens; for example, the right to vote freely in an election. Special rights are ones that we enjoy because of our particular situation in the world; for example, a right to inherit from our particular parents or wear the spe- cific shirt we bought.

The idea of universal human rights that are equally applicable to all human beings without distinction of citizenship, culture, geographical location, or historical context has been philosophically and politically controversial. The Westphalian Order that ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe in 1648 gave

extensive powers to sovereign rulers, most notably to determine the state's religion. Modern state sovereignty resolved the religious conflicts in Europe but also re- moved the legal grounds for the interven- tion of one state in the internal affairs of another, particularly in the case of human rights abuses.

The Anglo-American tradition of politi- cal philosophy connects the legitimacy of the sovereign state with its duty to guarantee rights. Thomas Hobbes suggested that the state is based on a social contract wherein the sovereign state guarantees to its subjects a

right to life in return for all their other native natural rights. John Locke assigned to the state the duty of guaranteeing the rights of its citizens. When the American colonists set out to justify their claim for independence, they formulated their arguments in Lockean terms as a reaction to the king's violation of their rights, the same rights that he was sup- posed to guarantee. Shortly thereafter, the French Revolution codified human rights for the first time in a political document, the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (1793). However, this declaration was issued during the Reign of Terror (1793– 1794), which witnessed the worst excesses of the French Revolution. For the next cen- tury and a half, the concept of human rights hardly played a role in international politics, with the possible exception of certain as- pects of the struggle against slavery and the slave trade. Still, the democratic emphasis on rights within the context of the Cold War was a natural development of tradition that did not quite exist in Eastern Europe.

World War II brought human rights to the forefront of international politics. On the one hand, the unique wickedness of Na- zism made the war against it a moral one rather than just a clash of nations and their interests. The positive content of that moral struggle was couched, especially by Amer- icans, in terms of universal human rights. On the other hand, the tentative and ideo- logically awkward alliance between Western democracies and the Soviet Union required some positive common denominator— good versus evil— that transcended a com- mon enemy. These two trends were further strengthened after the war, when the true scale of Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust became apparent and World War II acquired its established character as a war of good against evil. This good was interpreted by many as human rights. The Nuremberg War

Crimes Tribunals of 1945–1946, presided over by American, British, French, and So- viet judges, introduced the concept of crimes against humanity into international law. Al- though formulated and applied after the fact, the construct of crimes against humanity set standards of human rights according to which Nazi leaders could be tried and pun- ished not just for atrocities committed in oc- cupied territories but also for those against German citizens on German territory.

The United Nations (UN) went even fur- ther to promote the rhetoric, if not the prac- tice, of human rights in its founding Charter and in the December 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights. The significance of these documents was declarative rather than normative, because no enforcement mech- anisms with appropriate powers were cre- ated following these declarations. As noted above, there are no rights for some without duties for others. For humans to have rights, some institution must be entrusted with en- forcing them; otherwise, declarations remain just that. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a compromise between communist and democratic representatives, it included economic rights clauses that clearly make no normative sense in a univer- sal context; for example, the right of every human to enjoy a paid vacation.

The onset of the Cold War stifled attempts to enforce a universal regime of human rights because communist totalitarianism was in- herently founded on the state's right to violate any right of its subjects, while Western de- mocracies protected communist client states that abused human rights in the developing world, from Iran to Haiti to Latin America. The so-called realist approach to interna- tional relations promoted by Henry Kiss- inger, for example, dictates nonintervention

in the internal human rights policies of other countries and the determination of U.S. for- eign policy based exclusively on its geopo- litical interests. For example, in 1973 the United States supported the Chilean mili- tary in deposing leftist president Salvador Allende and instituting a regime that exhib- ited worse human rights violations than its predecessor. For political expediency, it also engaged in an alliance with Maoist China, al- though

China's Cultural Revolution violated human rights on a scale far greater than in the Soviet Union.

A variety of UN-sponsored human rights covenants and agreements from the 1960s further broadened the rhetorical connota- tions of human rights to encompass social, economic, and ethnic issues but also deep- ened the divide between the public rhetoric and actual practices of signatory nations to these covenants. Both sides in the Cold War used human rights rhetoric as a tool in their ideological war. The West lambasted com- munist states for allegedly violating the lib- erties of their subjects, while the communists harped on the alleged violation of the right to work of the unemployed in free market economies.

The policing of human rights became more effective by the mid-1970s through the introduction of various new methods for enforcement. The United States attempted to use its economic might to pressure human rights violators. In 1973, the U.S. Congress linked foreign aid to the human rights re- cord of recipient countries. The Jackson- Vanik Amendment to the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 attempted to use the Soviets' reli- ance upon American wheat to pressure the Soviet Union to increase Jewish, Baltic, and Baptist emigration by linking free emigra- tion with a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status. However, the generally low volume of trade between the two blocs limited the

effectiveness of this kind of leverage. The Soviets reacted by linking emigration to the state of their negotiations with the United States over disarmament and other political issues.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act Covenant on Human Rights was probably viewed by the Soviet leadership as yet another declarative statement of little lasting effect. It included safety clauses that precluded intervention in the internal affairs of Soviet-bloc countries. Y et its ratification by Soviet-bloc nations pro- vided international legal grounds for East Eu- ropean dissidents to assist their governments in its implementation. The Helsinki Process

provided a legal basis for the resurrection of civil society in Eastern Europe, especially through the Charter 77 dissident movement in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Human Rights Committee of Andrei Sakharov and Sergei Kovaljov. Dissident groups were able to pressure their governments to respect human rights through exposure of their viola- tions in the Western media, which were then broadcast back beyond the Iron Curtain via Radio Liberty. Dissidents pressed on to as- sert their rights to express their opinions in samizdat publications (typed carbon copies that circulated among friends) and in infor- mal gatherings where banned music and the- ater could be performed and critical lectures could be delivered. The dissidents were sup- ported most effectively by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the West, which put greater pressure on the Soviet regimes than governments ever could.

A somewhat parallel development took place west of the Iron Curtain, where NGOs such as Amnesty International became sig- nificant in enforcing human rights through monitoring and reporting and by embar- rassing the perpetrating governments in the forum of world public opinion. When U.S. president Jimmy Carter took office in 1977,

he refocused his nation's foreign policy to promote global human rights, although he continued to support some traditional U.S. allies, such as Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, despite their dismal human rights records. Still, the idealistic shift in policy persisted through the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administration attempted to improve the human rights situ- ation in nations in Latin America, Indonesia, and East Asia, albeit through private chan- nels rather than public diplomacy and some- times by utilizing illegal means. In 1985, human rights were one of four items on the agenda of Soviet and American negotiators as the Cold War began to wind down.

In 1987 the Soviet Union moved to im- prove its human rights record by releasing political prisoners and granting freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and travel, which ultimately led to political freedom and, after 1991, to national self-determination. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies were in large measure re- sponsible for these momentous turns of events. The problem then, as now, has been the lack of

institutional guarantees of human rights in the former Soviet states that would systematically enforce rights.

Gorbachev's attempt to reform commu- nism proved that totalitarian communist regimes could not easily introduce human rights into their system. Totalitarianism is, in essence, an all-or-nothing proposition. Once it allows its people to possess rudimentary human rights, it loses its claim to power; the people demand greater distribution of rights from the rulers to the ruled, and totalitarian- ism ends. This process had already been pre- dicted by Czech dissident Václav Benda in his 1978 essay "A Parallel Polis."

In the closing years of the Cold War, as international tensions subsided, the U.S. in- terest in supporting regimes that violated

human rights for the sake of political ex- pediency waned. Consequently, a wave of democratization swept Latin America and South Africa. Yet the end of the Cold War also exposed the inability of the international community to enforce human rights even in the most extreme cases of genocide, such as in Rwanda, the Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.

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Hydrogen Bomb

Hydrogen bombs (also known as H-bombs) rely on the fusion of hydrogen isotopes, un- like an atom bomb, which relies on the fis- sion (or splitting) of radioactive isotopes. Fusion occurs when neutrons collide with an unstable hydrogen isotope, causing two lighter isotopes to join together to make a

heavier element. During the fusion process, some of the mass of the original isotopes is released as energy, resulting in a powerful explosion. Because of the loss of mass, the end product, or element, weighs less than the total of the original isotopes. H-bombs are referred to as thermonuclear devices because temperatures of 400 million degrees Celsius are required for the fusion process to begin. In order to produce these temperatures, an H-bomb has an atomic bomb at its core. The explosion of the atomic device and the fis- sion process in turn leads to the fusion pro- cess in hydrogen isotopes that surround the atomic core.

An H-bomb, depending on its size, can produce an explosion powerful enough to devastate an area of approximately 150 square miles, while the searing heat and toxic radioactive fallout from such devices can im- pact an area of more than 800 square miles. The explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in September 1949 ended the U.S. atomic monopoly and led to a nuclear arms race. The development of more power- ful weapons such as the H-bomb and of new methods of delivering nuclear bombs, such as ballistic missiles, were primarily a result of the Cold War conflict and concomitant arms race.

In 1946 the U.S. Atomic Energy Act created the Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC). The USAEC was responsible for the development and control of the U.S. atomic energy program after World War II. The commission consisted of five mem- bers appointed by the president. A civilian advisory committee was also created, and Robert Oppenheimer, scientific head of the atomic bomb project, served as its chair- man. The USAEC also worked with

a mili- tary liaison with whom it consulted on all atomic energy issues that had military ap- plications. By 1949, the year the Soviets

exploded their first atomic bomb, Cold War tensions were running high. Nuclear physi- cist Edward Teller, USAEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss, and other scientists formed a coalition together with military officials to urge President Harry Truman to initiate a program to construct a superweapon, or H- bomb. This new weapon would be measured in megatons instead of kilotons and could yield an explosion equivalent to millions of tons of TNT. Despite opposition from Op- penheimer and several other nuclear scien- tists, Truman, under siege for being soft on communism, authorized an H-bomb pro- gram in January 1950.

It took the combined efforts of a number of scientists as well as Stanislaw Ulam, a mathematician, to solve the theoretical and technical problems related to building a hy- drogen weapon. They carried out their work at Los Alamos, New Mexico, the same facil- ity that had helped produce the atomic bomb. The prototype H-bomb was first detonated on November 1, 1952, on Enewetak Atoll in the South Pacific. The explosion virtually obliterated the island, creating a crater a mile wide and 175 feet deep. After the detonation of the prototype, scientists constructed an H-bomb that could be dropped by aircraft. That weapon was tested successfully in 1954.

Hydrogen bomb test IVY MIKE. This photo was taken at the height of approximately 12,000 feet and 50 miles from the detonation site. Two minutes after Zero Hour, the cloud rose to 40,000 feet. Ten minutes later, as it neared its maximum, the cloud stem had pushed upward about 25 miles, deep into the stratosphere. The mushroom portion went up to 10 miles and spread for 100 miles, October 31, 1952 (November 1, 1952, local time). (U.S. Air Force)

The Soviet Union tested its own H-bomb on August 12, 1953. The British also devel- oped a hydrogen weapon, which they tested on May 15, 1957.

Unable to maintain a monopoly on nu- clear weapons or to force the Soviet Union to alter its policies through either deterrence or the threat represented by nuclear arms, the United States instead found itself engaged in a nuclear arms race. Despite collective secu- rity agreements and pacts such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States maintained that only nuclear superiority would guarantee the security of the United States and its allies. The launch- ing of the first satellite to orbit Earth, the Soviet-built *Sputnik 1* in 1957, represented a dual threat to the West. It

seemed to sug- gest that Soviet scientists had pulled ahead of their American counterparts. More critically, it also posed the high probability of deliv- ering nuclear weapons with missiles rather than by planes. As a result, the United States increased funding for its space program and redoubled its efforts to fully develop and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and, later, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The rapid proliferation of nuclear weap- ons, of course, increased the threat of nu- clear war, whether by accident or by choice. With the advent of H-bombs and ballistic missile systems that could hurl bombs at an adversary in a matter of minutes, most civil defense preparations became exercises in futility. The Soviet Union's installation of

long-range missiles in Cuba led to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval quaran- tine around Cuba and refused to allow Soviet ships through the blockade. Faced with the real possibility of a catastrophic thermonu- clear war, both sides engaged in a flurry of diplomacy. The Soviets backed down, dis- mantling the missiles by the end of the year. The Cuban Missile Crisis, one of the few di- rect confrontations between the Americans and Soviets, showed the potential peril of the nuclear arms race. After the crisis passed, both U.S. and Soviet officials sought new ways to avoid the unthinkable consequences of a nuclear exchange. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty had been agreed to by both sides, the first small step toward eventual nu- clear arms reductions. The threat posed by nuclear weapons did not end with the col- lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, although reduced tensions have lessened the potential for a full-scale nuclear conflict.

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Indochina War (1946–1954)

The French had established themselves in Indochina in the 1840s, and by 1887 they had formed French Indochina, made up of the three divisions of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China) and the king- domsofCambodiaandLaos.Thecauseof the Indochina War was the French refusal to recognize that the days of colonialism were over. In the aftermath of World War II, a weakened France was determined to hold on to its richest colony

In 1941 veteran Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh had formed the Viet Minh to fight the Japanese, then in mili- tary occupation of Vietnam, and the French. A fusion of communists and nationalists, the Viet Minh had by 1944 liberated most of the northern provinces of Vietnam. The defeat of Japan in August 1945 created a power vacuum into which Ho moved. At the end of August 1945, Ho established in Hanoi the provisional government of the Demo- cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and on September 2, 1945 he pro- claimed Vietnamese independence.

With no support from either the Soviet Union or the United States, Ho was forced to deal with France. He and French diplo- mat Jean Sainteny concluded an agreement in March 1946 to allow 15,000 French troops into North Vietnam, with the understand- ing that 3,000 would leave each year and all would be gone by the end of 1951. In re- turn, France recognized

North Vietnam as a free state within the French Union. France also promised to abide by the results of a

referendum in Cochin China to determine if it would be reunited with Annam and Tonkin. The Ho-Sainteny Agreement fell apart with the failure of the Fontainebleau Con- ference in the summer of 1946 to resolve outstanding substantive issues and with the decision of new French governor-general of Indochina Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu to proclaim on his own initia- tive the independence of a republic of Co- chin China. Paris officials were not worried. They believed that the Vietnamese national- ists would not go to war against France and that if they did they would be easily crushed. Violence broke out in Hanoi in November 1946, whereupon d'Argenlieu ordered the shelling of the port of Haiphong, and the

war was on.
The French motives were primarily politi-

cal and psychological. Perhaps only with its empire could France be counted as a great power. Colonial advocates also argued that concessions in Indochina would adversely impact other French overseas possessions, especially in North Africa, and that further losses would surely follow.

The North Vietnamese leadership planned for a protracted struggle. Former history teacher V o Nguyen Giap commanded the military forces, formed in May 1945 into the People's Army of Vietnam (P A VN). Giap modeled his strategy on that of Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Giap' s chief contribution came in his recognition of the political and psycho- logical difficulties for a democracy waging a protracted and inconclusive war. He believed that French public opinion would at some point demand an end to the bloodshed. In the

populous rice-producing areas, the Viet Minh would employ guerrilla tactics and ambushes. In the less populated mountain and jungle re- gions, the Viet Minh would engage in large- scale operations.

For eight years the French fought unsuc- cessfully to defeat the Viet Minh, with a steady succession of French generals direct- ing operations. One French tactical innova- tion was the riverine division composed of naval and army forces, the Divisions Navales D'assaut, abbreviated as Dinassaut. By 1950 the French had six permanent Dinassauts in Indochina. The French also developed com- mando formations, the Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA, Composite Airborne Commando Groups), later known as the Groupement Mixte d'Intervention (GMI). Essentially guerrilla formations of about 400 men each, these operated behind enemy lines, sometimes in conjunction with friendly Montagnard

tribesmen or Vietnamese. By mid-1954 the French had 15,000 men in such formations, but they placed a heavy strain on the badly stretched French airlift capacity.

Sometimes the French cut deeply into Viet Minh–controlled areas, but as soon as the French regrouped to attack elsewhere the Viet Minh reasserted its authority. With their superior firepower the French held the cit- ies and the majority of the towns, while the Viet Minh managed to dominate most of the countryside, more of it as the years went by. French commanders never did have suffi- cient manpower to carry out effective pacifi- cation. The war was increasingly unpopular in France, and no conscripts were ever sent there, although a quarter of all of France's officers and more than 40 percent of its non- commissioned officers were in Indochina.

With Ho and the Viet Minh registering increasing success, Paris tried to appease nationalist sentiment by setting up a pliable

indigenous Vietnamese regime as a com- petitor to the Viet Minh. In the March 1949 Elysée Agreements, Paris worked out an ar- rangement with former emperor Bao Dai to create the State of Vietnam (SV). Incorpo- rating Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin, it was to be independent within the French Union. France never did give the SV genu- ine independence, however. Paris retained actual control of its foreign relations and armed forces. The result was that it was never able to attract meaningful nationalist support. There were in effect but two alter- natives: the Viet Minh, now labeled by the French as communists, or the French.

Meanwhile, the military situation con- tinued to deteriorate for the French. PAVN forces achieved their successes with arms in- ferior in both quantity and quality to those of the French. Disparities in military equip- ment were offset by the Viet Minh's popular backing.

Until the end of 1949, the United States showed little interest in Indochina, apart from urging Paris to take concrete steps toward granting independence. The U.S. government did not press too much on this issue, however, fearful that it might adversely affect France' s attitude toward cooperation in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA TO) and the European Defense Community (EDC). France was then virtually the only armed continental W est European power left to stand against the Soviet Union. In effect, W ashington supported France' s Indochina policy in order to ensure French support in containing the Soviet Union in Europe. The

United States underwrote the French military effort in Vietnam indirectly, but leaders in W ashington expressed con- fidence based on assurances from Paris that France was granting Vietnam its independence.

The U.S. policy of indirect aid to the French effort in Indochina changed after October 1949 and the communist victory in China. This and the beginning of the Ko- rean War in June 1950 shifted U.S. interest to the containment of communism in Asia. Paris convinced Washington that the war in Indochina was a major element in the world- wide containment of communism. Zealous anticommunism now drove U.S. policy and Washington now saw the French effort no longer as a case of colonialism versus nation- alism but rather as a free world stand against communist expansionism. With the commu- nist victory in China, in effect the war was lost for the French. China had a long com- mon frontier with Tonkin, and the Viet Minh could now receive large shipments of mod- ern weapons, including artillery captured by the Chinese communists from the national- ists. In 1950, in a series of costly defeats, the French were forced to abandon a string of fortresses in far northern Tonkin along Route Coloniale 4. In these battles, the Viet Minh captured French arms sufficient to equip an entire division. Then in 1951 Giap launched a series of attacks in the Red River Delta area that turned into hard-fought and costly bat- tles during 1951–1952. In these, Giap tried but failed to capture Hanoi and end the war. But as the French concentrated resources in the north of the country, the Viet Minh reg- istered impressive gains in central and south- ern Vietnam.

In January 1950 both the People's Repub- lic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union rec- ognized the North Vietnamese government. The next month, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the SV. U.S. mili- tary aid to the French in Indochina now grew dramatically, from approximately $150 mil- lion in 1950 to more than $1 billion in 1954. By 1954, the United States was also paying 80 percent of the cost of the war. The French

insisted that all aid to Bao Dai's govern- ment be channeled through them, frustrat- ing American hopes of bolstering Bao Dai's independence. Even

though a Vietnamese National Army was established in 1951, it remained effectively under French control. Meanwhile, the administrations of both President Harry S. Truman and President Dwight D. Eisenhower assured the Ameri- can public that actual authority in Vietnam had been transferred to Bao Dai.

By mid-1953, despite substantial aid from the United States, France had lost authority over all but a minor portion of the country. In September, with strong American encourage- ment, France entered into one final and disas- trous effort to achieve a position of strength from which to negotiate with the Viet Minh. Under Lieutenant General Henri Navarre, the new commander in Indochina, France now had 517,000 men, 360,000 of whom were Indochinese.

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu from April to May 1954 was the culminating and most dra- matic battle of the war. At this remote location in northwestern Tonkin, the French con- structed a complex of supporting fortresses, defended by artillery. Navarre's strategy was to entice the Viet Minh to attack this suppos- edly impregnable position and there destroy them. At best he expected one or two Viet Minh divisions. Giap accepted the challenge but committed four divisions. The French mistakenly assumed that the Viet Minh could not get artillery to this remote location, but eventually the Viet Minh outgunned the French. French air assets also proved insuf- ficient. The surrender of Dien Bien Phu on May 7 enabled the French politicians to shift the blame to the army and withdraw France from the war.

Not coincidental to the battle, a confer- ence had already opened in Geneva to dis- cuss Asian problems. It now took up the

issue of Indochina. The April 26–July 21 Geneva Conference provided for indepen- dence for Cambodia, Laos, and North Viet- nam. Vietnam was to be temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel, pending national elec- tions in 1956. In the meantime, Viet Minh forces were to withdraw north of that line and French forces south of it.

In the war, the French and their allies sustained 172,708 casualties: 94,581 dead or missing and 78,127 wounded. These break down as 140,992 French

Union casu- alties (75,867 dead or missing and 65,125 wounded) with the allied Indochina states losing 31,716 (18,714 dead or missing and 13,002 wounded). French dead or miss- ing numbered some 20,000; Legionnaires, 11,000; Africans, 15,000; and Indo-Chinese, 46,000. The war took a particularly heavy toll among the officers, 1,900 of whom died. Viet Minh losses were probably three times those of the French and their allies, and per- haps 150,000 Vietnamese civilians also per- ished. One major issue was that of prisoners, both soldiers and civilians, held by the Viet Minh in barbarous conditions. Only 10,754 of the 36,979 reported missing during the war returned, and some were not released until years afterward.

The Indochina War had been three wars in one. Begun as a conflict between Vietnam- ese nationalists and France, it became a civil war between Vietnamese, and it was also part of the larger Cold War. As it turned out, in 1954 the civil war and the East–West con- flict were only suspended. Ten years later a new war broke out in which the Americans replaced the French.

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Israel

Modern Israel dates from the end of World War I and the resulting defeat of the Otto- man Empire. The secret wartime Sykes- Picot Agreement between Britain and France to partition Turkish Middle Eastern territory gave control of Lebanon and Syria to France, with Britain receiving Palestine and Iraq.

Following the Allied victory, the Paris Peace Conference awarded these areas as mandates under the new League of Nations, envision- ing their ultimate independence.

The war also prompted the Zionist move- ment of Jews seeking a nation-state in Pal- estine. In order to enlist the support of international Jewry during the war effort, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917. The declaration an- nounced London's support for the creation of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine. The parameters of this home were not spelled out. In 1922 Britain split Palestine into Transjordan east of the Jordan River and Palestine to the west. The Jewish homeland would be in Palestine. There were several schemes for achieving this while bal- ancing the interests of the Arab population with those of the Jewish minority and the goals of the Zionist movement. Contradic- tory British assurances to both sides failed to satisfy either the Zionists or the Arabs,

however. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of European Jews arrived in Palestine and pur- chased land there, leading to Arab-Jewish rioting that the British authorities were not always able to control.

Events immediately before and during World War II accelerated the Jewish mi- gration to Palestine. Adolf Hitler's perse- cution of the Jews in Germany as well as anti-Semitism in Poland and elsewhere led to increasing Jewish migration and interest in a Jewish state. Once the war began, Hit- ler embarked on a conscientious effort to exterminate world Jewry. During the Nazi- inspired Holocaust an estimated six million Jews perished. Late in the war and afterward, many of the survivors sought to immigrate to Israel. The great lesson of World War II for Jews was that they could not rely on other nations; they would require their own inde- pendent state. The Holocaust also created in the West a sense of moral obligation for the creation of such a state. At the same time, however, the Arabs of Palestine were ada- mantly opposed to the implantation of a large foreign population in their midst.

After World War II, Jewish refugees and displaced persons streamed into Palestine, many of them only to be turned away by Brit- ish naval ships patrolling Palestine's Medi- terranean coast just for this purpose. At the same time, the British authorities wrestled with partitioning Palestine into Arab and

Jewish states. Jews and Arabs proved in- transigent, and in February 1947 after both rejected a final proposal for partition, Brit- ain turned the problem over to the United Nations (UN). In November the UN General Assembly passed its own resolution to parti- tion Palestine, with Jerusalem to be under a UN trusteeship. While the Jews accepted this arrangement, the Arabs rejected it.

In December 1945 the Arab League coun- cil announced that it would halt the creation

of a Jewish state by force. The Arabs then began raids against Jewish communities in Palestine. The United States, with the world' s largest and wealthiest Jewish popu- lation, became the chief champion and most reliable ally of the Jews. This position would, however, cost the United States dearly in its relations with the Arab world and would also influence Cold War geopolitics.

In January 1948 London announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine. This precipitous British policy led to war. The British completed the pullout on May 14, 1948, and that same day David Ben-Gurion, executive chairman and defense minister of the Jewish Agency, declared the existence of the independent Jewish state of Israel. Ben-Gurion became the first prime minis- ter, a post he held during 1948–1953 and 1955–1963.

At first, the interests of the United States and those of the Soviet Union regarding the Jewish state converged. U.S. recognition of Israel came only shortly before that of the Soviet Union. Officials in Moscow found common ground with the Jews in their suf- fering at the hands of the Nazis in the war and also identified with the socialism es- poused by the early Jewish settlers in Pales- tine as well as with their anti-British stance. The Cold War, the reemergence of official anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, and Mos- cow's desire to court the Arab states by sup- porting Arab nationalism against the West would soon change all that.

The Israeli independence proclamation led immediately to fighting. In the first Arab- Israeli War of 1948–1949, hard-pressed Is- raeli forces managed to stave off the far more numerous and better-equipped but poorly organized and inadequately trained Arab forces. In the process, many Palestinians liv- ing in Israel either fled or were forced out of the territory.

Soviet military support for Egypt and Syria led to increased U.S. military support for Israel. The rise of Egypt' s president Gamal Abdel Nasser only exacerbated the situation. Trumpeting Arab nationalism, Nasser block- aded Israeli ships in the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel's access to the Indian Ocean. Egypt also supported cross-border raids into Israeli territory by *fedayeen*, or guerrilla fighters. Nasser's turn to the Soviet Union for arms led to the withdrawal of U.S. support for his pet project of constructing a high dam at Aswan on the Nile. This led him to nationalize the Suez Canal. British prime minister Anthony Eden was determined to topple Nasser, and a coalition of Britain, France, and Israel then formed. Leaders of the three states devel- oped secret plans whereby Israel would in- vade Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and move to the canal. Britain and France would then use this as an excuse to introduce military forces into the canal zone.

At the end of October 1956, Israeli forces swept into the Sinai, easily destroying Egyp- tian forces there. When Nasser's response to French and British demands proved unsatis- factory, their forces also invaded Egypt from Cyprus. Although the Soviet Union threat- ened to send volunteers, it was the strong opposition of the United States and heavy economic pressure brought to bear on Brit- ain that proved decisive. All three powers subsequently withdrew their forces, greatly strengthening Nasser despite the abysmal showing of his armed forces. Israel was one of the chief winners of the 1956 war. It had cleaned out the *fedayeen* bases and secured a buffer of UN observers in the Sinai. It also ended the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Soviet Union made good on Egyptian material losses from the war and, over the next decade, sent considerable quantities of additional arms to the Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In May 1967, Nasser

Israeli forces in Galilee near the Arab village of Sassa, during the Israeli War for Independence, January 1, 1948. (Government Press Office)

moved Egyptian troops into the Sinai and or- dered out the UN observers who served as a buffer with Israel. Believing that they would soon be attacked, Israeli leaders ordered a preemptive strike. On June 5, 1967, the Israeli Air Force wiped out most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and then struck the Syr- ians. Although Israel made a bid for Jordan to stay out of the war, that country joined the fighting against Israel and paid a heavy price for it. The Israelis won the so-called Six-Day War and, in the process, seized the Sinai Pen- insula from Egypt, the West Bank of the Jor- dan River along with Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

On October 6, 1973, at the start of the Jew- ish holy days of Yom Kippur, Egypt, now led by Anwar Sadat, launched a surprise at- tack on Israel. Joined by Syrian forces, the Egyptians caught the Israeli government of

Prime Minister Golda Meier (1969–1974) by surprise and crossed over the Suez Canal, then took up defensive positions to destroy much of the counterattacking Israeli armor with Soviet-supplied antitank missiles. Ulti- mately, however, the Israelis beat back the Arab attacks. Having recrossed the canal, the Israelis were in position to drive on to Cairo. Both sides then agreed to a cease-fire.

Israel appeared menaced on all flanks except the Mediterranean. But Sadat, dis- mayed by the inability of the United States to pressure Israel into concessions, took the unprecedented step of traveling to Israel in November 1977, eventually leading to the Camp David Agreement of September 1978 and a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel. Begun in 1979, Israel completed a withdrawal of the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. Syria, meanwhile, had moved closer to the

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Israeli troops withdrawing from the Suez Canal area of Egypt in 1974 in accordance with an agree- ment reached by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. (Corel)

Soviet Union, and the Syrians then moved into Lebanon in support of Palestinians there and the Lebanese Muslims. This produced civil war in Lebanon, and following the shelling of Israeli settlements from southern Lebanon, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1982. In September 1983, Israeli forces withdrew to the Awali River. During 1987– 1991, Israeli security forces had to deal with a wide-scale uprising by Palestinians known as the Intifada within Israeli-occupied terri- tory in the West Bank and Gaza. The end of the Cold War brought a large influx of hun- dreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union. Despite peace between Egypt and Is- rael, at the end of the Cold War a general Middle Eastern peace agreement remained illusive.

Daniel E. Spector and Spencer C. Tucker

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J

Johnson, Lyndon Baines (1908–1973)

Lyndon Johnson was born in Stonewall, Texas, in a farmhouse on the Pedernales River on August 27, 1908. His early life was touched by rural poverty, which would later make him a champion of the poor and under- privileged. In 1931 Johnson became active in Democratic Party politics and that same year went to Washington, D.C., to serve as secretary to a Texas congressman.

A shrewd, brilliant, and sometimes over- bearing politician, Johnson honed his politi- cal skills for the next two decades. In 1948 Johnson won election to the Senate and in 1953 became its youngest majority leader in history. As majority leader, he worked with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's adminis- tration to maintain a bipartisan foreign pol- icy. Johnson was instrumental in defeating the proposed Bricker Amendment, which would have prohibited executive agreements with foreign powers, and also supported the Formosa Resolution and the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In 1960 Johnson was elected vice presi- dent on the Democratic ticket with Presi- dent John F. Kennedy. Riding in the Dallas motorcade on November 22, 1963, during which Kennedy was assassinated, Johnson was sworn in as president that same day. Taking advantage of the outpouring of grief immediately following the assassination, Johnson mustered his pitch-perfect politi- cal skills to ensure congressional passage of the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbade discrimination in all public places

and in hiring practices based on race, reli- gion, sex, or national origin. Hugely popu- lar, Johnson won the presidency in his own right in the November 1964 election, handily defeating his conservative Republican oppo- nent, Barry Goldwater.

Despite the lengthening shadows cast by the Vietnam War, Johnson took full advan- tage of his electoral mandate by ushering in some of the most far-reaching domestic re- forms since the New Deal. Johnson soon be- came overwhelmed by the course of events in Vietnam. Ultimately, many of his Great Society programs languished as the war con- sumed additional resources and more public attention.

Upon becoming president, Johnson had informed the South Vietnamese govern- ment that he would stay the course and help it secure victory over the communist insurgency. He approved OPLAN 34A, a U.S.-supported series of raids by the South Vietnamese along the Democratic Republic of V ietnam' s (DR V , North V ietnam) coast. A raid on July 31, 1964, coupled with a sig-nals intelligence–gathering desoto patrol by the destroyer *Maddox*, helped precipitate the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and led to the subsequent Tonkin Gulf Resolution, giving the president carte blanche to deploy U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. He used the reso- lution as legal justification to escalate the Vietnam War.

After the 1964 election, Johnson felt obliged to reverse the deteriorating military and political situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). With the support of most of his civilian and military

advisors, he pursued a policy of gradual es- calation beginning in 1965. In February 1965 he ordered a sustained bombing cam- paign against North Vietnam, code-named Operation Rolling Thunder. In March, he de- ployed the Marines to protect U.S. airbases. U.S. Army troops followed, and Johnson announced an open-ended commitment to South Vietnam in late July. By the end of 1965, he had dispatched 180,000 American troops to Vietnam. He defended his decision to escalate the war as a "political necessity" that he believed was essential to secure pas- sage of Great Society legislation.

Other foreign policy issues came to the fore, including the 1965 American inter- vention in the Dominican Republic. John- son dispatched Marines there on April 28, 1965, to protect American lives and prevent a potential communist takeover of the gov- ernment. In June 1967, Johnson met with So- viet Premier Alexei Kosygin for two days in Glassboro, New Jersey, to discuss Vietnam, the impact of the Six-Day War in the Middle East, and the potential for arms control talks and nuclear nonproliferation.

In the end, Vietnam overshadowed ev- erything else. During 1966–1967, American troop strength in Vietnam sharply escalated, bombing increased, casualties mounted, and yet the war ground on without resolution. Johnson grew increasingly frustrated by crit- ics of his Vietnam policies, some of which were from his own party. Public disaffection with the war also increased. Large antiwar demonstrations became commonplace by 1967, some resulting in violence and rioting. Meanwhile, as the war siphoned resources away from domestic programs, racial ten- sions increased dramatically, widespread urban riots and arson plagued the nation, and college campuses became hotbeds of political radicalism and antiwar activism. Johnson, who once seemed politically invin-

cible, appeared incapable of dealing with the mounting crises.

In late January 1968, after the adminis- tration had assured the American public that the war was being won, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched the Tet Of- fensive, a nationwide military operation that destroyed the credibility of the Johnson ad- ministration. Although a tactical victory for

the Americans and South Vietnamese, Tet 1968 permanently undermined Amer- ican support for the war and the president who escalated it. With 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam and growing violence and radi- calism on the home front, Johnson took the nation by surprise on March 31, 1968, fol- lowing a setback in the Democratic primary in New Hampshire, by announcing that he would not seek another presidential term. He then authorized exploratory truce talks with the North Vietnamese, which almost immediately stalled as the fighting contin- ued. Johnson left office a broken man, both physically and mentally. He was immensely unpopular by 1968 and would always be as- sociated with America's failure in Vietnam. In retirement, he wrote his memoirs. John- son died on January 22, 1973, at his ranch in Johnson City, Texas.

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K

Kennan, George Frost (1904 –2005)

Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on Feb- ruary 16, 1904, George Kennan attended Princeton University and joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1926, undergoing inten- sive, specialized Russian training at Berlin University and Riga.

As one of the State Department's small coterie of Russian experts, Kennan spent five years in the American embassy in Mos- cow, returning there in 1944 as minister- counselor. Despite his distaste for the Soviet regime, as World War II ended he recom- mended reassigning control of Eastern Europe to the Soviets. His influential February 1946 "Long Telegram" argued that the inter- nal dynamics of Russian communism made genuine Soviet–Western understanding un- attainable. The "Long Telegram" proved immensely influential.

From 1947 to 1949 Kennan headed the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, exercising his greatest impact on American foreign policy by enunciating the contain- ment doctrine that became the basis of U.S. Cold War strategy toward the Soviet Union. However, Kennan soon found himself in- creasingly out of sync with the evolving Cold War policies. In the late 1940s and again during the 1950s, he called for the neutral- ization and unification of Germany, and he opposed the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Ken- nan initially supported U.S. intervention in the Korean War but regretted the decision to carry the war into the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). In 1951 he took part in unofficial negotiations with Soviet diplomats that led to the open- ing of armistice talks.

In 1952 he was briefly ambassador to the Soviet Union, but his criti- cism of Josef Stalin's regime resulted in ex- pulsion. Kennan then began a lengthy career as a historian and political commentator.

Keen to encourage polycentrism within the communist world, Kennan welcomed his 1961 appointment as ambassador to Y ugo- slavia, where he remained until 1963. He ap- plauded the manner in which President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev handled the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Ken- nan believed that American preoccupation with Vietnam distracted officials from pur- suing détente with the Soviets. He applauded French president Charles de Gaulle' s initia- tives toward détente and called for West- ern recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). Initially outraged by the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kennan demanded massive American troop reinforcements in Western Europe but soon endorsed Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, W est Germany) chancel- lor Willy Brandt' s Ostpolitik.

Kennan initially showed little interest in Vietnam. In 1950 he had urged American attempts to encourage noncommunist, na- tionalist "third forces" in Indochina but by 1955 had grown pessimistic that such en- deavors would succeed. Despite misgivings, he endorsed President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Johnson's subsequent escalation of the war convinced

U.S. diplomat and historian George F. Kennan was an energetic proponent of a containment policy against communist expansion. He is among the most influential foreign policy makers of the post–World War II era. (Library of Congress)

Kennan that the United States was too heav- ily involved in a country of relatively slight strategic significance. He suggested that the United States restrict itself to defending strategic enclaves and supporting the Re- public of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) government. During widely publicized con- gressional hearings in 1967, he argued that employing the force levels needed to ensure victory in Vietnam would likely trigger Chi- nese intervention and full-scale, probably nuclear, Sino-American war. By November 1969 he publicly advocated American mili- tary withdrawal, notwithstanding the prob- ability that the communists would then take over South Vietnam.

In 1967 and 1972 Kennan published two volumes of best-selling confessional mem- oirs. He continued to write well into his 90s, frequently warning against the American tendency to intervene in nations and con- flicts of little

direct strategic interest and sug- gesting that wider concerns, particularly the environment, population growth, and arms control, were of far greater importance. Ken- nan died in Princeton, New Jersey, on March 17, 2005.

Priscilla Roberts

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Kennedy, John Fitzgerald (1917–1963)

John F. Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on May 29, 1917, into a large and wealthy Irish Catholic family. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was a multimil- lionaire with presidential aspirations, and his mother, Rose Fitzgerald, came from a prominent and politically active Boston fam- ily. After attending the elite Choate Prepa- ratory School in Wallingford, Connecticut, Kennedy earned his bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1940. He also spent six months of his junior year working in the U.S.

London embassy while his father was U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. His obser- vations during this time inspired his senior honors thesis on British foreign policies, which was published the year he graduated

under the title *Why England Slept*. During World War II Kennedy served four years in the U.S. Navy. He was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medals and the Purple Heart for action as commander of *PT-109*, which was rammed and sunk by a Japanese destroyer in the South Pacific.

Kennedy worked for a brief time as a newspaper correspondent before entering national politics at the age of 29, winning election as Democratic congressman from Massachusetts in 1946. In Congress, he backed social legislation that benefited his largely working-class constituents and criticized what he considered to be President Harry Truman's "weak stand" against com- munist China. Throughout his career, in fact, Kennedy was known for his vehement anti- communist sentiments.

Kennedy won election to the U.S. Sen- ate in 1952. In 1953 he wed the New York socialite Jacqueline Bouvier. Kennedy had a relatively undistinguished Senate career. Never a well man, he suffered from several serious health problems, including a back operation in 1955 that nearly killed him. While he recuperated from his back surgery, he wrote his second book, *Profiles in Cour- age*, for which he won the 1957 Pulitzer Prize in history.

Despite his fragile health and lackluster performance in the Senate, Kennedy none- theless was reelected in 1958 after losing a close contest for the vice presidential nomina- tion at the Democratic National Convention in 1956. He now set his sights on the presi- dency. Four years later, he won the Democratic nomination for president on the first ballot. As a northerner and Roman Catho- lic, he recognized his weakness in the South and shrewdly chose Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas as his running mate. As a candidate, Kennedy promised more aggres- sive defense policies, health care reform, and

U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev meet in Vienna, Austria, for their summit on June 3–4, 1961. (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library)

housing and civil rights programs. He also proposed his New Frontier agenda, designed to revitalize the flagging U.S. economy and to bring young people into government and hu- manitarian service. Winning by the narrowest of margins, he became the nation's first Roman Catholic president. Only 43 years old, he was also the youngest man ever to be elected to that office.

In his inaugural address, Kennedy spoke of the need for Americans to be active citi- zens and to sacrifice for the common good. His address, which in some respects was a rather bellicose call to arms, ended with the now-famous exhortation "ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country." As president, Kennedy

set out to fulfill his campaign pledges. Once in office, he was forced to respond to the ever-more-urgent demands of civil rights advocates, although

he did so rather reluc- tantly and tardily. By establishing both the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, Kennedy delivered American idealism and goodwill to aid developing countries.

Despite Kennedy's idealism, no amount of enthusiasm could blunt the growing ten- sion of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War rivalry. One of his first attempts to stanch the per- ceived communist threat was to authorize a band of American-supported Cuban exiles to invade the communist island in an attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in April 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion, which turned into an

embarrassing debacle for the president, had been planned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Dwight Eisenhower administration. Although Kennedy harbored reservations about the operation, he none- theless approved it. The failure heightened already-high Cold War tensions with the Soviets and ultimately set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Cold W ar confrontation was not lim- ited to Cuba. In the spring of 1961, the So- viet Union renewed its campaign to control West Berlin. Kennedy spent two days in Vienna in June 1961 discussing the hot- button issue with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In the months that followed, the crisis over Berlin was further intensi- fied by the construction of the Berlin Wall, which prevented East Berliners from escap- ing to the West. Kennedy responded to the provocation by reinforcing troops in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, W est Germany) and increasing the nation' s mili- tary strength. The Berlin Wall, unwittingly perhaps, eased tensions in Central Europe that had nearly resulted in a superpower conflagration. In the meantime, Kennedy had begun deploying what would be some 16,000 U.S. military "advisors" to prop up Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). In so doing, Kennedy had put the United States on the slippery slope of full-scale military intervention in Vietnam.

With the focus directed away from Europe, the Soviets began to construct missile-launching sites clandestinely in Cuba. On October 14, 1962, U.S. spy planes photographed the potential placement of nuclear missiles only 90 miles from Amer- ica's shores and thus began a new threat to destabilize the

Western Hemisphere and undermine the uneasy Cold War nuclear de- terrent. Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine

on Cuba, designed to interdict any offensive weapons bound for the island. The world held its collective breath as the two Cold War superpowers appeared perched on the abyss of thermonuclear war, but after 13 har- rowing days of fear and nuclear threat, the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles. In return, the United States pledged not to preemptively invade Cuba and to remove secretly its obsolete nuclear missiles from Turkey.

Both Kennedy and Khrushchev had been sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis, realiz- ing that the world had come as close as it ever had to a full-scale nuclear war. Cold War tensions were diminished when the Sovi- ets, British, and Americans signed the Lim- ited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963, forbidding atmospheric testing of nu- clear weapons. In October 1963, the same three nations agreed to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in outer space. To avoid potential misunderstandings and miscalcu-lations in a future crisis, a hotline was in- stalled that directly linked the Oval Office with the Kremlin.

Following the nerve-wracking Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy looked toward 1963 with considerable enthusiasm. In Novem- ber 1963 Kennedy embarked on a whirlwind tour of Texas. On November 22 in Dallas, T exas, just as Kennedy' s motorcade neared the end of its course and as onlookers cheered, shots rang out. Kennedy, riding in an open car, was fatally wounded by an assassin's bullet. In the hours immediately after the murder,LeeHarveyOswaldwasarrestedfor the assassination of the president. Two days later, as the president's body lay in state at the U.S. Capitol, Jack Ruby fatally shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas police station as millions of Americans watched the latest bizarre event on television in dazed horror. In a great national outpouring of grief, Kennedy

was laid to rest in Arlington National Cem- etery on November 25, 1963.

Lacie A. Ballinger

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Khrushchev, Nikita (1894–1971)

Born on April 17, 1894, in Kalinovka, Kursk Province, to a peasant family, Nikita Ser- geyevich Khrushchev worked beginning at age 15 as a pipe fitter in various mines near his home. His factory work exempted him from wartime service. In 1918 he joined the Russian Communist Party.

In 1919 Khrushchev became a politi- cal commissar in the Red Army, accom- panying troops fighting both the Poles and Lithuanians. In 1922 he returned to school and completed his education. In 1925 he became Communist Party secretary of the Petrovosko-Mariinsk District. Recognizing the importance of Communist Party sec- retary Josef Stalin, Khrushchev nurtured a friendship with Stalin's associate and party

secretary in Ukraine, Lars Kaganovich, who helped him secure a full-time party post in the Moscow city party apparatus in 1931.

By 1935 Khrushchev was secretary- general of the Moscow Communist Party, in effect mayor of the capital. In 1938 he be- came a candidate (nonvoting member) of the Politburo, and in 1939 he was a full member. He was one of only a few senior party offi- cials to survive Stalin's Great Purges. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Khrushchev was made a lieuten- ant general and placed in charge of resistance in Ukraine and relocating heavy industry eastward.

With the Red Army's liberation of Ukraine, Khrushchev took charge of that region. This led to his first clash with Stalin. With Ukraine suffering major food shortages in 1946, Khrushchev concentrated on efforts to in- crease agricultural production, while Stalin wanted emphasis to be on heavy industry. As a consequence, Stalin demoted Khrushchev. By 1949, however, Khrushchev was back in favor in his previous post as head of the Com- munist Party machinery in Moscow. In 1952, at the 19th Party Congress, Khrushchev re- ceived the assignment of drawing up a new party structure, which led to the replacement of the old Politburo by the Presidium of the Central Committee. Khrushchev benefited from this change as one of the powerful com- mittee secretaries.

Following Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, a brief power struggle ensued, with no one person on the 10-member Presidium dominating. Khrushchev did not appear to be a likely choice for supreme power, but on March 14, when Georgy Malenkov suddenly resigned as secretary of the Central Commit- tee, Khrushchev succeeded him. Malenkov, however, retained his post as head of the party. Shortly thereafter, another Khrush- chev rival, Lavrenty Beria, was removed

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from authority and executed. Over the next four years, Malenkov and Khrushchev strug- gled over who would dominate the Soviet state. Khrushchev had taken responsibility for Soviet agriculture, and by 1953 he reg- istered considerable successes in that vital sector of the economy. His Virgin Lands program the next year opened new agricul- tural lands in Kazakhstan and western Sibe- ria. Early successes in that region assisted his rise to power, although they proved tempo- rary. Unpredictable climatic

conditions and overuse of chemical fertilizers undermined the program, but not until he was already in power.

Meanwhile, Malenkov advocated in- creases in consumer goods to benefit the Soviet people. Hard-liners in the party lead- ership and military opposed this and sought continued concentration in heavy industry and increases in defense spending. Khrush- chev took the tactical decision to side with the hard-liners, and in February 1955 Malen- kov was defeated in a party plenum called on this issue, and resigned as party chairman. On Khrushchev's recommendation, Nikolai Bulganin succeeded Malenkov. For a time it appeared as if both Bulganin and Khrush- chev were running the Soviet state, although Khrushchev wielded actual power through his control of the party machinery.

Malenkov remained a member of the Presidium, where he continued to intrigue against Khrushchev. In June 1957 Khrush- chev took full authority when an attempt by Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Vyacheslav Molotov to unseat Khrushchev miscarried and they themselves were purged. It speaks volumes about the change in the Soviet state under Khrushchev, however, that the three men were not executed.

Indeed, Khrushchev's greatest—and per- haps most risky—achievement as leader of the Soviet Union was the unmasking

of Stalin's legacy and his attempt to de- Stalinize Soviet society. The most powerful blow to the Stalinists came during Khrush- chev's famous speech at a closed session of the 20th Party Congress on February 25, 1956, in which he documented just some of the crimes and purges of the Stalinist period. In fact, the Soviet Union became gradually more liberal under Khrushchev, and it never did return to the kind of oppressive barba- rism for which Stalin was known.

Nevertheless, the overall thrust of Khrush- chev's policies tended to be ambivalent and was overshadowed by surprising shifts, in- consistencies, and poorly conceptualized initiatives. Success during the 1950s in eco- nomic policy, industrial production, and the space program, in which he took special in- terest, compelled Khrushchev to proclaim that, by 1970, the Soviet Union

would sur- pass the United States in per capita produc- tion. In 1980, he predicted, America would embrace communism.

In reality, severe economic problems per- sisted in the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to consumption and agriculture, where the early initiative to develop the Vir- gin Lands ended poorly. During Khrush- chev's reign, the ideological and political atmosphere often changed. To some extent, his orientation in this regard depended on his standing within the Soviet leadership and the international communist movement. In 1957 he forbade the publication of Boris Paster- nak's *Doctor Zhivago*, whereas in 1962 he allowed the publication of Aleksandr Sol- zhenitsyn's (much more critical) novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

In foreign policy, Khrushchev generally attempted to ease tensions with the West, particularly with the United States. He re- jected Stalin's thesis that wars between capi- talist and socialist countries were inevitable and instead sought peaceful coexistence. On

the whole, up until 1960, Soviet–American relations improved. Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States was a remarkable suc- cess. His talks with President Dwight D. Eisenhower produced, at least for a brief time, what came to be called the Spirit of Camp David. Another highlight of improved East–West relations was the July 25, 1963, signing of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

But Khrushchev engaged in some rather dubious and dangerous foreign policy ini- tiatives as well. He initiated the 1958 Ber- lin Crisis, authorized the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and used the U-2 Crisis in 1960 to provoke a showdown with Eisenhower and torpedo the May 1960 Paris Conference.

Most disturbing of all, in 1962 Khrush- chev decided to install intermediate-range ballistic missiles in communist Cuba. After a brief but extremely tense confrontation with President John F. Kennedy's administration in October

1962, during which the super- powers were poised on the abyss of thermo- nuclear war, Khrushchev decided to remove the weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis was by far Khrushchev's worst foreign policy mistake. Although he did exact a few con- cessions from the Americans in return for the missiles' removal, the crisis was clearly a humiliating loss of face for the Soviets and for the Soviet leader personally. Ultimately, it became an important factor in his fall from power less than two years later.

Khrushchev's policy toward other social- ist states was equally ambivalent. He re- stored Soviet relations with Yugoslavia in 1955, after the Tito-Stalin break of 1948. He promoted de-Stalinization programs in East- ern bloc states and allowed a certain extent of limited autonomy for communist parties abroad. However, Khrushchev was not above cracking down on dissent when it was in his best interest. When his secret 1956 speech

on Stalin and the ensuing de-Stalinization campaign led to revolts in Poland and Hun- gary, he intervened in both cases. In fact, he ordered the 1956 Hungarian Revolution crushed by brute force. He was unable to head off crises in Soviet-Albanian and Sino- Soviet relations when Albanian and Chi- nese officials criticized his de-Stalinization policies and rapprochement with the W est. Both crises became quite serious by the early 1960s and led to permanent schisms. Particu- larly noteworthy was the Sino-Soviet split, for which Khrushchev was largely blamed.

Because of the failure of Khrushchev's agricultural policies, the Sino-Soviet split, the debacle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the leader's increasingly unpredictable and unstable leadership, he was ousted by the party's Central Committee on October 14, 1964, and relieved of all his positions. He then wrote his memoirs, which were pub- lished in the West beginning in 1970. Khrush- chev died in Moscow on September 11, 1971, following a massive heart attack.

Magarditsch Hatschikjan

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Kissinger, Henry (1923–)

Of German-Jewish extraction, Henry Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Germany. He left Adolf Hitler's Ger- many for New York in 1938 and became an American citizen five years later. After serv- ing in the U.S. Army, Kissinger became a professor of government at Harvard University, publishing his doctoral dissertation, *A World Restored* (1955), which focused par- ticularly on the Austrian Prince von Metter- nich, whom Kissinger admired and in some ways modeled himself on. He also published a study of U.S. atomic policy for the presti- gious Council on Foreign Relations.

Although his intellectual capabilities were highly respected, Kissinger's real ambitions lay in the practice, not the study, of interna- tional relations. He used his Harvard position to meet major political figures and served as an advisor to leading Republicans, includ- ing Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York and former vice president Nixon. Kiss- inger's efforts won him only minor assign- ments under President John F. Kennedy, but when Nixon

became president he appointed Kissinger as his national security advisor. Kissinger greatly overshadowed William P. Rogers, nominal secretary of state until Au- gust 1973, when Kissinger succeeded him, taking virtual control of U.S. foreign policy.

Kissinger's undoubted abilities included an immense capacity for hard work, a tal- ent for grand designs and broad conceptual- ization, and the imagination to reformulate the international system to accommodate the relative weakness of the United States, de-emphasizing ideology in favor of a bal- ance of power and the pursuit of closer re- lations with communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and détente with the Soviet Union. This resulted in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that imposed limits on Soviet and American nuclear arse- nals and delivery systems; the 1975 Helsinki Accords that normalized relations between Eastern and Western Europe and created the permanent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and a rap-prochement between communist China and the United States that Kissinger pioneered with a secret 1971 personal visit to Beijing. He also proved himself to be an excellent negotiator in complicated and protracted shuttle diplomacy designed to resolve long- standing Arab–Israeli tensions and disputes after the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Kissinger's weaknesses included a pen- chant for secrecy and intrigue, enormous van- ity, and overweening personal ambition, all of which sometimes impelled him to decid- edly unscrupulous behavior; an overriding concern to maintain international stability that often led him to endorse brutal right- or left-wing regimes; and a focus on realism in foreign policy to the near exclusion of all con- siderations of morality. The latter was appar- ent in his involvement in the secret bombing of Cambodia in the early 1970s, an operation that Congress halted when it became public in 1973, and the 1970–1971 invasion of that country despite Nixon's promise when he took office to end the Vietnam War as soon as possible; acquiescence in a 1973 military

coup that brought the death of left-wing president Salvador Allende of Chile; en- dorsement of Indonesia's military takeover of Portuguese East Timor in December 1975 and the brutal suppression of indigenous re- sistance there; and readiness to authorize wiretapping against American bureaucrats suspected of leaking official information to the press. These aspects of Kissinger and his failure, constant negotiations notwith- standing, to end the Vietnam War—a con- flict that his Cambodian policies effectively broadened —until 1973 made him the bête noire of many American liberals.

Likewise, conservative Republicans found much to dislike in Kissinger's willingness to accommodate the communist Soviet Union and the PRC and, if Sino-American rap- prochement required, to jettison the Repub- lic of China (ROC, Taiwan), a longtime U.S. ally. Under Nixon's successor, Gerald R. Ford, who became president in August 1974 when the Watergate scandal forced Nixon's resignation, both SALT I and the Helsinki Accords on Europe that Kissinger helped to negotiate with the Soviets became targets for attack by such conservatives as California governor and presidential hopeful Ronald W. Reagan, who assailed the Soviet human rights record. The fall of Vietnam to com- munist forces in April 1975, little more than two years after Kissinger had negotiated the Paris Peace Accords supposedly ending the war, also damaged his credibility. On No- vember 3, 1975, Ford replaced Kissinger as national security advisor, although Kissinger remained secretary of state until Ford left of- fice in January 1977.

Upon leaving government, Kissinger es- tablished an influential business consultancy firm. He continued to provide unofficial ad- vice to successive administrations, wrote and spoke extensively on international af- fairs, and published three weighty volumes

of memoirs. He remains a perennially con- troversial figure.

Priscilla Roberts

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Korean War (1950–1953)

The Korean War was a watershed conflict within the Cold War. The first shooting war of the Cold War, it was also the first limited war of the nuclear age. Korea was long the scene of confrontation among China, Japan, and Russia. Controlled by either China or Japan for most of its modern history, Korea was divided in half after World War II. War- time agreements called for the United States to temporarily occupy southern Korea up to the 38th Parallel, while the Soviet Union did the same north of that line. The Cold War brought the permanent division of Korea into two states.

Efforts to establish a unified Korea failed, and in September 1947 the United States

KOREAN WAR, 1950 – 1953
125°E
130°E
SOVIET UNION
MANCHURIA
Vladivostok
N
CHINA
Tunghwa
Chongjin
Yalu R.
Kanggye
Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir
Chosan
Changjin (Chosin)
Iwon
Sinuiju
Chongchon R.
Hagaru
40°N
Hungnam
NORTH KOREA
Sea of Japan
Yongdok
Wonsan
Pyongyang
Imjin R.
Iron Triangle
Pyonggang
Pork Chop Hill
Ongjin Peninsula
Kumhwa
Chorwon
Yangyang
38th Parallel
Kaesong
Panmunjom
Chunchon
Seoul
Samchok
Inchon
Osan
Han R.
TAEBAEK MTS.
SOBAEK MTS.
SOUTH KOREA
Yellow Sea
Yondok
Kum R.
Taejon
Kumchon
Pohang
Kunsan
Taegu
CHIRI MTS.
Naktong R.
Limit of North Korean advance, Jun-Sep 1950
Limit of United Nations advance, Nov 1950
Limit of Chinese advance, Jan 1951
Armistice Line, Jul 27, 1953
Battle site
Principal railroads
Principal Chinese railroad supply lines
Principal roads
Masan
Pusan
35°N
Mokpo
Korea Strait
Tsushima (Japan)
JAPAN
Koje-do Island
Tsushima Strait
0 50 100 mi
0 50 100 km

referred the issue to the United Nations (UN), which called for a unified Korean gov- ernment and the withdrawal of occupation forces. In January 1948 Soviet authorities refused to permit a UN commission to over- see elections in northern Korea, but elections for an assembly proceeded in southern Korea that spring. By August 1948 the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) had officially formed, with its capital at Seoul and headed by 70-year-old Syngman Rhee, a staunch conservative. Washington then terminated its military government and agreed to train South Korea's armed forces.

In September 1948 the communists formed the Democratic People' s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), with its capital at Pyongyang and led by veteran communist Kim Il Sung. Kim had fought the Japanese oc- cupation and ended World War II as a major in the Soviet Army.

Both Korean governments claimed au- thority over the entire peninsula, but in December 1948 the UN General Assem- bly endorsed the ROK as the only lawfully elected government. That same month the USSR announced that it had withdrawn its forces from North Korea. The United States withdrew all its troops from South Korea by June 1949.

Beginning in May 1948, sporadic fight- ing began along the 38th Parallel. Fear- ful that it might be drawn into a civil war, the United States purposely distanced itself from these clashes. President Harry S. Tru- man announced that fighting in Korea would not automatically lead to U.S. military inter- vention. In January 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea from the U.S. strategic Asian defensive perimeter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agreed with this, as did U.S. Far Eastern commander General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Such pro- nouncements undoubtedly encouraged Kim

to believe that the United States would not fight for Korea.

For many years North Korea, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintained that the Korean War began with a South Korean attack on North Korea. This was propaganda. Beginning in late 1949 North Korea prepared for full-scale war. Its Korean Peoples Army (KPA) was well armed

with Soviet weapons, including such modern offensive arms as heavy artillery, T-34 tanks, trucks, automatic weapons, and about 180 new aircraft. The KPA numbered about 135,000 men in 10 divisions.

South Korea's military situation was far different. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) lacked equipment and trained lead- ers because of Washington's unwillingness to fight in Korea and because the meager

North Korean propaganda poster of August 1950 urging citizens to work for victory over United Nations forces. (National Archives)

U.S. defense budget would not allow it. ROKA training was incomplete and lacked heavy artillery, tanks, and antitank weap- ons. South Korea had no air force apart from trainers and liaison aircraft. The South Ko- rean military numbered 95,000 men in eight divisions, only four of which were at full strength.

Washington was aware of the North Ko- rean military buildup but believed that the communist powers would not risk war. Lim- ited war was still a foreign concept to U.S. planners. The U.S. military was also woe- fully unprepared and ill-equipped. The army numbered only nine divisions and 630,000 men.

Kim planned to use his military superiority to invade and quickly conquer South Korea. Twice he consulted Soviet leader Josef Stalin, promising him victory in a matter of weeks, assuring him that there would be a commu- nist revolution in South Korea, and insisting that Washington would not intervene. Mos- cow and Beijing were actively preparing for the invasion as early as the spring of 1949, and Russian military advisors assisted in its planning. Stalin concluded that even if the United States decided to intervene, it would come too late.

Stalin pledged military assistance but not direct Soviet military involvement. He also insisted that Kim meet with PRC leader Mao Zedong and secure his assent to the plans. In late 1949, Mao released the People's Libera- tion Army (PLA) 164th and 166th Divisions of Korean volunteers who had fought against the Japanese and in the Chinese Civil War, providing North Korea with 30,000–40,000 seasoned troops.

On June 25, 1950, KPA forces invaded South Korea. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of North Korean forces, a reso- lution that went unchallenged because of a

Soviet UN boycott. On June 27 the Security Council asked UN member states to furnish assistance to South Korea. President Harry S. Truman also extended U.S. air and naval operations to include North Korea and au- thorized U.S. Army troops to protect the port of Pusan. On General MacArthur's recom- mendation, President Truman committed U.S. Far Eastern ground forces to Korea on June 30.

The invasion caught both MacArthur and Washington by surprise. Yet U.S. interven- tion was almost certain, given the Truman Doctrine, domestic political fallout from the communist victory in China in 1949, and the belief that success in Korea would embolden the communists elsewhere. During the

three- year conflict, no war was ever formally de- clared; Truman labeled it a "police action."

At the time of the invasion the United States had four poorly trained and equipped divisions in Japan. By cannibalizing his 7th Infantry Division, MacArthur was able to dispatch the 24th and 25th Infantry Divi- sions and the 1st Cavalry Division to Korea within two weeks. Meanwhile, Seoul fell on June 28. Most of South Korea's equipment was lost when the bridges spanning the Han River were prematurely blown.

On July 5 the first American units battled the KPA at Osan, 50 miles south of Seoul. Expected to stop a KPA division, Task Force Smith consisted of only 540 men in two rifle companies and an artillery battery. The KPA, spearheaded by T-34 tanks, easily swept it aside.

At the request of the UN Security Council, the UN set up a military command in Korea. Washington insisted on a U.S. commander, and on July 10 Truman appointed MacArthur to head the UN Command (UNC). Seven- teen nations contributed military assistance, and at peak strength UNC forces numbered about 400,000 South Korean troops, 250,000

U.S. troops, and 35,000 troops from other nations. Two British and Canadians units formed the 1st Commonwealth Division. Turkey provided a brigade, and there were troops from Australia, Thailand, the Philip- pines, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Other nations provided medi- cal units.

U.S. forces were unprepared for the fight- ing. Difficult terrain, primitive logistics, poor communication, and refugees did as much to delay the North Korean offensive as did the defenders. In the chaotic atmosphere of the UNC retreat, both sides committed atrocities. The South Koreans executed some 2,000 po- litical prisoners. U.S. and UNC troops shot a number of innocent civilians as the KPA infiltrated throngs of refugees and used them as human shields. North Korea committed far greater atrocities during its occupation of

South Korea, however, slaying an estimated 26,000 political opponents. The KPA also executed American prisoners of war (POWs) in the fall of 1950.

By mid-July UNC troops had been pushed back into the so-called Pusan Perimeter, an area of 30–50 miles around the vital port of Pusan on the southeastern coast of Korea. Here U.S. and ROK forces bought valuable time and ultimately held. This success was attributable to UNC artillery, control of the skies, and Eighth Army (EUSAK, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea) commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker's brilliant mobile defense. The KPA also failed to employ its early manpower advantage to mount simultaneous attacks along the entire perimeter.

Even as the battle for the Pusan Perimeter raged, MacArthur was planning an amphibi- ous assault behind enemy lines. Confident that he could hold Pusan, MacArthur delib- erately weakened EUSAK to build up an invasion force. He selected Inchon as the

invasion site. As Korea's second largest port and only 15 miles from Seoul, Inchon was close to the KPA's main supply line south. Seizing it would cut off KPA troops to the south. MacArthur also knew that he could deal North Korea a major political blow if Seoul were promptly recaptured.

The Inchon landing was a risky ven- ture, and few besides MacArthur favored it. Inchon posed the daunting problems of a 32-foot tidal range that allowed only 6 hours in 24 for sea resupply, a narrow winding channel, and high seawalls. On September 15, Major General Edward Almond's X Corps of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division commenced the invasion. Supported by naval gunfire and air attacks, the Marines secured Inchon with relatively few casualties. UNC forces reentered Seoul on September 24.

At the same time, EUSAK broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and drove north, link- ing up with X Corps on September 26. Only one-quarter to one-third of the KPA escaped north of the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang ig- nored MacArthur's call for surrender, and on October 1 South Korean troops crossed into North Korea. On October 7 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, and two

days later MacArthur ordered U.S. forces across the 38th Parallel. Pyongyang fell on October 19 as stunned KPA forces fled north.

MacArthur then divided his forces for the drive to the Yalu River. He ordered X Corps transported by sea around the Korean Pen- insula to the east coast port of Wonsan. Al- mond would then clear northeastern Korea. EUSAK would remain on the west coast and drive into northwest Korea. The two com- mands would be separated by a gap of be- tween 20 and 50 miles. MacArthur believed, falsely as it turned out, that the north-south

United States Marines of the 1st Division scale a sea wall during the Inchon invasion on September 15, 1950. The Inchon landing was a brilliant strategic coup that turned the tide of the war against North Korea. (National Archives)

Taebaek Mountain range would obviate large-scale communist operations there. The Eighth Army crossed the Chongchon River at Sinanju, and by November 1 elements of the 24th Division were only 18 miles from the Yalu. Several days earlier a South Ko- rean unit reached the Yalu, the only UNC unit to get there.

China now entered the war—unofficially. Alarmed over possible U.S. bases adjacent to Manchuria, Mao had issued warnings about potential Chinese military intervention. He be- lieved that the United States would be unable to counter the Chinese numerical advantage and viewed American troops as soft and un- used to night fighting. On October 2 Mao in- formed Stalin that China would enter the war.

Stalin agreed to move Soviet MiG-15 fighters already in China to the Korean bor- der. In this position they could cover the Chinese military buildup and prevent U.S. air attacks on Manchuria. Soviet pilots began flying missions against UNC forces on No- vember 1 and bore the brunt of the com- munists' air war. Stalin also ordered other Soviet air units to deploy to China, train Chi- nese pilots, and then turn over aircraft to them.

Although Russian and Chinese sources disagree on what the Soviet leader promised Mao, Stalin clearly had no intention of using his air units for anything other than defen- sive purposes. China later claimed that Stalin had

promised complete air support for their ground forces, but this never materialized.

On October 25 Chinese troops entered the fighting in northwestern Korea, and Walker wisely brought the bulk of EUSAK back be- hind the Chongchon River. Positions then stabilized, and the Chinese offensive slack- ened. The Chinese also attacked in north- eastern Korea before halting operations and breaking contact. On November 8 the first jet battle in history occurred when an American F-80 shot down a MiG-15 over Sinanju.

The initial Chinese incursion ended on November 7. In a meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on October 15, General MacArthur had assured the presi- dent that the war was all but won but that if the Chinese were to intervene, their forces would be slaughtered. UNC airpower, he be-

lieved, would nullify any Chinese threat. Yet from November 1, 1950, to October 1951, MiGs so dominated the Yalu River area that U.S. B-29 bombers had to cease daylight operations.

The initial Chinese intervention had con- sisted of 18 divisions. In early November they moved an additional 12 divisions into Korea, totaling some 300,000 men. MacAr- thur responded by ordering the air force to destroy the bridges over the Yalu. Wash- ington revoked the order, but MacArthur complained that this threatened his com- mand. Washington gave in. On November 8, 79 B-29s and 300 fighter-bombers struck bridges and towns on either side of the Yalu. The bombing had little effect. At the time most of the Chinese were in North Korea, and the Yalu was soon frozen.

Meanwhile, Washington debated how to proceed. The political leadership and the JCS under the chairmanship of General Omar Bradley believed that Europe was the top priority. Washington decided that Man- churia would remain off-limits, but MacAr- thur could take other military steps that he deemed advisable, including resumption of

the offensive. The Democrats were reluctant to show weakness in Korea, and the Republi- cans had gained seats in the November 1950 congressional elections.

While much was being made in the United States about the prohibitions of strikes on Manchuria, the communist side also exer- cised restraint. With the exception of a few ancient biplanes that sometimes bombed UNC positions at night, communist airpower was restricted to north of Pyongyang. No ef- fort was made to strike Pusan, and UNC con- voys traveled without fear of air attack. Nor did communist forces attempt to disrupt Al- lied sea communications.

MacArthur had made X Corps dependent logistically on EUSAK instead of Japan, and W alker insisted on delaying resump- tion of the offensive until he could build up supplies. Weather also played a factor, with temperatures already below zero. Fi- nally, Walker agreed to resume the offen- sive on November 24. To the east, X Corps was widely dispersed.

MacArthur seemed oblivious to any prob- lems, seeing the advance as an occupation rather than an offensive. It went well on the first day, but on the night of November 25–26 the Chinese attacked the Eighth Army in force. The Americans held, but on Decem- ber 26 the South Korean II Corps disintegrated, exposing EUSAK's right flank. The Chinese poured 18 divisions into the gap, en- dangering the whole Eighth Army. In a bril- liant delaying action at Kunuri, the U.S. 2nd Division bought time for the other EUSAK divisions to recross the Chongchon. MacAr- thur now ordered a retirement just below the 38th Parallel to protect Seoul.

Washington directed MacArthur to pull X Corps out of northeastern Korea to prevent it from being flanked. Under heavy Chinese at- tack, X Corps withdrew to the east coast for sea borne evacuation along with the South

Korean I Corps. The retreat of the 1st Ma- rine Division and some army elements from the Chanjin Reservoir to the coast was one of the most masterly withdrawals in military history. X Corps was redeployed to Pusan by sea. On December 10, Wonsan was evac- uated. At Hungnam through December 24, 105,000 officers and men were taken off, along with about 91,000 Korean refugees who did not want to remain in North Korea.

The Korean War had entered a new phase: in effect, the UNC was now fighting China. MacArthur refused to accept a limited war and publicized his views to his supporters in the United States, making reference to "inhibitions" placed on his conduct of the war. UNC morale plummeted, especially with General Walker's death in a jeep accident on December 22. Not until Lieutenant Gen- eral Matthew Ridgway arrived to replace Walker did the situation improve. In the United States, Truman found himself under heavy pressure from Republicans to pursue the war vigorously. But the administration reduced its goal in Korea to restoring the sta- tus quo ante bellum.

UNC forces again had to retreat when the Chinese launched a New Y ear' s of- fensive, retaking Seoul on January 4. But the Chinese outran their supply lines, and Ridgway took the offensive. His methodi- cal, limited advance was designed to inflict maximum punishment rather than to secure territory.

Nonetheless, by the end of March UNC forces recaptured Seoul, and by the end of April they were again north of the 38th Parallel.

On April 11, 1951, President Truman re- lieved MacArthur of command, appointing Ridgway in his stead. Lieutenant General James Van Fleet took over EUSAK. Al- though widely unpopular at the time, Ma- cArthur's removal was fully supported by the JCS, as MacArthur had publicly expressed

his disdain of limited war. He returned home to a hero's welcome, but much to his dismay, political support for him promptly faded.

On April 22 the Chinese counterattacked in Korea. Rather than expend his troops in a defensive stand, Van Fleet ordered a me- thodical withdrawal with maximum artillery and air strikes against communist forces. The Chinese pushed the UNC south of the 38th Parallel, but the offensive was halted by May.

UNC forces then counterpunched, and by the end of May the front stabilized just above the 38th Parallel. The JCS generally limited EUSAK to that line, allowing only small local advances to gain more favorable terrain.

The war was now stalemated, and a dip- lomatic settlement seemed expedient. On June 23, 1951, Soviet UN representative Jacob Malik proposed a cease-fire. With the Chinese expressing interest, Truman autho- rized Ridgway to negotiate. Meetings began on July 10 at Kaesong, although hostili- ties would continue until an armistice was signed.

UNC operations from this point were es- sentially designed to minimize friendly ca- sualties. Each side had built deep defensive lines that would be costly to break through. In August armistice talks broke down, and later that month the Battle of Bloody Ridge began, developing into the Battle of Heart- break Ridge and lasting until mid-October. In late October negotiations resumed, this time at Panmunjom, although the fighting con- tinued. Half of the war's casualties occurred during the period of armistice negotiations.

On November 12, 1951, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to cease offensive operations. Fighting now devolved into raids, local at- tacks, patrols, and

artillery fire. In February 1953 Van Fleet was succeeded as EUSAK commander by Lieutenant General Maxwell

D. Taylor. Meanwhile, UNC air operations intensified to choke off communist supply lines and reduce the likelihood of commu- nist offensives.

In November 1952 General Dwight Eisen- hower was elected president of the United States on a mandate to end the war. With U.S. casualties running 2,500 a month, the war had become a political liability. Eisen- hower instructed the JCS to draw up plans to end the war militarily including the possible use of nuclear weapons, and made the plans known to the communist side. More impor- tant in ending the conflict, however, was Stalin's death on March 5, 1953. As the ar- mistice negotiations entered their final phase in May, the Chinese stepped up military ac- tion, initiating attacks in June and July to re- move bulges in the line. UNC forces gave up some ground but inflicted heavy casualties.

The chief stumbling block to peace was the repatriation of POWs. The North Ko- reans had forced into their army many South Korean soldiers and civilians, and thousands of them had subsequently been captured by the UNC. If all KPA prison- ers were repatriated, many South Koreans would be sent to North Korea. Also, many Chinese POWs sought refuge on Taiwan (Formosa) instead of returning to the PRC. Truman was determined that no prisoner be repatriated against his will. This stance prolonged the war, but some U.S. officials saw a moral and propaganda victory in the Chinese and North Korean defections. The communist side rejected the UNC position out of hand.

Following intense UNC air strikes on North Korean hydroelectric facilities and the capital of Pyongyang, the communists accepted a face-saving formula whereby a neutral commission would deal with pris- oner repatriation. On July 27 an armistice

was signed at Panmunjom, and the guns fi- nally fell silent.

Of 132,000 North Korean and Chinese military POWs, fewer than 90,000 chose to return home. Twenty-two Americans held by the communists also elected not to re- turn home. Of 10,218 Americans captured by the communists, only 3,746 returned. The remainder were murdered or died in captiv- ity. American losses were 142,091, of whom 33,686 were killed in action. South Korea sus- tained 300,000 casualties, of whom 70,000 were killed in action. Other UNC casualties came to 17,260, of whom 3,194 were killed in action. North Korean casualties are estimated at 523,400 and Chinese losses at more than a million. Perhaps 3 million Korean civilians also died during the war.

The war devastated Korea and hardened the divisions between North and South. It was also a sobering experience for the United States. After the war, the U.S. military estab- lishment remained strong. For America, the Korean W ar institutionalized the Cold W ar national security state. It also accelerated the racial integration of the armed forces, which in turn encouraged a much wider U.S. civil rights movement.

China gained greatly from the war in that it came to be regarded as the preponderant military power in Asia. This is ironic, be- cause the Chinese Army in Korea was in many respects a primitive and inefficient force. Nonetheless, throughout the follow- ing decades exaggeration of Chinese mili- tary strength was woven into the fabric of American foreign policy, influencing subse- quent U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The Korean War effectively militarized the containment policy. Before the war, Mar- shall Plan aid had been almost entirely non- military. U.S. aid now shifted heavily toward military rearmament. The war also marked

a sustained militarization of American for- eign policy, with the Vietnam War a logical consequence.

Additionally, the Korean War solidified the role of the United States as the world's policeman and strengthened the country's relationship with its West European allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The war facilitated the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West

Germany). It also impacted Japan and was a major factor fueling that nation's economy.

No formal peace has ever been concluded in Korea. Technically, the two Koreas re- main at war, and the 38th Parallel remains one of the Cold War's lone outposts.

Spencer C. Tucker

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Laos

Comprising 91,428 square miles, about twice the size of the U.S. state of Pennsyl- vania, Laos is a landlocked nation border- ing Vietnam to the east, Cambodia to the south, Thailand to the west, and Burma and China to the north. It had a 1945 population of some 1.7 million people. During the Cold War, Laos was consumed by revolution and war. Landlocked by larger neighbors and the buffer between ancient empires, after World War II Laos found itself at the intersection of French colonialism, Indochinese nation- alism, communist expansionism, and U.S. containment policies.

Once an ancient Thai kingdom, in 1893 Laos was incorporated into French Indo- china. Lao nationalism developed rapidly upon Japan's conquest of Indochina during World War II. Lao King Sisavangvong pro- claimed Lao independence in March 1945. But with Japan's defeat shortly thereafter, he renounced the declaration and instead endorsed a French protectorate. His prime minister, Prince Phetsarath, did not agree with this decision and in September 1945 proclaimed Lao independence. The king dismissed him, and Phetsarath joined the dissident Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement.

The Lao Issara was intertwined with the communist-led Viet Minh in neighbor- ing Vietnam. Many Lao nationalists, such as Prince Souvannaphong, were linked to Vietnam by ethnicity or marriage. In March 1946 Lao and Vietnamese guerrillas fought together against French rule. The French prevailed, and the Lao Issara fled in disarray

to Thailand. Laos was then reabsorbed into French Indochina. Badly weakened by World War II and conflict with the Viet Minh that included the latter's invasion of Laos, in 1953 France granted the Royal Lao Government (RLG) nominal independence. The independence of Laos was confirmed in the July 1954 Geneva Accords.

The United States began economic and social programs to develop Laos. However, aid created a dependency on the United States that eventually spawned considerable re- sentment. Prince Souvannaphong and others joined the communist Pathet Lao (Country of Lao), which opposed Western imperial- ism, including aid from the West. Fearing a civil war, a neutralist solution emerged in the mid-1950s, centered on Prince Souvanna Phouma. Intelligent and mild-mannered, Souvanna was well respected by most Lao.

However, U.S. officials saw him as a com- munist dupe. Souvanna believed that Laos could survive the Cold War only through neutrality. He also tried to bridge divisions by building coalition governments. In 1956 Souvannaphong and other leftists represent- ing the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX, Lao Patri- otic Front) joined Souvanna's coalition.

The success of the NLHX in the 1958 elections alarmed the Americans, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. aid. This action de- stabilized Souvanna's government and gave rise to Phoui Sananikhone, a pro-American rightist. He became prime minister in Au- gust 1958 and brought members of the Royal Lao Army (RLA) into government, notably Colonel Phoumi Nosavan. Phoumi led the RLA against North Vietnamese forces using

Lao territory for what would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam). When Phoui chal- lenged this, Phoumi took control of the gov- ernment in a December 1959 coup.

Phoumi was related to Thai strongman Sarit Thanarat and developed links through him to the U.S. military in Thailand. This alienated some Lao, even within the RLA, who resented foreign domination. In August 1960, RLA soldiers led by Captain Kong Le launched a coup of their own to restore Sou- vanna's neutralist government. Humiliated, Phoumi withdrew to secret bases in northern Thailand. U.S. president Dwight Eisenhow- er's administration decided to reestablish aid programs to Souvanna and restrain Phoumi, but Thailand refused to lift its blockades of the Lao border. Souvanna appealed to the Soviet Union, which airlifted supplies to Vientiane. In December 1960, Phoumi's forces drove Souvanna out of Vientiane. Kong Le's men retreated to the Vietnamese border, where they linked up with the Pathet Lao. Phoumi installed yet another govern- ment under Prince Boun Oum.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) now feared that Phoumi would shut down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and allow American air bases in Laos. American strategy was to deny commu- nist access through

Laos to insurgencies in South Vietnam and northern Thailand, and Laos thus became an important litmus test of America's anticommunist resolve. Washington backed Phoumi and increased aid to Thailand, which became the base for many operations throughout Indochina.

U.S. president John F. Kennedy's admin- istration continued these policies but by 1962 decided to abandon the volatile Phoumi. In- stead, Kennedy reluctantly put his faith in Souvanna. After months of negotiations, in June 1963 an international agreement

was reached barring foreign military advi- sors and establishing a neutralist, coalition government in Laos. Souvanna returned as prime minister, with both Souvannaphong and Phoumi serving in his cabinet.

The agreement did not last. North Viet- namese soldiers remained in eastern Laos, while American and Thai operations contin- ued in other parts of the country. Infighting paralyzed the Lao government with assas- sinations and ceaseless power struggles. Finally, Souvanna abandoned neutralism, convinced that Hanoi controlled the Pathet Lao. In December 1964 he authorized U.S. military operations against communists in the country, drawing Laos ever closer to the war next door in Vietnam.

In Operation Barrel Roll, the United States routinely bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos, and by 1968 there were between 200 and 300 U.S. air strikes in the country daily. Laos soon became the most heavily bombed country in the history of warfare. As a result, untold thousands of Lao people were killed, with ethnic minorities, comprising 50 percent of the population, caught in the middle. Many minority Hmong, Yao, Akha, and other peoples became refu- gees. Some joined anticommunist irregular forces under the command of Hmong RLA officer Vang Pao, who was trained and sup- plied by the Thais and Americans to fight the so-called Secret War in Laos.

By 1970 the communists controlled much of Laos. The Americans responded with more bombing, expanded covert operations, and then a South Vietnamese invasion aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All failed. RLG losses were very high, and by 1970 a large number of V ang Pao' s men were

in fact Thais secretly reassigned to Laos. Fac- ing defeat, in 1973 the RLG secured a cease- fire upon the Paris Peace Accords between North Vietnam and the United States. A new

coalition government emerged, dominated by the NLHX.

Communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam did not immediately spread to Laos. Pathet Lao success came from Viet- namese backing and did not translate into wide popular support. Many still favored Souvanna and Lao King Savana Vatthana. Gradually, the NLHX eliminated its rivals. Finally, in December 1975, the communists forced Souvanna and the king to resign their offices. The NLHX took power with Sou- vannaphong as president and banned all other political parties.

There was, however, no peace for Laos. Armed resistance continued, particularly among the Hmong. Many Lao people died or disappeared in communist reeducation camps, including the royal family. Border clashes with Thailand flared throughout the 1980s, and innumerable economic problems made Laos one of the world's poorest coun- tries. Laos became even more dependent on Vietnam, which itself was isolated from the world community because of its Cambodian occupation. Only very recently has Laos opened up and begun to address the long, painful process of rebuilding.

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Latin America, Popular Liberation Movements in

The Cold War contest between the United States and the Soviet Union affected people everywhere. In Latin America, Fidel Cas- tro's successful consolidation of the revolu- tionary state in Cuba after 1959 encouraged the mobilization of popular resistance move- ments. These liberation movements gener- ally had two targets: standing governments that repressed popular political ambitions and aspirations, and the international order that, according to the theoretical assertions of the organizers of the liberation move- ments, held Latin America in a subordinate position.

The Cuban Revolution did not in itself spark liberation movements in other coun- tries. In fact, efforts by Ernesto "Che" Gue- vara to sponsor other revolutions through the creation of organizational *focos* failed.

Foco meant literally a focal point of orga- nizational activity, associated with *foquismo*, whereby the term was blown up into a theory of revolution. Guevara and his followers as- serted that a small group of committed rev- olutionaries could, given the circumstances of Latin America's general exploitation and widespread poverty, move into any isolated or impoverished area and generate a commu- nity of resistance by providing an example of sacrifice, organization, and ideological com- mitment. This theory had been extrapolated from the Cuban revolutionary experience in the Sierra Maestra, the highlands of central Cuba, where a small band of committed rev- olutionaries galvanized popular support for

the movement to overthrow Fulgencio Ba- tista. Guevara and his later supporters built up their experience into a general plan for revolutionary struggle and change. Their assertions were particularly influential for rebel efforts in Central America and Chi- apas in southern Mexico. In 1967

Guevara himself was captured and executed in Bo- livia during such an attempt.

The atmosphere that produced the spread of popular liberation movements was more complex. First, the Cold War fostered the rise of powerful dictatorships in much of Latin America. During the 1940s and 1950s, governments in Argentina, Brazil, Colom- bia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela that had mobilized popular sectors with prom- ises of economic and social reform had been forced from power by military coups (often sponsored by the United States), foreign in- vasion, or interparty strife. By the start of the 1960s, the power of the regimes that had come into being earlier in the Cold War had weakened substantially, and in turn frustra- tion over the lack of substantive reform had grown.

A variety of examples had appeared in and beyond Latin America that helped inspire or- ganized challenges to state power. The defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954 helped demonstrate the potential success of a guer- rilla insurgency against a stronger foe. Alge- rian resistance to French control beginning in November 1954 generated important the- oretical and practical lessons. The brief suc- cess of the Bolivian Revolution in 1952 and the ability of Castro and his communist reb- els to challenge one of Latin America's most entrenched dictatorships demonstrated that a social base for revolution existed within the region.

In the 1960s, two distinct intellectual streams inspired the development of revolu- tionary organizations. The Marxist tradition,

central to the Cuban Revolution, enjoyed broad support among intellectuals, students, and organizations linked to industrial work- ers. Although communist parties, in existence for decades in almost every Latin American country, remained largely isolated from the popular mobilization under way, in univer- sities, large cities, and within unions clan- destine radical groups formed and began to organize for revolution. Groups that defined themselves as Marxist and dedicated them- selves to the revolutionary struggle appeared in almost every Latin American country be- fore 1965.

Coincidentally, within organizations as- sociated with the Roman Catholic Church, a second revolutionary front took shape. Responding to calls from the Church hier- archy to make the Church more responsive to the needs of the poor and oppressed, lay organizers and clergy alike began reach- ing out to communities in new and impor- tant ways. The worker-priest movement in Argentina and the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs, Ecclesial Base Communi- ties) in Brazil and elsewhere are notable ex- amples of this trend. As this push for social and political engagement peaked in response to the instructions that Vatican Council II (1962–1965) provided, many of the clergy became radicalized by the experience. Dis- couraged by the Catholic Church's conser- vatism, individuals resigned their positions and became political activists.

The spread of revolutionary organiza- tions did not result in many successful chal- lenges to established regimes in the 1960s, however. Urban revolutionary cells in Mex- ico, Nicaragua, and V enezuela appeared and quickly collapsed. In Guatemala, ef- forts to organize a peasant revolt collapsed under pressure from military campaigns that the United States helped coordinate and support.

The few successful organizations relied on a community or institutional base. Radical Marxist groups in Peru took shape in Andean universities. In Argentina, the Ejército Revo- lutionario del Pueblo (ERP, Revolutionary Army of the People) and the Montoneros emerged from groups that had splintered off from the Perónist political movement. Other groups, such as the Fuerza Armada Revo- lucionaria Colombiana (FARC, Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), the M-19 in Colombia, and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista Na- tional Liberation Front) in Nicaragua, sur- vived and expanded by shifting from urban to rural bases.

The Catholic Church unintentionally con- tributed to the survival and spread of popu- lar liberation movements in much of Latin America. Church officials eventually backed away from the political engagement that Vatican II had dictated, but local parishes provided space and protection for commu- nity groups that initially focused on commu- nity needs and concerns. The meeting places and community base allowed leaders to shift these groups into

more radical directions. This trend, which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, came at times in reaction to attempts at repression or came as a result of links to other radical cells that effectively re- cruited locals to their broader causes.

In the 1970s, incompetent or incomplete efforts to destroy guerrilla groups and pro- test organizations helped galvanize lib- eration movements in some cases. Most notably in Nicaragua, the clumsy and brutal actions of the Anastasio Somoza dictator- ship helped win sympathy and support for the FSLN. By 1979, united with opposition political parties, reform groups, and other dissenters, the FSLN overthrew the dicta- torship and moved to establish a new Marx- ist revolutionary regime.

By the end of the 1970s, applying the les- sons learned from the Vietnam War and mo- tivated by the challenge that the Sandinista government represented to its authority in the region, the United States became more directly involved in a military reaction to popular liberation movements. U.S. inter- vention in El Salvador helped transform the conflict there into a bloody stalemate. Aid and advice to the Guatemalan military sus- tained its struggle against peasant-based re- sistance groups. Military governments in Argentina and Uruguay effectively neutral- ized urban guerrilla movements. But in other contexts, government actions helped main- tain the strength of liberation movements into the 1980s and beyond.

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Literature

The Cold War was fought on the literary as well as the diplomatic and political fronts. Although it did not provide such immedi- ately absorbing subject matter for writers as did the two world wars of the 20th century, it

created a tense, competitive environment in which all thoughtful writers operated. Some- times openly, but often by parable or indi- rection, serious writers confronted the social, political, and philosophical issues raised by the conflict, which eventually split the world into two opposing ideological camps. Dur- ing the McCarthy era of the early 1950s,

a significant number of American writers found their careers threatened should they express sympathy for communism. Their often-coerced testimonies before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senator Joseph McCarthy's Senate sub- committee were invariably dramatic and sometimes life-altering. Always mindful of the feared blacklist, writers learned to pro- ceed with caution. Those who did not con- form resorted to the use of pen names. At the same time, the interest generated by Senate hearings and Cold War intrigues provided the more openly commercial writers, those who produced entertainment that titillated casual readers, a superabundance of plot possibilities.

Decades before the Cold War began, nu- merous men and women of letters had found socialist and Marxist ideas attractive. Some had flirted with communism and had looked toward the Soviet Union as a noble experi- ment. Naturalism, the literary movement that dominated serious European and American fiction in the first half of the 20th century, had actually encouraged many writers in this direction. Since the time of Émile Zola in late 19th-century France, practitioners of lit- erary naturalism had prided themselves on their ability to rouse the public and mitigate miserable living conditions by highlighting social abuses in fiction. Because these writ- ers knew the social problems of Western Europe and the United States best and jux- taposed this reality to the rosy propaganda that was emanating from the Soviet Union, it was not uncommon for them to respond posi- tively to features of the communist message.

As the HUAC hearings got under way, writers who had worked in Hollywood were particularly vulnerable to the committee' s scrutiny. Lillian Hellman

(1905–1984) was perhaps the most highly publicized writer to confront HUAC directly. A major American

dramatist and woman of letters, she had earned her reputation with such plays as *The Chil- dren's Hour* (1934), one of the first Broad- way dramas to treat lesbianism, and *Watch on the Rhine* (1941), an antifascist play. Al- though born in New Orleans to an affluent family, she had become involved in radical politics under the influence of her compan- ion, Dashiell Hammett (1894–1961).

Hellman became an eager student of Marxist texts and briefly joined the Com- munist Party for humanitarian and ideal- istic reasons. In the early years of World War II, she had carefully followed the party line, first urging the United States to stay out of the conflict, during the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and later advocating involvement when Germany violated its treaties by invading the Soviet Union in 1941. By the time she was called to testify before HUAC, her days with the party were over. By skillful management of public relations, she was able to avoid tat- tling on former associates without going to prison herself.

Hammett was not so fortunate. Although a dedicated Marxist who had supported radical movements in the United States, he claimed that he had never actually joined the Com- munist Party. Nevertheless, he refused to cooperate with HUAC, invoking the Fifth Amendment 80 times during his testimony. Refusing to identify communist sympathiz- ers he had known, he was sentenced to six months in federal prison, was blacklisted in Hollywood, and was hounded by the Inter- nal Revenue Service (IRS) for the rest of his life. His writings, identified as subversive by Senator McCarthy and McCarthy's sidekick Roy Cohn, were removed from many librar- ies. This was a considerable disappointment to Hammett's many readers, who regarded him as a creator of the American hard-boiled school of detective fiction with his Sam Spade and Thin Man stories. His best-known

works, such as *Red Harvest* (1927) and *The Maltese Falcon* (1930), are still regarded as classics of the genre.

Other writers with strong Hollywood connections caught up in the HUAC net in- cluded Clifford Odets (1906–1963), Ring Lardner Jr. (1915–1983), and Arthur Miller (1915–2005). Odets emerged as one of the sadder figures of the McCarthy era. A lead- ing playwright of the 1930s and 1940s and the author of *Waiting for Lefty* (1935) and *Golden Boy* (1937), Odets was a member of the Marxist League of American writers, which had included the great American nov- elist Theodore Dreiser (1871–1945). Odets joined the party itself around 1935. Accord- ing to his later testimony, he resigned six or eight months later in disappointment. The communist publications *The Daily Worker* and *The New Masses* had unfavorably re- viewed his plays, labeling him a "hack writer" who did not properly promote pro- letarian themes. When he later testified be- fore HUAC, Odets attempted to downplay leftist influence in Hollywood, claiming that the collaborative system that produced Hol- lywood films made it next to impossible for a writer to inject Marxist ideas into scripts. Because of his conciliatory approach to the committee, many of his colleagues accused him of collusion with the enemy, and the ex- perience left him disheartened.

Lardner was the son of a popular Amer- ican humorist and had been an Academy Award–winning screenwriter in 1942. He was the youngest of the group of motion picture screenwriters and directors accused of communist sympathies, designated as the Hollywood Ten. In the 1930s he had visited the Soviet Union to judge the Marxist ex- periment firsthand. At that time he had truly believed it his duty to try to communicate Marxist ideas through film. HUAC regarded him as an important witness, but his failure

to answer the committee's questions resulted in a citation for contempt, a year's prison sentence, a $1,000 fine, and the Hollywood blacklist. For two years he was forced to make his living anonymously. His novel *The Ecstasy of Owen Muir* appeared in England in the 1960s but could not be published in the United States. He was finally able to return to Hollywood in the 1960s, where he earned a second Academy Award for his work on the screenplay of *M*A*S*H* (1970).

Miller, like Hellman, was a major 20th- century American playwright whose drama *Death of a Salesman* (1949) redefined trag- edy for the modern theater. A liberal activist from youth, Miller had still never been willing to put

himself under the discipline of the Com- munist Party. He rejected its doctrine that all artists should employ their talents to further the party line. Yet he believed that the Commu- nist Party should be able to function legally in the United States, and he condemned HUAC as a pack of witch-hunters. Though Miller was willing to be forthright with HUAC about his own beliefs and actions, he firmly refused to testify against others. On several occasions in later years, Miller publicly expressed his con- viction that the very existence of civilization depended on trust and loyalty. Although his career survived and he became a media ce- lebrity upon his marriage to Hollywood ac- tress Marilyn Monroe, Miller did not escape unscathed. He was even refused a passport by the State Department.

Two later Miller plays powerfully reflect his reactions to HUAC and the anticommunist hysteria that damaged the careers of people close to him. *The Crucible* (1953), ostensibly about the Salem witch trials of early Amer- ican colonial history, was generally under- stood to be a parable of McCarthyism. *After the Fall* (1964) was a more direct depiction of Miller's personal experiences as a harassed artist and husband of a neurotic film star.

To those who were seized by the Red hysteria, it often seemed that all American letters had turned leftist. There were, how- ever, significant counterbalances. During the early years of the Cold War, Ernest Heming- way (1899–1961) and William Faulkner (1897–1962) were among the most admired American writers. Hemingway believed that a writer betrayed his art if he used it to promulgate an ideology. The extreme sub- jectivity of Hemingway and the social con- servatism of Faulkner made them unlikely heroes of the Left.

Nineteen Eighty-Four (1947), a horrific piece of political satiric fiction by the En- glish writer George Orwell (1903–1950), circulated throughout the United States and was widely interpreted as a vision of what the West would become if dominated by the Soviet Union. In the society of Oceania, as described in the book, the omnipresent tele- vision set indoctrinates folk in

the Big Lie, the government's interpretation of every- thing. All speech, action, and even thought are controlled by Big Brother.

Another book that profoundly influenced American thought appeared in 1949. *The God That Failed* was a collection of essays by important novelists, poets, and journalists whose earlier ideals had been betrayed by the reality of what the Soviet Union had become. They had all initially believed communism to be the best hope for the oppressed masses of the world. The participants in *The God That Failed* were Arthur Koestler, a Hun- garian novelist; Louis Fischer, an American journalist; André Gide, a French essayist and novelist; Richard Wright, a major African American novelist; Ignazio Silone, an Ital- ian journalist and novelist; and the British poet Stephen Spender.

Especially moving was Richard Wright's narrative of his emergence from Mississippi plantation life to a writing career in Chicago.

The Communist Party had promised equal- ity for all, with particular concern for the plight of the African American in the years before the successes of the civil rights move- ment. Wright's eventual discovery of the tyr- anny and duplicity of the party was a painful epiphany.

Equally powerful was Gide's account of his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1936 as a guest of the Soviet Society of Authors. He had approached his visit with the con- viction that the Russian experiment was the wave of the future. Although he was shown every courtesy and provided the finest ac- commodations the country had to offer, his eyes and ears were open. He was unable to deny that the vast masses of Soviet citizens still lived in abject poverty. While the rest of the world was bombarded with rosy visions of an ideal state by the party's propaganda machine, Russian workers continued to suf- fer under deplorable tyranny that rivaled that of the czars.

Perhaps the most outspoken and abra- sive literary opponent of communism in the United States during the Cold War was Ayn Rand (1905–1982), a native of Russia who had experienced communism firsthand and passionately hated it and all its works. Her novels, which sometimes became best- sellers and always attracted a cult following, were rarely more than fictional

embodiments of her ideas and prejudices. *We, the Living* (1936), *The Fountainhead* (1943), and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957) extolled the virtues of self-interest, the fulfillment of individual poten- tial, and the value of capitalism as the system best designed to favor self-fulfillment. As a friendly witness before HUAC in October 1947, Rand attacked early Hollywood por- trayals of life in the Soviet Union as an ide- alized lie. She testified that the Soviet Union was in fact a prison from which many were risking their lives to escape. Her claim that

Russians smiled only "privately and acci- dentally" was widely quoted and was ridi- culed by Hellman and others.

In the English language, it was genre fic- tion that most directly exploited the Cold War. Spy thrillers became a staple, expertly penned by Graham Greene (1904–1991), Ian Fleming (1908–1964), John le Carré (1931–), Tom Clancy (1947–), and oth- ers. Greene was a major British writer who rarely concealed his hostility toward Ameri- can policies. He divided his literary output into two clear categories: his serious fiction, which explored religious and philosophical themes, and his entertainments, often set against worldwide political conflicts. *The Third Man* (1948) unfolded in postwar Vi- enna with a leading character who bore a re- markable resemblance to Soviet mole Kim Philby, a man for whom Greene had once worked. *The Quiet American* (1955) used Vietnam as a backdrop, at the beginning of the American involvement in the turmoil generated by the French and by nationalist and communist factions. *Our Man in Ha- vana* (1958) revealed a cloak-and-dagger world of espionage more ridiculous than awesome.

Fleming, another British writer, created the character of James Bond, perhaps the most popular of all fictional Cold War spies, certainly so after the cinema discovered him. Bond's most notable Cold War adventures erupted in *From Russia with Love* (1957) in which Bond romped with buxom Soviet female agents as he battled SMERSH, the Soviet organ of vengeance, interrogation, torture, and death; in *For Your Eyes Only* (1960), in which SHAPE headquarters, a Russian hideout near Paris, is destroyed; and in *Octopussy* (1966), which found Bond snaring a top Soviet agent found bidding for a Fabergé egg in a Sotheby auction. The Bond stories were splendid camp, and their

exaggerations made many feel that the Sovi- ets were more buffoons than threats.

Le Carré, a third British spy novelist, made good use of his personal experiences in the British Foreign Service as background for his novels. Among his best-known thrill- ers are *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (1963) and *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1974). These narratives suggest a grim, lonely espionage underworld in which val- ues are often blurred and loyalties some- times ambiguous.

Clancy, an American, wrote thrillers ri- valing the appeal of the leading British spy novelists. Books with special Cold War rel- evance included *The Hunt for Red October* (1984), *Red Storm Rising* (1986), *Patriot Games* (1987), and *Cardinal of the Krem- lin* (1988). He wrote a fast-paced adventure narrative, more real-world than were the James Bond adventures, yet he avoided the moral ambiguities that intrigued Greene and le Carré.

Science fiction became the most popular literary category during the Cold War, par- ticularly after paperbacks became widely distributed. This genre at its best provided an even more provocative attack on commu- nism than had the spy stories. Hundreds of paperbacks were published each year, some predicting dystopian futures in which tyr- anny would prevail. Others painted a horri- fying panorama of a planet devastated by a Cold War turned hot in a thermonuclear di- saster. These narratives generally refrained from siding with either East or West in the conflict. The destructive potential, they seemed to say, is spread about equally throughout the human race. The bomb had become the new Frankenstein monster, the golem through which the suicidal impulses of humanity would find expression.

Two of these apocalyptic novels attracted special attention. Nevil Shute (1899–1960)

was a British writer living in Australia when he published *On the Beach* (1957). He en- visioned a near future where nuclear war has wiped out all life

in the Northern Hemi- sphere. Australians alone survive, but only for a few days, with full awareness that global winds will soon bring radioactive contamination to them.

Three years after the appearance of *On the Beach*, Walter M. Miller Jr. (1922–1996) published his hauntingly poetic *A Canticle for Leibowitz*, one of the few science fiction books that has crossed over literary catego- ries to become recognized as a significant work of 20th-century American fiction. In this unusual science fiction story, after the nuclear holocaust the tiny Catholic Order of Leibowitz undertakes the task of preserving some memory of previous civilization.

Although writers in the English language have most notably confronted the Cold War in their fiction, European literature has also been strongly conditioned by the events of the period, often struggling with Cold War issues on a philosophical or religious plane. In Italy, France, and elsewhere on the Eu- ropean continent, atheistic views, strongly influenced by the dialectal materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, have bat- tled Christianity in the minds and hearts of serious writers.

In France, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), highly sympathetic to Marxism although frequently critical of the Soviet Union, best represented the atheistic position. In 1945 Sartre founded a political and literary maga- zine, *Les Temps Modernes*, which reflected his position as an independent socialist ad- dressing Cold War issues. His novels, such as *The Age of Reason* (1945) and *Troubled Sleep* (1949), gave fictional embodiment to his social and philosophical ideas. A more mellow atheistic French voice was that of Albert Camus, a fellow existentialist who

had actually once been a Communist Party member. His novel *The Plague* (1947) has been variously interpreted as a parable of Resistance fighters in Paris revolting against Nazi domination and as a protest against all revolutionary movements that justify the use of any methods to achieve their ends.

Espousing Christianity even in a France often labeled “post-Christian” were writ- ers such as Georges Bernanos (1888–1948), François Mauriac (1885–

1970), and Julian Green (1900–1998), an American citizen who spent most of his life in France and wrote almost exclusively in the French lan- guage. Much of the career of Bernanos was devoted to writings that promoted his liberal views, which included his denunciations of French bourgeois values and Spanish dic- tator Francisco Franco's exploits. As a fre- quent essayist, Bernanos took positions with which both communists and ultra-rightists could occasionally agree.

Mauriac, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1952, affirmed Chris- tian values with novels that were more con- cerned with personal and family relationships than social movements. His message in nu- merous novels was that beneath prosperous exteriors, regardless of the political system, human beings are torn by uneasy emotions in disordered lives of their own making.

Green likewise concentrated on the wars within the human personality in books that reflected his personal dilemmas, his con- version from Protestantism to Catholicism, and his acknowledgment of his homosexu- ality. These introspective works included *Moira* (1950) and *Each in His Own Dark- ness* (1960).

In Italy, Alberto Moravia (1907–1990), an influential intellectual tormented by the plight of the poor, skeptical of Christian solutions, and alert to the appeal that the Communist Party made to postwar Italians,

became the best known of his country's novelists throughout Europe and the United States. From the beginning, the socially alienated were his choice subjects, while his style was sparse and realistic. *A Woman of Rome* (1947), about a Roman prostitute, and *Time of Desecration* (1978), a political allegory, were among his most penetrating works.

While the intellectuals were debating the social reality portrayed by Moravia and ex- amining his implied solutions, masses of people were devouring the Don Camillo sto- ries of Giovannino Guareschi (1908–1968). These were simple tales somewhat remi- niscent of medieval legends of St. Francis, about a village priest in the Po Valley who converses with the crucifix above his altar and verbally spars with his old friend, Pep- poni, the communist mayor

of his village. The books made the simple plea for Chris- tian virtues above the vapid promises of communism.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Russian writers faced very different prob- lems than their W estern counterparts, who often had a bewildering assortment of phil- osophical options from which to choose. Instead of castigating their opponents, So- viet writers had to concern themselves with pleasing their government and following the party line or else circulating their manu- scripts through a flourishing Russian under- ground. Writing guilds in the Soviet Union operated under clearly defined precepts of socialist realism, which an individual au- thor violated only with considerable cour- age. In Soviet Russia under Josef Stalin, there was to be no art for art's sake. All writ- ings were to serve the proletarian revolu- tion. Crude propaganda novels flooded the Russian market, celebrating women who chose to forgo singing in the Moscow opera in order to increase their egg production on

collective farms or men allowed to marry their intended only after factory quotas had been surpassed.

Ilya Ehrenburg (1891–1967) was one of the best-known writers of genuine talent to faithfully follow the party line. He was, not surprisingly, awarded two Stalin Prizes for *The Fall of Paris* (1941), a fictional account of French societal decay from 1935 through 1940, and *The Storm* (1948), a war novel with Tolstoyan pretensions. Vera Panova (1905–1973) was another loyal Soviet nov- elist who, nevertheless, managed to convey in her writing the compassion and humanistic vision that had been the identifying feature of the great 19th-century Russian novelists. She received the Stalin Prize in 1947 for *The Train*. Although she did not fail to tackle so- cial issues according to the cannons of so- cialist realism, she is best remembered for her loving portraits of children, such as *Evo- dokiia* (1959).

Mikhail Sholokhov (1905–1984), who became the Nobel laureate of 1965, was ac- claimed by his government as an obedient communist as well as a powerful writer. His most loved work was *And Quiet Flows the Don*, written between 1928 and 1940. It pre- sented a vast panorama of the revolutionary period in a way that did not displease the authorities.

Two serious Russian writers came into open conflict with their government when they were awarded Nobel Prizes. During the Cold War the prize itself, still the most pres- tigious in the world for literary achievement, became politicized. In 1958, Boris Paster- nak (1890–1960) was coerced by his government into refusing the prize, which was awarded to him not only for a distinguished body of poetry but also for his masterpiece *Doctor Zhivago*, completed in 1956 but not published in his native land until 1988. *Doc- tor Zhivago*'s theme was the aspirations of

the individual pitted against the demands of doctrinaire systems.

In 1970 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918– 2008) was awarded the Nobel Prize. His writings—fictionalizations of personal experiences—had exposed the underside of Soviet life, the ruthlessness of the prison camps, and the injustice of the courts. *First Circle* (1968) was based on the years that he spent in a prison research institute, while *Cancer Ward* (1968) resulted from his hos- pitalization and treatment for cancer during a forced exile in Kazakhstan in the 1950s. *The Gulag Archipelago*, which began publication in Paris in 1973, was considered his most thor- ough exposé of the notorious Soviet prison and labor camps. Living under almost con- stant harassment, Solzhenitsyn did not bend to the Soviet authorities but remained a thorn in their flesh until he finally was expelled from the country in 1974. Equally unhappy in the West, despite the acclaim he received both for his writing and his political courage, he re- turned to Russia in 1994.

On both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Cold War conditioned both serious and popular literature. The unsettled quality of life and the fears generated by the reality of mutual assured destruction (MAD) may be easily discerned in the novels of several decades, although the conflict failed to call forth the epic writing that has always resulted from the world's great armed conflicts.

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Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)

The Malayan Emergency was a 12-year guerrilla war that began on June 18, 1948. The conflict was an indigenous attempt by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to overthrow British colonial rule. Expected to last no more than a few months, the insur- gency continued until July 31, 1960, three years after Malaya had gained its indepen- dence. The Malayan Emergency was Britain's longest colonial conflict and turned out to be far more costly in human and material terms than anyone could have foreseen.

The war's immediate catalyst was the murder of three rubber plantation manag- ers in Perak, Malaya, on June 16, 1948. The MCP guerrillas in the mobile corps commit- ted the murders three months after the party had called for an armed insurrection against British rule. Two days later the British high commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, declared a state of emergency. The conflict was called an "emergency" for economic reasons, as London insurance companies would cover property losses to Malayan rubber and tin estates during riot or commotion in an emer- gency, but not in an armed insurrection or civil war.

The Malayan Emergency was rooted pri- marily in postwar economic and political dis- locations in Malaya. Despite the importance of these local factors, however, the predomi- nant explanation for both the origins of the insurgency and the British determination to defeat it was the Cold War paradigm of com- munist containment. The inaugural confer- ence of the Cominform in September 1947

and the Calcutta conference of the Indian Communist Party in February 1948, which adopted Andrei Zhdanov's two-camps the- sis, were presumed to be linked to the armed rebellions against colonial rule in Burma, In- donesia, Malaya, and the Philippines.

Britain treasured its role in Southeast Asia, as it relied on the region for both economic and strategic reasons. Britain' s massive mili- tary commitment to defeat the insurgency (by October 1950 nearly 50,000 British troops were deployed) at a time of severe postwar fiscal austerity had a significant economic di- mension. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the British were determined to return to Ma- laya, and Malaya' s dollar-earning potential made British control over its colonial pos- session absolutely essential. In dollar terms, rubber sales exceeded in total value all other domestic exports from Great Britain to the United States. Interruption of that supply would inflict significant damage on the Brit- ish economy. When the insurgency com- menced, Britain was struggling to maintain the value of its currency. This made earnings from the Sterling Area, of which Malaya was the linchpin, all the more vital. Crushing the insurgency would ensure the maintenance of British economic interests.

But the insurrection was not easy to quell. Initially, the British response was fitful, uncertain, and inept. Not until 1950, when Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs be- came director of operations, did the British initiate a more systematic and coordinated approach to the crisis. Britain's new pro- gram, in which the insurgents were detached from their supply sources and their support

bases, provided a key breakthrough in the rebellion. Through a major relocation pro- cess, which prefigured the American policy of strategic hamlets in the Republic of Viet- nam (RVN, South Vietnam), more than half a million Chinese squatters living near guer- rilla areas were moved into 450 so-called New Villages. The villages hampered MCP operations and increased their vulnerabil- ity to the military operations of British-con- trolled security forces.

This population control, initiated by Briggs, was harsh but effective. It was prosecuted even more vigorously by General Sir Ger- ald Templer, appointed high commissioner in early 1952, with full powers over the mili- tary, police, and civilian authorities. Templer also fought the counterinsurgency on other fronts. He developed an efficient, synchro- nized, and expanded intelligence apparatus; implemented the so-called hearts and minds approach meant to address popular aspira- tions; enlarged the intelligence budget so that informers could be paid; and coordinated the use of sophisticated black propaganda and psyops by MI6 personnel.

Aerial warfare was refined as well. Safe conduct passes accompanied by promises of monetary rewards were airdropped to encourage or accelerate defections. Aerial drops of millions of strategic leaflets, such as handwritten letters and photographs from surrendered guerrillas, were used in con- junction with voice aircraft to personalize propaganda. British aircraft also dropped 1,000-pound bombs, chemical defoliants, and napalm on MCP jungle camps.

By 1954, when Templer departed, these measures had transformed the conflict. The insurgents had been forced back into the jun- gle, where they struggled to sustain them- selves. In 1955 the MCP offered, in vain, to negotiate a settlement. In 1957, upon Ma- laya's independence, the insurgency lost its

motive as a war of colonial liberation. In 1958, after mass defections, the MCP demobilized, and by 1960 the movement was limited to a small nucleus hiding on the Malayan-Thai border, from which it conducted hit-and-run raids along the northern Malay Peninsula for the next 25 years. A final peace settlement was signed on December 2, 1989.

The Malayan Emergency cast a long shadow over the new nation. Its mythology has come to dominate the modern history of Malaya, and it became a benchmark of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. For Americans embarking on military involvement in Viet- nam and wishing to apply successful British strategies, the Malayan Emergency became the quintessential counterinsurgency primer.

Phillip Deery

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Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

Born in Shaoshan, Hunan Province, on November 19, 1893, Mao Zedong gradu- ated from the Hunan First Normal School in 1918. He then went to Beijing to work in the Beijing University Library, where he learned Marxist ideology and developed his revolutionary plan to save China. Mao helped found the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai in 1921. In 1924, following the Comintern's instructions, Mao joined the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) party, forming the first United Front aimed

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at Chinese national unification. In so doing, he bought time for the infant CCP to grow under the GMD shield. However, the United Front broke down in mid-1927 when GMD leader Jiang Jieshi decided to purge the Chi- nese communists, thereby beginning the CCP–GMD power struggle that lasted for two decades.

Following the breakdown of the United Front, Mao and other frustrated Chinese communists worked on their own to develop a unique Chinese path to carry out the social- ist revolution. In January 1935 Mao became

Mao Zedong (old spelling Mao Tse-tung) led the Communists in the civil war against the Nationalists in China and was the leader of the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1976. Although remembered as one of the great Chi- nese leaders who made China a major player on the world stage, he was also responsible for the disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

the CCP chairman, a post he held until his death. His ascension to power is attributed to his ideological and tactical pragmatism, which rejected the rigid application of So- viet orthodox thinking and instead empha- sized the uniqueness of Chinese history and culture. After expelling Jiang's GMD government from the mainland, Mao pro- claimed the establishment of the PRC on Oc- tober 1, 1949, officially ending the Chinese Civil War. Mao's reign can be divided into three periods: 1949–1957, 1958–1965, and 1966–1976.

The first period was characterized by imi- tation of the Soviet model in reconstructing China and consolidating the CCP's power. On foreign policy matters, Mao coined the three principles of make another stove, clean the house and then invite the guests, and lean to one side. According to the first two prin- ciples, Mao was determined to start anew by pursuing an anticolonial and anti-imperialist policy to eliminate China's century-old semi-colonial status, imposed by imperial pow- ers since the mid-19th century. Because the PRC's birth coincided with the Cold War, Mao's policy of lean to one side signaled a pro-Soviet and anti-American stance. His first foreign policy initiative was a visit to Moscow in December 1949, culminating in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950.

The PRC's anti-American stance was vividly showcased over the question of Tai- wan, where Jiang's GMD government still retained power, as well as in the Korean War, the Geneva Conference, the first and second Taiwan Strait crises, and the Bandung Con- ference, at which Mao attacked America for its "imperialist" designs in the Taiwan Strait.

Domestically, Mao selectively trans- planted the Soviet model. Politically, he pre- ferred a democratic dictatorship, along the principles of democratic centralism and co- existence with other revolutionary parties and



noncommunist classes, to the Soviets' prole- tarian dictatorship. Mao wished to avoid the Soviet political purges of the 1930s. Yet he ensured that real

power and leadership rested in the hands of the CCP, as the terms “dictatorship” and “centralism” suggested.

In economic matters, Mao strictly adhered to the Soviet model, with Soviet technical and material assistance. In early 1950, he ushered in land reform, which involved gov- ernment confiscation and the redistribution of agrarian land to peasants. This stage was completed in late 1953 and was succeeded by collectivization aimed at boosting agri- cultural production. In 1953, Mao launched the First Five-Year Plan, which strove to de- velop heavy industries and was completed a year ahead of schedule.

To consolidate his control over the coun- try, Mao adopted mass socialization. The government encouraged the formation of nu- merous mass organizations in the early 1950s to mobilize the population to participate in such movements as the Resist-America Aid- Korea Campaign, the Three-Anti Movement to combat corruption and wasteful bureau- cracy, and the Five-Anti Movement against bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of govern- ment property, and leakage of state eco- nomic secrets.

The second period of Mao’s rule dem- onstrated his determination to establish a unique brand of Chinese socialism, de- signed to wean China from Soviet aid. The year 1958 began with the Second Five-Year Plan, which was much more ambitious than the first. To accelerate China’s industrial- ization, Mao launched the three-year Great Leap Forward program at year’s end, a radi- cal measure designed to catch up with and surpass British industrial output. To this end, he ordered the establishment of nationwide People’s Communes, which was also an es- sential step in facilitating the socialist trans- formation of China.

The Great Leap Forward, however, was doomed to failure, as the PRC was not ready for such a radical transformation. The re- sults were measured in massive manpower and property losses. Another adverse impact was the growing division within the PRC leadership. Realizing his miscalculation and hoping to avoid becoming the scapegoat for further losses, Mao gave up his PRC chair- manship to Liu Shaoqi in April 1959 while retaining the chairmanship of the CCP. In September 1959, Mao relieved Peng Dehuai of his post as defense minister because of his opposition to the Great Leap

Forward. The failure of the Great Leap Forward convinced moderate leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai that socialization should be slowed down, a view that made both men tar- gets of the Cultural Revolution in later years. To compensate for the economic dislocation and destruction of the Great Leap Forward, Mao reluctantly agreed to relax economic socialization by dismantling the communes and using material incentives to revive the Chinese economy, cures proposed by Liu and Deng. By the mid-1960s, China's econ- omy had been restored to its 1957 level.

Mao's drive for independence also re- sulted in the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alli- ance. His insistence on proceeding with the radical Great Leap Forward alarmed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who decided to stop assisting the PRC's national reconstruc- tion in 1958. This forced Mao to pursue a lone course in implementing both the Second Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward.

Mao's unilateral initiation of the Sec- ond Taiwan Strait Crisis in September 1958 prompted Khrushchev to withhold nuclear information. The Sino-Soviet split became official after Mao passed the chairman- ship to Liu, who intensified the ideologi- cal attack against Soviet revisionism and Khrushchev's advocacy of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. By

1963, Sino-Soviet unity had all but disap- peared. To compensate for the loss of So- viet aid, Mao promoted closer PRC ties with Asian and African countries. His success in this enabled the PRC to become an influen- tial leader in the developing world, trans- forming the bipolar Cold War world into a tripolar one.

The decade-long Cultural Revolution constituted the third period of Mao's era, during which the PRC experienced violent chaos and disorder. Determined to reassert his personal authority and monolithic lead- ership over the country, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 through his wife Jiang Qing. In reviving the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist teachings, he purged all po- tential opponents, including old comrades, from both the government and the CCP. To ensure his personal control, Mao packed the party and the government with his sup- porters, such as his wife

and Hua Guofeng, both of whom were made Politburo mem- bers. Outside the government, Mao incited the Red Guards, radical youths indoctrinated with Maoism, to criticize old customs and practices by employing violence and mass rallies. The Red Guards were also sent into the countryside to encourage the so-called cult of Mao. This 10-year period constituted the darkest days of the PRC's history, char- acterized by a reign of red terror that badly bruised Mao's revolutionary legacy.

The Cultural Revolution also had a direct bearing on the PRC's foreign policy. On the one hand, the revolution aroused grave hostil- ity and suspicion from the PRC's allies, who either severed diplomatic relations with the PRC or recalled their foreign service delega- tions. Combined with the Sino-Soviet split, the Cultural Revolution almost completely isolated the PRC within the international community. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution made possible the normalization of U.S.–Chinese relations because of their

mutual desire to enhance each other's bar- gaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In February 1972, Mao received U.S. pres- ident Richard M. Nixon in Beijing, which culminated in American diplomatic recog- nition of the PRC in 1979. This rapproche- ment marked the end of China's diplomatic isolation.

Mao died in Beijing on September 9, 1976. Shortly after his death, in October 1976, Hua, now the premier, seized power and ended the Maoist era by officially ter- minating the Cultural Revolution.

Law Yuk-fun

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Marshall Plan

In the wake of World War II, Europe expe- rienced a severe economic crisis because of the crippling effects of nearly six years of war. The United States had attempted to pro- mote European recovery through limited re- construction loans, relief assistance, German war reparation transfers, and new multilat- eral currency and trade arrangements. By the winter of 1947, however, it was apparent that these piecemeal stabilization efforts were not working. Millions of West Europeans

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were unemployed, inflation and shortages were rampant, and malnutrition had become a widespread concern.

The central problem facing Europe was low industrial productivity. Industrial and agricultural production lagged behind pre- war levels, as the wartime destruction or dis- ruption of factories and equipment had led to dramatically decreased industrial output. Adequate funds were not available for re- construction and replacement, and none of the nations involved had the wherewithal to raise large amounts of capital. To make mat- ters worse, basic building-block industrial materials such as steel and coal were scarce.

The growing economic troubles fed frus- tration, hopelessness, and despair. And many Europeans had begun to seek out po- litical solutions to their troubles. Alienated from capitalism, some began turning to com- munism as an alternative. In France, Italy, and Germany, the crisis had eroded govern- ment support and lent credence to commu- nist promises of economic stability. In Great Britain, serious financial woes forced poli- cymakers to reduce international agreements that had helped resist the spread of commu- nism. Only by eliminating the economic conditions that encouraged political

extrem- ism could European governments withstand the influence of communism, and nobody seemed to understand that better than the Americans.

U.S. policymakers believed that rejuve- nated West European economies would pro- vide a strong demand for American goods and help maintain the United States as the world's leading economic power. They also envisioned Western Europe as an integral part of a multilateral economic system of free world trade crucial to the liberal-capitalist world order that Washington had in mind for itself and its allies. Clearly, unity and prosperity in Western Europe would create

A worker shovels rubble during the rebuilding of West Berlin in front of a building adorned with a sign supporting the Marshall Plan. This massive United States financial aid program greatly assisted in the rebuilding of Western Europe after World War II. (National Archives)

an economy able to generate high produc- tivity, decent living standards, and political stability.

The European Recovery Program, which came to be known as the Marshall Plan in honor of Secretary of State George C. Mar- shall, would serve to strengthen shaky pro- American governments and ward off the inroads being made by domestic commu- nist parties and other left-wing organiza- tions sympathetic to the Soviet Union. U.S. undersecretary of state Dean G. Acheson, who helped formulate the plan, argued that American foreign policy had to harness American economic and financial resources to preserve democratic institutions and to expand capitalism abroad. He also saw the Marshall Plan as necessary for long-term na- tional security. Thus, the plan emerged as an all-embracing effort to revive the economies of Western Europe. The plan was unprece- dented in terms of the massive commitment

of American dollars, resources, and interna- tional involvement.

First formally proposed by Secretary of State Marshall on June 5, 1947, in a speech at Harvard University, the plan applied to all of Europe. Aid was not directed against com- munism specifically, but directed toward the elimination of dangerous economic condi- tions across all of Europe. Accordingly, the United States controversially planned to re- construct Germany as an industrial power. Marshall had concluded that German re- sources, manpower, expertise, and produc- tion were absolutely essential to European recovery. For success, the plan had to allow full German participation but at the same time prevent German industrial power from becoming a future threat to peace.

Additionally complicating matters was Marshall's belief that the objective of the Soviet Union was to delay European eco- nomic recovery and therefore exploit the consequent misery and political instability. Yet Marshall did not want his nation to as- sume the responsibility for permanently di- viding Europe. Thus, to avoid having the plan viewed as anti-Soviet, he invited the Soviet Union and its East European satellite states to participate in implementation of the plan. Nations eligible to receive economic assistance would be defined by those coun- tries that were willing to cooperate fully with the American proposal. All the while, U.S. policymakers fully counted on Moscow's rejection.

President Harry S. Truman believed that the United States should not unilaterally de- vise a plan for recovery and force it on the Europeans. Instead, the particular aid ini- tiatives came from the Europeans and rep- resented not a series of individual requests but rather a joint undertaking by all of the countries in need of American assistance. In other words, the Americans wanted a lasting

cure for Europe's problem rather than a mere quick fix. America's role would be to assist in the drafting of a program and to support that program with American resources.

The Soviet Union together with Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, and 12 other European nations gathered at the first planning conference, convened in Paris on June 27, 1947. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov demanded that each country be allowed to fashion its own plan and present it to the United States. Georges Bidault and Ernest Bevin, the foreign minis- ters of France and Britain, respectively, op- posed Molotov. Bidault and Bevin, in line with American wishes, stressed that the Marshall Plan had to be a continent-wide program in order to take advantage of the economies of the continent as a whole, or, seen in another light, to take advantage of the economies of scale rendered only through a jointly administered effort. As the United States had predicted, the Soviets quickly withdrew, denouncing the plan as an impe- rialist, anti-Soviet tool. Molotov warned that if Germany were to be revived, then the con- tinent would be divided. Poland, Czechoslo- vakia, Hungary, and Romania still expressed

interest in the Marshall Plan, but the Soviet Union pressured them into withdrawing.

The Soviets left Paris chiefly because par- ticipation in the plan would have required the disclosure of extensive statistical infor- mation about the Soviet Union's financial condition and also would have given the Americans some control over Russia's in- ternal budget. Additionally, George Ken- nan, father of the U.S. containment policy and director of the State Department's pol- icy planning staff, had earlier made it clear that aid would not be advanced to nations that refused to open their economies to U.S. exports. These requirements were unaccept- able to the Soviets, as Kennan realized.

The Soviets kept their finances a well- guarded secret and set about weakening the Marshall Plan. They formed the Cominform on July 6, 1947, to help coordinate interna- tional propaganda aimed at torpedoing the plan. On July 12, 1947, the Soviet Union ne- gotiated trade agreements with its communist satellites that diverted a substantial amount of trade from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. Finally, later that year, the Soviets proposed the Molotov Plan for East European recovery as an alternative to the Marshall Plan.

Lengthy negotiations thus ensued with- out the Soviets or their client states. Partici- pating nations laid the groundwork for the recovery plans and requested $28 billion to be spent over the course of four years. On March 15, 1948, the U.S. Senate endorsed the plan by a 69–17 vote after the House had approved it by a 329–74 margin, but only allocated $17 billion in aid. The Marshall Plan passed despite growing conservative objections to international agreements. The communist-led overthrow of the Czechoslo- vakian government and the Soviet Union's badgering of Finland for military bases had apparently convinced U.S. legislators of the seriousness of the Soviet threat.

When the plans were finalized, the United States created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and named Paul Hoffman as its head. The

ECA made the ultimate determination of specific aid and projects to be undertaken. The fundamental way in which the Marshall Plan contributed to increased European productivity was by furnishing capital, food, raw materials, and machinery that would have been unavailable without American help. The ECA made U.S. funds available to foreign governments to buy goods that were primarily obtained from their own private agricultural and industrial producers. The ECA also authorized pur- chases in other countries, especially Canada

and Latin America. These policies also helped to reduce excessive demand on raw materials in the United States, thereby pro- tecting the U.S. economy from inflationary pressures. The plan additionally benefited non-European countries and contributed to the development of multilateral trade. Re- cipients of the largest amounts of aid were Britain, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), and the Netherlands.

Participating European governments sold American-financed goods to their own peo- ple. The payments received were placed in special funds that were employed where they could best serve economic recovery and en- sure financial stability. Italy used its funds for public works projects, such as replacing bombed-out bridges. The British reduced government debt to check inflation.

During 1948–1952, approximately $13.5 billion in Marshall Plan aid went to the re- vitalization of Western Europe and guided it onto the path of long-term economic growth and integration. By 1950, industrial pro- duction in Marshall Plan countries was 25 percent higher than 1938 levels, while agri- cultural output had risen 14 percent from the prewar level. The volume of intra-European trade among Marshall Plan beneficiaries in- creased dramatically, while the balance-of- payments gap dropped significantly. Britain had sufficiently recovered by January 1951 so that Marshall Plan aid was suspended at that time, a full year and a half before the sched- uled termination of the program. It should be noted, however, that the onset of the Korean War in June 1950 and the autumn 1950 de- cision to deploy American troops to West- ern Europe to bolster North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA TO) defenses also contrib- uted to increased European productivity.

The Marshall Plan also advanced European unification and integration. The Americans

sought a single large market in which quanti- tative restrictions on the movement of goods, monetary barriers, and trade tariffs had been largely eliminated. The creation of an inte- grated free market modeled after the United States would encourage the growth of con- sumer demand and large-scale industry. It would also permit more efficient use of ma- terials and labor while stimulating competi- tion. The West Europeans removed a number of economic barriers and established subre- gional agreements such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The success of the Marshall Plan ultimately paved the way for the establishment of the Common Market in 1958.

The Marshall Plan did not cure all of Eu- rope's problems. Productivity advanced considerably but leveled off by 1952, the last year of the plan. Europe's dollar gap had also begun to widen. The Korean War and concomitant rearmament program diverted resources and manpower to defense produc- tion, thereby creating scarcities of certain commodities. As a result, inflation became problematic.

The intensification of the Cold War and the onset of the Korean War hastened the end of the Marshall Plan. The Mutual Secu- rity Act of 1951, signed in the wake of the Korean War, provided a new strategy for European recovery that largely superseded the Marshall Plan. The act made military security rather than economic self-reliance the major objective of American policy in Western Europe. Aid recipients had to sign new agreements assuring the fulfillment of military obligations and promising to main- tain European defensive strength. The ECA was abolished in favor of a Mutual Security Agency that was responsible for supervising and coordinating all foreign aid programs— military, technical, and economic.

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McCarthyism

McCarthyism refers to an era of intense an- ticommunist sentiment, sometimes referred to as the Second Red Scare, that dominated American politics and society, resulting in civil liberty encroachments and widespread paranoia. As the Cold War settled in during the late 1940s, Americans became increas- ingly concerned with the perceived commu- nist threat at home. President Harry Truman initiated his Loyalty Program in 1947, aimed at rooting out communists from the federal government. Politicians in both major parties began vying with one another in an attempt to prove their patriotism and anticommu- nist mettle. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a Wisconsin Republican looking for a politi- cal opportunity and instant fame, seized the moment and turned the politics of anticom- munism into a high art form, in the process becoming one of the nation's most notori- ous demagogues. McCarthy did not begin the Second Red Scare, but his name became synonymous with it, and his actions coars- ened political discourse, cheapened basic

constitutional freedoms, and ruined the ca- reers of many innocent individuals. McCar- thyism began in earnest in 1950 and ended in 1954, when McCarthy was finally censured for his reckless activities.

McCarthy, who won election to national office in 1946, had experienced a most un- inspiring career in the Senate. Facing the po- tential prospect of losing his seat in the 1952 elections, he decided to take advantage of the anticommunist atmosphere. Thus, during a February 1950 speech in Wheeling, West Vir- ginia, he claimed—quite dramatically—that he held in his hand a list of 205 communists working in the State Department. This captured the immediate attention of the American press, which gave McCarthy wide coverage, and he soon became a household name.

By employing what one historian has termed "multiple untruths," McCarthy' s mostly bogus claims went largely unques- tioned by the press and even by his own polit- ical colleagues. He gained the most notoriety through his myriad hearings, during which he accused hundreds of writers, actors, teachers, scholars, and others of having commu- nist sympathies. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 added immense fuel to the fires of McCarthyism. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine McCarthy' s enormous popularity had the war not occurred. His antics created a supercharged atmosphere of paranoia and hysteria seldom seen in American society.

For a time, McCarthy was so power- ful and so feared that few people seriously scrutinized his allegations or the corrosive results of his hearings, some of which were conducted through the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), although the vast majority were conducted on his own via a Senate subcommittee. By bombarding witnesses with vast amounts of conflicting, unsubstantiated, and ever-changing informa- tion, McCarthy evaded serious challenges to

his credibility. His clever use of "multiple untruths" combined with his courtship of the American press made it nearly impossible to pin him down on any particular allegation, although in retrospect it may be said that almost none of his charges resulted in the dis- covery of the "vast communist conspiracy" that he claimed resided in the top echelons of government. McCarthy' s accusations re- sulted in the blacklisting of a host of Hollywood actors and screenwriters, as most studios feared the repercussions of the sena- tor' s indictments. In 1952, McCarthyism had become so entrenched that when the sena- tor implied that General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army in World War II and an icon of that conflict,

had ties to com- munism, nobody, including General Dwight D. Eisenhower, publicly rebuked McCarthy for such a patently absurd accusation.

The age of McCarthyism had serious ram- ifications and enormous reach. For example, when a group of teachers in New York came under fire for their alleged "communist leanings," the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the McCarthyites' attacks in *Adler et al. v. Board of Education of the City of New York*. Reviewing the case in 1952, the Court ruled that schoolteachers did not have the right to work on their own terms and that past and present associations were relevant because of teachers' responsibility for shaping the minds of their students. McCarthyism also had a devastating impact on the State De- partment. McCarthy' s accusations against the department's Asian experts left a void in the department' s ability to correctly analyze developments in East and Southeast Asia.

In 1954, during the nationally televised Army-McCarthy Hearings in which the Wis- consin demagogue tried to claim communist subversion in the U.S. Army, the subter- fuge of McCarthyism was finally laid bare. McCarthy' s bizarre allegations, bullying

Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy delivers a televised speech in 1953. (Library of Congress)

of witnesses, and generally boorish behav- ior shocked many Americans. The national press finally undermined the senator' s cred- ibility, while the reputation and gravitas of the U.S. Senate was seriously undermined. After the hearings were suspended, Mc- Carthy was formally censured by his Sen- ate colleagues and stripped of his committee assignments. The fall of McCarthy in 1954 was as spectacular as his rise, but the long shadows of McCarthyism would not be soon forgotten. Many of McCarthy' s victims never did revive their ruined careers, and the McCarthy era serves as a cautionary tale of how intolerance mixed with fear-mongering can chisel away at the most basic of consti- tutional rights.

Valerie Adams and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

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Missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic

The intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, along with the manned bomber and submarine-

launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), made up the strategic nuclear triad of these two superpowers. China later also developed ICBMs.

The land-based ICBMs offered surviv- ability and quick delivery of nuclear weap- ons over long distances. Throughout the Cold War, the accuracy, reliability, and flexibility of ICBM systems continuously improved. At the peak of the Cold War in 1984, the United States maintained 1,054 ICBMs de- ployed in underground silos, while the Sovi- ets possessed 1,398 ICBMs deployed in silos and in rail and road-mobile systems.

Development of the ICBM began shortly after the end of World War II. ICBMs are normally defined as long-range missiles that can attack targets located great distances from their launch sites. In 1966, the Air Uni- versity Aerospace Glossary defined ICBMs as those missiles with a range of 5,000 miles or more. Other sources have defined the ICBM as a missile with a range of 1,500– 2,000 miles. The ICBMs deployed during the Cold War were configured with nuclear warheads.

Initial missile programs, especially in the United States, focused more on air- breathing, jet-powered cruise missiles than on ballistic systems. By the late 1940s, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union had determined that ballistic missiles were bet- ter for long-range attack missions because flight times, survivability, and accuracy were much better than they were for slower, aerodynamic vehicles. By 1953, the devel- opment of smaller, lighter thermonuclear weapons made it possible to construct long- range missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads. The earliest systems were compli- cated liquid-fueled missiles that employed liquid oxygen and kerosene or storable hy- pergolic chemicals (fuel and oxidizer that ignited and burned when mixed without a

separate igniter) as propellants. The first ver- sions were deployed on soft, above-ground launchers that required anywhere from 15 minutes to several hours to prepare for launch. They were guided by ground-based radio guidance systems that limited the num- ber of missiles that could be launched at a single time. The first U.S. operational ICBM system, the Atlas D, was a 75-foot-long mis- sile weighing more than 250,000 pounds. It was housed in either above-ground gan- tries or ground-level concrete structures, known as

coffins, with three missiles and one guidance system at each complex. The first American ICBM attained nuclear alert (ready) status in October 1959.

Inertial guidance systems replaced the radio systems early in the life of ICBMs, with only the Atlas D and Titan I deployed with radio guidance. The inertial system was

Launch of an Atlas missile from the U.S. Air Force Missile Test Center, Cape Canaveral, Florida on February 20, 1958. (U.S. Air Force)

more accurate and reliable than radio guid- ance and allowed missiles to be based in- dividually, providing a higher survivability scenario during a nuclear exchange. The early U.S. liquid-fueled cryogenic missiles were expensive to maintain, had low reli- ability, and were not exceptionally accurate. These systems, the Atlas and Titan I, car- ried single four-megaton nuclear warheads. The United States was quick to replace these missiles with

the solid-fueled Minuteman missile, and by 1965 all Atlas and Titan I missiles were removed from service, to be replaced by the Minuteman and the hyper- golic-fueled Titan II.

These new systems were easier to main- tain and required far fewer missile combat crew members and maintenance personnel to keep them on alert. They were also much more survivable, with hardened silos scat- tered over wide areas, and were accurate to within a few hundred feet of the target. The United States maintained a force of 54 Titan II missiles, each with a nine-megaton war- head, on alert from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. The Minuteman, which was de- veloped in three versions (I, II, and III), first came on alert in 1962.

By 1967, 1,000 Minuteman missiles were on alert at six U.S. bases. The Minuteman I and II had single warheads of about 1.1 megatons, while the Minuteman III featured a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) system equipped with up to three warheads of either 170 or 340 kilotons of yield. The entire force of Minuteman and Titan II missiles could be launched in a mat- ter of minutes after the decision to execute was made. In the late 1980s, 50 Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, were replaced by 50 Peacekeeper missiles, a larger system that could carry up to 10 300-kiloton warheads capable of hit- ting 10 different targets.

The Soviets developed more varieties of missiles than did the Americans, early on re- lying on both cryogenic and hypergolic stor- able propellant systems. As with the United States, the Soviet Union quickly realized that the cryogenic systems were slow to launch and hard to maintain, but, unlike the United States, Russia concentrated on ICBM de- signs in the 1960s through the 1980s that featured storable liquid-fueled systems, with missiles deployed both in underground silos and in mobile launchers. The first So- viet ICBM, the SS-7 (known to the Soviets as R-16), employed storable propellants and was first put on alert on November 1, 1961.

The Soviets were slower to adopt solid- fueled ICBMs but eventually replaced their second- and third-generation liquid-fueled missiles with systems similar to the Min- uteman and Peacekeeper systems. Soviet

warheads were generally in the 1-megaton range, but two Soviet ICBMs (the SS-9 and SS-18) carried enormous 25-megaton war- heads. In 1984, at the peak of the Cold War, the Soviets had 1,398 ICBMs deployed, in- cluding 520 SS-11s, 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s, and 360 SS-19s.

China tested its first missile in 1960 but did not complete development and testing of an ICBM until 1980. China's first ICBM was liquid-fueled. China did not develop a solid- fueled ICBM until the early 1990s. Compared to the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chinese have maintained a very small ICBM force, with most of the emphasis on coun- tering the threat posed by the Soviet Union rather than any threat by the United States.

Strategic arms limitation and reduction agreements between the United States and Russia resulted in a significant reduction in the number of ICBMs. The United States re- duced its force to only 500 Minuteman III missiles, which will eventually have only one warhead apiece. All Minuteman II missiles

were removed and the silos destroyed at three bases between 1994 and 1998, and Peace- keeper missiles were removed between 2002 and 2007. At the end of 2002, the Russians maintained a force of 709 ICBMs, a mix of SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, and SS-27 liq- uid- and solid-fueled missiles in silos or mo- bile launchers.

Charles G. Simpson

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Moscow Meeting, Brezhnev and Nixon (May 22–30, 1972)

The summit meeting between U.S. presi- dent Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leo- nid Brezhnev, May 22–30, 1972, marked a historic turning point in U.S.–Soviet re- lations. It was the first presidential visit to the Soviet Union since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nixon' s nine-day summit meeting with Brezhnev solidified the superpower détente, underway since the late 1960s. Among the numerous agree- ments signed during the summit, the most important were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the accompanying Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Re- spect to the Limitation of Strategic Offen- sive Weapons (Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, SAL T I Interim Agreement).

These agreements completed the first stages of the larger SAL T discussions.

Crucial to understanding the nature of the Moscow summit is the international situa- tion in which it occurred. In the early 1970s, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improved dramatically be- cause of the relaxation of tensions in Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet suppression of the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. In the spirit of détente, the Nixon adminis- tration embarked on a policy of multilateral disarmament agreements, such as the 1971 signing of the Seabed Treaty. Détente ul- timately served not only U.S. interests but also Soviet security interests. Despite re- laxed tensions in Europe, Asian events might have had a damaging effect on American– Soviet relations. The 1971 India-Pakistan War and the Vietnam War were additional irritants. To the Soviets, détente outweighed these concerns, and a secret trip to Moscow by Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, in April 1972 finalized the sum- mit plans.

In addition to the fruitful Moscow dis- cussions and daily signatures of agreements between the conferees, Nixon made trips to Leningrad and Kiev and gave a live radio- television address to the Soviet people. His address highlighted the shared historical struggles of the two nations and reiterated their mutual responsibilities as global su- perpowers. During the summit, Nixon and Brezhnev discussed the status of the interna- tional community and a plethora of bilateral issues in hopes of continuing and further- ing

détente despite the differing ideologies of the two superpowers. The two leaders agreed that smaller third-party states should not interfere with maintaining détente. Bilat- eral negotiations included the limitation of strategic armaments; commercial and eco- nomic agreements; cooperation in health

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issues; environmental cooperation; scien- tific, educational, and cultural cooperation and exchanges; and cooperation in space ex- ploration. The results of these negotiations provided the necessary framework for a joint space venture in 1975, large U.S. grain sales to the Soviets, and, most importantly, the SALT agreements.

The majority of the summit concentrated on the SALT agreements. The Nixon admin- istration had inherited a legacy of outdated doctrines pertaining to U.S. nuclear strat- egy. The antiquated policy of maintaining nuclear superiority over the USSR was no longer practical. Through détente it was now possible to conduct negotiations limiting the

growth of the superpower nuclear arsenals. In a first step toward the realization of SALT, on May 26 Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. The ABM Treaty limited the deployment of an- tiballistic missiles for each nation to two sites. The SAL T Interim Agreement froze the number of intercontinental ballistic mis- siles (ICBMs) possessed by each country.

In a move to reaffirm both American and Soviet commitments to détente, the two powers signed the Basic Principles of Mu- tual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics. This document contained 12 principles and served to encapsulate the



General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union (left) and President Richard Nixon (right) shake hands in Moscow during talks regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The treaty was the first significant arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. (National Archives)

spirit of the Moscow summit and the evolv- ing superpower détente. Some of the more important principles included the notion of peaceful coexistence and the promise of fu- ture summit meetings.

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Mutual Assured Destruction

The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was an important part of the Cold War beginning in the 1960s, and is cited as one of the main reasons that there was no direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The doc- trine was founded on nuclear deterrence and based on the premise that both superpow- ers had enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over. Thus, if one superpower launched a nuclear first strike, the other would launch a massive counter- strike, resulting in the total devastation of both nations.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's ad- ministration in the mid-1950s warned that if the United States were attacked first it would



unleash massive retaliation. Thus, the MAD doctrine was born in the 1950s but did not reach fruition until the 1960s, when the So- viets achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States. Through the years, techno- logical advances were constantly molding the doctrine. The U.S. deployment of sub- marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the early 1960s ensured a second-strike capability, thus further deterring the likeli- hood of a first strike.

The doctrine propagated the notion that each side had equal nuclear firepower and that if an attack occurred, retaliation would be equal to or greater than the initial attack. It followed that neither nation would launch a first strike because its adversary could guar- antee an immediate, automatic, and over- whelming response consisting of a launch on warning, also known as a fail deadly. The final result would be the destruction of both sides. The end reasoning of MAD was that it contributed to a relatively stable peace.

The MAD doctrine survived into the 1970s and ironically contributed to the nuclear arms race. Each side tried to outwit and out pro- duce the other, as the example of the intro- duction of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) demonstrates. MIRVs came on-line in the early 1970s and upped the ante of nuclear deterrence by plac- ing multiple warheads on a single missile. The justification for this and other techno- logical enhancements was that the more mis- siles produced, the less chance there would be of an intentional nuclear attack.

The MAD doctrine became essentially obsolete on July 25, 1980, when President Jimmy Carter adopted the so-called counter- vailing strategy by reorienting U.S. policy to win a nuclear war. This was to be achieved by attacking and destroying the Soviet lead- ership and its military installations. It was

A time exposure of eight Peacekeeper (LGM- 118A) intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicles passing through clouds while ap- proaching an open-ocean impact zone during a flight test, December 20, 1983. (Department of Defense)

assumed that such an attack would precipi- tate a Soviet surrender, thereby preventing the total destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union. This policy was taken even further by President Ronald Reagan, who proposed the Strategic Defense Initia- tive (SDI) in 1983. This was a system that would purportedly form a protective um- brella over the United States by destroy- ing incoming nuclear missiles before they reached their targets. SDI has yet to be im- plemented, however, and many of its crit- ics argue that there is no current technology available to make it a safe and reliable nu- clear deterrent.

Regardless of the variety of opinions about MAD, the potential of nuclear holocaust



tremendously influenced political leaders and their military advisers during the Cold War.

Dewi I. Ball

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National Security Act (July 26, 1947)

The National Security Act, signed into law on July 26, 1947, was a critical step in pre- paring America to wage the deepening Cold War. Its legislation made sweeping organi- zational changes in U.S. military and for- eign policy establishments. Specifically, the act created the National Security Council (NSC), National Security Resources Board (NSRB), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and U.S. Air Force (the third branch of the U.S. armed forces). Congress amended the act in 1949 to provide the secre- tary of defense with more power over the in- dividual armed services and their secretaries.

Soon after World War II ended, the un- easy alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union began to degenerate, and a long-standing ideological and military confrontation between the two superpow- ers quickly set in. By late 1946, the Truman administration had adopted a defense policy that became known as *containment*. This policy sought to contain Soviet influence and the spread of communism throughout the world. It was this mind-set that prompted passage of the National Security Act.

By the end of 1947, the containment pol- icy had elicited both the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The National Security Act was an effort to add a domestic compo- nent

to containment and to help coordinate U.S. diplomatic and military commitments to meet the challenges of the Cold War. The

act was designed to centralize the military services under the single banner of the DOD (directed by the secretary of defense, a new cabinet-level position) to provide one main intelligence apparatus in the new CIA, and to provide foreign policy advice directly to the president via the NSC, which resided within the Executive Office of the president. The JCS, composed of a representative from each of the armed services, was to act as a military advisory group to the president and his civil- ian advisors.

The CIA emerged from the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and smaller postwar intelligence operations. Its first di- rector was Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoet- ter. The existing War and Navy Departments were folded into the DOD, whose first sec- retary was James V. Forrestal. The new U.S. Air Force, which became a free-standing en- tity, was built from the existing U.S. Army Air Corps. The NSC's chief role was to coor- dinate and prioritize information it received from other agencies and to advise the presi- dent on national security issues based on anal- ysis of that information. At the time, there was no provision made for a national security ad- visor, a post that came into being under Presi- dent Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953. Taken in its totality, the National Security Act provided for a powerful, well-coordinated system that linked national security with foreign policy and military decision making.

Bevan Sewell

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National Security Agency

The National Security Agency (NSA) is the highly secretive component of the U.S. in- telligence community that specializes in cryptography and signals intelligence (SI- GINT). Established on November 4, 1952, by President Harry S. Truman in the wake of a series of intelligence lapses regarding the Korean War, the NSA served as the U.S. government' s primary technical intelligence- collection organization throughout the Cold War.

The United States was renowned for its success in the realm of SIGINT (the gather- ing and analysis of intercepted voice com- munications intelligence, or COMINT) and electromagnetic radiation (electronic intel- ligence, or ELINT) during World War II. Yet the Americans entered the early years of the Cold War with a disorganized SIGINT apparatus loosely coordinated among the independent and oftentimes redundant cryp- tologic agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In line with the centralizing theme of the 1947 National Security Act, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson established the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949 to streamline SIGINT collection. Plagued by the weaknesses of limited juris- diction and ill-defined authority, however, deficiencies in AFSA's relationship with the

service agencies were made readily apparent prior to and during the outbreak of the Ko- rean War in June 1950.

At the urging of President Truman, Secre- tary of State Dean Acheson appointed New York attorney George Abbott Brownell to head a probe investigating AFSA's failings. The resultant "Brownell Committee Report" advocated replacing AFSA with a central- ized national agency capable of unifying all U.S. SIGINT efforts. Fully agreeing with this recommendation, within months Presi- dent Truman dissolved the AFSA and qui- etly signed into law the NSA.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the NSA established itself as a key intelligence player in virtually all major Cold War politi- cal and military

conflicts. In 1953 the NSA began overflights of Soviet airspace using converted B-47 Stratojets equipped with var- ious receivers capable of intercepting Soviet air defense radar signals. By intentionally triggering the activation of the Soviet air de- fense radar system, the B-47s could pinpoint and map the locations of Soviet systems on the ground, providing crucial information for U.S. pilots. By the late 1950s, the Stratojets had been replaced by the high-flying U-2 re- connaissance jet, and overflights to collect Soviet SIGINT data continued, focusing on radar emissions and telemetry information related to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches. The overflight program ended suddenly amid an international cri- sis when, on May 1, 1960, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the central Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. Initially disavow- ing any knowledge of the overflight program, the Eisenhower administration was forced to concede that it had ordered the flights when faced with irrefutable evidence presented by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

Although direct flights over Soviet air- space were terminated in the wake of the

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Powers controversy, the NSA maintained a robust collection effort utilizing ground, air, sea, and space-based antennas and sen- sors to monitor the transmissions of the Eastern bloc as well as nonaligned and al- lied nations. In an often contentious rela- tionship with the U.S. Navy, NSA listening posts were established on both adapted warships such as the *Liberty* and on smaller dedicated collection platforms such as the *Pueblo,* which loitered in international wa- ters collecting transmissions, while NSA- directed submarines tapped into undersea communication cables. Ground stations concentrating on intercepting shortwave and very high frequency (VHF) emissions were established in strategically important locations around the globe, ranging from Ellesmere Island in the upper reaches of the Arctic Circle to Ayios Nikolaos in Cy- prus, to Field Station Berlin in West Berlin, to Misawa Air Force Base in Japan. After the undisclosed launch of the first SIGINT satellite in June 1960, the NSA also began to establish an array of ground-based relay centers in remote locations on the periphery of the Soviet Union.

By the late 1970s the NSA was enjoying great success in decoding the encrypted So- viet messages that had previously eluded the U.S. intelligence community. As the NSA's mission grew, its budget increased exponen- tially. Exact budgetary figures from the Cold War period continue to be withheld as clas- sified information, but during that time the NSA established itself as the largest U.S. in- telligence agency in terms of both manpower and financial resources.

Robert G. Berschinski

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Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913–1994)

Born in Yorba Linda, California, on Janu- ary 9, 1913, Richard Nixon graduated from Duke Law School and then practiced law in Whittier, California, until 1942. During World War II he spent four years in the U.S. Navy, serving in the South Pacific and be- coming a lieutenant commander. After de- mobilization in 1946 he ran successfully for Congress as a Republican and in 1950 for a California Senate seat, races notable for his use of anticommunist smear tactics against his Democratic opponents. In 1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower selected Nixon as his running mate for the presidency, and Nixon spent eight years as vice president, demonstrat- ing particular interest in foreign affairs and traveling extensively. In 1960 he narrowly lost

the presidential race to John F. Kennedy. Eight years later Nixon was elected president on the Republican ticket.

As president, Nixon belied his earlier rep- utation as an uncompromising anticommu- nist, restructuring the international pattern of U.S. alliances by playing the China card and moving toward recognition of the commu- nist People's Republic of China (PRC) while using the new Sino-American rapproche- ment to extract concessions on détente and arms control from the Soviet Union. In doing



Richard M. Nixon realized his dream of becom- ing president in 1969. A strong proponent of opening relations with the People's Republic of China and of détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon was forced to resign the office in Au- gust 1974 as a result of the Watergate Scandal. (National Archives)

so, Nixon worked closely with his energetic national security advisor, Henry A. Kiss- inger, restricting Secretary of State William P. Rogers largely to routine diplomatic busi- ness. Kissinger finally replaced Rogers in August 1973.

In 1968 the inability of the United States to achieve victory in the controversial Viet- nam War, despite increasingly high deploy- ments of troops, dominated the political agenda. Nixon, promising that he had a plan to end the war expeditiously, won the presi- dency. He accelerated the program of Viet- namization begun under President Lyndon

B. Johnson, gradually withdrawing Amer- ican troops while providing Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) forces with massive amounts of war supplies intended to enable them to defend themselves. In Au- gust 1969 Kissinger embarked on protracted negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam). To win time for Vietnamization, Nixon ordered the secret bombing of Cambodia as well as a ground invasion of that country that helped bring the communist Khmer Rouge to power there later. At Christmas 1972 Nixon ordered a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam to pressure its leaders to accept a settlement. Some assailed him for winning a peace settlement that effectively assured South Vietnam only a decent interval before a North Vietnam takeover two years later.

American withdrawal from Vietnam was only part of the broader strategic realignment that Nixon and Kissinger termed their Grand Design. The Nixon Doctrine, announced in July 1969, called on American allies to bear the primary burden of their own defense, looking to the United States only for supple- mentary conventional and, when necessary, nuclear assistance.

Conscious that their country no longer en- joyed the undisputed supremacy of the im- mediate post–World War II period and that growing economic difficulties mandated cuts in defense budgets, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to negotiate arms limitations agree- ments with the Soviet Union. To pressure the Soviets, whose relations with commu- nist China had become deeply antagonistic by the early 1960s, Nixon began the process of reopening American relations with China, visiting Beijing in 1972, where he had ex- tended talks with Chinese communist Chair- man Mao Zedong and Premier

Zhou Enlai, and preparing to de-emphasize the long- standing U.S. commitment to the Republic

of China (ROC) on Taiwan and recognize the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in its stead.

These tactics alarmed Soviet leaders and facilitated a relaxation of Soviet–American tensions, broadly termed détente. At a May 1972 Moscow summit meeting, Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed two arms limitations treaties, jointly known as SALT I, that took effect the following Oc- tober. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited antiballistic missile defense sites in each country to two, with neither hosting more than a hundred ABMs. The Interim Agreement froze the number of nu- clear warheads possessed by each side for five years. Détente did not mean the end of Soviet-American rivalry, however.

After winning a second presidential victory in 1972, Nixon hoped to move toward full rec- ognition of the PRC and further arms control agreements. The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, however, diverted his administration' s attention from these plans. The war precipitated an Arab oil embargo on Western states that followed pro-Israeli policies, contributing to an international spi- ral of skyrocketing inflation and high unem- ployment that afflicted the United States and Western Europe throughout the 1970s.

Presidential summit meetings with Bre- zhnev at Moscow and Yalta in June–July 1974 brought no immediate results, in large part due to Nixon's own calamitous domes- tic problems, even though they set the stage for the Helsinki Accords and additional arms control agreements under Nixon's succes- sor, Gerald Ford. The Watergate political scandal, which led to Nixon's resignation in August 1974, aborted all his ambitions for further progress in overseas affairs.

Nixon devoted his final two decades to writing his memoirs and numerous other books and essays on international affairs,

part of a broader and reasonably successful campaign to engineer his political rehabilita- tion and to win respect from contemporaries and a place in history for his presidential achievements and foreign policy expertise. In Nixon's

final years, several presidents, in- cluding Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and William Jefferson Clinton, sought his insights on various international subjects, especially relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union. Nixon died in New York City on April 22, 1994.

Priscilla Roberts

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Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was a loose association of nations opposed to Cold

W ar entanglements, which sought to create a third force between the Communist bloc and the Western bloc. It originally com- prised 24 Afro-

Asian countries plus Y ugo- slavia. It held its first summit in Belgrade in September 1961. From the outset, NAM em- braced issues theoretically unrelated to the Cold War, including anticolonialism, antira- cism, economic development, and, under the Arab states' influence, anti-Zionism. To date there have been 13 summits at approximately three-year intervals. In 2003, the move- ment had 116 members. Mutual interests in protecting state sovereignty and promot- ing development account for its expanding membership and durability.

Before NAM's foundation, Indonesian leader Sukarno's Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955 demonstrated the value of small-state collaboration. In- dian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vaguely worded *Panch Sheel* (five princi- ples of peace), which formed the basis for Sino-Indian relations and was popularized at Bandung, anticipated NAM principles by stressing mutual respect, preservation of state sovereignty, and peaceful coexistence. In the five years before the Belgrade confer- ence, the founding countries—India, Yugo- slavia, and Egypt—took exception to Great Power interference in weaker countries' af- fairs and to the superpowers' unwillingness to reduce nuclear tensions.

The simultaneous Suez Crisis and Hun- garian Revolution of 1956 drew together Nehru, Yugoslavian marshal Josip Broz Tito, and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although their politics were dissimi- lar, they shared concerns about the Cold War, decolonization, and national independence. The emergence of 16 African states in 1960, the intensification of South African apart- heid, the worsening U.S.–Soviet relations, the Congo Intervention, the U.S.-sponsored

Bay of Pigs incursion (1961), and the Sec- ond Berlin Crisis furnished the first sum- mit's historical context.

The NAM' s organizational meeting, which took place in Cairo in June 1961, con- fined membership to countries that rejected participation in what were termed "Great Power conflicts" or signaled their intention of eventually departing from them. Coun- tries that did not fully meet these criteria could nevertheless be invited as observers. The Algerian provisional government' s in- vitation as a full member, one year before that country' s independence,

underscored NAM' s commitment to anticolonialism. Subsequent summits conferred diplomatic recognition on the Angolan provisional government, the Palestine Liberation Or- ganization (PLO), the Zimbabwe African National Union/Zimbabwe African Peo- ple' s Union, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the Southwest African People' s Organization (SAPO) in Namibia. Members reached agreement by consensus rather than by ballot, a procedure that led to criticism from the United States at later summits.

Forty-seven countries attended the 1964 Cairo summit. NAM invited all members of the new Organization of African Unity (OAU) because its 1963 charter adopted nonalignment. Under Nasser, NAM called for a Palestinian homeland three years be- fore the PLO's foundation. Cairo was also significant for what was ignored: in Octo- ber and November 1962, the PRC invaded India. At Cairo, the Chinese invasion was not mentioned because many members wished to cultivate good relations with the PRC. The selective treatment of security issues where members' national interests were at stake typified this and subsequent meetings

Unlike the Afro-Asian People's Solidar- ity Organization (AAPSO), NAM was not

an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. Certain members, such as Saudi Arabia, had close U.S. ties, whereas others, such as Yugosla- via, feared Soviet interference. The move- ment nevertheless supported certain Soviet initiatives, such as the call for two special UN disarmament sessions and the establish- ment of nuclear-free zones. Quick to con- demn Western countries' actions deemed to be violating developing-world coun- tries' sovereignty, such as the continuing U.S. naval presence at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, NAM did not apply this standard to Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

Although U.S. policymakers in the 1950s decried neutralism as aiding the Soviets, suc- cessive U.S. administrations retained strong relations with many uncommitted countries. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Rea- gan issued reminders to the 1964 Cairo and 1983 New Delhi summits that Soviet ex- pansion constituted another form of impe- rialism. The Soviets

anticipated that NAM would facilitate their goal of frustrating Western–developing world alliances and of becoming eventual adherents to the Soviet bloc. A split over North–South issues in the 1970s demonstrated that Soviet and NAM interests were not identical, however.

The Non-Aligned Movement has repeat- edly lobbied for economic aid to the devel- oping world. A special NAM meeting in Cairo in 1962 called on the UN to facilitate development, which led in early 1964 to the first UN Conference on Trade and Develop- ment (UNCTAD) in Geneva, at which the Group of 77, then the world's poorest coun- tries and including many NAM members, was formed. At the 1973 Algiers conference and afterward, NAM called for a special UN General Assembly session on development. In 1974, the UN passed the New Interna- tional Economic Order (NIEO), an agenda

that sought increased technical, financial, and agricultural aid for nations in the devel- oping world, to which the Soviets, partly for ideological reasons, showed little sympathy.

Joseph Robert White

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North American Aerospace Defense Command

The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) had its origins in the coopera- tion of the United States and Canada dur- ing World War II and a formal agreement on defense collaboration signed in 1947. In 1954, the two countries began develop- ing the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across northern Canada and Alaska to pro- vide advanced warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the polar region.

As the DEW Line became operational in August 1957, the United States and Canada reached agreement to create an integrated op- erational control system for the air defense forces of the two countries. NORAD was thus established in September. Its headquarters

was located at Ent Air Force Base in Colo- rado Springs, while an operations center was constructed in a deep, hardened bunker in- side nearby Cheyenne Mountain. Initial op- erations began in April 1966. The NORAD commander was a U.S. general who also commanded the U.S. Continental Air De- fense (CONAD) Command and the U.S. Air Force component, the Air Defense Com- mand (ADC). The deputy commander was a Canadian flag officer.

The NORAD command and control sys- tem integrated the full range of air defense capabilities. The early warning system in- cluded the northern DEW Line, the Mid- Canada Line, the Pinetree Line, coastal radar sites, Texas Tower radar sites at sea, U.S. Navy picket ships, and U.S. Air Force air- borne radar platforms. NORAD directed its active defenses through a series of comput- erized operations centers that controlled air defense assets for designated regions of the two countries. The system controlled Amer- ican and Canadian interceptor aircraft and U.S. Army and Air Force surface-to-air mis- siles (SAMs) dedicated to strategic defense as well as other available resources such as fighter aircraft that could be assigned to air defense in an emergency. As the mis- sile threat evolved, NORAD also became responsible for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and a range of space-tracking systems. Although CONAD was responsible for operational antiballistic missile (ABM) capabilities (the Safeguard system was briefly

operational in 1975– 1976), the Canadian government declined to become involved in ABM activities.

During the 1970s, the air defense forces assigned to NORAD were significantly re- duced, and subordinate command struc- tures were revised, reflecting the increased threat from ballistic missiles and changing national strategies. The strategic SAM sites

The Command Post of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Cheyenne Mountain Complex in April 1984. (Depart- ment of Defense)

were phased out, dedicated interceptor units were substantially reduced, and the multi- service CONAD was disbanded, replaced by the Aerospace Defense Command. The Canadian component changed from the Ca- nadian Forces Air Defence Command to the Air Defence Group. The role of NORAD shifted to emphasize warning and attack as- sessment as well as space surveillance and supporting nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a surprise attack would not destroy U.S. retaliatory forces. In 1979, a major U.S. Air Force reorganization resulted in most ADC operational capabilities being dispersed to the Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command (SAC), with the ADC being inac- tivated in 1981.



The increased role of space in NORAD operations was recognized when the name was changed to the North American Aero- space Defense Command in

1981. As the Cold War ended, NORAD's functions con- tinued to provide the warning and space sur- veillance missions.

Jerome V. Martin

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, History of (1948–1990)

Preliminary discussions surrounding an Atlantic treaty among the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty Powers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Nether- lands, and Britain) began on July 6, 1948, in Washington, D.C. By the end of October, the framework for a mutual defense pact for the North Atlantic region was agreed upon. Drafting commenced in December 1948, and the final text was made public in March 1949. On March 15, 1949, the United States, Canada, and the Brussels Treaty Powers

formally invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to join the alliance. These nations all endorsed the North Atlan- tic Treaty on April 4, 1949, providing the legal basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NATO). On August 24, 1949, the treaty entered into force, and the first North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting took place in Washington on September 17.

The first and primary task for the new or- ganization was to put in place an effective and credible apparatus for collective defense. During NA TO' s first few years, efforts fo- cused primarily on defense-related problems and their economic implications. The political process of cooperation, which was also a com- ponent of the alliance, remained largely un- defined. In October 1949 President Harry S. Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, setting the stage for U.S. involvement in NATO collective security arrangements. In January 1950 he approved plans for the in- tegrated defense of the North Atlantic region and authorized the expenditure of a significant sum of money for military aid.

Other important tasks after NA TO' s founding were establishing its main orga- nizations and bodies and making them op- erational. To this end, the NAC appointed U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on December 19, 1950. In April 1951,SupremeHeadquartersAlliedPowers Europe (SHAPE) became operational. Later that year, the NA TO Defense College (NDC) was unveiled in Paris. In March 1952, Brit- ish general Hastings Lionel Ismay was ap- pointed NA TO' s first secretary-general. A month later, NA TO opened its provisional headquarters in Paris and convened the first NAC meeting in permanent session. The first enlargement of the organization also took place in 1952, when Greece and Turkey were invited to join NA TO.



Secretary of State Dean Acheson signing the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of the United States on April 4, 1949. (NATO Photos)

On March 31, 1954, the Soviet Union re- quested membership in NATO but Britain, France, and the United States vetoed it. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), on the other hand, was invited to join and became a member in 1955. By the mid-1950s, broad lines of intra-alliance cooperation on defense issues had been de- fined, and the main institutional bodies had been established. Strengthening the political consultation process and cooperation in non- military areas was identified as the new pri- ority for NATO.

In 1961, NATO members reaffirmed their support of West Berlin, strongly condemn- ing the building of the Berlin Wall, and ap- proved the renewal of diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union. In the 1962 Athens

Guidelines, the circumstances involving the use of nuclear weapons were reviewed. To- ward this end, the United States and Brit- ain agreed to contribute and integrate part of their strategic nuclear forces to NATO. In a NATO military exercise (dubbed Op- eration Big Lift) in 1963, the United States ably demonstrated how quickly it could re- inforce NATO forces in Europe in the event of a crisis.

In a move deeply troubling to other NA TO states, French president Charles de Gaulle withdrew his nation from the integrated mil- itary structure of NATO in 1966. In 1967 the NAC approved the Harmel Report, aimed at reducing East–West tensions by proposing a new military strategy for NATO. NATO's old strategy had required a massive military

response to any form of aggression. The new strategic concept of flexible response provided the alliance with myriad options to respond to many types of enemy aggres- sion. In 1968, NATO issued the Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), an initiative to work for disarma- ment and nuclear nonproliferation.

Because of the relentless growth in War- saw Pact forces, in 1976 the NAC agreed to further strengthen NATO conventional de- fenses. Unfortunately, this decision inter- rupted the promising developments in the MBFR process. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also endangered the improve- ment in East–West relations. The controver- sial double-track decision made at a special ministerial meeting in 1979 announced the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Europe, to be paralleled by an arms control effort to obviate the need for such deployments.

The first deliveries of IRBM components to Britain in 1983 were the ultimate result of the double-track decision. Deployment of the missiles proved highly controversial and sparked a considerable nuclear freeze movement throughout W estern Europe. In response, the Soviet Union suspended nego- tiations on intermediate nuclear forces reduc- tions. In the mid-1980s, East–West relations began to thaw once again. In 1986 NATO called on the Soviet Union to help promote peace, security, and a productive East–West dialogue. A high-level task force on conven- tional arms control was established in 1986, and at the end of the year NATO foreign ministers issued the Brussels

Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, calling for further negotiations on confidence-building measures and conventional stability. In 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed, which eliminated American and Soviet land-based IRBMs.

The forward progress in East–West relations continued throughout 1988. NA TO issued a statement on conventional arms control, call- ing for progress in eliminating conventional force disparities. In December, NA TO for- eign ministers welcomed Soviet reductions in conventional forces and outlined NA TO proposals for negotiations on confidence- building measures and conventional stability.

In 1989 two new sets of negotiations were launched at the follow-up meeting in Vienna, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) follow-up meeting in Vi- enna: talks on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) between NATO and the War- saw Pact and negotiations on confidence-building and security measures among all 35 CSCE members. In December 1989 NATO celebrated its fortieth anniversary at a special summit meeting in Brussels. NATO set forth new goals and policies in recognition of the recent and sweeping changes in the waning Cold War and to further extend East–West cooperation. In July 1990 NATO issued the London Declaration, which provided a road map to guide the transition of the alliance from the era of Cold War confrontation to the age of post–Cold War cooperation and partnership. A joint declaration and commit- ment to nonaggression was signed in Paris in November 1990. The transformation of the alliance in the new security environment was clearly reflected in its new strategic concept unveiled in November 1991. Cooperation and partnership with Central and East Euro- pean nations thus became a central and inte- gral part of NATO policies.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO played an important deterrent role in checking So- viet expansion in Europe. It also provided the framework for consultation and coordi- nation of policies among its member coun- tries to diminish the risk of crisis and war.

Anna Boros-McGee

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NSC-68, National Security Council Report

NSC-68 was a response by President Harry S. Truman's administration to the Soviets' first atomic explosion in late August 1949 as well as the October 1949 communist vic- tory in the Chinese Civil War. The top secret report was released to the president on April 14, 1950. Its principal architect was Paul H. Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

The basic premise of NSC-68 was that be- cause the Soviets had developed a workable atomic bomb, a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb would not be far behind. The drafters of NSC-68 estimated that by 1954, "the year of maximum danger," the Soviets would be capable of launching a crippling preemptive strike against the United States. According to NSC-68, the United States could not prevent such a blow without a massive increase in its military and economic capacities. Should the

report not be heeded, in case of Soviet ag- gression the United States would be forced into appeasement or nuclear war. Nitze and other policymakers believed, therefore, that the key to avoiding this dilemma and pre- serving

free-world security lay in a vast conventional rearmament. NSC-68 also demanded greater foreign aid, along with ex- panded military assistance to the Western Allies, additional funding for information and propaganda campaigns, better intelli- gence gathering, and an expansion of nuclear weapons programs.

Alarmed by the report's recommenda- tions and likely costs, President Truman ini- tially shelved the plan. Only after the sudden outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 did he agree to implement the NSC-68 rearmament program. Thanks in part to the Korean War, U.S. defense expenditures quadrupled, going from $13.5 billion before the war to more than $54 billion by the time Truman left office in January 1953. The lion's share of this massive rearmament program was not directed to the Korean War but instead went toward fulfilling America's long-term mobilization base as envisioned in NSC-68. Indeed, NSC-68 put muscle into Truman's containment policy.

Although subsequent administrations would tinker with the recommendations in NSC-68, the report nonetheless guided U.S. national security and military mobilization planning for almost a generation after its drafting. Fundamentally, NSC-68 was un- derpinned by the traditional Cold War mentality. Many of its critics have argued that the report overstated the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. Some, however, have maintained that NSC-68 was a wise and pru- dent response to a real and present Soviet danger. Still others have pointed out that al- though NSC-68 may have painted a some- what distorted picture of the Soviet Union,

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this distortion results more from what is now known from newly opened Eastern bloc ar- chives as opposed to what was known to of- ficials at the time. Whatever the case, it is a truism that NSC-68 was a seminal and paradigmatic Cold War document.

Josh Ushay

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Nuclear Arms Race

The nuclear arms race is a general term for the undeclared Cold War contest in which the United States and the Soviet Union developed, tested, and deployed in- creasingly advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The strategic motivation behind the arms race was each nation' s drive to ensure that its adversary not gain any measurable advantage in nuclear-strike capability. Also at play was the evolving con- cept of nuclear deterrence, which held that a nation must retain adequate nuclear capa- bilities to deter the enemy from launching a preemptive nuclear attack. This concept be- came known as mutual assured destruction

(MAD) and held that any preemptive attack would result in an overwhelming and cata- strophic retaliatory strike.

With its first test explosion in July 1945, the United States possessed an atomic mo- nopoly. The Soviet Union feared the Amer- ican nuclear threat, especially given the demonstrated ability of the United States to conduct long-range strategic bombing. Thus, the Soviets pursued their own atomic bomb with great vigor. Soviet spies who had in- filtrated the Manhattan Project and a skilled scientific community allowed the Soviet Union to detonate its first nuclear weapon in September 1949.

The United States sought to retain its nu- clear lead and, in an action-reaction cycle that would typify the arms race, pursued the next nuclear development —in this case, a thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb. Amer- ica's success in developing the hydrogen bomb in 1952 was followed by Soviet suc- cess in

1955. The nuclear arms race now en- tered its most recognizable form, wherein the superpowers pursued weapons that were smaller in size, more powerful, and increas- ingly accurate. In the same vein, delivery systems became faster, more accurate, and more difficult to locate.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the primary delivery vehicle for nuclear weap- ons was strategic bombers. More advanced aircraft were needed to carry more than one nuclear weapon, and indeed, nuclear weap- ons needed to be smaller so that they could be carried by a variety of aircraft. The Amer- ican B-29 was matched by the Soviet TU-4, but neither proved sufficient. Developments led ultimately to the B-52 and the TU-20, both intercontinental bombers capable of de- livering large payloads to multiple targets.

The next step in the nuclear arms race was missile development. Advances in rocketry led to the development of ballistic missiles in

Nuclear Arms Race, 1945 – 1985



both the United States and the Soviet Union. The first U.S. intercontinental ballistic mis- sile (ICBM), the Atlas D, was deployed on October 31, 1959. The Soviets followed suit with their own ICBM, the SS-6 Sapwood of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation, on January 20, 1960. ICBMs were a step up from their cousins, medium- range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and inter- mediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and became the most popular delivery sys- tem because of their range and relative in- vulnerability to enemy air defenses. ICBMs had a maximum range of 10,000 miles and could be stationed on the other side of the world from their targets.

In the 1950s, both superpowers came to rely on nuclear weapons as the primary weapon for any major Cold War engagement.

The nuclear arms race created ever-larger arsenals and increasingly effective deliv- ery systems. As a result, both sides became vulnerable to an enemy attack. It was this vulnerability that perpetuated the arms race during the decade and beyond. Neither side was willing to give up its weapons, and the newer weapons now meant that the nation that launched a first strike might be able to avoid a retaliatory strike if its nuclear advan- tage were enough to allow it to destroy most of the enemy's nuclear forces in the first blow. Any large gap in nuclear arms made one nation vulnerable, and nuclear stabil- ity could only be ensured by nuclear parity. As a result, scientific advances by one na- tion had to be matched by the other, or else a gap would result and one side would gain advantage.



Military parade through Red Square in Moscow, 1963. (Library of Congress)

This situation was aggravated in the 1960s with the evolution of the counterforce (or no cities) doctrine. Advocates of the doctrine suggested a general agreement between the superpowers to use nuclear weapons only against military installations, sparing popu- lation centers. Adopting this policy meant accepting the reality that in order to sustain the ability to launch an effective counter- strike, a nation must deploy enough weapons to ensure that the enemy could not destroy them all in a preemptive strike. Thus, more and better weapons were needed.

The alleged existence first of a bomber gap, then a missile gap, later an antiballistic missile gap, and later still a missile throw- weight gap kept arms manufacturers in per- petual development. In the United States, the military-industrial complex also contributed to the arms race as defense industries

fought for lucrative military contracts by driving for- ward to the next level of weaponry and deliv- ery systems. Changes in computer technology also advanced the nuclear arms race. In No- vember 1960, the United States deployed the world's first nuclear-powered ballistic mis- sile submarine (SSBN), the *George Washing- ton*, capable of launching 16 Polaris missiles. The Soviets followed in 1968 with their own SSBN. These weapons increased the danger of the arms race and were potentially even more deadly than ICBMs, as they were ca- pable of avoiding retaliatory strikes because of their ability to hide deep beneath the ocean.

Advances were made on both sides in ICBMs, bombers, and submarines, but the United States maintained strategic superi- ority. In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, however, the Soviet Union took the lead in ICBM production and in the development of antiballistic missile (ABM) technology. So- viet ABMs were designed primarily to pro- tect major cities, such as Moscow, and were less effective against a full attack against

Soviet military installations. Multiple inde- pendently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) complicated matters. MIRVs meant that each ICBM could deploy a dozen or more warheads, each programmed for a separate target. MIRVs promised to overcome any ABM system.

Arms control talks and treaties during the 1970s and arms reduction agreements during the 1980s slowed but did not stop the nuclear arms race. When the Cold War ended, so did the nuclear arms race in its original form.

Brian Madison Jones

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Nuclear Tests

Beginning with the first successful test of a nuclear weapon by the United States in July 1945, nuclear-armed nations have built and tested nuclear devices in a continuing ef- fort to improve the design and increase the yield of fission (atomic bomb) and fusion (hydrogen bomb) weapons. Nuclear tests have been conducted in the atmosphere, un- derground, and underwater and have con- tributed to remarkable progress in nuclear weapons research. Nuclear tests serve both military and scientific purposes as well as diplomatic goals. Often, nations have used nuclear tests to convey a variety of diplo- matic messages.

The first test of a fission weapon took place near Alamogordo, New Mexico, at 5:29 a.m. on July 16, 1945, under the aus- pices of the Manhattan Project, the top secret U.S. program aimed at building an atomic bomb. Named Trinity, the test successfully detonated and yielded the equivalent of 20,000 tons, or 20 kilotons (kt), of TNT.

In the years that followed the Trinity test, other nations pursued first fission weapons and later fusion, or thermonuclear, weap- ons. Successful tests were key markers of progress for these nations as they sought to be included in the elite “nuclear club.” In- deed, until the advent of supercomputers in the late 1980s, nuclear tests were the only way of determining readiness of a nation’s nuclear forces.

The United States conducted two addi- tional nuclear tests after Trinity before the Soviet Union became the second nuclear na- tion, testing a fission bomb yielding 22 kt on August 29, 1949. The successful Soviet test convinced American policymakers to pursue the next level in nuclear weapons, the fusion bomb, which was first tested by the United States on October 3, 1952. That weapon yielded the equivalent of 10 million tons, or 10 megatons (mt), of TNT. The So- viets followed with their own thermonuclear test on November 22, 1955, with a device that yielded 1.6 mt. The Soviets claimed that an August 12, 1953, explosion was a ther- monuclear test, but it was in fact a fission weapon boosted in yield by the use of tritium in the nuclear reaction. The United States had tested a similar device in 1951.

Three more nations—Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—all tested fission weapons during 1953–1964. Great Britain tested its first nuclear weapon on October 3, 1953, France on February 13, 1960, and China on October 16, 1964. These nations later successfully tested fusion

The mushroom cloud of an atomic explosion billows skywards as Communist China tests its first atomic bomb, on October 16, 1964. (AP/ Wide World Photos)

weapons. Great Britain was first among the three with a thermonuclear test on Novem- ber 11, 1957, followed by China on June 17, 1967, and France on August 24, 1968. These five nations constituted the five declared nu- clear nations. However, two other nations— India and Pakistan—have also tested nuclear weapons. India did so first on May 18, 1974, and then tested three more times in 1998 be- fore Pakistan tested its first weapon on May 28, 1998, and its second on May 30, 1998. On October 9, 2006, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) an- nounced its first nuclear detonation. Western intelligence confirmed that a large under- ground explosion had occurred and it had emitted radioactivity, but it is believed that the detonation was a misfire because of its



small yield (under one kiloton). North Korea admitted that the yield was less than ex- pected but insisted that it was a full-fledged detonation. Scientists and scholars continue to debate the specifics of this test.

During 1945–1998, the five officially de- clared nuclear nations plus India and Pakistan conducted 2,051 nuclear weapons tests, 528 (26 percent) of which were atmospheric. The Soviet Union and the United States accounted for 1,745 (85 percent) of the total number of tests. The British tested 45 weapons and the French 210. The biggest year for nuclear tests was 1962, when 178 tests were con- ducted. Tests have been conducted in North America, Asia, Africa, and Australia. Israel is widely believed to have nuclear weapons, even though it has conducted no nuclear tests.

In the largest nuclear test ever recorded, the Soviet Union conducted an atmospheric test on October 30, 1961, that yielded 50 mt. The weapon was not suitable for deploy- ment, however, as no delivery system had been constructed to carry such a large de- vice. The largest underground test yielded 5 mt and was conducted by the United States on November 6, 1971. In the Soviet Union, 496 tests were in Kazakhstan. In the United States, Alaska, Mississippi, and Colorado have been hosts to nuclear tests, but 935 have been conducted in Nevada.

The goals of such tests vary but generally include a desire to improve the design, in- crease the yield, or shrink the size of nuclear weapons. Nations also utilized such tests to prepare for possible battlefield uses. After a test, troops would march into the area, simu- lating an actual engagement and testing their ability to operate in such an environment. Nuclear blasts were also detonated to test the survivability of various infrastructures, civilian homes, and even ships at sea.

During the Cold War, nuclear tests served as a means of communication between su- perpowers and regional powers, as in the

case of India and Pakistan. The Soviet nu- clear test of 1949 announced to the world that the American atomic monopoly had ended, a development that dramatically af- fected the course of the Cold War. Now pos- sessing atomic weapons, the Soviets quickly regained a military advantage because the United States could never match the Soviet Red Army man-for-man.

An even better example might be the Soviet test in November 1961. Soviet Pre- mier Nikita Khrushchev took every oppor- tunity to test the new

American president, John F. Kennedy. In Cuba, Laos, and Berlin, Khrushchev attempted to bully Kennedy. As part of this strategy, Khrushchev broke the three-year-long nuclear testing moratorium with a series of tests that concluded with the world's largest nuclear test, of 50 mt. This weapon was 3,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and it forced Kennedy to resume nuclear testing in the United States. The Cold War grew in- creasingly tense in the months that followed.

In the United States, in particular, nuclear tests became a controversial political issue. Dangerous radioactive fallout resulted from every atmospheric test conducted, and those conducted in Nevada and New Mexico im- pacted those Americans living downwind of the nuclear fallout. Radioactive dust settled back to the earth, where it entered the food chain. Americans who lived close to the test sites suffered lasting and debilitating health effects. Increased cancer rates and genetic birth defects were just some of the deadly re- sults of America's nuclear testing program.

In 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which halted nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space. With negotiations beginning in 1993, the Compre- hensive Test Ban Treaty is a more inclusive treaty that would all but eliminate nuclear tests. Failure on the part of major nations to

sign or ratify the treaty has hindered its util- ity. Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the treaty, and neither the United States nor China has ratified it.

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Ostpolitik

Ostpolitik was a Federal Republic of Ger- many foreign policy initiative that sought rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. During 1949–1963, West Germany, under the leadership of Chancel- lor Konrad Adenauer, pursued Westpoli- tik (Western Policy). Westpolitik involved, among other things, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NA TO), the rearmament of West Germany, and par- ticipation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Common Market. W estpolitik also dictated a relatively uncompromising attitude toward the Soviet Union and its East European sat- ellites, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in particular. Epito- mizing this attitude were Bonn’s refusal to open relations with the Soviets until forced to do so by Moscow’s threat not to release thousands of German prisoners of war still held in captivity and the Hallstein Doctrine, which held that West Germany would not enter into relations with any country, the Soviet Union excepted, that recognized East Germany.

Beginning with Ludwig Erhard’s chancel- lorship (1963–1966) and continuing with that of Kurt Kiesinger (1966–1969), West Ger- many’s leadership began to modify its ap- proach toward the Soviet bloc, sending trade missions to Poland, Hungary, and Romania in hopes that economic agreements would lead to political dialogue. This transforma- tion served as a prelude to the more radical Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) implemented by

Chancellor Willy Brandt's government dur- ing 1969–1974.

Mayor of West Berlin during 1957–1966 and foreign minister in the Kiesinger gov- ernment, Brandt became W est Germany' s first Social Democratic chancellor in Oc- tober 1969, heading a coalition cabinet that included Walter Scheel, leader of the Free Democratic Party, as foreign minister. Seek- ing to reduce tensions in Central Europe, hoping to ameliorate conditions for Ger- mans living in East Germany, and recogniz- ing that a hard-line approach had brought German reunification no closer, Brandt as foreign minister had already set out to im- prove relations, via negotiations and diplo- matic agreements, between W est Germany and the Warsaw Pact. As chancellor, he and Scheel worked aggressively to expand this process.

Brandt's Ostpolitik encountered sub- stantial obstacles, both internationally and domestically. President Richard M. Nix- on's administration, itself seeking détente, proved reluctant to surrender the initiative in East–West relations to Bonn. At the same time, East Germany, led by Walter Ulbricht, made negotiations with West Germany de- pendent on Bonn's willingness to recognize East Germany diplomatically, a condition unacceptable to the Brandt cabinet. In addi- tion, the Christian Democratic Union/Chris- tian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) opposition in the Bundestag made repeated attempts to stymie Brandt's initiatives.

Fortunately for Brandt, the Soviet Union had ample reason to embrace Ostpolitik. Concerned over growing hostilities with

communist China, desirous of increasing economic ties with the West, and sensing an opportunity to possibly split NATO, the Kremlin welcomed Ostpolitik, agreeing to discuss relations with W est Germany in early 1970. Talks between the Soviet Union and West Germany culminated in the Treaty of Moscow on August 12, 1970, whereby both sides renounced the use of force against each other and acknowledged existing Euro- pean frontiers as inviolable. Moscow even added a supplemental declaration affirm- ing

Germany's right to reunify by peace- ful means, thereby undercutting one of the CDU/CSU' s chief criticisms of Ostpolitik. The Soviets agreed to discuss Berlin with the United States, Great Britain, and France, with the objective of redressing the divided city's status.

West Germany's willingness to recognize existing European frontiers paved the way for an agreement with Poland via the Treaty of Warsaw, signed on December 7, 1970. In so doing, Bonn acknowledged the disputed Oder-Neisse Line (although stipulating that it remained subject to change in a final peace settlement), and Warsaw agreed to allow Germans residing in Poland to relocate to either East or West Germany provided they conformed with Polish emigration laws. Moscow's decision to discuss Berlin's status led to the Quadripartite Agreement of Sep- tember 3, 1971, which saw Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union ac- knowledge that West Berlin was not part of West Germany, recognize West Germany's right to represent West Berlin internation- ally, and offer diplomatic protection to its citizens. Additionally, the agreement prom- ised Soviet facilitation in the movement of traffic from West Germany to West Berlin and pledged the signatories to use negotia- tion to resolve any future problems concern- ing Berlin.

Eight months later, in May 1972, East Germany (now headed by Erich Honecker) and West Germany signed a transit agree- ment guaranteeing West Berliners access rights to East Germany—all but forbidden since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961—and granting East Germans the right to visit West Germany in cases of family emergency. This agreement set the stage for the West German–East German Basic Treaty, signed on December 21, 1972, in which the two Germanies renounced the use of force in their relations, agreed to recog- nize and respect each other's authority and independence, renounced any claim to rep- resent the other internationally, agreed to re- spect human rights principles as enumerated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, and con- sented to an exchange of permanent missions (but not of ambassadors).

Brandt followed up the Basic Treaty by entering discussions with Czechoslovakia that led to a concrete agreement similar to the 1970 Treaty of Moscow in December 1973. That same month, West Germany exchanged ambassadors with both Hungary and Bul- garia, meaning that by the time

Brandt left office in May 1974, West Germany enjoyed relations with every East European commu- nist regime except Albania.

Ostpolitik greatly reduced Cold War ten- sions in Central Europe and thereby contrib- uted to the success of détente in the 1970s. It essentially eliminated Berlin as a Cold War issue, opened the door for the entry of both Germanies into the UN in September 1973, and improved conditions for Berliners. It also marked West Germany's emergence as a state willing to act independently on the in- ternational stage. Finally, Ostpolitik earned Brandt acclaim both in Germany and abroad, symbolized by his selection as the winner of the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize.

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PartialTest BanTreaty (August 5, 1963)

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union and was entered into force on October 10, 1963, with unlimited duration. The PTBT was the result

of five years of intense negotiations concerning the limiting of nuclear weapons tests. Some 125 nations have since signed the document, although France and the Peo- ple's Republic of China (PRC) refused to sign, arguing that the test ban was a means of preserving the superiority of the three ini- tial nuclear powers.

The PTBT was clearly an attempt to make nuclear weapons programs more difficult to sustain, thus limiting nuclear proliferation. The signatories to the treaty agreed that they would no longer carry out any nuclear test explosion in the atmo- sphere, underwater, in outer space, or in any other environment that would allow the spread of radioactive fallout beyond the territorial borders of the state conduct- ing the test.

World public opinion was already attuned to the dangers of atmospheric nuclear test- ing as a result of the 1954 *Castle Bravo* in- cident, in which a thermonuclear weapons test at Bikini Island in the Pacific unwittingly exposed 28 Americans, 236 Marshall Island- ers, and 23 crew members of the Japanese fishing boat *Lucky Dragon No. 5* to nuclear fallout. Public opinion was further inflamed

by France's decision to conduct atmospheric tests in Polynesia in 1962.

Two more general developments were also influential in pushing forward a test ban. Considerable radioactive materials were being poured into the atmosphere as a result of atmospheric nuclear testing, and the world's nuclear states had advanced their nuclear technology to the point where a com- bination of underground tests and physical calculations gave them sufficient informa- tion to design and test their strategic weap- ons without the risk of radioactive fallout.

In the United States there was increasing support for a test ban throughout the summer of 1963. In early July of that year, 52 per- cent of Americans signaled unqualified sup- port for a test ban. After the treaty had been signed, 81 percent of those polled approved the ban. In 1962, the newly established Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) within the United Nations (UN) became the principal forum for discussions concerning a test ban. After protracted nego- tiations, an agreement emerged on the use of seismic

stations and on-site inspections for verification purposes, but there was still dis- agreement on the acceptable number of in- spections continued

The PTBT seemed to offer hope for fu- ture disarmament agreements. Following the PTBT negotiations, worldwide concern over nuclear testing and the nuclear arms race in general declined dramatically. In 1968 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed, restricting the flow of weapons, technical knowledge, and fis- sile materials to states that did not already

have nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union went a step further in 1974 when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). It limited underground testing, which was allowed by the PTBT, to a maximum weapons yield of 150 kilo- tons, and only at declared testing sites. It also allowed on-site inspection by the other state for any test expected to exceed 35 ki- lotons. The TTBT did not enter into force until 1990. It had a duration of five years, with five-year extensions, and remains in force today. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was called for in the pream- ble of the PTBT but was not signed until 1996. As of 2007, the United States had refused to ratify the CTBT, despite being one of the original signatories. Nonetheless, the United States, Great Britain, and Rus- sia have observed unilateral nuclear testing moratoriums since 1992, and the last French test took place in 1995.

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Peace Movements

The Cold War was perhaps unique with re- gard to the amount of dissent it created in both the East and West. During 1945–1990, three significant peace movements stand

out. The first was sparked by the 1954 U.S. testing of the hydrogen bomb on the South Pacific island of Bikini, leading to the rise of a large-scale international nuclear disar- mament movement. In the second, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a global rebel- lion against the Vietnam War. And in 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) double-track decision to station in- termediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Western Europe led to large-scale antiwar and antinuclear protest demonstrations that culminated during 1982–1983.

Defined as autonomous, nongovernmen- tal, generally nonpartisan, and nonviolent organizations, peace movements range from strict opposition to all wars (pacifism), to op- position against a specific type of weapon (such as nuclear bombs), to opposition against a particular conflict. After World War II, peace movements were overwhelmingly concerned with the banning of the produc- tion, testing, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons.

In the United States, uneasiness over the use of nuclear weapons was voiced only days after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Church groups were joined by scientists and politicians in promoting international controls over nu- clear energy. As the Cold War intensified during the late 1940s, antinuclear activists— including prominent scientists Albert Ein- stein and Leo Szilard—were clearly fighting an uphill battle. At the time, the antinuclear movement found little support among an American public focused on combating the communist threat. During the early 1950s, McCarthyism further pushed peace activists onto the defensive.

On March 1, 1954, the U.S. testing of the most powerful hydrogen bomb to date on the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific led to rising public concern over the long-term

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health effects of nuclear fallout. When 28 Americans, 236 Marshall Islanders, and 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing boat were contaminated by nuclear fallout from the blast, the Bikini tests made international headlines. This led to renewed demands for nuclear disarmament by international peace organizations such as the War Resisters' International (WRI), the International Fel- lowship of Reconciliation (IFR), and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Mainstream publi- cations as well as period novels and films greatly alarmed the American public, while scientific studies on radioactivity further stirred pacifist sentiment.

By no means were these concerns limited to the United States, however. Japanese re- action to the Bikini tests had been furious, whereas in Britain as early as 1950 scien- tists had already urged their government not to develop the hydrogen bomb. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany), the stationing of the first U.S. nu- clear weapons in 1953 as well as the news of NATO military exercises that simulated the dropping of 335 atomic bombs gave overwhelming appeal to banning the bomb. There was rising concern in Scandinavia, Italy, and France as well. In the mid-1950s, polls all over Western Europe showed that between 80 and 90 percent of the population supported a test-ban treaty as well as a ban on nuclear weapons altogether.

Early on, scientists themselves played a prominent role in the struggle against the bomb. A key figure was British mathema- tician and philosopher Bertrand Russell, whose December 23, 1953, BBC radio ad- dress attracted considerable international at- tention and led to the creation of the Pugwash Movement, supported by a number of lead- ing physicists on both sides of the Iron Cur- tain. Influenced by their Western colleagues,

some Soviet physicists, most notably Andrei Sakharov, warned their government of the dangers of nuclear weapons.

When nuclear testing programs acceler- ated during the late 1950s, a first wave of mass protests to ban the bomb erupted. Brit- ain took the lead with the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The first march from London to Aldermas- ton on Easter 1958 adopted the symbol that has become the emblem of peace movements ever since: a circle encompassing a broken cross. In West Germany, the CND was cop- ied by the Easter March Movement, which originally grew out of opposition to NATO's decision to equip West German forces with nuclear weapons. Other countries such as Sweden and Switzerland followed suit, al- though French leftists were more concerned with the Algerian War than with antinuclear issues.

In the United States, the National Com- mittee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) came into existence in 1957. Like the CND, it began by demanding a halt to nuclear test- ing but evolved into a broader nuclear dis- armament movement. Unlike its European counterparts, however, SANE was unable to achieve the same kind of mass mobilization. At about the same time, European peace ac- tivists began to coordinate their efforts. In 1959, for example, British, Dutch, Swedish, Swiss, and West German nuclear disarma- ment organizations set up the European Fed- eration Against Nuclear Arms.

Although the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) fell short of peace activists' de- mands, protesters could claim that they had helped pressure the Americans and Soviets to achieve a breakthrough at the negotiating table. Reaching its zenith in 1964 with the tally of Easter Marchers numbering 500,000 in 20 nations, the antinuclear campaign waned during the late 1960s as Cold War tensions

eased. By politicizing a generation of young people, cooperating across national borders, and developing new forms of political action, however, it had set the stage for the coming protests against the Vietnam War.

By the mid-1960s, the Vietnam War had already replaced the antinuclear movement as the main focus of peace-related activities. In the United States,

worries over the Viet- nam War mounted even before President Lyndon Johnson began to dispatch large numbers of combat troops in 1965. In Britain, the CND staged large demonstrations against the war in 1966 and 1967. At its an- tiwar rally in February 1966, groups from West Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands declared their solidarity with American student pro- testers. In October 1967, the march on the Pentagon was echoed by closely coordinated solidarity demonstrations against American military installations in West Berlin and by antiwar rallies in Amsterdam, London, Oslo, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo.

Throughout the world, Vietnam War pro- tests stimulated the growth and expansion of student movements, which saw their cul- mination in 1968. In Britain and West Ger- many, student protests that had originally organized over issues of college discipline and curriculum were transformed into mass demonstrations with more than 100,000 par- ticipants in 1968. In France, student protests snowballed into mass demonstrations in- volving organized labor and other groups, nearly toppling the government of Charles de Gaulle. The greatest mobilization was in Japan, where Vietnam War protests ral- lied almost 800,000 people in 1970. There is much evidence from many other Western as well as developing countries that opposition to the American engagement in Vietnam led to the radicalization of students worldwide.

As with the antinuclear protests that pre- ceded it, the Vietnam War protests witnessed

the emergence of global networks of rebel- lion. The close ties among American and West German and other European protest- ers formed a striking parallel with their gov- ernments' Cold War cooperation. Important figures of the German New Left had become acquainted with their American counterparts as exchange students during the early 1960s. After their return to Germany, they helped organize protests against the American war in Vietnam using methods that they copied from the U.S. civil rights movements, such as mass sit-ins.

Whereas the nuclear disarmament activ- ists of the 1950s had by and large accepted the established institutional framework, Vietnam War protests developed into a more systematic anti-imperialist and anti- capitalist

ideological critique of W estern democracy. European and American activ- ists identified with developing-world revo- lutionaries such as Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong. However, their revolutionary rhetoric and violent methods often alienated even those middle-class vot- ers who had been broadly sympathetic to the antinuclear cause.

Because of significant steps made toward nuclear arms control and superpower détente during the late 1960s and early 1970s and the focus on Vietnam, the antinuclear campaign had largely disintegrated. It returned, how- ever, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when NATO's 1979 double-track decision to deploy land-based cruise missiles and Per- shing II missiles in Western Europe led to new fears of nuclear Armageddon. This sec- ond-wave antinuclear movement achieved an even larger protest mobilization than the first. Like its predecessor, it was transna- tional and was often built on the experiences of earlier protest efforts.

The antinuclear campaign of the early 1980s took place within the framework of renewed Cold War tensions and hostilities.

Soviet efforts to achieve military superiority in Europe and the 1979 invasion of Afghani- stan as well as Ronald Reagan's election as president in 1980 ended the long phase of détente between the superpowers. Yet de- spite the Soviet military buildup, a majority of West Europeans did not fear an impend- ing invasion. Because of growing public dis- sent to nuclear armaments in Eastern Europe as well, West European activists perceived themselves as part of a Pan-European move- ment battling against the dangers of the nu- clear arms race.

President Jimmy Carter's Neutron Bomb Campaign had already raised antinuclear fears in Western Europe during 1977–1978. It was not until December 1979, however, when a NATO summit decided to deploy IRBMs if the Soviet Union did not with- draw its forward-basing of SS-20 missiles, that large-scale protests in several countries emerged. Campaigns achieved the most do- mestic support in Belgium and the Neth- erlands, where the peace movement was successful in coaxing the governments to delay the NATO deployment schedule. In Britain, where the CND was rejuvenated, nuclear weapons became an important po- litical issue as well. In October

1980, 80,000 people marched to Trafalgar Square. In West Germany, protest demonstrations involved upward of 100,000 people in the same year. The high point occurred in December 1983, just before the deployment of the IRBMs began. As many as a million demonstrators protested throughout West Germany, in ad- dition to 600,000 in Rome and 400,000 in London.

The transnational protest networks of the 1980s had their roots in the ecological and feminist movements that had sprung up dur- ing the 1970s. They also enjoyed the back- ing of a substantial number of churches and labor unions. Despite considerable support in Western Europe and among the media,

the peace movement of the early 1980s was unable to build on the same kind of nuclear anxiety that had lent the 1950s' movement such resonance. Because of its association with leftist and liberal causes, the 1980s' antinuclear campaign came to enjoy only limited support among mainstream politi- cal parties. This led to the founding of new political groups such as the West German Green Party.

The 1980s peace movement did not origi- nate in the United States. Despite consider- able support from American peace groups (such as the National Freeze Campaign), the European peace movement developed inde- pendently from American influences. The stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles affected the balance of power in Europe. In addition, it had been European governments, above all West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government, that had taken the lead in pushing NATO toward the double-track decision. Finally, there was a strong sense of a European solidarity vis-à-vis the superpowers because East European anti- nuclear activists shared many concerns with their West European counterparts.

The Cold War–era peace movements did not produce immediate results in terms of disarmament or the lessening of tensions between East and West. Yet they had pal- pable effects on Western public opinion and to a lesser degree on East European govern- ments. Beginning in the 1950s, they forced governments to address widespread fears of the destructive force of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Cold War, with its strong elite cooperation across national borders, pro- vided a unique international framework for the

unprecedented growth of transnational peace activity. Thus, antiwar activism dur- ing the 1945–1990 period paved the way for more recent peace, environmental, and anti- globalization movements.

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Perestroika

Perestroika, meaning "restructuring" in Russian, was an important aspect of So- viet leader Mikhail Gorbachev' s reform agenda, designed in conjunction with glas- nost ("openness") and demokratizatsiia ("de- mocratization") to renew socialism and end the political and economic stagnation that had plagued the Soviet state for nearly two decades. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Con- gress in 1986, Gorbachev first promoted his ideas of perestroika, which included reduced centralization and bureaucratization, a de- emphasis on state economic planning, and modest moves toward private ownership of commercial enterprises. In 1987, in an at- tempt to further promote his reform

ideas, Gorbachev published *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*. In doing so, he propounded new economic con-

cepts, novel ideas on foreign policy, and his thoughts on socialist ethics.

Gorbachev's lack of detailed expertise on economic matters combined with great re- sistance among staunch Communist Party defenders of the status quo made significant changes in the Soviet Union exceedingly difficult to enact. In the end, his commit- ment to reforming communism rather than abolishing it meant that his reforms were too limited to satisfy those individuals and groups calling for more dramatic change. Although some parts of his reform agenda were successfully implemented, continued sociopolitical problems and a failed coup at- tempt in August 1991 led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous res- ignation of Gorbachev in December 1991. Perestroika may not have been successful domestically, but it was definitely influen- tial on the international scene, allowing the Soviets and Americans to engage in revo- lutionary nuclear and conventional arms re- duction agreements.

Melissa Jordine

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Prague Spring (1968)

The so-called Prague Spring was a brief pe- riod of unprecedented liberalization in com- munist-ruled Czechoslovakia, short-circuited by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of the country. On January 5, 1968, the Communist

Party leadership of Czechoslovakia ousted Stalinist first secretary Antonín Novotný. Having been elevated to first secretary in March 1953 and thus enjoying one of the lon- gest tenures among communist leaders in So- viet-dominated Eastern Europe, he fell victim to growing economic, political, and national discontents. Since the early 1960s, he had re- jected reform while exhibiting a willingness to use repression against workers, intellectu- als, and students who questioned the existing system.

Novotný's replacement as first secretary was 46-year-old Alexander Dubcˇek, who as leader of the Slovak Communist Party since 1963 had championed reform in gen- eral and the cause of equality for Slovakia in particular. While committed to maintain- ing Czechoslovakia's relationship with Mos- cow, he advocated socialism with a human face, sponsoring reforms designed to trans- form the Czechoslovak system into one in which socialism coexisted with democracy,

individual rights, and moderate economic freedoms. The result was a brief era of po- litical, cultural, and economic liberalization known as the Prague Spring.

While Dubcˇek's accession to power brought an immediate change in the politi- cal climate in Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring commenced in earnest on April 9, 1968, when the Czech Communist Party an- nounced the so-called Action Program. This promised, among other things, reduced state economic planning and greater freedom for both industry and agriculture, a commitment to economic quality between Czechoslova- kia and the Soviet Union, protection of civil liberties, and autonomy for Dubcˇek's native Slovakia. The party would retain its leader- ship position, but the program stipulated that henceforth it would be more responsive to the desires of the people.

Over the course of the next several months, with the support of Ludvik Svoboda, who had replaced Novotný as Czechoslovak

COLD WAR IN EUROPE, 1945 – 1990
30°W
20°W
10°W
0°
10°E
20°E
30°E
40°E
50°E
60°E
N
50°N
40°N
FINLAND
NORWAY
SWEDEN
North Sea
Baltic Sea
IRELAND
GREAT BRITIAN
THE NETHERLANDS
DENMARK
SOVIET UNION
ATLANTIC OCEAN
BELGIUM
EAST GERMANY
WEST GERMANY (1955)
POLAND
LUXEMBOURG
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGRY
ROMANIA
Black Sea
PORTUGAL
SPAIN (1982)
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
GREECE (1952)
TURKEY (1952)
Mediterranean Sea
0 200 400 mi
0 200 400 km
NATO member countries (with date of country's admission if after 1949)
United States and Canada, only non-European founding members of NATO
Warsaw Pact member countries, 1955 – 1990
Neutral countries

Young Czechs holding a Czechoslovakian flag stand atop an overturned truck in Prague amid Soviet tanks in August 1968, while other youths surround the tanks. (AFP/Getty Images)

president in early April, Dubcˇek fulfilled many of the program's promises. He abol- ished censorship, sanctioned the creation of workers' councils in factories, moved to in- crease trade with the West, allowed greater freedom to travel abroad, and supported the writing of a new party constitution designed to democratize the party. The Dubcˇek re- gime even went so far as to enact a Rehabil- itation Law in June that provided retrials for individuals previously convicted of political crimes by the communist regime.

The Czechoslovak population responded enthusiastically to the reforms, basking in a freedom it had not enjoyed since before the communist coup of February 1948. The press, radio, and television especially flourished, for the first time openly raising

questions about political purges, show trials, and concentration camps. By early summer, the public was pushing for further reforms to include the creation of independent political parties, the establishment of genuine political democracy, and more radical economic reforms.

As the Prague Spring unfolded, anxieties arose in Moscow. Soviet leader Leonid Bre- zhnev viewed the Czechoslovak reforms as a rejection of the Soviet political and eco- nomic model and worried that Prague might unilaterally withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Similar anxieties took hold among German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) and Polish conservative communist lead- ers who feared that the Czechoslovak re- forms might destabilize their own countries.

On July 16, Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders sent a joint letter to Prague demanding a halt to the reform movement. Blaming recent de- velopments in Czechoslovakia on "reaction- aries" supported by imperialism, the letter explained that the Czechoslovaks appeared headed off the socialist path and that the re- forms threatened the entire socialist system. Dubcˇek responded that his reforms should not be construed as anti-Soviet and that Czechoslovakia had no intention of leaving the Warsaw Pact. He also met twice with Brezhnev, in Prague on July 22 and in Cierna on July 29, apparently to prevent a Soviet military intervention.

Annoyed with Dubcˇek's refusal to end the reforms, and unconvinced of his intentions, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact part- ners, Romania excepted, decided to act. On the night of August 20–21, 1968, an estimated 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops (primarily So- viet Red Army but including units from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) invaded Czechoslovakia, meeting minimal resistance from a stunned population. Arrested and transported to Moscow on Au- gust 21, 1968, Dubcˇek surrendered to Soviet demands to end the reforms. On August 27, he returned to Prague, tearfully informing the Czechoslovak population that the era of liberalization was over. Subsequently, the Prague Spring's most significant reforms were annulled as the old political and eco- nomic system was restored. Ultimately, in April 1969, Dubcˇek was removed as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's first secretary. His replacement, Gustáv Husák, supported

by Red Army troops, thereafter presided over one of the most repressive communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Moscow justified its intervention by for- mulating what soon became known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which de- clared that no individual communist party had the right to make unilateral decisions that might be potentially damaging to social- ism. It further stated that because a threat to the socialist system in any given country rep- resented a threat to the socialist system as a whole, it was the duty of other socialist coun- tries to intervene militarily to suppress any potential deviation from prescribed commu- nist policies.

Although military intervention in Czecho- slovakia headed off what Moscow perceived as a dangerous development, it exacerbated the Soviet Union's already precarious rela- tions with the People's Republic of China (PRC), whose leaders publicly compared it to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler's aggres- sion against Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. Equally significant, the intervention elicited public condemnation by the United States and led to the postponement of already- scheduled Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between President Lyndon Johnson and Bre- zhnev in Moscow.

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Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

During the Cold War, the U.S. government- sponsored Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) broadcast uncensored news and information to audiences in the So- viet bloc in an attempt to weaken communist control over information and to foster inter- nal opposition. RFE broadcast to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Ro- mania and, in the 1980s, to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. RL transmitted in Russian and some 15 other national languages of the Soviet Union.

Unlike other Western broadcasters, RFE and RL concentrated on developments within and about their target countries not covered by state-controlled domestic media. They acted as surrogate home services, reporting on ac- tions of the authorities and relaying views of dissidents and opposition movements. Not- withstanding repeated technical interference (jamming, for example), broadcasts generally reached their intended audiences. Evidence of the impact of the broadcasts on the even- tual collapse of the communist regimes has been corroborated in the testimony of lead- ers such as Czech president Václav Havel after 1989.

RFE and RL were conceived in 1949 by George F. Kennan of the U.S. Department of State and Frank G. Wisner, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Policy Coordination, as instruments to utilize Soviet and East European émigrés in support of American foreign policy ob-jectives. Founded as nonprofit corporations

ostensibly supported with private funds, RFE and RL were in fact funded by the U.S. government through the CIA until 1972. The first official broadcast took place on July 4, 1950. RFE and RL initially adopted more confrontational editorial policies and used more aggressive language than other Western broadcasters. By the mid-1950s, however, as U.S. foreign

policy toward the Soviet bloc became more conciliatory, the networks emphasized the need for liberal- ization and evolutionary system changes. In so doing, they broadcast news and informa- tion about domestic politics and economic issues as well as cultural and historical tra- ditions normally suppressed by communist authorities. Over time, the networks evolved into saturation home services, seeking large audiences by broadcasting almost around the clock and by incorporating programs on Western music, religion, science, sports, youth, and labor issues.

The networks faced the considerable challenge of operating as surrogate home services in information-poor environments. They carefully monitored state-controlled print and electronic media and frequently interviewed travelers and defectors in field bureaus around the world. The networks cul- tivated ties with Western journalists and other visitors to communist countries and received information from regime opponents, often at great personal risk to the informants, within their target countries. This information was gathered to support broadcasts, but RFE and RL research reports also served many West- ern observers as their major source of infor- mation about the communist bloc.

RFE and RL programs were produced in Munich in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and were broad- cast via shortwave transmitters operating on multiple frequencies and high power to overcome jamming and other frequency- disruption tactics. The networks enjoyed substantial operational autonomy and were highly decentralized in function. Émigré broadcast service directors with intimate knowledge of their audiences were responsi- ble for most broadcast content, within broad policy guidelines and under American man- agement oversight.

The communist authorities devoted major resources to countering RFE and RL broad- casts. In 1951, Soviet leader Josef Stalin per- sonally ordered the establishment of local and long-distance jamming facilities to block Western broadcasts. Eastern bloc authorities also launched propaganda, diplomatic,

and espionage campaigns intended to discredit the broadcasts. In addition, they jailed indi- viduals providing information to either net- work. Ironically, the same authorities relied on secret transcripts of the broadcasts for in- formation they could not obtain from local media that they themselves controlled.

After 1971, direct CIA involvement in the networks ended, and they were then openly funded by congressional appropriation through the Board for International Broad- casting. The network corporations were merged into a single entity, RFE/RL, Incor- porated, in 1976.

The networks established intimate contact with their audiences during the 1970s and 1980s, when new waves of émigrés strength- ened broadcast staffs and as dissidents and other regime opponents, emboldened by the Helsinki Final Act (1975), began to chal- lenge the communist system. RFE and RL provided a "megaphone" through which in- dependent figures, denied normal access to

local media, could reach millions of their countrymen via uncensored writings. RFE and RL were able to document large audi- ences and acted as the leading international broadcaster in many target countries. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, many East European and Russian leaders testified to the importance of RFE and RL broadcasts in ending the Cold War. Operating today from Prague in the Czech Republic, RFE/RL broadcasts to the southern Balkans, most of the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq in support of democratic institutions and a transition to democracy.

A. Ross Johnson

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Reagan, Ronald Wilson (1911–2004)

Born on February 11, 1911, in Tampico, Il- linois, Ronald Reagan graduated from Eu- reka College in California, worked as a sports announcer, and in 1937 won a Holly- wood contract with Warner Brothers, even- tually appearing in 53 movies. As president of the Screen Actors Guild during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the once-liberal Rea- gan purged alleged communists and veered strongly to the Right. His politics grew in- creasingly conservative in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In 1966 the genial Reagan won the first of two terms as the Republican gover- nor of California. During his campaign he

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Ronald Reagan was president of the United States during 1981–1989. A staunch anti- com- munist, he carried out the largest peacetime defense buildup in U.S. history and worked to reverse the liberal tradition that had domi- nated U.S. politics since the Great Depression. (Library of Congress)

supported U.S. intervention in Vietnam and condemned student antiwar protesters. He soon became one of the leading figures of the increasingly powerful Republican Right, supporting deep cuts in taxes and domestic expenditures, high defense budgets, and a strong anticommunist international posture, positions he affirmed while seeking the Re- publican presidential nomination in 1976 and 1980.

In 1980, when Reagan defeated Demo- cratic incumbent president Jimmy Carter, the United States was suffering from spi- raling inflation and high unemployment. In Iran, radical Muslims had overthrown Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, sending

oil prices soaring, and for more than a year held U.S. diplomatic personnel hostage in Tehran. An almost simultaneous Soviet- backed coup in Afghanistan intensified a sense of American impotence, as did com- munist insurgencies in Central America and Africa. Reagan opposed compromise with communism. Believing firmly in the Ameri- can way of life and convinced that an Ameri- can victory in the Cold War was attainable, the ever-optimistic Reagan used blatantly triumphalist, anti-Soviet rhetoric, famously terming the Soviet Union an “evil empire.”

Reagan purposefully engaged the Sovi- ets in an arms race whereby he and his advi- sors hoped that American technological and economic superiority would strain the So- viet economy. In 1982 and 1983 the presi- dent issued directives intended to deny the Soviets Western credits, currency, trade, and technology and to embargo Soviet exports of oil and natural gas to the West. The Rea- gan administration hiked the defense budget from $171 billion to $376 billion between 1981 and 1986, hoping to force the Soviets into bankruptcy and to position the United States to better combat communism around the world. In 1983 Reagan announced that the United States would begin research on an expensive new ballistic missile defense sys- tem, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars, to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear missiles. If successful, this program, which contravened several existing arms control treaties, would have provided the United States with sub- stantial protection against a Soviet nuclear attack, thereby destabilizing the nuclear bal- ance and quite possibly triggering a new arms race.

Breaking with Carter's policies, Rea- gan also deliberately de-emphasized human rights, consciously supporting dictatorships provided they were pro-American, while

assailing human rights abuses within the So- viet sphere. Covert operations intensified as the United States offered support to anticom- munist forces around the world, providing economic aid to the dissident Polish Solidar- ity trade union movement and military and economic assistance to antigovernment reb- els in Angola, mujahideen guerrillas in Af- ghanistan,

and the anti-Sandinista Contras in Nicaragua. Efforts to overthrow the existing Nicaraguan government included Central In- telligence Agency (CIA) mining of ports and harbors. When Congress responded by pass- ing the Boland Amendment of 1984, forbid- ding funding for Nicaraguan covert actions, the Reagan administration embroiled itself in an ill-fated secret enterprise to sell arms to Iran—thereby evading its own embargo but, officials suggested, enhancing the politi- cal standing of Iranian moderate elements— and using the proceeds to aid the Nicaraguan Contras. Revelations of these illegal activi- ties and his probable complicity in them em- barrassed Reagan during his second term.

They did not, however, compromise Rea- gan's ability to reach unprecedented new understandings with the Soviet Union. Not- withstanding his bellicose rhetoric, in prac- tice Reagan was surprisingly pragmatic and cautious. In potentially difficult guerrilla settings, his administration favored covert operations, preferably undertaken by sur- rogates such as the Afghan mujahideen or the Nicaraguan Contras, over outright mili- tary intervention. Wars were kept short and easily winnable, as in the small Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983 when American troops liberated the island from Marxist rule. When, almost simultaneously, radical pro-Syrian Druze Muslims bombed the Bei- rut barracks of an American peacekeeping force in Lebanon, killing 241 American sol- diers, the United States quickly withdrew. In 1986, suspected Libyan involvement in

terrorist incidents provoked only retaliatory American surgical air strikes on Tripoli.

Despite campaign pledges to the contrary, Reagan did not shun the People's Republic of China (PRC) or restore American relations with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). In 1982 the Reagan administration reached an understanding with China on Taiwan, after which the Chinese gave some support to the Afghan rebels. Sino-American trade in- creased, and Reagan made a 1984 state visit to Beijing. By 1984, domestic politics sug- gested that the president moderate his anti- Soviet line. He faced a reelection campaign against a liberal opponent, Walter Mondale, just as his nuclear buildup and the stalemat- ing of inconclusive arms control talks had generated substantial public support in both America and Europe for a nuclear freeze. In September

1984, Reagan proposed combin- ing all major ongoing nuclear weapons talks into one package, and Soviet leaders soon agreed.

Reagan's mellowing coincided with the culmination of long-standing Soviet eco- nomic problems. Empire imposed added burdens on the Soviets as military spend- ing rose, diverting funds from domestic pro- grams. Most countries in Eastern Europe still resented Soviet domination. In Poland, the Solidarity movement proved remarkably persistent, undercutting Soviet control. As- sertive Soviet policies in Africa and Latin America carried a high price tag too, while the decade-long Afghan intervention em- broiled Soviet troops in a costly and unwin- nable guerrilla war.

In 1985 the young and energetic Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He immediately sought to address Russia' s problems and reform the communist economic and social system, an uphill battle given the immense burdens of the Soviet

military. In addition, the costly SDI program that Reagan had proposed was likely to de- mand massive further Soviet investment.

American and European leaders were initially wary of Gorbachev's overtures, but even so, he quickly won great popu- larity. After meeting Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, the hard-line British Conserva- tive prime minister whom Reagan had long found to be a political soul mate, urged her colleague to work with the Soviet leader, and Reagan was more willing than many of his advisors to trust Gorbachev. Domestic eco- nomic factors may also have impelled Rea- gan toward rapprochement. Deep tax cuts meant that heavy government budget deficits financed the defense buildup in the 1980s, and in November 1987 an unexpected Wall Street stock market crash suggested that American economic fundamentals might be undesirably weak. Reagan had several sum- mit meetings with Gorbachev, and in 1987 the superpowers signed the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, elimi- nating all medium-range missiles in Europe and imposing strong verification procedures. This marked the beginning of a series of arms reduction agreements, continued under Reagan's successor George H. W. Bush, and of measures whereby the Soviet Union with- drew from its East

European empire and, by 1991, allowed it to collapse. Although Bush's presidency saw the culmination of these developments, it was Reagan who first perceived their potential.

Reagan, the oldest U.S. president in his- tory, left office in 1989. After a decade-long battle with Alzheimer's, he died of pneumo- nia at his home in Los Angeles, California, on June 5, 2004. Reagan's impressive state funeral in Washington, D.C., paid tribute to him as the American president whose poli- cies effectively helped to end the Cold War on U.S. terms.

Priscilla Roberts

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Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921–1989)

Born on May 21, 1921, in Moscow, the son of a physics professor, Andrei Sakharov studied physics at Moscow University dur- ing 1939–1942 and at the Lebedev Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during 1945–1947 under the eminent theoretical physicist Igor Tamm. Sakharov earned his doctorate in 1947 and joined the Soviet nu- clear weapons program in 1948, working in a special group then headed by his mentor.

Spearheaded by Sakharov, Tamm's group produced the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, successfully tested in August 1953, a devel- opment that greatly intensified the nuclear arms race with the United States. For his contributions to the development of the hy- drogen bomb, Sakharov received both the Lenin and Stalin Prizes and earned election as a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1953.

Sakharov's participation in the Soviet nuclear weapons program lasted nearly 20 years. Initially, he believed that his work was of vital importance to the global balance of power. However, over time he grew uneasy with what he characterized as moral prob- lems inherent in his work, and he became disillusioned with the Soviet system, specifi- cally the absence of civil liberties and the secrecy surrounding science, culture, and technology.

Beginning in the late 1950s, Sakharov called on the Soviet regime to ban atmo- spheric testing of nuclear weapons. In the early to mid-1960s, he moved on to criticize

the continuing influence of the erroneous the- ories of T. S. Lysenko on Soviet genetics and to protest Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's tentative first steps toward rehabilitating the legacy of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Sakha- rov ultimately crossed the Rubicon to full dissident in 1968, when his essay

“Reflec- tions on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom” appeared in the West- ern press. This extended essay, also known as the Sakharov Memorandum, warned of the dangers, including thermonuclear anni- hilation, that threatened humanity. He also pushed for reconciliation between socialist and capitalist nations, advocated democratic freedoms in the Soviet Union, denounced collectivized agriculture, and called for a careful reexamination of the Stalin era. In response, the Brezhnev regime removed Sakharov from the Soviet nuclear weapons program and stripped him of all privileges to which he had been entitled as a member of the Soviet Nomenklatura.

In the summer of 1969, Sakharov became a senior researcher at the Lebedev Institute, but his primary concerns for the remainder of his life were human rights and the democra- tization of the Soviet Union. In 1970, he and fellow physicist Valeri Chalidze established the Moscow Human Rights Committee, which advocated freedom of speech and the full implementation of the Soviet constitu- tion, and monitored violations of the law and the constitution including the arrests of dis- sidents by the Soviet regime. Sakharov’s ef- forts in the name of human rights earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, making him the first Soviet citizen to garner the award,



Dissident Soviet physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, March 1974. (AP/Wide World Photos)

although he was not permitted to leave the Soviet Union to claim it.

Although the Soviet Komitet Gosudarst- vennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) harassed Sakha- rov and threatened him with prosecution, he remained a free man until 1980 when, in the wake of his criticisms of the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and with the 1980 Moscow Olympics approaching, the Brezhnev regime exiled him to Gorky, a military-industrial city closed to foreigners. There Sakharov re- mained until December 1986, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, as part of his pol- icy of glasnost, freed him, allowing him and his wife Yelena Bonner to return to Moscow and resume his scientific endeavors.

In 1989, the Soviet Academy of Sciences selected Sakharov to serve as a deputy in the newly established Congress of People' s Dep- uties, the first democratically elected national legislative body to sit in Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution. There Sakharov proved to be an outspoken critic of Gorbachev, con- stantly pushing him to carry his political and

economic reforms further. Sakharov died of a heart attack in Moscow on December 14, 1989.

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Sino-Soviet Split (1956–1966)

The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance marked the transformation of the Cold War world from bipolarity to multi-polarity. Su- perficially an ideological partnership be- tween the world's two largest communist countries, the Sino-Soviet alliance began on February 14, 1950, with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. From its incep- tion, the seemingly monolithic union was fraught with constantly shifting expecta- tions about its precise place in the social- ist world, subjected to American attempts to split it, and afflicted by the progressively ideological radicalism of People's Repub- lic of China (PRC) Chairman Mao Zedong. Although Sino-Soviet disagreements over Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 de- Stalinization campaign remained hidden for a time, the advanced state of the alliance's disintegration became known to the outside world by the early 1960s. Because Mao ex- ploited ideological conflict for domestic purposes, the final breakdown of the Sino- Soviet partnership in mid-1966 coincided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolu- tion (1966–1976), launched both to purge

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of al- leged ideological revisionists and to create a communist utopia.

Viewing any alliance with a great power solely as a temporary means to help restore past Chinese glory and power, the Chinese Communists by the late 1940s had decided to lean toward the Soviet Union. Surprised by Mao's request in late 1949 for an eco- nomic and military alliance, Soviet leader Josef Stalin first hesitated but then agreed for utilitarian reasons to conclude a Friendship and Alliance Treaty that provided the So- viet Union access to railroads, warm-water ports, and important raw materials deposits in Manchuria and Xinjiang in exchange for Soviet military and economic aid. Stalin's limited support of the PRC during the Ko- rean War (1950–1953), however, revealed the limits of the military aspects of the al- liance. After the dictator's 1953 death, the end of the Korean War, and Khrushchev's ascendancy to power, the focus of the Sino- Soviet relationship gradually shifted toward assistance in economic development and im- proved party relations.

Khrushchev' s "secret speech" of Febru- ary 25, 1956, charging Stalin with arbitrary and criminal rule, undermined Mao' s grow- ing personality cult in China but strength- ened his hand in his relations with the Soviet leaders. After increasing his influence in the socialist world through diplomatic media- tion during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Mao concluded that although he considered Khrushchev' s criticism of Stalin unfair and imbalanced, it had nevertheless revealed the need to preempt internal dissent in China in order to prevent a crisis similar to the Hungar- ian Revolution. The PRC' s Hundred Flowers campaign in the spring of 1957 was designed to allow party members and intellectuals to vent their pent-up frustrations in a highly controlled framework but threatened within

only a few weeks to undermine the Chinese communist regime. While Beijing launched the Anti-Rightist campaign in the summer of 1957 to stamp out internal dissent, Khrush- chev survived the so-called Anti-Party Inci- dent, which the remaining Stalinists in the party leadership staged with the goal of re- versing de-Stalinization. Both events proved to be crucial for the further development of the Sino-Soviet relationship, since they put the PRC

and the Soviet Union on two conflict- ing political, ideological, and economic paths.

As modest liberalization continued in the Soviet Union in 1958, Mao, following the Anti-Rightist campaign, radicalized the do- mestic political discourse in the run-up to the Great Leap Forward, which was supposed to propel the PRC into full-fledged commu- nism. These internal changes led to a more aggressive and anti-American foreign policy before and during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (August–September 1958). Mao's willingness, stated to Soviet foreign minis- ter Andrey Gromyko in early September, to trigger a nuclear war over a series of small, disputed islands in the Taiwan Strait placed the first significant strains on the Sino-Soviet relationship.

Faced with widespread famine as a result of the misguided economic policies of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP leadership undertook internal discussions in mid-1959 about economic reforms aimed at averting further disaster. Fearing challenges to his leadership, Mao was able both to purge his opponents within the party and to relaunch an unreformed Great Leap Forward in late 1959 in order to save his vision of a com- munist utopia. The economic catastrophes resulting from the Great Leap Forward, however, shocked the Soviet Union. Further- more, Mao's radical anti-American stance also clashed with Khrushchev's rapproche- ment policies.

People's Republic of China leader Mao Zedong confers with leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev during the latter's 1958 visit to Beijing. (Library of Congress)

The unexpected April 1960 Chinese publi- cation of the so-called Lenin Polemics—three articles released on the occasion of Vladimir I. Lenin's 90th birthday that promoted ideo- logically radical positions diametrically opposed to Soviet viewpoints—revealed the brewing Sino-Soviet tensions to the world. After ideological clashes between the Soviet and CCP delegations during the Third Ro- manian Party Congress in late June 1960, the Soviet Union decided to punish the PRC by withdrawing all of its advisors from the PRC in July 1960.

Although the Great Leap Forward had caused the complete collapse of China's economy and had brought Sino-Soviet trade to a virtual standstill, Beijing used the with- drawal to blame Moscow for its economic problems. Until the mid-1960s, the PRC

shifted much of its foreign trade away from the Soviet Union toward Japan and Western Europe. Because of China's pressing eco- nomic problems and

the failure of Khrush- chev's rapprochement with U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower after the May 1960 U-2 crisis, however, both sides realized the necessity of an ideological truce, which they formally reached at the Moscow Confer- ence of the world's communist parties in late 1960.

Shunted aside from domestic decision making because of his close association with the failed Great Leap Forward, Mao used the 1961 Soviet–Albanian conflict as a tool to rebuild his political fortunes at home. Subsequent anti-Soviet propaganda in the PRC triggered conflicts between Soviet citizens and ethnic Central Asians living in Xinjiang

on the one side and the local Chinese ad- ministration on the other. The mass flight of 67,000 people to Soviet Kyrgyzstan in the late spring of 1962 caused Beijing to abro- gate its consular treaty with Moscow on the basis of alleged Soviet subversive activities in western China. Mao used these develop- ments to restore his standing in the CCP leadership and to push for more anti-Soviet policies in the second half of 1962. Khrush- chev's nuclear provocation and sudden re- treat under U.S. pressure during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis provided Mao with an unexpected opportunity to attack the Soviet leadership publicly for ideological inconsis- tency and political unreliability.

The United States had been intent on split- ting the Sino-Soviet alliance since 1950, but only in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis was it able to use the Soviet-British- American negotiations on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) to deepen the Sino- Soviet rift. Aware of the problems between Beijing and Moscow, Washington played on Soviet fears about China's nuclear weap- ons program and Khrushchev's dissatisfac- tion with Mao's ideological warfare. Despite the fact that the PTBT (initialed on July 25, 1963) did not infringe on China's nuclear program, the signing of the treaty by almost all countries of the world within five months isolated the PRC internationally.

The period from mid-1963 to mid-1966 witnessed the final collapse of Sino-Soviet party and military relations. Convinced that the Sino-Soviet pact had fulfilled its useful- ness, Mao fanned and exploited ideologi- cal conflict and territorial disputes with his Soviet comrades for domestic purposes. Because the launching of the Cultural Rev- olution required a prior break with what

Mao termed Soviet "revisionists, traitors of Marxism-Leninism, and fascists," he eventu- ally broke party relations in early 1966 by his

refusal to send a delegation to the Twenty- Third Soviet Party Congress. Simultaneously, his radical ideological stances precluded the invocation of Sino-Soviet Treaty obligations in support of the Democratic Republic of Viet- nam (DRV, North Vietnam) during the Viet- nam War (1964–1973). By the mid-1960s, the military alliance between Beijing and Moscow factually ceased to exist, although the treaty did not officially expire until February 14, 1980. Until the rapprochement initiated by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, for nearly 25 years Sino-Soviet relations consisted only of low-level cultural relations and limited trade links.

Lorenz M. Lüthi

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Solidarity Movement

The Solidarity Movement was a Polish inde- pendent labor union established in September 1980, credited with bringing democracy to Poland and helping to end the Cold War. On July 1, 1980, the Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Edward Babiuch and

communist First Secretary Edward Gierek, announced across-the-board price increases. Immediately, factory workers throughout Poland staged protest strikes. These prolif- erated and soon reached the Baltic coast, af- fecting Poland's largest port cities of Gdan´sk and Gdynia.

Workers at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdan´sk went on strike at the beginning of August. The local strike committee, led by electri- cian Lech Wałęsa, was soon transformed into the Inter-Factory Strike Committee. It was unprecedented in both size and form, as it claimed to represent not just the ship- yard workers but all Polish workers. The Strike Committee put forth a list of 21 de- mands to be met by the Polish Communist Party. These demands included the right to form independent labor unions, the right to strike, freedom of speech and press, the release of political prisoners, and other so- cial and economic demands. On August 31, 1980, Wałęsa's committee signed an agree- ment in Gdan´sk with Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Jagielski by which the govern- ment agreed to the workers' demands, in- cluding the formation of independent trade unions. Similar agreements were signed in Szczecin and Jastrzębie. Several days later, Gierek resigned his post.

As soon as the agreements were signed, workers began to organize themselves into union groups. Inter-Factory Strike Commit- tees became Inter-Factory Founding Com- mittees. Until this point, Polish labor unions had been an extension of the Communist Party and had no true independence.

On September 17, 1980, the Founding Committees decided to organize one um- brella labor union known as Solidarnos´c´ (Solidarity). By this time, union member- ship was close to four million people, and the decision to form one central union was deeply troubling to Polish authorities. On

November 10, 1980, following a series of difficult negotiations, Solidarity was offi- cially registered as a union.

Moscow and Warsaw eyed Solidarity with great trepidation. The movement was large, and Soviet leaders especially viewed its antisocialist elements as

particularly troubling. They also feared that it would set a precedent that might be followed in other communist bloc nations. Over the next 13 months, an uneasy relationship existed be- tween the Communist Party and Solidarity. Solidarity was gradually realizing its demands through strikes or the threat of strikes. These demands were in most cases limited to working conditions, wages, and workers' rights. By the end of 1981, nearly 10 million members, some 80 percent of the national workforce, had joined the movement.

Polish authorities never fully accepted the legitimacy of Solidarity. In fact, they re- sorted to stalling tactics and harassment of union activists in the hope of weakening the movement. Meanwhile, the authorities were preparing plans to crush Solidarity, by mili- tary means if necessary. Tensions between Solidarity and the government peaked dur- ing the Solidarity Congress in September– October 1981. Solidarity's September 8, 1981, "Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe," which urged workers in other communist bloc nations to unite, brought applause among union members and near panic on the part of Polish and Soviet authorities. By then, it was clear that Solidar- ity had become a grave threat to communist rule. Moscow threatened Polish leaders with armed intervention unless Solidarity was shut down. For a time, the real threat of a Soviet military invasion loomed.

Then, on December 13, 1981, the Pol- ish government, now headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, imposed martial law

Shipyard strikers hoist Lech Walesa on their shoulders after the official founding of the indepen- dent trade union *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity) in Warsaw, Poland, on September 24, 1980. (Alain Keler/ Sygma/Corbis)

and declared Solidarity illegal. Almost 10,000 Solidarity members were detained. Wałęsa was among those arrested.

Pope John Paul II and the Catholic Church publicly supported the struggles of Solidarity and its imprisoned principals while clandes- tinely sending messages of encouragement to Wałęsa and others. Wałęsa credited the eventual triumph of Solidarity to the pope's intercession.

In April 1982, Solidarity activists who had avoided arrest formed the Solidarity Temporary Coordinating Committee to stage underground union activity. Four years later, in September 1986, Wałęsa initiated an open, albeit illegal, Solidar- ity Committee. The government refused to recognize this committee, and its members were closely watched by the secret police. Nevertheless, W ałęsa, who had won the

1983 Nobel Peace Prize, was now a promi- nent international figure. Silencing him was therefore exceedingly difficult for Polish authorities.

In August 1988, Polish authorities, together with the Catholic Church and the still-illegal Solidarity movement, commenced negotia- tions concerning the future of Poland. During February–April 1989, a roundtable brought together communists, opposition leaders, Solidarity members, and Catholic Church representatives. The talks brought an end to the government prohibition of Solidarity. In the elections that followed in June 1989, in which 35 percent of the seats were to be de- cided by election, Solidarity candidates won 161 of 161 seats in the Sejm and 99 of 100 in the Senate. In August 1989, Tadeusz Mazow- iecki, one of Solidarity's founders, formed the first noncommunist post–World War II Polish

Centrum
E 81 Gdansk
11 Augustów
E 8 Terespol
E 81 Lublin
E 12 Bialystok
E 7 Kielce
E 82 Katowice
E 8 Poznan
E 12 Łódź

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During a 1987 visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II, demonstrators march down a street carry- ing banners reading "Solidarnosc" ("Solidarity"), the name of the first Polish trade union, formed despite communist government opposition. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)

government. After 1989, Solidarity became a traditional political labor party.

Jakub Basista

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Sputnik (October 4, 1957)

The world's first man-made, earth-orbiting satellite was launched by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957. Although commonly used to describe the first satellite, *Sputnik*, mean- ing "fellow traveler," actually designates a series of satellites that were numbered se- quentially. *Sputnik I* weighed 184 pounds, excluding the propulsion vehicle, and was placed into space as part of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Y ear (IGY), which included the objective of launching artificial satellites for scientific research. *Sputnik I* was followed by the November 3, 1957, launch of *Sputnik II*, a 1,118-pound

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capsule with a dog named Laika as a pas- senger. These two stunning Soviet successes occurred before the failed launch attempt of *Vanguard*, the American contribution to the IGY scientific effort, on December 6, 1957.

The *Sputnik* launches, especially when contrasted with the American failure, were important symbols of Soviet technological prowess, which marked the beginning of the intense space competition with the United States that became known as the space race. The launch provided the Soviet Union with an important propaganda tool that was used to publicize the alleged advanced nature of Soviet society and the progress that was pos- sible in a modern communist society.

The American public was shocked by the *Sputnik* success, and American domestic

politics were soon dominated by discussions of the Soviets' technological superiority and of the implied threat to the United States. American political leaders quickly pushed for changes that would restore public con- fidence and retain technological superiority over the Soviets. The U.S. government re- sponded to the challenge by passing the 1958 National Defense Education Act, which pro- vided incentives to promote the study of sci- ence, mathematics, engineering, technical education, and other fields deemed neces- sary to national security. Additionally, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to help centrally organize and coordinate American space efforts. However, military-oriented space



Passenger on the Soviet space craft *Sputnik 2*, Laika was the first life form in space. There were no plans for her to survive the journey. She probably died within hours of launch from heat and stress. (AP/Wide World Photos)

programs, such as reconnaissance satellites, remained outside NASA and were cloaked in secrecy.

Militarily speaking, the launch of a So- viet R-7 rocket, which propelled *Sputnik* into orbit, confirmed the Soviets' capability to field nuclear-armed intercontinental bal- listic missiles (ICBMs). This created an im- pression of vulnerability in the United States and led to intensified American efforts to en- hance early warning and defensive systems, expand the national civil defense program, and strengthen strategic nuclear forces. *Sput- nik* directly contributed to the erroneous idea that a missile gap had developed between the Americans and Soviets, placing the United States at a comparative disadvantage. Pres- ident Dwight D. Eisenhower knew that no such gap

existed but was bound to maintain silence on the issue, as the information was highly classified. Ultimately, the missile gap became a hot-button issue in the 1960 presi- dential campaign.

For the Eisenhower administration, there was a beneficial side to *Sputnik*, however, as it removed concerns that the Soviet Union would raise national sovereignty issues in re- sponse to an orbital overflight by an Ameri- can satellite. *Sputnik* established a precedent for satellites operating over sovereign terri- tories and opened the legal window for re- connaissance satellite operations that were already being planned by the U.S. govern- ment. *Sputnik I* was an important scien- tific first, a clear public relations victory in the Cold War, and an important event that shaped the continuing international struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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Stalin, Josef (1879–1953)

More absolute a ruler than any Russian tsar, Josef Stalin (born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili) was one of the most power- ful and influential figures in history and cer- tainly one of its most horrific. As many as 20 million people may have died as a direct result of his policies.

Much of Stalin's early life remains ob- scure, in part because he took pains to re- write it. Born in the town of Gori, Georgia, in the Caucasus on December 21, 1879, he was the only child of his parents to survive infancy. His father

was a cobbler and his mother a washerwoman and domestic. His father (who died in a barroom brawl) was an alcoholic and beat young Josef regularly.

Stalin's mother wanted Josef to become a priest, and he graduated from the four-year elementary ecclesiastical school in Gori in 1894 and then entered a theological semi- nary in Tiflis (Tblisi) on a scholarship. He grew up to be a small man, barely five feet in height, with a pockmarked face and a with- ered arm (or at least one of sufficient infir- mity to keep him out of the Russian Army). He either quit the seminary or was expelled. In any case, he said it was there that he was introduced to Russian Marxism.

In 1901 Josef joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. His activities to secure funds included robberies and coun- terfeiting operations. He was subsequently

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arrested, tried, and convicted. Exiled to Si- beria in 1903, he escaped a year later. His enemies would later charge that he was also in the pay of the tsarist secret police.

One of Josef's aliases, the one by which he became best known, was that of Stalin (Man of Steel), given to him by his fellow revo- lutionaries for his strength and ruthlessness. Coarse and ill-mannered, Stalin was arrested and exiled six times and escaped five times. Freed during the March 1917 Revolution, he returned to Petrograd and became editor of the party newspaper *Pravda* (Truth). His role in the Bolshevik seizure of power that November is unclear, but he clearly did not take a leading part. Leon Trotsky, a rival for power later, remembered Stalin's role as "a gray blur."

Stalin was active in the Russian Civil War (1918–1921) and the Russo-Polish War (1920–1921), and from 1920 to 1923 he was commissar of nationalities. In 1923 he assumed the post of secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a position he used as a springboard to power. His political rise has been ascribed to his skill at infighting and playing one fac- tion against another as well as his absolute ruthlessness, but he also put in long hours at his job and deserves considerable credit for his achievement.

By the late 1920s, Stalin had triumphed over his rivals, chief among them Trotsky, to wield absolute power in the Soviet Union. Stalin created the bureaucratic sys- tem and refined both the secret police and slave labor camps begun under his prede- cessor, Vladimir Lenin. Stalin abandoned Lenin' s New Economic Policy (NEP) that permitted a degree of capitalism in Russia and initiated a series of five-year plans to modernize the economy, concentrating on heavy industry. Stalin's economic poli- cies included the forced collectivization of

agriculture that claimed an estimated 10–15 million lives.

Stalin was personally responsible for the Great Purge trials of the 1930s that consumed virtually all of the top party leadership. Also falling victim to the Great Purge were mil- itary leaders, including 60 percent of Red Army officers above the rank of major. In the so-called Deep Comb-Out that accompa- nied the show trials, hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens simply vanished without benefit of judicial procedure.

Much of the blame for the dismal show- ing of the Red Army in the 1939–1940 war with Finland and at the outset of the Ger- man invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 must be attributed to Stalin's policies. He had also labeled repeated warnings of an impending German attack as "Western dis-information." He grew in stature as a mili- tary commander and strategist during the war, however. Learning the art of war and absorbing specialist military information, he made all important strategic decisions for the Red Army as well as taking many decisions on the tactical level.

In foreign affairs, Stalin seized opportu- nities that presented themselves in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Knowing exactly what he wanted, he met with Western lead- ers in Moscow and at the T ehran, Y alta, and Potsdam conferences. In 1919, following W orld W ar I, the W est had quarantined the new communist Russia with a series of new successor states, endeavoring to contain communism with a cordon sanitaire. Now, following W orld W ar II, Stalin sought the reverse, insisting at the very least on govern- ments friendly to the Soviet Union in order to provide security for a badly wounded So- viet empire. Throughout his long reign, Sta- lin was intensely suspicious of

foreigners and foreign, above all W estern, influences. Thus, Soviets who had been in the West,

including Red Army personnel captured during the war, were immediately suspect and treated as enemies. A great many peo- ple who had been in the West, voluntarily or involuntarily, were shipped off to the gu- lags. Many Soviet citizens had openly co- operated with the Germans during the war. Although Ukrainians were far too numer- ous to be uprooted, Stalin did make an ex- ample of the Crimean Tartars. He ordered some 300,000 of them sent to Uzbekistan in Central Asia.

Although there were fears in the West that Stalin's plans included the communization of Western Europe, the dictator's immedi- ate motivation was simply that of securing the Soviet empire. Because of the Red Army presence on the ground, there was little that Western leaders could do to prevent this, short of war with the Soviet Union, which despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly was un- imaginable to Washington in 1945. Stalin's regime emerged from the war with all of Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe under its control.

The Soviet Union had suffered grievously during the war, with perhaps 27 million people dead and widespread physical de- struction. Stalin put the population to work rebuilding, although his people paid for this in retention of the 48-hour workweek and living standards well below those of 1940. In a new five-year plan, he continued his em- phasis on building heavy industry, although some attention was paid to pressing hous- ing needs.

To unite the Soviet people under his lead- ership, Stalin proclaimed the belief of a communist world threatened by encircling enemies. Everything was done to maintain the intense nationalist sentiments aroused by the ordeal of the long struggle against the Germans in World War II. Andrei Zh- danov, political boss of Leningrad, became

the guiding spirit of this ideology, known as Zhdanovshchina. It championed Russian nationalism and attacked Western influence (now known as

bourgeois cosmopolitan- ism), glorified communism, and above all trumpeted the accomplishments and inspira- tion of the Great Leader, Stalin, attributing to him all Soviet successes.

Once Stalin rejected a closer relationship with the West, the Cold War was launched in earnest. Stalin refused to allow the East European Soviet satellites to participate in the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), and following an impasse over Ger- man reunification on Soviet terms and im- pending Western currency reform in the Allies' zones of Germany, in the summer of 1948 Soviet troops cut off Western land access to the city of Berlin. This sparked a major East–West confrontation and led to the Berlin Airlift. Stalin's tactics and saber rattling resulted in the 1949 formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and prompted the movement toward West European unity.

Stalin pushed hard to develop an atomic bomb, a process greatly accelerated by So- viet espionage. Following the explosion of the Soviet Union's first nuclear device in late 1949, he adopted a less militant foreign policy, jettisoning the militant expansion- ism of the immediate postwar years in favor of one that was comparatively defensive in nature. While maintaining the tradition- ally truculent Soviet tone, he abandoned the further extension of his European em- pire. This move was accompanied by a mas- sive propaganda effort, the great Stalinist Peace Campaign. Agitation against colonialism was increasingly used to weaken the Western hold on global military bases, while Soviet foreign policy also sought to sow discord between the United States and its allies.

Early in 1950, Stalin gave his blessing to plans by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) leader Kim Il Sung to invade the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and reunify the peninsula under communist rule. Stalin evidently believed Kim's contention that the United States would either do nothing or would not react in time to save South Korea. Later, when the war went badly for Kim and North Korea, Stalin sanctioned military intervention by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The last act in the Stalinist drama was the so-called Doctors' Plot. Fed by Stalin's con- tinuing paranoia, nine doctors, six of them Jewish, were accused

of employing their medical skills to assassinate prominent indi- viduals, among them Zhdanov, Stalin's heir apparent. Many in the Soviet Union believed that this heralded a return to the purges of the 1930s. But it may only have been a maneuver to strike out against the growing ascendancy of a leadership group headed by Georgy Malen- kov and Lavrenty Beria or perhaps an effort to imbue the bureaucracy with renewed revolu- tionary zeal, much the way that Mao Zedong would do in the Cultural Revolution in China. Whatever the reasons, Stalin's death in Mos- cow on March 5, 1953, following a paralytic stroke, came as a relief to many in highly vul- nerable Soviet leadership positions. His even- tual successor, Nikita Khrushchev, began the slow process of de-Stalinization and de- nounced the many excesses of the Red Tsar.

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Strategic Air Command

The Strategic Air Command (SAC), a combat command of the U.S. Air Force, was respon- sible for long-range bombers and interconti- nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), two-thirds of the nation' s strategic nuclear triad. SAC' s main goal was to maintain a strong, credible strategic nuclear force that could swing into action within minutes, either to prevent a nu- clear strike or to inflict one on an enemy nation.

SAC was formed in 1946, a year before the U.S. Air Force became a separate military service. Originally, SAC consisted of World War II B-17 and B-29

bombers. Its first com- mander was General George Kenney. On October 19, 1948, Lieutenant General Cur- tis LeMay took command and oversaw the move of SAC headquarters from Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland to Offutt Air Force Base outside Omaha, Nebraska. He quickly established stringent standards of performance, strict evaluation procedures, and incentive and retention programs. He also changed the way that personnel viewed the command.

Spencer C. Tucker

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During LeMay' s tenure, SAC added B-50 and B-36 bombers. In its early years, the command had its own jet fighters for bomber protection and its own airlift. B-29 bombers were modified to be used as aerial tankers, with aerial refueling becoming an in- tegral part of SAC and the nuclear war plan. In 1951, SAC began taking delivery of the all-jet B-47 bomber and the KC-97 tanker. These two aircraft were the mainstays of SAC forces into the early 1960s. In 1955, SAC received its first B-52 Stratofortress eight-engine bomber. SAC entered the mis- sile age with the Snark subsonic intercontinental cruise missile and the Rascal, designed to be launched against ground targets from the B-47. The following year, the KC-135 Stratotanker, a four-engine jet air refueling aircraft, entered service.

At least one-third of all aircraft and al- most all missiles were on alert at SAC bases 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. During the 1960s, B-52 bombers armed with nuclear weapons were on airborne alert, ready to strike targets from

orbits outside the Soviet Union. The airborne alerts were terminated in late 1968.

In 1959, SAC employed 262,600 person- nel, 3,207 aircraft, and 25 missiles, including the Snark, the first Atlas ICBMs, Thor in- termediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and the Hound Dog, an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) carried by the B-52. By 1959, SAC's bomber force was an all-jet force. In 1960, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was formed with SAC's commander as director and a vice ad- miral as deputy director. The JSTPS was es- tablished to provide centralized planning for the entire U.S. nuclear triad, SAC bombers and missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear-armed tactical aircraft, and IRBMs. In the early 1960s, the Snark and Thor missiles were

deactivated to make room for the new Atlas and Titan I ICBMs. B-47s and KC-97s were phased out, and the supersonic B-58 bomber was put into service. By 1962, the new Titan II and Minuteman I ICBMs came on-line. SAC reconnaissance aircraft included the U-2 and the SR-71, which was commis- sioned in the late 1960s. At its peak strength in 1962, SAC employed more than 282,000 personnel.

During the next 30 years, SAC's mission remained unchanged. Missile forces stabi- lized with a mix of 1,000 Minuteman II and III ICBMs (with 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs re- placing 50 Minuteman IIIs in the late 1980s) and 54 Titan II ICBMs (phased out in the mid-1980s). SAC aircraft included, at vari- ous times, a mix of B-1, B-52, and FB-111 bombers armed with gravity weapons, short- range attack missiles, and ALCMs; a tanker force of KC-135s and KC-10s; and U-2 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft.

SAC B-52 bombers played a major role in the Vietnam War. The SAC airborne command post, dubbed "Looking Glass," with an airborne battle staff commanded by a general officer, was on alert with at least one EC-135 aircraft airborne at all times during 1961–1992. The number of people in the command remained near 200,000 until reductions in the bomber force caused a slow exodus. SAC had about 110,000 per- sonnel when it was deactivated on June 1, 1992.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. Air Force underwent a fun- damental reorientation in structure and doc- trine. Air force leadership acknowledged that SAC had accomplished its mission. It had maintained nuclear superiority—and peace—for 46 years. After it was deactivated, SAC's aircraft became part of new U.S. Air Force operational commands.

Charles G. Simpson



The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber first flew in 1954 and remains in active service. It is considered one of the greatest aircraft ever built. The B-52G Model shown here was photo- graphed in 1984. (Department of Defense)

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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Treaties

Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Cri- sis, the United States and the Soviet Union began to move away from the abyss of nu- clear war and toward the reduction of nu- clear armaments. The two superpowers also sought cooperation on this issue because of

the immense cost of the nuclear arms race. Continued production of nuclear weapons was becoming superfluous, as each side had more than enough capability to cripple the other even if only a small percentage of the weapons, should they be launched, actually struck their targets. The leadership of both nations was sufficiently motivated to seek an agreement on nuclear arms reduction. Add- ing to American motives were concerns that the Soviets might soon undermine U.S. supe- riority in nuclear arms and that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had acquired nu- clear weapons beginning in 1964. Although the United States first approached the Soviet Union concerning strategic arms reduction talks in 1964, efforts to begin a dialogue failed repeatedly until the end of the decade.

Arms reduction talks between the two na- tions began in November 1969 and, after two and a half years of detailed negotiations, a

two-part agreement was reached. The first major agreement to come out of the talks was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. This treaty reflected a belief on the part of both nations that they should seek to limit the de- ployment of antiballistic missile systems.

ABMs were designed to destroy enemy missiles before they could strike their tar- gets. The United States had sought an agree- ment with the Soviets since the late 1960s on ABMs, which the Soviets had begun to deploy, arguing that their continued deploy- ment would lead the United States to develop larger nuclear weapons to defeat these de- fenses. Therefore, the development and

de- ployment of ABMs would only intensify, not slash, the arms race. The Soviets finally ac- cepted this line of reasoning. The preamble to the treaty reflected this understanding: “Effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial fac- tor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons.”

The treaty had unlimited duration, with five-year reviews. The two sides created the Standing Consultative Commission to serve as the forum for discussing compliance is- sues or other problems with the treaty. The commission met in Geneva, Switzerland.

The ABM Treaty prohibited deployment of an ABM system for “the defense of the territory” or the provision of “a base for such defense.” This effectively restricted the creation of a nationwide defensive system while permitting the Soviets and Americans to maintain two ABM sites, comprising no more than one hundred interceptor missiles at each location. Each country could position one ABM site to defend its capital, and the other could shield one group of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The agreement also prohibited transferring ABM sites to other nations.

Each side would verify compliance with the treaty through the use of national tech- nical means. A 1974 Protocol to the treaty further limited each side to one ABM de- ployment site. The United States chose to place its system near the ICBM missile fields of Grand Forks, North Dakota, and the So- viet Union chose to defend Moscow.

The United States and Russia signed a se- ries of agreements on September 27, 1997, that allowed Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to succeed the Soviet Union as state parties to the treaty. These agreements also attempted to establish the demarcation between theater and national ballistic missile defense systems.

Ultimately, both sides realized that ABM systems lacked any real military value and were prohibitively expensive. The United States closed its sole ABM site in 1975. Russia’s Galosh system surrounding Mos- cow is still operational. Citing national secu- rity concerns and a need to deploy a limited

national missile defense system, the United States withdrew from the treaty on June 13, 2002.

Of greater importance was the wider- ranging arms control agreement that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limita- tion Talks (SALT). The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Lim- itation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which came to be known as SALT I, was signed in Moscow by President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev on May 26, 1972, along with the ABM treaty. The SALT I accord, which was scheduled to last for five years, required the two su- perpowers to maintain nuclear arsenals that were roughly equivalent to one another in

terms of offensive land- and sea-launching platforms. The agreement froze the number of Soviet offensive ICBMs to 1,618 land- based missiles and 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The American arsenal was restricted to 1,054 land-based missiles and 710 SLBMs. Mobile missile systems were not addressed. Though the So- viets seemed to have a numerical advantage in missile-launching capabilities, the United States continued to enjoy a substantial ad- vantage in bombers (about 450 to 260 for the Soviets) and could also rely on the nu- clear deterrents belonging to their European allies. The Americans also took advantage of their technological superiority to develop multiple independently targeted reentry ve- hicles (MIRVs). The Nixon administration refused to negotiate any limits in regard to this technological advance, and the Soviets would later take advantage of this.

In order to verify compliance with the terms of the treaty, both countries agreed to satellite photo reconnaissance of each oth- er's territory. Even so, there were flaws in the agreement. The biggest problems were that the agreement failed to sufficiently regu- late the upgrading of current missile systems. And it said nothing about the replacement of existing systems with new ones.

Each side took advantage of the loopholes in the treaty. The Soviets began to deploy a new missile system, the SS-19, that car- ried a warhead with six MIRVed warheads. This missile carried twice as many nuclear warheads as

the mainstay of the U.S. inter- continental missile arsenal, the Minuteman. Eventually, the Soviet Union would develop the ability to launch missiles carrying 10 MIRVs. On the other hand, the United States began to work on the development of the cruise missile, arguing that such a system was not covered under the SALT I agreement. Further compromising the spirit of the treaty

were the new Soviet Backfire bomber, capa- ble of reaching targets in the United States, and American plans to build the North Amer- ican/Rockwell B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine. Another flaw in the treaty was that it permitted the replacement of so-called light missiles with heavy missiles, without adequately defining the term "heavy."

SALT I was designed to be an interim agreement, and the treaty contained a pro- vision calling for continued talks aimed at creating a more detailed and comprehen- sive plan to regulate nuclear arms. Reach- ing agreement on what would become SALT II proved difficult, however. Progress was stalled by numerous factors, including Pres- ident Nixon's resignation over the Watergate scandal in August 1974, American concerns with human rights violations in the Soviet Union, and a general deterioration in U.S.– Soviet relations during the 1970s. The broad numerical outlines of the eventual SALT II agreement were laid out in a summit meet- ing between Brezhnev and President Ger- ald Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974, but this did not lead to forward progress for many years.

Arms control talks continued between the two superpowers despite these obstacles. By 1979, both sides desired a new SALT agreement. Anxious to overcome numerous foreign policy setbacks, President Jimmy Carter' s administration sought an arms deal to improve his chances for reelection in 1980. The Soviets sought an agreement chiefly for economic reasons, as the na- tion's rate of economic growth was quickly stagnating.

Concerned that the Soviets had an advan- tage in throw weight, or the size of the war- head that a missile could carry into space, Carter offered to cancel development of an experimental mobile ICBM that could carry 10 warheads (the MX missile) if the Soviets

would cut their heavy ICBM force in half. The Soviets refused to consider an offer to prevent deployment of what was still an ex- perimental system. Carter then backed away from this position, and the negotiations began to move toward an eventual agreement. As a result, Carter and Brezhnev affixed their sig- natures to the SALT II Treaty at the Vienna summit meeting on June 18, 1979.

By the terms of the treaty, both sides agreed to a limitation on the number of war- heads that would be allowed on an ICBM and the total number of allowable strategic launchers. Strategic nuclear launch vehicles were limited to 2,250 on each side, and no more than 1,320 of these missiles could be outfitted with MIRVs. Within that total, a further subcategory limited MIRVed bal- listic missiles to 1,200, of which only 820 could be ICBMs. New ICBMs were limited to carry no more than 10 warheads, and new SLBMs were limited to 14 warheads each. The treaty also prohibited space-based nu- clear weapons, fractional orbital missiles, and rapid-reload missile launchers.

A protocol to the treaty was signed at the same time and remained in effect until De- cember 31, 1981. The Soviets agreed not to utilize their Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire bomber, which had the ability to reach tar- gets throughout most of the United States, as an intercontinental weapon, while the Americans consented to delay deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles for three years. In addition, MIRVed ground- launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and sub- marine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with a range of more than 600 kilometers could not be tested.

The SALT II treaty ran into considerable opposition in the United States, as some liber- als expressed disappointment that the treaty had failed to halt the arms race, and con-

servatives complained that the Soviets had retained a significant edge in throw weight.

Soviet actions in 1979 added immeasur- ably to the problem of ratifying the treaty. Their support of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Sandinista uprising in Nica- ragua, and the Soviet invasion of Afghani- stan in December 1979 all but torpedoed any prospects that SALT II would be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Knowing that the Senate would not ratify the SALT II treaty under such circumstances, Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration on January 3, 1980. Although the treaty was never ratified by the United States, both sides none- theless honored the agreement until May 1986, when President Ronald Reagan, citing Soviet violations, declared that the United States would no longer be bound by the lim- its of the SALT agreements.

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Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Treaties

In the early 1980s the United States launched an arms buildup that was part of an overall strategy to confront the Soviet Union. Rea- gan hoped to improve the American bar- gaining position vis-à-vis the Soviets by increasing the nation's military strength. He also hoped to force the Soviets to allo- cate more of their resources to the military in order to keep up. The most notable aspect of this renewed arms race was President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initia- tive (SDI), which was an attempt to create a space-based missile shield that would render offensive nuclear weapons impotent and ob- solete. Critics viewed the SDI proposal as an expensive, unworkable, and possibly offen- sive weapons system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began installing Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in 1983 in response to the Soviets' refusal to downsize their arsenal of forward-deployed SS-20 theater-range missiles. This move caused the Soviets to walk out of arms con- trol talks that had been ongoing in Geneva since 1982. Negotiations did not resume until March 1985.

In October 1986, Reagan abruptly re- versed himself. During his first summit meeting with new Soviet leader Mikhail

Gorbachev in Reykjavík, Iceland, the Amer- ican president expressed his willingness to remove intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) weapons from Europe and to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons. The initiative failed because Reagan was unwilling to in- clude SDI in the proposal, and Gorbachev was unwilling to proceed unless SDI was part of the package.

Some two months later, the Soviets de- clared that they would negotiate according to the agenda laid out by the Americans, although initially focusing on the INF issue. The Soviets accepted the American proposal in February 1987, which called for the complete elimina- tion of medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe. At the Washington Summit in De- cember 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the INF Treaty. This treaty established a dou- ble-zero solution, calling for the removal of two classes of intermediate-range

missiles— those with a range of roughly 600–3,500 miles and those with a range of 300–600 miles. An extensive on-site verification process was established as well. By the end of 1988, the re- moval of the missiles was complete.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations that had resumed in Geneva in 1985 bore fruit in 1991 with the signing of a treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the START I treaty. Under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev, the two nations concluded the treaty on July 31, 1991, just months be- fore the collapse of the Soviet Union. The complex document served to reduce stra- tegic nuclear delivery systems to 1,600 on each side, with attributed nuclear warheads (a somewhat arbitrary but agreed-upon num- ber associated with certain delivery systems) restricted to 6,000 each.

There were additional sublimits for attrib- uted warheads: 4,900 on deployed ballistic missiles, of which no more than 1,100 could be on mobile launchers. The Soviet Union was also limited to 154 heavy ICBMs, each carrying 10 warheads. The treaty placed a limit on total nuclear throw weight, provided for verification processes, and also placed limitations on the types of vehicles that could carry nuclear warheads (including limits on the numbers of U.S. nuclear armed cruise missiles and Russian Backfire bombers).

On May 23, 1992, the Lisbon Protocol was signed, making START I a multilat- eral agreement among the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994. The three new member states re- turned their residual Soviet-era nuclear arsenals to Russia prior to the implementation of the treaty and also joined the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear weapons states.

The START I treaty had a duration of 15 years, with the option to extend it at five-year intervals. All parties officially reached their treaty limits on

December 5, 2001. The par- ties created a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission tasked with monitoring compli- ance with the treaty. The commission began meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1991.

START I was followed by the signing of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as START II, by Bush and Boris Yeltsin at the Moscow summit on January 3, 1993. START II relied heavily on START I for its definitions, procedures, and verifi- cation. The U.S. Senate ratified START II on January 26, 1996, and the Russian Duma ratified in on April 14, 2000.

This agreement called for a two-phase se- ries of reductions. Phase one called for each

side to reduce its deployed strategic forces to 3,800–4,250 attributed warheads within seven years of entry into force. There were sublimits for several categories within that total. Phase two, which was originally supposed to be completed by the year 2003, required each side to further reduce their de- ployed strategic forces to 3,000–3,500 at- tributed warheads. The following sublimits applied to phase two: 1,700–1,750 warheads on nuclear submarines, the elimination of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles, and the elimination of heavy ICBMs. America' s B-2 bomber was left out of the START I treaty process since it was not scheduled to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). In START II, however, the two parties agreed to include the B-2 as a strategic weapons de- livery vehicle with a U.S. commitment not to hang ALCMs on its wings. This meant that it was accountable under the warhead limits and inspectable under the treaty' s verifica- tion and compliance rules. The B-1 bomber was declared to have only a conventional mis- sion. ST ART II also significantly increased the level of on-site inspections necessary for implementation and compliance verification.

In March 1997, Yeltsin and President Bill Clinton met in Helsinki and agreed to ex- tend the time period for START II imple- mentation to December 31, 2007, as long as warheads were removed from the appli- cable systems by December 2003. Because of the delayed entry into force, phases one and two

were to be completed simultane- ously. The treaty parties created the Bilateral Implementation Commission, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, to monitor the com- pliance regime.

Although eventually ratified by both sides, START II lost its relevance over the years, as the United States became more concerned with obtaining a modification to the ABM

Treaty in order to deploy a ballistic missile defense system, to which the Russians re- mained opposed. START II was supplanted by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty), signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in May 2002. That agreement further reduces the number of nuclear warheads that can be deployed by each nation to 1,700–2,200 by the year 2012. Neither country any longer feels obliged to abide by the provisions of the START II treaty, but both are complying with START I.

The Start treaties were important to the history of the Cold War because unlike ear- lier arms control agreements that slowed or froze the rate of growth of strategic systems, they were the first treaties to actually reduce the number of warheads and delivery sys- tems on both sides.

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Strategic Defense Initiative

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was a space-based, antiballistic missile (ABM) system endorsed by U.S. president Ron- ald Reagan in 1983 as a way to neutralize the Soviet nuclear threat. Nicknamed "Star Wars" by its critics and the media, SDI fore- saw the use of satellites, mirrors, and lasers that would detect, track, and destroy incom- ing nuclear missiles. Reagan believed that the SDI might force the Soviets to engage in nuclear arms reduction talks and serve as a partial solution to the threat posed by the nuclear arms race.

To counter the Soviet threat in the 1950s, the United States began work on an ABM system. Various incarnations emerged dur- ing the 1960s and early 1970s, until the United States and the Soviet Union signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This treaty limited the deployment of ABM sys- tems to only two operational areas and stipu- lated that such a system could not protect the entire nation. Nevertheless, work continued in both nations to develop an effective means of nullifying an enemy nuclear attack.

Reagan had many motivations for pursu- ing the SDI. In principle, he disagreed with the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). MAD held that because of the cat- astrophic nature of thermonuclear war, any nation that initiated a nuclear exchange was guaranteed to suffer complete destruction in a counterstrike. Reagan believed that MAD was immoral and unacceptable. He was further motivated by the upcoming 1984 election and his desire not to be seen as a warmonger. Deploying a defensive system

would demonstrate his desire to end the arms race.

Among those who supported the SDI were military contractors who stood to make money developing and deploying such a system. Other supporters included Robert McFarlane, Reagan's national security ad- visor during 1983–1985, who believed that the SDI could be used as a bargaining chip to motivate the Soviets to scale back their missile production. Opponents of the SDI, including some Reagan administration offi- cials, mockingly nicknamed the plan "Star Wars" after the popular science fiction film series.

In a televised address on March 23, 1983, Reagan publicly announced his desire to pur- sue the SDI. The scientific task was difficult,

he admitted, but the rewards would be worth it: a United States whose citizens did not have to live in fear of nuclear destruction. The SDI would be costly, perhaps in the tril- lions of dollars. Reagan lobbied his friend and ally British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who initially opposed the SDI but eventually came to see it as a good idea.

Unlike previous ABM systems, the SDI would provide missile defense from space. In fact, to intercept missiles in flight, space-based weapons were the best op- tion, because land-based weapons could not overcome the problems presented by the curvature of the earth. Because So- viet long-range missiles took only 30 min- utes to reach their targets, there was just enough time to detect, track, and intercept



Artist's rendering of one of the Strategic Defense Initiative designs from Los Alamos National Laboratory. It shows a space-based particle beam weapon attacking enemy intercontinental bal- listic missiles. (U.S. Department of Energy)

the warheads before they reentered the at- mosphere. As Reagan described it and as scientists conceived it, the SDI would em- ploy a number of satellites and space-based radars to detect and track incoming missiles and land- or satellite-based lasers reflected off orbital mirrors to destroy a warhead in flight. Scientists planned lasers that would employ X-ray, infrared, ultraviolet, or mi- crowave radiation. They also conceived of particle-beam weapons in which streams of charged atomic matter would be directed at incoming warheads.

From the perspective of some, particu- larly new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the SDI was a great threat. When Reagan and Gorbachev first met in Geneva in 1985, the SDI proved the sticking point on any arms control agreements. Gorbachev fiercely ob- jected to the SDI, arguing that such a

system only made sense if the United States planned to launch a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union. Gorbachev also well under- stood that the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in computer technology, an area crucial to such an advanced weapons system. For the Soviet Union to allow the SDI to move forward would be to admit de- feat. Gorbachev therefore insisted that Rea- gan give up the SDI before agreements on limiting offensive weapons could be reached. Reagan refused, but he also told Gorbachev

that the SDI was necessary and that when it was finally completed, he would share the technology with the Soviets. Gorbachev did not believe Reagan. Reagan, in turn, could see no logical argument against the SDI. Be- cause of the SDI, the two men departed Ge- neva without a deal on arms control.

The Reagan administration ultimately failed to develop and deploy the SDI. The technology proved too daunting, and the costs were too high. Still, the mere threat of the SDI put tremendous pressure on the Soviets. Some scholars attribute the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse to Reagan's vigorous pursuit of the SDI. Others, however, regard the SDI as a costly boondoggle that only es-calated Cold War tensions and contributed to swollen defense allocations and mammoth budget deficits.

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Tiananmen Square (June 4, 1989)

A large public plaza in Beijing, capital of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Ti- ananmen Square, literally meaning "Gate of Heavenly Peace," has been the site of student movements since the 1919 May Fourth Movement. The Tiananmen Square protests of April 15–June 4, 1989 were of the utmost importance in both their domes- tic and international contexts. The protests began on April 15 when Beijing's students gathered in the square, mourning the death of Hu Yaobang, former secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during 1980–1987. That Hu was ousted from office in January 1987 because of his sympathetic stance toward the prodemocracy student movement of 1986 helped transform mourn- ing activities into a series of nationwide stu- dent demonstrations. Students renewed their calls for immediate democratization and de- manded direct dialogues with senior leaders. The movement employed mass sit-ins, boy- cotts of classes, public forums, bicycle dem- onstrations, and hunger strikes.

On May 4, 1989, organized prodemocracy demonstrations occurred in 51 Chinese cit- ies. Other sectors also expressed their dis- content with the CCP. Coincident with the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in mid-May, the protests received global media coverage.

The worldwide attention and escalation of the student movement irritated PRC leaders. The handling of students' demands renewed the factional struggles between the liberal reformers and the conservatives, whose

origins dated to 1979, when the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping introduced a market economy and open-door policy to modernize China. This time, the struggle was personal- ized by the liberal reformist CCP secretary- general Zhao Ziyang and the conservative hard-liner Premier Li Peng. Zhao preferred a conciliatory stance, arguing that the pro- test was of a patriotic nature and

that politi- cal reform should be accelerated to facilitate economic modernization. Li, by contrast, in- sisted on clear-cut coercive measures to dis- perse the demonstrators and restore stability.

Although away from the front line since the early 1980s, Deng remained highly in- fluential as the chairman of the Central Mili- tary Commission. Fearing that his economic program would be jeopardized, he supported Zhao's soft-line, accommodating posture. The government's dialogues with students, however, proved fruitless. With no sign that the protests would soon end, Deng's patience was exhausted, and he decided to adopt Li's hard-line approach.

On May 20, 1989, Li declared martial law in Beijing, ordering the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to clear Tiananmen Square on the condition that no bloodshed occur. Owing to the students' blockade, the army stopped on the outskirts of Beijing city, resulting in a stalemate for the rest of the month. Mean- while, the government was preoccupied with two issues: preparing a change in leadership to end the factional struggles and regaining Tiananmen Square to end the protests. On May 28, Zhao was placed under house ar- rest and was replaced by Jiang Zemin, the party secretary of the Shanghai Municipal



A Chinese man stands alone to block a line of tanks during a pro-democracy demonstration in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on June 5, 1989. The man, calling for an end to the recent violence and bloodshed against demonstrators, was pulled away by bystanders, and the tanks continued on their way. The Chinese government crushed a student-led demonstration for democratic reform and against government corruption, killing hundreds, or perhaps thousands of people. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Committee, whose decisive action in closing down a newspaper for reporting the Tianan- men Square protests drew the conservatives' attention.

After consulting retired elder statesmen such as Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, and PRC pres- ident Yang Shangkun, Deng finally agreed on more forceful means to end the standoff, implying the clearance of the square at all costs. On June 2, Yang ordered a military crackdown on the student demonstrators and the clearance of Tiananmen Square on the grounds that an alleged counterrevolution- ary riot was brewing and that continued in- stability would retard economic reform. On June 4 at midnight, the PLA marched into the square, and by dawn it had fulfilled its

orders, thereby ending the seven-week-long protests. Because of a press blackout, the es- timated deaths and injuries on that night vary from 240 to 10,000.

To prevent a recurrence, on June 9 the government ordered the arrest of all student leaders and activists. Some leaders, such as Wang Dan, were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms, whereas others, such as Chai Ling and Wuer Kaixi, fled abroad. On June 10, the PRC claimed that a total of 468 "troublemakers" had been arrested and that calm had been restored in Beijing.

The PRC's use of the PLA to suppress the student demonstrations stunned the world. Some contemporaries labeled the incident the Tiananmen Massacre. Foreign condemnations,

including those from the Soviet bloc, flooded in, followed by a number of punitive sanc- tions, including the suspension of arms sale to China, the linking of human rights issues to the PRC's entry into the World Trade Organiza- tion (WTO), and economic embargoes. From a broader perspective, the legacy of the Ti- ananmen Square protests was twofold. In the PRC, the protests enabled the conservatives to gain the upper hand. In November 1989, Deng relinquished his remaining post to Jiang, pass- ing the ruling power to the third generation, and his economic modernization was slowed down. In the Cold War context, there is a con- sensus that the Tiananmen Square protests in some ways inspired the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet control, precipitating the Cold War's end.

Law Yuk-fun

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Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

Born on May 7, 1892, into a peasant fam- ily in the village of Kumrovec in Croatia on the border with Slovenia (then part of Aus- tria), Josip Broz was one of 15 children of a Croat blacksmith and a Slovene mother. Much of his early life remains obscure. With little formal education, he became a metal-worker and machinist. Active in the Social- Democratic Party, he was drafted into the

Austro-Hungarian Army in 1913. He fought in World War I and rose to the rank of ser- geant, commanding a platoon in a Croatian regiment before being captured in 1915 on the Russian Front.

While in the camp, Broz became fluent in Russian. Released following the March 1917 Revolution, he made his way to Petrograd, where he joined the Bolsheviks but was im- prisoned until the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917. He fought on the communist side in the Russian Civil War but returned to Croatia in 1920 and helped organize the Yugoslav Communist Party (YPJ). Rising rapidly in responsibility and position, he be- came a member of the YPJ Politburo and Central Committee. It was at this time that he took the pseudonym of "Tito" to conceal his identity. He was imprisoned from 1929 to 1934. In 1937 Stalin appointed Tito to head the YPJ as its secretary-general. Tito knew little of communist ideology, but Stalin was interested in loyalty.

Following the German invasion of Yu- goslavia in April 1941, Tito took command of the communist partisan resistance move- ment with the twin goals of fighting the Axis occupiers and then seizing power in Yugo- slavia once the Allies had won. Tito and the partisans did not hesitate to attack German garrisons, sparking retaliation and the execu- tion of many more innocent hostages than Germans. Tito's partisans became archrivals of the Serb-dominated C̆etniks (Chetniks) led by General Draža Mihajlovic´, minister of war in the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London. The C̆etniks eschewed the types of attacks undertaken by the partisans, rightly fearing

German reprisals. In a controversial decision that had far-reaching repercussions for the future of Yugoslavia, in 1943 the British government, which headed the Al- lied effort to assist the Yugoslav resistance, shifted all support to the partisans.

By the end of the war, the partisans had grown to a force of 800,000 people and had in fact liberated most of Yugoslavia them- selves, placing Tito in a strong bargaining position with Stalin. Tito attempted to annex the southern provinces of Austria, moving Yugoslav forces into Carinthia, but was pre- vented in this design by the timely arrival of the British V Corps and was convinced to quit Austrian territory in mid-May 1945.

Tito extracted vengeance on the Croats, many of whom had been loyal to the Axis, as had many Slovenes. Perhaps 100,000 people who had sided with the Axis occupiers were executed by the partisans without trial within weeks of the war's end. The majority of Ger- man prisoners taken in the war also perished in the long March of Hate across Yugoslavia.

With the support of the Red Army, Tito formed the National Front and consolidated his power. Although superficially there ap- peared to be a coalition government in Yu- goslavia, Tito dominated. In the November 1945 elections for a constituent assembly, the National Front headed by the Partisans won 96 percent of the vote. The assembly promptly deposed Peter II and proclaimed a republic. Yugoslavia's new constitution was modeled on that of the Soviet Union. Tito elaborated the twin ideas of national self-determination for Yugoslavia's nationalities and a strong, centralized communist party organization that would be the sole politi- cal expression of each national group's will. Under Tito, Yugoslavia became a federal re- public, a beneficial change for a country that had suffered severely from rivalries among its various peoples. Tito also nationalized the economy and built it on the Soviet model.

Following the war, Tito had General Mihajlovi and some other leading etniks put on trial under trumped-up charges of col- laboration with the Germans. Despite vigor- ous Western protests, they were executed in

July 1946. Equally destructive of European goodwill was the sentencing of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac to life imprisonment for his anticommunist role during the war.

For 35 years, Tito held Yugoslavia to- gether by ruling as a despot. In a departure from his past record of sharing hardships with his men, once in power he developed a taste for a luxurious lifestyle. He muzzled dissent, but repression and fear of outside powers, chiefly the Soviet Union, solidified his rule.

In 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the international communist movement. The break sprang in large part from Tito's de- sire to form under his leadership a Balkan confederation of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. There were also differences with Moscow over Yugoslav support for the com- munist side in the Greek Civil War, as Mos- cow lived up to its bargain with Winston Churchill during the war not to contest Brit- ish control in Greece.

The break with Moscow and fears of a Russian invasion led Tito to build up a large military establishment. In this he was assisted by the West, chiefly the United States. By the time of Tito's death in 1980, the Yugoslav standing army and reserves totaled two mil- lion men. To protect his freedom of move- ment, Tito also joined Yugoslavia to the Non-Aligned Movement, and in the 1960s he became a leader of this group along with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawahar- lal Nehru of India.

Before the break, Tito was as doctrinaire as Stalin. After the schism, Tito became more flexible. He allowed peasants to with- draw from cooperative farms and halted the compulsory delivery of crops. He decen- tralized industry by permitting the estab- lishment of workers' councils with a say in running the factories. He permitted citizens more rights in the courts and limited freedom

of speech, and he opened cultural ties with the West and released Archbishop Stepinac (although he was not restored to authority). In 1949 Tito even wrote

an article in the in- fluential American journal *Foreign Affairs* titled "Different Paths to Socialism," giving birth to polycentralism.

By 1954, however, reform had ended. Tito reacted sharply to Milován Djilas's proposal to establish a more liberal socialist movement in the country that would in effect turn Yugoslavia into a two-party state. Dji- las's book, *The New Class* (1957), charged that a new class of bureaucrats exploited the masses as much as or more than their pre- decessors. Djilas was condemned to prison. Meanwhile, financial problems multiplied. By the end of the 1970s, inflation was surg- ing, Yugoslavia's foreign debt was up dra- matically, its goods could not compete in the world marketplace, and there were dramatic economic differences between the pros- perous North and impoverished South that threatened to break up the state.

As long as Tito lived, Yugoslavia held to- gether. In 1974, Tito had set up a compli- cated collective leadership. The constitution of that year provided for an association of equals that helped to minimize the power of Serbia, diminish Yugoslavia's ethnic and religious hatreds and rivalries, and keep the lid on nationalism. There was a multiethnic, eight-man State Presidency representing the six republics and two autonomous regions. Each of the six republics had virtual veto power over federal decision making. Djilas claimed that Tito deliberately set things up so that after his death, no one would ever possess as much power as he did.

Tito died in Lubljana on May 4, 1980. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the end of the threat of Soviet invasion, and with the discrediting of communism, the federal system that Tito

had put together came apart in bloodshed and war.

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Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947)

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman addressed a joint session of Con- gress and stated: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by out- side pressures." He was of course refer- ring to communist "pressures" and thereby committed the United States to uphold the containment policy, which pledged that all necessary measures would be taken to check the spread of communism and Soviet influence.

The catalyst for the Truman Doctrine had been Britain's February 1947 announce- ment that it could no longer afford to pro- vide military or financial support to Greece and Turkey. This meant that these nations might fall to communism, especially Greece, whose pro-Western government was fight- ing a communist guerrilla insurgency in the northern part of the country.

Further Reading

The eastern basin of the Mediterranean, including the Middle East, had historically been under British influence since the 19th century. The area was still important to Brit- ain after World War II, but it took on great importance in light of the developing Cold War. Soviet presence in the region would jeopardize the ability of the Western powers to launch strategic air strikes on the Soviet Union from bases in the area. The defense of the region had been a British preserve and rested on British military bases, the largest of which was in Egypt. British power was declining, however, while at the same time Soviet activity in the region seemed on the increase.

For planners in Washington, there seemed to be a power vacuum in the region. Britain was providing military aid to Turkey, but the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thought that because of its strategic importance and in order to increase its ability to meet Soviet ag- gression, the United States should increase its economic and military aid to Turkey. As long as the British furnished military assis- tance, however, the Truman administration would provide only economic aid.

American attitudes toward the situation in Turkey were linked to the situation in Greece. Like Turkey, Greece was considered a bar- rier between the Soviet Union and the Med- iterranean. The struggle in Greece was not one inspired by the Soviet Union but rather resulted from conflict between rightists seek- ing to restore the monarchy, who were also failing to tackle the grave economic situa- tion, and left-wing parties seeking to install a communist regime. Washington, however, chose to view the Greek Civil War through the lens of the Cold War. A loss in Greece to the communists would not only result in a vic- tory for the Soviets but, it was argued, would also open the entire region to communist

subversion. Thus, the Americans could not tolerate the establishment of a communist re- gime in Athens whether or not it was inspired by Moscow. Despite the shortcomings of the anticommunist Greek government, the Tru- man administration now moved to provide assistance to it. The decisive turning point came with London's announcement in Feb- ruary 1947 that Britain would be unable to continue its support to Greece and Turkey. It was obvious to U.S. State Department of- ficials that the United States had to fill the breach. While preparing the draft legisla- tion for the 1947 Greco-Turkish aid pack- age, however, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson found it difficult to justify the assis- tance request for Turkey, as it was not under a direct threat from either the Kremlin or an indigenous communist insurgency. Acheson also knew that Congress was in no mood to approve a large foreign aid request without proper justification, as it was engaged in ef- forts to curtail spending and pay down the national debt accrued during World War II. Also, Moscow was issuing conciliatory messages, further reducing the incentive in Congress to take strong measures against the Soviet Union.

Truman and his advisors, determined to provide military and economic assistance to both Greece and Turkey, had to find a way to sell this foreign aid package to Congress. Just prior to Truman's speech, Acheson de- scribed to the congressional leadership in stark terms the implications of Soviet domi- nation over the eastern Mediterranean and the worldwide geopolitical consequences of such a scenario. In response, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a formerly steadfast isolationist, informed Truman that if he were to present his request to Con- gress in the manner that had been used by Acheson, he and the majority of Congress

would support the aid deal. As a result, Tru- man's request for a $400 million aid pack- age earmarked for Turkey and Greece was presented in the Cold War terms of a strug- gle "between alternate ways of life," mark- ing the emergence of the Truman Doctrine, which came to represent a concerted long- term effort to resist communist aggression around the world. V andenberg kept his promise. The Greco-Turkish aid package was speedily approved.

David Tal

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U-2 Incident (May 1960)

Because the closed nature of Soviet so- ciety made it difficult to determine that nation' s military capabilities, in 1954 Pres- ident Dwight Eisenhower secretly ordered the fabrication of a small number of special reconnaissance aircraft, built by Lockheed and dubbed the U-2, to secretly overfly the Soviet Union. The U-2 was an engineering marvel, essentially a glider outfitted with a jet engine and capable of flying at 70,000 feet and more than 4,000 miles without refueling.

Eisenhower feared that revelation of the flights could be considered a hostile action, but he believed that the need to obtain in- telligence outweighed the potential risks of the U-2 program. On July 4, 1956, civilians under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began piloting U-2 aircraft on 24 missions over the Soviet Union, taking photographs and gathering other electronic data. The U-2 overflights showed that the Soviets had been exaggerating their bomber and missile capabilities.

Although initial studies suggested that the Soviet Union's defenses would be incapable of reliably tracking or attacking the U-2s at their normal flying altitude, the planes were nevertheless monitored closely and were fre- quently targeted by Soviet interceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Soviets lodged objections with the United States after the early flights but did not complain publicly, probably because of their reluc- tance to acknowledge their inability to de- stroy the planes.

In February and March 1960, having au- thorized only four overflights since 1958, Eisenhower approved two missions for the coming weeks. Although he was worried about harming East–West rapport on the eve of a summit among American, Soviet, Brit- ish, and French leaders scheduled to begin on May 16 in Paris, he was convinced of the need to gather details about recent Soviet

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) developments before the meeting. Midway through the second of these flights, the U-2 jet piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down by Soviet air defenses, and he para- chuted into Soviet hands. The Soviets also collected—largely intact—the camera and other remnants of the plane.

To Khrushchev, this overflight was a par- ticular affront because it occurred on a com- munist holiday (May Day) and because he saw it as an intentional presummit provo- cation. Correctly assuming that the United States did not know that the Soviets had captured Powers and secured incriminating aircraft components, Khrushchev set out to embarrass the Eisenhower administration. After the United States announced that the downed plane was a weather research air- craft, the Soviet leader publicly revealed the damning evidence to the contrary and announced his intent to try Powers for es- pionage. The eventual confirmation of the Americans' activities and their attempts to cover them up created an international sensa- tion and torpedoed the Paris summit.

Eisenhower tried to explain the overflights as regrettable infringements upon Soviet sovereignty that were nonetheless necessary

to understand Soviet military capacity. Some of Eisenhower's advisors thought that the CIA had been ill-prepared for the possibil- ity of a downed plane and failed to advise the president of the likelihood of an inter- ception, especially given persistent Soviet efforts to achieve such a feat. Some aides proposed that Eisenhower avoid responsibil- ity by claiming that the overflights occurred without his authorization, a suggestion the president rejected because it would improp- erly place blame on subordinates and would incorrectly suggest that underlings had the latitude to authorize such significant activ- ity. Some officials, not privy to the details of what to do if captured, blamed Powers for allowing himself to be taken prisoner and too readily admitting to his activities.

While it is more difficult to assess So- viet reactions, many U.S. analysts believe that Khrushchev shared Eisenhower's quest for relaxed relations but faced resistance from hard-liners in the Kremlin. This forced Khrushchev to balance anger with interest in a rapprochement, although he did lash out against Pakistan and Norway, nations that he knew had facilitated some U-2 missions. When he arrived in Paris putatively for a preliminary meeting, Khrushchev made it clear that he would not assent to the formal convening of the summit without a public apology from Eisenhower. Although Eisen- hower hoped that the summit would continue as planned and thus allow his presidential term to conclude on a high note by building on the improved relations that had resulted from Khrushchev's celebrated 1959 visit to the United States, he refused to apologize, although he renounced any further aircraft overflights. This stance was unacceptable to Khrushchev, who therefore refused to par- ticipate in the summit and canceled arrange- ments for Eisenhower's state visit to the Soviet Union.

Although global reaction varied as to which party was responsible for the meet- ing's failure (some believed that Khrushchev exaggerated his position for propaganda pur- poses), Eisenhower considered it a great loss. After an August 1960 show trial, Powers was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. In Feb- ruary 1962, however, he was traded for Col- onel Rudolf Abel, a Soviet spy being held in U.S. custody. Subsequent investigations determined that Powers had acted properly during his mission and time in captivity. By the late summer of 1960, U.S. photographic intelligence of the Soviet Union began to rely on secret orbiting satellites that passed over Soviet territory. Because they traveled through space, international law did not con- sider them violations of sovereign airspace.

Christopher John Bright

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United Nations

The United Nations (UN) was conceived as a multinational organization designed to pro- mote four primary objectives: collective se- curity, international economic and cultural cooperation, multilateral humanitarian assis- tance, and human rights. The UN's creation in 1945 represented an attempt by the World War II Allies to establish an international organization more effective than the inter- war League of Nations, which had failed to

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mitigate the worldwide economic depres- sion of the 1930s or prevent a second world war. UN architects were heavily influenced by the belief that during the 1930s, national- ist policies, economic and political rivalries, and the absence of international collabora- tion to help resolve outstanding disputes had contributed substantially to the outbreak of World War II.

Even before the United States officially joined the war effort, in the early months of World War II, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull established a departmental planning group for the purpose of creating the UN. At a meeting off the Newfoundland coast in Au- gust 1941, American president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Win- ston Churchill included a broad proposal for an international security system in the At- lantic Charter, which was their declaration of overall war objectives.

On January 1, 1942, the governments of 26 nations fighting Germany, Italy, and Japan issued the Declaration by the United Nations affirming their alliance against the Axis powers and also stating their commit- ment to liberal war objectives, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and the restoration of the principles of international law. In 1943, both houses of the U.S. Congress also passed res- olutions demanding the creation of a postwar international security organization in which, they implied, their own country should take the leading role that it had abdicated in the League of Nations. Meeting in Moscow in October 1943, foreign ministers of the four leading Allied powers —the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China— signed the

Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, committing their nations in general terms to the creation of a postwar international organization.

More specific proposals came out of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in

Washington, D.C., from August to Octo- ber 1944 in which 39 nations participated. These recommendations represented a com- promise between the ideas of Roosevelt and other devotees of realpolitik—that agree- ment between the Big Four Allied powers, "the four policemen," must be the founda- tion of postwar international security—and more idealistic popular visions of a world in which all powers, great and small, enjoyed equal status and protection. The Dumbar- ton Oaks Conference agreed to create a bi- partite UN modeled on the earlier League of Nations but reserving ultimate authority to the dominant Allied states. Any peace- loving state that was prepared to accept the terms of the UN Charter would be eligible to apply for membership. All member states would be represented in the UN General As- sembly, which would debate, discuss, and vote on issues that came before it. Execu- tive authority rested with the 11-member UN Security Council, which would have 5 permanent members: Britain, France, the United States, Russia, and China. The re- maining Security Council representatives were drawn from other UN states, all of which would serve two-year terms in ro- tation. Besides providing an international security mechanism, the UN was also ex- pected to promote international cooperation on economic, social, cultural, and humani- tarian issues.

At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the Allies—at Soviet insistence—agreed that each permanent Security Council mem- ber should enjoy veto power over all Gen- eral Assembly decisions. The Soviet Union also obtained separate representation for Be- lorussia (Belarus) and Ukraine. The Yalta Conference further agreed on a UN trustee system to administer both former League of Nations mandatory territories—originally colonies taken from Germany and Turkey



Still keeping the UN General Assembly in New York in an uproar with his angry speeches, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev swings his clenched first as he pounds away at his topic, "American Imperialism," October 12, 1960. The October 12 session was adjourned abruptly in a scene of disorder after Khrushchev, among other things called the Philippines delegate a "jerk." (AP/Wide World Photos)

after World War I—and areas seized from the Axis powers when the current war ended. The Y alta Conference formally invited all Allied and most neutral powers to attend a conference that would open in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to establish the UN. Rep- resentatives of 51 nations attended this gath- ering, which ended on July 25, 1945, and hammered out the details of the UN Charter, which accorded smaller states slightly more authority than had the original Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The charter incorporated the International Labor Organization (ILO), established under the original 1919 League of Nations Covenant. To pursue its stated nonsecurity objectives, the charter also cre- ated the United Nations Economic, Social

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to- gether with an 18-member Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court

of Justice, and the UN Secretariat, which administered the orga- nization. By the end of 1945, all 51 states represented at San Francisco had ratified the UN Charter. In 1946 the body held its first session in London and in 1947 it moved permanently to the United States, where its headquarters was completed soon afterward in New York City.

So vast were the mandate and responsibil- ities of the UN that much regarding its future role remained open when it was founded in 1945. As is not uncommon with bureaucra- cies, additional agencies proliferated, and its

structure gradually became more complex. As former colonies won independence and large states were sometimes partitioned into smaller units, by the end of the 20th century the membership had expanded from the orig- inal 51 member states to close to 200. As the number of members soared, the Security Council grew from 11 to 15 members, and the Economic and Social Council rose first to 27 members and eventually to 54. By the mid-1990s, the UN system embraced 15 spe- cialized institutions, among them the ILO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group, UNESCO, and the World Health Organization (WHO); two semiau- tonomous affiliates, including the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA); 15 specific organizations established by and responsible to the General Assembly; 6 functional commissions; 5 regional com- missions; and 75 special committees. By the mid-1990s, more than 29,000 international civil servants worked for the UN in its New York headquarters and its subsidiary offices in Geneva and Vienna.

The UN soon became an arena for Cold War contests and disputes in which the major powers tested their strength, while Third World nations came to see the UN as a forum where, given their growing numbers, the concerns of less- developed countries could be voiced and made effective, especially in the General Assembly, which was empow- ered to discuss all international questions of interest to members. In the Cold War con- text, the UN became a venue in which the Western and communist camps contended for power. Despite its stated security role, the organization proved remarkably unsuccess- ful in defusing the growing tensions. Dur- ing the second half of the 1940s, the Western powers of Britain, France, and the United States were soon fiercely at odds with their former World War II ally the Soviet Union.

With UN endorsement, in 1948 the Re- public of Korea (ROK, South Korea) es- tablished a pro-Western and noncommunist government, while the communist Demo- cratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) failed to win UN recognition. A much greater test of strength came after the communist takeover of Mainland China in October 1949, when the United States ve- toed Soviet-backed efforts to transfer UN representation for China from the rejected Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) govern- ment—which still controlled the island of Taiwan—to Mao Zedong's new People's Republic of China (PRC). In protest against the veto, the Soviet delegation withdrew from the UN, a boycott that was maintained for several months. Only in 1970 did the PRC win UN membership and China's Se- curity Council seat.

When the UN was founded, it was antici- pated that peacekeeping and the restoration of international security and order, if nec- essary by military means, would be among its major functions. Under Article 43 of the UN's charter, member states were originally expected to agree to make specified mili- tary forces available to the UN for deploy- ment under the organization's control, for use on occasions when military intervention was required to maintain or reestablish in- ternational peace and security. In practice, no nation signed any such agreement relin- quishing control of any military forces to UN authority.

The Soviet boycott permitted the United States in June 1950 to win UN endorse- ment for military intervention in Korea after North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Soviet attempts later that year to veto the continuation of UN intervention in Korea were blocked when the United States persuaded the General Assembly, where it possessed a majority, to pass the

Uniting for Peace Resolution, allowing the assembly to recommend measures to mem- ber states to implement the restoration of international peace and security. The Ko- rean War was the only occasion until the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War on which the UN itself intervened militarily to restore the status quo. In practice, the United States provided the bulk of troops

involved, al- though other North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation (NA TO) allies, most notably Britain and Canada, provided substantial forces, as did Australia and New Zealand. The fact that the stalemated Korean War lasted for approximately three years, despite all UN efforts at mediation, illustrated the limita- tions of the peacekeeping functions of the organization.

Between 1945 and 1988 the UN did, how- ever, undertake 11 limited peacekeeping op- erations, deploying an Emergency Force of troops—usually from states such as Canada, Colombia, Sweden, Norway, and Pakistan that were not permanent members of the Se- curity Council—at the request and on the territory of at least one nation involved in a conflict or crisis in efforts to maintain peace. The first such occasion was the Suez Crisis of October 1956, when British, French, and Israeli forces attacked Egypt. The UN re- sponded to a request from Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser by sending a contingent of 6,000 lightly armed personnel to oversee truce arrangements and the withdrawal of the invading forces. Although such arrange- ments were supposedly neutral, in practice the UN normally acted on the request of one party or the other in a dispute, and its forces often came to be identified with that side. When UN forces were dispatched to the Congo for several years in the early 1960s, they were soon perceived as working closely with Lieutenant General (and future presi- dent) Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko and against Prime Minister Moise Tshombe, a situation

that soon led to increased casualties among UN forces.

Apart from such peacekeeping efforts, the UN responded to most international crises, such as the successive Arab-Israeli wars, with calls for cease-fires and truces and of- fers of mediation. Often, the UN embargoed the shipment of military equipment to states at war, although the effectiveness of such sanctions varied according to the willing- ness of member states to enforce them. After the failure to implement the Geneva Ac- cords of 1954, which mandated the unifica- tion of Vietnam after nationwide elections, the UN refused to admit either the northern or southern Vietnamese states as members. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, suc- cessive UN secretary-generals nonetheless made repeated though unavailing efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in Vietnam. The UN verbally condemned the Soviet in- vasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslo- vakia in 1968 and the imposition

of martial rule in Poland in 1981. The UN generally encouraged all international efforts toward arms control and provided the arena for the negotiation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1992 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil- ing, and Use of Chemical Weapons.

The UN General Assembly was the arena for some of the most significant pronounce- ments and dramatic confrontations of the Cold War. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" address before the assembly, calling for in- ternational cooperation to develop peaceful uses for nuclear energy. More tense occa- sions included those when the flamboyant Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev openly defied the Western powers, and U.S. rep- resentative Adlai Stevenson's challenge to his Soviet counterpart in October 1962 to

confirm the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, UN secretary-general U Thant offered to mediate a settlement, an offer that President John F. Kennedy might have accepted had his own efforts proved unsuccessful. More embar- rassingly for the United States, during the American-backed Bay of Pigs invasion at- tempt against Cuba in April 1961, Stevenson initially denied that his country was involved, a statement that he was later forced to retract. The rapid increase in UN member-states dur- ing the 1950s and 1960s, largely the result of decolonization, brought growing numbers of African and Asian representatives to the General Assembly. In 1964, African, Asian, and Latin American nations formed the Group of Seventy-Seven, whose numbers eventually grew to 120 states from Third World or developing nations and who fre- quently voted as a bloc and constituted more than a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Cuba, the bête noire of succes- sive American presidents, took a prominent role in this grouping. The group's concerns focused primarily on economic issues (in- cluding the global distribution of wealth, resources, and power), the Arab–Israeli con- flict, and South Africa rather than the Cold War per se. These concerns nonetheless fre- quently put them at odds with the United States, whereas the Soviet Union endorsed most Group of Seventy-Seven positions. It was largely at the group's instigation, for ex- ample, that the UN

in 1970 expelled the Re- public of China (ROC, Taiwan), admitting the PRC in its place, and sought to impose in- ternational economic sanctions on countries such as Israel, Rhodesia (subsequently Zim- babwe), and South Africa that defied UN resolutions. Western moral authority within the UN was also affected by the revelation in the late 1970s that as a young man during World War II, the Austrian-born UN secre- tary-general Kurt Waldheim had belonged

not just to the Nazi party but also to a military unit that had committed atrocities in Yugo- slavia. No secretary-general since Waldheim has been of European origin.

From the late 1960s onward the United States, faced with declining influence in the UN and from the mid-1960s finding itself on the winning side less than 50 percent of the time in General Assembly votes, became decidedly less enthusiastic toward the orga- nization. In the mid-1970s, U.S. represen- tative to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan chose to adopt more confrontational tactics, aggressively putting forward his country' s position and its commitment to the values of liberty and democracy. For the rest of the 1970s his successor, Andrew Y oung, nominated by President Jimmy Carter, was more conciliatory, but under President Ron- ald Reagan UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpat- rick once again adopted a confrontational stance, fiercely defending American values and the U.S. commitment to authoritarian but noncommunist regimes and assailing the communist position around the world. In Nicaragua, the United States not only supported the Contras who sought to un- dermine the left-wing Sandinista govern- ment but also defied the International Court of Justice by mining the harbor of Mana- gua, the capital. In 1985, distaste for the organization' s policies, outlook, and man- agement led the United States to withdraw from UNESCO, an action that the United Kingdom and Singapore soon emulated. Even more significantly, citing financial mismanagement and inefficiency, in 1985 the United States, which normally contrib- uted at least 25 percent of the UN's budget, declined to pay a substantial portion of its assessed contribution, a decision reversed only in the mid-1990s.

The announcement in 1988 by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev that his coun- try intended to renounce the "use or threat

of force" as an "instrument of foreign pol- icy" and to make dramatic cuts in its military forces in Eastern Europe marked the begin- ning of a new era for the UN. Initially skep- tical, U.S. leaders gradually came to credit Gorbachev's good faith. The Soviet Union and the United States were no longer at odds in the Security Council, and the Group of Seventy-Seven could no more rely automat- ically on Soviet, or subsequently Russian, support. Between 1988 and 1994, the Secu- rity Council undertook 20 peacekeeping op- erations, while the UN helped to bring about a settlement of the Iran–Iraq War and to fa- cilitate Soviet withdrawal from its lengthy and fruitless intervention in Afghanistan. The UN also encouraged negotiation by the Soviet Union and the United States of wide- ranging arms control agreements that, by the mid-1990s, had massively reduced the num- bers of nuclear weapons each side deployed on its own soil and elsewhere.

Although less controversial and publi- cized than its efforts to maintain peace and resolve international conflicts, at all times many of the UN's energies were devoted to economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian efforts, including the eradication and pre- vention of disease, environmental and cli- matic issues, human rights, women's and children's rights, immigration, education, the care of refugees, and measures to combat such transnational problems as international dealings in human beings and the narcotics trade. The UN was perhaps most successful in promoting joint international action on humanitarian, economic, social, and envi- ronmental issues that transcended national boundaries and demanded concerted inter- national action, such as food and hunger, health, trade policies, social justice, women's rights, pollution, and other ecological con- cerns. The ending of the Cold War facilitated UN endeavors to promote such objectives by

removing some of the East–West barriers to their successful implementation.

Although sometimes derided as inef- fective and handicapped in international crises by its reliance on military forces contributed by member states, the UN often provided a valuable forum for the quiet exchange of views and the promo- tion of humanitarian and social goals. On occasion, it also

conveniently furnished a useful alternative channel of communi- cations among powers whose diplomatic relations were otherwise limited or even nonexistent. Though never as effective in terms of resolving international conflicts as its founders envisaged, the UN proved considerably more successful than its pre- decessor, the League of Nations, in at- tracting and retaining as members most of the world's major as well as minor states, whose continuing membership implicitly bestowed authority and legitimacy upon the organization' s statements and actions. Although often hampered by Cold War an- tagonisms, during the 45 years from 1945 to 1990 the UN played a significant role in moderating Cold W ar tensions and defus- ing at least some international crises, pro- viding an arena in which disputes could be nonviolently resolved.

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V

Vietnam War (1957–1975)

The Vietnam War grew out of the Indochina War (1946–1954). The 1954 Geneva Con- ference, ending the Indochina War between France and the nationalist-communist Viet Minh, provided for the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Agreements reached at Geneva temporally divided Viet- nam at the 17th Parallel, pending national elections in 1956. In the meantime, Viet Minh military forces were to withdraw north of that line and the French forces south of it. The war left two competing entities, the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) and the southern French-dominated State of Vietnam (SV), each claiming to be the legitimate govern- ment of a united Vietnam.

In June 1954, SV titular head Emperor Bao Dai appointed as premier the Roman Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem, whom Bao Dai believed had Washington's backing. Diem's base of support was narrow but had recently been strengthened by the addition of some 800,000 northern Catholics who relocated to southern Vietnam. In a subsequent power struggle between Bao Dai and Diem, in Oc- tober 1955 Diem established the Republic of Vietnam

(RVN, South Vietnam), with him- self as president. The United States then ex- tended aid to Diem, most of which went to the South Vietnamese military budget. Only minor sums went to education and social wel- fare programs. Thus, the aid seldom touched the lives of the preponderantly rural popu- lace. As Diem consolidated his power, U.S. military advisors also reorganized the South

Vietnamese armed forces. Known as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, South Vietnamese Army) and equipped with American weaponry, it was designed to fight a conventional invasion from North Vietnam rather than deal with insurgency warfare.

Fearing a loss, Diem refused to hold the scheduled 1956 elections. This jolted vet- eran communist North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh. Ho had not been displeased with Diem's crushing of his internal opposi- tion but was now ready to reunite the country under his sway and believed that he would win the elections. North Vietnam was more populous than South Vietnam, and the com- munists were well organized there. Fortified by the containment policy, the domino the- ory, and the belief that the communists, if they came to power, would never permit a democratic regime, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration backed Di- em's defiance of the Geneva Agreements.

Diem's decision led to a renewal of fight- ing, which became the Vietnam War. Fight- ing resumed in 1957 when Diem moved against the 6,000–7,000 Viet Minh political cadres who had been allowed to remain in South Vietnam to prepare for the 1956 elec- tions. The Viet Minh began the insurgency on their own initiative but were subsequently supported by the North Vietnamese govern- ment. The South Vietnamese communist insurgents came to be known as the Viet Cong (VC). In December 1960 they estab- lished the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam. Supposedly independent, the NLF was controlled by Hanoi. The NLF program called for the overthrow of the

Cold War in Far East, 1945 – 1990

After a firefight, two soldiers of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade wait for a helicopter to evacuate them and one of their fallen. (National Archives)

Saigon government, its replacement by a "broad national democratic coalition," and the "peaceful" reunification of Vietnam.

In September 1959, North Vietnamese de- fense minister Vo Nguyen Giap established Transportation Group 559 to send supplies and men south along what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, much of which ran through supposedly neutral Laos. The first wave of infiltrators were native southerners and Viet Minh who had relocated to North Vietnam in 1954. Viet Cong sway expanded, spreading out from safe bases to one village after another. The insurgency was fed by the weaknesses of the central government, by the use of terror and assassination, and by Saigon's appalling ignorance of the move- ment. By the end of 1958, the insurgency had reached the status of conventional warfare in several provinces. In 1960, the commu- nists carried out even more assassinations, and guerrilla units attacked ARVN regulars, overran district and provincial capitals, and ambushed convoys and reaction forces.

By mid-1961, the Saigon government had lost control over much of rural South Viet- nam. Infiltration was as yet not significant, and most of the insurgents' weapons were either captured from ARVN forces or left over from the war with France. Diem re- jected American calls for meaningful reform until the establishment of full security. He did not understand that the war was primar- ily a political problem and could be solved only through political means.

Diem, who practiced the divide and rule concept of leadership, increasingly delegated authority to his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his secret police. Isolated from his people and relying only on trusted family members and a few other advisors, Diem resisted U.S. demands that he promote his senior officials and officers on the basis of ability and pursue the war aggressively.

By now, U.S. president John F. Kennedy's administration was forced to reevaluate its position toward the war, but increased U.S. involvement was inevitable, given W ashing- ton' s commitment to resisting communist expansion and the belief that all of South- east Asia would become

communist if South Vietnam fell. Domestic political consider- ations also influenced the decision.

In May 1961, Kennedy sent several fact- finding missions to Vietnam. These led to the Strategic Hamlet program as part of a gen- eral strategy emphasizing local militia de- fense and to the commitment of additional U.S. manpower. By the end of 1961, U.S. strength in Vietnam had grown to around 3,200 men, most in helicopter units or serv- ing as advisors. In February 1962, the United States also established a military headquar- ters in Saigon, when the Military Assis- tance and Advisory Group (MAAG) was replaced by the Military Assistance Com- mand, Vietnam (MACV), to direct the en- larged American commitment. The infusion of U.S. helicopters and additional support for the ARVN probably prevented a VC military victory in 1962. The VC soon learned to cope with the helicopters, however, and again the tide of battle turned.

Meanwhile, Nhu' s crackdown on the Buddhists led to increased opposition to Di- em's rule. South Vietnamese generals now planned a coup, and after Diem rejected re- forms, the United States gave the plotters tacit support. On November 1, 1963, the generals overthrew Diem, murdering him and Nhu. Within three weeks Kennedy was also dead, succeeded by Lyndon B. Johnson.

The United States seemed unable to win the war either with or without Diem. A mili- tary junta now took power, but none of those who followed Diem had his prestige. Coups and countercoups occurred, and much of South Vietnam remained in turmoil. Not

until General Nguyen Van Thieu became president in 1967 was there a degree of po- litical stability.

Both sides steadily increased the stakes, apparently without foreseeing that the other might do the same. In 1964 Hanoi made three decisions. The first was to send to South Vietnam units of its regular army, the People's Army of

Vietnam (PAVN), known to the Americans as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The second was to rearm its forces in South Vietnam with modern com- munist-bloc weapons, giving them a fire- power advantage over the ARVN, which was still equipped largely with World War II–era U.S. infantry weapons. And the third was to order direct attacks on American in- stallations, provoking a U.S. response.

On August 2, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred when North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack on the *Maddox* and another U.S. destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, reported two days later, probably never oc- curred, but Washington believed that it had, and this led the Johnson administration to order retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases and fuel depots. It also led to a near-unanimous vote in Con- gress for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution au- thorizing the president to use whatever force he deemed necessary to protect U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.

Johnson would not break off U.S. involve- ment in Vietnam, evidently fearing possible impeachment if he did so. At the same time, he refused to make the tough decision of fully mobilizing the country and committing the resources necessary to win, concerned that this would destroy his cherished Great Society social programs. He also feared a widened war, possibly involving the Peo- ple's Republic of China (PRC).

By 1965, Ho and his generals expected to win the war. Taking their cue from John- son's own pronouncements to the American people, they mistakenly believed that Wash- ington would not commit ground troops to the fight. Yet Johnson did just that. Faced with Hanoi's escalation, in March 1965 U.S. Marines arrived to protect the large Ameri- can air base at Da Nang. A direct attack on U.S. advisors at Pleiku in February 1965 also led to a U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam.

Ultimately more than 2.5 million Ameri- cans served in Vietnam, and nearly 58,000 of them died there. At its height, Washington was spending $30 billion per year on the war. Although the conflict was the best-covered war in

American history (it became known as the first television war), it was conversely the least understood by the American people.

Johnson hoped to win the war on the cheap, relying heavily on airpower. The air cam- paign, known as Operation Rolling Thunder, would be pursued in varying degrees of in- tensity over the next three and a half years. It was paralleled by Operation Barrel Roll, the secret bombing of Laos (which became the most heavily bombed country in the history of warfare). The goals of the air war were to force Hanoi to negotiate peace and to halt infiltration into South Vietnam. During the war, the United States dropped more bombs than in all of World War II, but the campaign failed in both its objectives.

In the air war, Johnson decided on gradu- ated response rather than the massive strikes advocated by the military. Gradualism be- came the grand strategy employed by the United States in Vietnam. Haunted by the Korean War, at no time would Johnson con- sider an invasion of North Vietnam, fearful of provoking a Chinese reaction.

By May and June 1965, with PAVN forces regularly defeating ARVN units, MACV

commander General William Westmoreland appealed for U.S. ground units, which John- son committed. PAVN regiments appeared ready to launch an offensive in the rugged Central Highlands and then drive to the sea, splitting South Vietnam in two. Westmo- reland mounted a spoiling attack with the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division (Air- mobile) formed around some 450 helicop- ters. During October–November 1965, the 1st Cavalry won one of the war's rare de- cisive encounters in the Battle of Ia Drang and may have derailed Hanoi's hopes of win- ning a decisive victory before full American might could be deployed.

Heavy personnel losses on the battlefield, though regrettable, were entirely acceptable to the North Vietnamese leadership. Ho re- marked at one point that North Vietnam could absorb an unfavorable loss ratio of 10 to 1 and still win the war. Washington never did understand this and continued to view the war through its own lens of what would be unacceptable in terms of casual-

ties. From 1966 on, Vietnam was an esca- lating military stalemate, as W estmoreland requested increasing numbers of men from Washington. By the end of 1966, 400,000 U.S. troops were in Vietnam. In 1968, U.S. strength was more than 500,000 men. John- son also secured some 60,000 troops from other nations—most of them from the Re- public of Korea (ROK, South Korea)— surpassing the 39,000-man international coalition of the Korean War.

Terrain was not judged important. The goals were to protect the population and kill the enemy, with success measured in terms of body counts that, in turn, led to abuses. During 1966, MACV mounted 18 major op- erations, each resulting in more than 500 supposedly verified VC/PAVN dead. Fifty thousand enemy combatants were suppos- edly killed in 1966. By the beginning of 1967,

the PAVN and VC had 300,000 men versus 625,000 ARVN and 400,000 Americans.

Hanoi, meanwhile, had reached a point of decision, with casualties exceeding available replacements. Instead of scaling back, North Vietnam prepared a major offensive that would employ all available troops to secure a quick victory. Hanoi believed that a major military defeat for the United States would end its political will to continue.

Giap now prepared a series of peripheral attacks, including a modified siege of some 6,000 U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh near the de- militarized zone (DMZ), beginning in Janu- ary 1968. With U.S. attention riveted on Khe Sanh, Giap planned a massive offensive to occur over Tet, the lunar new year holidays, called the General Offensive–General Upris- ing. The North Vietnamese government be- lieved that this massive offensive would lead people in South Vietnam to rise up and over- throw the South Vietnamese government, bringing an American withdrawal. The at- tacks were mounted against the cities. In a major intelligence failure, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials misread both the timing and strength of the attack, finding it incon- ceivable that the attack would come during Tet, sacrificing public goodwill.

The Tet Offensive began on January 31 and ended on February 24, 1968. Poor com- munication and coordination plagued Ha- noi's plans. Attacks in one province occurred a day early, alerting the authorities. Hue, the former imperial capital, was especially hard hit. Fighting there destroyed half the city.

Hanoi's plan failed. ARVN forces gen- erally fought well, and the people of South Vietnam did not support the attackers. In Hue, the communists executed 3,000 people, and news of this caused many South Viet- namese to rally to the South Vietnamese gov- ernment. Half of the 85,000 VC and PAVN soldiers who took part in the offensive were

killed or captured. It was the worst military setback for North Vietnam in the war.

Paradoxically, it was also its most re- sounding victory, in part because the John- son administration and Westmoreland had trumpeted prior Allied successes, and the intensity of the fighting came as a profound shock to the American people. Despite the victory, they were disillusioned and turned against the war. At the end of March, John- son announced a partial cessation of bombing and withdrew from the November presiden- tial election.

Hanoi persisted, however. In the first six months of 1968, communist forces sustained more than 100,000 casualties, and the VC was virtually wiped out. In the same period, 20,000 Allied troops died. All sides now opted for talks in Paris in an effort to negoti- ate an end to the war.

American disillusionment with the war was a key factor in Republican Richard Nix- on's razor-thin victory over Democrat Hubert Humphrey in the November 1968 presiden- tial election. With no plan of his own, Nixon embraced Vietnamization, actually begun under Johnson. This turned over more of the war to the ARVN, and U.S. troop withdraw- als began. Peak U.S. strength of 550,000 men occurred in early 1969. There were 475,000 men by the end of the year, 335,000 by the end of 1970, and 157,000 at the end of

1971. Massive amounts of equipment were turned over to the ARVN, including 1 million M-16 rifles and sufficient aircraft to make the South Vietnamese Air Force the world's fourth largest. Extensive retraining of the ARVN was begun, and training schools were estab- lished. The controversial counterinsurgency Phoenix Program also operated against the VC infrastructure, reducing the insurgency by 67,000 people between 1968 and 1971, but PAVN forces remained secure in sanc- tuaries in Laos and Cambodia.

Nixon's policy was to limit outside as- sistance to Hanoi and pressure the North Vietnamese government to end the war. For years, American and South Vietnamese mili- tary leaders had sought approval to attack the sanctuaries. In March 1970 a coup in Cam- bodia ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk. General Lon Nol replaced him, and secret operations against the PAVN Cambodian sanctuaries soon began. Over a two-month span, there were 12 cross-border operations, known as the Cambodian Incursion. Despite widespread opposition in the United States to the widened war, the incursions raised the allies' morale, allowed U.S. withdraw- als to continue on schedule, and purchased additional time for Vietnamization. PAVN forces now concentrated on bases in south- ern Laos and on enlarging the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In the spring of 1971, ARVN forces mounted a major invasion into southern Laos, known as Operation Lam Son 719. There were no U.S. advisors, and ARVN units took heavy casualties. The operation set back Hanoi's plans to invade South Viet- nam but took a great toll on the ARVN's younger officers and pointed out serious command weaknesses.

By 1972, PAVN forces had recovered and had been substantially strengthened with new weapons, including heavy artil- lery and tanks, from the Soviet Union. They now mounted a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam. Hanoi believed that the United States would not interfere. Giap had 15 divisions. He left only 1 in North Vietnam and 2 in Laos and committed the remaining 12 to the invasion.

The attack began on March 29, 1972. Known as the Spring or Easter Offensive, it began with a direct armor strike across the DMZ at the 17th Parallel and caught the best South Vietnamese troops facing Laos.

Allied intelligence misread its scale and pre- cise timing. Giap risked catastrophic losses but hoped for a quick victory before ARVN forces could recover.

At first it appeared that the PAVN would be successful. Quang Tri fell, and rain lim- ited the effectiveness of airpower. In May, President Nixon authorized B-52 bomber strikes on North Vietnam's principal port of Haiphong, and the mining of its harbor. This new air campaign was dubbed Linebacker I and involved the use of new precision- guided munitions (so-called smart bombs). The bombing cut off much of the supplies for the invading PAVN forces. Allied air- craft also destroyed large numbers of PAVN tanks. In June and July, the ARVN coun- terattacked. The invasion cost Hanoi half its force—some 100,000 men died—while ARVN losses were only 25,000.

With both Soviet and Chinese leaders anxious for better relations with the United States in order to obtain Western technology, Hanoi gave way and switched to negotia- tions. Finally, an agreement was hammered out in Paris that December, but President Thieu balked and refused to sign, where- upon Hanoi made the agreements public. A furious Nixon blamed Hanoi for the impasse, and in December he ordered a resumption of the bombing, dubbed Linebacker II, but also known as the December or Christmas Bombings. Although 15 B-52s were lost, Hanoi had fired away virtually its entire stock of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and now agreed to resume talks.

After a few cosmetic changes, an agree- ment was signed on January 23, 1973, with Nixon forcing Thieu to agree or risk the end of all U.S. aid. The United States recovered its prisoners of war and departed Vietnam. The Soviet Union and China continued to supply arms to North Vietnam, however, while Congress constricted U.S. supplies to

South Vietnam. Tanks and planes were not replaced on the promised one-for-one basis as they were lost, and spare parts and fuel were both in short supply. All of this had a devastating effect on ARVN morale.

In South Vietnam, both sides violated the cease-fire, and fighting steadily increased in intensity. In January 1975, communist forces attacked and quickly seized Phuoc Long Province on the Cambodian border north of Saigon. Washington took no action. The communists next took Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, then in mid-March Presi- dent Thieu decided to abandon the northern part of his country. Confusion became disor- der, then disaster, and six weeks later PAVN forces controlled all of South Vietnam. Sai- gon fell on April 30, 1975, to be renamed Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam was now reunited, but under a communist government. An es- timated 3 million Vietnamese, soldiers and civilians, had died in the struggle. Much of the country was devastated by the fighting, and Vietnam suffered from the effects of the widespread use of chemical defoliants.

The effects were also profound in the United States. The American military was shattered by the war and had to be rebuilt. In- flation was rampant from the failure to face up to the true costs of the war. Many ques- tioned U.S. willingness to embark on such a crusade again, at least to go it alone. In this sense, the war forced Washington into a more realistic appraisal of U.S. power.

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Vladivostok Meeting (November 22–24, 1974)

The Vladivostok Summit Meeting be- tween U.S. president Gerald Ford and So- viet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev took place November 22–24, 1974. It ended in a joint resolution that expressed mutual friendship and outlined future arms control measures between the United States and the Soviet Union. Vladivostok was a piv- otal summit in that it not only set a working outline for the second Strategic Arms Limi- tation Treaty (SALT II) but also reinforced the spirit of détente that had been diminished following the 1973–1974 energy crisis and tensions in the Middle East.

Leaders from both nations and around the world initially hailed the summit at Vladi- vostok as a significant diplomatic success. The conference allowed Ford and Brezhnev the chance to discuss face-to-face concerns important to U.S.–Soviet relations includ- ing the situation in the Middle East, which both recognized as an intrinsically danger- ous area. By far the most important issue at the Vladivostok Meeting, however, was the curtailment of the burgeoning nuclear arms race. By the end of the meeting, Ford and Brezhnev had arrived at a preliminary, non- binding framework on which to base a future arms control agreement. The two leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to contin- ued peaceful coexistence and détente.

The Vladivostok summit built on ear- lier arms control agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT

I) Interim Agreement, both signed in May 1972. The summit sought to redress inequal- ities in SALT I while promoting a new pro- gram to replace it when it expired in 1979. Fundamental to this was the difficult task of balancing the asymmetrical strategic forces of both sides. The draft produced at Vladivo- stok focused on a number of concrete issues. At the heart of the joint agreement was the overall ceiling of 2,400 placed on all nuclear delivery systems. An absolute and mutual limit of 313 heavy intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs) was also part of the pre- liminary agreement. In addition, the talks included a ceiling on the number of multi- ple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) as well as limits on the construc- tion of new missile silos.

Although these preliminary agreements received an enthusiastic response in the So- viet Union, American critics from both sides of the political spectrum pointed to several perceived flaws. On the strategic side, they noted the unfair advantage the treaty would give to the Soviet Union by excluding its in- tercontinental Backfire bomber. Opponents also groused about the limited ability to mon- itor and enforce the agreements. Other crit- ics attacked the framework for not placing sufficiently stringent limits on the develop- ment of new weapons systems, thus shifting the nuclear rivalry into a different but equally expensive and dangerous competition for better delivery technology.

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W

Warsaw Pact

The multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Co- operation, and Mutual Assistance signed on May 14, 1955, in Warsaw, Poland, formally institutionalized the East European alliance system, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, known as the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Treaty was identical to bilateral treaties con-

cluded during 1945–1949 between the Soviet Union and its East European client states to assure Moscow' s continued military presence on their territory. The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia pledged to de- fend each other if one or more of the mem- bers were attacked.

The Warsaw Pact was created as a politi- cal instrument for Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev' s Cold W ar policy in Europe. The immediate trigger was the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) into the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NATO) on May 5, 1955, and the Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955, which provided for Austrian neutrality and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The creation of the Warsaw Pact sent important signals to both Eastern Europe and the West. On the one hand, the Soviet Union made clear to its satellite states that Austria' s neutral status would not likewise be granted to them. On the other hand, Khrushchev allured the West with a standing offer to disband the Warsaw Pact simultaneously with NA TO, contingent upon East–West agreement on a new collec- tive security system in Europe.

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was established as the alliance's high- est governing body, consisting of the mem- ber states' party leaders. The PCC met almost annually in one of the capitals of the Warsaw Pact states. On the military side, a unified command and a joint staff were created to organize the actual defense of the Warsaw Treaty states. Soviet Marshal Ivan G. Konev was appointed as the first supreme com- mander of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces.

In its early years, the Warsaw Pact served primarily as a Soviet propaganda tool in East–West diplomacy. Khrushchev used the PCC to publicize his disarmament, dis- engagement, and peace offensives and to accord them a multilateral umbrella. The first concrete military step taken was the admission of the East German Army into the unified command, but not until the Ber- lin Crisis (1958–1961) did a systematic militarization of the Warsaw Pact occur. The Soviet General Staff and the Warsaw Pact unified command prepared East Eu- ropean armies for a possible military con- flict in Central Europe. In 1961, the Soviets replaced the old defensive strategy of So- viet leader Josef

Stalin with an offensive strategy that provided for a deep thrust into Western Europe. In the early 1960s, the Warsaw Pact began to conduct joint military exercises to prepare for fighting a nuclear war in Europe. The new strategy re- mained in place until 1987. Despite détente, the militarization of the Warsaw Pact ac- celerated under Soviet leader Leonid Bre- zhnev in the 1970s.

Soviet mechanized troops on a tactical exercise in May 1984. (Department of Defense)

Behind the façade of unity, however, growing differences hounded the Eastern al- liance. Following Khrushchev's campaign of de-Stalinization, Poles and Hungarians in the fall of 1956 demanded a reform of the Warsaw Pact to reduce overwhelming Soviet dominance within the alliance. Pol- ish generals issued a memorandum that pro- posed modeling the Warsaw Pact more after NATO, while Hungary's new Communist Party leader, Imre Nagy, declared his coun- try's neutrality and plans to leave the War- saw Pact. In

November 1956, the Soviet Army invaded Hungary and soon crushed all resistance.

In 1958, Romania demanded the with- drawal from its territory of all Soviet troops and military advisors. To cover Soviet em- barrassment, Khrushchev termed this a uni- lateral troop reduction contributing to greater European security. At the height of the Ber- lin Crisis (1961), the Warsaw Pact's weakest

and strategically least-important country, Al- bania, stopped supporting the pact and for- mally withdrew from the alliance in 1968.

The Warsaw Pact was left in ignorance when Khrushchev provoked the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Only after the crisis was ended did East European leaders learn in a secret meeting that a nuclear war had been narrowly avoided. In prompt reac- tion to Moscow's nonconsultation in such a serious matter, in 1963, the Romanian gov- ernment gave secret assurances to the United States that it would remain neutral in the event of a confrontation between the super- powers. In the same year, Romanian and Pol- ish opposition prevented Khrushchev from admitting Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact.

In the mid-1960s the Warsaw Pact, like NATO, underwent a major crisis. The 1965 PCC meeting, convened by East Germany, demonstrated profound disagreements among Warsaw Pact allies on matters such as the

German question, nuclear weapons' sharing, nuclear nonproliferation, and the Sino-Soviet split. In early 1966, Brezhnev proposed a So- viet plan to reform and institutionalize the Warsaw Pact. But resistance by Moscow's allies prevented the implementation of the scheme for more than three years.

In 1968, the Czechoslovak Crisis re- sulting from the Prague Spring seriously threatened the cohesion of the alliance. The Soviet Union tried to intimidate Alexander Dubcˇek's liberal Czechoslovak government with purportedly multilateral Warsaw Pact military maneuvers, but the invading forces sent in on August 20, 1968 were mostly from the Soviet Union with token Polish, Hun- garian, and East German contingents but no Romanian troops. Romania denounced the invasion as a violation of international law and demanded the

withdrawal of all Soviet troops and military advisors from its terri- tory. It also refused to allow additional So- viet forces to cross or conduct exercises on its territory.

The consolidation that resulted from the PCC session in Budapest in March 1969 trans- formed the Warsaw Pact into a more consulta- tive organization. It established a committee of defense ministers, a military council, and a committee on technology. With these three new joint bodies, the Warsaw Pact finally be- came a genuine multilateral military alliance.

In 1976, previous informal gatherings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers were in- stitutionalized into a committee of ministers of foreign affairs. In the 1970s, consultations within Warsaw Pact bodies primarily dealt with the Council on Security and Coopera- tion in Europe (CSCE) process. Despite dé- tente, preparations for a deep offensive thrust into Western Europe accelerated and intensi- fied during numerous military exercises. In 1979, a statute on the command of the alli- ance in wartime was finally accepted by all but Romania after a year-long controversy.

During 1980–1981, the Solidarity Cri- sis in Poland heralded the end of Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe. Yet it did not pose a serious threat to the Warsaw Pact's integrity. At first, Moscow was tempted to threaten the opposition with military exer- cises and, eventually, military intervention. To avoid the high political costs of such a move, however, Moscow in the end trusted that the loyal Polish military would suppress the opposition on its own. The imposition of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski was a major success for Moscow, as it dem- onstrated that the Moscow-educated Polish generals were protecting the interests of the Warsaw Pact even against their own people.

During the renewed Cold War of the 1980s, internal disputes in the Warsaw Pact increased. Romania demanded cuts in nu- clear and conventional forces as well as in national defense budgets. It also called for the dissolution of both Cold War alliances and for the withdrawal of both U.S. and So- viet forces from Europe.

The issue of an appropriate Warsaw Pact response to NATO's 1983 deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in West- ern Europe, matching Soviet SS-20 interme- diate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) aimed at West European targets, proved to be most divisive for the Eastern alliance. In 1983, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania en- gaged in a damage control exercise to main- tain their ties with the West, which they had established during the era of détente in the 1970s.

At the time of the Warsaw Pact's 30th an- niversary in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev be- came the new Soviet leader and improved the role of Warsaw Pact consultations on the desired nuclear and conventional cuts in the Eastern alliance. At the PCC meet- ing in Berlin in May 1987, he changed War- saw Pact military doctrine from offensive to defensive. In the late 1980s, however, East

Germany, Bulgaria, and—in a reversal of its earlier opposition—even Romania proposed to strengthen the Warsaw Pact by improving its intrabloc political consultative functions.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, East and West at first saw merit in keeping both Cold War alliances in place. In January and February 1991, however, Czechoslova- kia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria declared that they would withdraw all support by July 1 of that year. The Warsaw Pact thus came to an end on March 31, 1991, and was of- ficially dissolved at a meeting in Prague on July 1, 1991.

Christian Nuenlist

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Washington Summit Meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev (December 7–10, 1987)

At a summit meeting between U.S. presi- dent Ronald Reagan and Soviet general sec- retary Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington, D.C., on December 7–10, 1987, the princi- pal agenda item was nuclear arms reduction. The Washington Meeting showcased not

only Gorbachev's new style of leadership but also the unprecedented thaw in the Cold War, which would by 1991 end with the dis- solution of the Soviet Union. The conference marked the first superpower summit on U.S. soil in 14 years and endeavored to build on the November 1985 Geneva Meeting, during which Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to a 50 percent mutual reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, and the Reykjavík Meeting of Oc- tober 1986, which ended on a negative note over disagreements concerning Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The sum- mit in Washington saw both sides agree to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons (land-based intermediate-range missiles), codified by the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Mos- cow during Reagan and Gorbachev's final meeting in May–June 1988.

In spite of the breakthrough in superpower relations, Reagan and Gorbachev still found themselves in disagreement on key issues during the 1987 negotiations. First, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was in- terpreted differently by the Americans and the Soviets, which underscored the prob- lems posed by SDI, colloquially referred to as "Star Wars." Gorbachev believed that SDI violated the ABM Treaty, while Reagan tried to legitimize SDI by arguing that it fell into a category of space-based testing and devel- opment that did not violate previous agree- ments. Neither leader even mentioned SDI during postconference speeches to their re- spective nations, which may explain why the conference was deemed a success. Fur- ther, Reagan and Gorbachev failed to come to terms on regional issues in

American and Soviet spheres of influence. Reagan criti- cized Gorbachev for turning a blind eye to the human rights record of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and also for failing to estab- lish a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet

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troops from Afghanistan. Gorbachev, in a press conference held three hours after the departure ceremony, stated that a proposal for withdrawal would be instituted as soon as the United States agreed to halt arms shipments and financial aid to insurgent forces battling Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Gorbachev also criticized Reagan over the Iran-Contra scan- dal and argued that the time had not yet come for the United Nations (UN) Security Coun- cil to impose sanctions on Iran for refusing to accept an earlier UN resolution demanding a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War.

Even if deemed a marginal success, the 1987 Washington meeting should be con- sidered a significant turning point in Cold War history. Americans were well aware of Gorbachev's internal reforms (glasnost and perestroika) and saw his visit as power- fully symbolic, perhaps even foreshadowing the end of the Cold War. People crowded the streets to get a glimpse of Gorbachev, and many scholars indeed argue that Rea- gan needed the Soviet leader's cooperation in order to improve the image of the United States. Reagan had little choice but to address Gorbachev' s initiatives regarding nuclear disarmament as an opportunity to divert pub- lic attention from domestic issues, such as the

Iran-Contra scandal, to those that involved a dynamic new approach to foreign policy.

Whatever the ramifications of the 1987 Washington Meeting, it must be remem- bered not as the culmination of a process but rather as the beginning of both a new route to nuclear arms reductions and, perhaps more importantly, the end of the Cold War.

John C. Horn

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Yeltsin, Boris (1931–2007)

Born on February 1, 1931, in Butka in the Sverdlovsk Oblast in the Ural Mountains, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin graduated from the Urals Polytechnical Institute in 1955 as a construction engineer. He joined the Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1961 and worked on various construction projects in the Sverdlovsk area until 1968.

Yeltsin rose through the party ranks in the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee. He was elected the region's industry secretary in 1975 and first secretary in 1976. During 1976–1985, he moved through the national ranks of the CPSU. He served as a deputy in the Council of the Union (1978–1989), a member of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Transport and Communication (1979– 1984), a member of the Presidium of the Su- preme Soviet (1984–1985), and chief of the Central Committee Department of

Construc- tion in 1985. The new CPSU general secre- tary, Mikhail Gorbachev, summoned Yeltsin to Moscow in April 1985 as part of a team of reform-minded party members.

Gorbachev asked Yeltsin to reform the Moscow City Committee. Yeltsin began to clear the city's Party Committee of cor- rupt officials, which endeared him to Mus- covites. Eventually, he became dissatisfied with the slow pace of the perestroika re- forms and openly criticized the CPSU offi- cials. This was directed at the power base of Yegor Ligachev, who endorsed a moderate party–led reform. In 1987, Yeltsin resigned to force Gorbachev to take sides. Gorbachev needed Yeltsin to counterbalance Ligachev's

growing skepticism and rejected his resigna- tion, asking him to curb his critiques.

Yeltsin ignored Gorbachev's plea. Thus, Gorbachev allowed Ligachev to continue the campaign against Y eltsin, which finally led to Y eltsin' s dismissal as first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. In 1988 Yeltsin was also expelled from the Polit- buro, but he remained in Moscow as the first deputy chair of the State Committee for Construction.

Yeltsin went on to win a landslide victory in the newly established Congress of Peo- ple's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Feder- ated Socialistic Republic (RSFSR) in March 1989. In May 1990 he became chairman of the RSFSR. By June 12, 1990, the RSFSR, along with the other 14 Soviet republics, had declared its independence. Yeltsin was di- rectly elected to the newly created office of president of the now-independent RSFSR on June 12, 1991. He then demanded Gorbach- ev's resignation. Gorbachev refused to step down, but he did agree to sign a new union treaty in late August 1991.

Hard-line conservative forces within the CPSU tried to prevent the signing of the treaty, which would lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On August 19, 1991, the conservatives dispatched troops to key positions around Moscow and held Gor- bachev under house arrest. Yeltsin climbed atop one of the tanks surrounding the par- liament building, denounced the CPSU coup as illegal, and called for a general strike. He and his supporters remained in

the parlia- ment building as they rallied international support. For three days, thousands of people

demonstrated in front of parliament, holding off an expected attack on the building.

The failed putsch and massive street dem- onstrations quickly destroyed the credibility of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost re- forms. On December 24, 1991, the RSFSR and then later Russia took the Soviet Union's seat in the United Nation (UN) Security Council. The next day Gorbachev resigned, an act that officially dissolved the Soviet Union. Yeltsin, as president of Russia, im- mediately abolished the CPSU. In the mean- time, he had negotiated with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus to form the Common- wealth of Independent States as a federation of most of the former Soviet republics.

With a stagnating economy, a hostile legis- lature, and an attempted coup, Y eltsin was not expected to win reelection in 1996. However,

he staged an amazing comeback. Despite be- coming increasingly unpopular and suffer- ing from ill health, he continued as president of Russia until December 31, 1999, when he named Vladimir Putin acting president. Y elt- sin died in Moscow on April 23, 2007.

Frank Beyersdorf

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Declaration on Liberated Europe: TheYalta Conference (February 1945)

The most controversial of the wartime summit meetings of the Big Three Allied leaders — Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. presi- dent Franklin D. Roosevelt—was that held at Yalta in the Crimea in February 1945. With victory in both Europe and Asia looming ever closer on the horizon, the three men discussed numerous questions relating to the future gov- ernment of many enemy or "liberated" states in both Europe and Asia. High on the agenda was the question of exactly who would con- trol the new governments established in such countries. The Allied powers' wartime decla- rations had formally endorsed the principles of national self-determination, but in practice au- thority would ultimately rest with the state or states whose armed forces controlled a particu- lar country. Apparently seeking to soothe the fears of his Western Allies that Soviet forces would exercise uncurbed and arbitrary power in those countries under their control, Stalin agreed to sign a declaration that promised all "liberated" European countries "democratic" governments chosen through "free elections" as soon as possible, in accordance with the principles stated earlier in the Atlantic Char- ter and the Declaration of the United Nations. In practice, this statement failed to define pre- cisely what constituted "democratic" or "free" governments, a deliberate resort to vagueness that effectively permitted the occupying pow- ers to make their own determination on the subject. Before long, East Europeans and U.S. Republican Party politicians alike would at- tack the Yalta agreements on the grounds that they effectively acquiesced in Soviet domina- tion of Eastern Europe. Given Soviet military

dominance of the area, however, Roosevelt and Churchill had few real alternatives to ac- cepting Stalin's control there, no matter how harshly Russian rule might be implemented and exercised.

Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of Amer- ica, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

[. . .]

II. Declaration of Liberated Europe

The following declaration has been approved: The Premier of the Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Govern- ments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their

pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the

last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

a. to establish conditions of internal peace;

b. to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;

c. to form interim governmental authori- ties broadly representative of all demo- cratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest

possible estab- lishment through free elections of Gov- ernments responsive to the will of the
people; and

d. to facilitate where necessary the holding
of such elections.
The three Governments will consult the

other United Nations and provisional au- thorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Govern- ments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Na-

tions and our determination to build in co- operation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three pow- ers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[. . .]

Source: U.S. Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941– 1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 24–25.

Ho Chi Minh: Telegrams to President Harry S. Truman (September 29, 1945, and February 28, 1946)

In 1941 Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam to fight against French occupation. Although he was the founder of the Vietnamese Com- munist Party, Ho downplayed orthodox communist ideology. Instead, he formed a broad nationalist alliance, the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh), dedicated to anti-imperialism and land reform. In

August 14, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter, which addressed the right of occupied peoples to choose their form of government. At his guerrilla base in northern Vietnam, Ho learned of the Atlantic Char- ter. He considered it a ringing endorsement for Vietnamese self-rule. Ho hoped that the United States would support Vietnamese in- dependence from both the Japanese and the French. From an American perspective, there were two sticking points: France was an Amer- ican ally in the war against the Axis powers; Ho was a well-known communist. In the early summer of 1944, the Viet Minh worked with American intelligence operatives, providing information about Japanese movements in

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Vietnam and helping to rescue American air- men shot down over Indochina. On Decem- ber 24, 1944, Ho ordered an attack against two small French outposts. From a communist viewpoint, this date marked the birth of the Vietnamese Army. From an American view- point, Ho's fight against the French marked a troubling attack against a key ally. Ho tried repeatedly to contact American political au- thorities regarding purported U.S. support for national self-determination. He warned that if the United States failed to support him he would turn to Russia for support. His final ef- forts came in 1945 when he sent numerous let- ters and telegrams to American ambassadors, generals, politicians, and President Harry S. Truman. He never received a reply. The fact that Ho wrote Truman remained an American state secret until it was declassified in 1972. His correspondence is stored at the National Archives.

Sept. 29, 1945

The President of the Provisional Govern- ment of the Republic of Viet-nam to The President of the United States of America.

.. .

Allow me to take this opportunity to as- sure you that the sentiments of friendship and of admiration which our people feel towards the American people and for its representatives here, and which have found enthusiastic expressions on various occa- sions, do come straight from the bottom of our hearts. That such friendly feelings have not only been shown to the American them- selves but also to imposters wearing Ameri- can uniforms is the evidence that America's fine stand for peace and international justice on all occasions is not only appreciated by our governing spheres but also by the whole Vietnamese nation.

In my personal name and in the name of my people I address here to you, Mr. President, and to the people of the U.S.A.,

the expression of our great admiration and respect.

Ho-Chi-Minh

Source: National Archives, Record Group 84, box 74, folder 800.

Hanoi February 28, 1946
Telegram
President Hochiminh Vietnam Demo-

cratic Republic Hanoi to the President of the United States of America Washington D.C.

On behalf of Vietnam government and people I beg to inform you that in course of conversations between Vietnam government and French representatives the latter require the secession of Cochinchina and the re- turn of French troops in Hanoi. Meanwhile French population and troops are making active preparations for a coup de main in Hanoi and for military aggression. I there- fore most earnestly appeal to you personally and to the American people to interfere ur- gently in support of our independence and help making the negotiations more in keep- ing with the principles of the Atlantic and san Francisco charters.

Respectfully Ho-Chi-Minh

Source: National Archives, Record Group 226: Re- cords of the Office of Strategic Services, 1919–2002.

Winston Churchill: "The Sinews of Peace" (Iron Curtain Speech) (March 5, 1946)

In a commencement address entitled "The Sin- ews of Peace" delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, for- mer British prime minister Winston Churchill painted a picture of the post–World War II world and the emerging struggle between democracy and communism. Although Churchill was out of office, he spoke with all the prestige of "the greatest living Englishman," the charismatic

British leader who in 1940 had caught the world's imagination when he proclaimed his country's determination to stand alone against Adolf Hitler's German forces, which had al- ready conquered Western Europe. President Harry S. Truman escorted Churchill when he gave this speech, which Truman had seen in advance and which—although Churchill was supposedly speaking as a private citizen—had also been quietly cleared with the British gov- ernment. Describing the birth of the Cold War, Churchill proclaimed that an "iron curtain" had descended across Europe behind which the So- viet Union exercised unlimited control with no regard for basic human rights. He called upon the United States to join with Great Britain in preventing the further extension of Soviet power. Churchill' s phrase caught the popular imagination, and the speech was widely publi- cized throughout the Western world. The iron curtain metaphor remained in prominent use throughout the Cold War.

[. . .]

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the popula- tions around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone—Greece with its immortal glories—is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now

taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.

[. . .]

In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other causes for anxiety. In Italy the Communist Party is seriously hampered by having to support the Commu- nist-trained Marshal Tito's claims to former Italian territory at the head of the Adriatic. Nevertheless the future of Italy hangs in the balance. Again one cannot imagine a regen- erated Europe without a strong France. All my public life I have worked for a strong France and I never lost faith in her destiny, even in the darkest hours. I will not lose faith now. However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in com- plete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. These are somber facts for anyone to have to re- cite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains.

[. . .]

On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that

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we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our dif- ficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what hap- pens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What

is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more dif- ficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become.

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am con- vinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weak- ness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, of- fering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If how- ever they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are al- lowed to slip away then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

[. . .]

Source: Winston S. Churchill, *Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*, edited by Randolph S. Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mif- flin, 1949).

George C. Marshall: Remarks by the Secretary of State (Marshall Plan) (June 5, 1947)

By spring 1947, it was becoming clear that Western Europe was unlikely to recover from the devastation of World War II without a major infusion of outside funds. The harsh winter of 1946–1947 brought shortened working hours, power cuts, food and fuel shortages, and so- cial unrest in France and Italy, enhancing the political position of domestic communist par- ties in the latter two countries. European lead- ers, spearheaded by the British, appealed to the United States for economic aid. State Depart- ment officials such as Undersecretary of State Will Clayton, who toured Europe in early 1947, returned convinced that without such assis- tance, the West European nations were likely to collapse, and communist regimes that looked to Moscow for guidance might well come to power there. On June 5, 1947, in a speech at the commencement ceremony of Harvard College in Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall proposed that the United States grant financial aid to countries in need to prevent them from succumbing to com- munism. U.S. president Harry S. Truman later dubbed the proposal the Marshall Plan, and it became one of the major U.S. initiatives of the early Cold War. American officials invited all European countries, including the communist satellite states in Eastern Europe, to participate in the plan, which envisaged a

carefully coordi- nated scheme to revive the economies of all the European nations rather than a series of bilat- eral programs between the individual countries and the United States. To join the enterprise, each nation had to provide accurate and de- tailed economic information. Several East European states initially expressed interest in taking part but, on Soviet instructions, eventu- ally withdrew. Congress debated the Marshall Plan throughout 1948 and eventually enacted a series of laws to implement the plan, offi- cially known as the European Recovery Pro- gram and run by the Economic Cooperation

Administration. By 1953 the United States had provided approximately $13 billion in aid under the Marshall Plan, most of it directed to Euro- pean nations but some to China, whose politi- cal allies in Congress demanded that China be included. The Marshall Plan gave a great boost to European economic recovery and helped to usher in two decades of prosperity in Western Europe. The plan also helped to intensify the Cold War. The inclusion of the Federal Repub- lic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in the Marshall Plan led Soviet leader Josef Stalin to fear that any German economic revival would eventually lead to a German military resur- gence that would once more threaten the secu- rity of the Soviet state, and this was one reason for the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949, a period when for almost a year East German and Soviet forces denied the Western powers land access to West Berlin. In 1948 Soviet-backed coups in Hungary and Czechoslovakia also ejected all noncommunist elements from the governments of those two states, tightening Soviet control. In response, in 1949 the Western powers es- tablished the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion security pact in which the United States, Canada, and 10 West European states agreed to come to each other's assistance should any of them be attacked by another power.

I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraise- ment of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and conse- quent reaction of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, facto- ries, mines, and railroads was correctly esti- mated, but it has become obvious during re- cent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of the European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of na- tional economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies and shipping compa- nies disappeared, through the loss of capi- tal, absorption through nationalization or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the busi- ness structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously re- tarded by the fact that 2 years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Ger- many and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evi- dently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessi- ties of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply.

Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of

food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these neces- sities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruc- tion. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next 3 or 4 years of foreign food and other essential products— principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterio- ration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for cur- rencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of distur- bances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should

be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assis- tance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is will- ing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human

misery in order to profit therefrom politi- cally or otherwise will encounter the oppo- sition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in

the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The pro- gram should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an under- standing on the part of the people of Amer- ica of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With fore- sight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibilities which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

Source: George C. Marshall, "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery," *Department of State Bulletin* 16, no. 415 (1947): 1159–60.

North Atlantic Treaty (1949)

Signed on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty created the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NA TO), a mutual defense alliance of nations from Europe and North America. NATO was organized to defend member na- tions from the possible aggression of the So- viet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, which formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization six years later. Originally NA TO comprised the United States, Canada, and 10 West Euro- pean nations, including Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium,

the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal. In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) became a member, a move that reawakened bitter Soviet memories of past German attacks on Russia and impelled Soviet leaders to respond by establishing the Warsaw Pact. Greece and Turkey both joined NATO in 1952, and Spain joined in 1982 after dictator Francisco Franco' s death brought the restora- tion of democracy in that country. NATO was intended as a purely defensive alliance whose very existence would deter any Soviet attack

on any of the signatory nations, since all of them were bound to come to the assistance of any member that came under attack from an outside power. The alliance did not cover attacks on or uprisings within the colonies of the various European signatories. Perhaps one of the greatest successes of NATO was that no signatory ever found it necessary to invoke the alliance during the Cold War, a fact that was either a tribute to its deterrent effect or, perhaps, evidence that the Soviet Union never had any intention of attacking any of its signa- tories. NATO was the first permanent military alliance ever concluded by the United States, a development that marked a new departure in American foreign policy. Although it was ini- tially intended that NATO military forces in Europe should be small and the United States only committed two divisions there, the out- break of the Korean War in 1950 soon brought the dispatch of an additional four divisions to Western Europe. One unspoken purpose of the alliance was to counter any potential future military resurgence on the part of Germany, whose belligerent record since the mid- nineteenth century prompted fears on the part of other NA TO members, especially France, that German leaders might once again seek to dominate Europe by force of arms. Despite differences among members and the withdrawal of France in the mid-1960s, NATO endured even the end of the Cold War. As East–West tensions eased, former Soviet satellites—including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999 and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004—joined the alliance, perceiving it in part as a guarantee of their own security should Russia once again seek to dominate them. The Warsaw Pact, by contrast, collapsed. NA TO also sought to redefine its role, participating in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and seeking to maintain peace in former Yugoslavia dur- ing the 1990s. The NATO alliance was for- mally invoked for the first time in September 2001 when, after Muslim al-Qaeda extremists mounted suicide aircraft attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pen- tagon building in Washington, D.C., NA TO

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forces took part in the subsequent war against Afghanistan.

will encourage economic collaboration be- tween any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, sepa- rately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an at- tack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of indi- vidual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so at- tacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the se- curity of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the [United Nations] Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

Treaty Establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their de- sire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the free- dom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of de- mocracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well- being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlan- tic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a man- ner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the fur- ther development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and

a.

b.

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Alge- rian Departments of France, on the ter- ritory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these ter- ritories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Medi- terranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a posi- tion to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of ac- cession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instru- ment of accession.

[. . .]

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "The North Atlantic Treaty," Online Library, NATO Basic Texts. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

Harry S.Truman: First U.S. Acknowledgment of Soviet Atomic Bomb Detonation (September 23, 1949)

From July 1945 to August 1949, the United States and Britain enjoyed a nuclear monop- oly that the Soviet Union was determined to break. On learning of the success of the first U.S. atomic test, Soviet leader Josef Stalin im- mediately launched a crash program to build a Soviet bomb. Due in part to the help of spies within the Anglo-American Manhattan Proj- ect laboratories at Los Alamos, New Mexico, four years later, on August 29, 1949, the So- viet Union successfully tested an atomic de- vice. Three days later, specially equipped U.S. radar airplanes detected atmospheric debris from the test. The newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had predicted that Soviet scientists

would eventually develop a bomb but had not expected this to occur for several more years. Soviet success in doing so

Article 7

The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of in- ternational peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the inter- national engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implemen- tation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a

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led to a rapid reevaluation of the U.S. national security position. In late September, Presi- dent Harry S. Truman tersely informed the American people that the Soviet Union now possessed atomic weapons, stating that this re- inforced the need to bring nuclear power under "truly effective enforceable international con- trol." In practice, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared to relinquish direction of its own atomic weapons to an out- side body. At that juncture, American scien- tists and government officials were debating whether to mount an expensive program to de- velop thermonuclear weapons in the form of the immensely more powerful hydrogen bomb. On January 31, 1950, Truman authorized this project and ordered that it be implemented as expeditiously as possible. Soviet scientists likewise began work on such weapons, which both sides developed in the mid-1950s, bring- ing a mutual escalation of the nuclear arms race that eventually helped to generate growing popular and official support for arms control negotiations. In early 1950 the president also instructed the State Department Policy Plan- ning Staff and the National Security Council (NSC) to undertake a major

review of U.S. na- tional security policies, which resulted in the April 1950 paper NSC-68, a document that urged major increases in U.S. defense spend- ing and overseas commitments and bases and envisaged the quadrupling of military budgets. Truman initially rejected these conclusions on the grounds that they were too expensive, but with the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950, most of NSC-68's recommenda- tions were eventually implemented. Russian possession of atomic weapons contributed to a new sense of U.S. vulnerability, one reason that the domestic anticommunism of Senator Joseph McCarthy and other Truman adminis- tration critics appealed to so many Americans in the early 1950s.

President Harry S. Truman
September 23, 1949.
I believe the American people, to the full-

est extent consistent with national security,

are entitled to be informed of all develop- ments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the following information.

We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.

Ever since atomic energy was first re- leased by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us.

Nearly 4 years ago I pointed out that "scientific opinion appears to be practi- cally unanimous that the essential theoreti- cal knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoreti- cal knowledge in time." And, in the Three- Nation Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada, dated No- vember 15, 1945, it was emphasized that no single nation could in fact have a monopoly of atomic weapons.

This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for that truly effective enforceable international control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority of the members of the United Na- tions support.

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Pres- idents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 485.

Joseph McCarthy: Speech on Spread of Communism (February 20, 1950)

In February 1950 Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin spoke before the Women's Club of

Wheeling, West Virginia, claiming that he had a list of 205 known communists working in the U.S. State Department. McCarthy, whose Sen- ate record was decidedly mediocre, was appar- ently looking for an issue that would help him win reelection in 1952. His allegations came a few months after the Chinese Communist Party had won the four-year Chinese Civil War and established the People's Republic of China. Also in 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb, an event that made the United States feel more vulnerable to sudden and devastating external attack than ever be- fore. It soon became public that some Cana- dian, American, and British scientists working in the American-financed nuclear program had passed information to the Soviets, accelerating the development of Russian atomic weapons. Alger Hiss, a former State Department official accused of passing secret government infor- mation to the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s, had also been tried and convicted for perjury in 1949, though his former associ- ate, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, publicly refused to condemn him.

McCarthy's accusations therefore came at a psychologically fertile moment. They quickly made him into the foremost leader of the eponymous McCarthyism, the movement in the early 1950s to weed out communists and communist sympathizers in the U.S. govern- ment and American society in general. Mc- Carthy was not inhibited by any considerations of accuracy or even probability, accusing such leading Cold Warriors as Acheson and former secretary of state George Marshall of being communist sympathizers or dupes, if not out- right agents. McCarthy's charges touched off a hailstorm of controversy that led to loyalty investigations of numerous diplomats, espe- cially those concerned with China policy, and other government officials. As chairman of the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommit- tee of the Government Operations Committee, McCarthy held well-broadcast public hearings to determine the political ideologies of politi- cal figures and public personalities, including movie stars. McCarthy was taking advantage of a climate of increasing suspicion of leftist dis-

sent, exemplified by the anti-radical activities of the House Un-American Activities Commit- tee from the 1930s onward, and later by Presi- dent Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9835, issued in March 1947, establishing a loyalty- security program for federal employees. McCarthy later submitted his speech to Con- gress so that it could be recorded in the Con- gressional Record, but he changed the number of known communists to 57. For several years, few Americans dared to challenge McCarthy, fearing that they themselves would be attacked as communist agents. McCarthy also appealed to the populist resentment many ordinary Americans harbored toward the internation- ally oriented East Coast elite, whose members tended to dominate the U.S. diplomatic and na- tional security apparatus. In the long run, his inaccuracies and a general disregard of facts led to McCarthy's downfall, but he ruined the reputations of several prominent people in the process, and generated a climate of fear that discouraged dissent from or even honest criti- cism of American foreign policies.

Senator Joseph McCarthy
February 20, 1950
Five years after a world war has been

won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace, and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes from war. But this is not such a period —for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of the "cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps. . . .

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate or members of minority groups who have been selling this Nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on

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earth has to offer—the finest homes, the fin- est college education, and the finest jobs in Government.

This is glaringly true in the State Depart- ment. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the worst. . . . In my opin- ion, the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists.

I have in my hand 205 cases of individu- als who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy. . . .

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes—of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Chris- tian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justifi- cation and reason therefor, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, pro- claimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and a betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of national honesty and decency in government.

Source: U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1954–1957.

Harry S.Truman: Declaration of a National Emergency (December 16, 1950)

Until late November 1950, when it became ap- parent that communist Chinese forces had in- tervened in large numbers in the Korean War, the Democratic administration of President Harry S. Truman assumed that by the end of 1950 the conflict would be over and would have ended in a sweeping United Nations (UN) victory, uniting all Korea under a pro-Western government. Chinese intervention ensured that the fighting would be protracted and would eventually end in a stalemate, a compromise that completely satisfied none of the combat- ants. It also meant that the United States would have to make far greater efforts than originally expected to attain even these limited goals. As the forces under General Douglas MacArthur's command retreated in a near rout throughout December, Truman proclaimed a national state of emergency, urging the American people to make all necessary sacrifices to ensure their country's ultimate triumph over

communism. In apocalyptic terms, Truman warned that un- less they did so, they faced a communist threat to their way of life, which would mean that Americans would lose the freedoms of reli- gion, speech, thought, education, and politi- cal and economic activity that they currently enjoyed. The draft was reinstated for young men of military age, and rationing and price controls were imposed. The United States also launched a massive military buildup, imple- menting the permanent expansion of its armed forces and American overseas bases and com- mitments envisaged the previous year in the policy planning paper NSC-68.

By the President of the United States of America a Proclamation

WHEREAS recent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat to the peace of the world and imperil the efforts of this country and those of the United Nations to prevent aggression and armed conflict; and

WHEREAS world conquest by commu- nist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world; and

WHEREAS, if the goal of communist imperialism were to be achieved, the people of this country would no longer enjoy the full and rich life they have with God's help built for themselves and their children; they would no longer enjoy the blessings of the freedom of worshipping as they severally choose, the freedom of reading and listening to what they choose, the right of free speech including the right to criticize their Govern- ment, the right to choose those who conduct their Government, the right to engage freely in collective bargaining, the right to engage freely in their own business enterprises, and the many other freedoms and rights which are a part of our way of life; and

WHEREAS the increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as possible:

Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRU- MAN, President of the United States of Amer- ica, do proclaim the existence of a national emergency, which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this coun- try be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made through the United Nations and other- wise to bring about lasting peace.

I summon all citizens to make a united ef- fort for the security and well-being of our beloved country and to place its needs fore- most in thought and action that the full moral and material strength of the Nation may be readied for the dangers which threaten us.

I summon our farmers, our workers in in- dustry, and our businessmen to make a mighty production effort to meet the defense require-

ments of the Nation and to this end to elimi- nate all waste and inefficiency and to subordi- nate all lesser interests to the common good.

I summon every person and every com- munity to make, with a spirit of neighborli- ness, whatever sacrifices are necessary for the welfare of the Nation.

I summon all State and local leaders and officials to cooperate fully with the military and civilian defense agencies of the United States in the national defense program.

I summon all citizens to be loyal to the principles upon which our Nation is founded, to keep faith with our friends and allies, and to be firm in our devotion to the peaceful purposes for which the United Na- tions was founded.

I am confident that we will meet the dan- gers that confront us with courage and de- termination, strong in the faith that we can thereby “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

[. . .]

Source: Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Pres- idents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 746–47.

Douglas MacArthur: Post- Recall Speech to Congress (April 19, 1951)

U.S. general Douglas MacArthur, Allied com- mander of United Nation forces during the Korean War, was an able general but also a controversial figure, whom top American officials in Washington feared might readily use nuclear weapons to ignite World War III. Ma- cArthur, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific during World War II, headed the postwar Allied forces that occupied Japan. In early July 1950, shortly after the onset of the Korean War, MacArthur was appointed com- mander of the United Nations forces that were to be deployed to Korea. MacArthur, a fierce

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anticommunist, also had close ties to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the Chinese Nationalist or Guomindang leader who fled to Taiwan in 1949 with the remnants of his forces as the Chinese Communist Party conquered mainland China. In defiance of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's policies, by June 1950 MacArthur already favored a continuing American com- mitment to Taiwan, and hoped that U.S. forces would ultimately attack and overthrow the new People's Republic of China. As United Nations commander, in September 1950 Ma- cArthur reversed the initial North Korean ad- vances in the war by taking the enemy from behind after a daring amphibious landing at In- chon. The original remit of the United Nations resolution authorizing military intervention in Korea had been merely to drive North Korean troops out of the South, but MacArthur's UN forces quickly drove the enemy back well be- yond the earlier Thirty-Eighth Parallel border that had previously divided the Koreas. Ma- cArthur ignored Chinese warnings that, should non-Korean troops cross this boundary and try to unite Korea under a noncommunist govern- ment, the PRC would in its turn intervene. In November 1950 hundreds of thousands of Chi- nese "People's Volunteer" troops came to the assistance of North Korea, once more driving the United Nations army back well beyond the Thirty-Eighth Parallel boundary. Ignor- ing repeated instructions from President Harry Truman that he would not authorize the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC, a move that Truman feared might provoke Soviet in- tervention, in early 1951 MacArthur publicly advocated the employment of atomic bombs to devastate the northeastern Manchurian prov- inces, the Chinese industrial heartland border- ing on North Korea, and 30–50 Chinese cities. Whereas Truman wished to wage a limited war, MacArthur favored total war, even at the risk of provoking World War III. MacArthur's bellicose rhetoric was intended to undercut moves by Truman to open peace negotiations with the North Koreans and Chinese. It deeply alarmed the European allies of the United States, most of whom were contributing mili- tary contingents to the United Nations army,

but who feared that the Korean conflict might escalate into a full-scale great power confron- tation. Infuriated by the arrogant general's con- stant insubordination, President Harry Truman relieved MacArthur of his office on April 11, 1951. Eight days later, on April 19, the still charismatic MacArthur used masterly rhetoric to deliver a farewell address to Congress, of- fering a defense of his actions in Korea. His speech was interrupted by 30 ovations. Mac- Arthur's public popularity soared and that of Truman declined but, although he harbored political ambitions, MacArthur never served again in any significant public office. His criticisms of Truman's policies did, however, give additional ammunition to Senator Joseph McCarthy and others who repeatedly attacked Truman administration officials, alleging that they were overly soft on communism and that such figures as Secretary of State Dean Ache- son and Secretary of Defense George Marshall were communist agents or at least gullible fel- low travelers. During the Truman administra- tion's final two years in office, such allegations helped to make both the Korean War and many of Truman's top officials extremely unpopular.

April 19, 1951

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and distin- guished members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride—humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.

Here are centered the hopes and aspira- tions and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any par- tisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of parti- san consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.

I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered view- point of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bit- terness in the fading twilight of life with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole.

While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we can not divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism.

If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sec- tor. You cannot appease or otherwise surren- der to Communism in Asia without simulta- neously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general tru- isms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may ob- jectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present.

Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration of the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles

of colonialism, and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 per cent of its natural resources, these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adap- tations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments.

Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world eco- nomic frontiers, as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.

In this situation it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in conso- nance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the real- ity that the colonial era is now passed and the Asian peoples covet the fight to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding and sup- port, not imperious direction; the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake.

World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the people strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, and a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political free- dom.

These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security but do form a backdrop to contem- porary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate beating upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pa- cific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto, the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway and Guam to the Philippines.

That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack. The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All this was changed by our Pacific vic- tory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which be- came a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it.

Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pa- cific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free allies.

From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore—with sea and air power, as I said, every port from Vladivostok to Singapore—and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an am- phibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance.

With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure. Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It as-

sumes instead the friendly aspect of a peace- ful lake.

Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of mili- tary effort and expense. It envisions no at- tack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invin- cible defense against aggression.

The holding of this littoral defense in line in the Western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof. For any major breach of this line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to deter- mined attack every other major segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception.

For that reason I have strongly recom- mended in the past as a matter of military urgency that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control.

Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of Califor- nia, Oregon and Washington.

To understand the changes which now ap- pear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely nonhomo- geneous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The warmaking tendency was almost nonexistent, as they still follow the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso-lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now

taken on the character of a united national- ism, of increasingly dominant aggressive tendencies.

Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now con- stitute excellent soldiers with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperial- istic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism. There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese makeup. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thor- oughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate, unable to follow any leadership which seemed to promise an alleviation of local stringencies.

I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communist support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are at present parallel to those of the Soviet, but I believe that the aggressive- ness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and point- ing

potentially toward the south reflects pre- dominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would- be conqueror since the beginning of time.

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a com- mendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative Government committed to the advance of political mo-

rality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.

Politically, economically and socially, Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the uni- versal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japa- nese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest and confusion surrounding them from the outside, and checked Communism within their own frontiers without the slight- est slackening in their forward progress.

I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slight- est qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly and industrious nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.

Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the ex- isting unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them as in our hour of need they did not fail us.

A Christian nation, the Philippines stands as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the Government of the Re- public of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gos- sip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland.

The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government; and politically, economically

and socially appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surround- ing areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the

President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would ad- vocate sending our ground forces into con- tinental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently de- mand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary, first, the intensification of our economic blockade against China; second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; third, removal of restric- tions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; fourth, re- moval of restrictions on

the forces of the Re- public of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective opera- tions against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all profes- sionally designed to support our forces com-

mitted to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay at a sav- ing of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understand- ing that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was in- formed that reinforcements were not avail- able. I made clear that, if not permitted to destroy the enemy-built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on For- mosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from get- ting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant ma- neuver, and at an approximate area where our supply-line advantages were in balance with the supply-line disadvantages of the enemy. But we could hope at best for only an indeci- sive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new po- litical decisions essential to a solution. Ef- forts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a war- monger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing, to me, is more revolt- ing. I have long advocated its complete ab- olition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. In- deed, on the second day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese

nation on the battleship *Missouri,* I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men, since the beginning of time, have sought peace. Various methods, through the ages, have been attempted to devise an in- ternational process to prevent or settle dis- putes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger in- ternational scope have never been success- ful. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war."

The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.

The problem basically is still logical and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless ad- vances in science, art, literature, and all ma- terial and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory. There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches, with unmistakable emphasis, that appease- ment but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appease- ment has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in

blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Source: U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951. Vol. 97, pp. 4124–25.

Korean Armistice Agreement (1953)

By the spring of 1951 the Korean War was ef- fectively stalemated, with neither side able to attain full victory. Hostilities continued until June 1953, although armistice negotiations in- tended to end actual fighting in the Korean War opened in July 1951 and continued, with inter- missions, for two years. One major stumbling block was the repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who did not wish to return to their home countries, an issue eventu- ally resolved by permitting those who wished to return to do so and handing over the remain- der to a neutral commission, leaving their ul- timate disposition undetermined or at least unstated. South Korean president Syngman Rhee hoped that hostilities would continue until, with American assistance, he had uni- fied his country, but U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took office in January 1953, was determined to end the unpopular war as soon as possible. In exchange for Rhee's acqui- escence in the armistice, the following Novem- ber the United States signed a bilateral security treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). The death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin in March 1953 was another factor facilitating an armistice. Whereas Stalin apparently wel- comed the entanglement of both communist China, a potential rival, and the United States, his major opponent, in the costly and protracted war, his successors were more inclined to end the stalemated conflict, which placed some aid burdens upon the Soviet Union. On July 27, 1953, representatives from the United Nations, which included delegates from both the United States and South Korea, met with top commu- nist officials from China and the Democratic

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People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) to sign an armistice ending the Korean War, which had raged on the Korean penin- sula since June 1950. The signatories intended that a formal peace treaty, to be negotiated at a conference to be held in Geneva the follow- ing summer, would follow the armistice, but when the Geneva Conference took place, it proved impossible for the interested parties to agree on any such permanent settlement. The supposedly temporary armistice therefore re- mained in force into the 21st century, with the demilitarized zone separating the two opposed Korean states flanked by massive defenses on each side. Numerous minor violations of the cease-fire became almost routine occurrences, but in the half century following the armistice, the war was not resumed.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COM- MANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEO- PLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY AR- MISTICE IN KOREA.

Preamble

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objec- tive of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do in- dividually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set

forth in the following Articles and Para- graphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

Article I: Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to es- tablish a Demilitarized Zone between opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is lo- cated as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as in- dicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Mili- tary Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable mark- ers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respec- tive areas. The Military Armistice Com- mission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the bound- aries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the at- tached map. Civil shipping of each side

shall have unrestricted access to land

under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demili-
tarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be
permitted to cross the Military Demar- cation Line unless specifically autho- rized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and re- lief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Com- mission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military De- marcation Line shall be the joint

respon- sibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Com- mander of the Chinese People's Volun- teers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of

11.

civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its as- sistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Su- pervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment spe- cifically authorized to enter the Demili- tarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of move- ment shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demili- tarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

[. . .]

Article III: Arrangements Relating to Prisoners of War

51.

The release and repatriation of all pris- oners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agree- ment becomes effective shall be ef- fected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Ar- mistice Agreement becomes effec- tive, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and

hand over in groups all those prison- ers of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provi- sions of this Article. In order to expe- dite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agree- ment, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and in- ternment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those re- maining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its cus- tody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com- mission for disposition in accor- dance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Refer- ence for Neutral Nations Repatria- tion Commission".

c. So that there may be no misunder- standing owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of de- livery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agree- ment, be called "repatriation" in English, "[Korean characters]" (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and "[Chinese characters]" (CH'IEN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated

incident to the coming into effect of this

Armistice Agreement.
53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war

who insist upon repatriation shall be re- patriated with priority. Insofar as possi- ble, there shall be captured medical per- sonnel repatriated

concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above- mentioned prisoners of war in its cus- tody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be de- livered and received by both sides. Ad- ditional place(s) of delivery and recep- tion of prisoners of war in Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

[. . .]

Source: "Text of the Korean War Armistice Agree- ment," U.S. Department of State, http://www.state. gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31006.htm.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The Row of Dominoes," Presidential Press Conference (April 7, 1954)

From summer 1945 onward, France sought to restore colonial rule in French Indochina but faced increasingly effective opposition from the nationalist and communist Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh, who had declared Vietnam's independence in September 1945. Despite substantial U.S. financial support, by

early 1954 French efforts to defeat Ho's forces in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) had stalled. In mid-March that year, the French Army found itself encircled by Viet Minh forces at the mountain fortress of Dien Bien Phu. France urged the United States to intervene militarily, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on finding that Brit- ain was not prepared to join in any such effort, refused to commit American forces to Indo- china. The beleaguered French Army surren- dered in early May, a humiliating defeat for France that marked the end of almost a decade of French efforts to maintain its colonial posi- tion in Indochina. Despite his decision against intervention, Eisenhower clearly disliked the prospect of a communist Indochina. At a press

conference held while the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu was still besieged and the United States had made no formal decision, the president set out the domino theory that would become so influential as a justification for sub- sequent American assistance to Vietnam: that if one nation went communist its neighbors would inevitably be affected, and eventually the communist infection would spread from state to state throughout Asia and beyond.

Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. Pres- ident, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina for the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.

The President. You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.

First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the

"falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a begin- ning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.

Then with respect to more people pass- ing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

But when we come to the possible se- quence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following,

now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through the loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.

Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so- called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Austra- lia and New Zealand.

It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go—that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.

So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world. . . .

Q. Raymond Brandt, St. Louis Post- Dispatch: Mr. President, what response

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has Secretary Dulles and the administra- tion got [from Great Britain] to the re- quest for united action in Indochina?

The President. So far as I know, there are no positive reactions as yet, because the time element would almost forbid.

Q. Robert G. Spivack, New York Post: Mr. President, do you agree with Senator [John F.] Kennedy that independence must be guaranteed the people of Indo- china in order to justify an allout effort there?

The President. Well, I don't know, of course, exactly in what way a Senator was talking about this thing.

I will say this: for many years, in talking to different countries, different govern- ments, I have tried to insist on this prin- ciple: no outside country can come in and be really helpful unless it is doing some- thing that the local people want.

Now, let me call your attention to this in- dependence theory. Senator Lodge, on my instructions, stood up in the United Nations and offered one country indepen- dence if they would just simply pass a res- olution saying they

wanted it, or at least said, "I would work for it." They didn't accept it. So I can't say that the associated states want independence in the sense that the United States is independent. I do not know what they want.

I do say this: the aspirations of those peo- ple must be met, otherwise there is in the long run no final answer to the problem.

Q. Joseph Dear, Capital Times: Do you favor bringing this Indochina situation before the United Nations?

The President. I really can't say. I wouldn't want to comment at too great a length at this moment, but I do believe

this: this is the kind of thing that must not be handled by one nation trying to act alone. We must have a concert of opin- ion, and a concert of readiness to react in whatever way is necessary.

Of course, the hope is always that it is peaceful conciliation and accommoda- tion of these problems.

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisen- hower, 1954* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 382–85.

Warsaw Security Pact (1955)

Signed on May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Security Pact established a mutual defense alliance be- tween the countries of Eastern Europe, all of which were under Soviet control. Besides the Soviet Union, member states were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Re- public (GDR, East Germany), Hungary, Po- land, and Romania. The pact was intended to function as a counterbalance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), estab- lished by the countries of Western Europe and the United States in 1949. The immediate im- petus for the formation of the Warsaw Pact was NATO's acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) into its al- liance, a move that aroused bitter memories of past German eastward military attacks and fears of their recurrence. The Soviet Union di- rected Warsaw Pact policies and operations, and the organization had no independent head- quarters of its own. In practice, another major function of the Warsaw Pact was to main- tain Soviet control of Eastern Europe, as Po- land and Hungary proved recalcitrant in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland during the early 1980s. Hungary's announcement in Oc- tober 1956 of its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact triggered a Soviet invasion. The Warsaw Pact remained

in effect until the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 but then collapsed as the East

European states all withdrew, in several cases entering NATO soon afterward.

Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the People's Re- public of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Pol- ish People's Republic, the Rumanian Peo- ple's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic, May 1, 1955

The contracting parties, Reaffirming their desire for the organization of a system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the European states, ir- respective of their social and state systems, which would make it possible to combine their efforts in the interests of securing peace in Europe,

Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe as the result of ratification of the Paris agree- ments, which provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with a remilitarised Western Germany, and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of the peaceloving states,

Convinced that, under these circum- stances, the peaceloving states of Europe should take the necessary measures for safe- guarding their security, and in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

In the interests of further strengthening and promoting friendship, co- operation and mutual assistance, in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the

principle of noninterference in their internal affairs,

Have resolved to conclude this Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assis- tance.

Article 1

The contracting parties undertake, in accor- dance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peace- ful means so as not to endanger international peace and security.

Article 2

The contracting parties declare their readi- ness to take part, in the spirit of sincere co- operation, in all international undertakings intended to safeguard international peace and security and they shall use all their ener- gies for the realization of these aims.

Moreover, the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, of effective measures towards a gen- eral reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3

The contracting parties shall take council among themselves on all important inter- national questions relating to their common interests, guided by the interests of strength- ening international peace and security.

They shall take council among themselves immediately, whenever, in the opinion of any of them, there has arisen the threat of an armed attack on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty, in the interests of organizing their joint defense and of uphold- ing peace and security.

Article 4

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states, each state that is a party to this treaty shall, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Orga- nization, render the state or states so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the means it may consider necessary, including the use of armed force. The states that are parties to this treaty shall immediately take council among themselves concerning the necessary joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of restoring and upholding international peace and security.

In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, the Security Council shall be advised of the measures taken on the basis of the present article. These measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security.

Article 5

The contracting parties have agreed on the establishment of a joint command for their armed forces, which shall be placed, by agreement among these parties, under this command, which shall function on the basis of jointly defined principles. They shall also take other concerted measures necessary for strengthening their defense capacity, in order to safeguard the peaceful labour of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and to pro- vide safeguards against possible aggression.

Article 6

For the purpose of holding the consultations provided for in the present treaty among the

states that are parties to the treaty, and for the purpose of considering problems arising in connection with the implementation of this treaty, a political consultative commit- tee shall be formed in which each state that is a party to this treaty shall be represented by a member of the government, or any other specially appointed representative.

The committee may form the auxiliary or- gans for which the need may arise.

Article 7

The contracting parties undertake not to par- ticipate in any coalitions and alliances, and not to conclude any agreements the purposes of which would be at variance with those of the present treaty.

The contracting parties declare that their obligations under existing international trea- ties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty.

Article 8

The contracting parties declare that they will act in the spirit of friendship and co- operation with the object of furthering the development of, and strengthening the eco- nomic and cultural relations between them, adhering to the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article 9

The present treaty is open to be acceded to by other states—irrespective of their social and state systems—which may express their readiness to assist, through participation in the present treaty, in combining the efforts of the peaceloving states for the purpose of safeguarding the peace and security of na- tions. This act of acceding to the treaty shall become effective, with the consent of the states that are parties to this treaty, after the instrument of accedence has been deposited

with the government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10

The present treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the government of the Polish People's Republic.

The treaty shall take effect on the date on which the last ratification instrument is de- posited. The government of the Polish Peo- ple's Republic shall advise the other states that are parties to the treaty of each ratifica- tion instrument deposited with it.

Article 11

The present treaty shall remain in force for 20 years. For the contracting parties which will not have submitted to the government of the Polish People's Republic a statement denouncing the treaty a year before the ex- piration of its term, it shall remain in force throughout the following ten years.

In the event of the organization of a sys- tem of collective security in Europe and the conclusion of a general European treaty of collective security to that end, which the contracting parties shall unceasingly seek to bring about, the present treaty shall cease to be effective on the date the general Euro- pean treaty comes into force.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslo- vakia," May 14, 1955. *United Nations Treaty Series* 2962.

Mao Zedong: "U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger" (July 14, 1956)

For international communist revolutionar- ies during the Cold War, the United States

represented the head and front of the capital- ist forces raised against them. Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong regarded the United States as the foremost enemy that China would ultimately have to confront and overcome. A leader who favored dramatic and grandiloquent rhetoric, Mao nonetheless urged his countrymen and left- ists around the world not to fear the United States, characterizing it as a "paper tiger" that was far less formidable than it appeared. Strong though the United States was in mili- tary and economic terms, its power could, he proclaimed, be destroyed piecemeal and in- crementally, although this would take time. In the mid-1950s Mao called on all the oppressed peoples of the world to launch armed strug- gle against the United States and its allies, and China provided training and military aid to a wider variety of international revolutionary movements. His approach differed from that of the new Soviet

premier Nikita Khrushchev, who now sought peaceful coexistence with the W est, and contributed to growing divisions between Soviet Russia and Communist China that culminated in an outright split by the end of the decade. Soviet leaders thought Mao's policies likely to destabilize the international system and perhaps provoke nuclear war. Iron- ically, in practice Mao was far more cautious than his rhetoric implied in challenging the United States, suggesting that he himself may have been something of a paper tiger. After intervening in 1950 against UN forces in the lengthy, expensive, and wearing Korean War, which ended in stalemate, Mao was careful in successive international crises over Taiwan and Vietnam to avoid provoking outright war between China and the United States (UN). Eventually, moreover, when Sino-Soviet hos- tility led to outright fighting on the joint border in 1969, Mao even initiated a rapprochement with the United States, for two decades sup- posedly China's greatest enemy, as a means of countering the potential Soviet menace.

The United States is flaunting the anti- communist banner everywhere in order

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to perpetrate aggression against other countries.

The United States owes debts every- where. It owes debts not only to the coun- tries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, but also to the countries of Europe and Ocea- nia. The whole world, Britain included, dis- likes the United States. The masses of the people dislike it. Japan dislikes the United States because it oppresses her. None of the countries in the East is free from U.S. ag- gression. The United States has invaded our Taiwan Province. Japan, Korea, the Philip- pines, Viet Nam and Pakistan all suffer from U.S. aggression, although some of them are allies of the United States. The people are dissatisfied and in some countries so are the authorities.

All oppressed nations want independence.

Everything is subject to change. The big decadent forces will give way to the small new-born forces. The small forces will change into big forces because the majority of the people demand this change. The U.S. imperialist forces will change from big to small because the American people, too, are dissatisfied with their government.

In my own lifetime I myself have wit- nessed such changes. Some of us present were born in the Ching Dynasty and others after the 1911 Revolution.

The Ching Dynasty was overthrown long ago. By whom? By the party led by Sun Yat- sen, together with the people. Sun Yat-sen's forces were so small that the Ching officials didn't take him seriously. He led many up- risings which failed each time. In the end, however, it was Sun Yat-sen who brought down the Ching Dynasty. Bigness is nothing to be afraid of. The big will be overthrown by the small. The small will become big. After overthrowing the Ching Dynasty, Sun Yat- sen met with defeat. For he failed to satisfy the demands of the people, such as their de-

mands for land and for opposition to impe- rialism. Nor did he understand the necessity of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries who were then moving about freely. Later, he suffered defeat at the hands of Yuan Shih- kai, the chieftain of the Northern warlords. Yuan Shih-kai's forces were larger than Sun Yat-sen's. But here again this law op- erated: small forces linked with the people become strong, while big forces opposed to the people become weak. Subsequently Sun Yat-sen's bourgeois-democratic revolution- aries co-operated with us Communists and together we defeated the warlord set-up left behind by Yuan Shih-kai.

Chiang Kai-shek's rule in China was rec- ognized by the governments of all countries and lasted twenty-two years, and his forces were the biggest. Our forces were small, fifty thousand Party members at first but only a few thousand after counter-revolu- tionary suppressions. The enemy made trou- ble everywhere. Again this law operated: the big and strong end up in defeat because they are divorced from the people, whereas the small and weak emerge victorious because they are linked with the people and work in their interest. That's how things turned out in the end.

During the anti-Japanese war, Japan was very powerful, the Kuomintang troops were driven to the hinterland, and the armed forces led by the Communist Party could only conduct guerrilla warfare in the rural areas behind the enemy lines. Japan occu- pied large Chinese cities such as Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan and Canton. Nevertheless, like

Germany's Hitler the Japanese militarists collapsed in a few years, in accordance with the same law.

We underwent innumerable difficulties and were driven from the south to the north, while our forces fell from several hundred thousand strong to a few tens of thousands.

At the end of the 25,000-*li* Long March we had only 25,000 men left.

[. . .]

During the War of Resistance, our troops grew and became 900,000 strong through fighting against Japan. Then came the War of Liberation. Our arms were inferior to those of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang troops then numbered four million, but in three years of fighting we wiped out eight million of them all told. The Kuomintang, though aided by U.S. imperialism, could not defeat us. The big and strong cannot win, it is always the small and weak who win out.

Now U.S. imperialism is quite powerful, but in reality it isn't. It is very weak politi- cally because it is divorced from the masses of the people and is disliked by everybody and by the American people too. In appear- ance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of, it is a paper tiger. Outwardly a tiger, it is made of paper, un- able to withstand the wind and the rain. I be- lieve the United States is nothing but a paper tiger.

History as a whole, the history of class so- ciety for thousands of years, has proved this point: the strong must give way to the weak. This holds true for the Americas as well.

Only when imperialism is eliminated can peace prevail. The day will come when the paper tigers will be wiped out. But they won't become extinct of their own accord, they need to be battered by the wind and the rain.

When we say U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, we are speaking in terms of strategy. Regarding it as a whole, we must despise it. But regarding each part, we must take it se- riously. It has claws and fangs. We have to destroy it piecemeal. For instance, if it has ten fangs, knock off one the first time, and there will be nine left; knock off another, and there will be eight left. When all the

fangs are gone, it will still have claws. If we deal with it step by step and in earnest, we will certainly succeed in the end.

Strategically, we must utterly despise U.S. imperialism. Tactically, we must take it seriously. In struggling against it, we must take each battle, each encounter, seriously. At present, the United States is powerful, but when looked at in a broader perspective, as a whole and from a long-term viewpoint, it has no popular support, its policies are dis- liked by the people, because it oppresses and exploits them. For this reason, the tiger is doomed. Therefore, it is nothing to be afraid of and can be despised. But today the United States still has strength, turning out more than 100 million tons of steel a year and hit- ting out everywhere. That is why we must continue to wage struggles against it, fight it with all our might and wrest one position after another from it. And that takes time.

It seems that the countries of the Ameri- cas, Asia and Africa will have to go on quar- relling with the United States till the very end, till the paper tiger is destroyed by the wind and the rain.

To oppose U.S. imperialism, people of European origin in the Latin-American countries should unite with the indigenous Indians. Perhaps the white immigrants from Europe can be divided into two groups, one composed of rulers and the other of ruled. This should make it easier for the group of oppressed white people to get close to the local people, for their position is the same.

Our friends in Latin America, Asia and Africa are in the same position as we and are doing the same kind of work, doing some- thing for the people to lessen their oppres- sion by imperialism. If we do a good job, we can root out imperialist oppression. In this we are comrades.

We are of the same nature as you in our opposition to imperialist oppression, differ-

ing only in geographical position, national- ity and language. But we are different in na- ture from imperialism, and the very sight of it makes us sick.

What use is imperialism? The Chinese people will have none of it, nor will the people in the rest of the world. There is no reason for the existence of imperialism.

Source: Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse- Tung*, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 308–11.

Imre Nagy: Final Message to the Hungarian People (1956)

Imre Nagy served as prime minister of Hungary from 1953 to 1955 before falling from Soviet favor and losing office. He proved a sympa- thetic supporter of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, during which students and reform- ers attempted to undermine Soviet control of Hungary and revise the communist system in a democratic and multiparty direction. On Octo- ber 23, 1956, as demonstrations against Soviet rule expanded almost uncontrollably, Nagy was reappointed as prime minister. Fearing Soviet intervention, he sought to bring events under control, introducing reforms and offering amnesty to demonstrators while placating the Soviets and seeking to negotiate the peaceable withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. When Nagy realized that his efforts had failed to persuade the Soviets to eschew military in- tervention, he finally announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet- run military alliance of its East European satel- lite states. On November 4, 1956, Soviet troops invaded Hungary, capturing Nagy and numer- ous other Hungarian leaders. As Soviet troops surrounded the capital city of Budapest, Nagy delivered his final message to the Hungarian people, appealing for support from other coun- tries. His hopes of assistance from the West- ern powers or the United Nations (UN) were illusory, since—despite their proclaimed wish to roll back communism in Eastern Europe— U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower and his

secretary of state John Foster Dulles were not prepared to risk nuclear war over an area that they knew the Soviet Union considered essen- tial to its own national security. In 1958 the Soviets executed Nagy for his involvement in the revolution. After the Soviets relinquished control of Eastern Europe in 1989, Nagy was posthumously rehabilitated.

This fight is the fight for freedom by the Hungarian people against the Russian inter- vention, and it is possible that I shall only be able to stay at my post for one or two hours. The whole world will see how the Russian armed

forces, contrary to all treaties and conventions, are crushing the resistance of the Hungarian people. They will also see how they are kidnapping the Prime Minis- ter of a country which is a Member of the United Nations, taking him from the capital, and therefore it cannot be doubted at all that this is the most brutal form of intervention. I should like in these last moments to ask the leaders of the revolution, if they can, to leave the country. I ask that all that I have said in my broadcast, and what we have agreed on with the revolutionary leaders during meet- ings in Parliament, should be put in a memo- randum, and the leaders should turn to all the peoples of the world for help and explain that today it is Hungary and tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, it will be the turn of other countries because the imperialism of Moscow does not know borders, and is only trying to play for time.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956, pp. 746–47.

Soviet Announcement of *Sputnik* (October 5, 1957)

The International Council of Scientific Unions declared the period from July 1957 to Decem- ber 1958 the International Geophysical Year

(IGY). American scientists worked throughout the mid-1950s to construct a successful science satellite for the IGY. The project confronted numerous technical obstacles and was pro- ceeding poorly. Then, on the evening of Octo- ber 4, 1957, came the shocking news that the Soviet Union had successfully launched the first-ever artificial satellite into Earth orbit. Named *Sputnik*, the basketball-sized satellite weighed 184 pounds. The launch announce- ment, first issued in a terse, English-language radio broadcast from Tass and then published the next day in the Soviet official news organ *Pravda*, surprised American scientists. Al- though they knew their Soviet counterparts were working on a science satellite for the IGY, they had no idea that the Soviets had made such tremendous progress. On November 3, 1957, the Soviets launched *Sputnik 2*, a 1,118-pound capsule with a dog as a passenger. These two stunning Soviet successes preceded the at- tempted American contribution to the IGY. On December 6, 1957, the U.S. launch attempt of its own satellite failed. *Sputnik*'s launch, which came at a time of escalating Cold War tensions, shattered American confidence in its technical and scientific superiority. *Sputnik*

also had frightening military implications. The American public realized that the Soviets were acquiring the capability to launch long-range nuclear missiles against the United States. The U.S. government responded to *Sputnik* by passing the 1958 National Defense Education Act, which promoted space science and other scientific and technical fields deemed neces- sary to national security. The government also created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to administer Ameri- can space programs.

For several years scientific research and experimental design work have been con- ducted in the Soviet Union on the creation of artificial satellites of the earth.

As already reported in the press, the first launching of the satellites in the USSR were planned for realization in accordance with

the scientific research program of the Inter- national Geophysical Year.

As a result of very intensive work by scientific research institutes and design bu- reaus the first artificial satellite in the world has been created. On October 4, 1957, this first satellite was successfully launched in the USSR. According to preliminary data, the carrier rocket has imparted to the sat- ellite the required orbital velocity of about 8000 meters per second. At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajecto- ries around the earth, and its flight can be observed in the rays of the rising and setting sun with the aid of very simple optical in- struments (binoculars, telescopes, etc.).

According to calculations which now are being supplemented by direct observa- tions, the satellite will travel at altitudes up to 900 kilometers above the surface of the earth; the time for a complete revolution of the satellite will be one hour and thirty-five minutes; the angle of inclination of its orbit to the equatorial plane is 65 degrees. On Oc- tober 5 the satellite will pass over the Mos- cow area twice—at 1:46 a.m. and at 6:42 a.m. Moscow time. Reports about the subse- quent movement of the first artificial satel- lite launched in the USSR on October 4 will be issued regularly by broadcasting stations.

The satellite has a spherical shape 58 centimeters in diameter and weighs 83.6 kilograms. It is equipped with two radio transmitters continuously emitting signals at frequencies of 20.005 and 40.002 mega- cycles per second

(wave lengths of about 15 and 7.5 meters, respectively). The power of the transmitters ensures reliable reception of the signals by a broad range of radio ama- teurs. The signals have the form of telegraph pulses of about 0.3 second's duration with a pause of the same duration. The signal of one frequency is sent during the pause in the signal of the other frequency.

Scientific stations located at various points in the Soviet Union are tracking the satellite and determining the elements of its trajectory. Since the density of the rarified upper layers of the atmosphere is not accu- rately known, there are no data at present for the precise determination of the satellite's lifetime and of the point of its entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere. Calcula- tions have shown that owing to the tremen- dous velocity of the satellite, at the end of its existence it will burn up on reaching the dense layers of the atmosphere at an altitude of several tens of kilometers.

As early as the end of the nineteenth cen- tury the possibility of realizing cosmic flights by means of rockets was first scientifically substantiated in Russia by the works of the outstanding Russian scientist K[onstatin] E. Tsiolkovskii [Tsiolkovskiy].

The successful launching of the first man-made earth satellite makes a most im- portant contribution to the treasure-house of world science and culture. The scien- tific experiment accomplished at such a great height is of tremendous importance for learning the properties of cosmic space and for studying the earth as a planet of our solar system.

During the International Geophysical Year the Soviet Union proposes launching several more artificial earth satellites. These subse- quent satellites will be larger and heavier and they will be used to carry out programs of scientific research.

Artificial earth satellites will pave the way to interplanetary travel and, apparently our contemporaries will witness how the freed and conscientious labor of the people of the new socialist society makes the most daring dreams of mankind a reality.

Source: "Announcement of the First Satellite," from *Pravda*, October 5, 1957; in F.J. Krieger, *Behind*

the Sputniks (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1958), 311–12. Made available by the Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. http://his- tory.nasa.gov/sputnik/14.html.

John F. Kennedy: Inaugural Address (January 20, 1961)

The young Democrat John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in January 1961, the youngest man ever elected to that office, succeeding the Republican Dwight D. Eisen- hower, the oldest man until that time to be president. Kennedy subscribed almost unthink- ingly to orthodox Cold War ideology and pro- claimed the need for the United States to fight Soviet communism more energetically than in the past. Despite serious health problems of which the American people were largely un- aware, Kennedy projected an image of youth- ful dynamism and vigor, and his administration made almost a cult of physical fitness. Young, handsome, and a master of appealing rhetoric, through his style Kennedy caught the imagina- tion not just of Americans but of young people around the world. He appealed to Americans to be prepared to make sacrifices for their country and to wage the Cold War until victory was at- tained, pledging that the United States would help its allies whatever the price. Breaking with Eisenhower's New Look strategy, which was heavily reliant on the threat of nuclear weapons, Kennedy sought to make American military forces better able to fight conventional and guerrilla wars. Seeking to win the loyalties of decolonizing and relatively poor states, he also urged ordinary Americans to work closely with their counterparts in developing coun- tries, sharing their living standards and coop- erating on projects designed to benefit those nations, an appeal that led to the establishment of the Peace Corps. Despite promising to build up American military forces and to stand firm in the Cold War, he also sought to open seri- ous arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, evidence of his recognition that neither power could afford an outright nuclear war. In Kennedy's inaugural address, therefore,

one can discern the seeds of many of his sub- sequent policies, including his 1961 decision to support West Berlin, his moves to increase the American commitment to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), his demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its missiles from nearby Cuba in 1962, and his support for serious disarmament negotiations and the At- mospheric Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom—symbolizing an end as well as a beginning—signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same sol- emn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abol- ish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolution- ary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe—the be- lief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the sur- vival and the success of liberty.

This much we pledge—and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do— for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom—and to re- member that, in the past, those who fool- ishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever pe- riod is required—not because the Commu- nists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our bor- der, we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemi- sphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we

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renew our pledge of support—to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invec- tive—to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak—and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient be- yond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course—both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of man- kind's final war.

So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those prob- lems which divide us.

Let both sides, for the first time, formu- late serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms—and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and commerce.

Let both sides unite to heed in all cor- ners of the earth the command of Isaiah—to

"undo the heavy burdens. . .[and] let the op- pressed go free."

And if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our life- time on this planet. But let us begin.

In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again— not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need—not as a call to battle, though embat- tled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in

hope, patient in tribulation"— a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruit- ful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maxi- mum danger. I do not shrink from this re- sponsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country

and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what to- gether we can do for the freedom of man.

Finally, whether you are citizens of Amer- ica or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sac- rifice which we ask of you. With a good con- science our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presi- dents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, 1962), 1–3.

Vadim Orlov: Account of the B-59 Incident (1962)

As part of the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba, U.S. ships forced to the surface three Soviet submarines. Neither American political nor military leaders knew that the Soviet subma- rines were nuclear armed. Nor did the Amer- icans understand that conditions aboard the

Soviet submarines were so physically diffi- cult and unstable that commanding officers considered arming nuclear-tipped torpedoes in response to intense American naval harassment. Moreover, the effort to force the submarine B-59 to the surface on October 27, 1962, occurred on one of the most dan- gerous days of the missile crisis. Only hours earlier, the Soviets had downed an American U-2 spy plane over Cuba. Vadim Orlov, who served as a communications intelligence offi- cer on B-59, recounted the tense and stressful situation on October 27 when U.S. destroyers lobbed small depth charges at B-59. According to Orlov, B-59's "totally exhausted" captain

ordered a nuclear torpedo to be assembled for battle readiness. A subordinate calmed down the captain and they made the decision to sur- face the submarine. Historians are uncertain if Orlov's account is completely accurate. They noted that like their American counterparts, Soviet submarine commanders were highly disciplined and unlikely to use nuclear weap- ons by design. However, the unstable condi- tions on board B-59 raised the specter of an accident. Indeed, military historians and Orlov himself have concluded that the real danger was not from the unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, but rather from an accident caused by the interaction of men and machines under the highly stressful circumstances. If the Soviets had accidentally or intentionally used nuclear torpedoes, the United States would have made a nuclear counter-response. Instead, the two great Cold War rivals narrowly averted open conflict due to a combination of military professionalism and some degree of luck.

In the beginning, the Norwegian hydro- planes were searching for us, then at the Farer line—the British "Shackletons." Then it was the turn of the American "Neptunes." But judging by the events, they had not suc- ceeded in discovering us. In any case, not until we reached the Sargasso Sea. There they got us. A naval forward searching air- craft carrier group headed by the aircraft carrier "Randolph" confronted submarine B-59. According to our hydro-acoustic spe- cialists, 14 surface units were following our boat. Together with the navigator, we did parallel plotting [on the map]—he did the route of B-59, as he was assigned, I recalled my first naval specialization—and plot- ted the movements of the American ships. For some time we were able to avoid them quite successfully. However the Americans were not dilettantes either—following all the canons of the military art, they surrounded us and started to tighten the cir- cle, practicing attacks and dropping depth

charges. They exploded right next to the hull. It felt like you were sitting in a metal barrel, which somebody is constantly blast- ing with a sledgehammer. The situation was quite unusual, if not to say shocking—for the crew.

The accumulators on B-59 were dis- charged to the state of water, only emergency light was functioning. The temperature in the compartments was 45–50 C, up to 60 C in the engine compartment. It was unbearably stuffy. The level of CO2 in the air reached a critical practically deadly for people mark. One of the duty officers fainted and fell down. Then another one followed, then the third one . . . They were falling like domi- noes. But we were still holding on, trying to escape. We were suffering like this for about four hours. The Americans hit us with something stronger than the grenades [depth charges]—apparently with a practical depth bomb. We thought—that's it—the end. After this attack, the totally exhausted Savitsky, who in addition to everything, was not able to establish connection with the General Staff, became furious. He summoned the officer who was assigned to the nuclear torpedo, and ordered him to assemble it to battle read- iness. "Maybe the war has already started up there, while we are doing somersaults here—screamed emotional Valentin Grig- orievich, trying to justify his order. "We're going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all—we will not disgrace our Navy!" But we did not fire the nuclear tor- pedo—Savitsky was able to rein in his wrath. After consulting with Second Captain Casili Alexandrovich Arkhipov [deceased] and Deputy political officer Ivan Semenovich Maslennikov, he made the decision to come to the surface. We gave an echo locator sig- nal, which in international navigation rules means that "the submarine is coming to the surface." Our pursuers slowed down.

Source: Excerpt from Recollections of Vadim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59). "We Will Sink Them All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy." Alexander Mozgovoi, The Cuban Samba of the Quartet of Fox- trots: Soviet Submarines in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962, Military Parade, Moscow, 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB75.

John F. Kennedy: Commencement Address Announcing Cooperation with Soviets (June 10, 1963)

From the 1950s onward, American, Soviet, and European leaders alike, conscious of the dangers that full-scale nuclear warfare posed to their countries, showed considerable

inter- est in disarmament proposals. But there was little concrete advancement until the summer of 1963, when the Soviet Union and United States signed a treaty banning atmospheric nuclear testing, a practice that had previously been responsible for the release of substantial amounts of radioactive fallout. Somewhat so- bered by the Cuban Missile Crisis the previous year, the originally somewhat brash President John F. Kennedy mounted a major lobbying effort to secure the ratification of this treaty by the U.S. Senate. Around the same time, he also announced his intention to mount a major initiative for peace and disarmament, and to open serious discussions with the Soviet Union for this purpose. Kennedy expressed his under- standing of Soviet suffering during World War II, which he believed predisposed Rus- sian leaders to wish to avoid future destructive conflicts. Declaring that "both the United States and its allies, and Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race," Kennedy expressed his willingness to tolerate diverse political systems while hoping that the Soviet bloc would eventually change. While affirming American commitments to the various U.S. allies, he pledged the United States to work with the Soviet Union for peace and disarmament. He also announced that the

two great powers were establishing a direct telephone hot line, to facilitate communication in times of crisis and thereby prevent "dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions." Kenne- dy's assassination the following November, and the subsequent U.S. preoccupation with the escalating Vietnam War, meant that not until in the early 1970s, under President Rich- ard Nixon, did the United States and the Soviet Union sign major arms limitation agreements. Kennedy's address nonetheless indicated a sharpened awareness by American leaders in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis that both great powers had a shared stake in avoiding nuclear war and in preventing an unrestrained arms race.

President John F. Kennedy

Commencement Address at American University in Washington

June 10, 1963

President Anderson, members of the fac- ulty, Board of Trustees, distinguished guests, my old colleague, Senator Bob Byrd, who has earned

his degree through many years of attending night law school, while I am earn- ing mine in the next 30 minutes, ladies and gentlemen:

It is with great pride that I participate in this ceremony of the American Univer- sity, sponsored by the Methodist Church, founded by Bishop John Fletcher Hurst, and first opened by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914. This is a young and growing uni- versity, but it has already fulfilled Bishop Hurst's enlightened hope for the study of history and public affairs in a city devoted to the making of history and to the conduct of the public's business. By sponsoring this in- stitution of higher learning for all who wish to learn whatever their color or their creed, the Methodists of this area and the nation deserve the nation's thanks, and I commend all those who are today graduating.

Professor Woodrow Wilson once said that every man sent out from a university should be a man of his nation as well as a man of his time, and I am confident that the men and women who carry the honor of gradu- ating from this institution will continue to give from their lives, from their talents, a high measure of public service and public support.

"There are few earthly things more beauti- ful than a University," wrote John Masefield, in his tribute to the English Universities— and his words are equally true here. He did not refer to spires and towers, to cam- pus greens and ivied walls. He admired the splendid beauty of the University, he said, because it was "a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see."

I have, therefore, chose this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived—yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace.

What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weap- ons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about gen- uine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables man and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for

their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten

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times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear ex- change would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dol- lars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stock- piles—which can only destroy and never create—is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the neces- sary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament— and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlight- ened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude—as in- dividuals and as a Nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every gradu- ate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward—by examining his own attitude toward the pos- sibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the Cold War and to- ward freedom and peace here at home.

First: Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is im- possible. Too many of us think it is unreal. But that is dangerous,

defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevita- ble—that mankind is doomed—that we are gripped by forces we cannot control.

We need not accept that view. Our prob- lems are manmade—therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is be- yond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolv- able—and we believe they can do it again.

I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the values of hopes and dreams but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and im- mediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practi- cal, more attainable peace—based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace—no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process—a way of solving problems.

With such a peace, there will still be quar- rels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor—it requires only that they live together in mutual toler- ance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem the tide of time and events will often bring sur- prising changes in the relations between na- tions and neighbors.

So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevi-

table. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.

Second: Let us reexamine our attitude to- ward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It is discour- aging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on *Military Strategy* and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims—such as the allegation that " Ameri- can imperialist circles are preparing to un- leash different types of wars . . . that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union . . . (and that) the political aims of the American imperialists are to en- slave economically and politically the Euro- pean and other capitalist countries . . . (and) to achieve world domination . . . by means of aggressive wars."

Truly, as it was written long ago: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements—to real- ize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning—a warning to the Ameri- can people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodations as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lack- ing in virtue. As Americans, we find com- munism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in eco- nomic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique, among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the his- tory of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including nearly two thirds of its industrial base, was

turned into a wasteland—a loss equivalent to the devas- tation of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two stron- gest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many coun- tries, including this Nation's closest allies— our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better de- voted to combating ignorance, poverty and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counterweapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours—and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So, let us not be blind to our differences— but let us also direct attention to our com- mon interests and to means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we can- not end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our chil- dren's future. And we are all mortal.

Third: Let us re-examine our attitude to- ward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had history of the last eighteen years been different.

We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that construc- tive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach

solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our vital interest, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collec- tive death-wish for the world.

To secure these ends, America's weapons are nonprovocative, carefully controlled, de- signed to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplo- mats are instructed to avoid unnecessary ir- ritants and purely rhetorical hostility.

For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove

that we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people—but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful com- petition with any people on earth.

Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instru- ment for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system—a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of in- suring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished.

At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention or which threaten to erupt into war. Our ef- forts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East and in the Indian sub- continent, have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others—by seeking to adjust small but significant dif- ferences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and in Canada.

Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many na- tions by alliances. These alliances exist be- cause our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also be- cause their interests and ours converge.

Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom,

but in pursuing the paths of peace. It is our hope—and the purpose of allied policies— to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not in- terfere with the choices of others. The com- munist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, then peace would be much more assured.

This will require a new effort to achieve world law—a new context for world discus- sions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And in- creased understanding will require increased contact and communications. One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Wash- ington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur at a time of crisis.

We have also been talking in Geneva about other first-step measures of arms con- trol, designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and to reduce the risks of acciden- tal war. Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament—designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political devel- opments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an ef- fort of this Government since the 1920's. It has

been urgently sought by the past three administrations. And however dim the pros- pects may be today, we intend to continue this effort—to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities of disarmament are.

The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is in a treaty to out- law nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard.

First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Min- ister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of his- tory—but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now de- clare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disar- mament, but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us ex- amine our attitude toward peace and free- dom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedi- cation of our own lives—as many of you

who are graduating today will have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home.

But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our duties today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.

It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government—local, State and National—to provide and pro- tect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their authority. It is the re- sponsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land.

All this is not unrelated to world peace. "When a man's ways please the Lord," the Scriptures tell us, "he maketh even his en- emies to be at peace with him." And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation—the right to breathe air as nature provided it—the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

While we proceed to safeguard our na- tional interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it may be to the ad- vantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can—if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the in- terests of its signers—offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncon- trolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war.

We do not now expect a war. This genera- tion of Americans has already had enough— more than enough—of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also

do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strat- egy of peace.

Source: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presi- dents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, 1964), 459–64.

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)

By the mid-1950s it had become apparent that tests of nuclear weapons contaminated the at- mosphere with radioactive fallout, which could be highly detrimental to both human health and the environment. In March 1954 the *Lucky Dragon*, a Japanese fishing boat with a crew of 23, was exposed to fallout from the Bikini Island hydrogen bomb test. The fishermen suf- fered from radiation sickness, and one of them died, leading to an international furor in Japan. Scientists also demonstrated that radioactive fallout was carried around the world by the wind and that no area was immune to it, leading to fears of cumulative genetic damage to humans and others. Negotiations among nuclear powers to ban atmospheric and underwater testing of nuclear weapons began in 1955 but foun- dered over issues of verification. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 gave renewed impetus to negotiations for a test ban treaty, and representatives from the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain signed an agreement at Moscow on August 5, 1963. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was intended to be the first step toward total nuclear disarmament. It prohibited any of the signatory countries from testing nuclear weapons in outer space, the Earth's atmosphere, or underwater, although

underground testing was not banned. During the two months before the treaty went into ef- fect on October 10, more than one hundred countries around the world added their names to the treaty. Notable exceptions were France and China, two powers that regarded the treaty as an example of collusive Soviet–American ambitions to dominate the rest of the world and reserved the right to test nuclear weapons as they saw fit.

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEA- PON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

The governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit- ain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter re- ferred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agree- ment on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in ac- cordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the ar- maments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by ra- dioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty under- takes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test ex- plosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

a. in the atmosphere; beyond its lim- its, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

b. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose ju- risdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prej- udice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, in- cluding all such explosions under- ground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Pre- amble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty under- takes furthermore to refrain from caus- ing, encouraging, or in any way partici- pating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nu- clear explosion,

anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 2

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the De- positary Governments which shall circu- late it to all Parties to this Treaty. There- after, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Gov- ernments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of

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all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instru- ments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

Article 3

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

[. . .]

Article 4

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme inter- ests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty

three months in advance. [. . .]

Source: "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water," August 5, 1963, U.S. Department of State, http:// www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4797.htm.

Tonkin Gulf Resolution (August 7, 1964)

Passed by the U.S. Congress in August 1964, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution permitted President Lyndon B. Johnson to take whatever mea- sures he considered appropriate to deal with the growing crisis in Vietnam. As the mili- tary situation in Vietnam deteriorated in early 1964, Johnson and his advisors decided that

only with heavy support from the United States could the government of the Republic of Viet- nam (RVN, South Vietnam) survive. Johnson, running for reelection against hard-line Re- publican Senator Barry Goldwater, feared that a major escalation might jeopardize his cam- paign, so he relied extensively on covert opera- tions, including DeSoto intelligence-gathering missions undertaken by American destroyers to test North Vietnamese radar efficiency or land South Vietnamese forces on North Viet- namese territory. On the morning of August 2, three North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the destroyer USS *Maddox* as it undertook one such mission in the Tonkin Gulf, beyond the three-mile Vietnamese territorial limits that the United States recognized but within the 12-mile zone that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) claimed. Air- craft from the nearby USS *Ticonderoga* came to its assistance, sinking one patrol boat and disabling the others, and Johnson ordered the *Maddox* to continue patrolling farther offshore in the Gulf, accompanied by a fellow destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy*. On the night of August 4, both vessels reported hostile attacks, although it was later suggested that nervous radar and sonar operators or malfunctioning equipment probably triggered false alarms. North Viet- nam subsequently claimed that none of its pa- trol boats were responsible, alleging that the U.S. government deliberately fabricated the incident as a pretext to escalate the war. John- son, nettled by Goldwater's repeated criticisms that his Vietnam policy was irresolute and inef- fective, made no attempt to verify or question the reports. Without mentioning their involve- ment in covert operations, Johnson announced that American ships had encountered an un- provoked "deliberate attack," and he ordered retaliatory American bombing raids on an oil depot and North Vietnamese patrol boat bases. He also submitted to Congress a draft reso- lution authorizing him to "take all necessary measures" to "repel any armed attack" on U.S. forces, "prevent further aggression," and give any aid necessary, "including the use of armed force," to help any country that requested as- sistance through the Southeast Asian Treaty

Organization (SEATO), to which South Viet- nam belonged. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed unanimously by the House and with only two dissenting Senate votes, provided the legal basis for the conflict's future expansion, including massive bombing raids on North Vietnam, which began in February 1965, and two months later a major deployment of Amer- ican ground troops and the drastic expansion of such forces' operational activities within Vietnam. Only on December 30, 1970, after the Cambodian incursion authorized by Presi- dent Richard Nixon that spring, did an increas- ingly restive Congress repeal the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Skeptical congressional reluctance to ever again give a president a similar blank check was a major factor in the passage of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, drastically lim- iting the chief executive's future ability to de- ploy U.S. troops in combat situations.

[H.J. Res. 1145]

To promote the maintenance of interna- tional peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist re- gime in Vietnam, in violation of the princi- ples of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval ves- sels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a delib- erate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Viet- nam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the col- lective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep- resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all neces- sary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably as- sured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Source: "Text of Joint Resolution, August 7," *De- partment of State Bulletin* 51, no. 1313 (1964): 268.

Chinese Announcement of Nuclear Test (October 16, 1964)

In 1945 the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly. The Soviet Union rushed to develop its own nuclear weapons and the so-called nu- clear arms race began. The Soviet Union det- onated its first nuclear device in September 1949. In 1951 the People's Republic of China (PRC) signed a secret agreement with the So- viet Union by which China provided uranium

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ores in exchange for Soviet assistance in the nuclear field. Thereafter, Chinese scientists worked clandestinely to develop nuclear weap- ons. Chinese leaders made a formal decision to develop an independent strategic nuclear force sometime around early 1956. During the 1950s, the Soviets provided vital technical and material assistance including an experimental nuclear reactor, facilities for processing ura- nium, a cyclotron, and gaseous diffusion equip- ment. The cooling of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s ended Soviet help and convinced Chinese leaders to con- tinue their nation's nuclear development pro- gram on their own. Chinese leaders wanted to break the nuclear monopoly held by the other superpowers, ensure security against Soviet and U.S. threats, and enhance Chinese pres- tige and power. To develop an atomic bomb, China had to choose between producing Pu239 from a reactor or developing the method of pro- ducing U235 through isotope separation. Al- though technically more challenging, Chinese scientists chose to separate physically U235 and U238 isotopes. To the surprise of western observers, Chinese scientists made remarkable progress in pursuing this path.

The first Chi- nese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Nor on October 16, 1964, using uranium 235 as the nu- clear fuel. China was the fifth nation to develop a nuclear weapon. Henceforth, nuclear tensions associated with the Cold War would play out in a more complex world. China launched its first nuclear missile on October 25, 1966, and deto- nated its first hydrogen bomb on June 14, 1967. For the remainder of the Cold War, Chinese nu- clear capacity constrained American decision makers, particularly during the Vietnam War.

The Atomic Bomb, *Statement of the Gov- ernment of the People's Republic of China, October 16, 1964*

China exploded an atomic bomb at 15:00 hours on October 16, 1964, thereby success- fully carrying out its first nuclear test. This is a major achievement of the Chinese people in their struggle to strengthen their national

defence and oppose the U.S. imperialist pol- icy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats. To defend oneself is the inalienable right of every sovereign state. To safeguard world peace is the common task of all peace-loving countries. China cannot remain idle in the face of the ever increasing nuclear threats from the United States. China is conducting nuclear tests and developing nuclear weap-

ons under compulsion.
The Chinese Government has consistently

advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. If this had been achieved, China need not have developed nuclear weapons. But our pro- posal has met with stubborn resistance from the U.S. imperialists. The Chinese Govern- ment pointed out long ago that the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests signed in Moscow in July 1963 by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union was a big fraud to fool the people of the world, that it was an attempt to consolidate the nuclear monopoly of the three nuclear powers and tie the hands of all peace-loving countries, and that it had increased, and not decreased, the nuclear threat of U.S. imperialism against the people of China and of the whole world. . . .

The atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This fa- mous statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our

view at present. China is developing nuclear weapons not because it believes in their omnipotence nor because it plans to use them. On the contrary, in developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government is loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We believe in the people. It is the people, and not any weapons, that decide the outcome of a war. The destiny of China is decided by the Chinese people,

while the destiny of the world is decided by the people of the world, and not by nu- clear weapons. China is developing nuclear weapons for defence and for protecting the Chinese people from U.S. threats to launch a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government hereby sol- emnly declares that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. . . .

The Chinese Government will, as always, exert every effort to promote, through inter- national consultations, the realization of the lofty aim of complete prohibition and thor- ough destruction of nuclear weapons. Until that day comes, the Chinese Government and people will firmly and unswervingly follow their own path to strengthen their na- tional defence, defend their motherland and safeguard world peace.

We are convinced that man, who creates nuclear weapons, will certainly be able to eliminate them.

Source: Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 1–5. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ mod/1964china-bomb.html.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968)

By the early 1960s, the United States, Brit- ain, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and France had all developed nuclear weapons. Although wedded to main- taining their own nuclear forces, the first three of these powers were all keen to

keep the “nu- clear club” exclusive and to prevent the further spread of such weapons to smaller and weaker nations. One fear was that weak governments might not be able to maintain adequate secu- rity over their nuclear programs. For much of the 1960s, negotiations on the subject

continued at the United Nations (UN). The goal of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was to prevent the spread and development of nuclear weaponry. The treaty was signed by 130 nations in 1968 and went into effect on March 5, 1970. Signatory powers who pos- sessed nuclear weapons bound themselves not to transfer such technology to nonnuclear powers, while those who did not possess nu- clear weapons pledged not to develop them. Neither France nor China agreed to sign the treaty until 1992, and despite widespread in- ternational condemnation, both countries con- tinued to develop their nuclear arsenals and on occasion to provide assistance that enabled other states to develop nuclear weapons. It was widely believed, though never confirmed, that Israel possessed a nuclear deterrent. By the late 20th century, several states had disre- garded the treaty’s provisions. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, and both Pakistan and India detonated nuclear devices in May 1998. In the early 21st century, Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) also mounted programs apparently intended to develop nuclear weapons, causing much alarm to the United States and West European powers, as the number of nu- clear-armed states seemed likely to increase appreciably over the next decades.

[. . .]

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any re- cipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, en- courage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive

devices directly, or indirectly; not to manu- facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weap- ons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safe- guards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the In- ternational Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to prevent- ing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Proce- dures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facil- ity or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fis- sionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty under- takes not to provide: (a) source or spe-

cial fissionable material, or (b) equip- ment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner de- signed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological devel- opment of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use

or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or to- gether with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratifi- cation or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be inter- preted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to par- ticipate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or interna- tional organizations to the further de- velopment of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due con- sideration for the needs of the develop- ing areas of the world.

Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in ac- cordance with this Treaty, under appropri- ate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, poten- tial benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made avail- able to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for re- search and development. Non-nuclear- weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agree- ments, through an appropriate international

body with adequate representation of non- nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nu- clear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pur- suant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on ef- fective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nu- clear disarmament, and on a Treaty on gen- eral and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

[. . .]

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

[. . .]

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that ex- traordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the

United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

[. . .]

Source: "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," July 1, 1968, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 2.1, pt. 484.

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (May 26, 1972)

One major objective of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kiss- inger in seeking détente with the Soviet Union was to conclude agreements limiting the fur- ther growth of nuclear weapons and antibal- listic missile (ABM) systems. At a May 1972 summit meeting in Moscow, Nixon and So- viet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed two stra- tegic arms limitation treaties, jointly known as SALT I, which took effect the following October. The ABM Treaty limited antibal- listic missile defense sites in each country to two, neither hosting more than 100 ABMs. The Interim Agreement froze for five years the number of nuclear warheads each side pos- sessed, giving the Soviets numerical superior- ity (2,328 to the American 1,710) in exchange for accepting the American lead in multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the de- livery system. SALT I allowed its signatories to upgrade their nuclear weaponry provided they observed these limits. Although Ameri- can conservatives regarded them with suspi- cion, these treaties were widely viewed as a

diplomatic triumph for Nixon and were the first major arms control agreements concluded since the beginning of the Cold War. Further warming in Soviet–American

relations was anticipated. Several Soviet–American com- mercial agreements followed the disarma- ment accords, providing for Soviet purchases of $750 million of American grain, largely financed by American credits; various busi- ness contracts; maritime understandings; and comprehensive trade agreements settling out- standing Soviet debts to the United States and promising the Soviets most-favored trading nation status. At a second Nixon–Brezhnev summit, held in Washington in June 1973, the two leaders signed the Agreement on Pre- vention of Nuclear War, binding them to con- sult whenever international crises that might precipitate nuclear war between them or with other states arose and to act "in such a manner as to help prevent the development of situa- tions capable of causing a dangerous exacer- bation of their relations." They also concluded four executive agreements on oceanography, transport, agricultural research, and cultural exchange and issued a declaration of prin- ciples intended to accelerate talks at Geneva designed to produce a second and permanent nuclear arms limitation agreement (SALT II). Airline services were expanded, and trade mis- sions were established. The SALT agreements seemed a triumph for Nixon–Kissinger trian- gular diplomacy, promising further progress in the direction of Soviet–American détente, but in practice they marked its high tide.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein- after referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limita- tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the cre- ation of more favorable conditions for ac- tive negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international

tension and the strengthening of trust be- tween States,

Taking into account the relationship be- tween strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construc- tion of additional fixed land-based intercon- tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land- based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construc- tion on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agree- ment may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assur- ance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use de- liberate concealment measures which impede verification by national techni- cal means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conver- sion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementa- tion of the provisions of this Interim Agree- ment, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accor- dance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active ne- gotiations for limitations on strategic offen- sive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices

of acceptance by each Party, which ex- change shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of rat- ification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years un- less replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strate- gic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its na- tional sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that

extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this In- terim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
[. . .]

Source: "Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social- ist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," May 26, 1972, U.S. State Department, http://www.state. gov/t/ac/trt/4795.htm.

U.S.War Powers Act (November 7, 1973)

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, many American senators and congressmen resented the way in which President Lyndon B. John- son, after the passage of the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorizing him to take such measures as he considered appropriate to deal with the situation in Vietnam, had

sought no further congressional authorization before committing more than 500,000 military personnel to that country. Congress also resented the way in which Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, had felt free to expand the war beyond Vietnam, launching heavy bomb- ing raids on both Laos and Cambodia and even sending American forces to invade the latter country for two months in May and June 1970. In November 1973 Congress passed a joint res- olution, the terms of which required the presi- dent to consult with Congress before beginning hostilities with another country and at regular intervals during the course of such hostilities. Unless Congress voted either to declare war or to approve the use of U.S. forces in a hostile sit- uation, the president was required to withdraw all military personnel within 60 days, with at most an additional 30 days should circumstances make such an extension unavoidable. President Nixon vetoed the resolution, but Con- gress found the two-thirds majority necessary to pass it. Successive presidents stated that they considered it unconstitutional but nonetheless observed its provisions, and by the early 21st century, presidents had submitted 118 reports to Congress in connection with the War Pow- ers Act. The occasions on which it was invoked included U.S. participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions as well as before the interventions in Grenada and Panama and prior to the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President.

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Short Title Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the “War Powers Resolution”.

Purpose and Policy

Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint reso- lution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and in- sure that the collective judgement of both the

Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where im- minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Con- stitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the Presi- dent as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involve- ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statu- tory authorization, or (3) a national emer- gency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Consultation

Sec. 3. The President in every possible in- stance shall consult with Congress before in- troducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by

the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

Reporting

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, re- pair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writ- ing, setting forth—

. (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

. (B) the constitutional and legislative au- thority under which such introduc- tion took place; and

. (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

. (b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

. (c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any sit- uation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to

the Congress periodi- cally on the status of such hos- tilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such

hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

Congressional Action

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so trans- mitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa- tives and to the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropri- ate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a re- port is submitted or is required to be submit- ted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or re- quired to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a spe- cific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty- day period, or (3) is physi- cally unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty- day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed

Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territo- ries without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

[. . .]

Source: War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93– 148, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (November 7, 1973).

Yuri Andropov: Memorandum to Brezhnev on Afghanistan (December 1979)

In April 1978 the Marxist People's Demo- cratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP) overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, executing Daoud and his fam- ily and seizing power itself. PDP secretary- general Nur Muhammad Taraki became prime minister, and in December 1978 he signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union under whose terms sub- stantial Soviet aid and several hundred military advisers were dispatched to Kabul, the capital. Taraki was himself overthrown and killed in a palace coup in September 1979 that placed his deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, in power. Facing a guerrilla insurgency sup- ported by the United States, Amin likewise relied heavily on Soviet military equipment and advisers, but on December 28, 1979, his Russian patrons, considering him too unreli- able, organized a coup in which Soviet forces stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin. Former deputy prime minister Babrak Karmal, at that time ambassador to Czecho- slovakia, succeeded him. Moscow apparently hoped that removing Amin would restore some kind of stability in Afghanistan. Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, warned that

Amin was unable to maintain order and was likely to shift to the West, follow neutralist policies, and move against his Soviet advis- ers. Initially, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev rejected no fewer than 18 requests for assis- tance from Babrak and other Afghan com- munists outside the country, but it seems that eventually warnings that Amin was moving against "suspect persons" and might take ac- tion against the Soviet military advisers al- ready present in the country tipped the balance. Soviet ground forces and paratroopers entered the country on December 27, 1979, and re- mained there for almost a decade. Anticommu- nist Afghan guerrillas (mujahideen), many of them wedded to fundamentalist Islamic princi- ples, proved as intransigent toward the Babrak government as they had been to Amin's. The coup marked the beginning of a lengthy stale- mated war

in which more than 15,000 Soviet troops and almost one million Afghans died in a guerrilla conflict often compared, in its effect upon the Soviet Union, to the entanglement of the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

Personal memorandum from Andropov to Brezhnev

December 1979

1. After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan began to undertake an undesir- able turn for us. The situation in the party, the army and the government apparatus has become more acute, as they were essentially destroyed as a result of the mass repressions carried out by Amin. At the same time, alarming information started to arrive about Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and to adopt a "policy of neutral- ity." Closed meetings in which attacks were

made against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our headquarters in Kabul, etc. The diplo- matic circles in Kabul are widely talking of Amin's differences with Moscow and his possible anti-Soviet steps.

All this has created, on the one hand, the danger of losing the gains made by the April [1978] revolution (the scale of insurgent attacks will increase by spring) within the country, while on the other hand—the threat to our positions in Afghanistan (right now there is no guarantee that Amin, in order to protect his personal power, will not shift to the West), [There has been] a growth of anti- Soviet sentiments within the population.

2. Recently we were contacted by group of Afghan communists abroad. In the course of our contact with Babrak [Karmal] and [Asa- dullah] Sarwari, it became clear (and they in- formed us of this) that they have worked out a plan for opposing Amin and creating new party and state organs. But Amin,

as a preven- tive measure, has begun mass arrests of ‘sus- pect persons’ (300 people have been shot).

In these conditions, Babrak and Sarwari, without changing their plans of opposition, have raised the question of possible assis- tance, in case of need, including military. We have two battalions stationed in Kabul and there is the capability of rendering such assistance. It appears that this is entirely sufficient for a successful operation. But, as a precautionary measure in the event of unforeseen complications, it would be wise to have a military group close to the border. In case of the deployment of military forces we could at the same time decide various questions pertaining to the liquidation of gangs.

The implementation of the given opera- tion would allow us to decide the question of defending the gains of the April revolution, establishing Leninist principles in the party

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and state leadership of Afghanistan, and se- curing our positions in this country.

Source: “Personal Memorandum Andropov to Bre- zhnev, 12/01/1979, APRF, from notes taken by A. F. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Insti- tute.” Published in translation in Cold War Interna- tional History Project Virtual Archive. http://cwihp. org.

Civil Defense Instructions for Home Fallout Shelters (1980)

During the Cold War, the U.S. government devoted enormous energy to preparations de- signed to enable Americans to survive a nu- clear war. Top federal government officials were expected to take refuge in huge shel- ters hollowed out in the Catoctin Mountains near Washington, D.C. Businesses, govern- ment agencies, and other organizations were encouraged to include nuclear shelters when constructing new buildings or to adapt exist- ing structures to include them. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also urged individual families to add their own personal fallout shelters to their homes. To as- sist in such undertakings, FEMA published a range of pamphlets giving detailed plans for a variety of shelters designed to suit every fam- ily’s and house’s particular circumstances. The majority were intended to take advantage of existing basements: individuals could choose between two models of Modified Ceiling Shel- ter, the Concrete Block Shelter, the Tilt-Up Storage Unit Shelter, and the Lean-To Shelter. Families without a basement were not forgot- ten. They could opt for the aboveground home shelter, which could double “as a tool shed or workshop,” or the outside concrete shelter,

whose “roof . . . can be used as an attractive patio.” Each pamphlet was an illustrated man- ual giving detailed plans for the appropriate shelter’s construction, listing the materials that would be needed, describing the topographical situations that a particular shelter was most ad- vantageously designed to meet, and even men- tioning suppliers of suitable ventilators and plumbing. Further manuals gave advice as to

what supplies should be stored in a given shel- ter for particular family sizes. The home shelter program was intended to allay public fears and convince Americans that nuclear war was sur- vivable but may well have simply contributed to a lurking sense of Cold War insecurity and vulnerability.

Aboveground Home Shelter

General information

This family shelter is intended for persons who prefer an aboveground shelter or, for some reason such as a high water table, can- not have a belowground shelter. In general, belowground shelter is superior and more economical than an aboveground shelter.

The shelter is designed to meet the stan- dard of protection against fallout radiation that has been established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for public fallout shelters. It can also be constructed to provide significant protection from the blast and fire effects of a nuclear explosion. It has sufficient space to shelter six adults.

The shelter can be built of two rows of concrete blocks, one 12″ and one 8″, filled with sand or grout, or of poured reinforced concrete. Windows have been omitted; therefore, electric lights are recommended for day to day use.

The details and construction methods are considered typical. If materials other than shown are selected—for example, concrete block faced with brick—care should be taken to provide at least the same weight of materials per square foot: 200 lb. per sq. ft. in the walls and 100 lb. per sq. ft. in the roof. The wood frame roof over the rein- forced concrete ceiling probably would be blown off by extremely high winds such as caused by a blast wave or tornado. However the wood frame roof is intended primarily for appearance; the concrete ceiling pro- vides the protection. When using the shelter

for protection against high winds, DO NOT place the concrete blocks in the doorway or windows.

This structure has been designed for areas where frost does not penetrate the ground more than 20 inches. If 20 inches is not a sufficient depth for footings, one or two additional courses of concrete blocks may be used to lower the footings. Average soil bearing pressure is 1,500 lb. per sq. ft. Most soils can be assumed to support this pressure without special testing or investigation.

The baffle wall outside the entrance to the shelter is extended out 7´4˝ to allow storage of lawn equipment such as wheel-barrows and lawn mowers. If additional space is de- sired, extend this dimension.

Before starting to build the shelter, make certain that the plan conforms to the local building code. Obtain a building permit if required. If the shelter is to be built by a contractor, engage a reliable firm that offers

protection from liability or other claims aris- ing from its construction.

FIRST ALTERNATIVE indicates win- dows in the workshop area. Solid blocks, equal to a thickness of 12 inches, should be available to fill these openings to provide ade- quate fallout protection. Window sizes should be kept small. When using the shelter for pro- tection against high winds, do not place the concrete blocks in the doorway or windows.

SECOND ALTERNATIVE shows the cement block faced with bricks. Use one course 4-inch brick and two courses of 8-inch cement block to obtain the required weight per unit area.

THIRD ALTERNATIVE is to attach the tool shed or workshop to the house, with a covered area between. In this case, the fac- ing materials should match the house.

FOURTH ALTERNATIVE is to install built-up roofing of asphalt or tar, or other wearing surface, on top of the concrete deck.



Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Aboveground Home Shelter, Pamphlet H-12–2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, 1980).

U.S. Government: Disappearances and Human Rights,Three Document Excerpts (1980–1996)

In 1979 a U.S. congressional committee took up the issue of postwar disappearances into the Soviet Union. The most prominent of these was the disappearance of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg while in Soviet hands. In 1944 Wallenberg—acting on the request of the American War Refugee Board—had risked his life to rescue thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis. He was apparently ab- ducted and taken from Hungary by the Soviets in 1945 and his fate remains unknown despite continuing efforts by the Swedish government and human rights advocates. Soviet authorities first denied knowledge of Wallenberg's fate, but then claimed that he died in a Soviet prison in 1947. Following reports by former prisoners that they had seen Wallenberg alive, in 1980 Congress passed a joint resolution (presented here) decrying Wallenberg's disappearance as a violation of human rights principles stated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. A number of Americans believe that the Soviets and their al- lies also retained more than 20,000 U.S. prison- ers of war after World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War and incarcerated them in the Soviet Union. In order to investigate these allegations, the United States and a post–Cold War Russia formed the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs in 1992. In addition, Congress es- tablished a Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The following excerpts from the Sen- ate's 1993 report and the Commission's 1996 report state that no evidence exists to back up the claim that the Soviets incarcerated thou- sands of American servicemen. However, in- vestigations continued into several reports that appeared to have substance regarding postwar disappearances of American servicemen.

House Concurrent Resolution 404 (August 20, 1980)

Human Rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Organizations.

House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session on H. Con. Res. 434.

September 16 and 24, 1980.
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-

ington: 1980.

H. Con. Res. 404

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should convey to the Soviet Government the deep concern of the Con- gress and the American

people for the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that the United States delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should urge consideration of the case of Raoul Wal- lenberg at that meeting by the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act.

In the House of Representatives
August 20, 1980
Mr. Dodd (for himself, Ms. Holtzman,

Mr. Maguire, Mr. Wolfe, Mr. Lehman, Mr. Scheuer, Mr. Stark, Mr. Ford of Tennessee, Mr. Matsul, Mr. AuCoin, Mr. Bungham, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Ambro, Mr. Blanchard, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Pepper, Mr. Drinan, Mr. Garcia, Mr. Roe, Mr. Beilenson, Mr. Portee, Mr. Fazio, Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Whitehurst, Mr. Corman, Mr. Rodino, Mr. Yates, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Edwards of California, Mr. Horton, Mr. Evans of the Virgin Islands, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Ottinger, Mr. Richmond, Mr. Gray, and Mr. Dougherty), submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Concurrent Resolution

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should convey to the Soviet Government the deep concern of the Con- gress and the American people for the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that the United States delegation to the Madrid Conference on Se- curity and Cooperation in Europe should urge consideration of the case of Raoul Wal- lenberg at that meeting by the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act.

Whereas in July 1944, at the request of the American War Refugee Board and the Swedish Government, Swedish Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg undertook a mission of mercy to Bedapest, Hungary, as a result of which thousands of Hungarian Jews were saved;

Whereas considerable evidence exists that Raoul Wallenberg was abducted by So- viet forces in Hungary in 1945, in violation of international standards of diplomatic im- munity;

Whereas Soviet officials originally de- nied having custody of Wallenberg, but subsequently stated that a prisoner named "Walenberg" died in a Soviet prison in 1947;

Whereas reports from former Soviet pris- oners indicate that Wallenberg may not have died in 1947 but may still be alive in a Soviet prison;

Whereas significance of Wallenberg's he- roic and humanitarian actions has been ob- scured by the wall of silence that surrounds his fate;

Whereas the continued internment of Wallenberg, if indeed he is still alive, is in direct contravention of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Coop- eration in Europe, which states: "The par- ticipating states will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . and fulfill in good faith their obligations under interna- tional law. . ."; and

Whereas the purpose of the Madrid Con- ference on Security and Cooperation in Eu- rope to be held in November, as stated at the Belgrade Conference held in 1978, is to "continue the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE" to review compliance with the Helsinki Final Act: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representa- tives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the

3 President should express to the Soviet Government the deep

4 concern of the Congress and the Ameri- can people for the fate

5 of Raoul Wallenberg, and should urge the Soviet Govern-

6 ment to cooperate fully in ascertaining his fate.

7 Sec. 2. It is further the sense of the Con- gress that the

8 United States delegation to the review meeting of the Con-

9 ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which will be

10 held in Madrid in November 1980 should urge that the case

11 of Raoul Wallenberg be considered at that meeting by the

12 signatory countries to the Final Act of the Helsinki Confer-

13 ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Source: House Concurrent Resolution 404 (Au- gust 20, 1980).

Excerpt: Senate Report 103–1, Report of the Select Committee on POW / MIA Affairs (January 13, 1993)

Senate Report 103-1 POW / MIA'S REPORT
OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW / MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE January 13, 1993 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DEDICATION

To POWs

This report begins with three tributes, the first to those Americans who have been imprisoned in any war. Each person who has worn the uniform and fought the battle understands the nature of sacrifice. And there is a sense in which anyone caught in a firefight, flying through flak, patrolling the jungle while sensing ambush or work- ing desperately to perform triage in a make-shift hospital, is a prisoner of war. But we owe a special debt of respect and gratitude to those who were captured and yet still kept faith, even while deprived of their freedom, victimized by brutal tortures, and forced to battle not only their captors, but the tempta- tion to yield to self-pity and despair.

In the words of former POW, Admiral James Stockdale:

Young Americans in Hanoi learned fast. They made no deals. (In the end) the prisoner learns he can't be hurt and he can't be had as long as he tells the truth and clings to that forgiving hand of the brothers who are becoming his country, his family . . .

What does it all come down to? It does not come down to coping or supplication or hatred or strength be- yond the grasp of any normal person. It comes down to comradeship, and it comes down to pride, dignity, an en- during sense of self-worth and to that enigmatic mixture of conscience and egoism called personal honor.[1]

To the families

America's POWs and servicemen have met the test of personal honor, and so have the families of those still missing from past American wars. For these families, the wounds of conflict have been especially slow to heal. For them, there have been no joyous reunions, nor even the solace of cer- tainty ratified by a flagdraped casket and the solemn sound of taps. There has been no grave to visit and often no peace from gnaw- ing doubt. For them, there has been only the search for answers through years when they did not have active and visible support from their own government to the present day when our ability to get real answers has finally been enhanced. Their search for answers is truly understandable because to them, POW/MIA is not merely an issue or a symbolic figure on a black and white flag, it is a brother, a husband, a father or a son. These families, too, deserve our nation's gratitude and to them, as to their loved ones, we pay tribute.

To those who remembered

We salute, as well, the veterans and re- sponsible activist groups who have never stopped pushing for answers. These are the people who fought against the forget- ting; who persisted in their questioning; and whose concerns led directly to the creation of the Select Committee. The Committee's investigation has validated their efforts, for they had good reason to argue that the full story was not being told, to suggest that there was more to learn and to insist that a renewed focus on the issue would produce greater pressure and yield new results.

It is to these Americans, therefore, to the POWs who returned and to all those who did not, to the families and veterans who kept the memory alive, that we pay tribute, and

to whom we have dedicated the work of this Committee, including this final report.

The Committee's Purpose

The most basic principle of personal honor in America's armed forces is never willingly to leave a fellow serviceman be- hind. The black granite wall on the Mall in Washington is filled with the names of those who died in the effort to save their comrades in arms. That bond of loyalty and obligation which spurred so many soldiers to sacri- fice themselves is mirrored by the obliga- tion owed to every soldier by our nation, in whose name those sacrifices were made.

Amidst the uncertainties of war, every soldier is entitled to one certainty—that he will not be forgotten. As former POW Eu- gene "Red" McDaniel put it, as an American asked to serve:

I was prepared to fight, to be wounded, to be captured, and even prepared to die, but I was not prepared to be abandoned.

The Senate Select Committee on POW/ MIA Affairs was created to ensure that our nation meets its obligation to the missing and to the families of those still listed as unaccounted for from the war in Southeast Asia or prior conflicts. As past years have shown, that obligation cannot fully be paid with sympathy, monuments, medals, ben- efits or flags. It is an obligation—a solemn duty—that can be met only with the best and most complete answers that are within our power to provide.

Tragically, and for reasons found both at home and abroad, those answers have been slow in coming. Our nation has been haunted by the possibility

that some of the missing may have survived and that, some- where in Southeast Asia, brave men remain in captivity.

Although we know that the circumstances of war make it impossible for us to learn what happened to all the missing, we have been haunted, as well, by our knowledge that there are some answers from Southeast Asia we could have had long ago, but have been denied. Because our wartime adversar- ies in Vietnam and Laos have been so slow to provide the answers, the American people turned to the U.S. Government for help, but events over the past 20 years have un- dermined the public's trust. The Indochina war, itself, was partly a secret war and re- cords were falsified at the time to maintain that secrecy. The Paris Peace Accords prom- ised answers to POW/MIA families, but the war between North and South Vietnam did not stop, and for the families of many, the answers did not come. Ever-changing De- fense Department policies confused fami- lies and others about the official status of the missing and obscured even the number of men who might possibly have remained alive. The official penchant for secrecy left many families, activists and even Members of Congress unable to share fully in their own government's knowledge about the fate of fellow citizens and loved ones and this, more than anything, contributed to the atmo- sphere of suspicion and doubt.

Underpinning all this, the POW/MIA issue is alive today because of a fundamen- tal conflict between the laws of probability and the dictates of human nature. On a sub- ject as personal and emotional as the sur- vival of a family member, there is nothing more difficult than to be asked to accept the probability of death when the possibility of life remains. Since Operation Homecoming, the U.S. Government has sought to avoid raising the hopes of POW/ MIA families; it has talked about the need to maintain per- spective and about the lack of convincing evidence that Americans remain alive. But

U.S. officials cannot produce evidence that all of the missing are dead; and because they have been so careful not to raise false hopes, they have left themselves open to the charge that they have given up hope. This, too, has contributed to public and family mistrust.

Many of the factors that led to controversy surrounding the fates of Vietnam-era POW/ MIAs are present, as well, with respect to the missing from World War II, Korea and the Cold War. Here, too, there have been barriers to gaining information from foreign governments; excessive secrecy on the part of our own government; and provocative re- ports—official and unofficial—about what might have happened to those left behind.

The Select Committee was created be- cause of the need to reestablish trust be- tween our government and our people on this most painful and emotional of issues. It was created to investigate and tell publicly the complete story about what our govern- ment knows and has known, and what it is doing and has done on behalf of our POW/ MIAs. It was created to examine the possi-bility that unaccounted for Americans might have survived in captivity after POW repa- triations at Odessa in World War II, after Operation Big Switch in Korea in 1953, after Cold War incidents, and particularly after Operation Homecoming in Vietnam in 1973. It was created to ensure that account- ing for missing Americans will be a matter of highest national priority, not only in word but in practice. It was created to encourage real cooperation from foreign governments. It was created, in short, to pursue the truth, at home and overseas.

Whether the Committee has succeeded in its assigned tasks will be a matter for the public and for history to judge. Clearly, we cannot claim, nor could we have hoped, to have learned everything. We had neither the authority nor the resources to make case

by case determinations with respect to the status of the missing. The job of negotiat- ing, conducting interviews, visiting prisons, excavating crash sites, investigating live- sighting reports and evaluating archival ma- terials can only be completed by the Execu- tive branch. This job, long frustrated by the intransigence of foreign governments, will take time to complete notwithstanding the recent improvements in cooperation, espe- cially from Vietnam. The Committee takes considerable pride, however, in its contribu-tion, through oversight, to improvements in the accountability process, and in the record of information and accomplishment it leaves behind.

That record includes the most rapid and extensive declassification of public files and documents on a single issue in Ameri- can history. It includes a set of hearings and Committee files in which virtually every part of the POW/MIA controversy has been ex- amined. It includes disclosure after disclo- sure about aspects of U.S. policy and actions that have never before been made public. It includes a rigorous, public examination of relevant U.S. intelligence information. It in- cludes an exposure of the activities of some private groups who have sought inexcusably to exploit the anguish of POW/MIA families for their own gain. It includes a contribution to changed policies that is reflected on the ground in Vietnam in the form of unprec- edented access to prisons, military bases, government buildings, documents, photo- graphs, archives and material objects that bear on the fate of our missing servicemen. And it includes encouraging the Executive branch to establish a process of live-sighting response, investigation and evaluation that is more extensive and professional than ever before.

How then, one might ask, does this issue get brought to a close? There is no simple

answer to that question. Clearly, the desire for closure cannot override the obligation to pursue promising leads. Just as clearly, our future expectations must be confined within the borders of what the chaotic cir- cumstances of war, the passage of time, the evidence of survival and the logic of human motivation allow.

We want to make clear that this report is not intended to close the door on this issue. It is meant to open it. We knew at the outset that we could never answer all the questions that exist. In fact, some questions may never be answered or are more properly answered by other branches of government.

What we set out to accomplish, however, was to guarantee that the doors and windows of government were opened so that Ameri- cans would know where to go for informa- tion, so that the information would, to the greatest degree possible, be available, so that an unparalleled record would exist on which to

base judgments, and so that a pro- cess of accountability would be in place to provide answers over time. We have accom- plished our goal.

The Committee believes that a process is now in place that, over time, will provide ad- ditional answers. Americans can have confi- dence that our current efforts can ultimately resolve this painful issue. As this Com- mittee's investigation of World War II and Korea shows, new information can come un- expectedly, years after the fact. That is why our goal must not be to put the issue to rest, but to press the search for answers and, in this case, to go to the source for those an- swers in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

We must build on recent progress to guarantee that we reach the limits of what is knowable through an accounting pro- cess that is professional, open, genuine and unrestricted. We must constantly measure whether the promises and commitments of

foreign governments are being fulfilled. We must maintain the momentum that has built at the highest levels within our own country to continue the search for new information. And we must ensure that as long as there is good reason to hope for more answers, our national obligation to pursue those answers continues, as a matter of honor, and as a duty to all those who have or who someday will put their lives at risk in service to our country.

The Committee's Methods and Approach

The POW/MIA issue has proven almost as emotional and controversial as the Viet- nam War itself. As mentioned above, vig- orous disagreements have caused some to be accused of conspiracy and betrayal; and others to be accused of allowing their hopes to obscure their reason. The Committee has sought to transform this troubled atmo- sphere by encouraging all participants in the debate to join forces in an objective search for the truth.

Because the overriding hope and objec- tive of the Committee was to identify in- formation that would lead to the rescue or release of one or more live U.S. POWs, the Committee gave first priority to investi- gation of issues related to our most recent war, the conflict in Vietnam. Nevertheless, substantial resources were devoted to seek- ing and reviewing information concerning Americans missing from World War II, the Korean War and the Cold War.

To ensure credibility, the Committee has operated on a nonpartisan basis, with a non- partisan staff, directed by Members equally divided between the two parties.

To ensure perspective, the Committee sought the guidance of family members, activists, veterans' organizations and many others about how to conduct the investiga- tion, where to focus, whom to consult and

what issues to address. Every single individ- ual or group that has claimed to have infor- mation on the issue has been invited—and in a few cases repeatedly invited—to provide it. Former U.S. POWs from the Indochina War were contacted and asked to share their knowledge and all previous inquiries and in- vestigations on the subject were reviewed.

To ensure thoroughness, the Committee requested, and received, access to the re- cords of a wide range of U.S. Government agencies, including intelligence agencies and the White House. Unlike previous in- vestigators, we refused to accept "national security" as grounds for denying informa- tion and obtained assurances from the high- est levels of government that no relevant information would be withheld.[2] We trav- eled overseas to Moscow, Pyongyang, and several times to Southeast Asia for face to face talks with foreign officials and gained access to long-secret archives and facilities in Russia, Vietnam and North Korea. And we solicited the sworn testimonies of virtu- ally every living U.S. military and civilian official or former official who has played a major role in POW/MIA affairs over the past 20 years.

To ensure openness, the Committee's hearings were held almost entirely in pub- lic session. Among these were first-ever public hearings on POW-related signal and photographic intelligence and thorough dis- cussions of live-sighting reports. Also, the Committee has worked with the Executive branch to declassify and make public more than one million pages of Committee, De- fense Department, State Department, intel- ligence community and White House docu- ments, including Committee depositions, related to POW/MIA matters. The Com- mittee believes that this process must—and will—continue until all relevant documents are declassified.[3]

We believe that the Select Committee's hearing and investigatory process provide grounds for pride on the part of every Amer- ican. The Committee's very existence was a testament to the effectiveness of public ac- tion. And although offensive to a few and painful to some, the rigorous examination of current and former high government offi- cials and some private citizens on a matter of public interest is what democratic account- ability is all about. Members of the Commit- tee asked difficult and probing questions in order to ensure the fullest possible explora- tion of the issue. And, indeed, the Commit- tee's own work has been subject to rigorous public questioning and that, too, has been healthy and appropriate.

Summary of Findings and Recommendations ***Americans "last known alive" in Southeast Asia***

Information available to our negotiators and government officials responsible for the repatriation of prisoners indicated that a group of approximately 100 American civil- ians and servicemen expected to return at Op- eration Homecoming did not.[4] Some of these men were known to have been taken captive; some were known only to have survived their incidents; others were thought likely to have survived. The White House expected that these individuals would be accounted for by our adversaries, either as alive or dead, when the war came to an end. Because they were not accounted for then, despite our protests, nor in the period immediately following when the trail was freshest and the evidence strongest, twenty years of agony over this issue began. This was the moment when the POW/ MIA controversy was born.

The failure of our Vietnam war adversar- ies to account for these "last known alive"

Americans meant that families who had had good reason to expect the return of their loved ones instead had cause for renewed grief. Amidst their sorrow, the nation hailed the war's end; the President said that all our POWs are "on the way home";[5] and the De- fense Department, following standard pro-

cedures, began declaring missing men dead. Still, the governments in Southeast Asia did not cooperate, and the answers that these families deserved did not come. In 1976, the Montgomery Committee concluded that because there was no evidence that miss- ing Americans had survived, they must be dead.[6] In 1977, a Defense Department offi- cial said that the distinction between Ameri- cans still listed as "POW" and those listed as "missing" had become "academic".[7] Nixon, Ford and Carter Administration officials all dismissed the possibility that American POWs had survived in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming.[8]

This Committee has uncovered evidence that precludes it from taking the same view. We acknowledge that there is no proof that U.S. POWs survived, but neither is there proof that all of those who did not return had died. There is evidence, moreover, that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small number, after Operation Home- coming:

First, there are the Americans known or thought possibly to have been alive in captivity who did not come back; we cannot dismiss the chance that some of these known prisoners remained captive past Operation Homecoming.

Second, leaders of the Pathet Lao claimed throughout the war that they were hold- ing American prisoners in Laos. Those claims were believed—and, up to a point, validated—at the time; they can- not be dismissed summarily today.

Third, U.S. defense and intelligence offi- cials hoped that forty or forty-one pris- oners captured in Laos would be released at Operation Homecoming, instead of the twelve who were actually repatri- ated. These reports were taken seriously enough at the time to prompt recommen- dations by some officials for military ac- tion aimed at gaining the release of the additional prisoners thought to be held.

Fourth, information collected by U.S. intel- ligence agencies during the last 19 years, in the form of live-sighting, hearsay, and other intelligence reports, raises ques- tions about the possibility that a small number of unidentified U.S. POWs who did not return may have survived in captivity.

Finally, even after Operation Homecom- ing and returnee debriefs, more than 70 Americans were officially listed as POWs based on information gathered prior to the signing of the peace agree- ment; while the remains of many of these Americans have been repatriated, the fates of some continue unknown

to this day.

Given the Committee's findings, the question arises as to whether it is fair to say that American POWs were knowingly abandoned in Southeast Asia after the war. The answer to that question is clearly no. American officials did not have certain knowledge that any specific prisoner or pris- oners were being left behind. But there re- mains the troubling question of whether the Americans who were expected to return but did not were, as a group, shunted aside and discounted by government and population alike. The answer to that question is essen- tially yes.

Inevitably the question wfll be asked: who is responsible for that? The answer goes be-

yond any one agency, Administration or fac- tion. By the time the peace agreement was signed, a decade of division, demonstrations and debate had left our entire nation weary of killing and tired of involvement in an in- conclusive and morally complex war. The psychology of the times, from rural kitchens to the Halls of Congress to the Oval Office, was to move on; to put the war out of mind; and to focus again on other things. The Pres- ident said, and our nation wanted to believe, that all of our American POWs were on the way home.[9] Watergate loomed; other crises seized our attention. Amidst it all, the ques- tion of POW/MIA accountability faded. In a sense, it, too, became a casualty of war.

The record does indicate that efforts to gain accountability were made. Dr. Henry Kissinger personally raised the issue and lodged protests with Le Duc Tho and lead- ers of the Pathet Lao. Defense and State Department spokesmen told Congress of their continuing dissatisfaction with the ac- counting process; stressed their view that the POW/MIA lists received were not com- plete, and referred to the cases of Americans last known alive as the "most agonizing and frustrating of all."[10]

However, compared to the high-level, high-visibility protests about prisoners made public during the war, post-Homecoming Administration efforts and efforts to inform the American public were primarily low- level and low-key.

Before the peace agreement was signed, those "last known alive," were referred to as "POWs;" afterward, they were publicly, although not technically, lumped together with all of the others called "missing."

Before the agreement, Secretary of De- fense Melvin Laird and other Administra- tion officials had berated the North Vietnam- ese for their failure to disclose the status of these "last known alive" cases, while citing

their dramatic case histories and distributing photographs to the press. After Homecom- ing, Administration criticisms were less vo- ciferous and names and case histories cited only rarely and, even then, not publicly by cabinet officials, but by their assistants and their assistants' assistants."[11]

When the war shut down, so, too, did much of the POW/MIA related intelligence operations. Bureaucratic priorities shifted rapidly and, before long, the POW/MIA ac- counting operation had become more of a bureaucratic backwater than an operations center for matters of life and death.

From the fall of Saigon in 1975 through the early 1980's, efforts to gain answers from the Government of Vietnam and the other communist governments of South- east Asia bore little fruit. In 1982, President Reagan wisely raised the issue of account- ing for our missing to a "matter of highest national priority." In 1987, a Special Presi- dential Emissary to Vietnam was named and serious discussions resumed. More recently, the disintegration of the Soviet empire has opened new doors and created compelling new incentives for foreign cooperation— almost 20 years after the last American sol- dier was withdrawn. Today, the U.S. spends at least $100 million each year on POW/ MIA efforts.

Still, the families wait for answers and, still, the question haunts, is there anyone left alive? The search for a definitive answer to that question prompted the creation of this Committee.

As much as we would hope that no Ameri- can has had to endure twenty years of cap- tivity, if one or more were in fact doing so, there is nothing the Members of the Commit- tee would have liked more than to be able to prove this fact. We would have recommended the use of all available resources to respond to such evidence if it had been found, for

nothing would have been more rewarding than to have been able to re-unite a long- captive American with family and country.

Unfortunately, our hopes have not been realized. This disappointment does not re- flect a failure of the investigation, but rather a confrontation with reality. While the Com- mittee has some evidence suggesting the possibility a POW may have survived to the present, and while some information re- mains yet to be investigated, there is, at this time, no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia.

The Committee cannot prove a negative, nor have we entirely given up hope that one or more U.S. POWs may have survived. As mentioned above, some reports remain to be investigated and new information could be forthcoming. But neither live-sighting re- ports nor other sources of intelligence have provided grounds for encouragement,[12] par- ticularly over the past decade. The live-sight- ing reports that have been resolved have not checked out; alleged pictures of POWs have proven false; purported leads have come up empty; and photographic intelligence has been inconclusive, at best.

In addition to the lack of compelling evi- dence proving that Americans are alive, the majority of Committee Members believes there is also the question of motive. These Members assert that it is one thing to believe that the Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese might have seen reason to hold back Ameri- can prisoners in 1973 or for a short period thereafter; it is quite another to discern a motive for holding prisoners alive in captiv- ity for another 19 years. The Vietnamese and Lao have been given a multitude of oppor- tunities to demand money in exchange for the prisoners some allege they hold but our

investigation has uncovered no credible evi- dence that they have ever done so.

Yes, it is possible even as these coun- tries become more and more open that a prisoner or prisoners could be held deep within a jungle or behind some locked door under conditions of the greatest security. That possibility argues for a live-sighting followup capability that is alert, aggres- sive and predicated on the assumption that a U.S. prisoner or prisoners continue to be held. But, sadly, the Committee cannot pro- vide compelling evidence to support that possibility today.

Finally, there is the question of numbers. Part of the pain caused by this issue has re- sulted from rumors about hundreds or thou- sands of Americans languishing in camps or bamboo cages. The circumstances surround- ing the losses of missing Americans render these reports arithmetically impossible. In order for Americans to judge for themselves, we will append to this report a summary of the facts surrounding each known discrep- ancy case.[13]

An analysis of these incidents will show that:

Only in a few cases did the U.S. Govern- ment know for certain that someone was captured;

In many of the cases, there is only an indi- cation of the potential of capture; and In a large number of the cases, there is a

strong indication that the individual was killed.

The Committee emphasizes that simply because someone was listed as missing in action does not mean that there was any evidence, such as a radio contact, an open parachute or a sighting on the ground, of survival. We may make a presumption that an individual could have survived, and that is the right basis upon which to operate. But a presumption is very different from knowledge or fact, and cannot lead us—in

the absence of evidence—to conclude that someone is alive. Even some of the cases about which we know the most and which show the strongest indication that someone was a prisoner of war leave us with certain doubts as

to what the circumstances were. The bottom line is that there remain only a few cases where we know an unreturned POW was alive in captivity and we do not have evidence that the individual also died while in captivity.

There is at least one aspect of the POW/ MIA controversy that should be laid to rest conclusively with this investigation and that is the issue of conspiracy. Allegations have been made in the past that our government has had a "mindset to debunk" reports that American prisoners have been sighted in Southeast Asia. Our Committee found rea- son to take those allegations seriously. But we also found in some quarters a "mindset to accuse" that has given birth to vast and implausible theories of conspiracy and con- scious betrayal. Those theories are without foundation.

Yes, there have been failures of policy, priority and process. Over the years, until this investigation, the Executive branch's penchant for secrecy and classification con- tributed greatly to perceptions of conspiracy. In retrospect, a more open Policy would have been better. But America's government too closely reflects America's people to have permitted the knowing and willful abandon- ment of U.S. POWs and a subsequent cov- erup spanning almost 20 years and involving literally thousands of people.

The POW/MIA issue is too important and too personal for us to allow it to be driven by theory; it must be driven by fact. Witness after witness was asked by our Committee if they believed in, or had evidence of, a conspiracy either to leave POWs behind or to conceal knowledge of their fates—and

no evidence was produced. The isolated bits of information out of which some have constructed whole labyrinths of intrigue and deception have not withstood the tests of objective investigation; and the vast ar- chives of secret U.S. documents that some felt contained incriminating evidence have been thoroughly examined by the Commit- tee only to fmd that the conspiracy cupboard is bare.

The quest for the fullest possible account- ing of our Vietnam-era POW/MlAs must continue, but if our efforts are to be effective and fair to families, they must go forward within the context of reality, not fiction.

Investigation of issues related to Paris Peace Accords

Most of the questions and controversies that still surround the POW/MIA issue can be traced back to the Paris Peace Accords and their immediate aftermath. If that agree- ment had been implemented in good faith by North Vietnam and with necessary coop- eration from Cambodia and Laos, the fullest possible accounting of missing Americans would have been achieved long ago.

During negotiations, the American team, headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, had sought an agreement that would provide explicitly for the release of American prisoners and an accounting for missing American service- men throughout Indochina. The U.S. nego- tiators said, when the agreement was signed, that they had "unconditional guarantees" that these goals would be achieved.

The great accomplishment of the peace agreement was that it resulted in the release of 591 American POWs, of whom 566 were military and 25 civilian. It also established a framework for cooperation in resolving POW/MIA related questions that remains of value today. Unfortunately, efforts to

implement the agreement failed, for a num- ber of reasons, to resolve the POW/MIA issue.

Obstacles faced by U.S. negotiators

During its investigation, the Committee identified several factors that handicapped U.S. officials during the negotiation of the peace agreement, and during the critical first months of implementation.

The first and most obvious obstacle to a fully effective agreement was the approach taken to the POW/MIA issue by North Viet- nam (DRV) and its allies. During the war, the DRV violated its obligations under the Geneva Convention by refusing to provide complete lists of prisoners, and by pro- hibiting or severely restricting the right of prisoners to exchange mail or receive visits from international humanitarian agencies.

During negotiations, the DRV insisted that the release of prisoners could not be completed prior to the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, and consistently linked cooperation on the POW/MIA issue to other issues, in- cluding a demand for reconstruction aid from the United States. Once the agreement was signed, the DRV was slow to provide a list of prisoners captured in Laos. Follow- ing Operation Homecoming, the North Viet- namese refused to cooperate in providing an accounting for missing Americans, includ- ing some who were known to have been held captive at one time within the DRV prison system. Perhaps most important of all, the DRV's continued pursuit of a military con- quest of South Vietnam dissipated prospects for cooperation on POW/MIA issues.

A second factor inhibiting the achieve- ment of U.S. objectives was the limited le- verage enjoyed by U.S. negotiators. It was U.S. policy, fully known to the North Viet- namese, that the U.S. sought to disengage from the war. President Nixon was elected

on a platform calling for an end to U.S. in- volvement; support was building rapidly within the Congress for measures that would have mandated a withdrawal conditioned on the return of prisoners; and the American public had become increasingly divided and war-weary as the conflict continued. These same factors, along with the debilitating ef- fects of the Watergate scandal on the Nixon Presidency, weakened the U.S. hand in re- sponding to DRV violations after the peace agreement was signed.

A third factor limiting the success of the agreement was the absence of Lao and Cam- bodian representatives from the peace table. Although the U.S..negotiators pressed the DRV for commitments concerning the re- lease of prisoners and an accounting for the missing throughout Indochina, the peace accords technically apply only to Vietnam. Although the DRV, in a side understanding, assured Dr. Kissinger that it would cooperate in obtaining the release of U.S. prisoners in Laos, the fact is that the prisoners captured in Laos who were actually released had long since been transferred to Hanoi. No Ameri- cans held captive in Laos for a significant period of time have ever been returned. Nei- ther the peace agreement, nor the assurances provided by North Vietnam to Dr. Kissinger, established procedures to account for miss- ing Americans in Cambodia or Laos.

American protests

The Paris Peace Accords provided for the exchange of prisoner lists on the day the agreement was signed and for the return of all prisoners of war within 60 days. It also required the parties to assist each other in obtaining information about those missing in action and to determine the location of graves for the purpose of recovering and re- patriating remains.

U.S. officials, especially in the Depart- ment of Defense, were disappointed that more live American prisoners were not included on the lists exchanged when the peace agreement was signed or—with re- spect to prisoners captured in Laos—four days after the agreement was signed. The record uncovered by the Committee's in- vestigation indicates that high level De- fense Department and Defense Intelligence Agency officials were especially concerned about the incompleteness of the list of pris- oners captured in Laos.

This concern was based on intelligence that some Americans had been held cap- tive by the Pathet Lao, on repeated Pathet Lao claims that prisoners were being held, and on the large number of American pilots who were listed as missing in action in Laos compared to the number being proposed for return. Top military and intelligence of- ficials expressed the hope, at the time the peace agreement was signed, that as many as 41 servicemen lost in Laos would be re- turned. However, only ten men (7 U.S. mili- tary, 2 U.S. civilian and a Canadian) were on the list of prisoners captured in Laos that was turned over by the DRV.

During the first 60 days, while the Amer- ican troop withdrawal was underway, the Nixon Administration contacted North Vietnamese officials repeatedly to express concern about the incomplete nature of the prisoner lists that had been received. In early February, President Nixon sent a message to the DRV Prime Minister saying, with respect to the list of only ten POWs from Laos, that:

U.S. records show there are 317 Ameri- can military men unaccounted for in Laos and it is inconceivable that only ten of these men would be held prisoner in Laos.[14]

Soon thereafter, Dr. Kissinger presented DRV officials with 19 case folders of Ameri- cans who should have been accounted for, but who were not. The U.S. protests contin- ued[15] and in mid-March, the U.S. threatened briefly to halt the withdrawal of American troops if information about the nine Ameri- can prisoners on the DRV/Laos list and about prisoners actually held by the Pathet Lao were not provided.[16] By the end of the month, top Defense Department officials were recommending a series of diplomatic and military options aimed at achieving an accounting for U.S. prisoners thought to be held in Laos.

Ultimately, the Nixon Administration proceeded with the withdrawal of troops in return for the release of prisoners on the lists provided by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

Post-homecoming

The public statements made by President Nixon and by high Defense Department officials following the end of Operation Homecoming did not fully reflect the Ad- ministration's prior concern that live U.S. prisoners may have been kept behind. Ad- ministration officials did, however, continue to stress publicly the need for Vietnam to meet its obligations under the peace agree- ment, and U.S. diplomats pressed both the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao for information concerning missing Americans. Unfortunately, due to the intransigence of our adversaries, those efforts were largely unavailing.

During the Committee's hearings, it was contended by Dr. Kissinger and some Mem- bers of the Committee that Congressional attitudes would have precluded any Admin- istration effort to respond forcefully to the DRV's failure to provide an accounting for

missing American servicemen. These Mem- bers of the Committee contend that their view is supported by the Senate's rejection on May 31, 1973 of an amendment offered by U.S. Sen. Robert Dole that would have permitted the

continued bombing of Laos and Cambodia if the President certified that North Vietnam "is not making an account- ing, to the best of its ability, of all missing in action personnel in Southeast Asia.[17]

Conclusions

The Committee believes that its investi- gation contributed significantly to the pub- lic record of the negotiating history of the POW/MIA provisions of the Paris Peace Accords, and of the complications that arose during efforts to implement those provisions both before and after the completion of Op- eration Homecoming. That record indicates that there existed a higher degree of concern within the Administration about the possi- bility that prisoners were being left behind in Laos than had been known previously, and that various options for responding to that concern were discussed at the highest levels of government.

The Committee notes that some Admin- istration statements at the time the agree- ment was signed expressed greater certainty about the completeness of the POW return than they should have and that other state- ments may have understated the problems that would arise during implementation and that—taken together, these statements may have raised public and family expectations too high. The Committee further notes that statements made after the agreement was signed may have understated U.S. concerns about the possibility that live prisoners re- mained, thereby contributing in subsequent years to public suspicion and distrust. How- ever, the Committee concludes that the phrasing of these statements was designed

to avoid raising what were believed to be false hopes among POW/MIA families, rather than to mislead the American people.

Investigation of the accounting process

The Committee investigation included a comprehensive review of the procedures used by the U.S. Government to account for American prisoners and missing from the beginning of the war in Southeast Asia until the present day. The purposes were:

To determine accurately the number of Americans who served in Southeast Asia during the war who did not return, either alive or dead;

To evaluate the accuracy of the U.S. Gov- ernment's own past and current process for determining the likely status and fate of missing Americans;

To learn what the casualty data and intel- ligence information have to tell us about the number of Americans whose fates are truly "unaccounted for" from the war in Vietnam; and

To consider whether efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of our POW/ MIAs was treated, as claimed, as a mat- ter of "highest national priority" by the Executive branch;

To assess the extent to which Defense De- partment and DIA accounting policies and practices contributed to the confu- sion, suspicion and distrust that has char- acterized the POW/MIA issue for the past 20 years; and

To determine what changes need to be made to policies and procedures in order to instill public confidence in the govern- ment's POW/MIA accounting process with respect to past and future conflicts.

Although 2,264 Americans currently are listed as "unaccounted for" from the war in Indochina, the number of Americans whose

fate is truly unknown is far smaller. Even during the war, the U.S. Government knew and the families involved knew that, in many of these cases, there was certainty that the soldier or airman was killed at the time of the incident. These are generally cases in- volving individuals who were killed when their airplanes crashed into the sea and no parachutes were sighted, or where others witnessed the death of a serviceman in com- bat but were unable to recover the body.

Of the 2,264 Americans now listed as un- accounted for, 1,095 fall into this category. These individuals were listed as "killed in action/body not recovered" (KIA/BNR) and were not included on the lists of POW/MIAs that were released publicly by the Defense and State Departments during the war

or for several years thereafter. It was not until the late 1970's that KIA/BNRs were added to the official lists of "missing" Americans.

The next largest group of Americans now on the list of 2,264 originally was listed by the military services or by DIA as "miss- ing in action." These are individuals who became missing either in combat or in non- combat circumstances, but who were not known for certain either to have been killed or to have been taken into captivity. In most, but not all, of these cases, the circumstances of disappearance coupled with the lack of evidence of survival make it highly probable that the individual died at the time the inci- dent occurred.

Approximately 1,172 of the still unac- counted for Americans were originally listed either as MIA or as POW. Of these, 333 were lost in Laos, 348 in North Vietnam, 450 in South Vietnam, 37 in Cambodia and 4 in China. Since before the war ended, the POW/MIA accounting effort has focused, for good reason, on a relatively small num- ber of these 1,172 Americans, that is, those who were either known to have been taken

captive, or who were lost in circumstances under which survival was deemed likely or at least reasonably possible. These cases, in addition to others in which intelligence in- dicates a Southeast Asian Government may have known the fate of the missing men, are currently referred to as "discrepancy cases."

In 1987, Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA- Ret.) was appointed Presidential Emissary to Vietnam on POW/MIA matters. Gen. Vessey subsequently persuaded Vietnam to allow in-country investigations by the U.S. Government of high-priority discrepancy cases. The DIA and DOD's Joint Task Force- Full Accounting (JTF-FA) have identified a total of 305 discrepancy cases, of which 196 are in Vietnam, 90 are in Laos, and 19 are in Cambodia.[18]

In 61 of the cases in Vietnam, the fate of the individual has been determined through investigation, and the Committee finds that Gen. Vessey correctly states that the evidence JTF-FA has gathered in each of these cases indicates that the individuals had died prior to Operation Homecoming. The first round

of investigation of the 135 remaining cases in Vietnam is expected to be completed by January 18, 1993. A second round of investigation, which will proceed geographically on a district by district basis, will commence in February, 1993.

None of the discrepancy cases in Laos and Cambodia has been resolved. Because many of the Americans lost in those coun- tries disappeared in areas that were under the control of North Vietnamese forces at the time, resolution of the majority of Laos/ Cambodia cases will depend on a process of tripartite cooperation that has barely begun. The Committee further finds that, in addition to the past reluctance of the Viet- namese and Lao to agree to a series of tri- partite talks with the United States, both the Department of State and the Department of

Defense have been slow to push such a pro- cess forward.

As mentioned above, the Committee will append a case-by-case description of the circumstances of loss of each unresolved discrepancy case to this report. Those de- scriptions demonstrate that the U.S. Govern- ment has knowledge in only a small number of cases that the individuals involved were held captive and strong indications in only a small number more.

However, that is not to say that the Gov- ernments of Vietnam and Laos do not have knowledge pertaining to these or other MIA cases which may indicate survival. Answers to these troublesome questions will best be ob- tained through an accounting process that en- joys full cooperation from those governments.

The findings of this phase of the Commit- tee's investigation include:

By far the greatest obstacle to a successful accounting effort over the past twenty years has been the refusal of the for- eign governments involved, until re- cently, to allow the U.S. access to key files or to carry out in-country, on-site investigations.

The U.S. Government's process for ac- counting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia has been flawed by a lack of resources, organizational clar- ity, coordination and consistency. These problems had their roots during the war and worsened after the war as frustra- tion about the ability to gain access and answers from Southeast Asian Gov- ernments increased. Through the mid- 1980's, accounting for our POW/MlAs was viewed officially more as a bureau- cratic exercise than as a matter of "high- est national priority."

The accounting process has improved dra- matically in recent years as a result of

the high priority attached to it by Presi- dents Reagan and Bush; because of the success of Gen. Vessey and the JTF-FA in gaining permission for the U.S. to conduct investigations on the ground in Southeast Asia; because of an increase in resources; and because of the Commit- tee's own efforts, in association with the Executive branch, to gain greater cooper- ation from the Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

After an exhaustive review of official and unofficial lists Of captive and missing Americans from wartime years to the present, the Committee uncovered nu- merous errors in data entry and numer- ous discrepancies between DIA records and those of other military offices. The errors that have been identified, how- ever, have since been corrected. As a result, the Committee fmds no grounds to question the accuracy of the current, official list of those unaccounted for from the war in Southeast Asia. This list includes 2,222 missing servicemen ex- cept deserters and 42 missing civilians who were lost while performing services for the United States Government. The Committee has found no evidence to support the existence of rumored "secret lists" of additional missing Americans.

The decision by the U.S. Government to falsify "location of loss" data for Ameri- can casualties in Cambodia and Laos during much of the war contributed sig- nificantly both to public distrust and to the difficulties experienced by the DIA and others in trying to establish what happened to the individuals involved.

The failure of the Executive branch to establish and maintain a consistent, sustainable set of categories and cri- teria governing the status of missing Americans during and after the war in

Southeast Asia contributed substantially to public confusion and mistrust. Dur- ing the war, a number of individuals listed as "prisoner" by DIA were listed as "missing in action" by the military services.

After the war, the legal process for set- tling status determinations was plagued by interference from the Secretary of Defense, undermined by financial and other considerations affecting some POW/MIA families and challenged in court. Later, the question of how many Americans remain truly "unaccounted for" was muddied by the Defense De- partment's decision to include "KIA/ BNR's"—those known to have been killed, but with bodies not recovered—in their listings. This created the anomalous situation of having more Americans con- sidered unaccounted for today than we had immediately after the war.

The Committee's recommendations for this phase of its investigation include:

Accounting for missing Americans from the war in Southeast Asia should con- tinue to be treated as a "matter of high- est national priority" by our diplomats, by those participating in the accounting process, by all elements of our intelli- gence community and by the nation, as a whole.

Continued, best efforts should be made to investigate the remaining, unresolved discrepancy cases in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The United States should make a continu- ing effort, at a high level, to arrange regular tripartite meetings with the Governments of Laos and Vietnam to seek information on the possible con- trol and movement of unaccounted for U.S. personnel by Pathet Lao and North

Vietnamese forces in Laos during the

Southeast Asia war.
The President and Secretary of Defense

should order regular, independent re- views of the efficiency and professional- ism of the DOD's POW/MIA accounting process for Americans still listed as missing from the war in Southeast Asia.

A clear hierarchy of responsibility for handling POW/MIA related issues that may regretably arise as a result of fu- ture conflicts must be established. This requires full and rapid coordination be- tween and among the intelligence agen- cies involved and the military services. It requires the integration of missing ci- vilians and suspected deserters into the overall accounting process. It requires a clear liaison between those responsible for the accounting (and related intelli- gence) and those responsible for nego- tiating with our adversaries about the terms for peace. It requires procedures for the full, honest and prompt disclo- sure of information to next of kin, at the time of incident and as other informa- tion becomes available. And it requires, above all, the designation within the Executive branch of an individual who is clearly responsible and fully account- able for making certain that the process works as it should.

In the future, clear categories should be es- tablished and consistently maintained in accounting for Americans missing dur- ing time of war. At one end of the list- ings should be Americans known with certainty to have been taken prisoner; at the other should be Americans known dead with bodies not recovered. The cat- egories should be carefully separated in official summaries and discussions of the accounting process and should be ap- plied consistently and uniformly.

Present law needs to be reviewed to mini- mize distortions in the status determi- nation process that may result from the financial considerations of the families involved.

Wartime search and rescue (SAR) missions have an urgent operational value, but they are also crucial for the purposes of accounting for POW/MIAs. The records concerning many Vietnam era SAR mis- sions have been lost or destroyed. In the future, all information obtained during any unsuccessful or

partially success- ful military search and rescue mission should be shared with the agency re- sponsible for accounting for POW/MIAs from that conflict and should be retained by that agency.

Investigation of POW/MIA-related intelligence activities

The Committee undertook an investiga- tion of U.S. intelligence agency activities in relation to POW/MIA issues. This included a review of the DIA's primary role in inves- tigating and evaluating reports that Ameri- cans missing from the Vietnam war were or are being held against their will since the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The in- vestigation also included a review of signals intelligence (SIGINT) obtained by the Na- tional Security Agency (NSA), a review of imagery intelligence (IMINT) obtained by aerial photography and a review of covert U.S. Government activities associated with POW/MIA concerns.

In the area of intelligence, more than any other, the Committee and the Executive branch had to balance concerns about the public's right to know with a legitimate na- tional need to maintain secrecy about intelli- gence sources and methods. The Committee insisted, however, that the fullest possible accounting of government activities in the

intelligence field be made public and that no substantive information bearing directly on the question of whether there are live Ameri- can POWs in Southeast Asia be withheld.

As a result of Executive branch coopera- tion, especially from CIA Director Robert Gates and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, the Committee gained unprec- edented access to closely-held government documents, including access to relevant op- erational files, the President's Daily briefs, the Executive Registry and the debriefs of returning POWs. Unfortunately, the limited number of individuals affiliated with the Committee who were given access to these materials prevented as thorough a review as the Committee would have preferred.

At the Committee's insistence, and de- spite the reservations of the Executive branch, public hearings were held for the first time on the products of satellite im- agery related to the POW/MIA issue. Two former employees of the

National Security Agency testified in public about information they gathered while working as specialists in the field of signal intelligence. And two days of hearings culminated an exhaustive Com- mittee investigation of reports that American captives had been seen in Southeast Asia during the postwar period. In addition, thou- sands of pages of live-sighting reports have been declassified and made available to the public.

The Committee understands that the process of analyzing intelligence informa- tion is complicated and subjective. In most instances, the quality and source of infor- mation is such that it can be interpreted in more than one way and isolated bits of in- formation may easily be misinterpreted. As a result, the Committee believes in the im- portance of taking all sources of information and intelligence into account when judging the validity of a report or category of data.

Overall intelligence community support

During the Committee's investigation, all DIA directors since the late 1970's testified that the POW effort lacked national level Intelligence Community support in terms of establishing a high priority for collection, in funding, in the allocation of personnel and in high-level attention. None of the former directors recalled attending national-level management meetings to discuss the POW/ MIA issue prior to the mid-1980's, and only one national intelligence estimate was pro- duced on this issue during the first 17 years after the end of the war.

Senior CIA officials told the Committee that there was no written collection require- ment on POWs, but that everyone under- stood that POW information was important when obtained. CIA officials also asserted that this issue was the near exclusive pre- serve of the Department of Defense and that the CIA played only a supporting role.

Former NSA Director, Admiral Bobby Inman, testified that the NSA signals intel- ligence collection efforts in Southeast Asia were dismantled after the war and was not resumed until at least 1978.

Over the past decade, the Reagan and Bush Administrations have raised the pri- ority of POW/MIA intelligence collection, have increased resources and

improved pol- icy level management. The basic structure of responsibilities, however, has not changed.

The role of the Defense Intelligence Agency

The DIA has had a central, two-pronged, role in U.S efforts to account for our POW/ MIAs. First, the DIA is responsible for in- vestigating and analyzing reports of live- sightings or other evidence that American prisoners may still be held. Second, the De- partment of Defense relies heavily on DIA's

analysis to reach conclusions about the fate of missing servicemen.

In addition to these responsibilities, the DIA's prominent role in the POW/ MIA issue over the years has caused it to become a focal point for family, Congressional, press and public questions on the subject.

Criticisms of DIA Operations. The Com- mittee identified and arranged for the de- classification of a series of internal reviews of the DIA'S POW/MIA operations that were conducted during the mid-1980's. A principal concern raised by these reviews were the agency's procedures for evaluating and responding to reports that U.S. POWs had been seen alive after the conclusion of the war.[19]

The Committee agrees that the DIA'S POW/MIA Office has historically been:

Plagued by a lack of resources;
Guilty of over-classification;
Defensive toward criticism; Handicapped by poor coordination with

other elements of the intelligence

community;
Slow to follow-up on live-sighting and

other reports; and
Frequently distracted from its basic mission

by the need to respond to outside pres- sures and requests.

In addition, several of those who reviewed the workings of DIA during this period also faulted DIA's analytical process and referred to a "mindset to debunk" live-sighting re- ports.

Several Committee Members express concern and disappointment that, on oc- casion, individuals within DIA have been evasive, unresponsive and disturbingly incorrect and cavalier. Several Members of the Committee also note that other in- dividuals within DIA have performed their work with great professionalism and under

extraordinarily difficult circumstances both at home and abroad.

The Committee recommends that the Sec- retary of Defense ensure the regular review and evaluation of the DIA's POW/MIA of- fice to ensure that intelligence information is acted upon quickly and that information is shared with families promptly.

The Committee also believes that a cen- tral coordinating mechanism for pooling and acting upon POW/MIA-related intelligence information should be created as one of the Intelligence Community's Interagency Co- ordination Centers.

The Committee notes that the focus of the POW/MIA accounting process is in Southeast Asia. As a result, DIA analysts are spending more and more of their time trav- eling back and forth between Washington and the region or to Hawaii. The Commit- tee believes that this would be an opportune time to move the DIA's POW/MIA office to Hawaii where it could be closer to JTF-FA and CINCPAC, which it supports. A number of tasks now sometimes performed by the office involving public and family relations can be handled, and handled more capably and appropriately, by the office of the Dep- uty Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/ MIA Affairs.

Live-sighting Reports. For the past 20 years, there has been nothing more tantaliz- ing for POW/MIA families than reports that Americans have been seen alive in Southeast Asia and nothing more frustrating than the failure of

these reports to become manifest in the form of a returning American—with the single exception of Marine Private Rob- ert Garwood in 1979.

A live-sighting report is just that—a re- port that an American has been seen alive in Southeast Asia in circumstances which are not readily explained. The report could come from a refugee, boat person, traveler

or anyone else in a position to make such an observation. The information could be first- hand or hearsay; it could involve one Ameri- can or many; it could be detailed or vague; it could be recent or as far back as the end of the war.

The sheer number of first-hand live sight- ing reports, almost 1600 since the end of the war, has convinced many Americans that U.S. POWs must have been kept behind and may still be alive. Other Americans have concluded sadly that our failure, after re- peated efforts, to locate any of these alleged POWs means the reports are probably not true. It is the Committee's view that every livesighting report is important as a potential source of information about the fate of our POW/MIAs.

Accordingly, the review and analysis of live-sighting reports consumed more time and staff resources than any other single issue. The Committee investigation used a method of analysis that was based on the content of a carefully screened set of reports that dealt only with men allegedly seen in captivity after Operation Homecoming. The Committee took into account past criticisms and assessed current procedures while ex- amining and testing DIA's methodology for evaluating live-sighting reports. In so doing, Committee investigators examined more than 2000 hearsay and first-hand live- sighting files while compiling a list of 928 reports for "content" analysis. These reports were plotted on a map and grouped into geographic "clusters". During briefings and public hearings, the Committee reviewed the most significant "clusters" for the pur- pose of determining whether they would, taken together, constitute evidence of the presence of U.S. POWs in certain locations after Operation Homecoming.

DIA Assessment. It is DIA's position that the live-sighting reports evaluated to date do

not constitute evidence that currently unac- counted for U.S. POWs remained behind in Southeast Asia after the end of the war. Of the 1638 first-hand reports received since 1975, DIA considers 1,553 to be resolved.[20]

Committee View. The Committee notes that 40 first-hand live-sighting reports re- main under active investigation and that the nature of the analytical process precludes certainty that all past DIA evaluations are correct. Accordingly, the Committee rec- ommends a strong emphasis on the rapid and thorough follow-up and evaluation of current unresolved and future live-sighting reports. The DIA is urged to make a con- tinued and conscious effort to maintain an attitude among analysts that presumes the possible survival of U.S. POWs. The Ex- ecutive branch is also urged to continue working with the governments of Southeast Asia to expand our ability to conduct on the ground, on-site investigation and inspec- tions throughout the region.

The role of the National Security Agency (signals intelligence)

The responsibility for monitoring and collecting,signals (including communica- tions) intelligence rests with the National Security Agency (NSA). During the Viet- nam War, the NSA monitored all available sources of signals intelligence bearing on the loss, capture or condition of Ameri- can personnel. Such information would sometimes provide a basis for concluding whether or not a missing American had sur- vived his incident and, if so, possibly been taken prisoner.

During its investigation, the Committee was disturbed to learn that the NSA and its Vietnam branch were never asked to provide an overall assessment of the status of POW/ MIA personnel prior to Operation Home- coming. The Committee believes that this

information would have been useful both for the U.S. negotiating team and for those preparing for the repatriation of American POWs. The Committee also found that nei- ther DIA nor any other agency within the Intelligence Community placed a formal requirement for collection with NSA con- cerning POW/MIA related information. In fact, the Committee found that NSA end product reports were not used regularly to evaluate the POW/MIA

situation until 1977. It was not until 1984 that the collection of information on POW/ MIAs was formally established as a matter of highest priority for SIGINT.

After the fall of Saigon, the National Se- curity Agency and the military service com- ponents that support it largely dismantled their collection efforts in Southeast Asia. The elaborate collection capabilities that supported the war essentially ceased or were relocated to other trouble spots around the world. The analytical organizations that monitored signals intelligence in the region were also disbanded or sharply reduced as personnel were transferred to other assign- ments.

U.S. collection capabilities were further diminished during this period as Vietnam and Laos developed secure landline com- munications to replace the radio networks used during time of war. If officials in ei- ther country were communicating about live U.S. POWs, the likelihood that these com- munications would be detected by the U.S. had become remote. However, during this period, the NSA did receive third party in- tercepts concerning the reported presence of American POWs in Laos.[21]

In conducting its review of NSA files, the Committee examined more than 3,000 postwar reports and 90 boxes of wartime files. The Committee discovered that pre- vious surveys of NSA files for POW/MIA

related information had been limited to the agency's automated data base. Hundreds of thousands of hard copy documents, memo- randa, raw reports, operational messages and possibly tapes from both the wartime and post-war periods remain unreviewed in various archives and storage facilities. Most troubling, NSA failed to locate for investi- gators any wartime analyst files related spe- cifically to tracking POWs, despite the fact that tracking POWs was a known priority at the time. This failure made it impossible for the Committee to confirm some information on downed pilots that was provided by NSA employee Jerry Mooney.

At the Committee's request, the NSA and DIA are conducting a review of past SIGINT reports that appear relevant to the POW/ MIA issue for the purpose of adding to the all-source database used in the ac- counting process. Thousands of such reports have been identified. Although it is not clear that the reports will succeed in resolving questions about missing American service- men, they have raised questions about an individual's status in several cases and will, at a minimum, add to the context in which other POW/ MIA information is considered.

The Committee benefitted from the in- sights of a retired NSA SIGINT analyst, Se- nior Master Sergeant Jerry Mooney (USAF- retired). During the war, SMSgt. Mooney maintained detailed personal files concern- ing losses of aircraft and downed airmen. Unfortunately, those personal files did not become part of the archived files maintained by the NSA and have been lost. Although SmSgt. Mooney has sought to reconstruct some of that information from personal memory, the loss of the files makes it im- possible to check those recollections against the contemporaneous information.

The Committee found no evidence to substantiate claims that signals intelligence

gathered during the war constitute evidence that U.S. POWs were transferred to the So- viet Union from Vietnam.

Pilot distress symbols

The Committee's investigation of pilot distress symbols as a possible source of evi- dence of live POWs after 1973 was the first such investigation conducted by anybody of Congress.

During the war, the military services gave many pilots who flew combat missions in- dividual authenticator numbers to identify themselves by radio or other means in the event their airplanes were shot down or crashed. During their pre-flight training, pilots were also given Escape and Evasion (E&E) signals to employ either as an evader or POW to facilitate their eventual recovery. Most pilots received training in methods of constructing these E&E symbols in survival courses, prior to assignment to Vietnam. Both E&E symbols and authenticator num- bers were classified.

It was expected that these symbols would be used to attract rescuers and would be de- ployed in ways which would avoid ground detection and yet be visible to overhead col- lecting sources. Consequently, intelligence analysts have been encumbered with the difficult task of searching for signals which could be extremely faint, or a clever blend of natural and man-made features.

The Committee became interested in this area while looking into intelligence con- cerning the reported presence of POWs at a camp near Nhom Marrott, Laos, in 1980. This intelligence included the discovery of what appeared to be a "52" possibly fol- lowed by a "K" in the prison garden. It was learned that "K" was a pilot distress signal used during the war.

The Committee discovered that the in- telligence community had other overhead

photographs, taken by both airborne and satellite collection platforms, showing what appeared to be symbols or unexplained markings.

The earliest example was a four digit set of numbers followed by what appeared to be the letters "TH" found on a May, 1973 photo- graph of an area in central Laos. According to the Joint Service SERE Agency (JSSA),[22] the four digit number could be an authenticator number followed by the primary and back- up distress symbols of a downed pilot. An- other example was a 1975 photograph of a prison facility in Vietnam, in which the CIA noted unusual markings on the roof of one of the buildings. Although the CIA analysts assessed as remote the possibility that this represented a signal from a POW, they noted that the markings might be transposed to the letter "K" in Morse code. The Committee also learned of a 1988 photograph of a valley near Sam Neua, Laos, showing what clearly was a "USA" dug into a rice paddy. Beneath the "USA", DIA also noted a possible "K" created by "ground scarring.

During its investigation, the Committee was surprised by statements from DIA and CIA imagery analysts directly involved in POW/MIA work that they were not very knowledgeable about the military's E&E signals or, in some cases, even aware of the program. These analysts were not even tasked to look for such information prior to April, 1992. The Committee concluded that

there had not been a purposeful effort to search for distress signals, or a written formal requirement for symbols, after the end of the war. The Committee is confident, however, that if a symbol appeared clearly on imagery, it would be identified by imag- ery analysts, as was the case with the 1988 "USA" symbol.

The Committee recommends that the search for possible POW distress symbols

in Southeast Asia be a written intelligence requirement and that imagery analysts be educated fully about JSSA training. This is because a prisoner under detention is not likely to have the opportunity to construct distress signals that are blatant or elabo- rate; they are, in fact, trained to use discreet methods to avoid detection. The more famil- iar imagery analysts are with JSSA training, the more likely it is that they will be able to detect such a discreet signal. Also, given the possibility that past signals could have been missed, the Committee recommends that past photography of suspect detention sites be reviewed to the extent that resources permit.[23]

The Committee notes that JSSA officials had not been consulted previously with re- spect to the suspected symbols, except for the 1973 "TH" photograph, which was shown to them in the mid-1980's. Accordingly, the Committee asked JSSA to evaluate a num- ber of possible symbols and markings to see if they were consistent with JSSA training methods and distress symbols used during the war. JSSA concluded that the "USA, possible K", the "52 possible K", the "TH", the roof top markings and one other symbol were consistent with the methods taught to pilots downed in Laos.[24] JSSA analysis of the "USA possible K" concluded that this should be considered a valid distress symbol until proven otherwise. It should be empha- sized, however, that JSSA officials are not trained in photo analysis, and are not quali- fied to determine whether, in fact, symbols that may seem to appear in imagery actually exist.

The Committee notes that imagery anom- alies are caused by regularly occurring natural phenomena and that JSSA origi- nally identified 150 such numbers during its review of photography, of which 19 ap- peared to match the four-digit authenticator

numbers of U.S. airmen. It was later dem- onstrated to the satisfaction of all parties that none of these numbers were man-made, and all were naturally occurring phenomena such as shadows, ridges, or trees, with the exception of one additional symbol identi- fied by one consultant in an altogether dif- ferent location.

The DIA does not dispute that two of the possible symbols, the "USA" in 1988, and the 1973 "TH" are intentionally-constructed man-made symbols. In a message to the Committee received in January, 1993, how- ever, the agency stated that the " 'USA' sym- bol was not a distress symbol and had noth- ing to do with missing Americans." This finding was based on a December, 1992 on- site investigation which "determined that the symbol was made by Hmong tribe mem- bers." In the same message, the DIA raised the possibility that the 1973 "TH" symbol may have been made by a Hmong tribes- man whose name started with the English letters "TH" and who was a passenger on an aircraft piloted by the American Emmet Kay which went down in May, 1973, "a few kilometers" away from where the symbol appeared.

DIA now contends that the "52", possible "K" seen at Nhom Marrott is the result of shadowing and in no way represents a pilot distress symbol. The Committee notes, however, that DIA had earlier discounted the possibility that the symbol was caused by shadowing because of the constant shape of the figures over a period of days and at different times of the day. In fact, the intel- ligence community had concluded in 1980 that this symbol had been dug into the ground intentionally.

Due to the complexity of interpreting symbols obtained through imagery, the Committee decided to hire two independent imagery consultants. Each consultant was

given access to the necessary equipment and each submitted independently a report to the Committee. The consultants' reports, which differed on only the

one symbol referred to earlier, were subsequently provided to the intelligence community for its comments and evaluation.

A joint task group of DIA, CIA and NPIC imagery analysts found that an unresolved symbol found by one consultant was "prob- ably not manmade." This consultant had detected, with "100 percent confidence" a faint "GX 2527" in a photograph of a prison facility in Vietnam taken in June, 1992. This number correlates to the primary and back- up distress symbols and authenticator num- ber of a pilot lost in Laos in 1969. The joint agency team agreed that there were visible markings that could be interpreted as let- ters and numbers, but concluded that the marking "appeared" too "haphazard and ill- defined" to be man-made distress symbols.

Disagreement arose within the Commit- tee about the interpretation of some of the possible symbols, including the question of whether there is reason to believe that the "GX 2527" symbol is man-made, rather than the result of natural phenomena. How- ever, the Committee agrees that the benefit of the doubt should go to the individual in this case, because the apparent number cor- responds to a particular authenticator num- ber and because it was identified by one analyst with 100 percent confidence. Ac- cordingly, the Committee urges the appro- priate officials in the Executive branch to request information about the serviceman involved from the Government of Vietnam.

Although the Committee cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. POWs have at- tempted to signal their status to aerial ob- servers, the Committee cannot conclude, based on its own investigation and the guid- ance of imagery experts, that this has defi-

nitely happened. Although there is now an adequate collection process in place, the Committee investigators found unacceptable lapses in time between the point of collec- tion and evaluation; and between evaluation and follow-up. The Committee recommends better integration among the various intelli- gence agencies, including improved training and a better system for collecting and acting on information gathered through imagery.

Covert operations

The Committee investigated whether the United States Government may have un- dertaken or supported covert operations in order to confirm the presence of U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia after Operation Home- coming and, if so, to review the intelligence information upon which those operations were based.

The Committee has identified only one operation of this type mounted after 1973. Although operational details remain classi- fied, the fact that the operation took place has been reported publicly. The operation was prompted by a combination of human, photographic and signals intelligence con- cerning the possible presence of as many as 30 American POWs at a detention camp near the village of Nhom Marrot in Laos from 1979 until early 1981. The intelligence resulted in extensive and highest level ef- forts by the U.S. Government to confirm the information. Unfortunately, the results of the covert operation were inconclusive and subsequent efforts were rendered impossible by press leaks.[25]

Intelligence support in Laos during the Vietnam war

the significant use of military intelligence as- sets. This was true despite the fact that ac- counting for missing military personnel in Laos was the responsibility of the respective military services, and despite strenuous ef- forts made by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to gain support for an improved POW/ MIA related military intelligence effort. The Committee believes that an expanded war- time military intelligence effort in Laos might have increased significantly our ability to ac- count for the Americans lost in that country.

Cooperation from governments in Southeast Asia

It is not possible to account for the Ameri- cans who are missing from the war in South- east Asia without cooperation from the governments of the region, especially Viet- nam. The U.S. has requested this coopera- tion in four forms. First, we have requested information concerning live American pris- oners, former prisoners or deserters. Second, we have asked for the return of any recovered or recoverable remains of missing American servicemen. Third, we have sought accesss to files, records, documents and other mate- rials that are

relevant to the fate of missing Americans. Finally, we have asked for permission to visit certain locations within these countries for the purpose of investigating live-sighting reports and searching actual or suspected airplane crash sites.

The Committee has done everything it could to complement the diplomatic and political initiatives of the Executive branch in seeking to encourage a greater degree of cooperation on POW/MIA issues from the governments of Southeast Asia.

Vietnam

The U.S. has long suspected that the North Vietnamese have been withholding a considerable amount of information bearing

During the Vietnam war, intelligence sup- port for the U.S. effort in Laos was handi- capped because Administration policy, at the insistence of the State Department, excluded

on the fate of missing Americans. The North Vietnamese maintained detailed records of U.S. servicemen who came within their prison system during the war, including many lost in North Vietnamese-controlled areas of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. U.S. intelligence agencies are con- vinced, moreover, that the Government of Vietnam recovered and stored an unknown quantity of remains of American service- men for release at politically strategic points ill time.

The level of U.S.-Vietnamese coopera- tion in accounting for missing Americans has varied over the years depending on bi- lateral and global political conditions and on the degree of emphasis placed on the issue by officials of the United States. At the time the Select Committee was created, there was considerable progress being made in the investigation of discrepancy cases. In addi- tion, an agreement had been reached with Vietnam to allow an official Defense De- partment investigating presence to be estab- lished in Hanoi. These steps were directly attributable to the work

of Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam on POW/MIA issues.

The impetus for Vietnam's cooperation has come from several directions. Gen. Vessey has provided the Vietnamese with a respected and influential source of contact within our government. Bush Administra- tion policies have established a clear link- age between different levels of Vietnamese cooperation and American response. The disintegration of the Soviet empire has de- prived Vietnam of many external sources of economic assistance and political com- fort. The rapid economic growth of other Southeast Asian nations has given younger Vietnamese leaders a strong incentive to establish their own contacts with the west. And the creation of the Select Committee

has demonstrated anew the high priority at- tached to the POW/MIA issue by the Ameri- can people and government. Obviously, the Committee does not know precisely how all of these matters have been factored into the calculations of the Vietnamese Government, but clearly the overall trends are hopeful.

Over the past year, Committee Members have visited Vietnam on four occasions to press for further information. Committee delegations met with a wide range of high- level Vietnamese officials, including those in charge of administering the wartime pris- oner of war system. The Committee visits, coupled with ongoing efforts from the Ex- ecutive branch, have yielded substantial re- sults.

These results include:

Permission for U.S. investigators to carry out short-notice investigations of many live-sighting reports;

ermission for U.S. investigators to use U.S.-owned, maintained and operated helicopters in the course of investiga- tions within Vietnam;

Grants of access to certain highly-secure prison and defense ministry buildings for the purpose of investigating live sighting reports;

Guarantees of full access for JTF-FA in- vestigators to political and military ar- chives containing POW/MIA related information;

Access to certain key archival documents and personnel that had been long-requested, and long-denied by Vietnam;

The provision of thousands of photographs of American war-time casualties;

Access to Vietnam's military museum, in- cluding hundreds of material objects once owned by American servicemen that might contain clues about the fate of missing Americans;

Declaration of an amnesty for any Viet- namese citizens illegally holding Ameri- can remains to come forward with them without fear of punishment;

A commitment to cooperate in the conduct of an "oral history" program that would seek to record information from Viet- namese military officials, soldiers and civilians who might have information about the fate of missing Americans;

Promises of full cooperation from Vietnam in working with Laos and Cambodia to investigate discrepancy cases involving servicemen lost in parts of those coun- tries controlled by North Vietnamese forces during the war; and

Permission for POW/MIA families, if they so desire, to come to Vietnam and evalu- ate the investigation process.

The Committee welcomes the very sub- stantial strides towards full cooperation on the POW/MIA issue that the Government of Vietnam has made in recent months. The Committee looks forward to the implementation of those steps in the hope that they will yield significant additional information concerning missing Americans and encour- ages the Executive branch to do all it can to see that the promises and commitments made by Vietnam are fulfilled.

In noting recent progress, the Commit- tee does not wish to understate the fact that the progress is coming very late—almost 20 years after the signing of the peace agree- ment, and after two decades of noncoopera- tion, stalling

and deception on the part of Vietnam's leaders. The Committee also rec- ognizes that the recent changes in policy ap- pear to be the result primarily of Vietnam's desire for economic contacts with the west. The closed and nondemocratic nature of the government in Vietnam argues for cau- tion in accepting Vietnamese promises, for

pledges given by a government unwilling to be open with its own people can hardly be taken at face value. Nonetheless, the Com- mittee remains hopeful that recent improve- ments in POW/MIA cooperation are symp- tomatic of a trend in Vietnam that will lead ultimately to dramatic improvements in human rights, and political, economic and religious freedoms.

United States policy towards Vietnam should reflect the importance of freedoms that are central to American society and which have been central to our investiga- tion. Without a free press or representative government, the American people would not have learned the full extent of our own government's knowledge about our POW/ MIAs. Our policy towards Vietnam, as to- wards the other nations of Southeast Asia, should be predicated on a vision of the same freedoms for the people of that region that we enjoy here at home.

Laos

More than 500 Americans are still listed as unaccounted for in Laos, including 335 who were originally considered either POW or MIA. Accordingly, the Committee has attached a high priority to gaining greater cooperation from the Lao Government. The current leaders of Laos, who are succes- sors to the Pathet Lao forces that contended for power during the war, almost certainly have some information concerning missing Americans that they have not yet shared. At a minimum, they should be able to provide specific information about the fates of a small number of U.S. POWs known to have been held by the Pathet Lao during the early stages of the war. Unfortunately, Lao lead- ers have been significantly less cooperative than those in Vietnam. The Lao have denied any knowledge of U.S. POWs; they have re- fused access to some requested sources of

information; and they have been even more reluctant than the Vietnamese to grant U.S. access to their territory for conducting live- sighting investigations and inspecting crash sights. The atmosphere has improved to some extent in recent months, however. As a result, some discrepancy case investigations are underway and negotiations are ongoing for the establishment of a permanent POW/ MIA investigation office in Vientiane.

Cambodia

The present government of war-ravaged Cambodia cannot be expected to possess documentary information relevant to the fate of missing American servicemen. Nonethe- less, the Committee met with Cambodian President Hun Sen, who expressed his gov- ernment's full cooperation with the U.S. in efforts to resolve discrepancy cases. Unfor- tunately, the Cambodian Government is un- able to guarantee security in areas controlled by the brutal and lawless Khmer Rouge. The Committee is grateful to President Hun Sen for his help on this issue, given the scope and urgency of the other perils faced by his government and his country.

Government policies and actions Declassification

The Committee believes that much of the controversy surrounding the U.S. Gov- ernment's handling of the POW/MIA issue could have been avoided if relevant docu- ments had been declassified and made avail- able to the public long ago. Unnecessary secrecy breeds the suspicion that important information is being withheld, while fuel- ing speculation about what that information may be.

From its inception, the Committee has urged the Executive branch to identify and declassify all documents and other materi-

als within its possession that are related to POW/MIA issues, with the single exception of information bearing directly on intelli- gence sources and methods.

A Task Force of the Select Committee, led by Senators Charles Robb and Chuck Grassley, formulated specific requests and recommendations upon which the Commit- tee acted. For example, the President was asked, and agreed, to order the expeditious declassification of POW/MIA records from the Vietnam War, and the U.S. Senate unani- mously approved a resolution calling for the declassification of POW/MIA materials. A series of letters sent, requests made and meetings held resulted in a high degree of cooperation and understanding between the Committee and the Executive branch on this issue.

The result of the Committee's efforts has been the most rapid and comprehensive de- classification of materials on a single sub- ject in American history. More than one million pages have already been declassified and the Committee is confident that remain- ing documents will be made available. The Committee believes that President Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft should be congratulated for their coopera- tion on this issue.

Although the Committee was generally very satisfied with the degree of understand- ing and help it received from the Executive branch, its request for the release of relevant CIA operational files has, to date, been de- nied. The Committee recommends that the process of declassification of current POW/ MIA related materials go forward rapidly until completion and that the relevant CIA operations files be included.

The Committee also recommends that policies be put in place to assure the rapid declassification of POW/MIA related in- formation from possible future conflicts. It

should be enshrined in both attitude and law that the right of a POW/MIA family to know what the government knows about its loved one is as inalienable a right as any spelled out in the Constitution.

Finally, the Committee's records will be sent to the National Archives, with specific instructions that they be made available for public review. We caution, however, that these records include staff materials, memoranda of conversation, notes and other documents that may reflect raw opinion, in-

correct data, discredited theories, or bits of fact that may mislead unless placed within a proper context. The Committee emphasizes that judgments reached by the Committee, after consideration of all available evidence, are reflected in this report. Other informa- tion and judgments should not be accorded credibility simply because of tneir presence in the Committee's working files.

Inter-agency group

Since January, 1980, Executive branch policy-making has been coordinated by the Interagency Group on POW/MIA Affairs (IAG). Agencies and organizations repre- sented on the IAG include the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council and the National League of POW/MIA Families (the League). In recent years, IAG meetings have occurred every two to three weeks on the average. Meetings are characterized by informal discussions of policy options; deci- sions are reached by consensus; and no for- mal minutes of the meetings are maintained.

The scope of IAG discussion covers a broad spectrum of POW/ MIA related mat- ters including intelligence collection, com- munications with families, diplomatic ini- tiatives and public awareness activities. A major focus of attention over the past two years has been U.S. policy towards Vietnam.

The presence of league President Ann Mills Griffiths on the IAG is controversial. During Committee hearings, Members of the IAG said Griffiths was a highly con- structive and energetic member of the group who has contributed significantly to im- provements in U.S. policy. It is, however, extremely unusual for a private citizen to serve on a high-level panel such as the IAG, and to have access to sensitive intelligence information without the kind of accountabil- ity and official responsibility demanded of government representatives on that group.

During the summer of 1991, for example, Griffiths actively discouraged the Defense Department from granting access to classi- fied POW/MIA materials to Senate staff in- vestigators with appropriate clearances. The Committee finds it anomalous that a private citizen representing POW/MIA families

would be in a position to try to deny Sen- ate investigators the same right to review sensitive materials that she herself has been granted.

The Committee believes that an inter- agency coordinating body for POW/ MIA policies is needed and that the IAG ably fulfills this role. However, the Committee is disturbed by the lack of formality in IAG record-keeping and believes that, at a mini- mum, that the minutes of discussions at such meetings should be maintained.

Second, although the IAG should consult regularly with the League and other POW/ MIA family organizations, the Committee believes that the role of the IAG and issues of membership on it should be reviewed by the new Administration.

Government-to-government offers

The Committee investigated the possibil- ity that Vietnam or Laos had approached U.S. officials at any time since the end of the war in Southeast Asia with a proposal

that live U.S. POWs be returned in exchange for money or some other consideration. The Committee found no convincing evidence of any such offer being made. There were, however, two incidents which require fur- ther explanation.

The Committee received information that the Reagan Administration may have re- ceived an offer from Vietnam in 1981, trans- mitted through a third country, to exchange live POWs for $4.5 billion. The source of the information was a Secret Service agent who reported that he had overheard a discussion in the White House concerning this subject. The Committee deposed one of the individu- als, former National Security Adviser Rich- ard Allen, said to have been involved in the discussion, and several individuals who were said to have been in the area of the discussion. The Secret Service agent was not willing to provide testimony to the Committee volun- tarily, and the Committee voted 7-4 not to subpoena that testimony. A complete

descrip- tion of the investigation and the subpoena issue is contained in Chapter 6 of this report.

The Committee also received a report concerning a possible approach by Vietnam in 1984, through officials in an ASEAN na- tion, concerning the exchange of American remains and possibly live POWs. According to the report, the Vietnamese had indicated that they would welcome an offer from the U.S. on the subject. U.S. officials traveled to Vietnam late in 1984, but were report- edly told by Vietnamese officials that there were no live POWs and that the only issue that could be discussed involved remains. Select Committee investigators traveled to the ASEAN nation to interview officials in an effort to determine whether an approach from Vietnam concerning live U.S. POWs had, in fact, been made. The results were inconclusive. Two secondary sources dis- agreed about whether an exchange involv-

ing live POWs had been discussed. The individual who had initially discussed the subject with Vietnamese officials later told the State Department that the issue of live American POWs had not been raised. This investigation is also described in greater de- tail in chapter 6.

Review of private activities

A major part of the Committee's inves- tigation entailed the review of private ac- tivities related to the POW/MIA issue. This review focused on efforts by such organiza- tions to educate the public about the issue, to influence government policy, to raise funds and to recover information concerning pos- sible American POWs.

In its review, the Committee asked more than 50 POW/MIA-related organizations to provide information, on a voluntary basis, concerning their activities. Committee staff also interviewed or took formal testimony from organization officials and from the family members of some POW/MIAs.

The Committee found that the vast major- ity of POW/MIA related organizations are modest, local groups of volunteers operat- ing on small budgets and dedicated to public education, grassroots lobbying, mutual as- sistance and remembrance activities. These organizations, and those who support them, have performed an important service for the nation in

maintaining a strong national spot- light on the need for the fullest possible ac- counting of our POW/MIAS.

The Committee investigated several pri- vately-organized operations aimed at physi- cally rescuing or recovering information concerning possible American POWs. These included: (1) the Team Falcon operation in 1991-1992; (2) a 1988 effort to locate pris- oners in Laos; (3) Operation Skyhook II, an early 1980's initiative also aimed at finding prisoners in Laos; and (4) the efforts of re-

tired Army Lt. Col. Bo Gritz. None of these operations have been successful in rescu- ing prisoners or in uncovering evidence that prisoners are being held.

The Committee also investigated a num- ber of photographs of individuals purported to be of U.S. POWs. In the cases investi- gated, we found that such photographs are sometimes used by private organizations as a means of attracting financial support for "rescue" or "reconnaissance" opera- tions. The Committee concluded, based on investigative work done by the DIA, that photographs circulated in 1991 allegedly depicting missing Americans Donald Carr, Daniel V. Borah, John L. Robertson, Larry J. Stevens and Albro Lundy are fraudulent. (The Committee respects the fact that the Robertson, Stevens and Lundy families have not accepted the DIA analysis). In contrast to the large number of small, vol- untary POW/MIA organizations, there are a few private POW organizations that are relatively large, have paid staff and use professional fundraisers to prepare and dis- tribute solicitation materials to millions of actual or potential contributors. These so- licitations have yielded tens of millions of dollars in contributions since the end of the war. The Committee was concerned about a number of issues, including the extent to which some groups have diverted funds for purposes other than those advertised, the possibility that misleading or false infor- mation has been included in solicitations, the failure of fund-raisers to disclose infor- mation to potential donors and the impact that these solicitations may have had on the emotions and expectations of POW/MIA families.

The Committee's principal findings are:

The vast majority of private organizations engaged in POW/MIA related activities

reflect the highest standards of volun- tary, public service and deserve the nation's gratitude and praise.

Private initiatives aimed at the "rescue" of U.S. prisoners have failed in the past and are problematic for several reasons. In general, such operations are dependent on sources of information in Southeast Asia that have a very poor record of reliability and, in some cases, a consis- tent track record of fraud. Second, it is unrealistic to believe that such efforts will have a better chance of success than official efforts. Third, the possibility exists that such operations might jeopardize ongoing U.S. diplomatic

and intelligence activities. Fourth, such activities sometimes involve the violation of U.S. and/or foreign law.

The manufacture of fraudulent POW/MIA related materials, including photographs, dog tags and other purported evidence of live Americans has become a cottage industry in certain parts of Southeast Asia, and particularly Thailand. Sadly, these activities have been spurred by well-intentioned private offers of large rewards for information leading to the return of live U.S. POWs. The Commit- tee is angered and repulsed by activities that exploit the anguish of POW/MIA families for private gain.

The Committee's examination of POW/ MIA-related fundraising activities has created serious reason for concern. In some instances, an excessive percent- age of funds raised has been retained by the fundraising organization. In oth- ers, the fundraising solicitations have over stated to the point of distortion the weight of evidence indicating that live U.S. POWs continue to be held in Southeast Asia.

Information from Russia and Eastern Europe

Although the Committee's investigation focused primarily on efforts to account for Americans missing from the war in South- east Asia, the principle of accounting for lost American servicemen is the same, whether the war occurred 20 years ago or 50 years ago. Accordingly, the Committee under- took a review of information and allegations concerning Americans missing from earlier conflicts and hired a full time investigator to work in Moscow on this and related issues.

The Committee's effort was facilitated greatly by the lifting of the Iron Curtain and by the policies of openness and coopera- tion advocated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In February, 1992, the Commit- tee's Chairman, Sen. John Kerry, and Vice- chairman, Sen. Bob Smith, met with Russian officials and veterans in Moscow to discuss cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. This visit laid the groundwork for the creation of the U.S.- Russia Joint Commission (Com- mission) on POW/MIA Affairs under the leadership of Col. Gen. Dimitri Volkogonov and Malcolm Toon, former U.S. Ambas- sador to the Soviet Union.[26] The objectives of the Commission are (1) to gain access to people and documents in Russia that could shed light on the fate of missing Americans; (2) to pursue reports that current or former U.S. POWs may be alive within the borders of the former Soviet Union; and (3) to estab- lish a means by which remains identified as American may be repatriated. Investigative work by the U.S. side to the Joint Commis- sion is carried out by the Defense Depart- ment's Task Force Russia (TFR), under the leadership of Gen. Bernard Loeffke.

The Committee's investigation was conducted, in large part, through the staff investigator assigned to work with the Com-

mission in Moscow. In Washington, the Committee reviewed documents obtained from the National Archives and from private researchers. We also conducted interviews with former officials of the Eisenhower Ad- ministration and others possessing informa- tion on the subject.

In June, 1992, the Committee hosted a meeting of the Commission with Gen. Volkogonov following Russian President Yeltsin's public statements on the POW/ MIA issue. In November, 1992, two days of public hearings were held during which both U.S. investigators and Gen. Volkogonov tes- tified.

Finally, in December, 1992, Commit- tee investigators participated in fact-finding trips to Czechoslovakia and Ukraine, and at- tended a formal meeting of the Commission in Moscow.

The Committee emphasizes that firm or precise judgments about the number and circumstances under which American mili- tary and civilian personnel may have found themselves detained within the former So- viet Union in the past cannot yet be made. Large quantities of records, both in Moscow and elsewhere, remain to be reviewed. There are also many well-informed former military and intelligence officers and diplomatic per- sonnel who have not yet been interviewed. It is possible that evidence will be uncovered indicating greater involvement of former Soviet officials in the interrogation, trans- portation or detention of U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War and prior conflicts. Thus, the findings below, which are based on work to date, must be considered as preliminary in nature:

Gen. Volkogonov's assessment

Gen. Volkogonov contends that, to his knowledge, no Americans are currently being held against their will within the bor-

ders of the former Soviet Union.[27] Although the Committee has found evidence that some U.S. POWs were held in the former Soviet Union after WW II, the Korean War and Cold War incidents, we have found no proof that would contradict Gen. Volkogonov's conten- tion with respect to the present. However, the Committee cannot, based on its investigation to date, rule out the possibility that one or more U.S. POWs from past wars or incidents are still being held somewhere within the borders of the former Soviet Union.

World War II

The Committee found that the Russians have been particularly successful in produc- ing World War II archival documents, and is pleased to report that the fate of some American military and civilian personnel from the World War II era has been deter- mined through recent investigations in Rus- sia. Moreover, archival doeu ments provided by Russia indicate that several hundred U.S. POWs were held against their will on Soviet territory at the end of World War II. In al- most all cases, these were individuals who had been

born in, or who had previously lived in, the Soviet Union, and who could, therefore, be considered Soviet citizens by the Soviet Government. Many of these indi- viduals served in the Armed Forces of Ger- many, fought against the Soviet Army and were captured in combat. Some U.S. civil- ians from this era survived terms in concen- tration camps and are still alive today, living freely either in one of the former Soviet Re- publics or in the United States.

Cold war

There is evidence, some of which has been confirmed to the Committee by Presi- dent Yeltsin, that some U.S. personnel, still unaccounted for from the Cold War, were

taken captive and held within the former So- viet Union. This information involves sev- eral incidents stretching across the former Soviet Union from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan.

The Committee is pleased to report that Task Force Russia has been actively inves- tigating these cases and is keeping surviving family members fully apprised of its prog- ress to date. The Committee notes, however, that progress is, in large part, dependent on cooperation from Russian authorities. In the Committee's November, 1992 hearings, our investigator in Moscow testified that the U.S. was "intentionally being stonewalled" by the Russians on the subject of Cold War inci- dents, despite pledges of cooperation from President Yeltsin and Gen. Volkogonov. The Committee, therefore, urges the Joint Com- mission to place special attention and focus on obtaining further information on the fate of those U.S. personnel who are believed to have been taken captive during the Cold War.

Korean conflict

There is strong evidence, both from ar- chived U.S. intelligence reports and from recent interviews in Russia, that Soviet mili- tary and intelligence officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs dur- ing the Korean Conflict, notwithstanding recent official statements from the Russian side that this did not happen. Addition- ally, the Committee has reviewed informa- tion and heard testimony which we believe constitutes strong

evidence that some un- accounted for American POWs from the Korean Conflict were transferred to the for- mer Soviet Union in the early 1950's. While the identity of these POWs has not yet been determined, the Committee notes that Task Force Russia concurs in our assessment con-

cerning the transfers. We are pleased that this subject was raised by the U.S. side in December, 1992 at the plenary session of the Joint Commission in Moscow.

The Committee further believes it is possi- ble that one or more POWs from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The most nota- ble case in this regard concerns a USAF pilot named David "Markham" or "Markin", who was reportedly shot down during the Korean Conflict. According to several sources, this pilot was reportedly alive in detention fa- cilities in Russia as late as 1991. Although Task Force Russia has thus far been unable to confirm these reports, we note that the in- vestigation is continuing.

Vietnam war

The Committee is aware of several reports that U.S. POWs may have been transferred to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. Information about this possibility that was provided by a former employee of the Na- tional Security Agency (NSA), Mr. Jerry Mooney, was thoroughly investigated and could not be substantiated. The Committee notes that Mr. Mooney testified that he per- sonally believed prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union but that he had "no di- rect information" that this took place.[28] 0ther reports concerning the possibility that U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the former Soviet Union deserve further investi- gation and followup.

With respect to interrogations, the Com- mittee has confirmed that one KGB offi- cer participated directly in the questioning of an American POW during the Vietnam Conflict. More generally, Soviet military officers have told the Committee that they received intelligence from North Vietnam- ese

interrogations of American POWs and that the Soviets "participated" in interroga-

tions through the preparation of questions and through their presence during some of the interrogations. It is possible that Ameri- can POWs would not have been aware of the presence of Soviet officers during these interrogations. The Committee has also re- ceived information that Soviet personnel op- erated certain SAM sites in Vietnam which shot down American aircraft during the war.

The Committee notes that the cooperation received to date from Russia on POW/MIA matters has been due largely to the leader- ship of President Boris Yeltsin. During a visit to Washington last summer, President Yelt- sin declared that "each and every document in each and every archive will be examined to investigate the fate of every American un- accounted for." Although there is still much work to be done, Russian officials deserve credit for providing access to archival ma- terial, for cooperating in efforts to solicit testimony from Russian veterans and other citizens and for their willingness to disclose certain previously undisclosed aspects of the historical record. The ultimate success of the Joint Commission will be judged, however, on whether the U.S. side is able to obtain full support for its interview program and archival research from all levels of power and authority throughout the former Soviet Union.

President Yeltsin has made a heroic effort to demonstrate his own commitment to full cooperation and Gen. Volkogonov has done a great deal, with limited resources, to meet this standard. Unfortunately, the level of co- operation from within the Russian military and intelligence bureaucracy has been less extensive and has, at times, seemed inten- tionally obstructive. This may well be due to the uncertainty of the current political situ- ationin Russia. It is vital, therefore, that U.S. officials, both in Congress and the Executive branch, continue to demonstrate to Russian

authorities that America attaches a high pri- ority to cooperation on this issue and to en- sure that any problems. that might develop are raised with the Russians promptly and at a senior level.

The Committee also recommends strongly that the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission be continued and that efforts be made to gain the full cooperation, as needed and appro- priate, of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union.

Notes

1. “Perot’s Veep: From Hanoi to the De- bate”, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 13, 1992.

2. There were a few instances where the Executive branch denied the Committee access to specific intelligence sources. The Commit- tee has been assured, however, that the infor- mation that could have been provided by those sources has not been withheld. Also, access to the debrief ings of returned POWs was granted only to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman.

3. Subject only to the deletion of specific information that, if made public, would com- promise intelligence sources and methods.

4. On January 29, 1973, at a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, a DOD representative told Dr. Henry Kisssinger that “We have only six known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be forty or forty- one.” On February 1, 1973, DIA statistics listed 80 Americans as POWs who were not accounted for on the lists provided by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong.

5. Richard M. Nixon, Address of the Presi- dent to the nation, March 29, 1973.

6. Final Report of the House Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 12/13/76.

7. Dr. Roger Shields, head of the Defense Department’s POW/MIA Task Force, briefmg of the Woodcock Commission, February, 1977.

8. This discussion refers to U.S. POWs who were captured prior to Operation Home- coming. One civilian pilot, Emmet Kay, was known to have been taken captive after Op- eration Homecoming and was held prisoner from May, 1973 until his release in September,

1974. In addition, a small number of other Americans, including Private Robert Gar- wood, USMC, are known to have remained in Southeast Asia after the end of the war.

9. In an address to the nation on March 29, 1973, President Nixon said: “For the first time in 12 years, no American military forces are in Vietnam. All of our American POWs are on their way home . . . There are still some prob- lem areas. The provisions of the

agreement requiring an accounting for all missing in ac- tion in Indochina, the provisions with regard to Laos and Cambodia, the provisions concern- ing infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam have not been complied with . . . "

10. Testimony of Dr. Roger Shields, head of the DOD Task Force on POW/MIA, be- fore the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 31, 1973.

11. Sen. Brown wishes to stress his view that, based on testimony received by the Com- mittee, when the Administration discussed those missing in action, they were referring to prisoners of war and those last known alive; and that significant efforts were made to raise these issues as a matter of public concern.

12. Senators Smith and Grassley dissent from this statement because they believe that live-sighting reports and other sources of in- telligence are evidence that POWs may have survived to the present.

13. The Defense Intelligency Agency de- fines a "discrepancy case" as including three categories of missing Americans: "individuals who were carried as POWs by their respective services during the war but did not return dur- ing Operation Homecoming; "individuals who were known or suspected to have survived their loss incidents and might have been taken prisoner"; and "other cases in which intelli- gence indicates the Indochinese government may know the fate of a missing man."

14. Cable from President Nixon to Pham Van Dong, February 2, 1973.

15. For example, Dr. Kissinger sent a cable to Le Due Tho on March 20, 1973 saying, in part: "The. U.S. side has become increasingly disturbed about the question of American pris- oners held or missing in Laos . . . the U.S.

side has made clear on many occasions that the list of only nine American prisoners pre- sented belatedly by the Pathet Lao is clearly incomplete."

16. Some Members of the Select Commit- tee believe that the U.S. threat to halt troop withdrawals referred only to the prisoners on the DRV/Laos list, and have cited testimony by some former Nixon Administration offi- cials and some contemporary press accounts to support that view.

17. Other Committee Members believe that this second degree amendment to an amend- ment offered by Sen. Mark Hatfield was aimed far more at authorizing President Nixon to

con- tinue prosecuting the war in Southeast Asia than to gain an accounting for missing Americans.

18. Gen. V essey' s responsibilities are lim- ited to Vietnam. The investigation of discrepancy cases in Laos and Cambodia is the responsibility of the Joint Task Force-Full Ac- counting, established January 23, 1992, as a suc- cessor to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

19. The reviews included Inspector Gen- eral reports in 1983 and 1984/5; a 1985 interagency review; a September, 1985 review by Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks (USN-Ret.); and Task Force reports conducted in 1986 by Gen. Eugene Tighe (USAF-Ret.) and Col. Kimball Gaines (USAF-Ret.)

20. According to DIA, 1111 (68%) first- hand live-sighting reports correlate to Americans who are accounted for (returned POWs, missionaries, civilians jailed for reasons unre- lated to the war etc); 45 (3%) of the reports were correlated to wartime sightings of mili- tary personnel or pre-1975 sightings of civil- ians who remain unaccounted for; and 397 (24%) of the reports were found to be fabrica- tions. Of the 85 reports that remain under in- vestigation, 54 pertain to Americans allegedly seen in a captive environment.

21. A description of these intercepts is con- tained in Chapter 4 of the Committee's fmal report.

22. The JSSA is the service proponent agency for pilot distress symbols, code of conduct, survival training and POW resistance training.

23. Some members note DIA's contention that many DIA analysts are well aware of E&E signals and have worked with the agency's an- alysts for years, searching for E&E signals. The DIA also points out that the two alleged E&E signals given most prominence in this re- port were discovered by U.S. government im- agery analysts.

24. Some members note DIA's contention that the symbols in question are consistent with expected actions only because they are sym- bols; they do not relate to any evader signal in use during the Vietnam War.

25. Some members note DIA's contention that U.S. intelligence has interviewed former Royal Laotian officials held at Nhom Marrott for a number of years, including the time pe- riod in question. These individuals stated that no Americans were held at Nhom Marrott.

26. Senators Kerry and Smith were ap- pointed to serve as the Senate's representatives on the joint commission.

27. Gen. Volkogonov did not mean to in- clude in this contention any Americans who might legitimately be under arrest for recent violations of civil or criminal law. For example, at the time of the Select Committee hear- ing, one American was under arrest for dealing in contraband religious icons.

28. Committee hearing, Jan. 22, 1992.

Source: Excerpt: Senate Report 103-1, Report of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (Jan- uary 13, 1993).

Excerpt: Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAS (June 17, 1996)

Doc 27C: 1992–1996 Findings of the WWII Working Group

Despite these efforts, allegations that there were 15,597 American POWs being held in late May 1945 by the Soviets in Aus- tria persist.

If there had been 15,000 US POWs in Austria in late May 1945, whence had they

come? Allied intelligence estimated in Feb- ruary 1945 that there were only 4,000 Amer- ican prisoners in Austria, most in Stalag XVII-B, the largest camp in Austria. But the Germans evacuated that camp and moved the POWs westward, away from Marshal Tol- bukhin's advancing forces. On 3 May 1945, US troops liberated 3,000 American POWs at Branau, on the Austrian-German border, who had been evacuated and marched west- ward from XVII-B. By late May, clearly there were few American POWs remaining in Austria and certainly not 15,000 to be held by the Red Army or anyone else.

For it to be true (as Brown, Sanders, and Waley allege) that the Soviets liberated but never repatriated 23,000 US prisoners of war, all of the following, among other un- likely possibilities, also had to be true:

1. A substantial part of the historical docu- mentary record from World War II not only is completely inaccurate, but has been deliberatsssely falsified.

2. Discrepancies in the numbers of Ameri- can POWs liberated and not recovered simultaneously and identically appear in US, Soviet, German, and British data.

3. The Soviets had almost twice as many US POWs that they claimed or than Al- lied and German records indicated, and these 23,000 were transferred and im- prisoned in the Soviet Union without a trace.

4. The families of the 23,000 allegedly left behind participated in the cover up, be- cause these was no public outcry from these people regarding the status of their missing relatives.
   There is no documentary evidence that

could lead to a conclusion that significant numbers of American prisoners of war disap- peared into Soviet prisons after World War II.

The historical record in that regard is nei- ther inaccurate, nor has it been deliberately falsified. In the contemporary debriefings, interrogations, and similar documentation, and in the postwar POW memoir literature, there are no verifiable accounts that claim the Soviets held back 23,000 or any other substantial number of US prisoners. Such numbers, furthermore, are not consistent with the final postwar casualty resolution and accounting.

Conclusions and Further Directions

It remains to be determined whether any American prisoners of war liberater in 1945 by Soviet forces were not returned to US military control but were held in Soviet pris- ons. There were individuals known to have been POWs of the Germans who did not return to US military control after VE Day. Military authorities expended considerable effort, including inquiries to the Soviets, in determining what might have happened to these men.

On 27 July 1945, the Provost Marshal General of the European Theater sent a list of 492 names identified as “unrecovered American prisoners of war” to the POW Information Bureau in Washington. Not all of the POWs on this or subsequent lists of discrepancy cases would necessarily have been in Soviet hands. Most on the ETO list eventually were accounted for and otherwise

identified; others had died during the harsh conditions early in 1945, especially on the marches westward when the Germans evac- uated the POW camps in the east. In De- cember 1945 the Machine Records Branch of the Adjutant General's Office produced a somewhat refined listing, which included 207 names of "Unaccounted for American Prisoners of War Held by the German Gov- ernment (CFN 74)." A further refinement produced on 14 March 1946, by the POW

Information Bureau of the Provost Marshal General's Office, included 31 unrecovered prisoners known to have been held by the Japanese and 77 held by the Germans.

At an early date in its research into World War II questions, the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD) of the Depart- ment of Defense POW/MIA Office identi- fied the "207 List" as a significant "find" and as a possible source for names of Amer- ican POWs who might have been in Soviet custody at the end of the war. JCSD com- pared the names on this list against a variety of other documentary sources; the process has further accounted for and reduced to 87 the number of unresolved cases on this "207 List." Cases were resolved by identifying individuals who did return to military con- trols, or who had died in captivity, or who were killed in action, or who were not ac- tually POWs. We are continuing to pursue leads to resolve the fate of the 87 from the "207 List" and other World War II discrep- ancy cases.

We developed files on all of the individual cases examined; a description of several of the more significant cases is included in our report. The discrepancy cases we pursued, in which an individual POW or MIA was identifiable, all led to a conclusion that the person dies or had been returned to military control, not that they had been incarcerated in a Soviet prison. Our conclusions, in ef- fect, are consistent with the original find- ings of death issued by the War Department nearly fifty years ago and with the other earlier efforts at casualty resolution. Evi- dence supporting our conclusions comes from several sources including official personnel files, deceased personnel

files, reports of the casualty resolution boards, from other American military records, and from Soviet-era documents.

The evidence in the case studies we pur- sued does not indicate that liberated Ameri- can POWs were held against their will by the Soviet Government after VE Day. We uncovered no evidence from Russian or American archives that conclusively dem- onstrates such a finding, although research on several cases is still underway that could indicate otherwise. There is certainly no evidence that the Soviets held thousands of American POWs in the GULAG, or that the US Government participated in a cover-up of such an operation. We located ample evi- dence that contradicts such contentions and that demonstrated the "good faith effort" of military authorities following the war to re- solve individual casualty status, including that of MIAs.

Ongoing Issues

The work of the World War II Working Group is complicated by a number of factors:

1. The lack of an activist constituency. There are very few immediate fam- ily members still living who lost loved ones in World War II. There are no par- ents, wives, or children of former World War II POWs asking us the whereabouts of their loved ones. Any leads or issues that were developed have been done so primarily from information contained in archival documents;

2. Lack of living eyewitnesses. It is be- coming increasingly more difficult to locate actual participants in the events, both Russian and American;

3. The vast volume of information to re- view and the lack of access. World War II is the most extensively docu- mented twentieth century conflict. There are still literally tons of documents that should be reviewed for POW informa-

tion. The same is true in the former So- viet Union. The issue is compounded in Russia by the lack of access to this material by JCSD analysts. Presently we rely heavily on Russian archivists to search for information. Not only is there a lack of Russian manpower dedicated to this project, but Russian

archivists are not always aware of the types of docu- ments that would aid our project and do not always provide us with archival citations in case a promising holding is found. Full access to unclassified ar- chives is paramount.

We would like to propose an archival re- search exchange program to the Joint Com- mission. Under this program, JCSD analysts would be allowed to do active, long-term research in unclassified holdings in the for- mer Soviet Union, and Russian researchers would have the same rights in the United States archives. Experience has shown that key documents are found in the most un- likely places. Presently, members of Task Force Russia, the Moscow-based branch of the Joint Commission Support Directorate, have been allowed some limited access to some Russian archives, but have never been allowed to devote the time or obtain the ac- cess required to perform team research.

There are a number of ongoing issues of concern to the US side of the Joint Com- mission. These deal primarily with service- men, whose names have either appeared in Russian archival documents, in documents generated by the wartime US Military Mis- sion to Moscow in various publications, or are amount the 87 on "The 207 List" that we have not yet resolved. From our Russian colleagues, we have requested information or documents relating to a number of cases. We will continue to pursue these requests.

As other names or issues arise, they will be addressed through Commission channels.

Source: Excerpt: Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/ MIAS (June 17, 1996).

Ronald Reagan: The "Evil Empire" (March 8, 1983)

In 1981 the former Hollywood actor and gov- ernor of California Ronald Reagan, a staunch conservative from the right wing of the Re- publican Party, became president. Unlike his more pragmatic predecessors, he was a fierce anticommunist who felt a deep ideological an- tipathy toward the Soviet Union and did not hesitate to express this antagonism. Alarmed that during the late 1970s the Soviet Union had become more assertive in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, Reagan launched a major defense buildup, improving on the increases in military spending already pro- jected by his

predecessor, Jimmy Carter. Rea- gan consciously sought to restore the national confidence of the United States after the de- moralizing 1970s. He repeatedly proclaimed the superiority of capitalism, democracy, and free institutions over the Soviet Union and sought to encourage free enterprise, reduce the role of government, and cut taxes by curtailing spending on welfare and other social programs. Excessive intervention by the government, he proclaimed, was the problem, not the solution. One of Reagan's closest international allies was Margaret Thatcher, the equally conservative and ideologically driven prime minister of Great Britain, who shared his anticommunist and free market outlook. Reagan did not hesitate to use undiplomatic language to describe the Soviet Union. In June 1982 he made a state visit to Britain. Speaking in the British House of Commons, he relegated Soviet totalitarianism to the "ash heap of his- tory." He deliberately drew on memories of Winston Churchill, the towering British politi- cian who had sounded the alarm against Adolf Hitler's Germany during the 1930s, served as

an inspiring prime minister during World War II, and warned in 1946 that the Soviet Union had drawn an "iron curtain" across Europe. In the original draft of this speech, Reagan re- ferred to the Soviet Union as "the focus of evil in the modern world" and a "militaristic empire," passages that were later cut as too provocative. Reagan did, however, proclaim his mission to "preserve freedom as well as peace" and described the conflict between to- talitarianism and democracy as a battle be- tween good and evil, optimistically stating that good would prevail. Nine months later, he recycled his uncompromising "evil empire" description of the Soviet Union when address- ing the National Association of Evangelicals, a forum in which he also emphasized the antireligious aspects of communism. On this oc- casion, Reagan was particularly concerned to counter growing pressures in both the United States and Europe for a nuclear freeze agree- ment that would have halted deployments of additional short- and intermediate-range mis- siles in Western Europe.

[. . .]

Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world.

And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that

the only morality they recog- nize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that's their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class con- ceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation

of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influen- tial people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical re- luctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate our- selves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to re- mind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballis- tic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nu- clear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compro- mise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to

achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled mili- tary buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United

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States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require exten- sive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compli- ance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the en- tertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, "I love my little girls more than anything "And I said to myself, "Oh, no, don't. You can't— don't say that." But I had underestimated him. He went on: "I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God."

There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness— pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

It was C. S. Lewis who, in his unforgetta- ble "Screwtape Letters," wrote: "The great- est evil is not done now in those sordid 'dens

of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice."

Well, because these "quiet men" do not "raise their voices," because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they're always making "their final territorial demand," some would have us ac- cept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that sim- ple-minded appeasement or wishful think- ing about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom.

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the tempta- tion of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration's efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.

While America's military strength is im- portant, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.

Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western World exists to the degree in which the West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in commu- nism's attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marx- ism-Leninism is actually the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, "Ye shall be as gods."

The Western World can answer this chal- lenge, he wrote, "but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in Man."

I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bi- zarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limita- tion, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: "He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength. . . . But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary. . . ."

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, "We have it within our power to begin the world over again." We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself.

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presi- dents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 359–64.

Ronald Reagan: "Tear Down This Wall" Speech (June 12, 1987)

After Mikhail Gorbachev became general sec- retary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, Soviet relations with the West gradually im- proved. Gorbachev initially sought to reform rather than destroy communism in the Soviet Union, through policies of economic

restruc- turing (*perestroika*) and openness (*glasnost*). Gorbachev also began to rein back Soviet military spending and overseas interventions, and made serious overtures for cuts in nuclear and conventional forces. While responding to such overtures with growing enthusiasm, U.S. president Ronald Reagan remained a staunch anticommunist, and was unwilling as ever to appear to countenance Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Speaking at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987, the symbolic heart of Berlin, Reagan urged Gorbachev to "tear down this wall" and allow the people of East Germany to choose their own destiny. Less than three years later, in November 1989, Reagan's hopes were fulfilled, as Gorbachev relaxed Soviet control of Eastern Europe and the people of Berlin de- molished the Berlin Wall themselves.

President Ronald Reagan

Remarks on the East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin

June 12, 1987

Thank you very much. Chancellor Kohl, Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gen- tlemen: Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to the people of this city and the world at the City Hall. Well, since then two other presi- dents have come, each in his turn, to Berlin. And today I, myself, make my second visit to your city.

We come to Berlin, we American Presi- dents, because it's our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. But I must confess, we're drawn here by other things as well: by the feeling of history in this city, more than 500 years older than our own nation; by the beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten; most of all, by your courage and determi- nation. Perhaps the composer Paul Lincke understood something about American presidents. You see, like so many Presidents before me, I come here today because wher- ever I go, whatever I do: Ich hab noch einen Koffer in Berlin. [I still have a suitcase in Berlin.]

Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those lis- tening throughout Eastern Europe, a spe- cial word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in

the West, in this firm, this unalterable be- lief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.]

Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those bar- riers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same —still a restric- tion on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before

the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a Ger- man, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar.

President von Weizsacker has said, "The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed." Today I say: As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of tri- umph.

In this season of spring in 1945, the peo- ple of Berlin emerged from their air-raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State—as you've been told—George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this month, he said: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."

In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th an- niversary of the Marshall plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Ber- liners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the Western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: "The Marshall plan is

helping here to strengthen the free world." A strong, free world in the West, that dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to become an eco- nomic giant. Italy, France, Belgium—vir- tually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth; the European Community was founded.

In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the

Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Re- uter, and other leaders understood the prac- tical importance of liberty—that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and business- man enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Ber- lin doubled.

Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany— busy office blocks, fine homes and apart- ments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of park land. Where a city's culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there's abun- dance—food, clothing, automobiles—the wonderful goods of the Ku'damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But my friends, there were a few things the So- viets didn't count on—Berliner Herz, Ber- liner Humor, ja, und Berliner Schnauze. [Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a Berliner Schnauze.]

In the 1950s, Khrushchev predicted: "We will bury you." But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well- being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind—too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still

cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to

prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor.

And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broad- casts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permit- ted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we be- lieve that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace.

There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would ad- vance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the So- viet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent —and I pledge to you my country's efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Begin- ning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance re- sponded by committing itself to a counter-

deployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elim- ination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, pre- pared to go forward with its counter-deploy- ment, there were difficult days—days

of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city—and the Soviets later walked away from the table.

But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then—I in- vite those who protest today—to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the So- viets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limit- ing the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Ice- land to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the talks in Geneva, we have also proposed deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. And the Western allies have likewise made far- reaching proposals to reduce the danger of conventional war and to place a total ban on chemical weapons.

While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the ca- pacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative— research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must re- member a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each

other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled, Berlin was under siege. And today, despite all the pressures upon this city, Berlin stands secure in its liberty. And freedom itself is trans- forming the globe.

In the Philippines, in South and Central America, democracy has been given a re- birth. Throughout the Pacific, free markets are working miracle after miracle of eco- nomic growth. In the industrialized nations, a technological revolution is taking place— a revolution marked by rapid, dramatic ad- vances in computers and telecommunica- tions.

In Europe, only one nation and those it controls refuse to join the community of freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled eco- nomic growth, of information and inno- vation, the Soviet Union faces a choice: It must make fundamental changes, or it will become obsolete. Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers that sepa- rate people, to create a safe, freer world.

And surely there is no better place than Berlin, the meeting place of East and West, to make a start. Free people of Berlin: Today, as in the past, the United States stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four Power Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th an- niversary of this city, to usher in a new era, to seek a still fuller, richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties between the Federal Repub- lic and the Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 agreement.

And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all

the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that come with life in one of the great cities of the world. To open Berlin still further to all Europe, East and West, let us expand the vital air access to this city, finding ways of making commercial air service to Berlin more convenient, more comfortable, and more economical. We look to the day when West Berlin can become one of the chief aviation hubs in all central Europe.

With our French and British partners, the United States is prepared to help bring in- ternational meetings to Berlin. It would be only fitting for Berlin to serve as the site of United Nations meetings, or world confer- ences on human rights and arms control or other issues that call for international co- operation. There is no better way to estab- lish hope for the future than to enlighten young minds, and we would be honored to sponsor summer youth exchanges, cultural events, and other programs for young Ber- liners from the

East. Our French and British friends, I'm certain, will do the same. And it's my hope that an authority can be found in East Berlin to sponsor visits from young people of the Western sectors.

One final proposal, one close to my heart: Sport represents a source of enjoyment and ennoblement, and you may have noted that the Republic of Korea—South Korea—has offered to permit certain events of the 1988 Olympics to take place in the North. Interna- tional sports competitions of all kinds could take place in both parts of this city. And what better way to demonstrate to the world the openness of this city than to offer in some future year to hold the Olympic games here in Berlin, East and West?

In these four decades, as I have said, you Berliners have built a great city. You've done so in spite of threats—the Soviet attempts to

impose the East-mark, the blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the challenges implicit in the very presence of this wall. What keeps you here? Certainly there's a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe there's something deeper, something that involves Berlin's whole look and feel and way of life—not mere sentiment. No one could live long in Berlin without being completely disabused of illusions. Something instead, that has seen the difficulties of life in Ber- lin but chose to accept them, that continues to build this good and proud city in contrast to a surrounding totalitarian presence that refuses to release human energies or aspira- tions. Something that speaks with a power- ful voice of affirmation, that says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to freedom. In a word, I would submit that what keeps you in Berlin is love—love both profound and abiding.

Perhaps this gets to the root of the matter, to the most fundamental distinction of all be- tween East and West. The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship. The totalitarian world finds even symbols of love and of worship an affront. Years ago, before the East Germans began rebuilding their churches, they erected a secular structure: the television tower at Alexander Platz. Vir- tually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what they view as the tower's one major flaw, treating the

glass sphere at the top with paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet even today when the sun strikes that sphere—that sphere that towers over all Berlin—the light makes the sign of the cross. There in Berlin, like the city itself, symbols of love, symbols of worship, cannot be suppressed.

As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag, that embodiment of German unity, I noticed words crudely spray- painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner: "This wall will fall. Beliefs be- come reality." Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom.

And I would like, before I close, to say one word. I have read, and I have been ques- tioned since I've been here about certain demonstrations against my coming. And I would like to say just one thing, and to those who demonstrate so. I wonder if they have ever asked themselves that if they should have the kind of government they apparently seek, no one would ever be able to do what they're doing again.

Thank you and God bless you all.

Source: Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers of the Presi- dents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987*, Bk. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 634–38.

The Minsk Declarations (Dissolution of the Soviet Union) (December 8, 1991)

By 1990 the readiness of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to allow the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe to reject commu- nism and leave the Warsaw Pact had strength- ened separatist forces within the Soviet Union itself. The Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had only been incorpo- rated in the Soviet Union during World War II, were particularly outspoken in demanding au- tonomy or independence, but nationalist forces were also developing in various Soviet repub- lics, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine. In January 1991 unrest in Lithuania, whose government had declared that the Soviet constitution was no longer valid there,

led Gorbachev to order the Soviet military to replace the republic's government. At least 14 people were killed and another 600 injured, provoking protests from many Western states. Seeking to defuse the growing internal crisis, Gorbachev and his advisors proceeded to draw up a treaty of union that would have made the Soviet Union into a

voluntary democratic fed- eration whose members enjoyed economic free trade with each other. In August 1991 nation- alist hard-liners within the Soviet leadership, who feared that this arrangement would lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union, mounted a coup against Gorbachev, then on holiday in the Crimea. Although Gorbachev's govern- ment survived, largely due to the intervention of Boris Yeltsin, elected two months earlier as president of the Russian Republic, Gorbach- ev's authority was fatally weakened. Yeltsin, who sought to implement sweeping economic reforms within Russia, regarded the Soviet Union as expendable, and during the fall the Russian Republic gradually took over the Soviet ministries based in Moscow. After confidential negotiations, in early December 1991 Yeltsin met with the leaders of the republics of Ukraine and Belarus, and the three declared the disso- lution of the Soviet Union and its replacement by a voluntary Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States. Membership in this organization was open to all former Soviet republics, and by the end of the month 11 states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—had joined. On December 30 the signatories agreed to coordinate their military policies and to ob- serve the arms control agreements concluded by the former Soviet Union. Gorbachev ob- jected strongly but unavailingly to the disman- tling of the Soviet Union, which he had hoped to preserve. On December 24, 1991, the Rus- sian Federation took over the Soviet seat in the United Nations (UN). The following day, Gor- bachev finally resigned his position as the last Soviet president, leaving Yeltsin in undisputed control as president of the Russian Federation, an outcome that had probably been one major

underlying reason behind Yeltsin's move to break up the Soviet Union.

that of the unique ethno-cultural regions that have come into being, take them under their protection.

Article 4

The high contracting parties will develop the equal and mutually beneficial co-operation of their peoples and states in the spheres of politics, the economy, culture, education, public health, protection of the environment, science and trade and in the humanitarian and other spheres, will promote the broad exchange of information and will conscien- tiously and unconditionally observe recipro- cal obligations.

The parties consider it a necessity to con- clude agreements on co-operation in the above spheres.

Article 5

The high contracting parties recognize and respect one another's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth.

They guarantee openness of borders, free- dom of movement for citizens and of trans- mission of information within the Common- wealth.

Article 6

The member-states of the Commonwealth will co-operate in safeguarding international peace and security and in implementing ef- fective measures for reducing weapons and military spending. They seek the elimina- tion of all nuclear weapons and universal total disarmament under strict international control.

The parties will respect one another's as- piration to attain the status of a non-nuclear zone and a neutral state.

The member-states of the community will preserve and maintain under united com-

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The Minsk Agreement signed by the heads of state of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine on December 8, 1991

Preamble

We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine, as founder states of the Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics (USSR), which signed the 1922 Union Treaty, further described as the high contracting parties, conclude that the USSR has ceased to exist as a subject of in- ternational law and a geopolitical reality.

[. . .]

Article 1

The high contracting parties form the Com- monwealth of Independent States.

Article 2

The high contracting parties guarantee their citizens equal rights and freedoms regardless of nationality or other distinctions. Each of the high contracting parties guarantees the citizens of the other parties, and also persons without citizenship that live on its territory, civil, political, social, economic and cul- tural rights and freedoms in accordance with generally recognized international norms of human rights, regardless of national allegiance or other distinctions.

Article 3

The high contracting parties, desiring to promote the expression, preservation and development of the ethnic, cultural, linguis- tic and religious individuality of the national minorities resident on their territories, and

mand a common military-strategic space, including unified control over nuclear weap- ons, the procedure for implementing which is regulated by a special agreement.

They also jointly guarantee the necessary conditions for the stationing and function- ing of and for material and social provision for the strategic armed forces. The parties contract to pursue a harmonized policy on questions of social protection and pension provision for members of the services and their families.

Article 7

The high contracting parties recognize that within the sphere of their activities, im- plemented on the equal basis through the common coordinating institutions of the Commonwealth, will be the following:

—co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy;

—co-operation in forming and developing the united economic area, the common European and Eurasian markets, in the area of customs policy;

—co-operation in developing transport and communication systems;

—co-operation in preservation of the envi- ronment, and participation in creating a comprehensive international system of ecological safety;

—migration policy issues; —and fighting organized crime.

Article 8

The parties realize the planetary character of the Chernobyl catastrophe and pledge themselves to unite and co-ordinate their efforts in minimizing and overcoming its consequences.

To these ends they have decided to con- clude a special agreement which will take

consider [sic] the gravity of the consequences of this catastrophe.

Article 9

The disputes regarding interpretation and ap- plication of the norms of this agreement are to be solved by way of negotiations between the appropriate bodies, and when necessary, at the level of heads of the governments and states.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties reserved the right to suspend the validity of the pres- ent agreement or individual articles thereof, after informing the parties to the agreement of this a year in advance.

The clauses of the present agreement may be addended to or amended with the com- mon consent of the high contracting parties.

Article 11

From the moment that the present agreement is signed, the norms of third states, includ- ing the former USSR, are not permitted to be implemented on the territories of the sig- natory states.

Article 12

The high contracting parties guarantee the fulfillment of the international obligations binding upon them from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR.

Article 13

The present agreement does not affect the obligations of the high contracting parties in regard to third states.

The present agreement is open for all member-states of the former USSR to join, and also for other states which share the goals and principles of the present agreement.

Article 14

The city of Minsk is the official location of the coordinating bodies of the Commonwealth. The activities of bodies of the former USSR are discontinued on the territories of

the member-states of the Commonwealth.

Agreement on Strategic Forces

Concluded between the 11 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 30, 1991.

Preamble

each state participating in the Common- wealth in a separate protocol).

Article 2

The member-states of the Commonwealth undertake to observe the international trea- ties of the former USSR, to pursue a coor- dinated policy in the area of international security, disarmament and arms control, and to

participate in the preparation and im- plementation of programs for reductions in arms and armed forces. The member-states of the Commonwealth are immediately en- tering into negotiations with one another and also with other states which were for- merly part of the USSR, but which have not joined the commonwealth, with the aim of ensuring guarantees and developing mecha- nisms for implementing the aforementioned treaties.

Article 3

The member-states of the Commonwealth recognize the need for joint command of strategic forces and for maintaining unified control of nuclear weapons, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, of the armed forces of the former USSR.

Article 4

Until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the decision on the need for their use is taken by the president of the Russian Federation in agreement with the heads of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Ka- zakhstan and the Republic of Ukraine, and in consultation with the heads of the other member-states of the Commonwealth.

Until their destruction in full, nuclear weapons located on the territory of the Re- public of Ukraine shall be under the control of the Combined Strategic Forces Com-

Guided by the necessity for a coordinated and organized solution to issues in the sphere of the control of the strategic forces and the single control over nuclear weapons, the Re- public of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbai- jan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Fed- eration, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Re- public of Turkmenistan, the Republic of Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan, subsequently referred to as ‘the member- states of the Commonwealth,’ have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The term ‘strategic forces’ means: group- ings, formations, units, institutions, the military training institutes for the strategic missile troops, for the air force, for the navy and for the air defenses; the directorates of the Space Command and of the airborne troops, and of strategic and operational intel- ligence, and the nuclear technical units and also the forces, equipment and other military facilities designed for the control and main- tenance of the strategic forces of the former USSR (the schedule is to be determined for

mand, with the aim that they not be used and be dismantled by the end of 1994, including tactical nuclear weapons by 1 July 1992.

The process of destruction of nuclear weapons located on the territory of the Re- public of Belarus and the Republic of Ukraine shall take place with the participation of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine under the joint control of the Commonwealth states.

Article 5

The status of strategic forces and the proce- dure for service in them shall be defined in a special agreement.

Article 6

This agreement shall enter into force from the moment of its signing and shall be ter- minated by decision of the signatory states or the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth.

This agreement shall cease to apply to a signatory state from whose territory strategic forces or nuclear weapons are withdrawn.

Source: “The Minsk Agreement,” The Library of Con- gress Country Studies, http:// lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ belarus/by_appnb.html. “Agreement on Strategic Forces,” Berlin Information-Center for Transatlan- tic Security, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/START/ documents/strategicforces91.htm.

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Competition Spurs Technology

How Did Tensions between Global Superpowers Fuel Technological Advancements during the Cold War?

Motivated by the urgency of national secu- rity, and possibly even survival, the United States and Soviet Union poured money, re- sources, and talent into decades of scien- tific research. A number of events serve as important milestones in this decades-long competition. For instance, American devel- opment of the hydrogen bomb dramatically increased tension with the Soviets, who re- sponded by focusing more on their evolving technology programs. These efforts paid off in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite. The United States' sense of technological preeminence was shattered, and the space race had begun.

In the following Defining Moments, Dr. Larry Simpson analyzes the role of these two events—the detonation of the first hy- drogen bomb and the launch of Sputnik— on Cold War relations and the technological arms race. In the first, he explores the dra- matic deterioration of U.S.–Soviet relations in the first few years after World War II and the U.S. drive to create ever more powerful weapons. Both sides' keen interest in produc- ing new weapons was both caused by and a product of this breakdown. In the second De- fining Moment, Dr. Simpson demonstrates how the Soviet triumph of Sputnik altered

the balance of power between the two ene- mies. With the launch of that small satellite, outer space became a potential battlefield for the next war. Americans were stunned by the Soviet success but would soon coun- ter it with their own space program, which would eventually come to eclipse that of the Soviet Union.

Defining Moment 1: Development of the Hydrogen Bomb

On November 1, 1952, the United States tested its first hydrogen device on Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands in the South Pacific. The thermonuclear explosion—the equivalent of 10 million tons, or 10 mega-

tons, of TNT—created a three-mile-wide fireball that instantly obliterated the tiny land mass. The blast propelled the Cold War into another more potentially lethal stage. Its power was so unnerving that it took the Harry S. Truman administration two weeks to reveal what had happened to the world.

"Mike," the codename of the operation, was largely the product of the work of two individuals: the so-called father of the H- bomb, Edward Teller, and the lesser-known Stanislaw Ulam. Teller was a Hungarian Jew and a brilliant physicist who had come to the United States in 1935 fleeing totalitarianism in Europe. Ulam was an equally gifted Pol- ish mathematician who had also come to

the United States in the mid-1930s. During World War II, Teller became a leader of one of the research teams at Los Alamos, New Mexico, working on the Manhattan Proj- ect, which was responsible for creating the atomic bomb. That weapon had been deto- nated by atomic fission, but Teller's research led him to suggest making a much more pow- erful device using nuclear fusion as a trigger- ing mechanism. Many influential scientists, however, opposed Teller's proposal. Chief among these was J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had been the lead scientist on the Man- hattan Project. Oppenheimer had been ap- palled by the devastation wrought at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, as an adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission, which administered nuclear policy, he counseled against producing an even more destructive device than the atomic bomb. Moreover, as the United States then held a monopoly on the possession of atomic weapons, there was little incentive to develop more advanced ones. Ulam also demonstrated that some of the initial calculations behind Teller's model were incorrect. Hence, there was little prog- ress in the development of the new weapon.

The dramatic deterioration of relations be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union in the period following World War II had a profound influence on the American deci- sion to produce a thermonuclear device. In August 1949, the Soviets stunned the world when they tested their first atomic bomb. Then, on January 27, 1950, the German-born nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs

confessed to authorities at the War Office in London that he was a communist spy who had relayed top-secret information to the Soviets. Presi- dent Truman worried what would happen if Josef Stalin possessed thermonuclear weap- ons and the United States did not. Thus, just four days after Fuchs's revelations to the British, the American president ordered the accelerated development of the new weapon.

Within a year, Ulam had solved some of the problems with the original conception for the hydrogen bomb with the idea of compressing liquid deuterium, and he and Teller collabo- rated to produce a new theoretical version of the device. Nonetheless, officials at Los Ala- mos did not allow Teller to head the H-bomb project, so he left the team to continue teach- ing at the University of California, Berkeley, and to pursue his dream of creating a thermo- nuclear research institution at the Livermore Laboratory in California. He played no part in the test and learned of it by watching a seismograph in a Berkeley basement.

Whatever advantages the United States may have had in the technological race for more powerful weapons soon evaporated in a scant nine months with the detonation of a Soviet thermonuclear device on August 12, 1953. By the end of 1955, both sides had pro- duced the first operational bombs and, by the 1980s, they had 40,000 thermonuclear weap- ons in their arsenals—and thus had the capa- bility of inflicting cataclysmic destruction on each other.

Larry Simpson

Defining Moment 2: Sputnik *and the Beginning of the Space Race*

The Soviet launch into space of the 83.6- kilogram aluminum sphere called *Sputnik*, or "little traveler" in Russian, on October 4, 1957, was the first time man had success- fully placed an artificial object into Earth's orbit. In just over an hour and a half, as it accomplished its first revolution, the bas- ketball-sized satellite had inaugurated a new chapter in the Cold War with the start of the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the next two weeks, *Sput- nik*'s four antennas broadcast beeping radio signals and, all told, the satellite remained in space for 92 days and completed 1,440

orbits before plunging back into the atmo- sphere and incinerating on January 4, 1958.

Meanwhile, a month after the first launch, the Soviets sent a second, much larger satel- lite (1,110 pounds, or 508.3 kilograms) into orbit on which the dog, Laika, became the first living creature ever to be shot into space.

Americans and the world were stunned by the news, even as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev trumpeted the dramatic achieve- ment of socialist science. The remarkable news resulted in deep soul-searching and self-questioning on the part of many in the United States. America had its own space program, led by Wernher von Braun, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower had already announced in mid-1955 that the United States would launch an object into orbit sometime during the International Geophysical Year (July 1957 through December 1958), a pe- riod when solar activity was to be at a high- point. The United States successfully sent the satellite *Explorer* into orbit at the end of the following January, but only after an embar- rassing, nationally televised failure nearly two months earlier. In addition, the Ameri- cans could not launch payloads nearly as large as those launched by the Soviets. The Russian Ministry of Defense, which was re- sponsible for *Sputnik*, clearly had a more ad- vanced rocket propulsion program than did the United States. Such technology also had the potential of delivering nuclear weapons, and Americans feared that they were losing the Cold War to the communists. The U.S. Senate, with Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson taking the lead, held hearings to dra- matize the alleged failure of the Eisenhower administration.

The Soviets would once more beat the Americans in the space race when cosmo- naut Yuri Gagarin became the first man to orbit the earth on April 12, 1961. But the United States was already on its way to catching up with the Soviets with the pas- sage of the National Defense Education Act in September 1958 and the creation of the

National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- tration (NASA) the following month. The former emphasized funding for mathemat- ics and the sciences, while NASA became the instrument for overtaking the Soviets in space exploration. John F. Kennedy would set the terms of the international contest when, in 1961, he declared America's intent to put a man on the moon. By

the time Neil Armstrong walked on the lunar surface on July 20, 1969, the Americans and Soviets had successfully launched more than 5,000 objects into space and the United States had taken the lead in the space race.

Larry Simpson

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Evolving East–West Relations

How Did U.S. Diplomatic Relations with Communist Nations Vary during the Cold War?

Relations between nations will vary over time, from friendly to cool to tense, depend- ing on a number of factors, including internal and external issues relevant to each power and the ascendancy of new leaders and new policies. This was certainly the case during the Cold War. Although the capitalist West (in particular, the United States) and the com- munist East (in particular, the Soviet Union and China) were generally at odds with one another, there were a number of both high and low points. Such diplomatic crises as the Berlin Blockade and the Taiwan Straits Cri- sis were counterbalanced by triumphs such as détente and arms reduction treaties. Such ups and downs, however, help to underscore the uncertainty of the era.

In the following Defining Moments, Dr. Larry Simpson explores two key moments in the Cold War and analyzes how each im- pacted East–West relations. In the first, he examines the Cuban Missile Crisis of Oc- tober 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis was, to that point in history, the closest the world had ever come to nuclear war. American– Soviet relations were, for a short period of time in 1962, at their nadir, and only a combination of public maneuvers and se- cret deals resolved the crisis peacefully. The

second Defining Moment jumps ahead a de- cade to highlight Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China and the subsequent rapprochement between the two countries. This develop- ment changed the global balance of power by introducing another major player to the table. Thus, both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the thawing of Sino-American relations significantly changed the landscape of the Cold War.

Defining Moment 1: Cuban Missile Crisis

For 13 days in October 1962, Washington and Moscow came closer to an armed con- flict than at any other time during the Cold War. Considering that each side then pos- sessed an arsenal of nuclear weapons, the possibility of a clash between the superpow- ers had profound global ramifications.

The crisis followed the attempted intro- duction of ballistic missiles into Cuba by Nikita Khrushchev, premier of the Soviet Union. The Caribbean island, which lies just 70 miles from the United States, was under the leadership of Fidel Castro and aligned with the Soviet bloc. Castro sought and ob- tained massive military support from the So- viet Union, particularly in the wake of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, during which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had supported a failed attempt by Cuban exiles to

invade the island and overthrow its commu- nist government. For his part, Khrushchev decided to up the ante and secretly intro- duced medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as nuclear warheads into Cuba, thereby greatly enhancing his stra- tegic capability against the United States. It was a high-risk gambit mainly done to save Castro' s communist outpost in the W estern Hemisphere. While Soviet officials assured their American counterparts that the weap- ons were strictly of a defensive nature, some in Washington became alarmed with the in- troduction of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with the capability of downing U.S. recon- naissance aircraft. Suspecting that the com- munists were trying to hide the introduction of offensive weapons, the Americans decided to conduct photoreconnaissance missions over Cuba. On October 15, 1962, analyses of pictures taken by a U-2 spy plane the previ- ous day revealed that the Soviets were in the process of placing surface-to-surface mis- siles (SSMs) on the island.

The most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War now unfolded. When Presi- dent John F. Kennedy saw the photographs on October 16, he responded to the threat by organizing a special committee of high- ranking officials to advise him through the crisis. Kennedy's advisers intensely debated whether Washington should respond mili- tarily or diplomatically. Meanwhile, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who was unaware of what the president knew, contin- ued to assert in a White House visit that his country was supplying Cuba with defensive weapons only. An angry Kennedy weighed two options: conducting an air strike to re- move the missiles or initiating a blockade of the island while seeking a compromise.

One week after the U.S. discovery of the missile sites, Kennedy appeared on television and revealed the information to a stunned public.

He called for the immediate withdrawal or elimination of the missiles and imposed a "quarantine," as he termed the blockade, of Cuban waters. Elsewhere, American ambas- sador to the United Nations (UN) Adlai Stevenson confronted the Soviet representative on the floor of the Security Council. On Oc- tober 26, Khrushchev sent a letter demand- ing an American pledge not to invade Cuba. The Russian leader sent another message the following day that demanded that the United States remove Jupiter medium-range missiles that had recently been deployed in Turkey. When a Soviet antiaircraft unit ex- ceeded its orders and shot down a U-2 over Cuba and killed its pilot that same day, it ap- peared the situation might get out of control.

The moment of truth had arrived. Ken- nedy chose to publicly accept the Soviet leader's condition that he should not invade Cuba while privately giving reassurances that the Jupiters would be withdrawn. The Soviet Union also suffered from a 17:1 dis- advantage in strategic weaponry should any conflict escalate, and knew that fighting a conventional war at America's doorstep, where the United States had a preponder- ance of force, was a foolhardy undertaking. Hence, Khrushchev decided to compromise by not challenging the blockade and agree- ing to remove the missiles on October 28. Nonetheless, tensions remained high over the next few weeks as the United States ver- ified that the Soviets were actually removing their weapons, over Castro's vehement pro- tests. When, on November 20, 1962, Ken- nedy halted the blockade, the confrontation officially came to an end.

Larry Simpson

Defining Moment 2: Rapprochement with China

When Richard Nixon began an eight-day visit to the People's Republic of China

(PRC) on February 21, 1972, he completed a diplomatic revolution. The historic open- ing to America's erstwhile enemy, termed the "Nixon Shock," followed more than two decades during which the United States had no

relations with communist China. The visit consequently had profound geopolitical and economic ramifications. On the final day of his stay, the president issued the joint Shang- hai Communiqué recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of China and pledg- ing to seek normalized relations with Beijing. Playing the so-called China Card gave Nixon the potential of gaining leverage over both Moscow and Beijing, while at the same time it increased the ability for U.S. diplomatic maneuvering. The new relationship with communist China thereby contributed in the short-term to the end of the Vietnam War and helped ease global tensions in the long run. Another lasting effect of the foreign policy initiative was that it allowed for the devel- opment of trade between the world's rich- est nation and its most populous one. Critics assert, however, that the initiative came at the cost of ignoring China's dreadful human rights record and abandoning the Nationalist Chinese, who had relocated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Ulti- mately, some detractors would question who had influence over who.

The change of course in Sino-American relations began in 1969. Chinese leader Mao Zedong was uneasy following the 1968 War- saw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and, heeding the advice of some top Chinese mar- shals, sent signals that he might be willing to consider a less antagonistic relationship with the United States. Having come to of- fice only a month before, Nixon responded cautiously to Mao's initiative and charged his national security adviser, Henry Kiss- inger, with undertaking a thorough review of America's China policy. Kissinger saw

a possibility of exploiting the bitter rift that had arisen between the Chinese and the So- viets over ideological issues, foreign policy, and territorial disputes. Despite some of the harsh rhetoric that Beijing continued to di- rect publicly at the United States, Kissinger thought that Mao might be willing to accept rapprochement with the United States as a counterweight to the threat from Moscow.

A series of clashes along the Sino-So- viet border that began in March 1969 gave the United States the unique opportunity to test the diplomatic waters. In April, Secre- tary of State William Rogers announced the possibility of the United States adopting a new "two China" policy whereby Washing- ton

would recognize both the PRC and the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan. During the summer, the State Department eased travel and trade restrictions directed against the PRC, and Nixon sent signals that the United States sought an improvement in its dealings with the Chinese. When, in September, it ap- peared that the Soviets were poised to attack their neighbor preemptively, Nixon warned Leonid Brezhnev that he would not sit by and allow China's defeat. Finally, in December, Nixon sent word via the American ambassa- dor in Poland that he was interested in open- ing direct talks with the Chinese.

The next two years saw further steps be- tween the two sides to improve their rela- tions, although U.S. involvement in the conflict in Southeast Asia complicated dip- lomatic overtures. The Americans indicated a willingness to back off of their support of Taiwan, ended travel restrictions to China, and eased restraints on trade. In April 1971, after receiving a Chinese invitation, the U.S. table-tennis team became the first Ameri- cans allowed into the PRC since the com- munists came to power in 1949. In July, during a secret visit by Kissinger (part of the so-called ping-pong diplomacy), Nixon's

national security adviser made concessions on Taiwan in exchange for an invitation for the president to visit China. Shortly there- after, the Nixon administration removed its opposition to China becoming a member of the United Nations (UN) and, in October, the United States allowed the PRC's admis- sion to the international body and Nationalist China's expulsion by the General Assembly. The way was thus set for Nixon's historic trip to China the following February.

Larry Simpson

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Proxy Wars and Military Aid

How Did the Larger Context of the Cold War Influence the Nature of Military Conflict during That Period?

There were a number of "hot" conflicts dur- ing the Cold War. None, however, directly involved both of the world's two nuclear su- perpowers at the time—the United States and the Soviet Union. This does not mean, how- ever, that these superpowers were removed from these smaller wars. In fact, nearly all military conflicts between 1945 and 1991 were shaped by the larger

tensions that fu- eled the Cold War. Rather than fighting one another on the battlefield (which could have quickly escalated to include the use of nu- clear weapons), the United States and the Soviet Union used proxy states to do battle. They supplied these nations, most of which were in the developing world, with arms, technologies, and training. This allowed each to fulfill what it saw as its geopoliti- cal, economic, and ideological imperatives without having to go head-to-head with the other superpower. Even when one of the su- perpowers did become militarily engaged, the other found alternative methods of sup- porting its side without open military action.

In the Defining Moments that follow, Dr. Larry Simpson explores two of the most important military conflicts during the Cold War in order to illustrate the nature of warfare during that period. In the first, he

examines U.S. involvement in the Korean War, which erupted in 1950 when commu- nist North Korea attacked South Korea. In the second Defining Moment, Dr. Simpson discusses the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, and the subsequent Soviet oc- cupation of that country, which dragged on until 1988. Although these wars occurred in different parts of the globe and were sepa- rated from each other by more than two de- cades, they share many similarities. Both occurred in developing nations caught be- tween the opposing forces of East and West. In each case, one of the two superpowers directly intervened in accordance with its interests. In contrast, the other superpower found a more indirect way to try to achieve its own aims during the conflict.

Defining Moment 1: The Korean War

To understand the Korean War (1950–1953), some background information is necessary. Korea had been part of the Japanese Empire from 1910, but at the end of World War II, Soviet troops moved in to occupy the north while American soldiers took over the south, with the peninsula divided at the 38th paral- lel of latitude. In 1948, the United Nations (UN) held elections to determine the future of Korea, with the South participating but the North boycotting. Thus, Syngman Rhee, a Princeton PhD who fled Korea in 1912 and

led a government-in-exile for 20 years, came to power with American support in what be- came the Republic of Korea. For its part, the Soviet Union backed the Democratic Peo- ple's Republic of Korea led by a Russian-trained officer named Kim Il Sung. Despite the fact that the two men were bitter rivals and that each aspired to reunify the Korean nation under his personal leadership, both the Soviet Union and the United States with- drew their forces from Korea by mid-1949. Yet, that development did not signal a move- ment toward peace. In October, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China and an opportunistic Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, saw a chance to do in East Asia what he could not accomplish in Western Europe. Stalin thus began a massive military build-up of North Korea and sup- ported Kim's "liberation" of South Korea, which began when the Communists crossed the frontier in force on June 25, 1950.

The conflict quickly involved not just the Koreans but also the United Nations. While the South Korean army crumbled beneath the Communist onslaught, Harry Truman acted decisively to enlist the international body in supporting a "police action" to re- sist the invasion. Ironically, the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN Security Council at the time, so it could not veto this unprece- dented use of collective force. Nonetheless, the actual fighting continued to go against South Korea and its American-led UN allies until the latter were confined to the south- east portion of the peninsula around the vital port of Pusan. Then, on September 15, Gen- eral Douglas MacArthur, commander of UN forces, made a bold and daring move and landed American troops behind North Ko- rean lines at Inchon, on the western coast of the peninsula near Seoul. Cutting the North Koreans' supply lines as well as their route of retreat, MacArthur soon turned the tables on

the Communists and defeated the invading troops in the South. MacArthur next moved north and, with Truman's permission, drove deep into North Korea. Disregarding warn- ings that something was afoot, MacArthur was taken by surprise in mid-November when seven divisions of Chinese "volun- teers" crossed the Yalu River into Korea and overran his unprepared forces.

Mao had hesitated before sending the soldiers against the Americans, but pressure from Stalin and the prospect of having Yankee imperialists along his border forced the Chinese leader's hand. By year's end, Communist troops were again south of the 38th parallel.

The war now moved to another stage. MacArthur' s subordinate, General Matthew Ridgway, played a pivotal role in deploy- ing the beleaguered allied forces to halt the Chinese offensive. A frustrated MacArthur appealed to Truman to allow him to fight without restraint and approve the bombing of Chinese industrial areas as well as a blockade of the coast. When MacArthur took his case to the American public and sided with Re- publican critics of Truman' s policies, Truman dismissed the still-popular commander for insubordination and replaced him with Ridg- way. Ridgway managed to advance again roughly to the 38th parallel before the con- flict stalemated by mid-1951. Protracted and bitter negotiations ensued, complicated by the issue of repatriating prisoners–of war and Sta- lin' s unwillingness to compromise. The So- viet strongman's death in March 1953 paved the way for an armistice on July 27, although no peace treaty concluded the war. The num- ber of those who died in the fighting is un- certain, but estimates are that among the four principal belligerents, the United States suf- fered more than 33,000 combat deaths, South Korea at least 103,000, North Korea as many as 316,000, and the Chinese perhaps 422,000.

Larry Simpson

Defining Moment 2: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

On Christmas Eve 1979, Afghanistan reached a turning point. Just three months earlier, di- vision within the ruling People's Democratic Party had culminated in the overthrow of Hafizullah Amin and murder of Nur Mu- hammad Taraki, who had himself only taken power the prior December with Soviet help in a bloody coup. Revolts throughout the coun- tryside had followed the political repression that accompanied the pro-Soviet govern- ment' s implementation of land "reform" along with other Marxist-inspired attempts to modernize the traditional, Muslim coun- try. Violence spread from the provinces to Afghanistan's cities, and even a massive in- flux of aid from the Soviet Union could not stem the collapse of the Afghan army and

the continued impotence of the Afghani gov- ernment in Kabul. A desperate Amin turned to Pakistan for help and even approached Washington. Then, on December 12, hard- line members of the Politburo met with and persuaded the ailing and aged Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, to send in troops to suppress the Afghan unrest and ensure that the Central Asian country not slip into the West- ern orbit.

What followed was disastrous for both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Amin, whom the Russian leaders claimed had in- vited the airlift of Soviet troops into Kabul, fell to bullets in just days in a coup led by Babrak Karmal, the Afghan ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and Moscow's hand- picked man. When the last Soviet soldier left Russia's "Vietnam" in February 1989, he would leave behind him more than 14,000 dead companions and many times that num- ber wounded in a conflict that had cost the Soviet Union a million rubles per day. Yet, the price the Afghanis paid was even more staggering. Out of a population of 15 million,

1.5 million Afghanis died and another 3 mil- lion became refugees. The Afghan rebels styled themselves mujahideen, or holy war- riors, and received arms and aid from other countries in the Muslim world as well as the United States. The brutal Soviet invasion led President Jimmy Carter to boycott the Mos- cow Olympics in 1980 and ensured that the U.S. Senate would not approve the SALT II treaty whereby Carter had sought to con- tain the strategic arms race with the USSR. Having warned the Soviet Union against at- tempting to move beyond Afghanistan and capture the Persian Gulf in his 1980 State of the Union Address, the Carter Doctrine, the American president created the Rapid Deployment Force to back his new foreign policy initiative. Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, would transform that military unit into the Central Command. Reagan would likewise funnel money and modern arms through the Central Intelligence Agency and Pakistani intelligence to aid the mujahideen, whom he referred to as "freedom fighters." Probably the most important weapons that the Americans sent to the rebels were Stinger surface-to-air missiles, which the fighters used effectively to shoot down Russian air- craft and thus remove an important advan- tage the Soviets had heretofore enjoyed.

The involvement of the Western super- power had consequences that went beyond what Washington intended. Continued stale- mate in the vicious mountain war led the Rus- sians to replace Karmal with Muhammad Najibullah, who had served as head of the Afghan secret police. Nonetheless, Najibul- lah was no more successful than his prede- cessor. In April 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev accepted a negotiated settlement at Geneva, Switzerland, that resulted in the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Yet, it would not be until after the fall of the Soviet Union that the mujahideen

would oust Najibullah. Moreover, the reb- els soon would fight among themselves in a devastating civil war, creating a power vacuum that only would be filled by the radical Islamist group, the Taliban, in the late-1990s.

Larry Simpson

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Ronald Reagan and the Cold War

Was Ronald Reagan Responsible for the Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the Cold War?

A definitive answer as to why and how the Cold War ended when it did has proven to be elusive. Many historians are in disagree- ment as to what set of events and decisions was critical, and who, if anyone, was respon- sible. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a clear political divide has emerged in the argument. Generally, more liberal his- torians have seen the collapse as inevitable, while conservative voices see Ronald Rea- gan’s administration as the vital factor. De- spite the sometimes politicized nature of the debate concerning this dilemma, most histo- rians have recognized that no one single fac- tor was responsible, but rather it has become a matter of ranking factors in the importance of their impact. As is almost always the case with an historical event, there are numerous causes that contributed to the outcome.

Writers from both perspectives readily admit that there were several factors that contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union, but their opinions differ as to what were the most critical reasons. In the first essay, Dr. Spencer C. Tucker takes the posi- tion that accumulating internal problems in the Soviet Union were the deciding factors in bringing about an end to the USSR and the Cold War. He argues that the Soviets sowed

the seeds of their own destruction. In the sec- ond essay, Dr. Lee W. Eysturlid asserts that though other factors may have played a role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was President Reagan's policies, applied evenly over eight years, that ended the Cold War on American terms.

Perspective 1: The Soviet Collapse Was Inevitable

Though the massive defense buildup of Ron- ald Reagan's administration undoubtedly had an influence, it was not the principal rea- son for the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, and thus, the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the Soviet Union had been tot- tering toward collapse for some time, al- though U.S. officials and the military had failed to recognize the signs.

One factor was certainly the vast corrup- tion and inefficiency of the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union was a command economy, in which the government bureaucracy de- termined exactly what and how much of it would be produced. The West, on the other hand, had a demand economy, driven by consumers. The latter produced far better goods. If its leadership threw considerable resources at a problem, the Soviet Union could produce spectacular successes, as with some of its military hardware or in the 1957 *Sputnik*, the first satellite placed in Earth's

orbit; but even in the space race the Sovi- ets were soon far outdistanced by the United States. Most of what the Soviets produced in their state-run factories, particularly in the area of consumer goods, was shoddy. Health care was declining, and the average life span was actually decreasing, not increasing as in the West (the Soviet Union was the only de- veloping nation where this was occurring). Despite government efforts to keep the truth from the Soviet people, the average citizen knew that life was far better in the West.

Far from a classless society, the Soviet Union was as riven by economic division as under the czars. The elite lived very well, while the average

citizen found it difficult to get by. Corruption was rampant and bribes were a way of life. The judiciary was not in- dependent; it was an arm of the government charged with carrying out its policies. The lack of free flow of ideas and information was part of the problem. The Soviet leader- ship was afraid of the truth and sought to con- trol this area, and yet it impacted every aspect of national life, including the economy. Cy- bernetics had become vital yet, in 1985, the Soviet Union had an estimated 50,000 per- sonal computers, whereas the United States had 40 million.

Another factor was the failure of the Soviet Union to create a unified nation. Despite the claim of a classless society free of discrimina- tion, ethnic Russians predominated and con- trolled key government and military posts. There was rampant discrimination against minorities, who had been drifting back into their national republics. These minorities, es- pecially in Central Asia, had higher birth rates than the Russians, who were about to become a minority within the union. Sociologists were pointing out these democratic trends decades before the end of the Cold War.

Another factor was certainly the rest- lessness of the Soviet Empire. On several

important occasions—East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981—the Eastern and Cen- tral European states had demonstrated their desire for full independence. Perhaps only Bulgaria really desired close ties with the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The rest of the empire would bolt, given the opportunity.

Finally, there was, above all, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991. Today, many Russians blame him for the dramatic loss of national power. That is unfair, for it was inevitable. Thanks to Gorbachev, the dissolution of So- viet power was a peaceful process. True, he would have to worry about keeping the So- viet Union strong militarily (and not inciden- tally, keep an eye on the powerful military establishment should it seek to take power), but much more important was the need to modernize the economy and make commu- nism actually work. Gorbachev was one of the few who truly believed in the communist ideal. Gorbachev was also fully aware of the need to reform his nation economically. This was not only

because he genuinely wanted to improve the lot of the Soviet people but be- cause he knew that the Soviet Union could not continue to fall farther and farther be- hind the West and hope to compete. He was undoubtedly the best-informed leader in the history of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev at first tried to impose disci- pline on his people in an effort to make the system really work for the benefit of the people as it was supposed to. When that failed, he introduced perestroika in order to make the Soviet bureaucracy accountable and modernize the economy. When the So- viet bureaucrats, virtually all of whom had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, balked at Gorbachev' s reforms, he responded with glasnost. This meant open criticism and

democratization, but this also led to full rev- elations that the Soviet Union was really the "emperor with no clothes." And once the So- viet people were allowed full freedom of ex- pression, many turned their backs on failed communism. Gorbachev, in essence, had failed. The hole he opened became a massive breach, and he could not control the ensuing rushing torrent.

Gorbachev's foreign policy was also rev- olutionary, for he sought a new international era based on cooperation, rather than com- petition, with the West. If the cost of keep- ing up with the Americans militarily was a burden, so too was the bleeding wound of the senseless war in Afghanistan. What had begun in 1979 as an effort to maintain a communist regime became a quagmire that threatened to endure indefinitely with no res- olution. The economic and human costs of this effort were heavy. Gorbachev withdrew Soviet forces in 1989, and he also deter- mined that the Soviet Union could not afford to prop up communist regimes elsewhere in the world, from Vietnam, to Cuba, and East- ern Europe. The natural consequence of the withdrawal of Soviet aid, coupled with Gor- bachev's reluctance to use force to maintain communism, was the inevitable collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe. By November 1989, the Berlin Wall had been toppled.

Without Gorbachev, the Soviet Union would not have collapsed in 1990. If the members of the Politburo had chosen a com- munist hard-liner or if the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev had succeeded, there is little doubt that,

regardless of increased de- fense spending, communism would have continued for at least another decade or so until the same factors of economic inef- ficiency and demographics simply over- whelmed it. Probably the end would have come violently in a breakup of the member

republics. Thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev, what was inevitable occurred earlier and was peaceful.

Spencer C. Tucker

Perspective 2: Reagan's Policies Hastened the Soviet Collapse

U.S. president Ronald Reagan's policies and tough stance were key factors in caus- ing the Soviet Union—through its spend- ing and adoption of *glasnost*—to hasten its own collapse. In 1981, President Reagan, addressing an audience at Notre Dame Uni- versity, stated: "The West won't contain communism. It will transcend communism. It will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written." This prophetic asser- tion was dismissed at the time as wishful at best, and many felt that Reagan was under- mining the current status quo of a stagnant, détente-oriented world. But within 10 years, the Soviet Union, which in 1981 appeared to be winning the Cold War, was dissolved, and the United States was about to enter into a decade of peace and prosperity.

When Reagan became president, he inher- ited a significantly compromised situation. The old notion of parity between the Soviet Union and the United States had been slowly collapsing under pressure from without and from within. The Brezhnev Doctrine, the idea that once a state entered into the So- viet sphere it would remain there, even if by force, had seen Ethiopia, Kampuchea, An- gola, Mozambique, Yemen, Grenada, Nica- ragua, and Afghanistan fall to communist insurgencies between 1974 and 1980. So- viet military spending had exceeded 20 per- cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and the Russians and the Warsaw Pact countries had moved ahead of the West in both con- ventional and nuclear weapons. Internally, America was suffering from what historian

Paul Johnson has labeled a serious effort at “national suicide.” The U.S. economy, suffering from “stagflation,” or the double burden of high unemployment and soaring inflation, had stalled. The administration of President Jimmy Carter talked of a shaken American self-confidence and the need for citizens to expect less in the future.

Much to the shock of liberals, conser- vatives, and the Soviet leadership, Reagan immediately charted a separate course. He made it clear that he felt the policy of détente was finished, and that the U.S. would reas- sert itself with a substantial arms buildup, both in conventional and in cutting-edge nuclear weapons. At the same time, he also managed to gain substantial tax cuts and de- regulation that, following a brief recession, saw the revival of the U.S. economy. To make the buildup possible, Reagan initiated a $1.5 trillion military spending program, the largest ever in American peacetime his- tory. His intention was clearly to draw the Soviets into an arms race that he was cer- tain they could not match, let alone win. This paved the way for the advent of a high-tech weapons arsenal still in use today, which in- cluded the M-1 tank, stealth fighters, and laser-guided bombs.

Concerning nuclear arms, Reagan found allies in the European leadership of the United Kingdom (Margaret Thatcher) and West Germany (Helmut Kohl) that allowed him to offer a new generation of nuclear weapons for forward deployment. Reagan got approval for the placement of 108 Per- shing II and 404 Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe to counter Soviet medium-range SS-20s. At the same time, Reagan dropped the moribund Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) idea for a new “zero option” Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Combined with his March 1983 announce- ment of a new antimissile program called the

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the idea of reducing nuclear weapons became an op- tion for the first time.

Reagan also made it clear to the Soviet leaders, who were now facing an economic crisis that originated from a failed economic system and overextended military spending, that the U.S. policy of coexistence was over.

The Reagan Doctrine, as it came to be called, asserted that the United States would sup- port anticommunist movements worldwide with money and weapons. He also worked with the Vatican and the international branch of the AFL-CIO to support the Polish trade union Solidarity as it struggled to survive. Finally, Reagan ordered the surprise inva- sion of Grenada in October 1983, where the democratically elected government had been overthrown by communist insurgents aided by Cuba. This military operation, a success- ful assertion of U.S. willingness to use force, started the decline of communist guerrilla movements that was to continue throughout the 1980s.

That the Soviets saw what they were up against is clear. Experienced diplomat An- drei Gromyko stated that "behind all of this [military build-up] lies the clear calcula- tion that the USSR will exhaust its mate- rial resources and therefore will be forced to surrender." Yuri Andropov, general sec- retary when SDI was announced, stated that the program was intended as "a bid to dis- arm the Soviet Union." By 1985, the nor- mally ultraconservative Soviet leadership, unable to sustain the economy and an arms buildup, chose a relative unknown to lead, Mikhail Gorbachev. It was clear to Reagan that this shift in leadership gave him some- one that he could deal with, and the two entered into a series of meetings that culmi- nated in agreements for serious reductions in nuclear weapons. It can be asserted that this was only possible because the Soviets

understood they could no longer count on weak Western leadership. Gorbachev, fight- ing a losing, Vietnam-style war in Afghani- stan and faced with a failed economy and demand for reform, had little choice but to cooperate. These reforms, given the general title of glasnost, would lead, in 1989 and 1991, to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's removal from power, the end of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War.

Certainly, Reagan's policies were not the only reason for the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Further, the successes came at the cost of soaring fed- eral deficits and intense bitterness between liberals and conservatives. Yet it is also clear that Reagan's leadership played an ab- solutely key role in resurrecting U.S. confi- dence and power while fatally undermining the Soviet Union.

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Cold War Chronology

1945 February 4–12: Yalta Confer- ence—Big Three (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union)

represented by Franklin Roos- evelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin

May 8: V-E Day (end of World War II in Europe)

June 26: United Nations (UN) founding conference ends with the promulgation of the UN Charter

July 17–August 2: Potsdam Conference—Big Three rep- resented by Harry Truman, Winston Churchill (replaced by Clement Attlee during the con- ference), and Josef Stalin

August 14: V-J Day (end of World War II in the Pacific)—17 U.S. and Soviet officials agree on 38th Parallel as the boundary line between their occupation forces in Korea

September 2: Ho Chi Minh pro- claims in Hanoi the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam)

November 17: Nationalist leader Sukarno declares the Netherlands

East Indies (Indonesia) indepen- dent

November 27: U.S. General of the Army George C. Marshall begins his mission to China
to try to mediate between the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) and Communist Party of China (CCP)

1946 January 10: UN General As- sembly holds its first meeting;

Trygve Lie of Norway becomes first UN secretary general

January 19: Iran complains to the UN Security Council that the Soviet Union is meddling in in- ternal Iranian affairs

January 31: An agreement is reached in China on a new gov- ernmental structure for the country

February 9: Speech by Josef Stalin stating that capitalism and communism are "incompatible"

February 22: George Kennan issues the "Long Telegram," the basis for the containment policy of the United States

February 25: Chinese National- ists and Communists agree on a

program to integrate their armed forces

March 5: British statesman Winston Churchill delivers his "Sinews of Peace" speech (also known as the "Iron Curtain" speech) at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri

March 25: Under pressure from the West, the Soviet Union an- nounces that it will withdraw its troops from northern Iran

April 18: Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces clash in Manchuria

April 22: Merger of communist and socialist parties in Germany, creating the Socialist Unity Party (SED), in effect the new commu- nist party

July 12: The U.S. House of Rep- resentatives approves $3.75 bil- lion loan to Great Britain

July 29: Opening of conference in Paris to conclude peace trea- ties with World War II cobel- ligerents—Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania—of Germany

August: The Nationalist and Communist negotiations in China collapse

September: The Greek Civil War between the royalist British- backed government and Greek communist guerrillas begins

September 6: In an important speech in Stuttgart, U.S. sec- retary of state James F. Byrnes declares the U.S. intention to restore the German economy and vows that U.S. forces will remain

1947

in Europe as long as other pow- ers retain occupying forces there

September 17: In Zurich, Winston Churchill calls for the creation of a "United States of Europe"

November 25: President Harry S. Truman establishes the Loy- alty Commission (Presidential Temporary Commission on Em- ployee Loyalty)

December 3: The Greek govern- ment complains to the UN Secu- rity Council that the neighboring communist states are providing military support to the commu- nist insurgency

December 19: Viet Minh forces attack the French in Tonkin (northern Vietnam), beginning the Indochina War

January 8: Marshall, having failed to bridge the wide gulf be- tween the Nationalists and Com- munists, leaves China

February 10: Peace treaties signed with German cobelliger- ents of World War II: Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Ro- mania

February 21: British diplomats in Washington inform the U.S. State Department that Britain, hard-pressed financially, can no longer provide aid to Greece and Turkey

March 12: In a speech to Con- gress, President Truman asks for $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey and outlines the pol- icy that later comes to be known as the Truman Doctrine

March 21: Truman issues Ex- ecutive Order 9835 calling for an investigation into the loyalty of all federal employees

May 8: In a speech to the Delta Cotton Council in Mississippi that is in effect a trial balloon for the later Marshall Plan, U.S. undersecretary of state Dean Acheson discusses the economic plight of Europe and the U.S. stake in Europe's well-being

June 5: In a speech at Harvard University, Marshall, now sec- retary of state, proposes an eco- nomic aid program for Europe that will later be known as the Marshall Plan

July: "Sources of Soviet Con- duct" by "X" (George Kennan) is published in *Foreign Affairs*

July 2: The Soviet Union rejects U.S. assistance under the Mar- shall Plan given the conditions attached, forcing its European satellites to follow suit

July 20: Fighting erupts in Indo- nesia between Dutch and nation- alist forces, beginning a two-year war

July 26: Truman signs the National Security Act, which establishes the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Se- curity Council (NSC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

September 2: Western Hemi- sphere states sign the Treaty of Rio, designed to establish inter- American solidarity against ag- gression

September 22–23: Communist delegates meeting in Poland es- tablish the Communist Informa- tion Bureau (Cominform)

October 18: The House Un- American Activities Committee (HUAC) begins an investigation of communism and the movie industry in Hollywood

December: The Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and the Communists intensifies

1948 February 25: Communist coup in Czechoslovakia—after the

collapse of a coalition govern- ment, President Edvard Beneš is pressured into appointing a gov- ernment dominated by the com- munists

March 10: Czechoslovak gov- ernment authorities announce the death, allegedly by suicide, of Czechoslovak foreign minister Jan Masaryk (a 2004 Czech Re- public government investigation concludes that he had been murdered)

March 17: Treaty of Brussels is signed by France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—forerunner to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO)

March 20: Soviet representatives walk out of the four-power Allied Control Council for Germany

April 1: Soviet authorities in Germany impose restrictions on road and rail traffic from the Western zones of Germany into Berlin

April 2: The U.S. Congress es- tablishes the Economic Coopera-

tion Administration to oversee the Economic Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)

April 30: In Bogatá, Colom- bia, the United States and Latin American countries establish the Organization of American States (OAS)

June 13: The U.S. Senate adopts the Vandenberg Resolu- tion endorsing U.S. participation in regional defense organiza- tions

June 18: The Western occupying powers introduce a new currency in their zones of Germany and Berlin

June 24: The Berlin Blockade begins when the Soviet Union halts all land and water traffic between the Western zones of Germany and West Berlin

June 26: The Berlin Airlift be- gins
June 28: Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform

August 3: Whittaker Chambers testifies to HUAC that former State Department official Alger Hiss was a communist in the 1930s

November 2: In one of the most stunning upsets in U.S. political history, Truman wins reelection as president over the favored Republican Party challenger Thomas E. Dewey

December 10: The UN General Assembly adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1949 January 22: Communist forces capture Beijing in China

January 25: The Soviet Union announces the creation of the Council of Mutual Economic As- sistance (Comecon), the Soviet counterpart to the Marshal Plan, for its satellites of Eastern Eu- rope

January 28: The UN Security Council orders the Netherlands to end military operations in Indo- nesia and grant it independence

February 26: The government of the Netherlands agrees to grant independence to Indonesia

March 25: Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong proclaims Beijing to be the capital of China

April 4: NATO is established by 12 nations, including the United States

April 22: Nationalist forces in China abandon their capital of Nanjing (Nanking)

May 5: Ten Western European states form the Council of Eu- rope at Strasbourg, France

May 8: The Western German parliament approves the Basic Law, in effect the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany)

May 12: The Soviet Union ends the Berlin Blockade

May 23: West Germany is estab- lished

May 25: Chinese communist forces occupy Shanghai

August 24: The North Atlantic Treaty goes into effect following its ratification by France

August 29: The Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb

October 1: Mao proclaims the establishment of the People's Re- public of China (PRC)

October 7: The German Demo- cratic Republic (GDR, East Ger- many) is established

1950 January 21: Hiss is convicted of perjury

January 31: Truman announces that the United States will pro- ceed with the development of nuclear fusion (the hydrogen bomb)

February 9: In a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, U.S. senator Joseph R. McCarthy claims to have a list of 205 com- munist sympathizers working in the State Department

February 14: The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is signed in Moscow

April 7: The National Secu- rity Council produces NSC-68, which calls for a massive mili- tary buildup

by the United States calling for the defense of Korea

June 30: Truman approves the dispatch of U.S. ground forces to Korea

August 11: In the course of
a speech to the European As- sembly in Strasbourg, Winston Churchill, still a

private citizen, calls for the establishment of a European army, with West Ger- man participation

September 15: Successful am- phibious landing by American forces at Inchon, South Korea

October 7: UN forces cross the 38th Parallel into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)

October 28: Chinese communist forces launch a major interven- tion in the Korean War

November 25–26: Chinese communist forces carry out a massive offensive against UN forces in the Korean War

December 15: Truman pro- claims a state of national emer- gency

April 25: Truman approves
NSC-68 nist forces cross the 38th Paral-

May 9: French foreign minis-
ter Robert Schuman proposes **1951** creation of a European coal and steel community

June 25: North Korean forces invade the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), beginning the Korean War

June 27: The UN Security Coun- cil passes a resolution sponsored

December 31: Chinese commu- lel, invading South Korea

January 4: Chinese communist forces capture Seoul

March 15: UN forces recapture Seoul and Inchon

March 29: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are convicted of pass- ing nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union and on April 5 they re- ceive the death sentence

April 11: Truman dismisses General Douglas MacArthur as commander of UN forces in Korea, replacing him with Gen- eral Matthew Ridgway

April 18: Delegates of West Eu- ropean states, meeting in Paris, establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

May 23: The PRC takes control of Tibet

May 25: Guy Burgess and Don- ald Maclean, British Foreign Of- fice officials, leave Britain—later it is revealed that they had spied for the Soviet Union

June 23: Soviet UN delegate Jacob Malik proposes a cease-fire in Korea and the reestablishment of the status quo antebellum

July 10: Armistice talks begin at Kaesong in Korea

September 8: The Treaty of San Francisco is signed between the Allied powers, associated nations (49 in all), and Japan and goes into effect on April 28, 1952

September 27: Iran takes control of the Anglo-Iranian oil refinery at Abadan

1952 February 23: NATO authori- ties announces a plan to create

an army of 50 divisions within a year's time

March 10: Stalin proposes a re- unified and neutral Germany

July 21: Egyptian military offi- cers overthrow King Farouk

October 3: In waters off Aus- tralia, Britain detonates its first atomic bomb

November 1: The United States tests the world's first thermo- nuclear device (hydrogen bomb)

- **1953 March 5:** Stalin dies
  March 6: Georgy Malenkov becomes Soviet premier and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

March 14: Malenkov is forced to relinquish leadership of the CPSU to Nikita Khrushchev
June 17: Workers in East Berlin strike and riot against increases in work quotas and shortages of basic goods—the riots spread across East Germany and have to be put down by Soviet troops
June 19: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are executed despite widespread protests against their sentence
July 27: The United States and North Korea sign an armistice, ending the fighting in Korea
August 19: A CIA-sponsored coup overthrows the government of nationalist premier Moham- med Mossadegh in Iran

- **1954 January 12:** U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles enunciates the defense doctrine that will become known as massive retaliation
January 21: The United States launches the *Nautilus*, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine
March 1: The United States explodes its first deliverable thermonuclear bomb on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific

March 13: The Battle of Dien Bien Phu opens in Indochina

April 22: Opening of the Army- McCarthy Hearings in Washing- ton, D.C.

April 26: Beginning of the Ge- neva Conference on Korea and on the war in Indochina

May 7: Viet Minh forces defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu fol- lowing a furious two-month siege

June 27: A CIA-sponsored coup overthrows President Jacobo Ar- benz of Guatemala

July 21: The Indochina War ends with the signing of agreements in Geneva, although in order to comply with a deadline imposed by French premier Mendès- France, the document is dated July 20

August 30: The French National Assembly rejects the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty

September 3: The shelling of offshore Chinese islands in the Taiwan Strait until May 1, 1955 is initiated by the PRC

September 8: Establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Orga- nization (SEATO) with signing of documents in Manila

October 3: In London, the West- ern Allies sign an agreement that will allow the rearmament of West Germany within NATO

December 2: The U.S. Senate votes to censure Senator McCarthy

The United States and the Re- public of China (Taiwan) sign a mutual defense treaty

1955 February 8: Malenkov resigns as premier of the Soviet Union

and is replaced by Nikolai Bulganin, while Khrushchev emerges as the leader of the So- viet Union

February 24: Turkey and Iraq sign the Baghdad Pact

April 5: Britain, Turkey, and Iraq sign the Baghdad Pact, and Iran and Pakistan join later in the year (after Iraq leaves in 1959, the name is changed to the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO)

May 5: West Germany regains full sovereignty and joins NATO as a full member on May 8

May 14: The Soviet Union and its satellites form the Warsaw Treaty Organization to counter NATO

May 15: The Western Allies and the Soviet Union sign the Aus- trian State Treaty, ending the oc- cupation of Austria

June 18: Summit meeting in- volving Khrushchev, Dwight Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, and Edgar Faure at Geneva

August 4: The U-2 spy plane makes its first overflight of the Soviet Union

December 1: The Western Allies declare that despite Soviet con- tentions to the contrary, Berlin remains an occupied city

December 9: The West German **1957** government announces the Hall- stein Doctrine, indicating that
West Germany will no longer

maintain diplomatic relations with those states that recognize the East German government

1956 February 25: Khrushchev gives his so-called secret speech to

the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in which he denounces the "cult of personality built by Stalin," thus beginning a campaign of de- Stalinization

June 28: Workers riot in Poznan´, Poland, against poor economic conditions and communist rule

July 26: Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, nationalizes the Suez Canal

October 21: The Soviet Union accepts Władysław Gomułka as the new leader of Poland

October 23: The Hungarian Revolution begins

October 26: Representatives
of 70 nations sign a document creating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

October 29: The Suez Crisis be- gins, during which Israel, backed by Britain and France, attacks Egypt

November 1: Imre Nagy an- nounces that Hungary is leaving the Warsaw Treaty Organization

November 4: Soviet tanks enter Budapest to crush the Hungarian Revolution

December 2: Fidel Castro and his followers land in Cuba and begin the Cuban Revolution

January 5: President Eisen- hower announces a new policy, later known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, that promises U.S. military aid to victims of aggres- sion in the Middle East

March 9: Eisenhower signs into law congressional legislation au- thorizing U.S. forces to come to the aid of Middle Eastern states

July 3: Khrushchev defeats op- position to his rule and solidifies his position as leader of the So- viet Union

July 14: Coup in Iraq during which King Faisal and others are slain

October 4: The Soviet Union launches *Sputnik I*, the world's first orbiting satellite

1958 January 1: The European Com- mon Market and Atomic Energy

Commission are established

January 13: British government announces that a Soviet attack on the West, regardless of the weapons employed, will evoke a British hydrogen bomb response

January 31: U.S. Army launches *Explorer I*, the first American ar- tificial satellite

May: Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), an attempt at rural industrialization and increased agricultural pro- duction that results in a massive famine and the deaths of perhaps as many as 30 million people, begins

July–October: The United States sends troops under the Eisen-

hower Doctrine to protect Leba- **1960** non's pro-Western government

July 29: Establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

August 23: Renewed shelling
of Jinmen and Mazu (part of the Republic of China) in the Taiwan Strait by the PRC

October 4: Establishment of the French Fifth Republic

December 14: The Western Al- lies reject the Soviet demand that they withdraw their soldiers from West Berlin

1959 January 1: Castro takes power in Cuba

March 30: Release of earlier congressional testimony by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admi- ral Arleigh Burke in which he an- nounces the beginning of a shift in U.S. defense posture with a re- newed emphasis on conventional forces to build up a capability to wage limited war

April 4: The NATO Council announces its determination to maintain the status quo in West Berlin and the rights of all occupying powers to be there

July 24: Vice President Richard Nixon and Khrushchev have the "Kitchen Debate" at a U.S. exhi- bition in Moscow

September 15–27: Khrushchev becomes the first Soviet leader to visit the United States

December 1: Signing of the agreement on the peaceful use of Antarctica, the first major post- war arms-control agreement

March 17: Eisenhower approves a CIA plan calling for Cuban exiles to invade Cuba and over- throw Castro's regime

May 5: Khrushchev announces that the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane on May 1 and captured the pilot, Francis Gary Powers

May 7: The U.S. government ad- mits that the U-2 shot down over the Soviet Union had been on a surveillance mission

May 16: Eisenhower refuses to apologize for the U-2 flights, resulting in Khrushchev's depar- ture from Paris and the collapse of the scheduled summit there

July: Civil war breaks out in the Republic of the Congo, which had recently received indepen- dence from Belgium

September–October: Khrush- chev attends the UN General As- sembly session, and Eisenhower does not offer to meet him

October 19: The United States bans most trade with Cuba

December 20: Establishment of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the Republic of Viet- nam (RVN, South Vietnam) by Vietnamese communists

1961 January 1: The United States breaks diplomatic relations with

Cuba

April 12: Major Yuri Gagarin of the Soviet Union becomes the first human to orbit Earth in space

April 17: Cuban exiles invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs

May 5: Commander Alan Shepard becomes the first Ameri- can in space

May 15: U.S. president John F. Kennedy declares in a speech to Congress that the United States should achieve a manned flight to the moon before the end of the decade

June 3–4: Kennedy and Khrush- chev hold a summit meeting in Vienna

July 24: Kennedy warns the So- viet Union not to interfere with Western access to West Berlin

August 13: East German au- thorities close their border with the West and begin construction of the Berlin Wall

October 26–27: Confrontation in Berlin between U.S. and So- viet tanks ends peacefully

1962 February 7: The United States embargoes trade with Cuba

February 10: The United States swaps Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Powers

February 20: Lieutenant Colo- nel John H. Glenn Jr. becomes the first American to orbit Earth in space

July 1: French rule ends in Alge- ria following a vote in that coun- try in favor of independence

July 23: The neutrality of Laos is guaranteed by accords signed in Geneva

October 14: Beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the discovery in a U-2 reconnais- sance flight of the construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba

October 22: In a speech to the American people, Kennedy an- nounces the presence of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba and declares a quarantine on the shipment to Cuba of offensive weapons

October 28: Khrushchev agrees to withdraw missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. guarantee not to invade the island

November 20: Kennedy an- nounces an end to the U.S. blockade of Cuba

- **1963 June 20:** A hotline between the White House and the Kremlin is established
  June 26: Kennedy's speech at the Berlin Wall affirming support for Berlin
  August 5: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union sign a partial nuclear test-ban treaty

- **1964 August 2:** Attack by North Viet- namese torpedo boats against the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin
  August 7: The U.S. Congress passes the Gulf of Tonkin Reso- lution
  October 15: Leonid Brezhnev becomes first secretary of the CPSU, replacing Khrushchev
  October 16: The PRC tests its first atomic bomb

- **1965 February 7:** Communist forces in South Vietnam attack U.S. military installation at Pleiku
  March 8–9: U.S. Marines arrive in South Vietnam, the first U.S. combat troops sent there, charged with protecting U.S. bases

April 28: U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson sends Marines to the Dominican Republic

September 30–October 1: A communist coup is crushed by the Indonesian Army

- **1966 March 9:** France withdraws from NATO's military command but remains part of the alliance

- **1967 June 6:** The Six-Day War begins between Israel and Egypt, to include Syria and Jordan
  June 23: Johnson meets with Premier Alexei Kosygin in Glass- boro, New Jersey
  October 21: March on the Pen- tagon to protest the Vietnam War

- **1968 January 5:** Alexander Dubcˇek becomes leader of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (CPCz), and the Prague Spring begins two months later, in March
  January 30: The Tet Offensive begins in South Vietnam
  May 10–13: The United States and North Vietnam begin peace talks in Paris
  July 1: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
  August 20–21: Warsaw Pact troops end the Prague Spring by invading

Czechoslovakia
November 12: Brezhnev an- nounces the Brezhnev Doctrine in which socialist states are obligated to aid a socialist state

threatened by counterrevolution- ary forces

1969 March 2: Clashes erupt between the Soviet Union and the PRC

along the Ussuri River

June 8: The Nixon Doctrine proclaims that Asian nations will have to defend themselves with their own soldiers in the future

November 17: U.S. and Soviet negotiators begin the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

1970 April 30: Incursion by the United States and South Vietnam

into Cambodia

August 12: West Germany signs a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union

December 7: West German–Pol- ish Treaty recognizes the Oder- Neisse border

1971 June 13: *The New York Times* begins publishing the Pentagon

Papers

July 15: Nixon announces that he will visit the PRC in 1972

1972 February 21: Nixon begins his visit to the PRC

May 26: Nixon and Kosygin sign the SALT I treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

June 3: A four-power agree- ment between the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France resolves the Berlin issue

December 21: The Basic Treaty establishes mutual relations be- tween West Germany and East Germany

- **1973 January 27:** A Vietnam peace agreement is signed
  July 3: The Helsinki Conference on European security begins
  October 6: Egyptian forces strike across the Suez Canal, beginning what is known as the October, Yom Kippur, or Rama- dan War between Egyptian and Syrian forces against Israel
  November 7: Congress overrides Nixon's veto of the War Powers Act

- **1974 June 27:** Summit meeting be- tween Nixon and Brezhnev
  November 23–24: President
  Gerald Ford and Brezhnev agree **1980** on a draft for a SALT II treaty

- **1975 April 17:** Cambodia falls to the Khmer Rouge, and a genocidal campaign soon begins
  April 30: Fall of Saigon and end of the Vietnam War
  August 1: Leaders of 35 nations sign the Helsinki Accords

- **1976 July 2:** North and South Vietnam are officially united

- **1977 March 17:** President Jimmy Carter announces that human rights will be a major focus of U.S. foreign policy

- **1978 December 25:** Vietnam invades Cambodia

- **1979 January 1:** The United States and the PRC open diplomatic re- lations
  June 18: Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT II treaty (never ratified)

July 17: Marxist Sandinista guerrillas seize control in Nicara- gua

November 4: Radical Iranian students seize the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 70 Americans hostage

December 12: European mem- bers of NATO agree to deploy U.S. Pershing II and cruise mis- siles in Western Europe

December 27: Soviet forces in- vade Kabul and kill Afghan pres- ident Hafizullah Amin, thereby beginning a long occupation and war

January 3: Carter withdraws the SALT II treaty from consider- ation by the Senate in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghani- stan

January 23: Carter, in a state- ment that later becomes known as the Carter Doctrine—a reaf- firmation of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines and a partial repudiation of the Nixon Doctrine—announces that the United States will regard any Soviet aggression directed at the Persian Gulf as a threat to its vital interests

April 7: The United States breaks off diplomatic relations with Iran

May 4: President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, in power since 1945, dies

August 31: Solidarity, led by Lech Wałęsa, signs an agreement

with the Polish government that allows the establishment of the trade union movement

- **1981 January 20:** American hostages held in Iran are freed
  April 1: The United States sus- pends aid to the Sandinista re- gime in Nicaragua
  October 6: President Anwar
  Sadat of Egypt assassinated by **1984** Muslim fundamentalist military officers
  December 13: The Polish gov- ernment declares martial law and arrests the leaders of Solidarity

- **1982 June 6:** Israeli forces invade southern Lebanon in an attempt to end the terrorist activities of the Palestine Liberation Organi- zation (PLO)
  November 10: Brezhnev dies

- **1983 March 9:** President Ronald Rea- gan calls the Soviet Union an "evil empire"
  March 23: Reagan announces support for the Strategic Defense

Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars
April18: Arab terrorists set off a bomb at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people
September 1: Soviet aircraft shoot down Korean passenger jet KAL 007 in Soviet airspace
October 5: Wałęsa wins the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with Solidarity
October 23: Arab terrorists drive a truck full of explosives into a U.S. barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 Marines

October 25: Invasion of Grenada by U.S. and Caribbean contin- gents

November 23: The Soviet Union responds to the U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles in West- ern Europe by walking out of the intermediate-range nuclear forces reduction talks in Geneva

May 24: Congress bans further aid to the Contras in their strug- gle against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua

September 26: The PRC and Britain sign an agreement on the transfer of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997

- **1985 February 6:** Reagan announces U.S. support for all anticommunist rebels (freedom fighters) in a policy that later becomes known as the Reagan Doctrine
  March 11: Mikhail Gorbachev becomes general secretary of the CPSU
  May 20: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents ar- rest naval officer John Anthony Walker Jr. as a Soviet spy
  November 19–21: First summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev is held in Geneva

- **1986 April 26:** A major nuclear ac- cident occurs at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near Kiev in the Soviet Union
  October 11–12: Gorbachev and Reagan meet at Reykjavík, Ice- land, for a second summit but fail to reach agreement on arms control

- **1987 May 5:** Congress begins hear- ings on the Iran-Contra Affair
  June 14: Pope John Paul II makes his third papal visit to his native Poland and strongly en- dorses Solidarity
  December 8–10: Gorbachev and Reagan hold a summit in Washington, D.C., and sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe

- **1988 May 29–June 2:** Reagan and Gorbachev hold a summit meet- ing in Moscow
  December 7: Gorbachev an- nounces unilateral reductions in troop (100,000) and tank (10,000) strength in Europe in a speech to the UN General Assembly

- **1989 January 11:** Hungary introduces political reforms
  February 15: Soviet troops leave Afghanistan
  March 26: The Soviet Union holds the first partially free elec- tions in its history for the Con- gress of People's Deputies
  May 2: Hungary begins remov- ing the barbed-wire fence along its border with Austria
  June 3–4: Chinese troops kill and injure thousands of pro- democracy demonstrators in Bei- jing's Tiananmen Square
  June 4–18: Solidarity is victori- ous in Poland's first free election under communist rule
  June 16: Imre Nagy, executed for his role in the 1956 Hungar-

ian Revolution, is reburied with honors

August 24: Poland gets its first noncommunist premier since World War II

October 9: Demonstrations in Leipzig begin an expanding se- ries of protests against the East German government

October 18: Egon Krenz re- places Erich Honecker as head of the East German Communist Party

October 25: Gorbachev publicly rejects the Brezhnev Doctrine

November 9: East Germany in- advertently opens the Berlin Wall

November 20: More than 200,000 people demonstrate in Prague against the Czechoslovak communist regime

November 24: Czechoslovak communist leader Miloš Jakeš and his entire politburo resign

December 2–3: President George H.W. Bush meets with Gorbachev at sea near Malta

December 25: A military tribu- nal tries and executes Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaus¸escu and his wife Elena

December 29: Václav Havel becomes Czechoslovakia's first noncommunist president since 1948

1990 March 11: Lithuania declares its independence from the Soviet

Union

13 The Congress of People's Deputies repeals Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, depriving the

CPSU of its legal monopoly on political power, and the CPSU's Central Committee agrees to the change two days later

May 30–June 3: Bush and Gor- bachev hold a summit meeting in Washington, D.C.

July 16: Meeting between Helmut Kohl, chancellor of West Germany, and Gorbachev leads to an agreement allowing Ger- man unification

October 3: Germany is officially united

October 15: Gorbachev is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

November 21: The 34 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe sign

1991

the Charter of Paris, formally ending the Cold War

July 1: The Warsaw Pact for- mally disbands

July 31: Bush and Gorbachev, meeting in Moscow, sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)

August 19–21: Unsuccessful coup in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party hard-liners

December 25: Gorbachev re- signs as leader of the Soviet Union

December 31: The Soviet Union is officially dissolved

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