On 2/1/2003 7:22:16 PM, Penny Peters wrote:

>My question is this; without
>John's physical entity, how
>can his psychological being be
>expressed? Without John's
>body, how can he express his
>opinions or tell his jokes? I
>really don't see how the two
>can be separated.

A dualist might admit that I can't access
John's mind without interacting with his
body, but maintain that this does not prove
his mind and body are the same thing.
Conceptually, a person is something
different from a flesh and blood body, even
if the two cannot be separated from one
another. A helpful analogy: You cannot see
an object's shape without seeing its color
(including shades of gray and black). But
shape and color are conceptally clearly
different things.
>
>As for a person with amnesia
>exhibiting different
>personality traits, and
>therefore questioning if it is
>the same person, who is to
>know that these different
>traits weren't always there,
>just dormant?

A dualist might question whether or not the
new traits were consistent with the old
ones. If so, that might be evidence that
they don't belong to a person. If along with
those traits is a different set of memories,
one not associated with the body in
question, along with skills and abilities
which it is unlikely the person in this body
could or did aquire, one might reasonably
conclude that there is another person
inhabiting the body.

Prof. Borrowdale



Prof. Borrowdale
borrowdalej@lanecc.edu
541-463-5434