

other words, was exactly what Schell called the war: a piece of theater, in which Vietnamese actors were expected to follow a script written not to resolve the conflict that was ravaging their country, but to make an American failure look like a success and thus preserve America's reputation elsewhere in the world.

X FURTHER READING

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