

Due date: Saturday, 28 November 2009, 09:10 PM

Last edited: Saturday, 28 November 2009, 09:07 PM (539 words)

Personally I believe that A.J. Langguth's account of his time spent in Cambodia with the ARVN signaled the true turning point in the war. It's really not what he said or how he said it, but his accounts of the ARVN in the war in Cambodia. He mentions that the ARVN were so poorly equipped and supplied that when they made contact with the enemy, they couldn't pursue the enemy and finish the job. It makes one wonder. By the time Nixon announced his opening of a campaign against the Communist forces in Cambodia, "Vietnamisaztion" was already in full swing. The process of rearming and retraining the South Vietnamese to fight against North Vietnamese/VC forces was happening rapidly, but Langguth's account of his time with ARVN made it clear that the process was simply not happening rapidly or efficiently enough. This "Vietnamization" was simply a way that the American armed forces could withdraw from Vietnam without any guilt. They could say they tried, but all the blame could be put towards the Vietnamese. But can anyone blame the South Vietnamese for failing? Langguth mentions that South Vietnamese soldiers were not payed very well, hence they were very poor, and that medevac was basically a joke, due to the fact that the Americans loaned the Vietnamese only a 100 or so helicopters. (While we had over 3,000) It was truly a sign that the American armed forces were giving up. Previously, the American public was becoming quite sick and quite tired of the war, but in Langguth's account, it seems that the American and South Vietnamese armed forces were becoming just as exhausted and fed up.

Frank Maguire's account of hi last experiences in Vietnam truly signal and ending point to our involvement in Vietnam. The way he describes the deterioration of the professionalism of the various aspects of life in Saigon proves that everyone knew the end was not only coming, but that it was very much in sight. Our blatant disregard for the Vietnamese people. Our objectives at that point were made very clear: we simply did not have any. The recklessness and the carelessness of the GI's signaled that it was well known that we were going to pull out, and fast. Frank mentions an almost joyful, party like atmosphere in Saigon, in which a hotel ran by the state department had girls for every room. We were basically intoxicating ourselves for the coming painful defeat. No one simply cared anymore, the enthusiasm for staying in Vietnam was simply gone. Frank mentions that ARVN soldiers would simply just up and leave the battle field to go home and tend to their wounds. Frank mentions that, "I wrote a report and said that the local Vietnamese troops had picked up all the nasty habits of unemployed mercenaries of the Thirty Years War." Even the south Vietnamese were lost as to what the objectives of the war were at that time. The largest and most militarily sophisticated nation in modern history had been brought to it's knees, and Frank describes how we (and the South Vietnamese) dealt with it in the **end**.

Close this window

 [Moodle Docs for this page](#)