Upon taking office, President Johnson:
A)  Viewed Vietnam as an exciting challenge that he could use to establish his legacy and secure election in 1964.
B)  Saw Vietnam as a minor problem easily solved through more efficient management.
C)  Perceived Vietnam to be an unwanted intrusion that he had to deal with lest it interfere with his ambitious domestic political agenda.
D)  Brought in new top-level foreign policy advisors to replace policymakers such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who had orchestrated Kennedy's Vietnam policy.
ANSWER: C

President Johnson refused to grant a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) request for direct American air and ground operations in early 1964 because:
A)  He felt that direct American participation in the conflict would lead the South Vietnamese to let the United States fight the war for them.
B)  He had little enthusiasm for getting involved in a land war in Asia.
C)  Such a course would threaten his ambitious social agenda.
D)  American participation in Vietnam would result in hostile propaganda throughout the world.
E)  All of the above.
ANSWER: E

President Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf incident to:
A)  Press for a complete reappraisal of America's Vietnam policy.
B)  Begin a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam.
C)  Bring alleged North Vietnamese aggression to the attention of the United Nations.
D)  Win Congressional approval of a resolution authorizing him to use American forces in Vietnam.
ANSWER: D

Undersecretary of State George Ball objected to air attacks against North Vietnam for all of the following reasons EXCEPT:
A)  Bombing would not likely improve morale in South Vietnam.
B)  North Vietnam might respond with a strategic air offensive of its own.
C)  Hanoi could counter by sending its well-trained soldiers into South Vietnam.
D)  Bombing would not likely force Hanoi to yield to American wishes.
E)  Air attacks might prompt Communist China to intervene in support of North Vietnam.
ANSWER: B

The February 1965 National Liberation Front attack on a U.S. Army barracks in Pleiku:
A)  Served as a convenient pretext for the Johnson Administration to begin the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.
B)  Awoke American officials to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and to the necessity of quickly expanding American involvement.
C)  Spurred the Administration to begin an open, public debate over its Vietnam policy.
D)  Led LBJ to contemplate reducing America's commitment to South Vietnam.
E)  All of the above.
ANSWER: A

Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected strongly to General William Westmoreland's urgent, February 1965 request in for the deployment of American Marines to protect the air base at Danang because of his:
A)  Strong feeling that the U.S. needed to commit a substantially larger force to South Vietnam.
B)  Belief that the deployment would discourage aggressive action by South Vietnamese troops.
C)  Opposition to the use of American troops in the defense of static positions.
D)  Fears that the deployment would put the U.S. on a slippery slope leading inevitably to more and larger deployments.
ANSWER: D

Taylor's enclave strategy:
A)  Proposed a limited commitment of American forces to coastal base areas designed to prevent a quick Communist victory and to give South Vietnam time to build up its forces.
B)  Marked a step back from large-scale involvement.
C)  Was self-consciously designed to spur further American intervention.
D)  Called for aggressive offensive actions in the strategic Central Highlands.
E)  All of the above.
ANSWER: A

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara justified committing American ground troops to offensive operations in the summer of 1965 by arguing that doing so would:
A)  Quickly and decisively defeat the Communists.
B)  Overawe the Communists, who would surrender rather than face defeat at the hands of the mighty American military.
C)  Avert immediate defeat, and have a pretty good chance of creating conditions conducive to a favorable solution in the future.
D)  Cost the U.S. nothing, while mollifying domestic critics who were calling for decisive action.
ANSWER: C

LBJ's decision in July 1965 to commit American troops to offensive operations and to expand the air war constituted:
A)  A minor escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.
B)  A limited step based on the assumption that no further escalation would be necessary.
C)  A cunningly devised ploy to divide Hanoi and Beijing.
D)  An open-ended commitment that cleared the way for the U.S. to take the lead in fighting the war.
ANSWER: D