

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840 Chapter Contents
Book Title: Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People
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Chapter 11

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
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Chapter Introduction

Jackson as Democracy Incarnate

Andrew Jackson struck a romantic military pose for this portrait painted in 1820. Posing as the embodiment of democracy and as an extravagantly melodramatic hero, Jackson imposed himself on his times as few Americans have done.



Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution/Art Resource, NY



National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution/Art Resource, NY

NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERS from the 1820s until the outbreak of the Civil War faced two persistent problems. First, economic development and territorial expansion made new demands on government—demands that involved federal participation in state and local affairs. Second, a deepening rift between slave and free states rendered such involvement contested and dangerous.

The Whig Party proposed the American System (Program proposed by Henry Clay and others to foster national economic growth and interdependence among the geographical sections. It included a protective tariff, a national bank, and internal improvements.) as the answer to both questions. The national government, said the Whigs, should subsidize roads and canals, foster industry with protective tariffs, and maintain a national bank to control credit and currency. The result would be a peaceful, prosperous, and truly national market society. If the South, the West, and the Northeast profited by doing business with each other, the argument went, sectional jealousies would quiet down. Jacksonian Democrats, on the other hand, argued that the American System was unconstitutional, that it violated the rights of states and localities, and that it taxed honest citizens to benefit corrupt and wealthy insiders. Most dangerous of all, argued the Democrats, Whigs would create an activist, interventionist national government that would anger the slaveholding South. To counter both threats, the Jacksonians resurrected Thomas Jefferson's rhetoric of states' rights and inactive, inexpensive government—all of it deeply inflected in the code of white male equality, domestic patriarchy, and racial slavery.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-1 The American System
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11-1 The American System

President James Madison delivered his annual message to the Fourteenth Congress in December 1815. He asked for legislation to create a new national

Focus Question

bank, a tariff to protect American manufacturers, and congressional support for canals and roads. Congress agreed. Made up overwhelmingly of Jeffersonian Republicans and led by the young southern and western

What were the components of the “American System”? What did the American System promise to accomplish?

nationalists who had favored the war with Britain, this Congress reversed many of the positions taken by Jefferson’s old party. It chartered a national bank, enacted a protective tariff, and debated a national system of roads and canals at federal expense. Most prewar Republicans had viewed such programs as heresy. But by 1815, the Republican majority in Congress accepted them as orthodox and necessary. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin explained: “The War has renewed and reinstated the national feelings which the Revolution had given and which were daily lessened. The people have now more general objects of attachment with which their pride and political opinions are connected. They are more American.”

Even as they convinced themselves that they had won the war, Republicans were painfully aware of the weaknesses that the war had displayed. Put simply, the United States had been unable to coordinate a national fiscal and military effort: Bad roads, local jealousies, and a bankrupt treasury had nearly lost the war. In addition, the war and the years leading up to it convinced many Republicans, including Jefferson and Madison, that the export economy rendered the United States dangerously dependent on Europe (and especially Great Britain). Finally, many of the younger Republicans in Congress were interested less in ideological purity than in bringing commerce into new regions. The nation, they said, must abandon Jefferson’s export-oriented agrarianism and encourage prosperity and national independence through subsidies to commerce, manufactures, and internal improvements.

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11-1a National Republicans

Henry Clay of Kentucky, retaining his power in the postwar Congress, headed the drive for protective tariffs, the bank, and internal improvements. He called his program the “American System,” arguing that it would foster national economic growth and harmony

between geographic sections, thus a happy and prosperous republic.

In 1816, Congress chartered a Second Bank of the United States, headquartered in Philadelphia and empowered to establish branches wherever it saw fit. The government agreed to deposit its funds in the Bank; to accept the Bank's notes as payment for government land, taxes, and other transactions; and to buy one-fifth of the Bank's stock. The Bank of the United States was more powerful than the one that had been rejected (by one vote) by a Republican Congress in 1811. The fiscal horrors of the War of 1812, however, had convinced most representatives to support a national currency and centralized control of money and credit. The alternative was to allow state banks—which had increased in number from 88 to 208 between 1813 and 1815—to issue the unregulated and grossly inflated notes that had weakened the war effort and that promised to throw the anticipated postwar boom into chaos.

Chronology


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|------|--|
| 1816 | Congress charters a Second Bank of the United States and the first avowedly protective tariff • <i>Dartmouth College v. Woodward</i> defines a private charter as a contract that cannot be altered by a state legislature |
| 1819 | Controversy arises over Missouri's admission to the Union as a slave state • Panic of 1819 marks the first failure of the national market economy |
| 1820 | Missouri Compromise adopted |
| 1823 | Monroe Doctrine written by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams |
| 1824 | <i>Gibbons v. Ogden</i> asserts federal control of interstate commerce |

1824–1825	Adams wins the presidency over Andrew Jackson • Adams appoints Henry Clay as secretary of state • Jacksonians charge a “Corrupt Bargain” between Adams and Clay
1827	Cherokees in Georgia declare themselves a republic
1828	Jackson defeats Adams for the presidency • “Tariff of Abominations” passed by Congress • John C. Calhoun’s <i>Exposition and Protest</i> presents doctrine of nullification
1830	Congress passes the Indian Removal Act
1832	Jackson reelected over Henry Clay • <i>Worcester v. Georgia</i> exempts the Cherokees from Georgia law • Jackson vetoes recharter of the Bank of the United States
1833	Force Bill and Tariff of 1833 end the nullification crisis
1834	Whig Party formed in opposition to Jacksonians
1835	Treaty of New Echota
1836	Congress adopts “gag rule” to table antislavery petitions • Van Buren elected president
1837	Financial panic ushers in a severe economic depression
1838	U.S. Army marches the remaining Cherokees to Indian Territory
1840	Whig William Henry Harrison defeats Van Buren for presidency

With no discussion of the constitutionality of what it was doing, Congress chartered the Bank of the United States as the sole banking institution empowered to do business throughout the country. Notes issued by the Bank would be the first semblance of a national currency (they would soon constitute from one-tenth to one-third of the value of notes in circulation). Moreover, the Bank could regulate the currency by demanding that state bank notes used in transactions with the federal government be redeemable in gold. In 1816, the Bank set up shop in Philadelphia's Carpenter's Hall, and in 1824, it moved around the corner to a Greek Revival edifice modeled after the Parthenon—a marble embodiment of the republican conservatism that directors of the Bank of the United States promised as their fiscal stance. From that vantage point they would fight (with a few huge lapses) a running battle with state banks and local interests in an effort to impose fiscal discipline and centralized control over an exploding market economy.

The Second Bank of the United States

Located in downtown Philadelphia and modeled on the Parthenon in classical Athens, the new bank building was intended to be both republican and awesome. It was from here that gentleman-directors attempted to impose their kind of order on the exploding monetary and credit systems of the 1820s and 1830s.



The Granger Collection, NYC

The same Congress drew up the nation's first overtly protective tariff in 1816. Shut off from British imports during the war, the Americans had built their first factories, almost entirely in southern New England and the mid-Atlantic. The British planned to flood the postwar market with cheap goods and kill American manufactures, and Congress determined to stop them. Shepherded through the House by Clay and his fellow nationalist John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, the Tariff of 1816 raised import duties an average of 25 percent, protecting American manufactures at the expense of consumers and foreign trade. Again, wartime difficulties and wartime nationalism had paved the way: Since Americans could not depend on imported manufactures, Congress saw domestic manufactures as a patriotic necessity and a spur to commerce between the sections. The Northeast and the West supported the tariff, and it had enough southern support to ensure its passage. Tariffs would rise and fall between 1816 and the Civil War, but the principle of protectionism would persist.


Many of the Founders had seen a national transportation system as essential to the prosperity and safety of the union. George Washington had urged roads and canals linking

the Atlantic states with the interior—providing western farmers with the civilizing benefits of commerce and securing their loyalty to the United States. Thomas Jefferson shared Washington's views and, like his fellow Virginian, he favored improvements that would link the Potomac River with the Ohio. In 1802, President Jefferson signed a bill that began construction of the Cumberland Road (often called the National Road) from Cumberland, Maryland, to the Ohio River at Wheeling.

These early dreams and projects served the postcolonial economy: They would deliver farm produce to the coast and then to international markets; the coastal towns would receive imported goods and ship them back into the countryside. As early as 1770, George Washington had dreamed of making the Potomac River a busy “Channel of Commerce between Great Britain” and the farmers of the interior. Others dreamed of other routes and rivers, but nearly all proponents of transportation into the West shared the great assumption of Washington's early vision: The export economy would remain dominant; the United States would be an independent, unified, and prosperous economic colony of the Old World.

Henry Clay

Clay, posed here with emblems of commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing, was the most consistent and eloquent spokesman for the American System. His supposed participation in the “Corrupt Bargain” of 1825 severely hurt his chances of becoming president.



Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives

Henry Clay's American System grew into a new vision: a national transportation network that would make the United States economically independent of Europe and interdependent within itself. The Bank of the United States would supply fiscal stability and

a uniform, trustworthy currency. The tariff would encourage northeasterners to build factories and citizens in other parts of the country to buy what American manufacturers made, and farmers would enjoy expanded domestic markets. The West would sell food to the cities and to the plantation South, and the South would supply the burgeoning textile industry with cotton. The system would not deny international trade, but it would make the United States an economically integrated and independent nation.

Bills for transportation projects, however, did not get through Congress. Internal improvements were subject to local ambitions: Canals and roads that helped one place hurt another. Some areas—southern New England and eastern Pennsylvania are examples—had already built good roads and did not want to subsidize the competition. There were also objections based in old Republican ideals. Roads and canals were big public works projects with scores of contractors and subcontractors—all dependent on government subsidies, with the potential for becoming a system of corruption that was impossible to stop. Finally, federally sponsored improvements, however beneficial, were constitutionally doubtful. In the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin had proposed that the power to build roads and cut canals within the states be written into the Constitution, and his proposal had been voted down. National support for internal improvements could be justified only by the “necessary and proper” and “general welfare” clauses. The Republicans could charter a Second Bank of the United States because Hamilton’s bank had established the precedent. Roads and canals—extensive local projects at national expense—would stretch those clauses much further, worrying many Republicans (most of them southern) that future legislatures would justify whatever struck them as necessary and proper at any given time.

When Congress agreed to complete the National Road—the one federal internal improvement already under way—President Madison and his Republican successor James Monroe vetoed the bills, refusing to support further internal improvements without a constitutional amendment. In 1822, Monroe even vetoed a bill authorizing repairs on the National Road, stating once again that the Constitution did not empower the federal government to build roads within the states. As a result, the financing and construction of roads and canals fell to the states, overwhelmingly the *northern* states. Henry Clay watched his vision of transportation as a nationalizing force turn into northern regionalization and southern isolation, a dangerous trend that continued throughout his long political life.

11-1b Commerce and the Law

The courts after 1815 played an important nationalizing and commercializing role. John Marshall, who presided over the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835, took the lead. From the beginning he saw the Court as a conservative hedge against the excesses of provincial democratic legislatures. His early decisions protected the independence of the courts and their right to review legislation (see [Chapter 7](#)). From 1816 onward, his decisions encouraged business and strengthened the national government at the expense of the states. His most important decisions protected the sanctity of contracts and corporate charters against state legislatures. In [Dartmouth College v. Woodward \(1816 Supreme Court case that showcased one of many important decisions made by John Marshall to protect the sanctity of contracts and corporate charters against state legislatures.\)](#) (1819), he overturned New Hampshire's decision to turn the college into a public institution by upholding its original corporate charter from 1769. With this, corporate charters acquired the legal status of contracts, beyond the reach of democratic politics, which helped protect business corporations operating under charters granted by state governments.

Two weeks after deciding the *Dartmouth* case, Marshall handed down the majority decision in [McCulloch v. Maryland \(Supreme Court case in which the Bank of the United States Baltimore branch challenged the Maryland legislature's attempt to tax the bank; lead by John Marshall, the Court decided in favor of the Bank and denied Maryland's right to tax the Bank or any other federal agency.\)](#). The Maryland legislature, nurturing old Jeffersonian doubts about the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, had attempted to tax the Bank's Baltimore branch, which in fact was a corrupt and ruinous institution (see later section). The Bank had challenged the legislature's right to do so, and the Court decided in favor of the Bank. Marshall stated, first, that the Constitution granted the federal government "implied powers" that included chartering the Bank, and he denied Maryland's right to tax the Bank or any other federal agency: "The power to tax," he said, "involves the power to destroy." It was Marshall's most explicit blow against Jeffersonian strict construction. Americans, he said, "did not design to make their government dependent on the states." And yet there were many, particularly in Marshall's native South, who remained certain that that was precisely what the Founders had intended.

In *Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824), the Marshall Court broke a state-granted steamship monopoly

in New York Harbor. The monopoly, Marshall argued, interfered with federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce. Like the *Dartmouth* case and *McCulloch v. Maryland*, this decision empowered the national government in relation to the states, and like them, it encouraged private entrepreneurs. As surely as congressmen who supported the American System, John Marshall's Supreme Court assumed a natural and beneficial link between federal power and market society.

Meanwhile, the state courts were working quieter but equally profound transformations of American law. In the early republic, state courts had often viewed property not only as a private possession but also as part of a neighborhood. Thus, when a miller built a dam that flooded upriver farms or impaired the fishery, the courts might make him take those interests into account, often in ways that reduced the business uses of his property. By 1830, New England courts routinely granted the owners of industrial mill sites unrestricted water rights, even when the exercise of those rights inflicted damage on their neighbors. In the courts of northern and western states, what was coming to be called "progress" demanded legal protection for the business uses of private property, even when such uses conflicted with old common-law restraints.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-2 1819

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11-2 1819

Many traditionalist Jeffersonians disliked these developments, but they could not stop them. That changed in 1819. First, the debate that surrounded Missouri's admission as a slave state revealed the centrality and vulnerability of slavery within the national Union. Second, a severe financial collapse led many Americans to doubt the Market Revolution's compatibility with the Jeffersonian republic. By 1820, politicians were determined to reconstruct the limited-government, states'-rights coalition

Focus Question

What enduring political issues were raised by the Missouri controversy and the Panic of 1819?

that had elected Thomas Jefferson.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-2a The Argument over Missouri

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11-2a The Argument over Missouri

Early in 1819, slaveholding Missouri applied for admission to the Union as the first new state to be carved out of the Louisiana Purchase. New York congressman James Tallmadge, Jr., quickly proposed two amendments to the Missouri statehood bill. The first would bar additional slaves from being brought into Missouri (16 percent of Missouri's people were already slaves). The second would emancipate Missouri slaves born after admission when they reached their 25th birthday. Put simply, the [Tallmadge Amendments \(Two amendments proposed by James Tallmadge Jr. to be added to the Missouri statehood bill before Missouri's admission to the union; the first barred slaves from being brought into Missouri and the second emancipated Missouri slaves born after admission once they reached their 25th birthday.\)](#) would admit Missouri only if Missouri agreed to become a free state.

The congressional debates on the Missouri question had little to do with humanitarian objections to slavery and everything to do with political power. Rufus King of New York, an old Federalist who led the northerners in the Senate, insisted that he opposed the admission of a new slave state “solely in its bearing and effects upon great political interests, and upon the just and equal rights of the freemen of the nation.” Northerners had long chafed at the added representation in Congress and in the Electoral College that the “three-fifths” rule granted to the slave states (see [Chapter 6](#)). The rule had, in fact, added significantly to southern power: In 1790, the South, with 40 percent of the white population, controlled 47 percent of the votes in Congress—enough to decide close votes both in Congress and in presidential elections. Federalists pointed out that of the 12 additional electoral votes the three-fifths rule gave to the South, 10 had gone to Thomas Jefferson in 1800 and had given him the election. Without the bogus votes provided by slavery, they argued, Virginia's stranglehold on the presidency would have been broken with Washington's departure in 1796.

In 1819, the North held a majority in the House of Representatives. The South, thanks to the

recent admissions of Alabama and southern-oriented Illinois, controlled a bare majority in the Senate. The Tallmadge Amendments passed in the House of Representatives by a starkly sectional vote, then went on to the Senate. There, a unanimous South defeated the Tallmadge Amendments with the help of the two Illinois senators and three northerners. Deadlocked between a Senate in favor of admitting Missouri as a slave state and a House dead set against it, Congress broke off one of the angriest sessions in its history and went home.

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11-2b The Missouri Compromise

The new Congress that convened in the winter of 1819–1820 passed the legislative package that became known as the [Missouri Compromise \(Compromise that maintained sectional balance in Congress by admitting Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state and by drawing a line west from the 36°30'N parallel separating future slave and free states.\)](#).

Massachusetts offered its northern counties as the new free state of Maine, thus neutralizing fears that the South would gain votes in the Senate with the admission of Missouri. Senator Jesse Thomas of Illinois proposed the so-called Thomas Proviso: If the North would admit Missouri as a slave state, the South would agree to outlaw slavery in territories above 36°30'N latitude—a line extending from the southern border of Missouri to Spanish (within a year, Mexican) territory. That line would open Arkansas Territory (present-day Arkansas and Oklahoma) to slavery and would ban slavery from the remainder of the Louisiana Territory—land that would subsequently become all or part of nine states.

Map 11.1

The Missouri Compromise, 1820

The compromise admitted Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state, thus maintaining equal representation in the Senate. The compromise line promised the future states of Arkansas and Oklahoma to the South, and the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase (much of which was thought to be uninhabitable) to the North.



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Congress admitted Maine with little debate, but the Thomas Proviso met northern opposition. Finally, a joint Senate-House committee decided to separate the two bills. With half of the southern representatives and nearly all of the northerners supporting it, the Thomas Proviso passed. Congress next took up the admission of Missouri. With the votes of a solid South and 14 compromise-minded northerners, Missouri entered the Union as a slave state. President James Monroe applauded the “patriotic devotion” of the northern representatives “who preferr’d the sacrifice of themselves at home” to endangering the Union. His words were prophetic: Nearly all of the 14 were voted out of office in the next

election.

The Missouri crisis brought the South's commitment to slavery and the North's resentment of southern political power into collision. While northerners vowed to relinquish no more territory to slavery, southerners talked openly of disunion and civil war. A Georgia politician announced that the Missouri debates had lit a fire that "seas of blood can only extinguish." President Monroe's secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, saw the debates as an omen: Northerners would unanimously oppose the extension of slavery whenever the question came to a vote. Viewing the crisis from Monticello, the aging Thomas Jefferson was distraught: "A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper This momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once the knell of the Union." The Missouri question underlined a basic fact of American national politics: If politicians argued about slavery, they would split along North-South lines and the Union would be endangered.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-2c The Panic of 1819
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11-2c The Panic of 1819

Politicians debated the Missouri question against a darkening backdrop of economic depression. The origins of the Panic of 1819 were international and numerous. European agriculture was recovering from the Napoleonic wars, thereby reducing the demand for American foodstuffs, while revolutionary wars in Latin America cut off the supply of precious metals, the base of the international money supply. American bankers and businessmen met the situation by expanding credit and issuing banknotes that were mere dreams of real money, thereby creating an inflationary bubble. When the price of cotton collapsed in 1819, the bubble burst.

The president of the Second Bank of the United States, Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, responded to the crisis by curtailing credit and demanding that state banknotes received by the Bank of the United States be redeemed in specie (silver and gold). By doing so, Cheves rescued the Bank from the paper economy created by state-chartered banks, but at huge

expense: When the state banks were forced to redeem their notes in specie, they demanded payment from their own borrowers, and the national money and credit system collapsed.

The depression that followed the Panic of 1819 was the first failure of the market economy. Local ups and downs had occurred since the 1790s, but this collapse was nationwide. Employers who could not meet their debts went out of business, and hundreds of thousands of workers lost their jobs. In Philadelphia, unemployment reached 75 percent. A tent city of the unemployed sprang up on the outskirts of Baltimore. Other cities and towns were hit as hard, and the situation was no better in the countryside. Thomas Jefferson reported that farms in his neighborhood were selling for what had earlier been a year's rent.

Faced with a collapse that none could control and that few understood, many Americans directed their resentment onto the Bank of the United States. John Jacob Astor, a New York merchant and reputedly the richest man in America, admitted that “there has been too much Speculation and too much assumption of Power on the Part of the Bank Directors which has caused [sic] the institution to become unpopular.” William Gouge, who would become the Jacksonian Democrats' favorite economist, put it more bluntly: When the Bank demanded that state banknotes be redeemed in specie, he said, “the Bank was saved and the people were ruined.” By the end of 1819, the Bank of the United States had won the name that it would carry to its death in the 1830s: the Monster.

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11-3 Republican Revival

The crises during 1819 and 1820 prompted demands for a return to Jeffersonian principles. President Monroe's happily proclaimed Era of Good Feelings—a new era of partyless politics created by the collapse of Federalism—was, according to worried

Focus Question

What were the events and political motives that contributed to the republican revival that formed around Andrew Jackson?

Republicans, a disaster. Without opposition, Jefferson's dominant Republican Party had lost its way. The nationalist Congress of 1816 had enacted much of the Federalist program under the name of Republicanism. The result, said the old Republicans, was an aggressive government that helped bring on the Panic of 1819. At the same time, the collapse of Republican Party unity in Congress had allowed the Missouri question to divide Congress along dangerous sectional lines. By 1820, many Republicans were calling for a Jeffersonian revival that would limit government power and guarantee southern rights within the Union.

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11-3a Martin Van Buren Leads the Way

The busiest and the most astute of those Republicans was Martin Van Buren of New York. An immensely talented man without family connections (his father was a Hudson Valley tavern keeper) or formal education, Van Buren built his political career out of a commitment to Jeffersonian principles, personal charm, and party discipline. He and his colleagues in New York had begun to invent the modern political party. The Founders had denounced parties, claiming that republics rested on civic virtue, not competition. Van Buren's New York experience, however, along with his reading of national politics, told him that disciplined political parties were necessary democratic tools. Van Buren insisted that competition and party divisions were inevitable and good, but that they must be made to serve the republic. He wrote: "We must always have party distinctions, and the old ones are the best ... If the old ones are suppressed, geographical differences founded on local instincts or what is worse, prejudices between free & slave holding states will inevitably take their place." Van Buren claimed that the one-party politics of the Era of Good Feelings had allowed privileged insiders to create a big national state and to reorganize politics along sectional lines. Arriving in Washington in the aftermath of the Missouri debates and the Panic of 1819, he hoped to apply his new politics to what he perceived as a dangerous turning point in national public life.

Working with like-minded politicians, Van Buren reconstructed the coalition of northern and southern agriculturalists that had elected Thomas Jefferson. The result was the

Democratic Party and, ultimately, a national two-party system that persisted until the eve of the Civil War.

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11-3b The Election of 1824


With the approach of the 1824 presidential election, Van Buren and his friends supported William H. Crawford, Monroe's secretary of war and a staunch Georgia Republican. The Van Burenites controlled the Republican [congressional caucus \(In the early republic, the group of congressmen who traditionally chose the party's presidential candidates. By the 1820s, the American public distrusted the caucus as undemocratic because only one party contested for power. The caucus was replaced by the national nominating convention.\)](#), the body that traditionally chose the party's presidential candidates. The public distrusted the caucus as undemocratic because it represented the only party in government and thus could dictate the choice of a president. Van Buren, however, continued to regard it as a necessary tool of party discipline. With most congressmen fearing their constituents, only a minority showed up for the caucus vote. They dutifully nominated Crawford.

With Republican Party unity broken, the list of sectional candidates grew. John Quincy Adams was the son of a Federalist president, successful secretary of state under Monroe, and one of the northeastern Federalist converts to Republicanism who, according to people like Van Buren and Crawford, had blunted the republican thrust of Jefferson's old party. Adams entered the contest as New England's favorite son. Henry Clay of Kentucky, chief proponent of the American System, expected to carry the West. John C. Calhoun of South Carolina announced his candidacy, but when he saw the swarm of candidates, he dropped out and put himself up as the sole candidate for vice president.

John Quincy Adams

Adams enjoyed a remarkably productive career as Monroe's secretary of state, then rode into the presidency in the conflicted and controversial election of 1824. The intelligence and erudition that the picture projects had served him well as a

diplomat. As president, they marked him as aloof, aristocratic, and incapable of governing a democratic nation.



The Granger Collection, NYC

The wild card was Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, who in 1824 was known only as a military hero—scourge of the southern Indians and victor over the British at New Orleans (see [Chapter 7](#)). He was also a frontier nabob with a reputation for violence: He had killed a rival in a duel, had engaged in a shootout in a Nashville tavern, and had reputedly stolen his wife from her estranged husband. According to Jackson's detractors, such impetuosity marked his public life as well. As commander of U.S. military forces in the South in 1818, Jackson had led an unauthorized invasion of Spanish Florida, claiming that it was a hideout for Seminole warriors who raided into the United States and a sanctuary for runaway Georgia slaves. During the action, he had occupied Spanish forts, summarily executed Seminoles, and hanged two British subjects. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams had belatedly approved the raid, knowing that the show of American force would encourage the Spanish to sell Florida to the United States. After serving briefly as the governor of newly acquired Florida in 1821, Jackson retired from public life. It was a short retirement because only two years later Tennessee voters elected him to the U.S. Senate. In 1824, eastern politicians knew Jackson only as a "military chieftain," "the Napoleon of the woods," a frontier hothead, and, possibly, a robber-bridegroom.


Jackson may have been all of those things, but he was immensely popular, particularly in the new states of the South and West. In the election of 1824, in the 16 states that chose presidential electors by popular vote (six states still left the choice to their legislatures), Jackson polled 152,901 votes to Adams's 114,023 and Clay's 47,217. Crawford, who suffered a crippling stroke during the campaign, won 46,979 votes. Jackson's support was not only larger but also more nearly national than that of his opponents. Adams carried only his native New England and a portion of New York. Clay's meager support was limited to the Northwest, and Crawford's to the Southeast and to the portions of New York that Van Buren was able to deliver. Jackson carried 84 percent of the votes of his own Southwest, won victories in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Carolina, Indiana, and Illinois, and ran a close second in several other states.

Map 11.2

Presidential Election, 1824

Voting in the four-cornered contest of 1824 was starkly sectional. John Quincy Adams carried his native New England, while Crawford and Clay carried only a few states in their own sections. Only Andrew Jackson enjoyed national support: He carried states in every section but New England, and he ran a strong second in many of the states

that were awarded to other candidates.



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Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-3c “A Corrupt Bargain”

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11-3c “A Corrupt Bargain”

Jackson assumed that he had won the election: He had received 42 percent of the popular vote to his nearest rival’s 33 percent, and he was clearly the nation’s choice, but his 99 electoral votes were 32 shy of the plurality demanded by the Constitution. And so, acting

under the Twelfth Amendment, the House of Representatives selected a president from among the top three candidates. As the candidate with the fewest electoral votes, Henry Clay was eliminated, but he remained Speaker of the House and had enough support to throw the election to either Jackson or Adams. Years later, Jackson told a dinner guest that Clay had offered to support him in exchange for Clay's appointment as secretary of state—an office that traditionally led to the presidency. When Jackson turned him down, according to Jacksonian legend, Clay went to Adams and made the same offer. Adams accepted what became known as the **“Corrupt Bargain”** ([Following the election of 1824, Andrew Jackson and his supporters alleged that, in a “corrupt bargain,” Henry Clay sold his support during the House vote in the disputed election of 1824 of John Quincy Adams in exchange for appointment as Secretary of State.](#)) in January 1825. During the House vote, Clay's supporters, joined by several old Federalists, switched to Adams, giving him a one-vote victory. The new president appointed Henry Clay as his secretary of state.

“The Symptoms of a Locked Jaw.”

In 1827, Henry Clay published a rebuttal of Jacksonian charges that he had participated in a Corrupt Bargain to deliver the presidency to John Quincy Adams. Here, a pro-Clay cartoonist displays Clay as a tailor in the act of sewing Andrew Jackson's mouth shut. Neither the rebuttal nor the cartoon worked: The long-term suspicions of the bargain with Adams ruined Clay's chances to become president.



Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division[LC-DIG-ds-00856]

Reaction to the alleged Corrupt Bargain dominated the Adams administration and created a rhetoric of intrigue and betrayal that nourished a rising democratic movement. After the vote in the House of Representatives, Jackson declared, “The rights of the people have been bartered for promises of office.” He continued, “So you see, the *Judas* of the West has closed the contract and will receive the thirty pieces of silver. His end will be the same.” Others in Washington agreed, denouncing the Clay-Adams union as “unnatural & preposterous” and “monstrous.” The charge of corruption would follow Clay for the rest of his political life.

11-3d Jacksonian Melodrama

Andrew Jackson regarded the intrigues that robbed him of the presidency in 1825 as the culmination of a long train of corruption that the nation had suffered over the previous decade. Although his campaign had made only vague policy statements, he had firm ideas of what had gone wrong with the republic, and he made his views known in what he called “memorandums.” (This was the kind of gaffe that appalled his educated eastern opponents and pleased nearly everyone else.)

A frontier planter with a deep distrust of banks, Jackson claimed that self-serving miscreants in the Bank of the United States brought on the Panic of 1819. The national debt, he insisted, was another source of corruption. It must be paid off and never allowed to recur. The federal government under James Monroe was filled with swindlers, and in the name of a vague nationalism they were taking power for themselves and scheming against the liberties of the people. The politicians had been bought off, said Jackson, and had attempted—through “King Caucus”—to select a president by backstairs deals rather than by popular election. Finally, in 1825, they had stolen the presidency outright.

Like hundreds of thousands of other Americans, Jackson sensed that something had gone wrong with the republic—that selfishness and intrigue had corrupted the government. In the language of revolutionary republicanism, which Jackson had learned as a boy in the Carolina backwoods and would speak throughout his life, a corrupt power once again threatened to snuff out liberty.

In his memorandums, Jackson set against the designs of that power the classic republican safeguard: a virtuous citizenry. Unlike most of his revolutionary forebears, however, he believed that government should follow the will of popular majorities. An aroused public, he said, was the republic’s best hope: “My fervent prayers are that our republican government may be perpetual, and the people alone by their virtue, and independent exercise of their free suffrage can make it perpetual.”

More completely than any of his rivals, Jackson had captured the rhetoric of the revolutionary republic. And, with his fixation on secrecy, corruption, and intrigues, he transformed both that rhetoric and his own biography into popular melodrama. Finally, with a political alchemy that his rivals never understood, Jackson submerged old notions of

republican citizenship into a firm faith in majoritarian democracy: Individuals might become selfish and corrupt, he believed, but a democratic majority was, by its very nature, opposed to corruption and governmental excess. Thus, the republic was safe only when governed by the will of the majority. The Corrupt Bargain of 1825 had made that clear: Either the people or political schemers would rule.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-4 Adams versus Jackson
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11-4 Adams versus Jackson

While Jackson plotted revenge, John Quincy Adams assumed the duties of the presidency. He was well prepared. The son of a Federalist president, he had been an extraordinarily successful secretary of state under Monroe, guiding American diplomacy in the postwar world.

Focus Question

What were the principal events of the John Quincy Adams administration, and how did they contribute to his defeat in 1828?

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11-4a Nationalism in an International Arena

In the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 and the British-American Convention of 1818, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams helped pacify the Great Lakes, restore American fishing rights off the coast of Canada, and draw the U.S.-Canadian boundary west to the Rocky Mountains—actions that transformed the Canadian-American frontier from a battleground into the peaceful border that it has been ever since. He pacified the southern border as well. In 1819, following Jackson's raid into Florida, the Adams-Onís Treaty procured Florida for the United States and defined the U.S.-Spanish border west of the Mississippi in ways that gave

the Americans claims to the Pacific Northwest.

Trickier problems had arisen when Spanish colonies in the Americas declared their independence. Spain could not prevent this, and the powers of Europe, victorious over Napoleon and determined to roll back the republican revolution, talked openly of helping Spain or of annexing South American territory for themselves. Both the Americans and the British opposed such a move, and the British proposed a joint statement outlawing the interference of any outside power (including themselves) in Latin America. Adams had thought it better for the United States to make its own policy than to “come in as cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war.” In 1823, he wrote what became known as the **Monroe Doctrine** (Foreign policy doctrine proposed by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823 that denied the right of European powers to establish new colonies in the Americas while maintaining the United States’ right to annex new territory.) . Propounded at the same time that the United States recognized the new Latin American republics, it declared American opposition to any European attempt at colonization in the New World without (as the British had wanted) denying the right of the United States to annex new territory. Although the international community knew that the British navy, and not the Monroe Doctrine, kept the European powers out of the Americas, Adams had announced that the United States was determined to become the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere.

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11-4b Nationalism at Home

As president, Adams translated his fervent nationalism into domestic policy. In his first annual message to Congress, he outlined an ambitious program for national development under the auspices of the federal government: roads, canals, a national university, a national astronomical observatory (“lighthouses of the skies”), and other costly initiatives:

The spirit of improvement is abroad upon the earth.... While foreign nations less blessed with...freedom... than ourselves are advancing with gigantic strides in the career of public improvement, were we to slumber in indolence or fold up our arms

and proclaim to the world that we are palsied by the will of our constituents, would it not... doom ourselves to perpetual inferiority?

Congressmen could not believe their ears. Here was a president who had received only one in three votes and who had entered office accused of intrigues against the democratic will. And yet at the first opportunity he told Congress to pass an ambitious program and not to be “palsied” by the will of the electorate. Hostile politicians and journalists never tired of joking about Adams’s “lighthouses of the skies.” More lasting, however, was the connection they drew between federal public works projects and high taxes, intrusive government, the denial of democratic majorities, and expanded opportunities for corruption, secret deals, and special favors. Even members of Congress who favored Adams’s program were afraid to vote for it. Congress never acted on the president’s proposals, and the Adams administration emerged as little more than a long prelude to the election of 1828.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-4c The Birth of the Democratic Party

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11-4c The Birth of the Democratic Party

As early as 1825, it was clear that the election of 1828 would pit Adams against Andrew Jackson. Van Buren and like-minded Republicans, with their candidate Crawford hopelessly incapacitated, switched their allegiance to Jackson. They wanted Jackson elected, however, not only as a popular hero but as head of a disciplined and committed Democratic Party that would continue the states’-rights, limited-government positions of the old Jeffersonian Republicans.

The new Democratic Party linked white democracy with the defense of southern slavery. Van Buren began preparations for 1828 with a visit to John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. Calhoun was moving along the road from postwar nationalism to states’-rights conservatism. He also wanted to stay on as vice president and thus keep his presidential hopes alive. After convincing Calhoun to support Jackson, Van Buren embarked on reviving the alliance of “the planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North” that had elected Jefferson. Thus, a new Democratic Party, committed to states’ rights and minimal government and dependent on the votes of both slaveholding and nonslaveholding states,

would ensure white democracy, the continuation of slavery, and the preservation of the Union. The alternative, Van Buren argued, was an expensive and invasive national state (Adams's "lighthouses of the skies"), the isolation of the slaveholding South, and mortal danger to the republic.

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11-4d The Election of 1828

The presidential campaign of 1828 was an exercise in slander rather than a debate on public issues. Adhering to custom, neither Adams nor Jackson campaigned directly, but their henchmen viciously personalized the campaign. Jacksonians hammered away at the Corrupt Bargain of 1825, while the Adams forces attacked Jackson's character. They reminded voters of his duels and tavern brawls and circulated a "coffin handbill" describing Jackson's execution of militiamen during the Creek War. The most egregious slander centered on Andrew Jackson's marriage. In 1790, Jackson had married Rachel Donelson, probably aware that she was estranged but not divorced from a man named Robards. Branding the marriage an "abduction," the Adams team screamed that Jackson had "torn from a husband the wife of his bosom," and had lived with her in a state of "open and notorious lewdness." They branded Rachel Jackson (now a deeply pious plantation housewife) an "American Jezebel," a "profligate woman," and a "convicted adulteress" whose ungoverned passions made her unfit to be First Lady of a "Christian nation."

Rachel Donelson Jackson as a Mature Plantation Mistress

Andrew Jackson supposedly wore this miniature portrait of his beloved Rachel over his heart after her death in 1828.



Everett Collection Inc./Age Fotostock

The Adams strategy backfired. Many voters did agree that only a man who strictly obeyed the law was fit to be president and that Jackson's "passionate" nature disqualified him. But others criticized Adams for making Jackson's private life a public issue and claimed that his rigid legalism left no room for privacy or for local notions of justice. Whatever the legality of their marriage, Andrew and Rachel Jackson had lived as models of fidelity for nearly 40 years. Their neighbors had long ago forgiven whatever transgressions they may have committed. Thus, Jackson's supporters accused the Adams campaign of a gross violation of

privacy and defended Jackson's marriage—and his duels, brawls, executions, and unauthorized military forays—as a triumph of what was honorable and just over what was narrowly legal. The attempt to brand Jackson as a lawless man, in fact, enhanced his image as a melodramatic hero who battled shrewd, unscrupulous, legalistic enemies by drawing on his natural nobility and force of will.

Map 11.3

Presidential Election, 1828

The 1828 presidential contest was a clear result of the organizing efforts that were building a national Democratic Party under the name of Andrew Jackson. Jackson picked up all of the states that had gone for Crawford or Clay in 1824, leaving only New England and small portions of the mid-Atlantic for John Quincy Adams.



The campaign caught the public imagination. Voter turnout was double what it had been in 1824, totaling 56.3 percent. Jackson won with 56 percent of the popular vote (a landslide unmatched until the 20th century) and with a margin of 178 to 83 in electoral votes. Adams carried New England, Delaware, and most of Maryland, and took 16 of New York's 36 electoral votes. Jackson carried every other state. It was a clear triumph of democracy over genteel statesmanship, of limited government over expansive nationalism, and of the South and the West over New England. Just as clearly, it was a victory of popular melodrama over old forms of cultural gentility.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-4e A People's Inauguration
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11-4e A People's Inauguration

Newspapers estimated that from 15,000 to 30,000 citizens came to Washington to witness Jackson's inauguration on March 4, 1829. They were "like the inundation of the northern barbarians into Rome," remarked Senator Daniel Webster. Many had traveled as much as 500 miles, and "they really seem to think that the country is rescued from some dreadful danger." As members of the Washington establishment watched uneasily, the crowd filled the open spaces and the streets near the east portico of the Capitol Building, where Jackson was to deliver his inaugural address.

Jackson arrived at the Capitol in mourning. In December, his wife Rachel had gone to Nashville to shop and had stopped to rest in a newspaper office. There, for the first time, she read the accusations that had been made against her. She fainted on the spot. Although she had been in poor health, no one would ever convince Jackson that her death in January was not caused by his political enemies. He assumed the presidency wearing a black suit and black tie, a black armband, and a black hatband that trailed down his neck in what was called a weeper.

Jackson's inaugural address was vague. He promised "proper respect" for states' rights, a reform of the civil service, and the retirement of the national debt through "a strict and faithful economy." Beyond that, he said little, although he took every opportunity to flatter the popular majority. He had been elected "by the choice of a free people" (and not by King Caucus or Corrupt Bargains), and he pledged "the zealous dedication of my humble abilities

to their service and their good.” He finished—as he often finished an important statement—by reminding Americans that a benign providence looked over them. He then looked up to a roar of applause.

The crowd followed Jackson from the Capitol to the White House, invading the mansion, muddying the carpets, tipping things over, breaking dishes, and standing in dirty boots on upholstered chairs. Jackson had to retreat to avoid being crushed. The White House staff lured much of the crowd outside by moving the punch bowls and liquor to the lawn. A wealthy Washington matron who had admired the well-behaved crowd at the inaugural address exclaimed, “What a scene did we witness! *The Majesty of the People* had disappeared, and a rabble, a mob, of boys, negros, women, children, scrambling, fighting, romping. What a pity, what a pity.” A Democratic newspaper reported more favorably: “General Jackson is *their own* President... . He was greeted by them with an enthusiasm which bespoke him the Hero of a popular triumph.”

The President’s Levee

Robert Cruikshank drew Jackson’s inaugural reception with men and women of all classes, children, dogs, and bucking horses celebrating the Old General’s victory. Cruikshank subtitled his lithograph “All Creation Going to the White House.”



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Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-4f The Spoils System

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11-4f The Spoils System

Jackson had begun to assemble his administration months before he took office. Martin Van Buren, who had mobilized much of the support Jackson gained between 1824 and 1828, was the new secretary of state—positioned to succeed Jackson as president. He became Jackson’s most valued adviser. Other appointments were less promising, for Jackson filled cabinet posts with old friends and political supporters who, in many cases, proved unfit for their jobs. A critic looked at Jackson’s cabinet and pronounced it—with the exception of Van Buren—“the Millennium of the Minnows.”

Others were more concerned about what Jackson would do to the civil service than about whom he named to his cabinet. During the campaign, Jackson had vowed to fire corrupt officeholders—a term he applied to grafters, incompetents, long-term officeholders who considered their jobs personal property, and those who supported John Quincy Adams. Opponents soon complained that Jackson was replacing able public servants with political hacks who had been promised government posts in return for political support. They soon had convincing evidence: Samuel Swarthout, whom Jackson had appointed collector of the Port of New York (an office that handled \$15 million in tariff revenue annually), stole \$1.2 million and took off for Europe. Jackson insisted that he merely intended to end the long tenures that, he said, turned the civil service into “support of the few at the expense of the many,” but the furor over his **“spoils system”** (A postelection practice where a victorious political party awards loyal supporters with appointive public offices.) raged on. Jackson removed about 1 in 10 executive appointees during his eight years in office, and his replacements were most decidedly *political* appointees. Acting out of his own need for personal loyalty and on the advice of Van Buren and other architects of the Democratic Party, Jackson filled vacancies—down to postmasters in the smallest towns—with Democrats who had worked for his election.

In resorting to patronage to build the party, Jackson gave his opponents an important issue. Revolutionary republicans feared a government of lackeys dependent on a powerful executive, and congressional opponents argued that Jackson was using appointments to “convert the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power.” “A standing army,” railed Henry Clay in the Senate, “has been, in all free countries, a just object of jealousy and suspicion. But is not a corps of one hundred thousand dependents upon government, actuated by one spirit, obeying one will, and aiming at one end, more dangerous than a standing army?” It became an anti-Jacksonian axiom that Jackson had made the federal civil service an arm of the Democratic Party and of despotic executive power.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-5 Jacksonian Democracy and the South
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11-5 Jacksonian Democracy and the South

Andrew Jackson was a national figure, but his base of support was in the South, where he won 8 of every 10 votes in 1828. Southerners had grown wary of an activist government in which they were in the minority. They looked to Jackson not only as a military hero but also as a Tennessee planter who talked about returning to republican fundamentals. Although

southerners expected Jackson to look after southern interests, disagreement arose within the administration about how those interests should be protected. Some sided with Vice President Calhoun, who argued that states had the right to veto federal legislation and in extreme cases to secede from the Union. Others agreed with Secretary of State Van Buren that the Union was inviolable and that the South's best safeguard was in a political party committed to states' rights within the Union. The differences were fought out in the contest between Calhoun and Van Buren for the right to succeed Jackson as president, a contest that shaped every major issue of Jackson's first term.

Focus Question

At the national level, how did Jacksonian Democrats and their rivals deal with widening differences between North and South?

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11-5a Southerners and Indians

When Jackson entered office, a final crisis between frontier whites and the native peoples of the Eastern Woodlands was under way. Many earlier policymakers had believed that the American agrarian republic could assimilate Native Americans through civilization programs that transformed tribespeople into yeoman farmers who would voluntarily give up their hunting grounds for white settlement (see [Chapter 7](#)). But Indians' continuing resistance and white Americans' deep-seated beliefs in native savagery frustrated such scenarios. In 1818, President James Monroe declared that "experience has clearly demonstrated that independent Savage communities cannot long exist within the limits of a civilized population.... it seems indispensable that their independence as communities should cease, and that the control of the United States over them should be complete and

undisputed.” The architects of the new American nation claimed sovereignty over Indian-occupied territories east of the Mississippi River and imagined westward expansion as a legitimate, indeed providential, undertaking that turned undeveloped native lands into flourishing, privately owned farms. By the 1820s, few Indians remained east of the Appalachians. The Iroquois of New York were penned into tiny reservations, and the tribes of the Great Lakes region were broken and scattered.

Yet, in the early 1820s, more than 120,000 Indians still lived between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River. Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles in the South comprised half of them, living on their ancestral lands with tenure guaranteed by federal treaties that, at least implicitly, recognized them as sovereign peoples. Congress had appropriated funds for schools, tools, seeds, and training to help these populous peoples make the transition to farming. Some government officials assumed that the tribes would eventually trade their old lands and use their farming skills on new land west of the Mississippi. In contrast, many southern Indians embraced the United States’ civilization program as a means to build stronger governments and economies and ultimately protect their lands as sovereign nations. They became **Civilized Tribes (60,000 Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles who remained on their ancestral lands in the Old Southwest and were considered sovereign peoples.)** with schools, roads, mills, individual property rights, cotton plantations, and large numbers of black slaves. The lives of their propertied, slaveholding elite families did not differ much from those of their wealthy white neighbors in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.

Southern whites resented federal Indian policy as an affront to both white democracy and states’ rights. The poorer farmers coveted the Indians’ land, and states’-rights southerners denied the federal government’s authority to make treaties or to recognize sovereign peoples within their states. Resistance centered in Georgia, where Governor George Troup brought native lands under the state’s jurisdiction and then turned them over to poor whites by way of lotteries, thus tying states’ rights to white hunger for Indian land. At one point, Troup sent state surveyors onto Creek territory before federal purchase from the Indians was complete, telling President Adams that if he resisted state authority he would be considered a “public enemy.”

The Cherokees in Georgia pressed the issue in 1827 by declaring themselves a republic with its own written constitution, legislature, courts, police, and appointed principal leader—a sovereign indigenous nation within the state of Georgia. The Georgia legislature promptly declared Cherokee law null and void, extended Georgia’s authority into Cherokee country,

and began surveying the lands for sale. Hinting at the old connection between state sovereignty and the protection of slavery, Governor Troup warned that the federal “jurisdiction claimed over one portion of our population may very soon be asserted over *another*.” Alabama and Mississippi quickly followed Georgia’s lead by extending state authority over Indian lands and denying federal jurisdiction.

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11-5b Indian Removal

President Jackson agreed that the federal government lacked the authority to recognize native sovereignty within a state and declared that he could not protect the Cherokees and the other Civilized Tribes from state governments. Instead, he offered to remove them to federal land west of the Mississippi, where they would be under the authority of the benevolent federal government. Congress made that offer official in the **Indian Removal Act** (Legislation that offered the native peoples of the lower South the option of removal to federal lands west of the Mississippi. Those who did not take the offer were removed by force in 1838.) of 1830.

The Cherokees, with the help of New England missionaries, had taken their claims of sovereignty to court in the late 1820s. In 1831, John Marshall’s Supreme Court ruled in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* that the Cherokees could not sue Georgia because they were not a foreign nation but a “domestic dependent nation”—a dependent of the federal government, and not of the state of Georgia. In a consequential formulation, Marshall noted that the relationship between the tribes and the United States “resembles that of a ward to his guardian.” Cherokees understood the decision as an affirmation of their sovereignty and initiated another federal court case against Georgia. The Court’s decision in *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832) declared that Georgia’s extension of state law over Cherokee land was unconstitutional. Marshall’s ruling, which was strongly motivated by his desire to assert the precedence of federal power over states’ power in Indian affairs, was a victory for the Cherokees—although, as it turned out, a hollow one. President Jackson ignored the decision, reportedly telling a congressman, “John Marshall has made his decision: Now let him enforce it!”

The prolonged struggles with Georgia and the rapid economic and social changes among the Cherokees had split their nation into traditionalists who persistently opposed removal and those who favored accommodation with the whites. In 1835, a small minority group signed a Treaty of New Echota with the U.S. government, hoping to secure tolerable terms for the removal that seemed inevitable to its members. The vast majority of the Cherokees denounced the treaty, but to no avail. In 1838, Jackson's successor, Martin Van Buren, sent the army to march the 15,000 remaining Cherokees to a new Indian Territory in today's Oklahoma. At least four thousand of them died along this Trail of Tears of exposure, disease, starvation, and white depredation. Their suffering continued in the West. The Cherokees had brought their pre-existing internal divisions and disputes to Indian Territory, where bloodshed and instability plagued their lives for decades. They also clashed with the Comanches, Osages, and other powerful Plains Indians, who resented the newcomers on their borders. The Cherokee removal was but one of many cases of ethnic cleansing in the early 19th-century United States. Numerous native groups were moved to the West from Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, and across the South, where westward-pushing settlers demanded more land for farms and plantations. In total, more than 100,000 Native Americans were removed from the eastern United States during the 1820s and 1830s. Some, like the Seminoles in the Florida Everglades and Black Hawk's Sauks, Fox, and Kickapoos, fought back, but eventually they too had to go.

Indian removal also had profound political consequences in the United States. It violated Supreme Court decisions and thus strengthened Jackson's reputation as an enemy of the rule of law and a friend of local, "democratic" solutions. At the same time, it reaffirmed the link between racism and white democracy in the South and announced Jackson's commitment to state sovereignty and limited federal authority.

What They Said

President Andrew Jackson and the Cherokee Nation Debate Indian Removal

First introduced by Thomas Jefferson as an idea in 1803, the removal of eastern Indians west of the Mississippi River became one of the most contested issues in the early republic. The first selection below is Andrew Jackson's second State of the Union address on December 6, 1830, in which the president discusses the recently passed Indian Removal Act. The second is a memorial of the Cherokee Nation to the U.S. Congress.

Andrew Jackson, State of the Union Address, December 6, 1830

What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?

... To better their condition in an unknown land our forefathers left all that was dear in earthly objects. Our children by thousands yearly leave the land of their birth to seek new homes in distant regions. Does Humanity weep at these painful separations from every thing, animate and inanimate, with which the young heart has become entwined? Far from it. It is rather a source of joy that our country affords scope where our young population may range unconstrained in body or in mind, developing the power and faculties of man in their highest perfection.

... Can it be cruel in this Government when, by events which it can not control, the Indian is made discontented in his ancient home to purchase his lands, to give him a new and extensive territory, to pay the expense of his removal, and support him a year in his new abode? How many thousands of our own people would gladly embrace the opportunity of removing to the West on such conditions! If the offers made to the Indians were extended to them, they would be hailed with gratitude and joy.

And is it supposed that the wandering savage has a stronger attachment to his home than the settled, civilized Christian? Is it more afflicting to him to leave the graves of his fathers than it is to our brothers and children? Rightly considered, the policy of the General Government toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous. He is unwilling to submit to the laws of the States and mingle with their population. To save him from this alternative, or perhaps utter annihilation, the General Government kindly offers him a new home, and proposes to pay the whole expense of his removal and settlement.

Memorial of the Cherokee Nation, 1830

We are aware that some persons suppose it will be for our advantage to remove beyond the Mississippi. We think otherwise. Our people universally think

otherwise. Thinking that it would be fatal to their interests, they have almost to a man sent their memorial to Congress, deprecating the necessity of a removal....

We wish to remain on the land of our fathers. We have a perfect and original right to remain without interruption or molestation. The treaties with us, and laws of the United States made in pursuance of treaties, guaranty our residence and our privileges, and secure us against intruders. Our only request is, that these treaties may be fulfilled, and these laws executed.

But if we are compelled to leave our country, we see nothing but ruin before us. The country west of the Arkansas territory is unknown to us. From what we can learn of it, we have no prepossessions in its favor. All the inviting parts of it, as we believe, are preoccupied by various Indian nations, to which it has been assigned. They would regard us as intruders

... The far greater part of that region is, beyond all controversy, badly supplied with wood and water; and no Indian tribe can live as agriculturists without these articles. All our neighbors ... would speak a language totally different from ours, and practice different customs. The original possessors of that region are now wandering savages lurking for prey in the neighborhood.... Were the country to which we are urged much better than it is represented to be, ...still it is not the land of our birth, nor of our affections. It contains neither the scenes of our childhood, nor the graves of our fathers.

... there is not a man within our limits so ignorant as not to know that he has a right to live on the land of his fathers, in the possession of his immemorial privileges, and that this right has been acknowledged by the United States; nor is there a man so degraded as not to feel a keen sense of injury, on being deprived of his right and driven into exile....

Q

What sorts of similarities can you detect in the tone and style of the two documents? How does each use notions of law, history, and civilization to bolster its case? How does each depict Native Americans' relationship to land? By 1830, the Cherokees had developed a deep understanding of the United States and its ambitions, legal system, and self-understanding. They had interacted with its

political agents, traders, and missionaries for more than three generations, and many of them were literate mixed-bloods (people with both white and Indian ancestry) who knew the American value system intimately. How effective, do you think, was the Cherokee Nation's memorial in soliciting a sympathetic emotional response among the American audience?

Sources: (top) Andrew Jackson, State of the Union Address, December 6, 1830; (bottom) Memorial of the Cherokee Nation, 1830.

Trail of Tears

In 1838, the U.S. Army marched some 15,000 Cherokee men, women, and children, along with their animals and whatever they could carry, out of their home territory and into Oklahoma. At least 4,000—most of them old or very young—died during the march.

Picture History/Newscom

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-5c Southerners and the Tariff
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11-5c Southerners and the Tariff

In 1828, a Democratic Congress passed a tariff, hoping to win votes for Jackson in the upcoming presidential election. Assured of support in the South, they fished for votes in the mid-Atlantic states and the Northwest by protecting raw wool, flax, molasses, hemp, and distilled spirits. The result was a patchwork tariff that pleased northern and western farmers but that worried the South and violated Jackson's own ideas of what a "judicious" tariff should be. Protective tariffs hurt the South by diminishing exports of cotton and other staples and by raising the price of manufactured goods. More ominous, they demonstrated

the power of other sections to write laws that helped them and hurt the outnumbered South. Calling the new bill a **“Tariff of Abominations,”** ([A 1828 tariff passed by Congress to protect the manufacturers of the northern states by setting high duties on imported goods. Southern opponents denounced the tariff, arguing that it was unconstitutional and harmful to the South’s agrarian interests and cotton trade.](#)) the legislature of one southern state after another denounced it as unconstitutional, unjust, and oppressive.

South Carolina, guided by Vice President Calhoun, led the opposition to the Tariff of 1828. During the War of 1812 and the ensuing Era of Good Feelings, Calhoun’s South Carolina—confident of its future and deeply engaged in international markets for its rice and cotton—had favored the economic nationalism of the American System. Then the Missouri debates and the Denmark Vesey slave conspiracy of 1822 (see [Chapter 9](#)) sent South Carolinians looking for ways to safeguard slavery. Their fears grew more intense when federal courts shot down a state law forbidding black merchant seamen from moving about freely while their ships were docked at Charleston. Carolinians were disturbed too by persistent talk of gradual emancipation—at a time when their own commitment to slavery was growing stronger. Finally, southerners noted that in the congressional logrolling that made the Tariff of 1828, many western representatives had abandoned their old Jeffersonian alliance with the South to trade favors with the Northeast.

With the growth in the Northeast of urban markets for western produce, the American System’s promise of interdependence among regions was beginning to work, but in ways that united the northern states against the export-oriented South. The Tariff of 1828 was the last straw: It benefited the city and commercial food producers at the expense of the plantation, and it demonstrated that the South could do nothing to block the passage of such laws.

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11-5d Nullification

As early as 1827, Calhoun concluded that southern states could protect themselves from national majorities only if they possessed the power to veto federal legislation within their boundaries. In 1828, in his anonymously published essay *Exposition and Protest*, he argued

that the Constitution was a contract between sovereign states and that the states (not the federal courts) could decide the constitutionality of federal laws. A state convention (like the conventions that had ratified the Constitution) could nullify any federal law within state borders. “Constitutional government and the government of a majority,” Calhoun argued, “are utterly incompatible.” *Exposition and Protest* echoed the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves of 1798 and 1799 and anticipated the secessionist arguments of 1861: The Union was a voluntary compact between sovereign states, states were the ultimate judges of the validity of federal law, and states could break the compact if they wished.

Nullification (Beginning in the late 1820s, John C. Calhoun and others argued that the Union was a voluntary compact between sovereign states, that states were the ultimate judges of the constitutionality of federal law, that states could nullify federal laws within their borders, and that they had the right to secede from the Union.) was extreme, and Calhoun and his friends tried to avoid using it. They knew that President Jackson was a states’-rights slaveholder who disliked the Tariff of 1828, and they assumed that Vice President Calhoun would succeed to the presidency and would protect southern interests. They were wrong on both counts. Jackson favored states’ rights, but only within a perpetual and inviolable union. A tariff was ultimately a matter of foreign policy, clearly within the jurisdiction of the federal government. To allow a state to veto a tariff would be to deny the legal existence of the United States.

Jackson revealed his views at a celebration of Jefferson’s birthday on April 13, 1830. Calhoun’s southern friends dominated the speechmaking, and Jackson listened quietly as speaker after speaker defended the extreme states’-rights position. After the formal speeches were over, the president rose to propose an after-dinner toast. “Our Federal Union: *It must be preserved*,” he said. Isaac Hill, a New Hampshire Democrat and a supporter of Van Buren, reported, “an order to arrest Calhoun where he sat would not have come with more blinding, staggering force.” Dumbstruck, the southerners looked to Calhoun, who as vice president was to propose the second toast. Shaken by Jackson’s unqualified defense of the Union, Calhoun offered this toast: “The Union. Next to our liberties the most dear.” They were strong words, but they had little meaning after Jackson’s affirmation of the Union. A few days later, a South Carolina congressman on his way home asked the president if he had any message for him to take back. “Yes, I have,” replied Jackson. “Please give my compliments to my friends in your state, and say to them, that if a single drop of blood shall be shed there in opposition to the laws of the United States, I will hang the first man I can lay my hand on engaged in such treasonable conduct,

upon the first tree I can reach.”

Having reaffirmed the Union and rejected nullification, Jackson asked Congress to reduce the tariff rates in the hope that he could isolate the nullifiers from southerners who simply hated the tariff. The resulting Tariff of 1832 lowered the rates on many items but still affirmed the principle of protectionism. That, along with Boston abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison’s declaration of war on slavery in 1831, followed by Nat Turner’s bloody slave uprising in Virginia that same year (see [Chapter 9](#)), led the whites of South Carolina and Georgia to intensify their distrust of outside authority and their insistence on the right to govern their own neighborhoods. South Carolina, now with Calhoun’s open leadership and support, called a state convention that nullified the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832.

In Washington, President Jackson raged that nullification (not to mention the right of secession that followed logically from it) was illegal. Insisting that “disunion ... is *treason*,” he asked Congress for a Force Bill empowering him to personally lead a federal army into South Carolina. At the same time, however, he supported the rapid reduction of tariffs. When Democratic attempts at reduction bogged down, Henry Clay, who was now back in the Senate, took on the tricky legislative task of rescuing his beloved protective tariff while quieting southern fears. The result was the Compromise Tariff of 1833, which, by lowering tariffs over the course of several years, gave southern planters the relief they demanded while maintaining moderate protectionism and allowing northern manufacturers time to adjust to the lower rates. Congress also passed the Force Bill. Jackson signed both into law on March 2, 1833.

With that, the nullification crisis came to a quiet end. No other southern state had joined South Carolina in nullifying the tariff, although some states had made vague pledges of support in the event that Jackson led his army to Charleston. The Compromise Tariff of 1833 isolated the South Carolina nullifiers. Deprived of their issue and most of their support, they declared victory and disbanded their convention, but not before nullifying the Force Bill. Jackson chose to overlook that last defiant gesture because he had accomplished what he wanted: He had asserted a perpetual Union, and he had protected southern interests within it.

11-5e The “Petticoat Wars”

The spoils system, Indian removal, nullification, and other heated questions of Jackson’s first term were fought out against a backdrop of gossip, intrigue, and angry division within the inner circles of Jackson’s government. The talk centered on Peggy O’Neal Timberlake, a Washington tavern keeper’s daughter who, in January 1829, had married John Henry Eaton, Jackson’s old friend and his soon-to-be secretary of war. Eaton was middle-aged; his bride was 29, pretty, flirtatious, and, according to Washington gossip, “frivolous, wayward, [and] passionate.” Knowing that his marriage might cause trouble for the new administration, Eaton had asked for and received Jackson’s blessings—and, by strong implication, his protection.

The marriage of John and Peggy Eaton came at a turning point in the history of both Washington society and elite sexual mores. Until the 1820s, most officeholders had left their families at home. They took lodgings at taverns and boardinghouses and lived in a bachelor world of shirtsleeves, tobacco, card playing, and occasional liaisons with local women. But in the 1820s, the boardinghouse world was giving way to high society. Cabinet members, senators, congressmen, and other officials moved into Washington houses, and their wives presided over the round of dinner parties through which much of the government’s business was done. As in other wealthy families, political wives imposed new forms of gentility and politeness on these affairs, and they assumed the responsibility of drawing up the guest lists. Many of them determined to exclude Peggy Eaton from polite society.

The shunning of Peggy Eaton split the Jackson administration in two. Jackson was committed to protecting her. He had met his own beloved Rachel while boarding at her father’s Nashville tavern, and their grand romance (as well as the gossip that surrounded it) was a striking parallel to the affair of John and Peggy Eaton. That, coupled with Jackson’s honor-bound agreement to the Eaton marriage, ensured that he would protect the Eatons to the bitter end. Always suspicious of intrigues, Jackson labeled the “dark and sly insinuations” about Peggy Eaton part of a “conspiracy” against his presidency. Before long, his suspicions centered on Vice President Calhoun, whose wife, Floride Bonneau Calhoun, a powerful Washington matron, was a leader of the assault on Peggy Eaton. Sensing that Jackson was losing his patience with Calhoun, fellow Democrats, soon after the Jefferson birthday banquet in spring 1830, showed Jackson a letter from William H. Crawford revealing that while serving in Monroe’s cabinet, Calhoun, contrary to his protestations,

had favored censuring Jackson for his unauthorized invasion of Florida in 1818. An open break with Calhoun became inevitable.

An Opposition Cartoon on the Cabinet Shuffle of 1831

The cabinet rats run from the falling house of government, while a bewildered Jackson retains Van Buren by standing on his tail.

The Historical Society of Pennsylvania

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-5f The Fall of Calhoun
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11-5f The Fall of Calhoun

Jackson resolved the Peggy Eaton controversy, as he would resolve nullification, in ways that favored Van Buren in his contest with Calhoun. He pointedly made Peggy Eaton the official hostess at the White House. Then, in spring 1831, Van Buren gave Jackson a free hand to reconstruct his tangled administration. He offered to resign his cabinet post and engineered the resignations of nearly all other members of the cabinet, thus allowing Jackson to remake his administration without firing anyone. Many of those who left were southern supporters of Calhoun. Jackson replaced them with a mixed cabinet that included political allies of Van Buren. Also at this time, President Jackson began to consult with an informal Kitchen Cabinet that included journalists Amos Kendall and Francis Preston Blair, along with Van Buren and a few others. The Peggy Eaton controversy and the resulting shakeup in the administration were contributing mightily to the success of Van Buren's southern strategy.

Van Buren's victory over Calhoun came to a quick conclusion. As part of his cabinet reorganization, Jackson appointed Van Buren minister to Great Britain—an important post that would temporarily remove him from the heat of Washington politics. Vice President Calhoun, sitting as president of the Senate, rigged the confirmation so that he cast the deciding vote against Van Buren's appointment—a petty act that turned out to be his last exercise of national power. Jackson replaced Calhoun with Van Buren as the vice presidential candidate in 1832 and let it be known that he wanted Van Buren to succeed him as president.

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11-5g Petitions, the Gag Rule, and the Southern Mails

The Democratic Party's rigid party discipline and its commitment to slavery and states' rights antagonized many northerners and evangelical Protestants who advocated abolition, energetic government, and social and moral reforms. The antagonism came to a head in 1835, when abolitionists launched a "postal campaign," flooding the mail—in North and South—with antislavery tracts that condemned slavery in the federal territories, the interstate slave trade, and the admission of new slave states. The southerners and most

northerners considered such tactics incendiary.

Some Jacksonians, including Jackson, wanted to stop the postal campaign with a federal censorship law. Calhoun and other southerners, however, argued that the states had the right to censor mail crossing their borders. Knowing that state censorship of the mail was unconstitutional and that federal censorship of the mail would be a political disaster, Jackson's administration devised an informal solution. Without changing the law, the general postmaster simply looked the other way as local postmasters removed abolitionist materials from the mail. Calhoun and his supporters continued to demand state censorship, but the Democrats had no intention of relinquishing federal control over the federal mail. They made it clear, however, that no abolitionist literature would reach the South as long as Democrats controlled the U.S. Post Office.

The Democrats dealt in similar ways with antislavery petitions to Congress. With their postal campaign disabled, abolitionists began to bombard Congress with petitions to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia (where Congress had undisputed authority) and to deny the slaveholding Republic of Texas admission to the Union. Pressured by irritated pro-slavery representatives to resolve the matter, Congress conceived an unusual procedure: It simply voted at each session to table the petitions without reading them, thus acknowledging that they had been received but sidestepping any debate on them. This procedure, which became known as the **"gag rule,"** ([Procedure in which Congress voted at each session from 1836 to 1844 to table antislavery petitions without reading them in order avoid any debate.](#)) was passed by the support of southern representatives and the vast majority of northern Democrats. Increasingly, abolitionists sent their petitions to ex-president John Quincy Adams, who had returned to Washington as a congressman from Massachusetts. Adams spoke forcefully against slavery and the violations of civil liberties in Congress, evading the gag rule, which was rescinded in 1844, after eight years in effect. Thus, the Jacksonians answered the question that had arisen with the Missouri debates: how to protect the slaveholding South within the federal Union. Whereas Calhoun and other southern radicals found the answer in nullification and other forms of state sovereignty, Jackson and the Democratic coalition insisted that the Union was inviolable and that any attempt to dissolve it would be met with force. At the same time, a disciplined Democratic Party uniting northern and southern agrarians into a states'-rights, limited-government majority could guarantee southern rights within the Union. This answer to the southern question stayed in place until the breakup of the Democratic Party on the eve of the Civil War.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-6 Jacksonian Democracy and the Market Revolution
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11-6 Jacksonian Democracy and the Market Revolution

Jacksonian Democrats cherished the simplicity of Jefferson's agrarian republic. They assumed power at the height of the Market Revolution, and they spent much of the 1830s and 1840s trying to reconcile the market and the republic. Like the Jeffersonians before them, Democrats welcomed commerce as long as it served the liberty and rough equality of white men, but paper currency and the dependence on credit that came with the Market Revolution posed problems. The so-called paper economy separated wealth from "real work" and encouraged an unrepublican spirit of luxury and greed. Worst of all, the new paper economy required government-granted privileges that the Jacksonians, still speaking the language of revolutionary republicanism, branded "corruption." For the same reasons, the protective tariffs and government-sponsored roads and canals of the American System were unacceptable. The Jackson presidency aimed to curtail government involvement in the economy, to end special privilege, and thus to rescue the republic from the Money Power.

Focus Question

How did Democrats and Whigs in the national government argue questions raised by economic development?

History Through Film

***Amistad* (1997)**

Directed by Steven Spielberg.

Starring Matthew McConaughey (Roger Baldwin), Morgan Freeman (Theodore Joadson), Anthony Hopkins (John Quincy Adams), Djimon Hounsou (Cinque).

In 1839, an American cruiser seized the Cuban slave ship *Amistad* off the shore of Long Island. The ship carried 41 Africans who had revolted, killed the captain and

crew, and commandeered the ship—along with two Spanish slave dealers who bargained for their lives by promising to sail the ship east to Africa, then steered for North America. The Africans were imprisoned at New Haven and tried for piracy and murder in federal court. The government of Spain demanded their return, and southern leaders pressured President Van Buren for a “friendly” decision. The legal case centered on whether the Africans were Cuban slaves or kidnapped Africans. (The international slave trade was by then illegal.) The New Haven court acquitted them, the federal government appealed the case, and the Supreme Court freed them again. The Africans were returned to Sierra Leone.

The Africans spend most of the movie in a dark jail or in court, and the film centers on them and their experiences with two groups of Americans: the abolitionists who are trying to free them, and the political and legal officials who want to hang them—largely to keep their own political system intact. Spielberg’s abolitionists are Lewis Tappan, a black activist (Morgan Freeman), an obscure young white lawyer (Matthew McConaughey), and, in the grand finale, congressman and former president John Quincy Adams (played wonderfully by Anthony Hopkins). In the historical case, the defense was handled by veteran abolitionists or by persons who had been working with abolitionists for a long time. Spielberg shaped this group to tell his own story, beginning with reluctant and confused reformers and politicians who, along with the audience, gradually realize the moral imperatives of the case.

In one of the film’s more powerful sequences, the Africans’ leader, Cinque (Djimon Hounsou), through a translator, tells his story to the lawyer: his village life in Sierra Leone (the one scene filmed in bright sunlight), his capture by Africans, his transportation to the slave fort of Lomboko, the horrors of the passage on the Portuguese slaver *Tecora*, the slave market in Havana, and the bloody revolt on the *Amistad*—all of it portrayed wrenchingly on the screen. The Africans’ story continues in jail, as they study pictures in a Bible and try to figure out the American legal, political, and moral system. In court, they finally cut through the mumbo jumbo by standing and chanting “Give Us Free!”

In a fictive interview on the eve of the Supreme Court case, Cinque tells Adams that he is optimistic because he has called on the spirits of his ancestors to join him in court. This moment, he says, is the whole reason for their having existed at all. Adams, whose own father had helped lead the Revolution, speaks for his and Cinque’s ancestors before the Supreme Court: To the prosecution’s argument that

the Africans are pirates and murderers and to southern arguments that slavery is a natural state, he answers that America is founded on the “self-evident truth” that one’s natural state is freedom. It is a fine Hollywood courtroom speech: Adams has honored his ancestors, the justices and the audience see the moral rightness of his case, and the Africans are returned to Sierra Leone. (In a subscript, Spielberg tells us that Cinque returns to a village that had been destroyed in civil war, but the final ironic note is overwhelmed by the moral triumphalism of the rest of the movie.)

Amistad (1997) tells the story of 41 Africans who stage a revolt on the slave ship carrying them to Cuba and the trial that follows.

Andrew Cooper/Dreamworks LLC/The Kobal Collection/Picture Desk

Jackson’s policies met with growing opposition, which coalesced into a new party, the Whigs, in 1834. The Whigs favored an activist central government that would encourage orderly economic development through the American System of protective tariffs, a federally subsidized transportation network, and a national bank. This system, they argued, would encourage national prosperity. At the same time, it would create a truly national market economy that would soften sectional divisions. Jacksonian rhetoric about the Money Power and the Old Republic, they argued, was little more than the demagoguery of unqualified, self-seeking politicians.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-6a The Second Bank of the United States
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11-6a The Second Bank of the United States

The argument between Jacksonians and their detractors came to focus on the Second Bank of the United States that Congress had chartered in 1816. The national government deposited its revenue in the bank, thus giving it an enormous capital base. The government deposits also included state banknotes that had been used to pay customs duties or to buy public land; the Bank of the United States had the power to demand redemption of these notes in specie, thus discouraging state banks from issuing inflationary notes that they could not back up. The bank also issued notes of its own, which served as the beginnings of a national paper currency. Thus, with powers granted under its federal charter, the Bank of the United States exercised central control over the nation's monetary and credit systems.

Most members of the business community valued the Bank of the United States because it promised a stable, uniform paper currency and competent, centralized control over the banking system. But millions of Americans resented and distrusted the national bank, citing its role in the Panic of 1819 as evidence of the dangers posed by privileged, powerful institutions. President Jackson agreed with the latter opinion. A southwestern agrarian who had lost money in an early speculation, he was leery of paper money, banks, and the credit system. He insisted that both the bank and paper money were unconstitutional and that the only safe, natural, republican currencies were gold and silver. Above all, Jackson saw the Bank of the United States as a government-sponsored concentration of power that threatened American liberty.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-6b The Bank War
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11-6b The Bank War

The charter of the Bank of the United States ran through 1836, but Senators Henry Clay and Daniel Webster encouraged Nicholas Biddle, the Bank's brilliant, aristocratic president, to

apply for recharter in 1832. Clay planned to oppose Jackson in the presidential election later that year, and he knew that Jackson hated the bank. He and his friends hoped to provoke the hot-tempered Jackson into a response they could use against him in the election. The Bank applied for recharter in January 1832, and Congress passed the bill in early July and sent it on to the president. Jackson understood the early request for recharter as a political ploy. On July 4, Van Buren visited the White House and found Jackson sick in bed; Jackson took Van Buren's hand and said, "The bank, Mr. Van Buren, is trying to kill me, *but I will kill it!*" Jackson vetoed the bill.

Jackson's Bank Veto Message was a manifesto of Jacksonian democracy. It combined Jeffersonian verities with appeals to the public's prejudice and declared that the bank was "unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the states, and dangerous to the liberties of the people." Its charter, Jackson complained, bestowed special privilege on the bank and its stockholders, who were almost all northeastern businessmen or, worse, British investors. Having made most of its loans to southerners and westerners, the bank was a huge monster that sucked resources out of the agrarian South and West and poured them into the pockets of northeastern gentlemen and their English friends. The Bank Veto Message was a long, rambling attack that, in the opinion of the Bank's supporters, demonstrated Jackson's unfitness for office. "It has all the fury of a chained panther biting the bars of its cage," said Nicholas Biddle. "It really is," he concluded, "a manifesto of anarchy." So certain were they that the public shared their views that Clay's supporters distributed Jackson's Bank Veto Message as *anti*-Jackson propaganda during the 1832 campaign. They were wrong. Most voters shared Jackson's attachment to a society of virtuous, independent producers and to pristine republican government. They also agreed that the republic was being subverted by parasites, who grew rich by manipulating credit, prices, paper money, and government-bestowed privileges. Jackson portrayed himself as both the protector of the Old Republic and a melodramatic hero contending with illegitimate, aristocratic, privileged, secretive powers. With the bank and Jackson's veto as the principal issues, Jackson won reelection by a landslide in 1832.

Jackson began his second term determined to kill the Bank of the United States before Congress could reverse his veto. The bank would be able to operate under its old charter until 1836, but Jackson hurried its death by withdrawing government deposits as they were needed and by depositing new government revenues in carefully selected state banks—soon to be called "Pet Banks" by the opposition. By law, the decision to remove the deposits had to be made by the secretary of the treasury. Two successive treasury secretaries

refused to do so; Jackson removed both from office and appointed Roger B. Taney, a loyal Democrat who promptly withdrew the deposits. Without the deposits, the Second Bank withered away.

Map 11.4

Presidential Election, 1832

The election of 1832 was a landslide victory for Andrew Jackson. The National Republican Henry Clay carried only his native Kentucky, along with Delaware and southern New England. A defeated and resentful South Carolina ran its own candidate. Jackson, on the other hand, won in the regions in which he had been strong in 1828 and added support in New York and northern New England.

11-6c The Beginnings of the Whig Party

Conflict over deposit removal and related questions of presidential power united anti-Jacksonians—most of them committed advocates of the American System—into the Whig Party. The name of the party, as everyone who understood the language of the republic knew, stood for legislative opposition to a power-mad executive. Jackson, argued the Whigs, had transformed himself from the limited executive described in the Constitution into King Andrew I. They listed the spoils systems and frequent vetoes of congressional legislation as his principal offenses. While earlier presidents had exercised the veto only nine times, Jackson alone used it 12 times during his two terms. According to his critics, the president used his veto power in particular to restrain the growth of the markets, the American System, and federal spending. The bank veto conveyed the same position, and the withdrawal of the government deposits brought the question of “executive usurpation” to a head, causing uneasiness even among the president’s supporters,

Interpreting the Visual Past

King Andrew the First

New-York Historical Society

This widely distributed opposition cartoon depicts President Andrew Jackson as “King Andrew the First.” It was a powerful cartoon, for Americans knew that their nation had begun in opposition to monarchy, and to a royal government that usurped power and encroached upon liberty. Jackson’s opponents called themselves Whigs, in honor of the parliamentary faction that had opposed royal power in Britain. In fact, Jackson favored a small, inactive national government and used (abused, said his critics) presidential power to limit the powers of the government in Washington, largely by vetoing bills passed by the Whig legislatures that he faced throughout his presidency.

In the cartoon, King Andrew holds his scepter in one hand and a vetoed bill in the other. Internal improvements, the Bank of the United States, and the Constitution lie in ruins at his feet. The small print lists his crimes in detail: He had appointed federal officials that Whigs did not like, he had ignored Supreme Court decisions (on Indian removal in particular), and he had vetoed a lot of legislation—all of it in violation of “the will of the people.”

Q

Andrew Jackson has traditionally been known as a “powerful” president. What was the nature of his power, and to what ends did he use it?

Q

The cartoon refers repeatedly to “the People.” In the language and context of the cartoon, who were they?

Henry Clay, who had watched as Jackson denied one component after another of his American System, joined with Daniel Webster to lead the old National Republican coalition (the name that anti-Jacksonians had assumed since 1824) into the new Whig Party. They were joined by southerners (including Calhoun) who resented Jackson’s treatment of the South Carolina nullifiers and Biddle’s bank, and who distrusted his assurances on slavery. Jackson’s war on the Bank of the United States chased lukewarm supporters into the opposition, enabling Democrats to point to an increasingly sharp division between the Money Power and the Old Republic.

The dismantling of the Second Bank of the United States had left a federal surplus of \$5 million (produced by tariff proceeds and sales of public lands) without a depository. Jackson wanted to prevent the surplus money from being redistributed to the states, fearing that it would bolster the hated paper economy and encourage Congress to keep land prices and tariff rates high. Whigs, who by now despaired of ever creating a federally subsidized, coordinated transportation system, picked up the idea of redistribution. With help from the like-minded Democrats, they passed the Deposit Act of 1836, which increased the number of banks receiving federal deposits (thus removing power from Jackson’s Pet Banks) and distributed the federal surplus to the states to be spent on roads, canals, and other internal improvements. Jackson, who distrusted state-chartered banks as much as he distrusted the Bank of the United States, planned to veto the bill, but faced an overwhelming congressional coalition of Whigs and Democrats. He demanded a provision limiting the state banks’ right to print banknotes. With that provision, he reluctantly signed the Deposit Act.

Jackson and many members of his administration had deep fiscal and moral concerns about the inflationary boom that accompanied the rapid growth of commerce, credit, roads, canals, new farms, and the other manifestations of the Market Revolution in the

1830s. After insisting that his hard-money, anti-inflationary provision be added to the Deposit Act, Jackson issued a **Specie Circular** ([Provision added to the Deposit Act in 1836 that required speculators to pay in silver and gold coins when buying large parcels of public land.](#)) in 1836. This provided that speculators could only buy large parcels of public land with silver and gold coins, while settlers could continue to buy farm-sized plots with banknotes. Henceforth, speculators would have to bring wagonloads of coins from eastern banks to frontier land offices. With this provision, Jackson hoped to curtail speculation and to reverse the flow of specie out of the South and West. The Specie Circular was Jackson's final assault on the paper economy. It repeated familiar themes: It favored hard currency over paper, settlers over speculators, and the South and West over the Northeast.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-7 The Second American Party System

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11-7 The Second American Party System

In his farewell address in 1837, Jackson spoke once again of the incompatibility between the republic and the Money Power. He warned against a revival of the Bank of the United States and against all banks, paper money, the spirit of speculation, and every aspect of the “paper system.” That system encouraged greed and luxury, which were at odds with republican virtue, he said. Worse, it thrived on special privilege, creating a world in which insiders meeting in “secret conclaves” could buy and sell elections. The solution, as always, was a society of small producers, a vigilant democratic electorate, and a chaste republican government that granted no special privileges.

Focus Question

What was peculiarly national about the Second Party System?

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-7a “Martin Van Ruin”

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11-7a “Martin Van Ruin”

Sitting beside Jackson as he delivered his farewell address was his chosen successor, Martin Van Buren. In the election of 1836, the Whigs had acknowledged that Henry Clay, the leader of their party, could not win a national election. Instead, they ran three sectional candidates: Daniel Webster in the Northeast, the old Indian fighter William Henry Harrison in the West, and Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee, a turncoat Jacksonian, in the South. With this ploy, the Whigs hoped to deprive Van Buren of a majority and throw the election into the Whig-controlled House of Representatives.

The strategy failed. Van Buren had engineered a national Democratic Party that could avert the dangers of sectionalism, and he questioned the patriotism of the Whigs and their sectional candidates, asserting, “True republicans can never lend their aid and influence in creating geographical parties.” That, along with his association with Jackson’s popular presidency, won him the election. Van Buren carried 15 of the 26 states and received 170 electoral votes against 124 for his combined opposition. His popular plurality, however, was less than 51 percent.

Map 11.5

Presidential Election, 1836

In 1836, the Whigs tried to beat the Democrats’ national organization with an array of sectional candidates, hoping to throw the election into the House of Representatives. The strategy failed. Martin Van Buren, with significant support in every section of the country, defeated the three Whig candidates combined.

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Van Buren had barely taken office when the inflationary boom of the mid-1830s collapsed. Economic historians ascribe the Panic of 1837 and the ensuing depression largely to events outside the country. The Bank of England, concerned over the flow of British gold to American speculators, cut off credit to firms that did business in the United States. As a result, British demand for American cotton fell sharply, and the price of cotton dropped by half. With much of the speculative boom tied to cotton grown in the South, the economy collapsed. The first business failures came in March 1837, just as Van Buren took office. By May, New York banks, unable to accommodate people who were demanding hard coin for their notes, suspended specie payments. Other banks followed suit, and soon banks all over the country went out of business. The financial and export sectors of the economy suffered most. In the seaport cities, one firm after another closed its doors, and about one-third of the workforce was unemployed. For those who kept their jobs, wages declined by 30 to 50 percent. It was the deepest, most widespread, and longest economic depression Americans had ever faced.

Whigs blamed the depression on Jackson's hard-money policies, particularly his destruction of the Bank of the United States and his Specie Circular. With economic distress the main issue, Whigs scored huge gains in the midterm elections of 1838, even winning control of Van Buren's New York with a campaign that castigated the president as "Martin Van Ruin." Democrats blamed the crash on speculation, luxury, and Whig paper money. Whigs demanded a new national bank, but Van Buren proposed the complete divorce of government from the banking system. Under his plan, the federal government would simply hold and dispense its money without depositing it in banks. He also required that customs and land purchases be paid in gold and silver coins or in notes from specie-paying banks, a provision that allowed government to regulate state banknotes without resorting to a central bank. Van Buren asked Congress to set up the Independent Treasury in 1837, and Congress spent the rest of Van Buren's time in office arguing about it. The [Independent Treasury Bill \(1840 bill that permitted the federal government to hold and dispense money without depositing it in banks and required that customs and land purchases be paid in gold and silver coins or notes from specie-paying banks.\)](#) finally passed in 1840, completing the Jacksonian separation of bank and state.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-7b The Election of 1840
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11-7b The Election of 1840

Whigs were confident that they could take the presidency away from Van Buren in 1840. Trying to offend as few voters as possible, they passed over their best-known leaders, Senators Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, and nominated William Henry Harrison of Ohio as their presidential candidate. Harrison was the hero of the Battle of Tippecanoe (see [Chapter 7](#)) and a westerner whose Virginia origins made him palatable in the South. He was also a proven vote-getter: As the Whigs' "western" candidate in 1836, he had carried seven states scattered across the Northwest, the mid-Atlantic, New England, and the Upper South. Best of all, he was a military hero who had expressed few opinions on national issues and who had no political record to defend. As his running mate, the Whigs chose John Tyler, a states'-rights Virginian who had joined the Whigs out of hatred for Jackson. To promote this baldly pragmatic ticket, the Whigs came up with a catchy slogan: "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too." One wealthy New York City Whig admitted that the slogan (and the ticket)

had “rhyme, but no reason in it.”

Early in the campaign, a Democratic journalist, commenting on Harrison’s political inexperience and alleged unfitness for the presidency, wrote, “Give [Harrison] a barrel of hard cider, and settle a pension of two thousand a year on him, and my word for it, he will sit out the remainder of his days in his log cabin.” Whigs, who had been trying to shake their elitist image, seized on the statement and launched what was known as the Log Cabin Campaign. The log cabin, the cider barrel, and Harrison’s folksiness and heroism constituted the entire Whig campaign, while Van Buren was pictured as living in luxury at the public’s expense. The Whigs conjured up an image of a nattily dressed President “Van Ruin” sitting on silk chairs and dining on gold and silver dishes while farmers and workingmen struggled to make ends meet. Whig doggerel contrasted Harrison the hero with Van Buren the professional politician:

The knapsack pillow’d Harry’s head
The hard ground eas’d his toils; while Martin on
his downy bed
Could dream of naught but spoils.

Democrats howled that Whigs were peddling lies and refusing to discuss issues, but they knew they had been beaten at their own game. Harrison won only a narrow majority of the popular vote, but a landslide of 234 to 60 votes in the Electoral College.

Map 11.6

Presidential Election, 1840

In 1840, the Whigs united under William Henry Harrison, the one Whig candidate who had won national support four years earlier. Borrowing campaign tactics from the Democrats and inventing many of their own, Whigs campaigned hard in every state. The result was a Whig victory and a truly national two-party system.

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The election of 1840 signaled the completion of the Second Party System—the most fully national alignment of parties in U.S. history. Andrew Jackson had won in 1828 with Jefferson's old southern and western agrarian constituency; in 1832, he had carried his old voters and had won added support in the mid-Atlantic states and in northern New England. In 1836, Whigs capitalized on southern resentment of Jackson's defeat of nullification and on southern mistrust of the New Yorker Van Buren. They broke the Democratic hold on the South, carrying Kentucky, Georgia, South Carolina, and even Jackson's Tennessee. Jackson had won 8 in 10 southern votes; Van Buren carried barely half. The election of 1840 completed the transition: Harrison and Van Buren contested the election in nearly every state and they received nearly equal levels of support in the slave and free states. Van Buren's dream of a national party system that transcended sectional differences was realized. Ironically, the final pieces fell into place in an election that cost him the presidency.

The Times

This Whig cartoon from the 1840 campaign blames the Panic of 1837 on the Democrats. The factories are closed, the bank has suspended specie payments, and sailors and craftsmen are out of work, but the sheriff, the prison, the pawnbroker, and the liquor store are doing a booming business.

Library of Congress, Prints Photographs Division, [LC-USZC4-12948]

The election of 1840 also witnessed the high-water mark of voter turnout. Whig and Democratic organizations focused on presidential elections, and prospective voters met a quadrennial avalanche of oratory, door-to-door canvassing, torchlight parades, and party propaganda. Neither Democrats nor Whigs could take any state in the Union for granted. (In 1828, winning candidates carried individual states by an average of 36 percent; by 1840, that figure had dropped to 11 percent.) Whigs and Democrats maintained organizations

and contested elections in nearly every neighborhood in the country, and the result was increased popular interest in politics. In 1824, about one in four adult white men had voted in the presidential election. Jackson's vengeful campaign of 1828 lifted the turnout to 56.3 percent, and it stayed at about that level in 1832 and 1836. The campaign of 1840 brought out 78 percent of the eligible voters, and the turnout remained at that high level for the rest of the 19th century.

In every part of the country, Whigs presented themselves as the party of active government and economic progress. They promised good roads, public schools, stable currency, and social harmony. In the North, the wealthiest men were Whigs (8 in 10 of the merchant elites in New York and Boston, for example). But the Whig Party received its core northern support among the market farmers, local merchants, and manufacturers created by the new market economy and the fires of middle-class revivals—supporters not only of Whig nationalism but of roads and canals and a wide array of reforms in their own neighborhoods. In the South, Whigs ran well in plantation districts and in county-seat towns—the centers of southern wealth, commerce, and gentility. Many southern leaders came to dislike Jackson, and they took their personal followings into the Whig Party. Whigs also won votes in areas—eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina are examples—where farmers *wanted* to be brought into the flow of commerce. Put very simply, Whigs tended to be persons who were or wanted to be beneficiaries of the Market Revolution, and who embraced its attendant social and cultural transformations. They saw themselves as “improvers.”

The Democrats, on the other hand, posed as defenders of the common (white) man and the Old Republic. They tended to be persons who had been hurt or bypassed by the Market Revolution; who belonged to conservative, otherworldly churches; and who distrusted Whigs who talked about progress, big government, and social homogeneity. In the South, Democrats were strong in districts with small farms, few slaves, and limited market activity. The northern Democrats were a coalition of small farmers, working people, and small businessmen, along with cultural minorities (Irish immigrants, for instance, were almost unanimously Democratic). North and South, Democrats were localists. They argued for the limited national government that since Jefferson's day had been a bulwark of the revolutionary republic, of white male democracy, and of chattel slavery.

11-8 Conclusion

Thus, the party system answered the questions of slavery and economic development that had helped bring it into being. Nationally, Democrats stopped the American System. They dismantled the Bank of the United States, refused federal support for roads and canals, and revised the tariff in ways that mollified the export-oriented South. As a result, the stupendous growth of the American economy between 1830 and 1860 became a question of state and local—not national—government action. Neither the national commercial society envisioned by the Whigs nor the return to Jeffersonian agrarianism favored by many Democrats came into being. Instead, the United States experienced an almost inadvertent experiment in laissez-faire capitalism, with results that reflected the aims of the most ambitious states. Trade and transportation networks linked the North and mid-Atlantic and isolated the export economy of the South—a result that few politicians had intended. On the political problems surrounding slavery, the two-party system did what Van Buren had hoped it would do: Because both Whigs and Democrats needed both northern and southern support, they focused national political debates on economic development and stayed away from the questions of sectionalism and slavery. It worked that way until the party system disintegrated on the eve of the Civil War.

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-9 Chapter Review
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11-9 Chapter Review

11-9a Review

1. What were the components of the “American System”? What did the American System promise to accomplish?

2. What enduring political issues were raised by the Missouri controversy and the Panic of 1819?
3. What were the events and political motives that contributed to the republican revival that formed around Andrew Jackson?
4. What were the principal events of the John Quincy Adams administration, and how did they contribute to his defeat in 1828?
5. At the national level, how did Jacksonian Democrats and their rivals deal with widening differences between North and South?
6. How did Democrats and Whigs in the national government argue questions raised by economic development?
7. What was peculiarly national about the Second Party System?

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Chapter Review

11-9b Critical Thinking

1. Jacksonian Democrats represented themselves as a revival of Jeffersonian democracy. In what ways was that representation accurate? In what ways was it not?
2. Whigs claimed to be the party of economic progress. Yet, unlike modern pro-

growth politicians, they demanded a powerful, interventionist national government. How did they argue that position?

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Chapter Review

11-9c Identifications

Review your understanding of the following key terms, people, and events for this chapter

- **American System** (Program proposed by Henry Clay and others to foster national economic growth and interdependence among the geographical sections. It included a protective tariff, a national bank, and internal improvements.)
- **Dartmouth College v. Woodward** (1816 Supreme Court case that showcased one of many important decisions made by John Marshall to protect the sanctity of contracts and corporate charters against state legislatures.)
- **McCulloch v. Maryland** (Supreme Court case in which the Bank of the United States Baltimore branch challenged the Maryland legislature's attempt to tax the bank; lead by John Marshall, the Court decided in favor of the Bank and denied Maryland's right to tax the Bank or any other federal agency.)
- **Tallmadge Amendments** (Two amendments proposed by James Tallmadge Jr. to be added to the Missouri statehood bill before Missouri's admission to the union; the first barred slaves from being brought into Missouri and the second emancipated Missouri slaves born after admission once they reached their 25th birthday.)
- **Missouri Compromise** (Compromise that maintained sectional balance in Congress by admitting Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state and by drawing a line

west from the 368 309 parallel separating future slave and free states.)

- **congressional caucus** (In the early republic, the group of congressmen who traditionally chose the party's presidential candidates. By the 1820s, the American public distrusted the caucus as undemocratic because only one party contested for power. The caucus was replaced by the national nominating convention.)
- **“Corrupt Bargain,”** (Following the election of 1824, Andrew Jackson and his supporters alleged that, in a “corrupt bargain,” Henry Clay sold his support during the House vote in the disputed election of 1824 of John Quincy Adams in exchange for appointment as Secretary of State.)
- **Monroe Doctrine** (Foreign policy doctrine proposed by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823 that denied the right of European powers to establish new colonies in the Americas while maintaining the United States’ right to annex new territory.)
- **“spoils system,”** (A postelection practice where a victorious political party awards loyal supporters with appointive public offices.)
- **Civilized Tribes** (60,000 Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles who remained on their ancestral lands in the Old Southwest and were considered sovereign peoples.)
- **Indian Removal Act** (Legislation that offered the native peoples of the lower South the option of removal to federal lands west of the Mississippi. Those who did not take the offer were removed by force in 1838.)
- **“Tariff of Abominations,”** (A 1828 tariff passed by Congress to protect the manufacturers of the northern states by setting high duties on imported goods. Southern opponents denounced the tariff, arguing that it was unconstitutional and harmful to the South’s agrarian interests and cotton trade.)
- **nullification** (Beginning in the late 1820s, John C. Calhoun and others argued that the Union was a voluntary compact between sovereign states, that states were the

ultimate judges of the constitutionality of federal law, that states could nullify federal laws within their borders, and that they had the right to secede from the Union.)

- **“gag rule,”** (Procedure in which Congress voted at each session from 1836 to 1844 to table antislavery petitions without reading them in order avoid any debate.)
- **Specie Circular** (Provision added to the Deposit Act in 1836 that required speculators to pay in silver and gold coins when buying large parcels of public land.)
- **Independent Treasury Bill** (1840 bill that permitted the federal government to hold and dispense money without depositing it in banks and required that customs and land purchases be paid in gold and silver coins or notes from specie-paying banks.)

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Chapter Review

11-9d Suggested Readings

Sean Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln* (2006) is a comprehensive political history. Harry L. Watson, *Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America* (1990) is an excellent shorter synthesis. Mathew Mason, *Slavery & Politics in the Early American Republic* (2006) and Don E. Fehrenbacher, *The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government's Relations to Slavery* (2001) document the centrality of slavery through all these years. On southern Indians and the Indian removal, see Claudio Saunt, *A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816* (1999) and Theda Perdue and Michael Green, *The Cherokee Removal: A Brief History with Documents* (2005). On specific issues, see John Lauritz Larson, *Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States* (2001); A.F.C. Wallace, *The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians*

(1993); **R. Kent Newmeyer**, *The Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney* (1968); **Morton J. Horwitz**, *The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860* (1977); **Robert Pierce Forbes**, *The Missouri Compromise and Its Aftermath: Slavery and the Meaning of America* (2007); **William W. Freehling**, *Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816–1836* (1965); **Richard E. Ellis**, *The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights and the Nullification Crisis* (1987); and **Catherine Allgor**, *Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government* (2000).

Chapter 11: Whigs and Democrats, 1815–1840: 11-9d Suggested Readings

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