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Part 1:

I saw a big turning point in a shorter passage in Appy's fourth section of his book. In the passage Appy recalls regarding Philip Griffiths, we learn about lost loyalty and betrayed trust. In war, loyalty is a critical factor. Loosing loyalty can result in a person or groups of people trading sides, or giving up entirely. Loyalty played a major role in this war. If the Americans had perhaps gained more legitimate, not just simply stated, loyalty from more of the people of Vietnam, perhaps the war itself would or could have been avoided. That is the power of loyalty. A person's loyalty to a team creates a team. America was fighting for loyalty in this war, and not only did they seek it, but they were seeking to protect it as well. Learning about how America sought to protect District Eight, a district in which some of their most powerful Vietnamese loyalists lived, and ended up destroying it along with there loyalty, resulted in also learning about a turning point.

One very clear way to loose loyalty in any relationship is by breaking promises. Appy writes, "The Americans had always told the Vietnamese that they'd be safe in the cities. But what happened in '68 is that the Viet Cong said, 'You're not safe in those cities'" (295). Although, the Americans were seeking to protect their loyalty and hold their promise, they unfortunately lost their loyalty and broke their promise, by not handling the situation in District Eight correctly. "They sent a dozen guys into District Eight and got them to shoot a few policemen and fire a few rounds knowing that the Americans would overreact. And indeed, within an hour U.S. helicopters were killing everything that moved" (295).

The big turning point here was loosing loyalty and ending trust. These things can result in big game changers (switching sides, and giving up the will to fight for the cause), and you can be sure that their actions did result in lost loyalty.

Part two:

A war should have a legitimate reason to exist. When lives are at stake, there should be a cause that we are fighting for. When there is no clear idea of the cause and the cause itself can not be made justifiable, people have even more of a reason to question it. Morton Halperin's passage illustrates a clear ending of belief of justifiable cause of the Vietnam War. Halperin went from being a clear and public supporter to realizing that what was happening in Vietnam could not be justified. "So I started out being supportive of the war. But by the time I got involved in the government in the spring of '67, I had concluded that we could not win and should get out" (403).

My favorite illustration of Halperin's, "no cause mentality" is when Halperin mentions the fact that he avoided having an actual map of Vietnam in his office, and instead had the actual world map. Here is a part of that recollection, "Half of them couldn't find Vietnam on the world map and the other half would say, 'Vietnam is too small on this map to show you what I want to show you.' I would look at them and say, 'That's the point!'" (404). With this, he is saying that why fight with such a small country in the first place. Where is the cause there? His realization of this "no justifiable cause" belief marks an ending for powerful support of the war. Without support like Halperin's, things would and did have to end.

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