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The White House Tape Recordings,
February to July 1971
A Guide to the Major Themes and Personalities

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It is possible, when listening to the recorded segments made during the first six months of the White House taping system, to discern the major issues that confronted President Nixon and the members of his Administration. The greatest concerns of the Administration at this time can be classified into three overall categories: the effort to end the Vietnam War in a manner that best safeguarded both U.S. interests and the continued existence of the Republic of South Vietnam; the effort to develop and pursue a foreign policy that advanced the cause of peace worldwide; and the effort to develop a domestic policy that would serve the best interests of a diverse people.

All users of White House recordings should bear in mind that they do not tell the complete story about any of the policy matters and other subjects that are discussed. President Nixon transmitted many, if not most, of his important decisions in written form, particularly in foreign policy. In his conversations with colleagues, aides, and friends, he is frequently engaged in give-and-take that was part of his decision-making process. Accordingly the content of the tapes must always be weighed against the documentary record, participants' memoirs, and other sources.

II. VIETNAM WAR

The conversations captured on tape regarding the conflict in Vietnam may be divided into six categories.

1) One category involves the prosecution of the war itself. On January 18, 1971, President Nixon, at a meeting of the National Security Council, decided that U.S. Army helicopters and aircraft would provide tactical, strategic, and transportation support to troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam for an incursion into the southern part of Laos. (Since the President had stated to Congress the year before that no ground troops would be used in Laos henceforth, American forces were not used in such a capacity.)

This operation, which had as its objective the severance of the main North Vietnamese supply line through Laos, was termed Lam Son 619, and was launched on February 8, 1971. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger regarded the operation as an important test of the readiness of the South Vietnamese army to defend its people as part of the Vietnamization program, and during February and March he discussed the progress of the operation with the President on numerous occasions. Although the operation scored some successes in the first few weeks, North Vietnamese forces, employing Soviet-built tanks and other armor for the first time in the war, ultimately forced ARVN forces to retreat. Media coverage of this withdrawal tended to emphasize its disorderly aspects, although it was the President's view that the operation had achieved its goal of preventing a North Vietnamese offensive into South Vietnam during 1971. In these recordings the

President often expresses his view that American newspaper and TV correspondents in Southeast Asia are deliberately slanting the coverage in a fashion that embarrasses the Administration.

After the end of March, the main concern in the taped conversations, so far as the operational aspects of the war are concerned, involve the timing of withdrawal of U.S. forces, specifically the withdrawal of 100,000 U.S. troops, to be conducted between May 1 and December 1, 1971, announced by the President in his April 7, 1971 speech on the war.

2) The second category concerns the status of the Paris peace negotiations, in which the policy of the Nixon Administration was consistently to seek an end to hostilities in such a fashion as to safeguard the continued existence of the South Vietnamese state while making it possible for American troops and POWs to come home. In February 1971, the Paris talks concerning the conclusion of hostilities in Vietnam had been under way for over two years; since July 1 of the previous year David K. E. Bruce had been head of the American delegation to the talks. The North Vietnamese demands in these talks, as presented by Xuan Thuy, the leader of that nation's delegation, had changed very little since they began. Apart from these formal discussions, however, Dr. Kissinger was maintaining his contacts with Le Duc Tho, a member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, and frequently meeting secretly with the latter in Paris. Although little had emerged from these contacts prior to February 1971, during the months covered in the taped segments, Dr. Kissinger began to feel increasingly hopeful that a peace settlement could be reached sometime in 1972. The two major sticking points in these confidential talks concerned the matter of the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the status of U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were insisting on a unilateral and complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, and were not offering a definite figure on how many prisoners of war were being held by them, nor were they providing any guarantee of the release of the POWs if their other terms were met.

Despite calls from many antiwar politicians for a definite date to be set for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, the President, during the period under discussion, was refusing to set a date, feeling that to do so would deprive the United States of the single strongest bargaining chip in the negotiations and would disincline the North Vietnamese to make any guarantee of the release of the POWs. This concern is spoken of frequently by the President in these segments. During the period covered in these segments, various ways to bring about the conditions necessary for a settlement are discussed; one unusual alternative, based on a proposal from some officials of the International Red Cross, involved the transportation of U.S. and North Vietnamese POWs to a third country until such time as a settlement was reached. The President frequently notes, in his conversations, that many North Vietnamese POWs are reluctant to return to their own nation – a fact that had hindered the implementation of prisoner exchanges.

3) A third category concerns the policy of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam, itself. During the period covered by the taped conversations, elections had been set for October in South Vietnam. In the conversations between the President

and Dr. Kissinger concerning the elections, two matters are of greatest concern: that the election be conducted along free and democratic lines and that the largest possible number of the South Vietnamese electorate participate in the election, in order to disprove the charges of North Vietnam that the government in the South was a puppet imposed by the United States. It was the personal view of the President that the incumbent President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, was the candidate best suited to guide the nation through the immediate future. However, he considered it essential that the United States not favor one candidate over another, and that the people of South Vietnam make their own decision in the election.

4) The fourth category that may be discerned in the conversations concerns the debate within the United States over continued American involvement in the war. One event that had a bearing on this debate was the Mansfield Amendment. On May 11, 1971, the majority leader of the U.S. Senate, Mike Mansfield, offered, as an amendment to a bill that provided for a two-year extension of the draft, a proposal to decrease by half the number of American military personnel stationed in Europe. Although Mansfield had offered such legislation in the past, it had been in the form of a "sense of the Senate" resolution. The Mansfield Amendment, in the form in which it appeared in 1971, would have been effective upon passage of the draft-extension law. The concern that the President and his Administration, especially Dr. Kissinger, had about this law was twofold. First, they were concerned that its passage would be seen by the North Vietnamese as evidence that the United States was entering an isolationist phase and would soon end involvement in Vietnam unilaterally, whether or not the North Vietnamese made any concessions. The second concern was that passage of the Mansfield Amendment might start a trend that would subsequently result in the enactment by Congress of a law that would specifically mandate the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam by a specific date. Dr. Kissinger therefore contacted Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, who quietly lobbied for defeat of the Amendment. Several conversations concern a modified form of the Mansfield Amendment, offered by Sen. Charles Mathias, which would have made a cutback in U.S. forces in Europe optional. Though the Mathias Amendment had the support of some figures in the Administration who thought its passage would assuage opponents of the war, the President and Dr. Kissinger ultimately decided that it would be best if Congress voted the original Mansfield Amendment up or down. The Mansfield Amendment was ultimately defeated.

5) Opposition to the war, of course, was not limited to the halls of Congress. During March and April 1971, various organizations opposed to the war, coordinated by former Chicago Seven defendant Rennie Davis and several associates, made plans for a massive demonstration against the war in Washington during the first week in May. Of the several organizations involved, one of the most prominent was Vietnam Veterans Against The War, led by John Kerry. (One noteworthy aspect of the taped conversations concerns White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman's evaluation of Kerry's appearances on television; Haldeman notes Kerry's ability to field questions and make a point, and predicts a future in politics for the man who subsequently was elected to the U.S. Senate.) A number of conversations in these tapes, most already transcribed by the Archives for

use as exhibits in the case of *Dellums v. Powell*, concern these demonstrations. There was worry among some figures in the Administration that these demonstrations might significantly disrupt the ability of Federal employees to get to and from work. A number of conversations among the President, Haldeman, chief domestic advisor John D. Ehrlichman, and Attorney General John Mitchell concern the efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, in coordination with the Capitol Police and other law-enforcement groups, to safeguard the city during a weekend that saw considerable vandalism and disorder from the rowdier element among the demonstrators.

A matter covered on the tapes of considerable relevance to the debate on the war involves the conclusion of the trial of Army First Lt. William Calley, Jr, on charges of murdering Vietnamese civilians at My Lai in 1968. On March 29, 1971, Lt. Calley was found guilty at court-martial of the charges and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. During the court-martial, debate raged in many American households as to whether the lieutenant was a war criminal or a soldier acting no differently than other Americans had in extreme situations in other wars. Following announcement of the verdict, telegrams reaching the White House objected to the severity of Lt. Calley's punishment by a margin of nearly 100 to 1, and opinion polls showed a lower percentage, though still a majority, of the public at large felt the same way. The President announced, on April 1, that he would make no decision on the sentence until it reached him in the natural course of the appeal process, but announced that the lieutenant would be confined to quarters, rather than in the stockade, during the appeals process. The tapes show the President and his advisors evaluating the response to this decision, which was widely criticized in the media but generally quelled the furore of the American public on the matter. (In 1974, the President reviewed Lt. Calley's appeal, which by then had resulted in a reduction of the sentence to ten years, but took no action; at the end of the year the lieutenant was paroled.)

6) Finally, among these conversations, the events surrounding the publication by the *New York Times* of what came to be called the Pentagon Papers constitute a category of its own. On June 13, 1971, the *Times* began to publish a series of articles which included substantial excerpts from what was identified as a 7000-page report featuring numerous documents, examining the causes of American involvement in Vietnam, that had been prepared in the Department of Defense and given a high classification of secrecy. As soon as publication began, the matter generated considerable concern from the President, Dr. Kissinger, and other members of the Administration. The immediate concern was that the release of the papers might affect the ability of the Administration to reach a settlement of the war. Both Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers frequently noted that overseas governments, disturbed by the *Times's* publication of portions of diplomatic communications that appeared in the Papers, had questioned whether the American government's guarantees of diplomatic confidentiality could be relied on any more. There were also worries that if the person who had given the Papers to the *Times* were to go unpunished, other present or former government employees would be encouraged to leak classified documents with impunity.

Within a few days, the person who had given the *Times* the papers was identified as Daniel Ellsberg, who had served in the Johnson Administration as an advisor on

Vietnam, and had briefly been part of the NSA in the early days of the Nixon Administration. (Dr. Kissinger, who had taught Ellsberg at Harvard, comments on Ellsberg's intellectual brilliance in these conversations, while observing that such ability made his action all the more egregious.) After conferences between the President and Attorney General Mitchell, the Department of Justice sought an injunction in the courts to prevent further publication of the Papers in the *Times*, and took steps to prosecute Ellsberg. While a Los Angeles grand jury indicted Ellsberg on June 28, the Supreme Court, a few weeks after, decided the case in favor of the New York *Times*, primarily on the grounds that the government had failed to show that the national security had been damaged by the release of the material in the Papers.

In the recorded conversations regarding the documents, the President frequently returns to certain points he wants members of the Administration to make in informal conversations and briefings of the press and others. (The Attorney General's action in the courts precluded the Administration from publicly commenting on the documents.) One of these points is that the contents of the documents do not concern the events of the Vietnam War during his Administration, but focus on the events of the Kennedy and Johnson period. (During the first days after publication of the materials, before the name "Pentagon Papers" was adopted by the media, the President suggests the term "Kennedy-Johnson Papers" be used to describe them.)

Another point President Nixon speaks of is that the documents may be said to be "stolen goods," since Ellsberg had photocopied them and moved the copies from a secure facility, and transferred them to a third party without permission. He also suggests that the point be made that the release of the Papers encourages the North Vietnamese government to stall in negotiations, in the expectation that American morale will be diminished by their contents, and therefore prolongs the war. Finally, the President notes that if the government takes no action against Ellsberg and the *Times*, anyone in the government who disagrees with Administration policy will be encouraged to leak with impunity.

One issue arising from the publication of the Pentagon Papers that would have enormous consequences during the remainder of the Administration had to do with the President's view that Daniel Ellsberg was just one of several individuals in and out of the government who were determined to leak classified materials in order to turn public opinion against the Administration's policies. One area of special concern, covered in the tapes during July, was the discovery that an aide of HEW Secretary Elliott L. Richardson's had, when working at the State Department, made it possible for Ellsberg to have access to classified documents during 1970. Since President Nixon regarded it as imperative that actual leakers be tracked down and possible leakers be identified, he asked John Ehrlichman to organize a unit in charge of such matters. Ehrlichman selected Egil "Bud" Krogh to head the unit, which ultimately came to be known as the Plumbers. The tapes show, however, that Krogh, even after being asked to head the unit, spent far more of his time in the Oval Office discussing his work on the war against drugs than he did on this matter. In fact, the tapes find Charles W. Colson, assistant to the president, discussing the work of the unit primarily to the extent of recommending that E. Howard

Hunt, a fellow alumnus of Brown University, assist in its operations. The work of the Plumbers in protecting the security of classified materials was balanced by the President's directive that an extensive effort be made to identify and declassify material in documents that no longer constituted national-security secrets. It was the view of the President that various figures in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought to distort the record of his own Administration on the war in order to divert attention from their own actions and mistakes as depicted in such documents as the Pentagon Papers. He sought to bring about a situation where an objective assessment of the foreign-policy record of the last thirty years, particularly regarding Vietnam, could be conducted as early as possible.

III. FOREIGN POLICY

The most important foreign policy development to come from the Nixon White House between February and July 1971 was, of course, the opening to China. Second in order of importance among the foreign policy matters discussed on tape are the ongoing talks with the Soviet Union that culminated in the SALT agreement, and the US-Soviet summit of the following year. The other conversations involving foreign policy most frequently focus on the impact of international trade and monetary matters on relations between the United States and other nations, notably a conflict between Japan and the United States on textile matters.

CHINA

In the beginning of the six-month period that the tapes cover, President Nixon, when referring to China, tends to be cautious in conversation, though he gives some indication of what he and Dr. Kissinger were working on. The Foreign Policy Report of the President to Congress, issued on February 25, 1971 (nine days after the taping system was implemented), marked the first time that the People's Republic of China was referred to by its official name in a Presidential document. In conversations during the following days, the President and Dr. Kissinger discuss the official statements of the Chinese regarding the United States and note the subtle change in their tone. Although, during February and March, the President and his national security advisor also discuss the back-channel communications received from the Chinese via the Pakistani government, a considerable amount of this material is still classified for national security reasons.

On March 4, 1971, President Nixon stated at a press conference that "we will not proceed with a policy of normalizing relations with Communist China if the cost of such a policy is to expel Taiwan from the family of nations." Then, on March 15, 1971, the President took the step of formally lifting the ban on travel by Americans to the PRC (though the State Department had been authorizing travel on a case-by-case basis since the previous year).

On April 6, 1971, the United States table-tennis team, led by Graham B. Steenhoven, was

extended an invitation to visit the PRC at the conclusion of a tournament the team was playing in Japan. The taped conversations make clear that the Nixon White House was surprised but pleased by the suddenness of this development.

On April 12, Taiwanese Ambassador Chow Shu-kai visited the Oval Office. Though a considerable amount of his remarks are still deleted on national-security grounds at the insistence of the U.S. government, the degree to which he was dismayed by the lifting of the travel ban and “ping-pong diplomacy” is still evident on tape, though President Nixon did his best to assure the diplomat that the American commitment to protect Taiwan’s security continued. Shortly afterward, Mrs. Anna Chennault, a Chinese-born American businesswoman with close ties to Chiang Kai-shek and other Taiwanese leaders, visits the Oval Office, and the President repeats his assurances.

On April 14, following an exhibition match between the American and Chinese teams in Beijing, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai hosted a reception for the Americans during which the Chinese team accepted an invitation from Steenhoven and his fellow players to visit the United States. Following the return of the team, the President and several of his advisors met Steenhoven, and the tapes record their high regard for the team leader’s ability and tact in handling the trip.

The taped conversations reflect the rapid developments of the next few days. By the morning of April 16, several U.S. Senators, including Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott, were publicly speaking of visiting the PRC. On the same day, the President, speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, observed that during the previous Easter Sunday, in conversation with Julie and David Eisenhower, Tricia Nixon, and her fiancée Edward Cox, he had expressed the hope that they could soon visit China. As RN put it to the editors: “I hope they do; in fact, I hope sometime I do.”

Finally, on April 16, Zhou Enlai sent a secret dispatch to the President, via Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, proposing that the United States send a high-level emissary to Beijing. The tapes record President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger initially discussing the prospect of sending Gov. Nelson Rockefeller or Ambassador David K.E. Bruce for such a meeting. It was then decided, as history records, that Dr. Kissinger be the emissary. But it should be noted that almost all the recorded material concerning the procedure for his trip to Beijing, via Pakistan, is still classified at the insistence of the U.S. government, and that several important conversations concerning the matter were conducted outside the Oval Office – for example, the very first conversation between the President and Dr. Kissinger regarding Zhou’s message was held in the Lincoln Sitting Room. Thus, the taped record of the conversations leading up to Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking, in its public form, is still somewhat incomplete, while several conversations subsequent to the visit include national-security deletions regarding the arrangements and transportation used in the trip.

The tapes, however, do shed considerable light on President Nixon’s approach to facilitating the success of Dr. Kissinger’s secret trip. On July 1, 1971, the National Security Advisor left for Asia. On July 6, the President, during a speech otherwise

devoted to domestic matters in Kansas City, delivered extempore remarks regarding China which were intended to signal to the Chinese that the United States was ready to expand the opening to the PRC well beyond what previous American statements had indicated.

One interesting aspect caught by the White House taping system involves Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. In mid-April, the Vice-President had expressed his skepticism to the press about the ping-pong team's impending visit. The President was dismayed by his remarks. By the following month, however, Vice President Agnew had changed his attitude about travel to China to the extent, just prior to a round-the-world trip beginning in the Far East, of asking for White House assistance in arranging a secret trip to Beijing, though Taiwan was already on the Vice Presidential schedule. The recordings capture President Nixon's incredulity at this news.

Finally, the tapes show that the overall purpose of Dr. Kissinger's mission, and President Nixon's planned trip to China, was always to end the isolation of 800 million people and their government before the consequences of this isolation became impossible to reverse. The President makes this point time and again. Two other purposes for the opening to the PRC should be noted, however. One purpose involves the hope that the thawing of US-Chinese relations will motivate the Soviet Union to be less recalcitrant in its stand toward missile and weapons negotiations. In fact, the response of the Soviet Union to each step in the China opening is carefully examined by the President, Secretary Rogers, and Dr. Kissinger. Another concern captured on tape is the settlement of the Vietnam war; the hope is expressed by both the President and Dr. Kissinger that the Chinese may be able to exercise some influence on North Vietnam to reach a peace agreement sooner rather than later.

THE SOVIET UNION

The most important issue regarding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] during this period, as recorded on the White House taping system, involved the two-pronged effort to secure a strategic arms limitation agreement and to bring about a summit meeting between President Nixon and the leader of the Soviet Union. During March 1971, not long after White House taping began, it became clear, during the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that that nation's leader in charge of foreign policy was Leonid Brezhnev.

The tapes show that President Nixon, when directing American policy toward the USSR, relied to a great extent on the conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that took place several times a week and at times almost daily. The conversations, as recounted by Dr. Kissinger, show how he and Dobrynin used them to get a "feel" for how each nation stood on particular issues. Once or twice monthly, the President himself would meet with Dobrynin. From the beginning of April onward, as noted above, the President and Dr. Kissinger are at pains to assure Dobrynin that the American opening to China is not intended to impinge on the security of the

Soviet state.

The basis of the American approach in the arms field, throughout the February to July 1971 period, concerns the two points stressed by President Nixon in his January 27, 1969 press conference: strategic “sufficiency” in nuclear weapons, so far as the United States is concerned, and “linkage” – that is, the need to arms discussions to simultaneously deal with the number of offensive and defensive weapons in question. The American proposal for arms control involved Mutual Balanced Force Reduction – the idea that reduction in the number of weapons on both sides would involve each weapon eliminated by one side to be balanced by an equal reduction on the other side. The Soviet Union, during most of this period, was intransigent on the linkage question, insisting that discussions of offensive and defensive weapons be kept separate, if such discussions were to occur at all. During May 1971, however, the government of the USSR, following a message sent from President Nixon directly to Brezhnev, agreed to an arrangement where arms control negotiations, rather than dealing only with mutual Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] limitations as had previously been the case, be expanded to cover both offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, tentative arrangements were made for President Nixon to visit Moscow in September 1971. As history records, just as Dr. Kissinger was overseas and preparing to visit China, the Soviet government decided to postpone the President’s visit until May 1972. After the China trip was announced, the Soviets, in an effort to minimize the impact of the journey to Beijing, sought to have the earlier date for the Moscow trip reinstated, but in vain, and the announcement of the date for the historic summit -- the first visit by a U.S. President to the Soviet Union -- was finally made in October 1971.

One area of interest on the tapes involves President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger’s assessment of the talents of the Soviets as negotiators. They agree that the Soviet approach in diplomacy tends toward the crude, peremptory and clumsy, heavy on the use of ultimatums, and note that the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris favor much the same style. By contrast, as Dr. Kissinger notes, the Chinese are unfailingly polite and subtle, though even more determined than the Russians to achieve their ends.

Another important area of US-Soviet relations covered in the tapes involves the status of negotiations regarding West Berlin. It should be remembered that at the time Berlin was still divided into four sectors of military occupation (Soviet, French, British and American) as had been the case since the end of World War II in 1945 and continued to be so until the unification of Germany in 1990. While the Soviet sector in the east part of the city had ultimately become the capital of the German Democratic Republic and was treated as East German territory by the USSR, the Soviet government had never entered into an agreement regarding the status of West Berlin. The negotiations over the status of Berlin, in which Kenneth Rush, U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, played a leading role, proceeded by fits and starts throughout most of the period of these recordings. A visit to the Oval Office by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt shows the President and him examining Brandt’s concepts for developing a *détente* between the East and West parts of the divided nation – concepts later to be termed *Ostpolitik*. During July 1971, following the announcement of the President’s trip to China, the

disputed points in the Berlin talks began to rapidly resolve themselves as the Soviet negotiators became more conciliatory, and in September, just after the period covered by these tapes, the Quadripartite Agreement was signed guaranteeing unhindered access to West Berlin by West German citizens and officials, and recognizing the government of West Germany as the government under which West Berlin officials served.

THE MIDDLE EAST

From February until July 1971, as the tapes show, the principal issues in the Middle East, so far as the United States was concerned, were those that had been left unresolved at the end of the Six-Day War in 1967. The most notable questions concerned the matter of reopening the Suez Canal, and bringing about a settlement which would guarantee the continued survival of Israel. At the time, Israel occupied the eastern side of the canal, as had been the case since the Six-Day conflict's ceasefire was declared four years before, and was not inclined to pull back to its pre-1967 border with Egypt unless Egypt took concrete steps to ensure peace. Though Egypt's anti-Israel rhetoric had lost some of its fire with Nasser's death, it continued unabated, while Egyptian ties with the USSR remained close. On May 27, 1971, Egypt signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Although a very substantial portion of the material relating to the Middle East on these recordings is still classified at the insistence of the U.S. government (most notably a lengthy meeting between President Nixon and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia), an outline of the Administration's Mideast policy of the time can still be pieced together. During this period, although the President and Dr. Kissinger would sometimes discuss developments in the region, policy regarding the Mideast was almost entirely in the hands of the State Department. Secretary of State Rogers undertook an extensive trip to the region in early May, with a view toward resolving the Suez issue and decreasing the prospect of war. In late July, State Department envoy Joseph Sisco undertook a similar mission in a trip to Israel. The results both times were inconclusive. The conversation between President Nixon and Secretary Rogers is of no small interest because of the latter's detailed evaluation of the personality of President Sadat of Egypt, whose high intelligence and essentially conciliatory nature are noted by Secretary Rogers. By contrast, Rogers and Sisco both feel frustrated by what is perceived as the unwillingness to compromise of the Israeli government under Prime Minister Golda Meir, and the President, in several taped memos, expresses considerable frustration with what he regards as a lack of flexibility on the Israeli side.

OTHER NATIONS

The Administration's concerns regarding the deteriorating situation on the Indian subcontinent are a continuing theme on the recordings, though many segments involving this subject are still deleted at the insistence of the U.S. government. Throughout these months, the Awami League in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was

pursuing a policy aimed at securing independent status for that region. The Pakistani Army, whose troops were predominantly from the western part of the nation, were suppressing demonstrations and arresting political dissidents in a style widely regarded in the West as brutal, violent and arbitrary. India, the vast nation between the two parts of Pakistan, was more and more openly favoring the independence of East Pakistan, which at the end of the year became the nation of Bangladesh. Kenneth Keating, the former Senator from New York, was the American ambassador to India during this time, and in a meeting with the President presented the case against West Pakistan in no uncertain terms.

But it was the President's view that the Administration should not intercede in the India-Pakistan dispute and, if anything, should make no move to encourage the splitting of the Pakistani nation. This was in keeping with the view, frequently articulated by him on these tapes, that the United States should not presume to interfere with the internal affairs of nations who maintained ties of friendship and support with America. During the time of these recordings, the assistance of the Pakistani government was proving to be indispensable in establishing the opening to China, and it was President Nixon's view that a nation helping the cause of world peace should not be alienated and isolated over its own affairs.

So far as Latin America was concerned, the most notable problem discussed on the tapes involves the intention of the government of Salvador Allende in Chile to expropriate and nationalize some American-owned and operated businesses in that nation. The President, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger comment on several occasions in these tapes regarding the increasingly friendly relations between the Chilean government and the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro. President Nixon also makes clear that his Administration is unwilling to take the seizure of American property in stride, no matter in what nation it occurs. Where Cuba itself is concerned, a number of conversations occurring in February 1971, regarding followups to reports the previous year of Soviet submarine activity at a base in Cienfuegos, remain classified by the U.S. government.

GLOBAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

One continuing problem facing the Administration through most of this period was the continuing series of monetary crises overseas, complicated by the problematic American position in international trade.

For several decades, the status quo established by the Bretton Woods Conference just after World War II had served the United States and Europe well. In the years preceding 1971, however, a series of currency revaluations had produced a situation where inflation had started to flourish. For nearly forty years, the American ratio of the dollar to gold had been maintained at \$35 an ounce, but it was now clear, as more and more overseas investors abandoned the dollar for other currencies, that this no longer represented its true value, and by the beginning of the year the dollar was in its weakest position internationally in more than two decades.

On January 19, 1971, President Nixon, recognizing the increased problems presented in world markets, announced the formation of the Council on International Economic Policy [CIEP], to be headed by former Bell & Howell chairman Peter G. Peterson. Following considerable research into the issues, Peterson presented the President with a sizable report and recommendations in the spring. It was from the recommendations in the report and the advice of other figures in the Administration that the decision to float the dollar internationally, implemented in August 1971, emerged. During the period in the current release of tapes, however, the President is still mulling Peterson's recommendations with such figures as Presidential assistant Peter M. Flanigan, budget director George P. Shultz, and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally.

Through the summer of 1971, the West German mark was dangerously unstable, and memories of the rampant 1923 inflation that wiped out the German middle class and ultimately facilitated Hitler's rise were never far from the minds of the economic and foreign-policy advisors visiting the White House. The West German problem, in turn, was causing major difficulties among all the European nations. Of the conversations on the tapes, those between the President and Dr. Arthur F. Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who traveled to West Germany and consulted with banking figures at this time, are especially notable.

In the matter of international trade, the foremost problem faced by the Administration was easily the fact that 1971 saw the United States burdened with an overall trade deficit for the first time in 78 years, with Japanese exports to America far exceeding American imports to Japan. Japanese cameras, radios, stereos, motorcycles, and other goods were being purchased by Americans in increasing numbers, and the year saw such manufacturers as Honda and Toyota start to make inroads in the auto market, where imports for some years had been dominated by German car makers.

In March 1971, soon after the White House recording system began, representatives of the Japan Textile Federation, meeting with Rep. Wilbur Mills [chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee] reached an agreement providing for a unilateral limitation of Japanese textile exports to the United States. As the tapes show, the President was far from happy at what he regarded as an infringement on the executive branch's authority to handle such matters, and on March 11 he issued a statement characterizing the Mills action as a "maneuver" which "effectively precluded government to government negotiations." This produced a cooling in US-Japanese relations for a period, but, with the need of Prime Minister Sato's government to conclude a treaty regarding the status of Okinawa, both governments moved to resolve the matter. In June, 1972, the Japanese government announced an eight-point plan covering areas of US-Japanese cooperation, which was shortly followed by the signing of a treaty transferring sovereignty of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands back to Japan. However, the question of the trade deficit with Japan in many areas continued to simmer throughout this period.

IV. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

On January 22, 1971, President Nixon, in his State of the Union address, had outlined what he regarded as the six major domestic policy goals to be achieved by the Administration:

- 1) Welfare reform;
- 2) Continuation of the effort to improve the quality of the environment;
- 3) Improvement for health care for all Americans;
- 4) Paving the way for full prosperity in a peacetime economy;
- 5) Strengthening and protecting the role of state and local government; and
- 6) Comprehensive reorganization of the federal government.

THE ECONOMY

Of the economic issues, the one that perhaps worried the President and his advisors most was the increase in unemployment, which at the start of 1971 had reached 6 percent, its highest level in ten years. The problem was especially prominent in the American aerospace sector, where increasing numbers of highly educated workers had been losing their jobs as American involvement in the war had decreased. Fewer orders from the Department of Defense had produced job cutbacks at such companies as McDonnell-Douglas and Boeing. During this period, Lockheed was facing especially tough times, to the point where the President was seeking congressional support for legislation to help the company along.

So far as the President was concerned, the project that offered the best chance of creating aerospace jobs was the effort to develop the supersonic transport [SST] aircraft, to be the American version of the French-British Concorde, which had already taken to the air. When plans for the SST had been introduced in the late 1960s, there had been some public support for the aircraft, since the effort to reach the moon was still underway and all things related to aerospace still captured a part of the American imagination. By 1971, however, Apollo 11 had concluded the race to the moon, and American concerns were becoming increasingly earthbound in every way. During 1970, environmentalists had repeatedly warned about various adverse consequences, from noise pollution to atmospheric disturbances, if the SST took to the air, and many in the halls of Congress were questioning the expense and time needed to get the SST going. There was also the fact that, while the “space race” had involved a competition against the Soviet Union that seemed a natural corollary of the Cold War, the competition for a supersonic airliner had already seen Europe come out with a plane first.

Hence, apart from Congressmen and Senators from states where the SST would create work such as California and Washington, the project met with insufficient support on Capitol Hill. It was President Nixon’s view that not to go forward with the SST would be a mistake. Time and again, on these recordings, he quotes Charles de Gaulle’s words to the effect that France is never really great unless it has a mission beyond itself. The point

the President seeks to make on these tapes is that such a project as the SST could be the starting-point of such a mission for the United States – to shorten the time of travel between nations so as to make possible more person-to-person contacts between nations and thereby diminish the forces of isolationism and misunderstanding that produce distrust and conflict among peoples and nations. With the passing of the decades, it has been the role of such devices as the fax machine, the World Wide Web, and cellular-phone technology to advance this goal, but these advances were not so easy to anticipate in 1971. In any event, the Senate rejected the SST in two separate votes, despite extensive lobbying by the President and other administration officials, frequently captured on these tapes.

INFLATION AND WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS

During the almost daily analysis of new economic information conducted by the President, Haldeman, Connally, Shultz, Peterson, Flanigan and other officials, one of the foremost concerns is the increase in consumer prices. As noted above, part of the problem was produced by the weakness of the dollar in overseas markets, and a flood of imports that left American products at a disadvantage domestically. Over the months covered in the tapes, President Nixon, after initially resisting the idea, becomes increasingly inclined toward the view that wage-price controls offer at least a temporary solution to this matter. The tapes show that Dr. Burns was initially the member of the Administration most in favor of the approach. The President's objections were founded on his own experience as an attorney for the Office of Price Administration in 1941-42; he was highly concerned about the potential for wage-price controls to generate a huge bureaucracy that would become increasingly entrenched in American life, and the likelihood that such controls would be impossible to lift without producing runaway inflation the longer they continued. The turning-point in the President's thinking of the matter can be pinpointed in his conversations with Secretary Connally. Connally, at first reluctant to consider a wage-price freeze and controls for the same reasons as the President (in fact, the Treasury Secretary had publicly ruled out the idea at the end of June) comes to believe, when confronted with the European monetary crises in the summer, that investor confidence in the Administration's economic policy is lagging and needs to be restored by a series of dramatic actions in this area, preferably to be introduced all at once.

In a number of taped discussions in July 1971, the President and his Treasury Secretary conclude that such an approach should involve a wage-price freeze, followed by controls for a period; the floating of the dollar on international markets; and a termination of Bretton Woods as the basis for international monetary relations. Although the final form of the new economic policy was hammered out over the weekend of August 13 to 15, 1971, at Camp David, during discussions between the President, Connally, Shultz, Peterson and several others, the broad outlines of the plan can already be discerned in the tapes by the end of July. Although this meeting and a similar one in June at Camp David were not captured on tape, naturally, several Oval Office meetings of the President with his economic "Quadriad" [Connally, Burns, Shultz and Paul W. McCracken, chairman of

the Council of Economic Advisors] give an idea of the development of economic policy during these six months.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

During the six months under consideration, the greatest labor problems the Administration faced involved discord between management and unions in the steel, railroad, and construction fields. The labor-management friction in the construction area, which concerned demands for an increase in wages, especially concerned the President because the rank and file members of the building-trades unions had been highly vocal supporters of the Administration's Vietnam and law-and-order policies, to the point where the word "hardhat" had almost become a synonym for a backer of the White House. Through the six months in question, Willie J. Usery and J. Curtis Counts, the chief White House labor mediators, as well as Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson, devoted extensive effort to smoothing over the friction between unions and management in these areas. The tapes also show President Nixon and his advisors consulting with AFL-CIO leader George Meany, Teamsters President Frank Fitzsimmons, and a number of other figures in the field.

WELFARE REFORM

On August 8, 1969, President Nixon had proposed a comprehensive Family Assistance Plan [FAP] designed to curb the worst abuses of previous antipoverty programs while preserving a social safety net for those who genuinely required it. The program provided incentives for families to stay together rather than fall apart, as had been the case with programs that provided higher payments for one-parent families. It increased the amount of assistance available overall, while specifying that those who were able to work should seek jobs or enter job-training programs. It improved assistance for the infirm, the elderly, and mothers of pre-school children – those most in need of help. Finally, it sought to coordinate the existing programs and cut down on duplication, waste, and excessive bureaucracy. The program came under attack from both social conservatives, especially Southern senators and congressmen, who regarded it as an expansion of the existing welfare program, and from liberals, who objected to the cutbacks in personnel to administer the programs. FAP also excited little interest on the part of the public. Though some members of the Nixon White House, such as George P. Shultz, were still supportive of the policy, others regarded it critically. Though President Nixon still considered it a workable program, the tapes show him to be pessimistic about its prospects for passing Congress.

ENVIRONMENT

During the previous year, as public awareness of environmental issues reached an unprecedented level, President Nixon had announced the formation of the Environmental

Protection Agency [EPA], to be directed by William Ruckelshaus. During 1971, however, opposition by environmentalists to the development of the SST and other aerospace projects tended to drive a wedge between them and the Administration. On the tapes, the President frequently notes that, though he supports clean air and water as much as anyone, he does not favor protecting wildlife and the environment at the cost of completely stopping industrial progress. Nonetheless, the President was thoroughly supportive of Federal action to curb pollution and safeguard environmental considerations within reason, and the tapes find the Administration supporting a number of new programs and activities in this area.

HEALTH CARE

Where this issue, still the subject of much debate, is concerned, the tapes depict the President, HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson, Shultz, Connally and others discussing the way in which the Federal government can best use its special skills to help the ill, secure the benefits of quality health care for those most likely to need it, and protect the public from disease. An important element of this was the President's push for increased funding into cancer research and prevention, an area where he wanted the Administration to make a distinctive impact. In several conversations, the President and Richardson also discuss the role of the government in working with health management organizations [HMOs]. Vice President Agnew raised questions concerning whether HMOs could be as comprehensive and considerate to their clients as they were promised to be.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT [REVENUE SHARING]

During the period covered by the tapes, the Nixon White House continued to do its best to advance a program first developed under former domestic advisor Daniel P. Moynihan, announced in August 1969 and resubmitted by the President to the new Congress in January 1971 – an ambitious project to transfer various Federal revenues into the treasuries of state, city and county governments, for them to spend on local needs as they saw fit. Apart from President Nixon's discussing the program with visitors ranging from Senators to state legislators to governors, the tapes also find him consulting with H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, and other advisors about his speeches in other cities where the program is promoted. In spite of these efforts, revenue sharing, like FAP, had trouble catching the imagination of the public, as the poll data presented by Haldeman shows.

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Finally, the tapes find the President continuing his commitment to an effort to make the Federal Government more efficient and less unwieldy. A major concern to be found on these tapes is the problem of how to reduce personnel. The President frequently notes that, from the Office of the President to the Central Intelligence Agency to the Peace

Corps to a host of other agencies, many superfluous positions could be eliminated. Especially after the publication of the Pentagon Papers, he is dismayed at the large number of individuals routinely granted the highest security clearances. Although there is considerable discussion of the matter, at this time concrete steps, to a large extent, awaited the development of a formal plan, “the New Federalism” – still in its planning stages in 1971.

DRUGS

In the February-to-July 1971 period, opinion polls repeatedly showed that most Americans were increasingly concerned with the escalating use of illegal narcotics. Despite stringent penalties, marijuana abuse continued to rise. Heroin addiction was also on the rise, especially in major urban areas. Though still predominantly a drug of the rich and famous, cocaine showed signs of moving into the general population. President Nixon was determined not to let his Administration lose the initiative in fighting this outbreak.

The tapes find the President and his advisors, notably John D. Ehrlichman, Egil “Bud” Krogh, Secretaries Richardson and Connally, and Attorney General Mitchell, carefully evaluating the problem and discussing how best to deal with it. The consensus that emerges is one that seeks to help the addict get well, while vigorously punishing the trafficker; concentrates on interrupting the drug supply at its source by encouraging foreign governments to dissuade their citizens from raising the plants from which narcotics are produced; and aims to raise public awareness of narcotics as “Public Enemy No. 1.” To this end, the President consults with figures such as Dr. Robert DuPont and Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe, ultimately assigning Dr. Jaffe the task of coordinating addict-treatment and drug-education programs. Special attention is given to the use of methadone programs as a way to assist addicts in readjusting themselves to productive roles in society; to treating addicted soldiers in South Vietnam itself so that they can return to the United States with a fresh start; and to encouraging the Turkish government to have farmers eliminate opium farming as their means of livelihood.

EDUCATION

The fiscal 1972 budget announced a few weeks before the start of taping increased funding for education, and President Nixon’s conversations on tape during these six months show that his foremost concern in this area involved the need to increase funding for vocational education on the secondary-school level, to provide students with a way of earning a living if they are going to school part-time. During February 1971, the President consulted with National Urban League president Whitney M. Young Jr. about this and other programs to benefit the inner city, and found the veteran civil-rights leader warmly receptive. Thus, the President was especially saddened when Young died in the following month. During the early summer, the tapes find the President consulting with Young’s successor, Vernon Jordan, on continuing this work. In other conversations

related to education, the President hears with dismay of the frivolous goings-on at a National Youth Conference sponsored by the White House in Colorado; meets with various student leaders, finding some of them (especially from Eastern liberal-arts schools) to be inarticulate and confused to a distressing degree, and finding others (especially those from Midwestern and Western states) to be more impressive; and confers with a group of astronauts who have tours college campuses.

INTEGRATION AND BUSING

Where the issue of civil rights was concerned, the Nixon White House continued full enforcement of the major legislation enacted during the 1960s. The tapes show that a major concern of the President during this six-month period was school integration. The period was one in which the percentage of children attending desegregated schools in the South continued to rise dramatically, thanks in large part to the Administration's aggressive programs.

One area where the President had doubts, however, concerned the increasing use of busing, especially at the elementary-school level, as a method of achieving racial integration. During the February-to-July 1971 period, several local courts devised plans for the use of busing as a means of integration, most notably in Austin, Texas, and Charlotte, North Carolina (the latter having been discontinued just a few weeks ago). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Austin plan, and, in deciding a number of cases, favored an approach which, in the President's view, seemed to lean toward a finding of *de facto*, rather than *de jure*, segregation as a rationale for ordering busing. President Nixon, as well as his Attorney General, were of the view that busing children under the age of 12 was ill-advised because it compounded problems small children already had adjusting to a new school and a new environment. Their position was that it was the Administration's duty to enforce the letter of the law where the Court's decisions were concerned, but not to actively encourage the development of such plans by local authorities.

CONSUMER SAFETY

An interesting debate in the Administration at this time concerned the proposal of the Secretary of Transportation, John A. Volpe, that airbags be required in all new American vehicles. This measure was opposed by James Roche, president of General Motors, and by some within the Administration on the grounds that the devices had been inadequately tested and had not been shown to have the potential to dramatically decrease accident fatalities. President Nixon was inclined to view airbags unfavorably, and during his time in the White House they were not made mandatory.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The foremost problem in this area facing the White House, during the first six months of taping, was what to do regarding J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]. By February 1971, Hoover had held his post for nearly 47 years, and showed no intention of retiring, though a conversation quoted second-hand on the tapes indicates he has mused about doing so at the end of the next year. In recent years, the Director's relations with other agencies in law-enforcement and related fields had deteriorated, and the bombing of a restroom in the U.S. Capitol on March 1, 1971, seemed to raise more alarms about the FBI's continued effectiveness. During April, House Majority Leader Hale Boggs, in a long, emotional speech, accused the FBI of tapping his telephone lines. Although President Nixon several times expresses on tape his view that the time has come for Hoover to retire, he notes that the more strident the criticism of Hoover becomes, the less likely the Director is to leave. In several recorded calls between the President and Hoover, the two men find common ground in their dismay at the rise in attacks on police officers, and arrange for the President to address the FBI Academy. Hoover also offers his frank opinions about various elected and appointed officials, past and present. The President also meets with a number of other law-enforcement officials on the question.

V. SPEAKERS ON THE TAPES

This section examines the interaction between the President and those who appear most frequently, or are mentioned most often, on the White House recordings.

SPIRO T. AGNEW

The Vice President rarely is heard on the tapes, and only in the recordings for March and July 1971 is he discussed at length. During 1970, Vice-President Agnew had traveled across the United States, defending the Administration vigorously and employing his own alliterative and cadenced brand of rhetoric to attack liberal critics in the media and antiwar extremists. It was thought in some quarters of the White House that the Republican losses in 1970 were due in part to the Vice President's style, and by the beginning of 1971 he had scaled back his public appearances. During June and most of July 1971, Vice-President Agnew made a tour of a number of nations around the globe, during which he made several statements which excited unfavorable comment in the media at home.

The tapes show that, although the President personally likes Vice-President Agnew, he harbors considerable doubts about the latter's ability to handle the office of the Presidency should the need arise. Of the President's advisors, John D. Ehrlichman is the one most inclined to regard the Vice-President as a liability, even to the point of suggesting that he be found a job in the private sector and that the President select someone else as running-mate in 1972.

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The future columnist and presidential candidate, who worked as a Presidential speechwriter during this six-month period, is heard only occasionally on these tapes, generally in March and April, when he counsels how best to coordinate support from conservatives for the Administration in the face of media criticism of Vietnam and discusses the question of mobilizing blue-collar support for the White House.

STEPHEN B. BULL

Of all his staffers, the President probably sees his Appointments Secretary most frequently during the day. At the beginning of the day, Bull will almost always come in and briefly outline the morning's meetings with President Nixon, as well as stopping by just prior to scheduled meetings to remind the President of them, or interrupting ongoing meetings to remind the President that another one is to start.

ARTHUR F. BURNS

The orotund tones of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board are easily recognized on the tapes. Apart from his participation in the meetings of the economic "Quadriad," Dr. Burns is heard most often on occasions when conflict has arisen between the White House and himself regarding his public statements; more often than not his occasionally pessimistic views have been at odds with the stance the President wishes administration figures to project regarding the economy.

CHARLES W. COLSON

Colson, as the tapes show, has two fields of special expertise: maintaining good relations between the Administration and labor, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of critics of the White House, especially in the media. He talks on a regular basis with the AFL-CIO's Jay Lovestone about labor's role in combating Communist influence among unions abroad, and thus has a certain role to play in foreign policy. Whenever President Nixon concludes that a particular TV or newspaper story is especially unfair, Colson will be the man most often delegated to register a quiet protest with an executive at the network, newspaper or magazine in question.

JOHN B. CONNALLY

Despite John Connally's status as a Democratic former governor of Texas at the time of his appointment in 1970, the President, as shown on these tapes, soon develops a better rapport with him than with any other Cabinet member, a relationship akin to that between President Eisenhower and his second Treasury Secretary, Robert B. Anderson, another

onetime Democrat from Texas. Secretary Connally, in these conversations, gives the President considerable advice not only on matters relating to the Treasury, but also evaluates the prospects for the war on drugs, examines the possible reaction of various Democrats in the House and Senate to proposed legislation and, most often, expounds on the need for the Administration to present a unified front to American public opinion and to maintain a consistently positive tone. The President strongly agrees with this, and by June has seen to it that Connally is not only the designated spokesman for the Administration on economic matters, but is seizing every opportunity to speak to groups of businessmen and civic leaders about Administration policies.

ROBERT DOLE

The future Republican presidential nominee is heard more often on these tapes than any other Senator, insofar as he would often visit the Oval Office in connection with his work as head of the Republican National Committee. Since 1971 was an off-year electorally, however, Senator Dole more often is heard on the tapes discussing the prospects for various pieces of legislation in the Senate. It is noteworthy that the President, on the tapes, often expresses his frustration with the lack of support for Administration policies from most of the Senate Republican leadership, and apart from Sen. Dole, the members of that body he sees most often are Southern Democrats, most notably Sen. John McClellan of Arkansas.

JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

The President's chief domestic advisor comes to the Oval Office or the President's Old Executive Office Building [EOB] study about every other day, and sometimes daily, to review a range of matters. Ehrlichman, of the Presidential advisors, is probably the one most strongly concerned about environmental protection, and is also highly concerned with health care and revenue sharing.

One highly significant conversation involving Ehrlichman occurs on May 7, 1971, when he, Haldeman and the President are in the midst of a discussion of antiwar demonstrations. The President steps out of the room for a moment. Haldeman then whispers some words to Ehrlichman, which sound like: "There's some- something about (?) that little (?) he was (?) tapes – there's an automatic system here." After pausing, he continues: "It's true." The Tape Subject Log, compiled by the National Archives staff, states that this part of the conversation does concern the taping system in the Oval Office. Ehrlichman makes a noncommittal reply, the President returns, and conversation is resumed on the previous subject.

On page 268 of his book *The Ends Of Power* (Times Books, 1978), written with Joseph DiMona, H. R. Haldeman, describing a conversation between himself, Ehrlichman and the President in late April 1973, states: "...Ehrlichman unleashed another sensation in the EOB office: Nixon should use the top secret White House tapes as a defense. I was

startled. At that point, I thought Ehrlichman didn't even know about the tapes." Ehrlichman addresses this issue himself in two passages of his book *Witness To Power* (Simon & Schuster, 1982). On page 311, he states in a footnote: "In March 1973, I learned that Nixon had taped a conversation with John Dean, but still no one told me of the continuous taping that had taken place. I learned of the White House taping system when everyone else did, during Alex Butterfield's testimony before the Senate [Watergate] Committee." On page 344, Ehrlichman writes:

There is some question as to what I knew about the President's taping system. The fact is I was totally unaware it existed. Because one of the tapes has me referring to the President's recording of a conversation with John Dean, some commentators deduced that I knew about the whole system. In fact, Bob Haldeman, alluding to Nixon's fear that he might have said something self-incriminating to Dean in one of their March 1973 meetings, had just told me, "We have Dean on tape on that one." I didn't dream that *everything* I'd been saying and hearing in the President's office for years had been recorded.

ROBERT H. FINCH

The former HEW Secretary, during the early part of these six months, was absent on a European goodwill tour, accompanied by Donald H. Rumsfeld. Later in these conversations, the President weighs appointing Finch as Ambassador to Mexico.

PETER M. FLANIGAN

A political and economic advisor to the President, Flanigan is most often heard in discussions of international financial issues but also is heard on conversations regarding the status of domestic markets, attitudes of investment and banking toward Administration policies, and ambassadorial appointments. The President gives considerable thought to giving Flanigan a top position in the State Department, with the responsibility of encouraging Foggy Bottom to be more assertive in representing Administration interests abroad.

GERALD R. FORD

President Nixon's successor was at this time Minority Leader of the House. Rep. Ford meets with the President, and speaks with him, more often than does any other Congressman; only Rep. Leslie Arends, the House minority whip, and some Southern Democrats such as Rep. F. Edward Hebert and Rep. Joe Waggoner talk to him nearly as frequently. The President often expresses his high regard for the Minority Leader's diligence, skill and tenacity as a legislative leader.

LEONARD GARMENT

The Special Assistant to the President is heard on these tapes during several meetings, often focusing on specific Administration programs to help Hispanic, black, Native American and Asian American citizens, such as the funding of minority businesses.

GEN. ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR.

The tapes find Gen. Haig meeting with President Nixon both with Dr. Kissinger and on his own; the President also speaks with him on the phone on several occasions. During discussions of the Pentagon Papers, the General offers his views concerning the motives of leakers.

H. R. HALDEMAN

The president, on more than one occasion, remarked of his work: "I need to be organized; I don't need to organize." The task of coordinating all the various communications and proposals from various agencies and officials, with the aim of presenting them in coherent and comprehensible form to the President, therefore fell on his Chief of Staff. Haldeman is heard more often on these tapes, in terms of time spent with the President, than anyone else, and frequently is heard on the tapes advising the President as to whether meeting with some individual or group is worth his effort.

The conversations between the President and Haldeman most often focus on Haldeman's analysis of opinion about White House policies – whether the view of a Cabinet member or staffer within the Administration, advice offered from outside the White House, or the views of the American public, as manifested in the Gallup and Harris polls or by the Opinion Research Council's house poll for the Administration. During these talks the President will discuss how a particular question in a poll is phrased and how it affects the response of those polled; ORC's services were used primarily to determine the public's response to an issue more precisely than the Gallup or Harris poll permitted.

But discussions of poll data and perceptions of the Administration only scratch the surface of the subjects touched upon by the President and his Chief of Staff. Quite simply, if there is a question of whether a particular policy of the Administration's, or an issue with which the Administration is concerned will generate strong feelings among the American public, then it is the responsibility of Haldeman to discuss it with the Chief Executive.

CLIFFORD M. HARDIN

The Secretary of Agriculture visits the Oval Office on a few occasions, primarily to discuss the rural community development portion of the revenue-sharing program, but

during this period was planning to leave his position as early as possible. During some meetings in July regarding a possible replacement, the President favors appointing then-Kentucky Governor Louie B. Nunn, while Haldeman, surprisingly, suggests Dr. Ralph Bunche, though the recently retired UN Undersecretary-General was in poor health and would die later in the year.

BRYCE HARLOW

Harlow, whose work with the President went back to the Eisenhower years, had as his main responsibility during this period liaison work between the White House and Capitol Hill; he was the man in charge of evaluating the prospects for the enactment of a bill favored by the White House. Since one of the duties of Vice President Agnew was to preside over the Senate, Harlow would also keep in close touch with the Vice Presidential staff. Harlow most often is heard on these tapes in telephone conversations.

RICHARD M. HELMS

The Director of Central Intelligence is heard only a few times on the tapes, most notably in a conversation bearing on the Lam Son operation.

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

The beginning of the period covered in these recordings finds Dr. Kissinger initially frustrated by what he views as the reluctance of the State Department to allow him to do his work as National Security Advisor in the manner it should be done. This friction came to a head in a conversation of March 9, 1971, during which Dr. Kissinger informs the President that he is ready to resign. President Nixon, speaking with considerable compassion and understanding, assures his National Security Advisor that he has his, the President's, full support, and points out the many goals of the Administration that need Dr. Kissinger's skills and wisdom to be realized.

During subsequent conversations, the disagreements between Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers are smoothed out to an extent, though the President and his National Security Advisor spend much time pondering what they view as the disinclination of many State Department bureaucrats to give adequate support to the Administration's goals. A close listening to the conversations regarding the Pentagon Papers suggests that the President's and Dr. Kissinger's insistence on the importance of preventing leaks is expressed in careful and objective terms, rather than in the melodramatic fashion suggested in some accounts.

MELVIN LAIRD

The Secretary of Defense is heard primarily in conversations concerning the operational aspects of the Vietnam War, though he also weighs in during the investigation of the Pentagon Papers.

PAUL McCracken

The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors is most often heard at the meetings of the economic “Quadriad,” though he also meets with President Nixon on his own. The even-handed, non-dogmatic approach of Professor McCracken to economic problems is notable through all his conversations.

CLARK MacGREGOR

The President’s liason to Congress, MacGregor, as heard on these tapes, takes the lead in devising legislative strategies, and offers the President highly precise assessments of which Congressmen or Senators are likely to be supportive of bills and resolutions favored by the White House.

JOHN MITCHELL

The Attorney General is most heavily featured in conversations centering around the investigation into the release of the Pentagon Papers, and the injunction proceedings against the New York Times which took place simultaneously; in talks about law-and-order matters; and in discussions of the role of the Department of Justice in enforcing decisions regarding school integration.

PETER G. PETERSON

The Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, Peterson is heard not only on conversations pertaining to international trade matters but also on talks concerning a wide range of issues, from investor attitudes at home to monetary crises abroad.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

The Counsellor to the President figures most prominently in conversations regarding possible positions for him in the State Department or other sectors of the Administration.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

In conversations with President Nixon, Secretary Rogers discusses such matters as an extensive trip to the Mideast and the question of how the People's Republic of China should be admitted to the UN. Since Secretary Rogers and the President had worked together in the Eisenhower years, the names of such statesmen of the era as Thomas E. Dewey and Herbert Brownell also figure at times.

JOHN A. SCALI

Scali, long associated with ABC News, became senior White House consultant on foreign affairs information policy in April 1971. His responsibility was to seek to diminish misperceptions on the part of the media concerning what the Administration was doing in the foreign-policy area, and to work with both Press Secretary Ron Ziegler and Dr. Kissinger. On the tapes, President Nixon expresses some concern as to whether his National Security Advisor, whose contacts with reporters and columnists had heretofore incorporated some of what Scali was to do in a more formal manner, might consider the new consultant's work an infringement on his territory. Within a few weeks, however, Scali had established himself as one of the most capable figures in the Administration.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is heard on discussions covering a huge range of issues, from integration to housing to international trade policy to labor relations. His contributions in "Quadriad" meetings are especially notable.

ROSE MARY WOODS

The President's secretary, who had been part of his career longer than anyone else regularly heard on these tapes, is often heard giving her opinions on matters ranging from antiwar demonstrators in the capital to the entertainment at White House dinners, though the primary focus of their conversations is usually the day-to-day business of the Oval Office.

RONALD L. ZIEGLER

The Presidential Press Secretary is heard most often on these tapes stopping in the Oval Office just prior to his daily press briefing to check with the President on how some issue should be approached or how to handle a likely question. He also participates in discussions regarding a wide range of issues and how they can best be presented to the Administration's advantage.

VI. WOMEN AND MINORITIES

WOMEN

The opportunities and rights taken for granted by women today were still in an early stage of development during these six months in 1971. In one conversation with female journalists, the President expresses the view that women and men, though not unequal, tend to excel in different areas. Most participants refer to secretaries and other single women as “girls,” while President Nixon expresses the view that women generally lack the toughness needed to fight bureaucracies and make policy. But those conversations should also be noted where the President speaks with pride of the work of Jayne Spain at the Civil Service Commission, of Romana A. Banuelos at the U.S. Treasury, and of the skills and ability of his secretary, Rose Mary Woods, and such assistants as Marjorie Acker. One should also keep in mind that the President gave serious thought to following Mrs. Nixon’s advice to put a woman on the Supreme Court. In addition, thanks to the strenuous efforts made by Presidential advisor Barbara Hackman Franklin to increase the number of women in high-level Administration jobs, in just one year the number of women in policy-making positions in the Federal government paying \$28,000 or more had tripled, with more than one thousand women taking middle-management positions previously held by men. Finally, Title IX, which sparked a revolution in women’s school and collegiate sports, was signed into law by President Nixon.

GAYS

In a conversation of April 28, 1971, President Nixon notes with dismay that a White House-sponsored youth conference meeting in Colorado had “recommended legislation that would encourage homosexuality between consenting adults.” Dr. Kissinger notes that his office had received a call from poet Allen Ginsberg, and the mention of the Beat poet spurs the President to say that “[homosexuals] can be as gay as they want but I’m not going to have a situation where we pass a law indicating they can just go out and be gay. They can do it – just leave them alone.” As the President notes in these conversations, some who worked in the Administration were gay, and he has high regard for their competence and dedication. But it was his judgment at the time that gay rights was not an issue for his Administration to be concerned with.

HISPANIC AMERICANS

During the President’s early years in Whittier, those of Latino heritage constituted the minority most numerous and visible in the area, and he often speaks on tape (most notably in a conversation with Nobel Peace laureate Dr. Norman Borlaug) of having learned early to admire the strong sense of family, religious faith, and personal warmth of Americans of Hispanic heritage, as well as Latin-Americans in general. More than a few

visitors to the Oval Office were of Hispanic background, and President Nixon's praise Romana A. Banuelos's work as U.S. Treasurer is only one of several instances where he speaks with pride of the achievements of Hispanic Americans. Following a meeting with the students of Rio Grande High School in Texas, he repeatedly stresses how impressed he is with their efforts to raise money for their school events.

AFRICAN AMERICANS

There are several conversations to be found in these six months that show the President discussing with such figures as Vernon Jordan, Rep. Charles Rangel, and Sammy Davis Jr. the issues of greatest concern to African Americans. A phone conversation with Duke Ellington finds the Chief Executive offering words of support to the legendary bandleader on the eve of an overseas tour. The President also commends, on these tapes, the achievements of Gen. Daniel "Chappie" James and a number of other black military officers.

At the same time, however, the President, in conversations with his advisors and Cabinet members, raises the point that, so far as he is concerned, it is not fair to have one section of the country be obliged to desegregate completely when another section is not itself so desegregated; he wants the North to meet, itself, any obligations imposed on the South, and says so to legislators such as Sen. John Tower of Texas. He states rather frequently that African Americans, because of the disabilities imposed by discrimination over centuries, will take decades to catch up to the status of white Americans. This was one reason why the Nixon Administration pushed for affirmative action. But the President is unwilling to support methods of desegregation, such as busing elementary-age children, that he regards as counterproductive.

In one conversation on May 26, the tape begins during part of a sentence as President Nixon says to Dr. Kissinger:

...-is the blacks fighting the whites, that's the national problem, you know. this race thing, Henry, is so bad. "The blacks are inferior" – and you see a fellow like Vernon- Colonel Coffey, then you know the general statement is wrong. He's superior to any aide there is – believe me, there ain't one who's in his class, not one. Not one in terms of quiet, poise, brains and so forth. On the other hand, the black servicemen generally are an inferior bunch.

What the context in other conversations on the subject makes clear is that President Nixon regards African Americans, for the most part, as having had educational and social opportunities inferior to those of whites, and therefore being at a disadvantage when competing with whites. His point is that Col. Coffey is an example of what African Americans can achieve when they overcome these disadvantages. Meanwhile, the efforts of his Secretary of Commerce, Maurice Stans, to bring more African Americans into the economic mainstream were continuing. These goals had first been enunciated by

candidate Nixon in 1968 in an address entitled “Bridges to Human Dignity.”

JEWISH AMERICANS

Toward the end of a conversation with H. R. Haldeman on June 12, 1971, President Nixon, after expressing the view that most Jewish Americans are insisting that the Administration go along with what he regards as Israeli intransigence on the Suez Canal and other Mideast peace issues while refusing to give him support on his Vietnam policy, remarks: “If anybody who’s been in this chair ever had reason to be anti-Semitic, I did.” H.R. Haldeman replies: “That’s for damn sure.” The President continues: “And I’m not, you know what I mean? Accepted, I’m not pro-Israel; I’m not going to let Israel’s tail wag the dog.”

As with his attitudes toward African Americans, the President’s words about the Jewish community on these tapes show that his basic sense of compassion and support for these communities tends to co-exist with terminology from an earlier time. When discussing what he regards as displays of pique on the part of Dr. Burns and Dr. Kissinger, the President sometimes refers to such attitudes as “Jewish.” He tended to assume in this period that Dr. Kissinger should avoid active participation in Mideast policy because of a presumed inability to view the status of Israel objectively – though later, of course, the President abandoned this idea and gave his National Security Advisor a free hand in negotiation.

With the publication of the Pentagon Papers by the *New York Times*, the tapes find President Nixon wondering why a disproportionate number of individuals in the espionage cases of the early 1950s were Jewish. In July, the President, on finding that the Bureau of Labor Statistics has issued an unemployment figure that was revised on proving to be too high, comments that a high number of the statisticians, to his recollection, are Jewish, and sets John D. Ehrlichman on checking to see whether how many of them happen to be registered Democrats.

It should be noted that the President’s comments regarding lack of political support for the Administration among many Jewish Americans frequently occur when Haldeman is present, and that Haldeman is generally quick to note when some person who is the subject of adverse comment happens to be Jewish, especially when the Chief Executive is contemplating whether others besides Daniel Ellsberg may be leaking documents or information. In one conversation of July 1971 with John Connally, the President notes that Paul W. McCracken is keen to leave as Chairman of the Council on Economic Advisors. President Nixon mentions the name of the late Herbert Stein as a possible replacement. John Connally replies: “Well, the problem is he’s, well...” “Jewish?” asks the President. “Well, that and...right now...” says the Treasury Secretary. The drift of the conversation, since the politically aware Connally is involved, suggests that both men are thinking of reaction from those supporters of the Administration who may think that too many Jews occupy high positions in the White House already. Nonetheless, the President, within months, would make Stein his Chairman of the CEA – just as he would

give the Jewish state unequivocal, life-saving support in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The actions of the President, as well as the substantial documentary record of the Nixon Administration, should always be kept in mind when evaluating his words on the White House tapes.

[These notes were prepared by Robert Nedelkoff of the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace Foundation.]

VII. REPRESENTATIVE CONVERSATIONS

The following is not a complete list of all the most notable conversation segments but is intended to provide assistance in searching for the more representative parts of the tapes for this period, as well as references to the conversations mentioned in the above text. The segment number of the conversation is given first, followed by the month and day in 1971 when it was recorded. Initials of the most important speakers are given next; “P” represents the President, “VP” Vice President. Segments with numbers in the 400 and 500 series were recorded on the Oval Office taping system; ones in the 200 series on the Executive Office Building system; those numbered 42 and in the single digits on the White House telephone system.

450-21 2/17 (P meets Walter Scheel, West German foreign minister)
451-4 2/18 (P meets Emilio Colombo, president of Italy)
454-4 2/19 (Quadriad meeting)
454-9 2/19 (P, HRH, PMF discuss Alaskan oil pipeline, State Department)
456-5 2/23 (P, HRH discussion of HAK’s conflict with WPR; later, P, HAK discuss Lam Son, death of Gen. Tri, Civil War Gen. Joseph Maurer)
456-22 2/23 (same as above)
459-1 2/24 (P, HAK discuss Lam Son)
459-2 2/24 (P, HAK, ML, RMH, Joseph Sisco discuss Lam Son)
460-25 2/26 (P, WPR discuss foreign policy)
462-5 3/5 (P, HAK discuss Lam Son; comparison to Eastern Front in WWI; P discusses Presidential leadership)
464-17 3/9 (HAK’s discussion with P of resigning)
464-25 3/9 (P, GPS discuss economy; later, P, HRH discuss HAK’s offer to resign)
466-2 3/4 (P, HAK, PMF discuss textile issue)
467-23 3/17 (HAK’s view on timing of air strikes)
471-2 3/19 (discussion of end of Lam Son operation)
471-7 3/24 (P’s views on environment, SST)
471-12 3/24 (P discusses career of Whitney Young Jr.)
471-13 3/24 (P discusses VISTA, Job Corps)
472-9 3/23 (P discusses textile negotiations with PGP)
472-11 3/23 (P, JDE, GPS discuss welfare reform)
472-23 3/23 (P, HAK discuss Vietnam, Laos)

473-4 3/25 (P, HRH discuss DHR's role in Administration)
 473-5 3/25 (P meets student leaders)
 473-8 3/25 (P's dissatisfaction with state of American students based on above meeting)
 474-1 3/26 (P, HAK discuss CIA estimates used in Lam Son)
 475-4 4/6 (P discusses revenue sharing with the team preparing this legislation)
 475-17, 475-18 4/8 (P, PGP, others discuss CIEP)
 475-21 4/8 (P meets some student leaders from Texas, gets along well with them)
 475-22 4/8 (P discusses Calley case)
 475-22 4/8 (P discusses tax reform)
 475-24 4/8 (P talks with New Zealand ambassador to US)
 476-8 4/9 (P, GPS discuss economy, prospect of PMcC's leaving CEA)
 476-14 4/9 (LG, P discuss arts with Nancy Hanks, chairman of National Endowment for Arts)
 476-14 4/9 (P, HRH discuss Hale Boggs' speech regarding FBI)
 476-25 4/9 (P, HAK, PGP discuss international economic issues, future of Vietnam)
 477-1 4/12 (HRH, P discuss J. Edgar Hoover's possible retirement; P discusses Clark MacGregor's Capitol Hill work, and antiwar demonstrations; HAK, P discuss East Pakistan conflict)
 477-2 4/12 (P, HAK meet with Taiwanese Ambassador to US Chow Shu-Kai regarding the lifting of restrictions on American travel to PRC; P meets with Mrs. Anna Chennault)
 477-7 4/12 (P, HRH discuss poll data, Calley case)
 477-10 4/12 (P, HRH discuss antiwar demonstrations; P discusses China with PGP - a comprehensive account by P of how the opening to PRC came about, and its overall relation to foreign policy; P, GPS discuss international trade, domestic economy, fair housing, integration)
 477-11 4/12 (P, Maurice Stans discuss business, labor, EEOC)
 477-13 4/12 (P interviewed by Victor and Patricia Lasky for a book on the Nixon Presidency; P discusses Vietnam, China, other issues)
 477-14 4/12 (P, RLZ - representative of discussions of media coverage of Tricia Nixon's upcoming wedding to Edward Cox; later, P, WPR discuss Vietnam, China)
 478-12 4/13 (P, HRH discuss George Romney, John Volpe, China, economy; later, P, HAK discuss China, press relations, Vietnam elections)
 478-7 4/13 (P, JAS discuss Scali's role in Administration; later, P, HAK discuss various Cabinet members and P's plan to clean house in defense-related bureaucracy)
 479-2 (P meets Sens John Stennis and Margaret Chase Smith; representative of P's meetings with Senators; SALT, Calley case discussed)
 479-3 4/14 (P hosts ceremony in which Judge John J. Sirica swears in William J. Casey as chairman of SEC; later, P meets Dr. Rainer Barzel in discussion of Berlin)
 479-4 4/14 (Typical of P, APB meetings concerning schedule)
 479-7 4/14 (P, HAK discuss USSR reaction of PRC opening; later, P, RLZ, HRH discuss poll results, media coverage of upcoming wedding)
 480-3 4/15 (P meets Moulay Ahmed Laraki, Prime Minister of Morocco; later, P, HRH discuss scheduling of state visits)
 480-6 4/15 (P, RHF, DHR discuss European trip latter two have completed)
 481-3 4/17 (P's concerns regarding JAS's working relationship with HAK)
 481-5 4/17 (Sen. Mike Mansfield discusses China with HAK, P)

481-6 4/17 (P, HRH discuss attacks by media and others on J. Edgar Hoover)
 481-7 4/17 (P reviews remarks to American Society of Newspaper Editors; later, P, HAK discuss China, Vietnam)
 482-8 4/19 (Representative of P expressing skepticism about environmental extremists)
 482-10 4/19 (Further discussion of environmentalists)
 482-22 4/19 (P meets Sen. John McClellan)
 483-4 4/20 (P, HAK discuss Mideast)
 483-13 4/20 (P, having met with officials of International Red Cross, expresses view to HAK that IRC is turning blind eye to North Vietnamese abuses while unfairly criticizing US)
 483-17 4/20 (P discusses relief for Texas drought victims with Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, PMF, Gen. George A. Lincoln)
 483-19 4/20 (P, HRH, JM, John W. Dean meet regarding busing and court decisions)
 484-2 4/21 (P, Harry S. Dent discuss school desegregation; later, P, HSD, BH discuss domestic policy; P, ELR, Edward L. Morgan discuss schools and Charlotte-Mecklenberg busing plan; P notes that Presidential special assistant Robert J. Brown has reported that many African Americans are concerned about decline in enrollment in historically black colleges)
 484-5 4/21 (P, HAK, RZ, JAS meet Graham B. Steenhoven, discuss table tennis team's trip to PRC)
 485-2 4/21 (Lengthy meeting concerning breeder reactors, slate oil, impact on environment)
 485-4 4/21 (P, DHR discuss latter's role in Administration; later, discussion of whether Maj. Gen. Vernon Walters should be made Deputy Director of Central Intelligence)
 486-2 4/22 (P, Rep. Gerald R. Ford, ELR and others discuss health policy)
 486-7 4/22 (P, WPR discuss latter's upcoming Mideast trip)
 487-1 4/23 (P, HAK discuss Congressional attitudes toward Vietnam, Sen. Joe McCarthy)
 487-2 4/23 (P, ELR, ex-HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming discuss problems of senior citizens)
 487-5 4/23 (P, HRH, William Safire discuss domestic policy and welfare reform)
 487-7 4/23 (Representative of P and HAK's discussions on media opposition to war)
 487-15 4/23 (P, HAK discuss Vietnam, Thomas Jefferson, Wilson, what P sees as the decline in respect for moral values among educated Americans)
 487-21 4/23 (P, HRH discuss government reorganization)
 487-22 4/23 (P, HUD Secretary George Romney discuss housing, automobile airbags; later, P discusses airbags, airline regulation with Transportation Secretary John Volpe)
 488-15 4/27 (P discusses White House-sponsored youth conference in Colorado; later, P discusses auto industry, airbags with Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca)
 488-16 4/27 (Postmaster General Winton M. Blount outlines reorganization of Post Office into U.S. Postal Service)
 488-22 4/27 (P, JDE discuss airbags)
 488-24 4/27 (P discusses his meeting with cystic fibrosis poster child)
 489-5 4/26 (P, HAK discuss POWs)
 489-7 4/26 (P meets cystic fibrosis poster child)
 489-11 4/26 (P, HRH discuss farm policy, Elvis Presley's interest in assisting antidrug

effort)

489-17 4/26 (P, GPS discuss revenue sharing)

489-18 4/26 (P discusses farm policy with John C. Whitaker, members of Farm Bureau)

489-21 (P meets Sens. Russell Long and Wallace Bennett, discusses Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's proposed health care bill)

489-35/491-1 4/28 (P, HAK discuss message from Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, and SALT talks; later, P discusses youth conference resolution on homosexual rights)

42-33 4/13 (P, Gen. George A. Lincoln discuss Texas drought)

42-48 4/15 (P, PJB discuss economy)

42-63 4/21 (P, CWC discuss welfare, hardhat support of Administration)

42-79 4/29 (P, JDE discuss busing decisions)

1-4 4/6 (P, HAK discuss media coverage of Vietnam)

1-17 4/7 (HRH assesses P's speech on Vietnam and reaction to it)

1-26 4/7 (HAK summarizes opinion of his friends to P's speech on Vietnam)

1-63 4/9 (P, AFB discuss economy)

1-66 4/9; 1-81, 4/14; 1-153, 4/18 (Representative of several calls where P, CWC discuss political matters in the general sense)

1-136 4/17 (P, PJB discuss Presidential press conference)

1-150 4/18 (P, HAK discuss student attitudes in America)

2-21 4/20 (P, CWC discuss political matters)

2-23 4/21 (P asks John W. Dean to see to it District police avoid manhandling veterans in antiwar demonstrations)

2-52 4/27 (HAK, P discuss Nelson Rockefeller, David K.E. Bruce as possible envoys to PRC)

2-86 5/5 (P, ML discuss demonstrations)

2-88 5/5 (P, John W. Dean discuss demonstrations)

2-121 5/7 (Representative of P, CWC's discussions of labor issues)

246-5 4/7 (P, HRH discuss Calley case)

246-7 4/7/71 (P, WPR, HAK, ML discuss Vietnam; later, P, HRH discuss poll data)

247-4 4/13 (P, JDE discuss black colleges, and energy policy; later, P, PMF discuss economy, government reorganization, airbags, ambassadorial appointments)

248-21 4/14 (P, Sen. Robert J. Dole discuss Vietnam, Congress)

249-21 4/15 (P, PJB discuss radicals)

249-26 4/15 (P's meets with Robert D. Murphy, U.S. ambassador to Taiwan)

250-5 4/16 (P, HAK discuss opening to PRC, impact on relations with USSR)

250-9 4/16 (Representative of RN, HRH discussions regarding staff organization)

251-17 4/27 (P, HRH discuss airbags, seat belt requirement; later, P, JDE discuss "Blackjack cases," busing, cancer program)

251-36 4/29 (P, AMH discuss POWs)

490-7 4/29 (P, AMH discuss Vietnam peace negotiations)

491-23 5/5 (P, PGP, PMF discuss trade policy, textiles issue)

491-28 5/5 (P, PMcC, GPS, Ezra Solomon discuss the economy)

491-31 5/5 (P meets with Sen. John Tower regarding the Texas drought)

492-3 5/5 (P, HRH, PMF, Caspar W. Weinberger discuss unemployment, disaster relief, SST, budget, AMTRAK)

492-4 5/5 (P, JC discuss international monetary situation)

493-7 5/6 (P, Dr. Norman E. Borlaug discuss world hunger, Mexico)
 493-10 5/6 (P, AMH discuss P's planned meeting with Thieu)
 494-14 5/7 (P discusses Pakistan with M.M. Ahmed, Amb. Agha Hilaly)
 495-21 5/7 (P, George Meany and Willie J. Usery Jr. discuss Lockheed, SST, economy, labor relations)
 496-9 5/10 (P, HAK discuss Vietnam at length, SALT)
 496-13 5/10 (Representative of P's discussions with CMacG on legislative matters)
 496-13 5/10 (WPR describes his trip to Mideast, assesses Sadat)
 496-16 5/10 (P, HRH discuss Mideast policy; P's view that some American supporters of Israel encourage Israelis to be inflexible in negotiations)
 497-2 5/11 (P, Sen. William B. Saxbe, AMH discuss Vietnam policy)
 497-9 5/11 (P, GPS discuss revenue sharing and economy; P, PMF discuss railroads)
 498-1/499-2 5/14 (Discussion of Mideast policy)
 498-15 5/13 (P, HRH, JDE discuss Mansfield Amendment, SST vote; representative of HRH and JDE in meetings together)
 499-22 5/14 (P and fellow Quakers Landrum Bolling and D. Elton Trueblood discuss the visit of latter two to Middle East)
 499-24 5/14 (P meets with Sen. Edward W. Brooke concerning China, Vietnam, domestic issues)
 500-16 5/18 (P, JDE, GPS discuss SST vote; later, with HRH, discuss other domestic issues)
 500-17 5/18 (P, Art Linkletter and DeVan L. Shumway discuss the drug problem)
 500-22 5/18 (P, HRH discuss drug problem, the Cabinet)
 501-14 5/19 (Representative of several discussions of HAK's meetings with Amb. Anatoly Dobrynin)
 501-16 5/19 (P discusses Mathias Amendment)
 501-18 5/19 (P, HAK discuss SALT)
 501-29 5/19 (P discusses Mathias Amendment)
 502-6 5/20 (P, HAK discuss obtaining support of Sec. Dean Acheson and other elder statesman against Mansfield Amendment)
 502-11 5/20 (P, HRH assess Congressional reaction to SALT)
 502-12 5/20 (HRH analyzes P's televised announcement regarding SALT)
 502-20 5/20 (P, GPS, JDE discuss revenue sharing, manpower)
 504-4 5/27 (P meets King Faisal of Saudi Arabia)
 504-13 5/27 (P, HAK discuss MBFR, membership of PRC in UN)
 504-15 5/27 (P, JDE, Egil "Bud" Krogh, ELR, Fred Malek discuss organization of Narcotics Special Action Office, drug interdiction, methadone programs; later, P and HAK discuss drug problem in Vietnam)
 504-13 5/27 (P, WPR discuss issue of whether PRC should join UN; later, P, HAK discuss same issue)
 504-15 5/27 (P, HRH discuss numerous topics, including shakeups in CIA)
 505-4 5/26 (P, HAK discuss anti-semitism in Russia, African Americans in the armed forces)
 506-7 5/26 (P, David K. E. Bruce discuss Paris negotiations)
 506-18 5/28 (HRH analyzes poll data regarding opening to PRC)
 508-13 6/2 (P, RLZ discuss revenue sharing)

510-5 6/2 (P, JC discuss drug problem in America)
 258-42 6/23 (P, AMH discuss Vietnam)
 259-10 (P discusses dinner for Winton M. Blount)
 6-84 7/1 (P, J. Edgar Hoover discuss law enforcement, personalities)
 5-50 6/13 (P, AMH discuss Pentagon Papers)
 5-70 6/14 (HAK discusses Pres. Johnson's reaction to Pentagon Papers publication)
 5-109 6/17 (P stresses to CWC that Pentagon Papers are "stolen goods")
 4-103 6/9 (P, Gov. Ronald Reagan discuss shipbuilding in California)
 6-42 6/30 (P, Rep. F. Edward Hebert discuss Mansfield Amendment)
 6-163 (P, CWC discuss Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's plan to visit PRC)
 6-195 (P, Stewart Alsop discuss latter's leukemia treatment, cancer research)
 512-18 6/4 (P, HRH, discuss P's meeting with Arlen Specter on antidrug policy; representative of conversations in which P argues that an individual Jewish American he admires has attitudes going against a tendency, in this case a "softness" on law-and-order issues, that he regards as more common among American Jews)
 512-27 6/4 (P, VP discuss VP's upcoming trip around the world)
 513-4 6/7 (P, PGP discuss international trade)
 517-6 6/11 (P meets with Sen. John Sherman Cooper regarding SALT negotiations)
 517-20 6/11 (P, JC, HAK discuss recent policy of Chilean government and criticism of Brazil; representative of P's argument that Administration should stand by its friends overseas)
 518-3 6/12 (HAK discusses Le Duc Tho)
 519-1 6/14 (P, HRH discuss Brookings Institution and Pentagon Papers)

 525-1 6/17 (P, HAK discuss Daniel Ellsberg)
 526-2 6/18 (P, HRH discuss Pentagon Papers and HAK's reaction to their publication)
 526-3 6/18 (P meets Pres. Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal)
 527-9 6/19 (P and VP review latter's upcoming trip to Africa)
 527 -12 6/19 (P, JDE discuss Pentagon Papers probe, American Jews who figured in 1950s espionage investigations, Sen. Joe McCarthy)
 533-1 6/30 (P, ML discuss how to investigate leaks in State and Defense Departments)
 536-10 7/3 (P, CWC discuss whether personnel in Bureau of Labor Statistics are seeking to damage Administration by slanting unemployment figures)
 544-8 7/23 (P, JC, HAK, PMcC - wide-ranging meeting regarding economy, personnel cuts in Administration)
 547-9 7/27 (P, JC discuss who should replace Paul McCracken as CEA Chairman, and international monetary situation)
 549-25 7/28 (VP reports on his trip)
 552-3 7/30 (P, HAK discuss reaction of conservatives to opening to PRC)