Chapter 1



		
During World War II, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh organization developed the strategy that would eventually force the French out of Vietnam. It included:
		A)	Emphasizing the Vietminh's commitment to Communism and social revolution.
		B)	Tapping Vietnamese nationalism, promising independence, and pledging democratic reforms.
		C)	Fighting other nationalist groups.
		D)	Collaborating with the Japanese.
		E)	All of the above.
3
		
This organization helped Ho Chi Minh wage guerrilla war against the Japanese during World War II:
		A)	The Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
		B)	The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
		C)	The KGB.
		D)	The Chinese Nationalist government.
		E)	The British Secret Service.
4
		
The French government sought to reassert its authority in Indochina following World War II for which of the following reasons:
		A)	Control of Indochina would restore France's faltering prestige.
		B)	Indochina possessed valuable oil reserves.
		C)	The French government feared that Vietnam would fall into anarchy in the absence of French rule.
		D)	Continued French control of Indochina would prevent the USSR from dominating Southeast Asia.
		E)	All of the above.
5
		
In the late 1940s, Truman Administration policymakers abandoned America's earlier opposition to continued French control of Indochina because:
		A)	They viewed the colonial system as the best way to assist developing regions.
		B)	They wanted to maintain good relations with Paris in order to ensure that France would continue to help contain Soviet power in Europe.
		C)	Ongoing French control facilitated American economic penetration of Vietnam.
		D)	France promised to grant independence to Vietnam by 1950.
		E)	All of the above.
6
		
American officials determined that they could not support Ho Chi Minh for the following reason:
		A)	His close ties with Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.
		B)	His steadfast refusal to promise tax-free monopolies for U.S. imports.
		C)	His deeply held Communist beliefs.
		D)	His refusal to accept American military aid in 1947.
7
		
In 1950, this leader agreed to send military advisors to assist the Vietminh guerrillas:
		A)	Joseph Stalin.
		B)	Jawaharlal Nehru.
		C)	Chiang Kai-shek.
		D)	Mao Zedong.
		E)	Josep Tito.
8
		
In 1950, the Truman Administration shifted from pro-French neutrality to outright support for Paris in its war with the Vietminh because of:
		A)	Heightened Cold War fears in the wake of the Soviet Union's detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949.
		B)	The Communists' victory in the Chinese civil war.
		C)	The strong realization that the loss of further territory to Communism would come at a steep domestic political price.
		D)	The belief that the fall of Indochina to Communism would force resource-starved Japan into the Communist Bloc.
		E)	All of the above.
9
		
The Domino Theory held that:
		A)	The fall of Indochina to Communism would rapidly lead to Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.
		B)	Southeast Asian nations would stand up to Communism like a wall of dominos.
		C)	The fall of Indochina to Communism would have little impact on other nations in the region.
		D)	All of the above.
10
		
The Bao Dai government that France established in 1950 was notable because:
		A)	It was Vietnam's first truly independent, post-colonial government.
		B)	American officials unequivocally supported it.
		C)	It was a puppet government designed to obscure continued direct French control of Vietnam.
		D)	It was a compromise solution that enjoyed the strong support of Ho Chi Minh
		E)	All of the above.
11
		
As did their predecessors in the Truman Administration, top officials in the Eisenhower Administration viewed Ho Chi Minh as:
		A)	An instrument of the international Communist movement.
		B)	A brilliant political philosopher.
		C)	A well-meaning but misguided man.
		D)	A strong nationalist leader who also happened to be a Communist.
		E)	Vietnam's George Washington.
13
		
General Vo Nguyen Giap's Vietminh troops won a decisive victory over French forces in 1954 at:
		A)	Saigon.
		B)	Ap Bac.
		C)	Hanoi.
		D)	Dien Bien Phu.
		E)	Khe Sanh.
14
		
Congressional leaders conditioned their approval of U.S. intervention to save the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu on:
		A)	A willingness to accompany action with meaningful negotiations.
		B)	An Administration promise to intervene with large numbers of American ground troops.
		C)	Prior commitments from allies such as Great Britain to support intervention.
		D)	Nuclear attacks on Communist Chinese troops.
		E)	All of the above.
17
		
The Geneva Accords of 1954 included all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	A temporary partition of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel for the regrouping of military forces.
		B)	Reunification elections scheduled for the summer of 1956.
		C)	Stipulations that neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam would join a military alliance.
		D)	Assurances from Ho Chi Minh that he would abandon Communism in exchange for American recognition.
		E)	The establishment of a Communist state in North Vietnam.
19
		
Following the Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concluded that America would succeed in containing Communism in Indochina where France had failed because:
		A)	American troops were better equipped than their French counterparts.
		B)	The U.S. was trying to foster nationalism in Vietnam whereas the French had sought to perpetuate colonialism.
		C)	American nuclear superiority would permit Washington to dictate terms to Ho Chi Minh.
		D)	American economic aid could buy off the Vietnamese Communists.






chapter 2



2
		
Which of the following problems beset the South Vietnamese government in 1954:
		A)	A war-ravaged economy.
		B)	Antiquated governmental institutions.
		C)	An absence of popular support both in the countryside and among non-Communist nationalists.
		D)	Continued Vietminh control of key territory.
		E)	All of the above.

7
		
Washington shifted from giving Diem lukewarm support to backing him strongly in 1955 because:
		A)	Diem ably resolved South Vietnam's tremendous economic difficulties.
		B)	Hanoi agreed to recognize Diem's government.
		C)	Diem's army won a surprising victory over the sects.
		D)	Diem won the blessings of South Vietnam's influential Buddhist hierarchy.
		E)	All of the above.
8
		
Throughout the late 1950s, the fundamental goal of American policy in South Vietnam remained:
		A)	Maintaining South Vietnam as a barrier against Communist expansion.
		B)	Neutralizing Southeast Asia in the ongoing Cold War.
		C)	Effecting a rapprochement with Ho Chi Minh.
		D)	Using South Vietnam as a base for launching air attacks against the People's Republic of China.

10
		
From 1955-1961, the vast majority of American assistance to South Vietnam went toward:
		A)	Establishing a viable, democratic government based on majority rule.
		B)	Creating a strong army to counter North Vietnam's powerful military.
		C)	Spreading American values among South Vietnam's impoverished peasants.
		D)	Building a modern industrial economy.
11
		
The Military Assistance and Advisory Group's (MAAG) effort to turn South Vietnam's army into an effective force failed for which of the following reasons:
		A)	A lack of sufficiently educated officers.
		B)	Diem's determination to base the promotion of officers on loyalty to his regime rather than on merit.
		C)	The American decision to train the South Vietnamese army for a conventional war rather than the rural insurgency it would eventually have to fight.
		D)	All of the above.


13
		
Diem used his political philosophy—"personalism"—to:
		A)	Bring together Vietnam's many diverse ethnic groups.
		B)	Build popular support for democratic values.
		C)	Justify absolute state control and his belief that the ruling elite should determine the general welfare.
		D)	Rationalize opening a dialog with Ho Chi Minh.
14
		
The "reeducation centers" that Diem established in the late 1950s:
		A)	Imprisoned thousands of Communists and non-Communists, and helped fuel steadily increasing discontent in South Vietnam.
		B)	Affected only a handful of people.
		C)	Won the loyalty of "stay-behind" Communists through free education and the extension of rural aid.
		D)	Were the centerpiece of Diem's effort to achieve full literacy in South Vietnam by 1965.
15
		
Despite South Vietnam's vulnerability, Hanoi chose not to pursue reunification in the late 1950s because:
		A)	Periodic border skirmishes with China compelled North Vietnam to station most of its troops on its northern border.
		B)	Hanoi feared that America would respond to any aggression with nuclear weapons.
		C)	Ho Chi Minh believed that Vietnam should only be reunified by peaceful means.
		D)	Hanoi faced daunting postwar reconstruction and nation-building problems including popular resistance to its program of land reform.
		E)	All of the above.
16
		
The North Vietnamese government gradually committed itself to supporting a Communist insurgency against the Diem government between 1957 and 1959 because:
		A)	Diem's anti-Communist campaign had proven so successful that it threatened the survival of the revolutionary apparatus in the south.
		B)	Hanoi had successfully secured the revolution in North Vietnam.
		C)	Ho Chi Minh had decided to delay the completion of the socialist revolution in the north.
		D)	Washington had signaled its intention to abandon South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
17
		
Diem's "agroville" program proved to be:
		A)	A stunning success that rallied the peasants to the government and thereby eroded support for the National Liberation Front (NLF).
		B)	A complete flop that bred widespread resentment among peasants angry at being removed from their homes and separated from the sacred burial grounds of their ancestors.
		C)	A well-funded but poorly administered program that produced mixed results.
		D)	Popular with South Vietnam's rural people, but a failure because of insufficient government support.
		E)	More successful politically than economically.
18
		
In 1960, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow:
		A)	Argued that America should force Diem to implement broad reforms in exchange for further military aid.
		B)	Attempted to persuade a reluctant Diem to declare martial law and to centralize his authority
		C)	Backed a plot to replace Diem with a government dominated by the military.
		D)	Called publicly for direct American control of South Vietnam.
		E)	Urged President Eisenhower to end America's commitment to South Vietnam.



Chapter 3

	
Upon taking office, President John Kennedy met the challenges of the Cold War by:
		A)	Ordering a buildup of nuclear weapons, modernizing conventional forces, and developing counterinsurgency capabilities.
		B)	Withdrawing from American defense commitments such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
		C)	Opening relations with the People's Republic of China.
		D)	Pursuing Detente with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
		E)	All of the above.
2
		
Throughout his tenure in office, Kennedy:
		A)	Eagerly took up the burden in Vietnam.
		B)	Chose a cautious middle course that expanded America's role in Vietnam but kept it limited.
		C)	Swung wildly from a desire to shed America of its Vietnam commitment to an insistence on deploying massive numbers of troops to that nation.
		D)	Pursued a negotiated solution in South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.

4
		
Vietnam assumed a position of greater importance in the eyes of the Kennedy administration in 1961 because:
		A)	Khruschev's speech in support of wars of national liberation appeared to presage more aggressive Communist behavior in the developing world.
		B)	Kennedy had become increasingly concerned about the steadily growing Communist insurgency in rural South Vietnam
		C)	Vietnam appeared to be a better place than Laos to make a stand against Communism in Southeast Asia.
		D)	Setbacks in Laos and at the Bay of Pigs increased the symbolic importance of thwarting Communism in Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.


6
		
After receiving the Taylor-Rostow report, Kennedy opted to:
		A)	Deploy the "logistical task force" General Taylor had first proposed.
		B)	Expand the Laos negotiations to include Vietnam.
		C)	Begin regular bombing attacks against North Vietnam.
		D)	Publicly announce that his administration was washing its hands of South Vietnam.
		E)	Approve a limited commitment of aid and advisers.



9
		
At the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, South Vietnamese forces:
		A)	Used their advanced weapons and mobility to decisively defeat a well-armed NLF battalion.
		B)	Suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a better-equipped Viet Cong force.
		C)	Failed to destroy a Viet Cong unit despite overwhelming air and artillery support and a ten-to-one superiority in men.
		D)	Occupied a deserted village that the guerrillas had long since abandoned.
		E)	Impressed their American advisors with their great bravery under fire.
10
		
The strategic hamlet program:
		A)	Succeeded in protecting the villagers of South Vietnam from attacks by Chinese insurgents.
		B)	Was skillfully implemented by the Diem government.
		C)	Turned the tide in the struggle for the control of rural South Vietnam.
		D)	Proved to be a poorly implemented effort that failed either to incorporate meaningful land reform or to provide sufficient security for village residents.
		E)	Greatly interfered with the NLF's efforts to infiltrate rural villages.



15
		
Following the May 8, 1963, incident in Hue, Buddhist monks and their supporters protested the Diem government by:
		A)	Staging highly publicized self immolations and mass protests.
		B)	Waging guerrilla war.
		C)	Openly allying with the Viet Cong.
		D)	Assassinating high officials and burning down government buildings.
		E)	All of the above.

18
		
In the fall of 1963 the Buddhist crisis and the emerging rift with the Diem government led the Kennedy Administration to:
		A)	Give serious consideration to ending America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		B)	Drift toward backing coup in South Vietnam despite sharp divisions among top policymakers.
		C)	Open direct negations with Hanoi aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis in South Vietnam.
		D)	Support enthusiastically a French neutralization proposal for South Vietnam.
		E)	Contemplate a massive American invasion of North Vietnam.


21
		
With his top advisers sharply divided in October 1963 between those who continued to support Diem and those who advocated his removal, Kennedy:
		A)	Sided strongly with Diem supporters such as General Paul Harkins.
		B)	Unequivocally backed those who sought Diem's removal from power.
		C)	Ignored Vietnam in disgust.
		D)	Pursued a truly even-handed compromise policy.
		E)	Followed a compromise policy that left matters in Ambassador Lodge's hands and thereby ensured U.S. support for a coup d'etat against Diem.
22
		
In the aftermath of the November 1, 1963 coup d'etat, Diem and Nhu:
		A)	Left South Vietnam for exile under a promise of safe conduct.
		B)	Were brutally murdered in the back of an armored personnel carrier.
		C)	Fled from South Vietnam with the help of sympathetic American officials such as Ambassador Lodge.
		D)	Committed accidental suicide.
		E)	Escaped into the jungles of South Vietnam to join the National Liberation Front.
23
		
During his time as president, John F. Kennedy:
		A)	Reduced America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		B)	Neither increased nor reduced substantially America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		C)	Set in motion a plan for a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam.
		D)	Increased America's commitment to South Vietnam dramatically and bequeathed to Lyndon Johnson a problem far more dangerous than the one he had inherited.
		E)	Bravely pursued a neutralist solution to the problem of South Vietnam at great political cost.



Chapter 4 


4
		
Upon taking office, President Johnson:
		A)	Viewed Vietnam as an exciting challenge that he could use to establish his legacy and secure election in 1964.
		B)	Saw Vietnam as a minor problem easily solved through more efficient management.
		C)	Perceived Vietnam to be an unwanted intrusion that he had to deal with lest it interfere with his ambitious domestic political agenda.
		D)	Brought in new top-level foreign policy advisors to replace policymakers such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who had orchestrated Kennedy's Vietnam policy.
5
		
President Johnson refused to grant a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) request for direct American air and ground operations in early 1964 because:
		A)	He felt that direct American participation in the conflict would lead the South Vietnamese to let the United States fight the war for them.
		B)	He had little enthusiasm for getting involved in a land war in Asia.
		C)	Such a course would threaten his ambitious social agenda.
		D)	American participation in Vietnam would result in hostile propaganda throughout the world.
		E)	All of the above.

7
		
President Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf incident to:
		A)	Press for a complete reappraisal of America's Vietnam policy.
		B)	Begin a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam.
		C)	Bring alleged North Vietnamese aggression to the attention of the United Nations.
		D)	Win Congressional approval of a resolution authorizing him to use American forces in Vietnam.


10
		
Undersecretary of State George Ball objected to air attacks against North Vietnam for all of the following reasons EXCEPT:
		A)	Bombing would not likely improve morale in South Vietnam.
		B)	North Vietnam might respond with a strategic air offensive of its own.
		C)	Hanoi could counter by sending its well-trained soldiers into South Vietnam.
		D)	Bombing would not likely force Hanoi to yield to American wishes.
		E)	Air attacks might prompt Communist China to intervene in support of North Vietnam.


12
		
The February 1965 National Liberation Front attack on a U.S. Army barracks in Pleiku:
		A)	Served as a convenient pretext for the Johnson Administration to begin the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.
		B)	Awoke American officials to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and to the necessity of quickly expanding American involvement.
		C)	Spurred the Administration to begin an open, public debate over its Vietnam policy.
		D)	Led LBJ to contemplate reducing America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
13
		
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected strongly to General William Westmoreland's urgent, February 1965 request in for the deployment of American Marines to protect the air base at Danang because of his:
		A)	Strong feeling that the U.S. needed to commit a substantially larger force to South Vietnam.
		B)	Belief that the deployment would discourage aggressive action by South Vietnamese troops.
		C)	Opposition to the use of American troops in the defense of static positions.
		D)	Fears that the deployment would put the U.S. on a slippery slope leading inevitably to more and larger deployments.
14
		
Taylor's enclave strategy:
		A)	Proposed a limited commitment of American forces to coastal base areas designed to prevent a quick Communist victory and to give South Vietnam time to build up its forces.
		B)	Marked a step back from large-scale involvement.
		C)	Was self-consciously designed to spur further American intervention.
		D)	Called for aggressive offensive actions in the strategic Central Highlands.
		E)	All of the above.

19
		
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara justified committing American ground troops to offensive operations in the summer of 1965 by arguing that doing so would:
		A)	Quickly and decisively defeat the Communists.
		B)	Overawe the Communists, who would surrender rather than face defeat at the hands of the mighty American military.
		C)	Avert immediate defeat, and have a pretty good chance of creating conditions conducive to a favorable solution in the future.
		D)	Cost the U.S. nothing, while mollifying domestic critics who were calling for decisive action.
20
		
LBJ's decision in July 1965 to commit American troops to offensive operations and to expand the air war constituted:
		A)	A minor escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.
		B)	A limited step based on the assumption that no further escalation would be necessary.
		C)	A cunningly devised ploy to divide Hanoi and Beijing.
		D)	An open-ended commitment that cleared the way for the U.S. to take the lead in fighting the war.



Chapter 5

The United States' approach to fighting the Vietnam War:
		A)	Brilliantly related American military power to the central task of building an effective South Vietnamese government.
		B)	Was consciously designed to inflict the maximum number of civilian deaths possible.
		C)	Was never appropriate for the war because the U.S. merely assumed that applying its superior military power would achieve victory.
		D)	Was more political than military in nature.
		E)	Greatly overestimated North Vietnam's military strength.


3
		
The Johnson Administration's decision to pursue a gradualist approach to the air war permitted North Vietnam to do all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Establish a large munitions industry.
		B)	Build a powerful air defense system.
		C)	Implement alternative transportation systems.
		D)	Protect critical resources.
		E)	Persist in the war despite the damage the U.S. was inflicting.
4
		
The USSR began to provide North Vietnam with substantial military assistance beginning in 1965 because:
		A)	It hoped to tie the U.S. down in Southeast Asia so that unopposed Soviet forces could pursue opportunities in Europe and the Middle East.
		B)	An American defeat in Southeast Asia would set the stage for a real thaw in the Cold War.
		C)	Moscow wished to prevent America from establishing a strong position on the border of its close fraternal ally, China.
		D)	Assistance to North Vietnam would prove Soviet credibility in the face of hostile Chinese propaganda and give the USSR the chance to test new weapon systems.
		E)	All of the above.
5
		
Beijing assisted North Vietnam in its war with the U.S. by:
		A)	Having its fighter aircraft intercept American attack planes over the Tonkin Gulf.
		B)	Sending "volunteers" to join People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units fighting in South Vietnam.
		C)	Providing huge amounts of supplies and munitions and by deploying 320,000 troops to help North Vietnam rebuild and defend its transportation network.
		D)	Having Chinese divisions engage American Marines along the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
		E)	Threatening to invade Taiwan.
6
		
The Rolling Thunder air war did all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Result in the loss of over 950 American aircraft between 1965 and 1968.
		B)	Stop the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
		C)	Provide Hanoi with American hostages in the form of downed airmen.
		D)	Cost the United States $9.60 for each $1 of damage inflicted.
		E)	Give Hanoi a tremendous propaganda advantage.
7
		
Through his Search and Destroy strategy, General William Westmoreland:
		A)	Abandoned the U.S. Army's traditional, conventional approach to warfare in favor of a small-unit counterinsurgency strategy.
		B)	Sought to lure North Vietnamese units into populated areas where the U.S. could easily effect their destruction.
		C)	Pursued a typical, conventional strategy designed to eliminate the military threat to South Vietnam by locating and destroying North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) units.
		D)	Avoided engaging enemy main force units in favor of police activities designed to uproot and destroy the NLF's political apparatus.
		E)	Launched a conventional, tank-led invasion across the DMZ into North Vietnam.
8
		
President Lyndon Johnson's "many flags" campaign to secure troop commitments to Vietnam from America's Pacific allies:
		A)	Was a resounding success that resulted in large numbers of allied troops joining American forces in South Vietnam.
		B)	Met with outright hostility from previously steadfast allies such as Thailand, Australia, and South Korea.
		C)	Was publicly supported by American allies, but did not result in the commitment of any soldiers.
		D)	Was a disappointment that resulted in the deployment of only 71,000 troops.
		E)	All of the above.
9
		
American forces used which of the following in Vietnam:
		A)	IBM computers programmed to predict when and where the enemy would attack.
		B)	Defoliants such as Agent Orange designed to destroy the dense jungle that provided the enemy with cover.
		C)	Massive air support including napalm and B-52 raids.
		D)	Huge amounts of artillery fire.
		E)	All of the above.
10
		
From 1965 to 1968, North Vietnam:
		A)	Matched American escalations by sending more troops south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and by maintaining the military pressure so as to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. units.
		B)	Sought to engage in traditional, set-piece battles in which its forces could decisively defeat the Americans.
		C)	Proved unable to match the massive American escalation that took place between 1965 and 1968.
		D)	Sought to minimize combat with the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces so as to keep its casualties down.
		E)	All of the above.
11
		
The principle index the United States used to chart success in Vietnam was:
		A)	The movement of the front line and the capture of key geographical objectives.
		B)	A sophisticated measurement of the proportion of South Vietnamese peasants who were loyal to the Saigon government.
		C)	The strength and stability of the South Vietnamese government.
		D)	The "body count."
		E)	All of the above.


13
		
With the Americanization of the war in 1965, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):
		A)	Became more dependent than ever on the U.S.
		B)	Underwent a period of intensive retooling from which it emerged stronger than ever.
		C)	Was divided into small units that were then integrated into the American command under a system pioneered during the Korean War.
		D)	Shrank dramatically in size to become a highly mobile, elite striking force.
		E)	Undertook a series of spoiler attacks into North Vietnam that threw the enemy off balance.

18
		
Antiwar liberals opposed American participation in the war for all of the following reasons EXCEPT:
		A)	Their belief that the employment of weapons such as napalm was inhumane.
		B)	Their conviction that America had betrayed its bedrock principles by supporting a corrupt and repressive regime in South Vietnam.
		C)	Their conclusion that U.S. escalation violated a number of international agreements including the United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords.
		D)	Their doubts in the validity of the domino theory on which the Johnson Administration justified intervention.
		E)	Their belief that the war was but the latest example of the way in which American capitalism brutally exploited people all across the globe.
19
		
According to the author, the antiwar movement:
		A)	Failed to turn the American people against the war, but did compel a debate that eventually led policymakers and the public to give serious consideration to ending American involvement in Vietnam.
		B)	Almost single-handedly forced the U.S. to deescalate its involvement in Vietnam.
		C)	Turned the American people against the war and thus encouraged a wavering North Vietnamese government to press on toward victory.
		D)	Had no impact whatsoever on the course of the war.
		E)	Divided America to the point that a civil war nearly erupted in the summer of 1967.


21
		
By the summer of 1967, the chief opponent in the Johnson Administration to the continuation of the Vietnam War was:
		A)	Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
		B)	Vice President Hubert Humphrey.
		C)	Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles.
		D)	Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
		E)	Senator Robert Kennedy.