This organization helped Ho Chi Minh wage guerrilla war against the Japanese during World War II\:{
	=The Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
	~The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
	~The KGB.
	~The Chinese Nationalist government.
	~The British Secret Service.
}

For which of the following reasons did Ho Chi Minh, a confirmed Communist, seek United States support in 1945?{
	~He did not trust the Soviet Union
	=He was a pragmatist, principally preoccupied with Vietnam's salvation, and he would accept help where he could get it.
	~He knew that he would be turned down by the Americans, and then he could appeal more convincingly to the Soviets.
	~He had no hope of United States aid, but others in his administration urged him to appeal to the Americans.
}

During World War II, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh organization developed the strategy that would eventually force the French out of Vietnam. It included\:{
	~Emphasizing the Vietminh's commitment to Communism and social revolution.
	=Tapping Vietnamese nationalism, promising independence, and pledging democratic reforms.
	~Fighting other nationalist groups.
	~Collaborating with the Japanese.
	~All of the above.
}


American officials determined that they could not support Ho Chi Minh for the following reason\:{
	~His close ties with Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.
	~His steadfast refusal to promise tax-free monopolies for U.S. imports.
	=His deeply held Communist beliefs.
	~His refusal to accept American military aid in 1947.
}

In 1950, the Truman Administration shifted from pro-French neutrality to outright support for Paris in its war with the Vietminh because of\:{
	~Heightened Cold War fears in the wake of the Soviet Union's detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949.
	~The Communists' victory in the Chinese civil war.
	~The strong realization that the loss of further territory to Communism would come at a steep domestic political price.
	~The belief that the fall of Indochina to Communism would force resource-starved Japan into the Communist Bloc.
	=All of the above.
}


In 1950, this leader agreed to send military advisors to assist the Vietminh guerrillas\:{
	~Joseph Stalin.
	~Jawaharlal Nehru.
	~Chiang Kai-shek.
	=Mao Zedong.
	~Josep Tito.
}

As did their predecessors in the Truman Administration, top officials in the Eisenhower Administration viewed Ho Chi Minh as\:{
	=An instrument of the international Communist movement.
	~A brilliant political philosopher.
	~A well-meaning but misguided man.
	~A strong nationalist leader who also happened to be a Communist.
	~Vietnam's George Washington.
}


At an April 7, 1954 news conference, President Eisenhower argued that the U.S. needed to prevent the fall of Vietnam to Communism because\:{
	=A Communist victory in Vietnam would result in other nation's falling to Communism like a "row of dominoes."
	~Victory in Vietnam would permit the Vietminh to launch large-scale conventional attacks against neighboring non-Communist states such as Thailand and Cambodia.
	~The inclusion of Vietnam's awesome industrial base in the Communist Bloc would tip the global balance of power in Moscow's favor.
	~European security depended on continued access to Vietnam's markets.
}


Despite South Vietnam's vulnerability, Hanoi chose not to pursue reunification in the late 1950s because\:{
	~Periodic border skirmishes with China compelled North Vietnam to station most of its troops on its northern border.
	~Hanoi feared that America would respond to any aggression with nuclear weapons.
	~Ho Chi Minh believed that Vietnam should only be reunified by peaceful means.
	=Hanoi faced daunting postwar reconstruction and nation-building problems including popular resistance to its program of land reform.
	~All of the above.
}

Following the Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concluded that America would succeed in containing Communism in Indochina where France had failed because\:{
	~American troops were better equipped than their French counterparts.
	~The U.S. was trying to foster nationalism in Vietnam whereas the French had sought to perpetuate colonialism.
	=American nuclear superiority would permit Washington to dictate terms to Ho Chi Minh.
	~American economic aid could buy off the Vietnamese Communists.
}


Diem's "agroville" program proved to be\:{
	~A stunning success that rallied the peasants to the government and thereby eroded support for the National Liberation Front (NLF).
	=A complete flop that bred widespread resentment among peasants angry at being removed from their homes and separated from the sacred burial grounds of their ancestors.
	~A well-funded but poorly administered program that produced mixed results.
	~Popular with South Vietnam's rural people, but a failure because of insufficient government support.
	~More successful politically than economically.
}

Diem used his political philosophy-"personalism"-to\:{
	~Bring together Vietnam's many diverse ethnic groups.
	~Build popular support for democratic values.
	=Justify absolute state control and his belief that the ruling elite should determine the general welfare.
	~Rationalize opening a dialog with Ho Chi Minh.
}


During his time as president, John F. Kennedy\:{
	~Reduced America's commitment to South Vietnam.
	~Neither increased nor reduced substantially America's commitment to South Vietnam.
	~Set in motion a plan for a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam.
	=Increased America's commitment to South Vietnam dramatically and bequeathed to Lyndon Johnson a problem far more dangerous than the one he had inherited.
	~Bravely pursued a neutralist solution to the problem of South Vietnam at great political cost.
}









At the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, South Vietnamese forces\:{
	~Used their advanced weapons and mobility to decisively defeat a well-armed NLF battalion.
	~Suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a better-equipped Viet Cong force.
	=Failed to destroy a Viet Cong unit despite overwhelming air and artillery support and a ten-to-one superiority in men.
	~Occupied a deserted village that the guerrillas had long since abandoned.
	~Impressed their American advisors with their great bravery under fire.
}


President Johnson refused to grant a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) request for direct American air and ground operations in early 1964 because\:{
	~He felt that direct American participation in the conflict would lead the South Vietnamese to let the United States fight the war for them.
	~He had little enthusiasm for getting involved in a land war in Asia.
	~Such a course would threaten his ambitious social agenda.
	~American participation in Vietnam would result in hostile propaganda throughout the world.
	=All of the above.
}

LBJ's decision in July 1965 to commit American troops to offensive operations and to expand the air war constituted\:{
	~A minor escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.
	~A limited step based on the assumption that no further escalation would be necessary.
	~A cunningly devised ploy to divide Hanoi and Beijing.
	=An open-ended commitment that cleared the way for the U.S. to take the lead in fighting the war.
}

The principle index the United States used to chart success in Vietnam was\:{
	~The movement of the front line and the capture of key geographical objectives.
	~A sophisticated measurement of the proportion of South Vietnamese peasants who were loyal to the Saigon government.
	~The strength and stability of the South Vietnamese government.
	=The "body count."
	~All of the above.
}


With the Americanization of the war in 1965, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)\:{
	=Became more dependent than ever on the U.S.
	~Underwent a period of intensive retooling from which it emerged stronger than ever.
	~Was divided into small units that were then integrated into the American command under a system pioneered during the Korean War.
	~Shrank dramatically in size to become a highly mobile, elite striking force.
	~Undertook a series of spoiler attacks into North Vietnam that threw the enemy off balance.
}