#	User	Date	Time	Total Correct	Score	Percentage	Elapsed Time	Q10	Q20	IP
view	Smith.Tracy G.	10/31/2003	12:19:00 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	156	5	During President Johnson’s first month in office there were some major problems to deal with in South Vietnam. These problems were of great concern to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who went to South Vietnam to obtain a report on the situation. Most of the problems South Vietnam faced were in their new government. If they could not take care of themselves, then they could easily become trampled on again. The government was very “indecisive and drifting” (Logevall, Document 15). There was no one in the government that could make a good or clear decision because there was very little experience in the political administration area. This is a huge problem because the object of government is to rule and make decisions for a country or people. Another major problem was with “The Country Team” which was “very poorly informed and not working to a common plan” (Logevall, Document 15). If nobody is working together, then how can they expect to become a country able to defend itself and become free? South Vietnam was also conflicting USOM and military recommendations to the government of Vietnam and Washington regarding the size of the military budget. This is a symptom of the lack of communication this country faced. All of these problems were of great concern to our Secretary of Defense, who felt a need to help them out if they were ever going to become independent. The reason that this had not been resolved is because South Vietnam could not yet take care of itself. At the time, the Viet Cong controlled “very high proportions of people in certain key provinces” (Logevall, Document 15). This was all a part of trying to spread communism. If the Viet Cong could take over one more country, then communism is that much closer to taking over everything. The Strategic Hamlet Program was also greatly over-extended, with the Viet Cong destroying or abandoning many hamlets. The Viet Cong was also able to destroy many major roads and collect taxes at will. South Vietnam was obviously too weak and inexperienced to fight for itself. These were all major problems that needed to be fixed in order to resolve things for South Vietnam. To improve things, the government needed to reallocate its military forces to be able to become more efficient and effective. This would also make them much more powerful. For them to be able to do this they needed another more powerful country or countries to come in and help them get started. There was no way that they would be able to start themselves because of lack of experience. Most of the improvements should be made in their government and military at this time. They needed to increase their military staffs in order to get maximum use out of their operation. Securing the remaining government-controlled areas was also important. They needed to show some control over their area in order to show everyone else that they were not going to become overtaken by communism. People feared that if the United States did not become involved South Vietnam would at least become neutralized if not the very worst happening with the return of communism not only to South Vietnam, but it wouldn’t stop there. It would start spreading to other countries and it would be even harder to save people from this awful belief system. South Vietnam was vulnerable and new at being on their own and free. It would be very easy for them to become overtaken once again. Communism was already looking like it could start spreading like wild fire if it wasn’t stopped and the United States was probably one of the toughest countries able to deal with it. The United States has always prided itself on being the big brother to the smaller and weaker countries. What would the Americans have thought when it started spreading from country to country and we weren’t do anything about it? If they had done nothing to help stop the spread of communism, this world would have soon become a miserable place.	158.165.138.242
view	Graham.Deborah M.	10/31/2003	12:20:09 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	16955	5	Deborah Graham HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #5 Within his first month in office, President Johnson learned that the situation in South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15 (Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietnam? Why hadn’t the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did people think would happen if the United States did nothing? In 1960, Lyndon B. Johnson took office as Vice President of the United States, under John F. Kennedy. In 1963, when Kennedy was assassinated, he became the 36th president of the United States. Although Johnson’s ideas about Vietnam were similar to Kennedy’s, their strategies were quite different. The situation in Vietnam was changing rapidly, and the outlook was uncertain. Despite US support promised to South Vietnam, there had been no clear consensus on foreign policy. Dwight Eisenhower, while in office, chose a course of non-action, opposing a long, drawn out conflict that might have mirrored the US experience in Korea. John F. Kennedy committed himself mainly to stopping the spread of communism and preventing the “domino effect” from reaching US interests by supporting a new government in South Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson expressed his reluctance to increase military force, but also believed that the situation in Vietnam was escalating and required action to prevent a communist victory. One reason for the uncertainty was the unstable government system in South Vietnam. Eisenhower had supported Ngo Dinh Diem as a replacement for Bao Dai in 1955, concerned about the outcome of an election with no viable non-communist candidates. The US believed at that time that Diem could gain support in South Vietnam, and, with the help of US aid, make necessary reforms to stabilize the South Vietnamese government. The election results were suspicious at best (Diem claimed 98% of the vote,) but Diem took office at the end of 1955. He quickly proved himself to be a problem for US interests, refusing advice from US officials and employing tactics of corruption and violence. In 1963, the Kennedy administration helped to support a coup led by the South Vietnamese Air Force to oust Diem. In the months following, several Prime Ministers held short terms in South Vietnam. The US was obligated to support each candidate in turn, but no clear leader emerged. Adding to this problem, the Southern Vietnamese peasants opposed to communism were also opposed to French rule and American rule. There was no clear party to support, which made it difficult to build loyalty in this group. Another factor in the escalation of the war was the ineffectiveness of initial military involvement. US forces encountered problems with communication, intelligence, and the logistical difficulties of combat in a rural, agricultural environment. They were ineffective in stopping the flow of supplies to Viet Cong in the south, and unable to rally significant peasant support. Diem’s plan to use strategic hamlets to protect peasants from communist influence and infiltration was also largely ineffective, and the Viet Cong continued to advance into the south. When Johnson took office in 1963, American support for a war was building. Communism was considered a major threat to Democracy and the principles on which America was built. Not only was the American reputation on the line, but many saw combat in Vietnam as a way to protect our own freedoms in the long run, since it was widely believed that the communist threat could spread from Asia to other nations if unchecked. For these reasons, Johnson felt the time had come for more US involvement in South Vietnam. SOURCES: Vietnam: A Television History, "American's Mandarin (1954-1963)" Vietnam: A Television History, "LBJ Goes To War (1964-1965)" DeGroot, Gerald J. "A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War", 2000 Logevall, Fredrik "The Origins of the Vietnam War", 2001	12.108.30.38
view	Lear.Jason A.	10/31/2003	12:26:23 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	94	1	Jason Lear HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment # 1 Question 1: The Founding of the Vietminh The birth of the Vietnam Doc-Lap Dong Minh Hoi, or Vietminh, in summer of 1941 was the symbolic beginning of a long, multifaceted battle for freedom from foreign intervention. While in theory communist, the Vietminh initially was more nationalistic and pragmatic. Throughout, it remained a coherent, cogent, if not always consistent, voice for directing national resistance. The Vietminh leadership under Ho Chi Minh benefited from both intelligence and insight into Vietnamese mentality. Neither quality appeared in any quantity among the myriad leaders of the Republic of Vietnam. To understand the Vietminh’s importance, several aspects of their mission merit consideration. Among them are the Vietminh’s audience, its overarching goals, their specific plans and their enemies. Ho sought out to convert the whole of his people to the cause. The prelude to his first address to the newly formed Vietminh indicated this target audience: “Elders! Prominent personalities! Intellectuals, peasants, workers, traders and soldiers!” (Ho Chi Minh, Document 1) Despite this broad proclamation, though, the Vietminh was most concerned with the peasant population who so despised the yoke of French colonialism. “The people here suffered a lot because of high taxes and hard forced labor. They worked from dawn to dusk, but they did not have enough to eat.” (Duong Van Khanh, Video 1) The Vietminh promises of land reform and social justice guaranteed strong loyalty mainly from the poor. On the other hand, the communist mission, especially at the beginning, was balanced by nationalism with the goal of liberation. “The emphasis on national liberation would appeal to patriotic intellectuals, and was directed against both French rule and the growing Japanese presence in the country.” (Logevall, 13) By spotlighting Vietnamese freedom early on, the Vietminh prevented other groups from forming strong opposition, allowing it to focus on growth. Unlike more revolutionary communist movements, the Vietminh sought, above all else, a peaceful transition to independence. For a while, the Vietminh did their best to avoid direct confrontation (with several notable exceptions), opting for diplomacy, propaganda and low-level combat. After fighting the Japanese occupation during World War II, the Vietminh thought the war’s end would bring statehood. In a September 1945 victory speech, Ho paraphrased the declaration of independence. “His carefully chosen words were calculated to impress both his audience and, beyond them the Americans – whose support he desperately needed. The ‘Star Spangled Banner’ was played and Ho praised the ‘particularly intimate relationship with the United States.’” (DeGroot, 27) Soon after, the French returned with U.S. approval. The Vietminh, at Fontainebleau in 1946 did try to find a workable solution, but “the old problems remained unchanged: the Vietnamese wanted independence and a weak form of association with France.” (Logevall, 15) For each inch offered by the Vietminh, the French took a mile. Since independence would not come as easily as has been hoped, Ho’s cadre began to make more specific plans. The Vietminh’s logistical planning was dedicated to winning in the long run and not to decisive military victory. “The troops would spend most of their time as propaganda agents indoctrinating the local peasantry.” (DeGroot, 31) After a decade of using guerrillas to harass French troops, culminating in a more conventional victory at Dien Bien Phu, the Vietminh recommitted itself to its initial quest for peaceful transition. “A politburo resolution issued in early September 1954 called for a shift from war to peace, from the struggle for reunification to building a new society.” (Logevall, 35) The Vietminh entered the Geneva conference (to negotiate a French exit) from a position of strength and hoped to use their military momentum to gain political advantage. The conference ended with a temporary partition to be resolved by a national election in twenty-four months. “We thought that having signed the agreements, the French would now be forced by world opinion to carry out the Geneva accords. And we strongly believed that there would be a general election held in two years and then the revolution would certainly win.” (Colonel Bui Tin, Video 2) The Vietminh’s plans, for as long as possible were to find a diplomatic solution that would reunite the country under their leadership. Even when America came to inherit the war from the French, the basic strategy of guerilla war and propaganda leading to political victory would be maintained. Though they ultimately won out, some Vietminh plans worked better than others. Early successes did prove critical, however. As hunger gripped many rural Vietnamese under Japanese rule in 1945, “The Vietminh organized the peasants to seize rice stocks and gained tremendous prestige. This peasant support gave them a political edge they never lost.” (Narrator, Video 1) Though the peasants overwhelmingly supported the cause in the long run, there were certainly excesses and mistakes. The much-ballyhooed agrarian reforms promised by Ho failed when the first major program was launched in 1955. “For both ideological and sentimental reasons, the land reform campaign was escalated, so much so that in many areas vindictive peasant courts engaged in an orgy of land seizure.” (DeGroot, 55) It was only through Ho’s quick thinking such incidents were diffused. In this case, the Vietminh, from Ho Chi Minh on down, apologized for the accusations and wrongful executions. The greatest indication that the plans of the Vietminh were succeeding was that, despite uneven success, popular support remained strong for Hanoi and weak for Saigon. In 1961, inspired southern revolutionaries formed a political-military faction, the National Liberation Front, which would take its cues from Hanoi. The NLF was “a broad-based organization led by communists but designed to rally all those disaffected by Diem...” (Logevall, 38) On the whole, the Vietminh’s plans were marked by cautious execution and resounding success. The enemies of the Vietminh, throughout, changed as often as the South Vietnamese leadership. The French were warned early on by a Vietnamese officer, “Politics come before economics. Destruction is not important. The deaths…[are] not important. The French will die, too. We are ready. It will last 2 years, 5 years if necessary. We will no longer give in.” (General Jean-Julien Fonde, Video 2) But, the Vietminh would align their bull’s eye on any foreign interloper seeking to exert influence. For a time, even China would be considered hostile and kept at a distance, until Chairman Mao’s assistance became a necessity. Japan was universally hated during their occupation. In due time, despite initial hopes for an amicable relationship with America, it, too, would come to be seen as an intractable foe. “Americans were inextricably linked to an unpopular ideology and an even more unpopular administration. To the Vietnamese peasant they were the brokers of colonialism. Ho’s speeches increasingly pointed to the Americans, not the French as the real enemy.” (DeGroot, 36) While the RVN governments, the longest of which led by Ngo Dinh Diem, were hated by Hanoi, the people of South Vietnam might have hated them even more. If not for overwhelming economic and military aid, Southern Vietnam’s independent existence would have been pointlessly ephemeral. But no amount of money would alleviate the problem that even “those who could understand the predicament of the South Vietnamese peasants could still not feel compassion toward them.” (DeGroot, 100) Over the course of the seemingly interminable war, anyone who got in the way of the Vietminh would be considered an enemy target eventually. The establishment of the Vietminh by Ho Chi Minh and a few close supporters set the stage for a conflict that pit the will of a great many people against the most significant military apparatus ever to exist until that time. But now matter how strong the resolve of the United States and those who came before it was, it could not match that of the Vietminh. Though the history written by Hanoi after the U.S. slinked away in defeat would describe the Vietminh in terms sometimes incompatible with the tumultuous reality of its history, the organization proved a solid foundation on which to build a revolution. Sources: DeGroot, Gerard J. A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War. 2000. Logevall, Fredrik. The Origins of the Vietnam War. 2001. Minh, Ho Chi. Selected Works (Document 1). 1960-1962. Vietnam: A Television History, Video 1. Roots of War. Vietnam: A Television History, Video 2. The First Vietnam War (1946-1954).	67.42.59.113
view	Flitcraft.Traci K.	10/31/2003	12:29:06 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	38	2	The American Declaration of Independence of 1776 is and has been the model work for peoples and nations hoping to state a democratic philosophy and promote self-determination in their search for independence and nationhood. From the ideas of John Locke, Thomas Jefferson penned the document, which stated not only basic rights of humans, but listed grievances of the imperial British. The basic ideas of rights, liberty, and freedom being central to all people have been the important piece of the document. Thus, not just Americans or Europeans, but Asians and Africans, and Middle Easterns, Native Americans and others who have been exploited by competitive Imperialistic countries should experience freedom and liberty. These individuals united in spirit have as history might tell willed nationhood through resistance, self-sacrifice, and the true spirit of civilized humanity and gained their independence from conquerors like Mexico and Cuba gained freedom from Spain and ultimately Vietnam would gain freedom from Japan (1945), France (1954), and the United States (1974). The United States seems to symbolize the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. It is natural for other nations wanting the empowerment of self-government to use the same map that the United States used to gain nationhood and the position of worldly power. “For much of their history, the Vietnamese people have struggled against foreign invaders.” (Logevall, 7) The Vietnamese Declaration of Independence states clearly the desire of this people to achieve inalienable rights that so many others have earned and further states this peoples objections to a foreign countries control. They have shown the French as a governing body interested in exploitation and unscrupulous profiteering of Vietnam. The Declaration has also shown instances of Frances inability to protect Vietnamese people from foreign invaders, such as Japan’s invasion of French controlled Indochina in 1940. (Video #1) This document also continues to breath the spirit after each new colonial power tries to recapture Vietnam and make it into a colony. Although Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam free in the northern part of Vietnam, in Hanoi’s Ba Dinh square in 1945, and to the 400,000 North Vietnamese audience, he meant that ALL of Vietnam should be reunited and he was stating that this country was on a course of self-determination and the rest the world needed to be aware of their state of mind. (Logevall, 98) His primary concerns are uniting Vietnam and promoting a democratic society under one government without foreign interference. Although Ho Chi Minh was part of the French Communist party, he was “first and foremost a Nationalist.” (DeGroot, 102) Much of this conflict is based on the word in Vietnamese that means freedom. (Vietnam #1) The Vietnamese people, according to their leader Ho, deserved basic rights that all humans should have. He used the declaration of Independence of 1776 and restated grievances as well as basic rights and believed strongly that Vietnam could be reunited and remade so that all individuals with its borders could enjoy, benefit, and be protected by a government developed by and for Vietnamese. He would also symbolize the resolve of the Vietnamese to fight and die, but earn “Minh”. “Our Party is great because it covers the whole country and is at the same time close to the heart of every compatriot.” (Logevall, 107)	198.236.63.2
view	Thompson.Sarah J.	10/31/2003	12:39:52 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	86	2	A declaration of independence is in essence a very straightforward manuscript. It is an article that declares someone or something independent, it seems almost redundant to analyze it, however the actual wording, the timing, and the speaker of such a document are all very significant. The fact that Ho Chi Minh fashioned the Vietnamese declaration of independence after the United States Declaration of Independence is quite noteworthy. There are several reasons Ho Chi Minh did this; a main reason was that Ho Chi Minh was quite fond of things American and looked fondly upon Thomas Jefferson, in fact he held the American people and their ideals in the highest of regard. At this time in world history the Vietnamese and the Americans were on friendly terms. “The Americans were seen as the great anti-colonial and anti-fascist liberators by many Vietnamese and Ho played it for all it was worth.”(Birchall, 1) Nowhere is this more obvious then when the Star Spangled Banner was played and Ho Chi Minh talked of the “intimate relationship [Vietnam] had with the US”. (DeGroot, 27) For thirty years Ho Chi Minh traveled the world and in his time abroad he saw read an learned many things, he saw the double standard that many people in the civilized world were living, shouting for freedom and discriminating against others all in one breath. He came to know the ramifications of countries colonizing territories and exploiting their natural resources. This document like the declaration of independence that the United States wrote was not for a single group alone to read, but for the all the nations of the world to take notice of. Ho Chi Minh was speaking not only to his followers also to friends and enemies around the world. Both the US declaration of independence and the Vietnamese declaration of independence end with a list of unjust actions and atrocities committed against them. Ho Chi Minh wanted the world to be aware that he and his fellow countrymen realized the great degradation of their people, their culture and their morale. He wanted the world to be aware that these unjust and unfair actions against the Vietnamese were not unnoticed. No more were they the downtrodden in the rice paddies and the rubber factories they were ready for their independence and freedom. The Vietnamese declaration of independence ends “the entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.” This is similar to the US declaration of independence, which ends “we mutually pledge to each other our lives our fortunes and our sacred honor.” This drove home the point that they were ready to throw off the yoke of oppression and stand up as one nation and fight for their deserved freedoms and unalienable rights. This document was not for the Vietnamese populace alone. Instead this was a statement to the world, declaring themselves free waiting for recognition from without not within. For the peasants already knew of Ho Chi Minh’s undying love for his nation the people of Vietnam were no strangers to war their “long history of domination had developed into a strong tradition of national identity “ (Logevall, 7) the people were eager to follow a man how loved his country so much and had proved it in so many ways. His continued commitment to them was unparalleled he was always considered an admirable leader of their revolution. Ho Chi Minh was not concerned the Vietnamese people would question his authority, decisions or leadership but that other countries my try to take advantage of such a small, fragile country ransacked and divided by countless long years of war. Ho chi Minh did not want a divided country, by declaring every person free he hoped to unite the small war torn country in a fight for life and freedom where all the Vietnamese worked together to take back their lands, and their lives. Worked together to take back their country from the hands of the aggressive exploiting nations. Birchall, Jonathon Ho’s American Pals Article Financial Times (London, England) Aug - 15 1998 DeGroot, Gerard J. A Nobel Cause? America and the Vietnam War Logevall, Fredrik The Origins of the Vietnam War	209.181.58.91
view	Duste.Matt R.	10/31/2003	12:48:08 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	92	2	Matt Duste HST195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #2 A great deal can be learned from a nation’s Declaration of Independence. See Document #2 (Logevall p.96-98). Why was this declaration so similar to the American Declaration of Independence? What did this document mean? What were its authors trying to accomplish? What were Ho Chi Minh’s primary concerns? Who was the main target in this war of words? Why? Grade on paper= /100 Spelling- Grammar- No Use of First Person- Answer the question(s)- Document evidence- Other evidence- Instructor Comments: On March 9, 1945 the Japanese swiftly and forcibly took control of Indochina from the French who had been governing for more than eighty years during WWII. Ho Chi Minh leading the Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Vietminh, collaborated with the United States to fight the Japanese. On August 19, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan, the Japanese surrendered. Vietminh quickly took control of the government capital of Hanoi. Many religious, communist and nationalist groups declared support to the Vietminh. Indochina experienced a widespread nationalist revolution from August 18-28. On August 29, the Vietminh created the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with Hanoi as its capital. On September 2, in Hanoi’s Ba Dinh square, President HO Chi Minh declared Vietnam an independent nation from their French colonial oppressors. Vietnam’s declaration of independence was celebrated by Vietminh leaders and American officers while The Star Spangled Banner was played by the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, authored by Ho Chi Minh a communist leader, echoed The Declaration of Independence for the United States of America. All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free. (Logevall p.96) Ho praised the ‘particularly intimate relationship with the United States’. (DeGroot p.27) The audience he was trying to reach was not only that of the Vietnamese but also the Americans he had collaborated with against the Japanese. America was once a colony of a paternal nation and had won independence also. The President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, had conveyed consideration for Indochina’s independence. Abbot Low Moffat said, “The President had already decided that Indochina should be under an international trusteeship after the war (WWII). He had apparently told a great many people that he did not want the French to go back. That they had been there for over one hundred years and the people of Indochina were worse off now than they were.” (Vietnam: A Television History, Roots of war) He considered the French “exploitative and irresponsible”. (Logevall p.14) Ho Chi Minh needed the Americans to keep the French from attempting recolonization of Vietnam. However, the need for French and British cooperation in Europe applied pressure on Roosevelt to take on a more lenient position toward colonial rule. He also was of the opinion that, “The Vietnamese were unprepared for self-rule and would therefore need a period of foreign tutelage”. (Logevall p.14) This was due to the rapid fall of the Japanese. Roosevelt’s successor, President Harry Truman was much less concerned with anticolonialism and much more concerned with European stability. Ho Chi Minh was unsuccessful at winning American support, Through an allied plan the Chinese entered Vietnam from the north while British troops entered from the south. Indochina was still considered a French colony to America and Europe. Sources: Logevall, Fredrik “The Origins of the Vietnam War”, 2001 DeGroot, Gerard “A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War” 2000 Vietnam: A Television History, Roots of War	66.190.252.9
view	Ferguson.Casey L.	10/31/2003	13:29:07 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	76	3	Casey Ferguson HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Instructor J. Escobar Question #3: Determine what was “declared” on July 21, 1954? What steps were to follow the conference? What was the precise status of Vietnam? Why do you think the United States refused to join in the Final Declaration? Why was America standing apart at Geneva? The Final declaration of the Geneva Conference, that was issued of 21 July 1954, was intended to bring a new system of government to the Republic of Vietnam through the cessation of hostilities within Vietnam. The declaration stated that “the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. (Logevall, p. 105) The declaration was to try to prevent the expansion of communism. The western world saw the communists as “children of darkness, the source of evil in the world.” (Logevall p. 25) The United States were not satisfied with the final settlement on the declaration at Geneva, due to the declaration giving too much power to the Vietminh. The declaration divided the country into two regions, north and south at the seventeenth parallel. It allowed Ho Chi Minh to control the northern half of the country under communist rule. It also called for a free general election to be held in July of 1956 to unify the country. The United States feared that the elections would allow the popular candidate and communist Ho Chi Minh to take control of the entire country. In an attempt to prevent the Communists from taking control of the country “Washington moved quickly in the wake of the Geneva Conference to implement a Regional Defense System.” (Logevall p. 28) This system was to succeed France from as the direct supplier of financial and military assistance to the South Vietnamese. The United States took this stance because the Conference in Geneva took ‘note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military as well as all kinds of arms and munitions.’(Logevall p. 104) The United States refused to sign the accords, but issued a statement that agreed not to disturb the Vietnamese by the threat or use of force. The United States had realized that the accords worked to the advantage of Ho Chi Minh and the communist government. The United States believed that if the communists gained control of Vietnam, the “‘domino theory’ in which the fall of one country in the region to communism would cause the others to tumble swiftly as well. Knock over one domino and the rest would soon follow.” (Logevall p.21) The United States had stood apart at the conference because it had to prevent the spread of communism and did not sign the accord due to the popular belief at that time was “one can rarely win at the bargaining table what one was unable to achieve on the battlefield.” (Logevall p. 26) Through not signing the accords it allowed the United States to organize the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which consisted of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan. With this ‘U.S officials used this supposed collective security pact to justify the unilateral American commitment to Vietnam (Logevall p. 28) This gave the United States the ability to succeed France as the main military supporter of South Vietnam, as well as allow the United States to mold a leader for Vietnam. After the Agreement went into effect the Emperor Bao Dai was deemed by the United States as a weak, unsupported ruler, and supported his newly appointed Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem as the political leader of South Vietnam. Diem took control of South Vietnam through a landslide election victory (which was rigged). The country was in a state of turmoil and needed a strong ruler following the Geneva conference. This paved the way to an opportunity for the United States to escalate its military involvement in Vietnam in its attempt to prevent the spread of communism. Source: Logevall, Fredrik “The Origins of the Vietnam War” 2001	64.136.27.57
view	Miller.Jason M.	10/31/2003	13:36:09 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	1269	5	Jason Miller HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment # 1 Question # 5 Within his first month in office, President Johnson learned that the situation in South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15 (Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietnam? Why hadn’t the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Grade on paper=________________ / 100 Spelling Grammar No Use of First Person Answer the questions Document evidence Other evidence Instructor Comments: During President Johnson’s first month in office he had learned that the situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated with the return of Sec. of Defense Robert McNamara during December of 1963. On his return of the two day visit to South Vietnam Robert McNamara reported: The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed In the next 2-3 months will lead to neutralization at best and more Likely to a Communist-controlled state. (Logevall, 118) McNamara pointed out that the new government is the largest concern. They are very inexperienced in political administration. The Country Team is second major weakness. They lack leadership, are poorly informed and do not have a common plan to work together on. The Viet Cong have progressed greatly since the coup. The situation has been deteriorating for at least six months in the countryside. They have destroyed most of the major roads and are collecting taxes at will, mainly around Saigon in the south and west as well as in the delta. They are using trails in Laos and Cambodia. They are also using the Mekong River and the tip of the delta: The best guess is 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos In the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials Which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments… (Logevall, 120) The problems did not get resolved because the US had supported the coup of Diem. Over the next eighteen months to follow Saigon went through five different Prime Ministers, each worse than the last in loss of productivity in winning the war and by being more corrupt than the last. Due to the complicity of the coup the US was forced into supporting each new government which was weaker than the last and would require more US involvement. According to Taylor: The coup of Diem lifted the lid from the Pandora’s Box in which Diem had confined the genies of political turbulence. When freed, these forces tore South Vietnam apart. (DeGroot, 82) The situation in South Vietnam could have been improved upon if the Americans were not trampling all over an ancient culture, and if the evidence collected by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research had been paid attention too. The INR had suggested in the early 60’s “American aid did little to improve the quality of governance or increase peasant loyalty.” (DeGroot, 76) During most of the time of the conflict the western world was afraid of communism. The domino theory was wide spread among most of the US. McCarthyism had just ended and the threat of the reds taking over was in the fore front of most peoples mind. Then Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued: Failure in Vietnam would cause the communist world… [To] draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. (DeGroot, 125) The United States government could not afford to look weak in the communists’ eye over anything. The fear of communist take over was real to the world leaders of the west with the Russian support of Castro in Cuba and the defeat at his hands at the Bay of Pigs so the government could not just sit back and watch the South Vietnamese fall victim to the communists.	198.81.26.175
view	Gross.Allen	10/31/2003	13:43:30 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	114	1	The Vietminh spoke to the nationalist spirit of the peasantry. The chief victims of colonialism were the peasants, with sixty per cent of the rural population landless, and 6200 landlords owning 45 per cent of the rice acreage. (De Groot, p. 19) This group was a faithful core throughout the growing struggle for an independent Vietnam. They had been, as Phan Boi Chau put it, “like frogs in the bottom of a well… We knew nothing about life.” (DeGroot, p. 19) It would be difficult to wake this people. In his Pac Bo speech, Ho calls to a diverse audience. “Elders! Prominent personalities! Intellectuals, peasants, workers, traders, and soldiers! Dear compatriots!”(Logevall, p. 95) Ho addressed the intellectuals who “possessed an infectious spirit of optimism and cultural pride.” (DeGroot, p 23) And, he spoke to the elders and prominent personalities, “The elders and prominent personalities of our country should follow the example set by our forefathers.” It’s important to note that Ho made two separate and additional calls in the speech in Pac Bo. “Dear compatriots!” was a request for monetary contributions. Ho offered his “modest abilities to follow,” meaning his French education. The second is to the “Revolutionary fighters!” (Logevall, p. 96) calling on nationalist ears, “…the blood of our heroic predecessors who sacrificed their lives is stirring in your hearts!” (Logevall, p. 96) Exploitative of resources human and otherwise, and the subsequent humiliation of its’ racism, “The French always felt themselves to be superior to the Vietnamese.” (Video 1) In his speech in Pac Bo, Ho first speaks of the victimization of the Vietnamese people under colonialist rule, “There was a saying that the workers were fertilizer for the rubber trees, because their corpses were buried under the trees.” (Houng Quoc Viet, Video 1), and the historically independent nature of the Vietnamese people, “…when our country was endangered by the Mongolian invasion, our elders under the Tran dynasty rose up indignantly…to kill the enemy.” (Logevall, p95) These hallmark qualities of colonial rule carried forward the cause of the Vietminh. The Vietminh wanted an end to colonialism, and an independent autonomous Vietnam. Naturally, they saw themselves in the leading role. It must be said that Ho’s communism was consistently secondary to that goal. In fact, “Party journals censured Ho’s nationalist, peasant-based plan.” (DeGroot, p 23) The founding of the Vietminh in June 1941 was also a defining moment in the life of one man, Ho Chi Minh. Ho had read Lenin “Theses on the National and Colonial Questions,” and realized its’ usefulness as “a means of liberating Vietnam and other oppressed countries from colonial rule.” (Logevall, p. 10) Though having been removed from Vietnam for 30 years; France, United States, Germany, China, and the Soviet Union; Ho maintained a desire for an independent Vietnam. “Ho wanted the Vietminh to seek the dual objectives of national independence for Vietnam and the implementation of major social reform. But he gave primacy to the former goal.” (Logevall, p. 12) The Vietminh were effective in select, but vital areas. As the Japanese advance stalled in China on the one side, and Allied air pressure was placed on the other, and France was unable to muster any forces to save itself in Indo-China. With Ho’s land reform program an attempt to recover, for the peasants, land taken by the French or Vietnamese collaborators, and the industrial sector was a closed system, and dominated by outsiders. (DeGroot, p. 19) Ho felt it was time for a successful revolution for independence. Specifically the continued support and sacrifice of the common people. They were able to fight anywhere with the help of villagers throughout the country. The Vietminh rhetoric offered land to the landless and during the famine of the mid 40’s, organized peasants to seize rice stores thereby gaining tremendous prestige. (Video 1) Ho had two fronts toward which to direct his rhetoric. His father being a former government worker who quit in disgust at the Vietnamese leadership succumbing to French puppetry, Ho was fully aware of the tradeoff of people for profit, and who was behind it. Bao Dai was offered the puppet leadership position by the French when his father died, and Ho was no less disgusted than his father had been. In the larger context Ho was speaking to the western nations. Ho was one of a handful of French educated Vietnamese elite, and had taken the cause of Vietnamese independence to the Versailles conference (Video 1), gaining the respect of his fellow expatriate countrymen, but more importantly gaining western recognition if not notoriety, he spoke to the larger international audience. Ho had sought western support for the cause of independence, and targeted support for the Vietminh among the western nation as well. However, the western powers were afraid their own colonies would be placed under trusteeship as well, and none would relinquish their control. (Video 1) He had hoped to induce the Allies, by pointing to Trumans’ 14 points, that Vietnam should be independent but was denied entrance to the conference (Video 1), and “he despaired when [even] western communists turned a blind eye toward the imperialist excesses of their own countries.” (DeGroot, p. 22) SOURCES: DeGroot, Gerard J. "A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War", 2000. Logevall, Fredrik “The Origins of the Vietnam War”, 2001. Vietnam: A Television History, "Roots of War”	67.1.55.132
view	Schulze.Robert M.	10/31/2003	14:12:27 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	45	2	Robert Schulze 10/20/03 L00302286 History 195 On September 2nd 1945 Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of Vietnam from the French empire. The first words of his speech were taken directly from the United States declaration of independence. He also alluded to the French declaration and used many words that were from the Communist Manifesto. Most historians see this as a way to curry favor with the United States which had given support to his Vietminh during WWII. This opinion is most likely true. Unfortunately leading to war for the United States, they could not provide support or recognition to this new Vietnam. The British were hoping to reinstall the French into power, and shift their attention back to their own colonies. For Ho and the people of Vietnam this meant the return to war with the French who now had the support of the United States. Ho’s declaration had used wording that borrowed from the two democratic systems that he was familiar with. He had spent many years in France before the outbreak of WWII working for the strengthening of Vietnam and the withdrawal of the French from his native land. He was also the first Vietnamese to join the communist party, which explains the Marxist language in his own declaration years later. When the OSS worked with the Vietminh toward the end of the WWII, he was in direct contact with influential people in the United States army in the Pacific Theater. He was “hoping for help” from the United States after the war according to maj. Patti of the OSS. This explains his direct use of our declaration of independence. The use of the French wording later in the document, “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” was a way to show that even though the French ruled over the Vietnamese people they were not equal they were labor. This is a good reason for his use of a phrase like “exploited our workers” to explain his position as a communist. Major Patti however said in his interview that Ho was a nationalist first then a communist. This leads to the question, if the United States had given him aid and support would his government have been communist? The name of the country he declared independence for was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The audience for Ho and his declaration had many layers. First and foremost were the people of Vietnam. The peasants and the nationalist forces that fought along side him in the Vietminh, and the other nationalist troops fighting for the independence of their country. This was a way for Ho to gain support from the other nationalist groups that had not sympathized with his Vietminh. The second audience was the international community, especially, the Americans and French. Ho needed the support of other nations to legitimize his government. He was right in his thinking that the United States would be their for his government, however he knew that he would also have to be ready to fight the French if they did not recognize the declaration. The use of language from both the French and American was also a way that Ho was able to show the similarity between Vietnam’s struggle for independence and the struggles that both of these nations had faced. Ho and his declaration were fist of all for his supporters. The borrowing of language from both French and American declarations was a way for him to show the similarities in the struggle for independence from colonial rule and the oppressive rule of peasants by the upper class. Although the Vietnamese declaration did not gain support from the United States or the end of colonial rule from France it did solidify the power of Ho Chi Minh and create the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Vol I, root of war, Interview with major patty Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War DeGroot, A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War	67.1.44.56
view	Scharton.Robert J.	10/31/2003	14:14:10 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	340	5	*********************************************************************** Robert Scharton HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #5 Within his first month in office, President Johnson learned that the situation in South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15(Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietman? Why hadn't the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Grade on paper = /100 Spelling Grammer No Use of First Person Answer the question(s) Document evidence Other evidence Instructer Comments: ***************************************************** ****************** Lyndon Johnson took over the Presidents job and problems after the death of President Kennedy. At this time in history the United states was deeply concerned with the spread of communisum and what they can do to stop it. Johnson has only been in office for a few weeks and has learned that the situation in South Vietnam has greatly deteriorated. On December 21 1963 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported to President Johnson on the problems that were identified during a two day trip to South Vietnam, "the situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state"(Logevall p118). A major problem in South Vietnam is that there is a new government led by Duong Van Minh. Minh declares that he is in charge and not the committee of generals. Who is in charge is unclear but in any case niether are experienced enough in political administration to do anything about whats going on in South Vietnam. Another concern is the country team and its lack of leadership. The real problem that South Vietnam is dealing with is the progress of the Viet Chong. The Viet Chong are in control of mass amounts of people in certain key provinces. They have destroyed many key roads and are taxing the people at will. The situation in South Vietnam has been going up and down for many years. There have been multiple countrys that have had a hand in what is going on there. France had colonized Vietnam for almost 100 years and had done nothing but exploited the Vietnamese people. During this period the United States had backed the French. It wasn't until the fear of the spread of communisn that the United States stepped in. The President was advised: "as remedial measures, we must get the government to reallocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces essentially doubled." (Logevall p119) The people thought that if the United States did nothing that eventually communisn would take over Vietnam and slowly spread across the world with the help of China and Russia, who at the time were backing the North. *********************************************************************** Robert Scharton HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #5 Within his first month in office, President Johnson learned that the situation in South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15(Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietman? Why hadn't the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Grade on paper = /100 Spelling Grammer No Use of First Person Answer the question(s) Document evidence Other evidence Instructer Comments: ***************************************************** ****************** Lyndon Johnson took over the Presidents job and problems after the death of President Kennedy. At this time in history the United states was deeply concerned with the spread of communisum and what they can do to stop it. Johnson has only been in office for a few weeks and has learned that the situation in South Vietnam has greatly deteriorated. On December 21 1963 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported to President Johnson on the problems that were identified during a two day trip to South Vietnam, "the situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state"(Logevall p118). A major problem in South Vietnam is that there is a new government led by Duong Van Minh. Minh declares that he is in charge and not the committee of generals. Who is in charge is unclear but in any case niether are experienced enough in political administration to do anything about whats going on in South Vietnam. Another concern is the country team and its lack of leadership. The real problem that South Vietnam is dealing with is the progress of the Viet Chong. The Viet Chong are in control of mass amounts of people in certain key provinces. They have destroyed many key roads and are taxing the people at will. The situation in South Vietnam has been going up and down for many years. There have been multiple countrys that have had a hand in what is going on there. France had colonized Vietnam for almost 100 years and had done nothing but exploited the Vietnamese people. During this period the United States had backed the French. It wasn't until the fear of the spread of communisn that the United States stepped in. The President was advised: "as remedial measures, we must get the government to reallocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces essentially doubled." (Logevall p119) The people thought that if the United States did nothing that eventually communisn would take over Vietnam and slowly spread across the world with the help of China and Russia, who at the time were backing the North.	64.28.63.89
view	Nguyen.Khang P.	10/31/2003	14:35:06 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	97	1	Khang Nguyen HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment Question #1 The founding of Vietnam Doc-Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietminh in June 1941 was a major event in the history of Southeast Asia. READ Document #1 (Logevall). To whom were the Vietminh speaking? What were the major points raised by the Vietminh? What did they want? Where their plans effective? Who was the main target in this war of words? Why? The Germans overpowered France in June 1940, and the Vietnamese acknowledged the situation. Quickly as Ho Chi Minh recognized the predicament, he returned to his homeland, Vietnam, to form the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh); the party was formed in May 1941. “Ho Chi Minh early years was difficult to trace. He was always mysterious about himself giving little interviews” (Video #1, Roots of War) Ho Chi Minh's, leader of the Vietminh, words was, “Follow-countrymen! Rise up!... The hour has struck!” (DeGroot p. 23) His main objective was now their time to break free from trying to influence all colleagues in Vietnam to unite and fight against the Japanese and the French. Ho Chi Minh believed that all elders, intellectuals, peasants, workers, traders and soldiers, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Vietnam needed to have more trust and love for their country and finally overthrow their enemies. The reason for a liberation movement was that was their chance. Vietnam’s history of struggle to be independent from foreign control is near. The French being defeated by the Germans, couldn’t fight two wars with their crippled army. Their numbers were shrinking with such dramatic loss from the Germans; the Vietnamese could not miss this advantage. Also the Japanese being another enemy with the Vietnamese, they were struggling from China, British and American forces. With this intervention, Japan and France could compete with the Vietnamese if they came together. Finally uniting, Vietminh lead the fight against their invader, the Japanese. In 1945, the Japanese surrender after Hiroshima. After the surrender, Vietminh took over Hanoi and declare the Independence of Democratic Republic in Vietnam. As the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed, the flag of a five pointed yellow star on red field was hoisted and Ho Chi Minh became the president of the Provisional People’s Government. The United States supported with supplies and weapons from the war with Japan. Ho Chi Minh hopes for more United States support against their other invader, the French. The Vietnamese admired the United States in expressing their gratitude in the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Vietnam, signed on September 2, 1945. The document was intentionally formulated after the United States Declaration of Independence was in content, wording. “All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” (United States Policy Toward Vietnam, 1940-1945 p. 121) This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of the United States of America in 1776. The United States did not follow through because the French influenced the United States that this war was the stop of spreading communism. Ho Chi Minh received aid from the Chinese and the Soviets, and later is called a betrayal from the South Vietnamese; the South did not want to be Communist, they wanted their independence. In conclusion to the war, Ho Chi Minh regulated an objective government that defeated its enemies, then took over the South making it Communist. SOURCES: DeGroot, Gerard J. “a Noble Cause? American and the Vietnam War”, 2000 Vietnam: A Television History, “Roots of War” Brown, Weldon Amzy. “Prelude to Disaster “, 1975 Drachman Edward R. “United States Policy Toward Vietnam, 1940-1945”, 1970	67.168.207.230
view	Bylsma.Conrad D.	10/31/2003	14:45:09 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	79	3	Conner Bylsma HST 195 Assignment #1 / Question 3 By mid 1954 it seems that every country of power either had their foot in the door of Indochina or their own strong opinion about what should be done with the situation. Whether worded covertly or not the issue in Western minds was the destruction of communism, particularly to the US. This fact caught the attention of all communist states and anybody worried about their freedoms being wiped out by imperialism and colonialism. America’s sphere of influence had grown considerably after WWII, much to the dislike of other foreign powers. Washington had its own goals in my mind and seemingly didn’t care very much what anybody had to say about them. The US slowly and carefully let it be known that they wanted to dominate the situation in Indochina and put a hard edged policy in place of the detested French policy. “When Paris policy-makers began speaking in mid-1953 of the need for an early negotiated settlement, US officials were appalled.” (Logevall 25) In July of 1954 the countries concerned had converged at the Geneva conference hoping to come out with a unilateral written policy. The US did not expect to like anything that would from the conference; since WWII the lingering concept of containment and unconditional surrender left little room for negotiations. In fact, John Foster Dulles very reluctantly attended the conference and refused to shake the hand of the communist representative of China. However, the conference did not turn out as bad as Washington expected. Instead of coming up with any real conclusion a “holding action” had been implemented on Vietnam and Indochina for future diplomacy (for which little followed). The Geneva conference allowed the Vietminh to inhabit the northern part of Vietnam above the seventeenth parallel. There were many restrictions on the Vietminh to prevent hostilities and this was seemingly reciprocated on the part of the countries that had signed and agreed, of which the US was not one. “In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.” (Logevall 106) The US did not sign the Geneva accords mainly because they did not want to recognize communist China, but this declaration is certainly a good reason as well; “Interference” is exactly what the US is looking for in regards to Vietnam. It was also stated that an election would be held in 1956 to reunite the country and bring peace. The US knew that it was very possible for a communist government to legally come to power through an election--this had to be avoided completely. “The Geneva agreements called for country wide elections in 1956, if Ho Chi Minh won, the communists would control all of Vietnam.” (Video # 2) Though Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh had the dominating power in Vietnam (including over foreign colonialists as seen in the embarrassing defeat of the French at Dienbienphu) they left the conference with only half a country. They later sought to reclaim what they had lost. While Ho Chi Minh had the power in Vietnam and probably the popularity over Bao Dai, he didn’t always have the support. It was apparent after the separation of North and South Vietnam that many people in the North either did not want to be communist or just didn’t want any trouble from foreign powers. “Nearly one million Vietnamese, largely Catholic, migrated from North to South during the cease-fire, ten times the number moving North.” (Hall 7) It is apparent that French missionary influence was strong as seen in this migration. Though the Vietminh’s power was great, they still had to step lightly in negotiations at the Geneva conference. They knew that the US would have little problem declaring a full-scale war on their country and so had to appease to the demands of the conference. China and the Soviet Union knew this as well and often whispered in the ear of the DRV for their own protection. The Geneva conference was little more than a temporary solution to a situation that was much more out of the hands of the rest of the world than they would like to think. The US completely destroyed any legitimacy that the accords may have had. If anything, the conference simply allowed the US to move into South Vietnam and tighten their grip that much more around the communist threat. SOURCES: Logevall, Fredrik. “The Origins of the Vietnam War”, 2001 Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 99, Vietnam War, 1999 Vietnam: A Television History, “American’s Mandarin (1954-1963)	67.164.61.228
view	Billups.Matthew C.	10/31/2003	14:49:00 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	41	3	Matt Billups HST 195 - 1st Written Assignment The Geneva Conference was initiated on April 26, 1954 in Geneva, Switzerland. Participants from the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, China, The DRV, Cambodia, and Laos were all present. Despite the attendance of both the United States and representatives from Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam, neither parties participated in the conference. Both individual parties were specifically there for strictly observational purposes. The negotiations, in which the conference consisted of, touched basis on several “Far Eastern Problems” (Hall, p.6). The Geneva Conference was basically developed in regards to finding a primary solution to restoring the peace in Indochina, which essentially meant finding a solution to the political situation that was currently happening in Indochina during that time period. As far as what was “declared” on July 21, 1954 in relevance with the result/outcome of the Geneva Conference, was a series of mutual understandings between all of the parties present at the conference. These mutual understandings were confirmed through a series of signed agreements; the Geneva Accords. These signed agreements “established a cease-fire, a temporary division of French and Vietminh forces at the 17th Parallel, elections to reunify Vietnam within two years, and the formation of an international commission to supervise the agreement’s fulfillment” (Hall, p.7). These were to be the formal steps taken succeeding the Geneva Conference. Not every party present at the Geneva Conference had their expectations met though, such as the DRV leaders who were looking to emphasize and push the influence of communist ideas and goals. There were however, parties that benefited from the conference, such as the Soviets and the Chinese, who “were more interested in improved relations with the western powers than in pressing Vietnamese communist goals” (Hall, p.7). As far as the whole Geneva Conference in regards to the United States’ position, American leaders saw little purpose in any kind of compromises or agreements associated with communist governments. This idea was especially emphasized as a result of the “unprecedented power in world affairs” (Logevall, p.25) that the United States had obtained after World War II. As a result of this perspective that American leaders had on the conference that took place in Geneva, they decided that there participation would consist only of observation. The idea that association and compromise between a communist government served as little to no purpose in regards to the political agenda and hopes of American leaders, which resulted in the refusal of signing the Final Declaration during the Geneva Conference. American leaders had their own idea in terms of actions that should be taking place in South Vietnam. Following the Geneva Conference, leaders of the United States turned their attention to discontinuing the communist influences within South Vietnam, and turning it into a “noncommunist state” (Hall, p.7). The United States proceeded to bypass the Geneva Accords due to the fact that elections could result in a communist Vietnam under the control of Ho Chi Minh. Meanwhile, the communists attention was focused on reconstructing a new government in North Vietnam. After the Geneva Conference, the state of Vietnam was basically divided into two separate regions of different political agendas. Due to the fact that “the Geneva Accords allowed one year of free movement between the two halves of Vietnam” (Video #2, Narrator), it was permitted to “...allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live” (Geneva Accords, document #8). As a result, close to one million Vietnamese journeyed from the North region to the South. This information reveals that the majority of movement between the two areas were Vietnamese migrating from the North to the South. In the South, America had recommitted their support and involvement with Diem, and together were looking to avoid any kind of election that would allow Ho to reunify the North and the South under a communist government. In 1954, Diem resorted to a campaign known as “Denounce the Communists,” consisting of “using armed forces to uproot the Vietminh remnants in the South” (Hall, p.8). Despite Ho’s intentions to avoid war, attacks on the North eventually led them to retaliation. Due to a lack of compromise between the North and the South, confrontational friction between the two regions resulted in thousands of casualties in both the North and the South. This violent confrontation between North and South Vietnam, eventually developed into a war, in which the first significant battle occurred on the second of January. SOURCES: Logevall, Fredrik “The Origins of the Vietnam War”, 2001 Hall, Mitchell “The Vietnam War”, 2000 Vietnam: A Television History, “American’s Mandarin”, (1954-1963) The Geneva Accords: “Document #8”, (1954)	12.225.174.163
view	Day.Brian C.	10/31/2003	14:50:19 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	5780	5	If the declarations made in the Geneva accords had been enacated as they were stated, and Vietnam was indeed permitted to "henceforth play their part, in full independence and soveriengity" ( Logevall, document 8, p. 104 ) Vietnam would have been united under a Communist state after two years, had their been a fair election in July of 1956. Of Course the United States was not prepared to allow this to happen and they found help in a like minded Vietnamese statesmen Ngo Dinh Diem, who seized control of Saigon in 1954. From Washingtons perspective Diem's nine year reign as president of the Republic of South Vietnam was in no ways smooth or consistent, it was characterized with ups and downs; begining with uncertainty, eventually peaking in the late fifties when he was championed as one of our strongest anti-communists allies, and ending like in a bloody US supported Coup and assasination in 1963. At the highth of Diems reign Washingtons goals in Vietnam seemed to almost be attainable through purely political methods, after the assasination and the subsequent political conflagration in Saigon this was clearly no longer the case. This was made unambiguousley clear to President Lyndon Johnson in Robert Mcnamaras report on his visit to Saigon in December 1963. Mcnamaras report made it clear that there was no decisive leadership in Saigon and that this was the most concerning problem. Instead of the Minh government it was apparant that the commitee of generals were making the decisions as is often the case after a Coup. The primary problem with this is that if the generals are concerned with their political aims they are not focusing on fullfilling their duties as military commanders. Mcnamara makes this point by telling Johnson that a certain General whose name was illegible was spending little or no time commanding III Corps which was in charge of protecting an imperative zone around Saigon. The consequences of this were severe as Mcnamara makes clear in the fourth point of his report; "Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup.... The Viet Cong now control very high portions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon." ( Logevall, Doc 15 ) In attempt to prevent the Viet Cong from forming a more pervasive presence in the South Vietnamese countryside a program of strategic hamlets had been implemented near the end of Diems reign. The idea was that if you could consolidate all the peasants in a fortified area and remove all politcal trouble makers, the remaining peasants loyalty whether politicaly founded or not could be bought with American aid. Unfortunatley this was not the case as the aid money seldom found its way to the peasants. The hamlet program instead provided opportunities for corruption among Diems officials, and becauese life in the hamlets was no better than in the countryside the peasants had no reason to defend them from communists insurgensts. "by the spring of 1963, only 1,500 of the 8,500 strategic hamlets actually constructed were still viable. At the same time, the NLF was levying taxs in 42 of the 44 provinces supposedly under Diems control." ( Degroot, p.76 ) This point was made clear to Johnson by Mcnamaras who concluded that the Hamlet program had been overextended and was left wide open to the Communusts who were taking over and taxing the countryside at will. Mcnamara presented a few reasons as to why the situation had not been resolved; the Political instablilty in Saigon, an ineffectiveness in leadership among American political advisors, and a communication gap between the head of the Millitary Assistance Command, Paul Harkins, and the US ambasodor to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge. Essentially the problem boiled down to the fact that the Communists were not going to be kept out of South Vietnam by the government in Saigon, the only thing that could possibly prevent this from happening was the United States, and in 1963 there was simply not a sufficient prescence of United States aid and or military advisory to effectivly accomplish this. The nuts and bolts of this solution were spelled out by Mcnamara as he saw it; "As remedial meausures, we must get the government to reallocate its millitary forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operation" ( Logevall, Doc. 15 ) If these goals were not met Mcnamara and the rest of the United States feared that Vietnam, and consequently the rest of South East asia would fall to the hands of communism.	128.223.86.54
view	Miller.Christy L.	10/31/2003	14:51:33 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	67	5	Christy L. Miller HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #5 Within his first month in office, President Johnson learned that the situation in South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15 (Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietnam? Why hadn’t the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Grade on paper = ___________/100 Spelling Grammar No Use of First Person Answer the question(s) Document evidence Other evidence Instructor Comments: America was already in a quagmire concerning Vietnam when Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took over the presidency on November 22, 1963. America had become involved long before November 22, 1963. America’s involvement actually started in October 1945 when a State Department document declared that ‘with regard to the situation in French Indochina, this Government does not question French sovereignty’. (DeGroot, p. 28) In fact, President Roosevelt was unable to stand up for his belief that Indochina should be a free independent nation, that a free Indochina would risk instability in Europe for the sake of self-determination. President Harry Truman unashamedly placed European security before decolonization of Vietnam. However, after the French defeat, the Truman government officially recognized, in February 1950, the Associated State of Vietnam, governed by Boa Dai, a French puppet. President Eisenhower’s solution to Vietnam was what he called the ‘New Look’. The ‘New Look’ was a strategy that relied heavily upon nuclear weapons for deterrence or for actual combat rather than the sending in of ground troops. (DeGroot, p.39) President Eisenhower’s two policies to combat communism were containment and the domino theory. President Eisenhower’s containment policy was that the U.S. could not destroy communism, but it should prevent its expansion. The domino theory was that ‘the fall of one country in the region to communism would cause others to tumble swiftly as well. Knock over one domino and the rest would soon follow.’ (Logevall, p. 21) These two policies became the battle cry of the Vietnam era. Advocates used them to escalate the war, and dissenters used them to denounce the war. President Kennedy, in the summer of 1961, agreed to a settlement that established a three party rule, consisting of rightists, neutrals and the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao controlled the mountain region of eastern Laos, which bordered North Vietnam. This gave Ho Chi Minh the advantage to move men and supplies into South Vietnam through Laos, paving the way for ‘1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entering South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963’. (Longevall, p. 120, Document #15) In the summer of 1961, a steady stream of supplies and troops were transported to South Vietnam down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was not a single road that lead from North to South but many roads. Between 1961 and 1962, President Kennedy increased the number of “advisers”. Over that twelve-month period, an additional 10,000 Special Forces and logistical troops plus 120 helicopters and 300 aircraft were sent to South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the communication between the Vietnamese and the advisors was not effective. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported to President Johnson, on December 21, 1963, ‘Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins. …Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. … I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now…’ (Longevall, p. 120, Document #15) President Kennedy’s firm endorsement and encouragement of a showdown between Ngo Dinh Diem and several dissident generals resulted in Diem and his brother not only losing their place in the government but also in their deaths in November 1963. “But Kennedy’s death in Dallas only three weeks later overshadowed the assassinations in Saigon. It was left for the new President to discover what Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Ngo Dinh Diem had created in South Vietnam.” (Video #3, Narrator) In March 1964, American intelligence estimated that the National Liberation Front (NLF) controlled about 40 per cent of the South’s total Land. (DeGroot, p. 126) The Viet Cong had made great progress during the period after the coup of Diem’s government. According to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s report, ‘ … the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.’(Logevall, p. 119, Document 15) In early 1965 John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, summed up American priorities this way: 70%-To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor) 20%-To keep South Vietnam (SVN) (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands. 10%-To permit people of South Vietnam (SVN) to enjoy a better, freer way of life. Also-To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used (DeGroot, p.125.) Perhaps reordering those priorities could have led to success. Had the United States focused 70% of the attention on permitting ‘the people of South Vietnam (SVN) to enjoy a better, freer way of life, and 10% on avoiding a humiliating U.S. defeat’, perhaps the South Vietnamese people would have had greater incentive to participate in the search and destroy missions. The communists controlled the pace of the war. Less than 1 per cent of the nearly 2 million small unit operations conducted by the Americans resulted in contact with the enemy. ‘It was sheer physical impossibility to keep the enemy from slipping away…. In 1967, an official at the Department of Defense Systems Analysis Office advised McNamra: The Vc/Nva started the shooting in over 90% of the company- sized fire fights. Over 80% began with a well-organized enemy attack. ...if, as I believe, their strategy is to wait us out, they will control their losses to a level low enough to be sustained indefinitely, but high enough to tempt us to increase our forces to the point of US public rejection of the war. (DeGroot, p.154) Would the difference between the history-recorded failures of the Vietnam War have been rewritten to the success of the United States if the South Vietnam people had been the primary priority, thus realizing the preservation of the United States reputation?	198.81.26.175
view	Butler.John F.	10/31/2003	14:56:47 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	111	3	John Butler HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #3 Reread Document #8 (Logevall), the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, to determine what was "declared" on July 21, 1954? What steps were to follow the conference? What was the precise status of Vietnam? Why do you think the United States refused to join in the Final Declaration? Why was America standing apart at Geneva? The most significant agreements contained in The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference were the following: all hostilities were to cease, Vietnam would be divided at the 17th parallel with the Vietminh to the north and the Bao Dai government to the south, and there would be a countrywide general election to unify the country in July of 1956. Parties to the agreement were to meet in July of 1955 and, over the next year, formulate a plan for elections and unification. The agreement left Vietnam a divided country, with both sides looking for allies and armaments for the coming battle. Although the Vietminh came away from Geneva with far less than their military position indicated, the also reaped some benefits. On the world stage, they gained a great deal of recognition by defeating the French and forcing them to the bargaining table. They were able to reorganize their political center in the north, while forestalling any large-scale American military intervention in the south. They also received a great deal of support from China at the conference. That support would be important in their upcoming war with the United States. The South Vietnamese government was in a very precarious position after Geneva. Bao Dai, a very unpopular and weak leader, headed the government. He was forced to install individuals in his government who were staunchly anti-communist, such as Ngo Dinh Diem, in order to receive continued support from the United States. Those decisions by Bao Dai only increased the hostility between his government and the South Vietnamese people. The chances that a non-communist government would unify the county were very slim. Significantly, the American delegation refused to sign the agreement and instead issued a separate statement that they “would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb [the agreement]”. (DeGroot, 54) American strategy was obvious: to allow a diplomatic roadblock which would prevent further military action by the Vietminh -- who were in a superior military position after their decisive defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu -- while at the same time withholding American diplomatic recognition of the Vietminh government. Another benefit of the agreement is that it gave the Vietminh government the impression that there would be a quick unification of the country and that they could use the time before the elections to strengthen their influence in the south. However, with the signing of the agreement, the United States was now able to work to foster a viable non-communist government in the south, much as they had done in Korea. American political and military strategy, they believed, could work freely in the south without the taint of colonialism now that the French had been defeated. America stood apart from the agreements and from the countries that signed the agreements due to their disagreement with certain provisions. Particularly the provisions which prohibited interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam and the introduction of foreign troops and arms into the country. America officials knew, probably at the time of the agreements, that the chances of building a non-communist government in the south was very slim and, for that reason, they wanted to keep their prospects open militarily. As early as February, 1955, the State Department realized that, “Almost any type of election that could conceivably be held in Vietnam in 1956 would, on the basis of the present trends, give the Communists a very significant, if not a decisive advantage.” (DeGroot, 60) The Americans were not going to allow those elections to go forward. SOURCES: Vietnam: A Television History, “The First Vietnam War (1946-1954)” Vietnam: A Television History, "American's Mandarin (1954-1963)" DeGroot, Gerald J. "A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War", 2000 Logevall, Fredrik "The Origins of the Vietnam War", 2001	12.108.30.24
view	Miller.Christy L.	10/31/2003	14:59:06 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	23	5	Christy L. Miller HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 Question #5 Within his first month in office, President Johnson learned that the situation in South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15 (Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietnam? Why hadn’t the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Grade on paper = ___________/100 Spelling Grammar No Use of First Person Answer the question(s) Document evidence Other evidence Instructor Comments: America was already in a quagmire concerning Vietnam when Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took over the presidency on November 22, 1963. America had become involved long before November 22, 1963. America’s involvement actually started in October 1945 when a State Department document declared that ‘with regard to the situation in French Indochina, this Government does not question French sovereignty’. (DeGroot, p. 28) In fact, President Roosevelt was unable to stand up for his belief that Indochina should be a free independent nation, that a free Indochina would risk instability in Europe for the sake of self-determination. President Harry Truman unashamedly placed European security before decolonization of Vietnam. However, after the French defeat, the Truman government officially recognized, in February 1950, the Associated State of Vietnam, governed by Boa Dai, a French puppet. President Eisenhower’s solution to Vietnam was what he called the ‘New Look’. The ‘New Look’ was a strategy that relied heavily upon nuclear weapons for deterrence or for actual combat rather than the sending in of ground troops. (DeGroot, p.39) President Eisenhower’s two policies to combat communism were containment and the domino theory. President Eisenhower’s containment policy was that the U.S. could not destroy communism, but it should prevent its expansion. The domino theory was that ‘the fall of one country in the region to communism would cause others to tumble swiftly as well. Knock over one domino and the rest would soon follow.’ (Logevall, p. 21) These two policies became the battle cry of the Vietnam era. Advocates used them to escalate the war, and dissenters used them to denounce the war. President Kennedy, in the summer of 1961, agreed to a settlement that established a three party rule, consisting of rightists, neutrals and the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao controlled the mountain region of eastern Laos, which bordered North Vietnam. This gave Ho Chi Minh the advantage to move men and supplies into South Vietnam through Laos, paving the way for ‘1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entering South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963’. (Longevall, p. 120, Document #15) In the summer of 1961, a steady stream of supplies and troops were transported to South Vietnam down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was not a single road that lead from North to South but many roads. Between 1961 and 1962, President Kennedy increased the number of “advisers”. Over that twelve-month period, an additional 10,000 Special Forces and logistical troops plus 120 helicopters and 300 aircraft were sent to South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the communication between the Vietnamese and the advisors was not effective. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported to President Johnson, on December 21, 1963, ‘Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins. …Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. … I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now…’ (Longevall, p. 120, Document #15) President Kennedy’s firm endorsement and encouragement of a showdown between Ngo Dinh Diem and several dissident generals resulted in Diem and his brother not only losing their place in the government but also in their deaths in November 1963. “But Kennedy’s death in Dallas only three weeks later overshadowed the assassinations in Saigon. It was left for the new President to discover what Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Ngo Dinh Diem had created in South Vietnam.” (Video #3, Narrator) In March 1964, American intelligence estimated that the National Liberation Front (NLF) controlled about 40 per cent of the South’s total Land. (DeGroot, p. 126) The Viet Cong had made great progress during the period after the coup of Diem’s government. According to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s report, ‘ … the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.’(Logevall, p. 119, Document 15) In early 1965 John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, summed up American priorities this way: 70%-To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor) 20%-To keep South Vietnam (SVN) (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands. 10%-To permit people of South Vietnam (SVN) to enjoy a better, freer way of life. Also-To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used (DeGroot, p.125.) Perhaps reordering those priorities could have led to success. Had the United States focused 70% of the attention on permitting ‘the people of South Vietnam (SVN) to enjoy a better, freer way of life, and 10% on avoiding a humiliating U.S. defeat’, perhaps the South Vietnamese people would have had greater incentive to participate in the search and destroy missions. The communists controlled the pace of the war. Less than 1 per cent of the nearly 2 million small unit operations conducted by the Americans resulted in contact with the enemy. ‘It was sheer physical impossibility to keep the enemy from slipping away…. In 1967, an official at the Department of Defense Systems Analysis Office advised McNamra: The Vc/Nva started the shooting in over 90% of the company- sized fire fights. Over 80% began with a well-organized enemy attack. ...if, as I believe, their strategy is to wait us out, they will control their losses to a level low enough to be sustained indefinitely, but high enough to tempt us to increase our forces to the point of US public rejection of the war. (DeGroot, p.154) Would the difference between the history-recorded failures of the Vietnam War have been rewritten to the success of the United States if the South Vietnam people had been the primary priority, thus realizing the preservation of the United States reputation? Sources: DeGroot, Gerard J. “A Noble Cause? American and the Vietnam War”, 1983 Logevall, Fredri. “The Origins of the Vietnam War, 2001 Vietnam: A Television History.	198.81.26.175
view	Newton.Alexis N. Confidential	10/31/2003	15:34:13 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	29	n/r	Alexis Newton October 31, 2003 HSt 195 Vietnam Written Assign. #1 Question # 5 Within his first month of office,President johnson learned that the situation is South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15 (Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietnam? Why hadn’t the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did the people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Lyndon B. Johnson came into office late in 1963, after President Kennedy's tragic death. President Johnson wasn’t surprised at the situation which lie before him. As Vice-President Johnson had followed the Vietnam situation closely. On page 58 of the Logevall text, it states President Johnson saying, “It is clear to me that South Vietnam is our most critical military area and let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there.” Johnson came into office with great plans for the United States, and wanted to focus on creating “The Great Society” he had dreamt about. He didn’t want to have to decide if our boys should go fight a war, that so many people questioned. Like President Johnson's predecessors he realized his and Americas credibility was at stake. Since the 1954 Geneva conference, and the splitting of Vietnam, the southern half had suffered tremendously from political disarray. When Johnson came into office it was on the heels of Ngo Dinh Diems (South Vietnams current Prime Minister) coup d etat. Johnson, like Kennedy, Eisenhower, Truman and Roosevelt, didn’t not want to help Vietnam, he just was unsure about how to help a place, he viewed as incapable of helping itself. Just as the North and South were split, the people of the South were also. The political leaders of Southern Vietnam didn’t know how to reach the divided countrymen. The peasants were tired, angry and alienated. Religious conflicts brewed, and the army was near collapse. Johnson believed the people of the south were not interested in helping themselves. In fact, on page 62, the Logevall book states “One finds evidence that Washington decision makers were more committed to the war than were the mass of the south Vietnamese”. This idea, people were feeling quite a time before we sent any ground troops there. The only people, at the beginning of Johnson's term that were making progress in Vietnam, were the Vietcong communist. Not only were things tough in Vietnam, but “Influential voices within the United States were coming to question the viability of continuing the US commitment to the war.” (Logevall, 60) With all this in mind, and an upcoming election to face, Johnson wanted to keep things quiet and the growth of the United States commitment minimal. President Johnson was very anti-communist, but he also didn’t want war. He wanted a way out, but there seemed to be no clear easy way. On page 59 of Logevall, Johnson conveys to biographer Doris Kearns, “ I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that the communists took over China.” Johnson needed a re-election, and didn’t want Americans to perceive him how they had perceived Truman. Whether he feared, like Kennedy a psychological domino effect, or like other past presidents a territorial domino effect- the ability for the US to negotiate of neutralize didn’t seem to be an option. On page 46 of Logevall, Kennedy is quoted saying, “The moves of the United States now made would be examined on both sides of the iron curtain... as measure of the administrations intentions and determinations,’ and if it chose to negotiate it might ‘in fact be judged weaker.” On the same page, it also speaks of a Rusk-McNamara report saying “The loss of South Vietnam would... undermine the credibility of american commitments elsewhere.” So here you can see that it was believed by presidents, including Johnson, that if the US was shown to not be able to control South Vietnam, it wouldn’t be able to control situations elsewhere. They were determined to seek a way to control the escalating situation. They thought the answer was increased aid and military support to stop the rapidly advancing Vietcong. They were unsure about what to do about the South Vietnamese who were simply exhausted from decades of fighting. They wanted Vietnam to stabilize their government, but that didn’t seem to be happening. Johnson tried to get support fro allies, but other countries weren’t interested. America was becoming isolated from the international community. With hope fading, the advancement of the Vietcong, and their attacks, throughout 1964 and 1965 Johnson increased the US troops in Vietnam by more than 200,000. (Vietnam: A Television History Tape #4) In the McNamara report to President Johnson it was believed that, “Current trends unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely a Communist-controlled state.” (Logevall,118) Also, McNamara states on the same page, “The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting.” The United States was determined to not let communist take control of another country! It is hard to answer the question what could be done to improve things. I don’t think they really had any idea. In the first video it states “The Vietnam War, was a war that never had any clear lines or objectives.” They thought with political stability there would be great improvement. They couldn’t make that happen though. The US believed that they had to stay until things were resolved, so that they didn’t look like failures. Unfortunately this came at way to high of a cost. Sources: Degroot, Gerard J. “A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War”, 2000 Vietnam: A Television History, Roots of War, LBJ Goes to War Logevall, Fredrik “The Origins of the Vietnam War”, 2001	67.164.57.170
view	Newton.Alexis N. Confidential	10/31/2003	15:34:26 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	42	5	Alexis Newton October 31, 2003 HSt 195 Vietnam Written Assign. #1 Question # 5 Within his first month of office,President johnson learned that the situation is South Vietnam had greatly deteriorated as noted in Document #15 (Logevall). What were the problems in South Vietnam? Why hadn’t the situation been resolved? What could be done to improve things? What did the people think would happen if the United States did nothing? Lyndon B. Johnson came into office late in 1963, after President Kennedy's tragic death. President Johnson wasn’t surprised at the situation which lie before him. As Vice-President Johnson had followed the Vietnam situation closely. On page 58 of the Logevall text, it states President Johnson saying, “It is clear to me that South Vietnam is our most critical military area and let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there.” Johnson came into office with great plans for the United States, and wanted to focus on creating “The Great Society” he had dreamt about. He didn’t want to have to decide if our boys should go fight a war, that so many people questioned. Like President Johnson's predecessors he realized his and Americas credibility was at stake. Since the 1954 Geneva conference, and the splitting of Vietnam, the southern half had suffered tremendously from political disarray. When Johnson came into office it was on the heels of Ngo Dinh Diems (South Vietnams current Prime Minister) coup d etat. Johnson, like Kennedy, Eisenhower, Truman and Roosevelt, didn’t not want to help Vietnam, he just was unsure about how to help a place, he viewed as incapable of helping itself. Just as the North and South were split, the people of the South were also. The political leaders of Southern Vietnam didn’t know how to reach the divided countrymen. The peasants were tired, angry and alienated. Religious conflicts brewed, and the army was near collapse. Johnson believed the people of the south were not interested in helping themselves. In fact, on page 62, the Logevall book states “One finds evidence that Washington decision makers were more committed to the war than were the mass of the south Vietnamese”. This idea, people were feeling quite a time before we sent any ground troops there. The only people, at the beginning of Johnson's term that were making progress in Vietnam, were the Vietcong communist. Not only were things tough in Vietnam, but “Influential voices within the United States were coming to question the viability of continuing the US commitment to the war.” (Logevall, 60) With all this in mind, and an upcoming election to face, Johnson wanted to keep things quiet and the growth of the United States commitment minimal. President Johnson was very anti-communist, but he also didn’t want war. He wanted a way out, but there seemed to be no clear easy way. On page 59 of Logevall, Johnson conveys to biographer Doris Kearns, “ I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that the communists took over China.” Johnson needed a re-election, and didn’t want Americans to perceive him how they had perceived Truman. Whether he feared, like Kennedy a psychological domino effect, or like other past presidents a territorial domino effect- the ability for the US to negotiate of neutralize didn’t seem to be an option. On page 46 of Logevall, Kennedy is quoted saying, “The moves of the United States now made would be examined on both sides of the iron curtain... as measure of the administrations intentions and determinations,’ and if it chose to negotiate it might ‘in fact be judged weaker.” On the same page, it also speaks of a Rusk-McNamara report saying “The loss of South Vietnam would... undermine the credibility of american commitments elsewhere.” So here you can see that it was believed by presidents, including Johnson, that if the US was shown to not be able to control South Vietnam, it wouldn’t be able to control situations elsewhere. They were determined to seek a way to control the escalating situation. They thought the answer was increased aid and military support to stop the rapidly advancing Vietcong. They were unsure about what to do about the South Vietnamese who were simply exhausted from decades of fighting. They wanted Vietnam to stabilize their government, but that didn’t seem to be happening. Johnson tried to get support fro allies, but other countries weren’t interested. America was becoming isolated from the international community. With hope fading, the advancement of the Vietcong, and their attacks, throughout 1964 and 1965 Johnson increased the US troops in Vietnam by more than 200,000. (Vietnam: A Television History Tape #4) In the McNamara report to President Johnson it was believed that, “Current trends unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely a Communist-controlled state.” (Logevall,118) Also, McNamara states on the same page, “The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting.” The United States was determined to not let communist take control of another country! It is hard to answer the question what could be done to improve things. I don’t think they really had any idea. In the first video it states “The Vietnam War, was a war that never had any clear lines or objectives.” They thought with political stability there would be great improvement. They couldn’t make that happen though. The US believed that they had to stay until things were resolved, so that they didn’t look like failures. Unfortunately this came at way to high of a cost. Sources: Degroot, Gerard J. “A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War”, 2000 Vietnam: A Television History, Roots of War, LBJ Goes to War Logevall, Fredrik “The Origins of the Vietnam War”, 2001	67.164.57.170

 

#	User	Date	Time	Total Correct	Score	Percentage	Elapsed Time	Q10	Q20	IP
view	Jackson.Linda L.	10/31/2003	15:44:55 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	139	1	Linda Jackson HST 195 Vietnam Telecourse Written Assignment #1 10/30/03 Questions #1 The founding of the Vietnam Doc-Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietminh) in June 1941 was a major event in the history of Southeast Asia. Read Document #1 (Logevall). To whom were the Vietminh speaking? What were the major points raised by the Vietminh? What did they want? Were their plans effective? Who was the main target in this war of words? Why? The founding of the Vietminh in June of 1941 was the result of Ho Chi Minh’s efforts to establish Vietnam as a free and independent nation, which would be united. Ho was trying to create a single voice for the people of Vietnam to look to for their political leadership. As leader of an occupied nation, Ho looked to other nations for help with establishing the Republic of Vietnam as a free nation. China, USSR, and The United States of America were asked to help Ho in his quest for the people of Vietnam. Ho did receive help from the Chinese and the Soviets but not necessarily because they believe in his ambitions but for their own self-serving reasons. His vision was of a free and independent self-governing nation. He knew that only a unified nation could prosper and defend itself against enemies. With a willingness to fight for what he believed in Ho Chi Minh led the Vietminh with unwavering determination. This resolve spilled not only into the Vietminh Army but into the Vietnamese people as well, which create a strength though courage that was undefeatable. Army leaders, soldiers along with the people had a determination that was unmatched by the French and the Americans. As shown by General Vo Nguyen Giap statement “In war you must win.” (Vietnamese War Sciences). Inspirational speaking was a talent of Ho’s. Diem said in his call for national salvation: “Every Vietnamese must take part in it. He who has money will contribute his money, he who has strength will contribute his strength, he who has talent will contribute his talent. I pledge to use all my modest abilities to follow yum, and am ready for the last sacrifice.” (Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works, Volume II, pp. 151-4) Not only was “Uncle Ho” (Video 1) using his passionate words to communicate with the people of Vietnam, but he was also sending a clear message of inevitable war to any nation who stood in the Vietminh’s path to a free nation. This inspirational message of hope and war was also meant as a warning to France and Japan, that if not headed would surely bring war. Materialization into war against the piecemealed armies of France and Japan, was inevitable. After the French had failed to keep imperialistic control in Vietnam and Japan was distracted with its fight with the Germans Ho led the Vietminh against the occupying forces. Because Ho knew when to act, and having the courage to act, the Vietminh were successful in moving forward on the road to freedom. “The nation comes first, especially the fatherland”. (Video 2) These words said by Ho Chi Minh were a testament to the people of the priorities of the Vietminh held. Ultimately the Vietminh’s plans would not have taken place with out the leadership Ho Chi Minh provided to the Vietminh and all the people of Vietnam.	67.164.56.140
view	Koss.William V.	10/31/2003	18:41:37 America/Los_Angeles	0	0	0	168	2	Question # 2 A great deal can be learned from a nation's Declaration of Independence. Read Document #2 (Logevall). Why was this declaration so similar to the American Declaration of Independence? What did this document mean? What were its authors trying to accomplish? What were Ho Chi Minh's primary concerns? Who was his audience for this speech? On September 2, 1945, in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam to be an independent nation. The document declaring independence, (penned by Minh), had many similarities to the American Declaration of Independence. It also shared similarities with the Declaration of the French Revolution of 1791 which states: 'All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.' (Logevall, p. 96) This declaration was an example of the resolve felt, not just by Minh, but by a population weary of being dominated for so long. For sixty one years prior to Who's declaration, the Vietnamese people had lived under the rule of the French. France, who had divided the country into three parts, ruled the southern portion, Cochin China as a colony, and was self proclaimed "protectorate" over Tonkin and Annam, the northern and central portions. As in most cases of dominance and submission, the submissive resent their dominators. Especially when they are forced to adopt foreign values, religions, morals etc. As Ho writes: In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty. They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center, and the South of Viet-Nam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united. They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots; they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood. They have fettered public opinion; they have practiced obscurantism against our people. To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol. In the field of economics, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impoverished our people and devastated our land. They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolized the issuing of bank notes and the export trade. (Logevall, pages 96-97) As with other colonial uprisings, unfair and or unjust taxes, levied by the colonizer, were an issue. "They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty". (Logevall, p. 97) The audience for the Declaration of Independence, were cheering throngs of peasantry and young students who were excited to be taking a part in the changes in their nation. Even American military officers joined in the celebration. However, "Even as American officers joined in the celebrations in Hanoi on September 2, their superiors back in Washington were clearing the way for a return of the French to Vietnam". (Logevall, p.14) Ho Chi Minhs' concerns were many. The proclamation of the new Republic of Vietnam was a major attempt to unify the citizenry against colonialism, and establish a unified country that could be in control of her own destiny. His Declaration was an announcement, and at the same time an appeal to the world, and to the compassion of the United States. He needed the support of the Americans in order to gain "legitimate" recognition throughout the world. After the death of Roosevelt, who had expressed support for an independent Indochina, the new president Harry S. Truman, did not share the same foreign concerns over Southeast Asia, and the French reassumed control. For many Vietnamese, the Declaration of Independence and the August Revolution were: the sort of mass voluntarist surge of power that anti colonialists had dreamt of for decades....for those who were in their teens or early twenties, it represented the formative experience of their lives, fostering a deep sense of solidarity and readiness to sacrifice; older Vietnamese saw the August Revolution as justification for the previous agonies, capping three generations of struggle against unbelievable odds. (Marr, Vietnamese Tradition, p. 416) After the French had reestablished themselves in command of Vietnam, delegates from both countries met for talks in Fontainebleau, France. It seemed the differences between the representatives from both countries would not be resolved. American journalist, David Schoenbrun asked Ho what he would do if the French would not grant some sort of independence. "President Ho, what will you do"? Why, we will fight of course. We will be like the elephant and the tiger, when the elephant is strong and rested and near his base we will retreat. And if the tiger ever pauses, the elephant will impale him with his mighty tusks. But the tiger will not and the elephant will die of exhaustion and the loss of blood". (Logevall, p. 16) Sources: Logevall, Fredrik "The Origins of the Vietnam War", 2001 Marr, David G. "Vietnamese Tradition on Trial", 1920-1945, 1981 Vietnam: A Television History, "Roots of War" DeGroot, Gerard J. "A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War", 2000 Question # 2 A great deal can be learned from a nation's Declaration of Independence. Read Document #2 (Logevall). Why was this declaration so similar to the American Declaration of Independence? What did this document mean? What were its authors trying to accomplish? What were Ho Chi Minh's History 195 Vietnam Telecourse/Written Assignment #1 by Bill Koss primary concerns? Who was his audience for this speech? On September 2, 1945, in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam to be an independent nation. The document declaring independence, (penned by Minh), had many similarities to the American Declaration of Independence. It also shared similarities with the Declaration of the French Revolution of 1791 which states: 'All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.' (Logevall, p. 96) This declaration was an example of the resolve felt, not just by Minh, but by a population weary of being dominated for so long. For sixty one years prior to Who's declaration, the Vietnamese people had lived under the rule of the French. France, who had divided the country into three parts, ruled the southern portion, Cochin China as a colony, and was self proclaimed "protectorate" over Tonkin and Annam, the northern and central portions. As in most cases of dominance and submission, the submissive resent their dominators. Especially when they are forced to adopt foreign values, religions, morals etc. As Ho writes: In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty. They have enforced inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center, and the South of Viet-Nam in order to wreck our national unity and prevent our people from being united. They have built more prisons than schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots; they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood. They have fettered public opinion; they have practiced obscurantism against our people. To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol. In the field of economics, they have fleeced us to the backbone, impoverished our people and devastated our land. They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolized the issuing of bank notes and the export trade. (Logevall, pages 96-97) As with other colonial uprisings, unfair and or unjust taxes, levied by the colonizer, were an issue. "They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty". (Logevall, p. 97) The audience for the Declaration of Independence, were cheering throngs of peasantry and young students who were excited to be taking a part in the changes in their nation. Even American military officers joined in the celebration. However, "Even as American officers joined in the celebrations in Hanoi on September 2, their superiors back in Washington were clearing the way for a return of the French to Vietnam". (Logevall, p.14) Ho Chi Minhs' concerns were many. The proclamation of the new Republic of Vietnam was a major attempt to unify the citizenry against colonialism, and establish a unified country that could be in control of her own destiny. His Declaration was an announcement, and at the same time an appeal to the world, and to the compassion of the United States. He needed the support of the Americans in order to gain "legitimate" recognition throughout the world. After the death of Roosevelt, who had expressed support for an independent Indochina, the new president Harry S. Truman, did not share the same foreign concerns over Southeast Asia, and the French reassumed control. For many Vietnamese, the Declaration of Independence and the August Revolution were: the sort of mass voluntarist surge of power that anti colonialists had dreamt of for decades....for those who were in their teens or early twenties, it represented the formative experience of their lives, fostering a deep sense of solidarity and readiness to sacrifice; older Vietnamese saw the August Revolution as justification for the previous agonies, capping three generations of struggle against unbelievable odds. (Marr, Vietnamese Tradition, p. 416) After the French had reestablished themselves in command of Vietnam, delegates from both countries met for talks in Fontainebleau, France. It seemed the differences between the representatives from both countries would not be resolved. American journalist, David Schoenbrun asked Ho what he would do if the French would not grant some sort of independence. "President Ho, what will you do"? Why, we will fight of course. We will be like the elephant and the tiger, when the elephant is strong and rested and near his base we will retreat. And if the tiger ever pauses, the elephant will impale him with his mighty tusks. But the tiger will not and the elephant will die of exhaustion and the loss of blood". (Logevall, p. 16)	12.81.216.20