Either i'm misunderstanding you, or you've contradicted yourself. Here's my argument...

On 2/25/2003 7:12:47 PM, Julia Prociw wrote:
>A clone would not be "me"
>because the cell being used
>does not have my memories or
>experiences or even body (they
>have their own that looks like
>mine). If I wanted
>immortality I would need to be
>able to keep all of the same
>memories and experiences.

Point well taken. What you are saying is memories=identity. You are you because of your distinct thoughts and experiences. BUT then...

Someone with
>amnesia is still the same
>person even tho they can't
>remember it.

...this is where i see a contradiction. How can one be the same person if they don't have the same memories?? All they appear to be is the same physical makeup, but an empty shell with no identity! Any willing person could here forth put false memories into that amnesiac and the patient would be none the wiser.

>Two of us may both be present to
>experience the same exact
>sunset, but because of they
>way that my body perceives and
>the way yours perceives is
>different, the experience is
>slightly different and that is
>what makes the memory
>individual for each of us.

I disagree. I think it is possible for two separate entities to experience the same moment with the same qualities. Here's a morbid (albeit, possibly weak) example: Nagasaki. Nobody had a different experience. They were all vaporized at approximately the same time. Now one could argue that milliseconds of time before vaporization between victims would change the experience and thus that experience would be 'individual'. I think a better way to nail down this topic is what are the qualitative definitions of memories? What is it that makes mine different from yours if we are at the same precise time and place, yet viewing different realities?