Phan Boi Chau
Ho Chi Minh
Vo Nguyen Giap
O.S.S.
Truman Doctrine
Aloss of China
Adomino theory
Bao Dai
Battle of Cao Bang
Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG)
European Defense Community (EDC)
General Henri Navarre
Dien Bien Phu
Operation Vulture
United Action
Geneva Accords


Edward Lansdale
Ngo Dinh Diem
APassage of Freedom
The Sects Crisis
Anational referendum
International Rescue Committee (IRC)
American Friends of Vietnam (AFV)
Michigan State group
commercial import program
National Liberation Front (NLF)
agroville program
Pathet Lao


Thich Quang Duc
Taylor-Rostow mission
strategic hamlet program
Project ABeef Up
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
General Paul D. Harkins
Battle of Ap Bac
John Kenneth Galbraith
David Halberstam
Mike Mansfield
Buddhist Crisis
Krulak-Mendenhall Mission
DeGaulle Plan of 1962
Souvanna Phouma
McNamara-Taylor Report



National Security Council Actions Memorandum (NASM) 273
General Ngyuen Khahn
National Security Council Actions Memorandum (NASM) 288
OPLAN 34A
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Ernest Gruening
George Ball
Operation ARolling Thunder
Aenclave strategy
ATarget: College Campuses
General Nguyen Van Thieu
Clark Clifford
Bui Diem



Strategy of attrition
Amany flags" campaign
Agent Orange
Operation ACedar Falls
Honolulu Communiqué

Revolutionary Development Program
AFourteen Points
J. William Fulbright
Howard Levy
San Antonio formula
Operation Chaos





Chapter 1


Vietnam has a centuries-old tradition of resisting foreign domination. Who among the following led early efforts to win independence from China?
		A)	The Trung Sisters.
		B)	Tran Hung Dao.
		C)	Trieu Au.
		D)	All of the above.
2
		
During World War II, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh organization developed the strategy that would eventually force the French out of Vietnam. It included:
		A)	Emphasizing the Vietminh's commitment to Communism and social revolution.
		B)	Tapping Vietnamese nationalism, promising independence, and pledging democratic reforms.
		C)	Fighting other nationalist groups.
		D)	Collaborating with the Japanese.
		E)	All of the above.
3
		
This organization helped Ho Chi Minh wage guerrilla war against the Japanese during World War II:
		A)	The Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
		B)	The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
		C)	The KGB.
		D)	The Chinese Nationalist government.
		E)	The British Secret Service.
4
		
The French government sought to reassert its authority in Indochina following World War II for which of the following reasons:
		A)	Control of Indochina would restore France's faltering prestige.
		B)	Indochina possessed valuable oil reserves.
		C)	The French government feared that Vietnam would fall into anarchy in the absence of French rule.
		D)	Continued French control of Indochina would prevent the USSR from dominating Southeast Asia.
		E)	All of the above.
5
		
In the late 1940s, Truman Administration policymakers abandoned America's earlier opposition to continued French control of Indochina because:
		A)	They viewed the colonial system as the best way to assist developing regions.
		B)	They wanted to maintain good relations with Paris in order to ensure that France would continue to help contain Soviet power in Europe.
		C)	Ongoing French control facilitated American economic penetration of Vietnam.
		D)	France promised to grant independence to Vietnam by 1950.
		E)	All of the above.
6
		
American officials determined that they could not support Ho Chi Minh for the following reason:
		A)	His close ties with Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.
		B)	His steadfast refusal to promise tax-free monopolies for U.S. imports.
		C)	His deeply held Communist beliefs.
		D)	His refusal to accept American military aid in 1947.
7
		
In 1950, this leader agreed to send military advisors to assist the Vietminh guerrillas:
		A)	Joseph Stalin.
		B)	Jawaharlal Nehru.
		C)	Chiang Kai-shek.
		D)	Mao Zedong.
		E)	Josep Tito.
8
		
In 1950, the Truman Administration shifted from pro-French neutrality to outright support for Paris in its war with the Vietminh because of:
		A)	Heightened Cold War fears in the wake of the Soviet Union's detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949.
		B)	The Communists' victory in the Chinese civil war.
		C)	The strong realization that the loss of further territory to Communism would come at a steep domestic political price.
		D)	The belief that the fall of Indochina to Communism would force resource-starved Japan into the Communist Bloc.
		E)	All of the above.
9
		
The Domino Theory held that:
		A)	The fall of Indochina to Communism would rapidly lead to Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.
		B)	Southeast Asian nations would stand up to Communism like a wall of dominos.
		C)	The fall of Indochina to Communism would have little impact on other nations in the region.
		D)	All of the above.
10
		
The Bao Dai government that France established in 1950 was notable because:
		A)	It was Vietnam's first truly independent, post-colonial government.
		B)	American officials unequivocally supported it.
		C)	It was a puppet government designed to obscure continued direct French control of Vietnam.
		D)	It was a compromise solution that enjoyed the strong support of Ho Chi Minh
		E)	All of the above.
11
		
As did their predecessors in the Truman Administration, top officials in the Eisenhower Administration viewed Ho Chi Minh as:
		A)	An instrument of the international Communist movement.
		B)	A brilliant political philosopher.
		C)	A well-meaning but misguided man.
		D)	A strong nationalist leader who also happened to be a Communist.
		E)	Vietnam's George Washington.
12
		
President Dwight Eisenhower and his advisors argued that France could turn the tables on the Vietminh by doing which of the following:
		A)	Using tactical nuclear weapons.
		B)	Pursuing a more aggressive strategy and employing Vietnamese troops.
		C)	Shifting to guerrilla tactics.
		D)	Defending the countryside with Beau Geste forts.
		E)	All of the above.
13
		
General Vo Nguyen Giap's Vietminh troops won a decisive victory over French forces in 1954 at:
		A)	Saigon.
		B)	Ap Bac.
		C)	Hanoi.
		D)	Dien Bien Phu.
		E)	Khe Sanh.
14
		
Congressional leaders conditioned their approval of U.S. intervention to save the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu on:
		A)	A willingness to accompany action with meaningful negotiations.
		B)	An Administration promise to intervene with large numbers of American ground troops.
		C)	Prior commitments from allies such as Great Britain to support intervention.
		D)	Nuclear attacks on Communist Chinese troops.
		E)	All of the above.
15
		
At an April 7, 1954 news conference, President Eisenhower argued that the U.S. needed to prevent the fall of Vietnam to Communism because:
		A)	A Communist victory in Vietnam would result in other nation's falling to Communism like a "row of dominoes."
		B)	Victory in Vietnam would permit the Vietminh to launch large-scale conventional attacks against neighboring non-Communist states such as Thailand and Cambodia.
		C)	The inclusion of Vietnam's awesome industrial base in the Communist Bloc would tip the global balance of power in Moscow's favor.
		D)	European security depended on continued access to Vietnam's markets.
16
		
The Eisenhower Administration opposed the Geneva Conference because it feared that the meeting would:
		A)	Spur the growth of Vietnamese nationalism.
		B)	Give the French the opportunity to secure a respectable surrender.
		C)	Result in diplomatic recognition of Communist China.
		D)	Undermine its alliance with Western European nations such as Great Britain and France.
		E)	Solidify Bao Dai's position.
17
		
The Geneva Accords of 1954 included all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	A temporary partition of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel for the regrouping of military forces.
		B)	Reunification elections scheduled for the summer of 1956.
		C)	Stipulations that neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam would join a military alliance.
		D)	Assurances from Ho Chi Minh that he would abandon Communism in exchange for American recognition.
		E)	The establishment of a Communist state in North Vietnam.
18
		
In light of the decisive Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu the day before it started, the Geneva Conference was:
		A)	A serious diplomatic defeat for the United States.
		B)	A great victory for France in its quest to restore its colonial empire.
		C)	A qualified success for the U.S.
		D)	A decisive triumph for the Vietminh.
19
		
Following the Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles concluded that America would succeed in containing Communism in Indochina where France had failed because:
		A)	American troops were better equipped than their French counterparts.
		B)	The U.S. was trying to foster nationalism in Vietnam whereas the French had sought to perpetuate colonialism.
		C)	American nuclear superiority would permit Washington to dictate terms to Ho Chi Minh.
		D)	American economic aid could buy off the Vietnamese Communists.






chapter 2

Multiple Choice Quiz



1
		
To the Eisenhower Administration, all of the following were significant weaknesses to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) EXCEPT:
		A)	Its failure to include regional neutral nations such as Burma, India, and Indonesia.
		B)	Restrictions in the Geneva Accords that prevented Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam from participating formally.
		C)	The alliance's "western colorization."
		D)	The pact's avoidance of NATO-like commitments and ability to furnish the United States with the legal basis for intervention in Indochina.
2
		
Which of the following problems beset the South Vietnamese government in 1954:
		A)	A war-ravaged economy.
		B)	Antiquated governmental institutions.
		C)	An absence of popular support both in the countryside and among non-Communist nationalists.
		D)	Continued Vietminh control of key territory.
		E)	All of the above.
3
		
In August 1954, a National Intelligence Estimate rated the chances of creating a stable and effective government in South Vietnam as:
		A)	Excellent.
		B)	Likely, but at a great cost.
		C)	All but assured.
		D)	Poor.
		E)	Possible with British assistance.
4
		
Which of the following personal characteristics most accounted for Ngo Dinh Diem's rise to power in South Vietnam in the mid 1950s:
		A)	His persistence when confronted by danger and his surprising capacity for political survival.
		B)	His wistful determination to restore the imperial Vietnamese system that French colonialism had destroyed.
		C)	His keen sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of South Vietnam's peasants.
		D)	His well-thought-out plan to modernize South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
5
		
Which of the following helped fuel conflict between France and the United States in 1954-1955:
		A)	American officials believed that the French government was simultaneously trying to retain control of South Vietnam and establish close relations with Hanoi.
		B)	Washington feared that Paris would support fair elections that would result in a Communist victory under Ho Chi Minh.
		C)	French officials concluded that Washington sought to use Diem to supplant France's position in South Vietnam.
		D)	France had rejected the European Defense Community.
		E)	All of the above.
6
		
The following sects threatened Ngo Dinh Diem's fledgling government in 1955 EXCEPT:
		A)	The Cao Dai.
		B)	The Dek Dek.
		C)	The Hoa Hao.
		D)	The Binh Xuyen.
7
		
Washington shifted from giving Diem lukewarm support to backing him strongly in 1955 because:
		A)	Diem ably resolved South Vietnam's tremendous economic difficulties.
		B)	Hanoi agreed to recognize Diem's government.
		C)	Diem's army won a surprising victory over the sects.
		D)	Diem won the blessings of South Vietnam's influential Buddhist hierarchy.
		E)	All of the above.
8
		
Throughout the late 1950s, the fundamental goal of American policy in South Vietnam remained:
		A)	Maintaining South Vietnam as a barrier against Communist expansion.
		B)	Neutralizing Southeast Asia in the ongoing Cold War.
		C)	Effecting a rapprochement with Ho Chi Minh.
		D)	Using South Vietnam as a base for launching air attacks against the People's Republic of China.
9
		
From 1955 to 1961 American economic and military aid to South Vietnam totaled approximately:
		A)	$10 million.
		B)	$50 million.
		C)	$500 million.
		D)	$1 billion.
		E)	$10 billion.
10
		
From 1955-1961, the vast majority of American assistance to South Vietnam went toward:
		A)	Establishing a viable, democratic government based on majority rule.
		B)	Creating a strong army to counter North Vietnam's powerful military.
		C)	Spreading American values among South Vietnam's impoverished peasants.
		D)	Building a modern industrial economy.
11
		
The Military Assistance and Advisory Group's (MAAG) effort to turn South Vietnam's army into an effective force failed for which of the following reasons:
		A)	A lack of sufficiently educated officers.
		B)	Diem's determination to base the promotion of officers on loyalty to his regime rather than on merit.
		C)	The American decision to train the South Vietnamese army for a conventional war rather than the rural insurgency it would eventually have to fight.
		D)	All of the above.
12
		
The commercial-import program suffered from:
		A)	Its failure to ease inflation or offset South Vietnam's foreign exchange deficit.
		B)	Its tendency to focus on financing artificially high living standards rather than on developing industry or agriculture.
		C)	The high proportion of assistance it provided to North Vietnam.
		D)	The Eisenhower Administration's unwillingness to commit sufficient funds to Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
13
		
Diem used his political philosophy—"personalism"—to:
		A)	Bring together Vietnam's many diverse ethnic groups.
		B)	Build popular support for democratic values.
		C)	Justify absolute state control and his belief that the ruling elite should determine the general welfare.
		D)	Rationalize opening a dialog with Ho Chi Minh.
14
		
The "reeducation centers" that Diem established in the late 1950s:
		A)	Imprisoned thousands of Communists and non-Communists, and helped fuel steadily increasing discontent in South Vietnam.
		B)	Affected only a handful of people.
		C)	Won the loyalty of "stay-behind" Communists through free education and the extension of rural aid.
		D)	Were the centerpiece of Diem's effort to achieve full literacy in South Vietnam by 1965.
15
		
Despite South Vietnam's vulnerability, Hanoi chose not to pursue reunification in the late 1950s because:
		A)	Periodic border skirmishes with China compelled North Vietnam to station most of its troops on its northern border.
		B)	Hanoi feared that America would respond to any aggression with nuclear weapons.
		C)	Ho Chi Minh believed that Vietnam should only be reunified by peaceful means.
		D)	Hanoi faced daunting postwar reconstruction and nation-building problems including popular resistance to its program of land reform.
		E)	All of the above.
16
		
The North Vietnamese government gradually committed itself to supporting a Communist insurgency against the Diem government between 1957 and 1959 because:
		A)	Diem's anti-Communist campaign had proven so successful that it threatened the survival of the revolutionary apparatus in the south.
		B)	Hanoi had successfully secured the revolution in North Vietnam.
		C)	Ho Chi Minh had decided to delay the completion of the socialist revolution in the north.
		D)	Washington had signaled its intention to abandon South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
17
		
Diem's "agroville" program proved to be:
		A)	A stunning success that rallied the peasants to the government and thereby eroded support for the National Liberation Front (NLF).
		B)	A complete flop that bred widespread resentment among peasants angry at being removed from their homes and separated from the sacred burial grounds of their ancestors.
		C)	A well-funded but poorly administered program that produced mixed results.
		D)	Popular with South Vietnam's rural people, but a failure because of insufficient government support.
		E)	More successful politically than economically.
18
		
In 1960, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow:
		A)	Argued that America should force Diem to implement broad reforms in exchange for further military aid.
		B)	Attempted to persuade a reluctant Diem to declare martial law and to centralize his authority
		C)	Backed a plot to replace Diem with a government dominated by the military.
		D)	Called publicly for direct American control of South Vietnam.
		E)	Urged President Eisenhower to end America's commitment to South Vietnam.
19
		
Despite Diem's weakening position, this nation temporarily eclipsed South Vietnam as the Cold War's principal Southeast Asian battleground in 1960:
		A)	Thailand.
		B)	The Philippines.
		C)	Burma.
		D)	Cambodia.
		E)	Laos.


Chapter 3

	
Upon taking office, President John Kennedy met the challenges of the Cold War by:
		A)	Ordering a buildup of nuclear weapons, modernizing conventional forces, and developing counterinsurgency capabilities.
		B)	Withdrawing from American defense commitments such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
		C)	Opening relations with the People's Republic of China.
		D)	Pursuing Detente with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
		E)	All of the above.
2
		
Throughout his tenure in office, Kennedy:
		A)	Eagerly took up the burden in Vietnam.
		B)	Chose a cautious middle course that expanded America's role in Vietnam but kept it limited.
		C)	Swung wildly from a desire to shed America of its Vietnam commitment to an insistence on deploying massive numbers of troops to that nation.
		D)	Pursued a negotiated solution in South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
3
		
In 1961, the Kennedy administration confronted Cold War crises in all of the following places EXCEPT:
		A)	Laos.
		B)	Berlin.
		C)	The Congo.
		D)	India.
		E)	Cuba.
4
		
Vietnam assumed a position of greater importance in the eyes of the Kennedy administration in 1961 because:
		A)	Khruschev's speech in support of wars of national liberation appeared to presage more aggressive Communist behavior in the developing world.
		B)	Kennedy had become increasingly concerned about the steadily growing Communist insurgency in rural South Vietnam
		C)	Vietnam appeared to be a better place than Laos to make a stand against Communism in Southeast Asia.
		D)	Setbacks in Laos and at the Bay of Pigs increased the symbolic importance of thwarting Communism in Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
5
		
The Taylor-Rostow Mission of 1961 recommended all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	A massive commitment of American combat troops.
		B)	The deployment of an 8,000-man "logistical task force" to serve as a symbol of American intentions under the guise of flood relief.
		C)	Increased American military and economic assistance.
		D)	The commitment of highly trained American advisors to help the South Vietnamese government better combat the Communist insurgency.
		E)	Improved training for Civil Guard and Village Self-Defense Corps troops.
6
		
After receiving the Taylor-Rostow report, Kennedy opted to:
		A)	Deploy the "logistical task force" General Taylor had first proposed.
		B)	Expand the Laos negotiations to include Vietnam.
		C)	Begin regular bombing attacks against North Vietnam.
		D)	Publicly announce that his administration was washing its hands of South Vietnam.
		E)	Approve a limited commitment of aid and advisers.
7
		
The strategic hamlet program included:
		A)	Land reform.
		B)	The provision of schools and medical facilities to isolated villages.
		C)	The relocation of peasants to isolate them from the National Liberation Front (NLF).
		D)	The reinstitution of village elections.
		E)	All of the above.
8
		
American assistance to the South Vietnamese military in 1962 including all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Chemical defoliants.
		B)	Helicopters.
		C)	Biological weapons.
		D)	Armored personnel carriers.
		E)	Hundreds of aircraft.
9
		
At the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, South Vietnamese forces:
		A)	Used their advanced weapons and mobility to decisively defeat a well-armed NLF battalion.
		B)	Suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a better-equipped Viet Cong force.
		C)	Failed to destroy a Viet Cong unit despite overwhelming air and artillery support and a ten-to-one superiority in men.
		D)	Occupied a deserted village that the guerrillas had long since abandoned.
		E)	Impressed their American advisors with their great bravery under fire.
10
		
The strategic hamlet program:
		A)	Succeeded in protecting the villagers of South Vietnam from attacks by Chinese insurgents.
		B)	Was skillfully implemented by the Diem government.
		C)	Turned the tide in the struggle for the control of rural South Vietnam.
		D)	Proved to be a poorly implemented effort that failed either to incorporate meaningful land reform or to provide sufficient security for village residents.
		E)	Greatly interfered with the NLF's efforts to infiltrate rural villages.
11
		
During 1962, reporters such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan:
		A)	Agreed with Ambassador Frederick Nolting and General Paul Harkins that the U.S. had stemmed the Communist tide in South Vietnam.
		B)	Questioned the importance of containing Communism in South Vietnam.
		C)	Argued that the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments were losing the war.
		D)	Called on the Kennedy Administration to expand the war by bombing North Vietnam.
		E)	Pressed successfully for direct negotiations between Hanoi and Washington.
12
		
The Hilsman-Forrestal report of early 1963:
		A)	Occupied a middle ground between critical press reports and optimistic embassy assessments.
		B)	Agreed with the conclusion of reporters such as David Halberstam that the U.S. was losing the war.
		C)	Argued for wholesale changes in American policy.
		D)	Called for the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem.
		E)	Urged Kennedy to commit American combat formations to South Vietnam.
13
		
Friction between the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments in the spring of 1963 was highlighted by:
		A)	Diem's demand that the U.S. remove all of its advisers from South Vietnam.
		B)	Sporadic fighting between U.S. advisers and South Vietnamese soldiers.
		C)	U.S. insistence that Diem step down in favor of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.
		D)	Ngo Dinh Nhu's public proposal that the U.S. withdraw 5,000 men from South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
14
		
According to the author, the 1,000-man troop withdrawal proposal that the Kennedy Administration debated in 1963 was:
		A)	Part of JFK's secret plan to end American involvement in South Vietnam following his reelection in 1964.
		B)	The first step in the phased withdrawal of American forces made possible by the defeat of the Viet Cong.
		C)	A sign that Kennedy understood the failure of America's effort in Vietnam.
		D)	A political ploy to ease domestic concerns and to reassure Diem that the U.S. was not trying to take over his government.
		E)	All of the above.
15
		
Following the May 8, 1963, incident in Hue, Buddhist monks and their supporters protested the Diem government by:
		A)	Staging highly publicized self immolations and mass protests.
		B)	Waging guerrilla war.
		C)	Openly allying with the Viet Cong.
		D)	Assassinating high officials and burning down government buildings.
		E)	All of the above.
16
		
On August 21, 1963, the Diem government:
		A)	Reconciled with the Buddhists.
		B)	Demanded that the U.S. pull its troops out of South Vietnam.
		C)	Refused to promise outgoing Ambassador Frederick Nolting that it would not take further repressive actions against the Buddhists.
		D)	Launched massive raids on pagodas in Hue, Saigon, and other cities that resulted in the arrest of over 1,400 monks.
		E)	Opened negotiations with North Vietnam aimed at effecting a political solution to the ongoing war with the NLF.
17
		
The controversial August 24, 1963 cable to incoming Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge:
		A)	Strongly reaffirmed unqualified American support for the Diem government.
		B)	Argued that the U.S. needed to end its commitment to South Vietnam.
		C)	Indicated that the U.S. would back a coup by South Vietnamese generals if Diem refused to kick his brother Nhu out of the government.
		D)	Called for Lodge to press Diem mildly for democratic reforms.
		E)	Urged that American advisers be permitted to take part in combat.
18
		
In the fall of 1963 the Buddhist crisis and the emerging rift with the Diem government led the Kennedy Administration to:
		A)	Give serious consideration to ending America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		B)	Drift toward backing coup in South Vietnam despite sharp divisions among top policymakers.
		C)	Open direct negations with Hanoi aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis in South Vietnam.
		D)	Support enthusiastically a French neutralization proposal for South Vietnam.
		E)	Contemplate a massive American invasion of North Vietnam.
19
		
According to the author, French President Charles de Gaulle's neutralization proposal:
		A)	Constituted a lost chance to avoid American involvement in the Vietnam War.
		B)	Was part of a clever Soviet ploy designed to trap the U.S. into a no-win situation.
		C)	Won Kennedy's full support after he concluded that America could not achieve its objectives in South Vietnam.
		D)	Had little chance of success given the lack of interest either side had in meaningful negotiations.
		E)	All of the above.
20
		
The Kennedy Administration's move in October 1963 to recall CIA Station Chief John Richardson and to make selective cuts in the aid it provided to South Vietnam:
		A)	Indicated strong continued American support of Diem.
		B)	Failed to have an impact in Saigon.
		C)	Signaled American support for a coup d'etat by South Vietnamese generals.
		D)	Was only a slap on the wrist designed to appease domestic critics angry at Diem's repression of the Buddhists.
		E)	Prompted Ngo Dinh Nhu to seize power in a bloodless coup.
21
		
With his top advisers sharply divided in October 1963 between those who continued to support Diem and those who advocated his removal, Kennedy:
		A)	Sided strongly with Diem supporters such as General Paul Harkins.
		B)	Unequivocally backed those who sought Diem's removal from power.
		C)	Ignored Vietnam in disgust.
		D)	Pursued a truly even-handed compromise policy.
		E)	Followed a compromise policy that left matters in Ambassador Lodge's hands and thereby ensured U.S. support for a coup d'etat against Diem.
22
		
In the aftermath of the November 1, 1963 coup d'etat, Diem and Nhu:
		A)	Left South Vietnam for exile under a promise of safe conduct.
		B)	Were brutally murdered in the back of an armored personnel carrier.
		C)	Fled from South Vietnam with the help of sympathetic American officials such as Ambassador Lodge.
		D)	Committed accidental suicide.
		E)	Escaped into the jungles of South Vietnam to join the National Liberation Front.
23
		
During his time as president, John F. Kennedy:
		A)	Reduced America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		B)	Neither increased nor reduced substantially America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		C)	Set in motion a plan for a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam.
		D)	Increased America's commitment to South Vietnam dramatically and bequeathed to Lyndon Johnson a problem far more dangerous than the one he had inherited.
		E)	Bravely pursued a neutralist solution to the problem of South Vietnam at great political cost.



Chapter 4 

At its Ninth Plenum held in December 1963, the North Vietnamese Central Committee decided to:
		A)	Order the National Liberation Front (NLF) to increase political and military attacks on the South Vietnamese government.
		B)	Increase the infiltration of men to South Vietnam.
		C)	Commit People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) regular units to the war in South Vietnam.
		D)	Gamble that a quick move could result in the rapid collapse of South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
2
		
In his first formal statement of Vietnam policy, National Security Council Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273, Lyndon Johnson:
		A)	Candidly acknowledged that the situation in South Vietnam was a civil war, but still called on the U.S. to assist the South Vietnamese government.
		B)	Ordered a total reevaluation of American involvement in South Vietnam.
		C)	Maintained steadfastly that South Vietnam was the victim of an externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy, and made defeating that menace America's central objective in South Vietnam.
		D)	Continued American support for the Saigon government, but ordered preparations for American air attacks on Hanoi if necessary.
		E)	All of the above.
3
		
The military junta that overthrew the Diem regime:
		A)	Vigorously prosecuted the war with the NLF.
		B)	Worked harmoniously and aggressively to establish an effective government.
		C)	Sought to expand the role of American advisors.
		D)	Energetically promoted democracy in South Vietnam.
		E)	Was overthrown on January 29, 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh.
4
		
Upon taking office, President Johnson:
		A)	Viewed Vietnam as an exciting challenge that he could use to establish his legacy and secure election in 1964.
		B)	Saw Vietnam as a minor problem easily solved through more efficient management.
		C)	Perceived Vietnam to be an unwanted intrusion that he had to deal with lest it interfere with his ambitious domestic political agenda.
		D)	Brought in new top-level foreign policy advisors to replace policymakers such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who had orchestrated Kennedy's Vietnam policy.
5
		
President Johnson refused to grant a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) request for direct American air and ground operations in early 1964 because:
		A)	He felt that direct American participation in the conflict would lead the South Vietnamese to let the United States fight the war for them.
		B)	He had little enthusiasm for getting involved in a land war in Asia.
		C)	Such a course would threaten his ambitious social agenda.
		D)	American participation in Vietnam would result in hostile propaganda throughout the world.
		E)	All of the above.
6
		
Approved on March 17, 1964, National Security Council Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288:
		A)	Called for a reappraisal of policy that sharply if temporarily slowed America's growing involvement in Vietnam.
		B)	Laid the groundwork for direct American participation in South Vietnam.
		C)	Restated America's goal of preventing South Vietnam from falling to Communism, and called for a program to put that nation on a war footing.
		D)	Raised the possibility of neutralizing South Vietnam through diplomacy.
7
		
President Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf incident to:
		A)	Press for a complete reappraisal of America's Vietnam policy.
		B)	Begin a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam.
		C)	Bring alleged North Vietnamese aggression to the attention of the United Nations.
		D)	Win Congressional approval of a resolution authorizing him to use American forces in Vietnam.
8
		
Hanoi responded to the Tonkin Gulf incident by:
		A)	Ordering PAVN units to move into South Vietnam to support a planned final drive for victory scheduled for the spring of 1965.
		B)	Pursuing negotiations in hopes of unifying Vietnam peacefully.
		C)	Ordering the NLF to scale back its activities in South Vietnam so as to prevent further bombing raids on North Vietnam.
		D)	Launching air attacks against American aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf.
9
		
President Johnson opposed escalating the war in the fall of 1964 because:
		A)	His political position was sufficiently secure that he could resist hawkish calls for increased American involvement.
		B)	The establishment of a sufficiently stable and strong government in South Vietnam rendered that course unnecessary.
		C)	Guerilla aggression in South Vietnam had abated as a result of a Communist peace offensive.
		D)	He believed that the South Vietnamese government was far too weak to handle an expanded war at that time.
10
		
Undersecretary of State George Ball objected to air attacks against North Vietnam for all of the following reasons EXCEPT:
		A)	Bombing would not likely improve morale in South Vietnam.
		B)	North Vietnam might respond with a strategic air offensive of its own.
		C)	Hanoi could counter by sending its well-trained soldiers into South Vietnam.
		D)	Bombing would not likely force Hanoi to yield to American wishes.
		E)	Air attacks might prompt Communist China to intervene in support of North Vietnam.
11
		
In December 1964, President Johnson approved:
		A)	A massive commitment of American troops to combat operations in South Vietnam.
		B)	An immediate naval blockade of North Vietnam.
		C)	A two-phase plan that called for the limited bombing of North Vietnam and Laos followed by a large-scale air offensive and a naval blockade.
		D)	Secret negotiations designed to end America's unlimited commitment to South Vietnam.
12
		
The February 1965 National Liberation Front attack on a U.S. Army barracks in Pleiku:
		A)	Served as a convenient pretext for the Johnson Administration to begin the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.
		B)	Awoke American officials to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and to the necessity of quickly expanding American involvement.
		C)	Spurred the Administration to begin an open, public debate over its Vietnam policy.
		D)	Led LBJ to contemplate reducing America's commitment to South Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
13
		
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected strongly to General William Westmoreland's urgent, February 1965 request in for the deployment of American Marines to protect the air base at Danang because of his:
		A)	Strong feeling that the U.S. needed to commit a substantially larger force to South Vietnam.
		B)	Belief that the deployment would discourage aggressive action by South Vietnamese troops.
		C)	Opposition to the use of American troops in the defense of static positions.
		D)	Fears that the deployment would put the U.S. on a slippery slope leading inevitably to more and larger deployments.
14
		
Taylor's enclave strategy:
		A)	Proposed a limited commitment of American forces to coastal base areas designed to prevent a quick Communist victory and to give South Vietnam time to build up its forces.
		B)	Marked a step back from large-scale involvement.
		C)	Was self-consciously designed to spur further American intervention.
		D)	Called for aggressive offensive actions in the strategic Central Highlands.
		E)	All of the above.
15
		
President Johnson opposed basing American intervention in South Vietnam on a declaration of war because:
		A)	He believed that following such a course might trigger a Chinese or Soviet response.
		B)	He felt that a declaration of war would undermine his domestic Great Society reform program.
		C)	He and his advisors believed that foreign policy concerns were too complicated and important to be left to public debate.
		D)	He feared that a declaration of war might fuel public demands for an unlimited war against North Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
16
		
In the spring of 1965, the Johnson Administration sought to blunt criticism of its Vietnam policy through all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Withdrawing troops from South Vietnam.
		B)	Making dramatic peace initiatives such as Johnson's April 7, 1965, speech at Johns Hopkins University.
		C)	Organizing seminars on college campuses at which officials could present the Administration's case.
		D)	Approving a five-day bombing halt.
		E)	Inviting foreign leaders, newspaper editors, and congressmen to the White House to discuss the Administration's Vietnam policy.
17
		
In May 1965, a new government came to power in South Vietnam headed by:
		A)	Ngo Dinh Nhu.
		B)	Phan Huy Quat.
		C)	Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu.
		D)	Nguyen Chanh Thi.
		E)	Bui Diem.
18
		
George Ball opposed committing American troops to offensive operations in the summer of 1965 by raising all of the following objections EXCEPT:
		A)	His doubts that the U.S. could defeat the enemy.
		B)	His belief that the U.S. could effect a favorable diplomatic solution through a summit with Soviet leader Alexei Kosygin.
		C)	His assertion that direct military involvement would lead to a long war and would result in an open-ended American commitment.
		D)	His belief that once committed, the U.S. could not retreat from Vietnam without suffering a humiliating diplomatic loss of face.
		E)	His contention that even intervention on a massive scale could not force Hanoi to negotiate.
19
		
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara justified committing American ground troops to offensive operations in the summer of 1965 by arguing that doing so would:
		A)	Quickly and decisively defeat the Communists.
		B)	Overawe the Communists, who would surrender rather than face defeat at the hands of the mighty American military.
		C)	Avert immediate defeat, and have a pretty good chance of creating conditions conducive to a favorable solution in the future.
		D)	Cost the U.S. nothing, while mollifying domestic critics who were calling for decisive action.
20
		
LBJ's decision in July 1965 to commit American troops to offensive operations and to expand the air war constituted:
		A)	A minor escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.
		B)	A limited step based on the assumption that no further escalation would be necessary.
		C)	A cunningly devised ploy to divide Hanoi and Beijing.
		D)	An open-ended commitment that cleared the way for the U.S. to take the lead in fighting the war.
21
		
LBJ accompanied his decision to authorize offensive American military operations in South Vietnam with:
		A)	A low-key announcement designed to avoid whipping up public opinion.
		B)	A mobilization of the reserves and a call up of the National Guard.
		C)	A declaration of national emergency aimed at building popular support for war.
		D)	A tax increase designed to pay for the war.
		E)	A congressional resolution formally endorsing his decision.


Chapter 5

The United States' approach to fighting the Vietnam War:
		A)	Brilliantly related American military power to the central task of building an effective South Vietnamese government.
		B)	Was consciously designed to inflict the maximum number of civilian deaths possible.
		C)	Was never appropriate for the war because the U.S. merely assumed that applying its superior military power would achieve victory.
		D)	Was more political than military in nature.
		E)	Greatly overestimated North Vietnam's military strength.
2
		
The Rolling Thunder bombing campaign:
		A)	Had no impact on North Vietnam.
		B)	Crippled North Vietnam's well-developed munitions industry through massive strikes.
		C)	Caused a staggering $6 billion in damage.
		D)	Had little impact on North Vietnam, but completely disrupted the infiltration of men and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
		E)	Inflicted about $600 million in damage to North Vietnam.
3
		
The Johnson Administration's decision to pursue a gradualist approach to the air war permitted North Vietnam to do all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Establish a large munitions industry.
		B)	Build a powerful air defense system.
		C)	Implement alternative transportation systems.
		D)	Protect critical resources.
		E)	Persist in the war despite the damage the U.S. was inflicting.
4
		
The USSR began to provide North Vietnam with substantial military assistance beginning in 1965 because:
		A)	It hoped to tie the U.S. down in Southeast Asia so that unopposed Soviet forces could pursue opportunities in Europe and the Middle East.
		B)	An American defeat in Southeast Asia would set the stage for a real thaw in the Cold War.
		C)	Moscow wished to prevent America from establishing a strong position on the border of its close fraternal ally, China.
		D)	Assistance to North Vietnam would prove Soviet credibility in the face of hostile Chinese propaganda and give the USSR the chance to test new weapon systems.
		E)	All of the above.
5
		
Beijing assisted North Vietnam in its war with the U.S. by:
		A)	Having its fighter aircraft intercept American attack planes over the Tonkin Gulf.
		B)	Sending "volunteers" to join People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units fighting in South Vietnam.
		C)	Providing huge amounts of supplies and munitions and by deploying 320,000 troops to help North Vietnam rebuild and defend its transportation network.
		D)	Having Chinese divisions engage American Marines along the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
		E)	Threatening to invade Taiwan.
6
		
The Rolling Thunder air war did all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Result in the loss of over 950 American aircraft between 1965 and 1968.
		B)	Stop the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
		C)	Provide Hanoi with American hostages in the form of downed airmen.
		D)	Cost the United States $9.60 for each $1 of damage inflicted.
		E)	Give Hanoi a tremendous propaganda advantage.
7
		
Through his Search and Destroy strategy, General William Westmoreland:
		A)	Abandoned the U.S. Army's traditional, conventional approach to warfare in favor of a small-unit counterinsurgency strategy.
		B)	Sought to lure North Vietnamese units into populated areas where the U.S. could easily effect their destruction.
		C)	Pursued a typical, conventional strategy designed to eliminate the military threat to South Vietnam by locating and destroying North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) units.
		D)	Avoided engaging enemy main force units in favor of police activities designed to uproot and destroy the NLF's political apparatus.
		E)	Launched a conventional, tank-led invasion across the DMZ into North Vietnam.
8
		
President Lyndon Johnson's "many flags" campaign to secure troop commitments to Vietnam from America's Pacific allies:
		A)	Was a resounding success that resulted in large numbers of allied troops joining American forces in South Vietnam.
		B)	Met with outright hostility from previously steadfast allies such as Thailand, Australia, and South Korea.
		C)	Was publicly supported by American allies, but did not result in the commitment of any soldiers.
		D)	Was a disappointment that resulted in the deployment of only 71,000 troops.
		E)	All of the above.
9
		
American forces used which of the following in Vietnam:
		A)	IBM computers programmed to predict when and where the enemy would attack.
		B)	Defoliants such as Agent Orange designed to destroy the dense jungle that provided the enemy with cover.
		C)	Massive air support including napalm and B-52 raids.
		D)	Huge amounts of artillery fire.
		E)	All of the above.
10
		
From 1965 to 1968, North Vietnam:
		A)	Matched American escalations by sending more troops south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and by maintaining the military pressure so as to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. units.
		B)	Sought to engage in traditional, set-piece battles in which its forces could decisively defeat the Americans.
		C)	Proved unable to match the massive American escalation that took place between 1965 and 1968.
		D)	Sought to minimize combat with the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces so as to keep its casualties down.
		E)	All of the above.
11
		
The principle index the United States used to chart success in Vietnam was:
		A)	The movement of the front line and the capture of key geographical objectives.
		B)	A sophisticated measurement of the proportion of South Vietnamese peasants who were loyal to the Saigon government.
		C)	The strength and stability of the South Vietnamese government.
		D)	The "body count."
		E)	All of the above.
12
		
The American attrition strategy:
		A)	Was so destructive that North Vietnam proved unable to replace its losses and thus could not match American escalation.
		B)	Quickly turned the tide and gave the United States the strategic advantage.
		C)	Permitted General Westmoreland to put the enemy on the defensive and thereby allowed him to shift forces to the key task of pacification.
		D)	Rapidly decimated the critical NLF political infrastructure.
		E)	Proved able to achieve no more than a stalemate.
13
		
With the Americanization of the war in 1965, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):
		A)	Became more dependent than ever on the U.S.
		B)	Underwent a period of intensive retooling from which it emerged stronger than ever.
		C)	Was divided into small units that were then integrated into the American command under a system pioneered during the Korean War.
		D)	Shrank dramatically in size to become a highly mobile, elite striking force.
		E)	Undertook a series of spoiler attacks into North Vietnam that threw the enemy off balance.
14
		
In 1966, Nguyen Cao Ky solidified his political position by:
		A)	Having Nguyen Van Thieu assassinated.
		B)	Secretly negotiating with the NLF.
		C)	Holding and winning legitimate, free elections.
		D)	Sending South Vietnamese Marines to Da Nang to put down a Buddhist rebellion.
		E)	All of the above.
15
		
The Revolutionary Development (RD) program suffered from all of the following EXCEPT:
		A)	Difficulties recruiting sufficient personnel.
		B)	Attacks on RD cadre by NLF guerrillas.
		C)	Bureaucratic problems and insufficient funding.
		D)	Boorish behavior by nearby ARVN units that undercut the program's good work.
		E)	The efforts of top South Vietnamese officials to turn the RD program into a conduit for lucrative diamond smuggling.
16
		
The Americanization of the war that began in 1965:
		A)	Made an estimated 4 million Vietnamese refugees in their own country.
		B)	Fueled severe crime and corruption.
		C)	Led to an explosion of prostitution and to the creation of seedy bar districts.
		D)	Undermined South Vietnam's fragile economy.
		E)	All of the above.
17
		
North Vietnam's diplomatic position—the Four Points—conditioned negotiations on:
		A)	The rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from all of Southeast Asia, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, free elections, and amnesty for all NLF members.
		B)	A development loan of $2 billion dollars, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, American acceptance of Peaceful Coexistence, and the end of the strategic hamlet program.
		C)	The withdrawal of American troops form South Vietnam, the end of all acts of war against North Vietnam, the dismantling of American bases, and the resolution of South Vietnam's internal affairs on the basis of the NLF's program.
		D)	The immediate reunification of Vietnam.
		E)	All of the above.
18
		
Antiwar liberals opposed American participation in the war for all of the following reasons EXCEPT:
		A)	Their belief that the employment of weapons such as napalm was inhumane.
		B)	Their conviction that America had betrayed its bedrock principles by supporting a corrupt and repressive regime in South Vietnam.
		C)	Their conclusion that U.S. escalation violated a number of international agreements including the United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords.
		D)	Their doubts in the validity of the domino theory on which the Johnson Administration justified intervention.
		E)	Their belief that the war was but the latest example of the way in which American capitalism brutally exploited people all across the globe.
19
		
According to the author, the antiwar movement:
		A)	Failed to turn the American people against the war, but did compel a debate that eventually led policymakers and the public to give serious consideration to ending American involvement in Vietnam.
		B)	Almost single-handedly forced the U.S. to deescalate its involvement in Vietnam.
		C)	Turned the American people against the war and thus encouraged a wavering North Vietnamese government to press on toward victory.
		D)	Had no impact whatsoever on the course of the war.
		E)	Divided America to the point that a civil war nearly erupted in the summer of 1967.
20
		
In the summer of 1967, General William Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
		A)	Admitted that their program had failed and consequently called for a return to the enclave strategy.
		B)	Asked for 200,000 additional troops, a limited call up of the reserves, and an escalation of the war that would include operations in Laos and across the DMZ into North Vietnam.
		C)	Demanded a declaration of war designed to rally the American people behind continued involvement.
		D)	Asked President Johnson to seek a diplomatic solution to the war.
		E)	Resigned to protest the President's refusal to call up the reserves or provide the troops they believed necessary to achieve victory.
21
		
By the summer of 1967, the chief opponent in the Johnson Administration to the continuation of the Vietnam War was:
		A)	Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
		B)	Vice President Hubert Humphrey.
		C)	Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles.
		D)	Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
		E)	Senator Robert Kennedy.
22
		
The San Antonio peace formula:
		A)	Conditioned America's willingness to negotiate on the prior withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam.
		B)	Indicated Washington's willingness to pull all of its troops out of South Vietnam in exchange for the start of meaningful negotiations.
		C)	Made clear America's willingness to stop the bombing campaign "with the understanding" that meaningful discussions would follow and that Hanoi would not exploit the cessation to accelerate infiltration into the south.
		D)	Amounted to a complete repudiation of Washington's prior goal of maintaining a non-Communist South Vietnam.
		E)	Was designed to appease the antiwar movement at home and did not reflect a meaningful change in America's bargaining position.
23
		
The CIA's Operation CHAOS:
		A)	Was illegal and a violation of the agency's charter.
		B)	Uncovered links between Hanoi and the peace movement.
		C)	Provided overwhelming evidence that most major antiwar groups were under the direct control of the USSR.
		D)	Was an ugly but necessary action during time of war.
		E)	Effectively broke the back of the NLF's political organization in the Mekong Delta.